

‘One Country Two Systems’ Overview: Public Survey and Index Construction Fourth Report (Abridged)

Full report: <http://pathofdemocracy.hk/one-country-two-systems-index-feb-2019/>

1. Introduction

- (1) This is our 4th Report on the ‘One Country Two Systems’ (henceforth 1C2S) Index (henceforth the Index) to provide an objective assessment on the implementation of 1C2S.
- (2) The Index is the average of Index (A), which is the evaluation of the Hong Kong (henceforth HK) public obtained from a telephone poll on 9 dimensions of 1C2S, and Index (B), which is the evaluation of renowned international think tanks on freedom and democracy in HK.
- (3) Every half year, we update the Index through updating indices (A) and (B) respectively with a new telephone poll and with the latest data from international indices. We also include in the survey other important issues related to 1C2S, such as public opinions on initiating the Article 23 consultation, on emigration and confidence in 1C2S, and on the Greater Bay Area and the Belt and Road Initiative. This year, we have added a new topic relating to possible continuation of 1C2S after 2047.
- (4) To complement our Index (A), we have introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) that uses big-data techniques to measure the sentiment of HK newspapers on 1C2S since 1998 as news sentiment has very significant influences on public opinion.
- (5) Evaluations on 1C2S of the HK public (Index A), of international think tanks (Index B), and of the HK press (MMI) are determined by perceptions that may or may not reflect the reality. However, policy makers need to take perceptions into account in policy design even if they are mistaken or misplaced.
- (6) The findings in this Report from our telephone poll and from Index compilation are presented in the following order:
 - i) Changes in Indices (A), (B), the 1C2S Index, and the Mass Media Index (MMI);
 - ii) Rapid trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation in HK;
 - iii) Overwhelming support for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047;
 - iv) Citizens’ identity as ‘Hongkonger’ and as Chinese;
 - v) Other important findings related to 1C2S in our telephone poll, including attitudes towards initiating the Article 23 consultation, emigration and confidence in 1C2S, and attitudes towards the Greater Bay Area and the Belt and Road Initiative.

2. 1C2S Index

2.1 Index (A): Evaluation of the HK public (Table 1)


		2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	
Average (9 dimensions) 平均分 (九範疇)		-	4.98	5.05	4.84	* 
Average (8 dimensions) 平均分 (八範疇)		4.88	4.84	4.9	4.7	
Q4	The original ways of life have remained unchanged 維持原有生活方式	-	6.21	6.25	5.96	* 
Q5	A high degree of freedom of speech 言論自由	6.15	6.03	5.79	5.41	* 
Q2	An independent judiciary 獨立司法權	5.61	5.43	5.59	5.39	
Q3	An independent legislature 獨立立法權	5.42	5.28	5.35	5.08	* 
Q1	A high degree of autonomy in the executive branch 自行處理行政事務	4.82	4.73	4.84	4.82	
Q7	The successful implementation of the 'Self-Governance, High Autonomy' principles 落實「港人治港、高度自治」	4.43	4.42	4.57	4.38	
Q6	The gradual implementation of the politico-institutional democratization process 民主政制發展	4.36	4.43	4.50	4.34	
Q8	The full implementation of 1C2S in the future 全面落實「一國兩制」	4.28	4.28	4.32	4.09	
Q9	Resolving differences between Hong Kong and the Mainland via dialogue and negotiation 透過對話協商解決矛盾	3.97	4.17	4.27	4.05	

Note: “*” denotes changes that are statistically significant compared with the previous round

- (1) Index (A) is the average of sub-scores obtained from 9 questions on different dimensions of 1C2S in our survey.
- (2) Only 1 out of these 9 scores, namely the score on question 4 ('Original way of life in HK remained unchanged') is not comparable between the first survey and subsequent ones due to refinements of the question introduced after the first survey. Table 1 shows the average of 9 questions in the latter three surveys as well as the average scores of the other 8 questions that are identical across all four surveys.
- (3) Index (A), the average of 9 questions, declined to 4.84 from 5.05 in the last round, falling by 4.2%. This was the first time in the 4 surveys that the decline in Index (A) was statistically significant, which is worrisome.
- (4) Also the first time in the 4 surveys that all 9 sub-scores declined.
- (5) The declines in 3 items, namely, maintaining original ways of life, freedom of speech, and legislative independence, were statistically significant.


2.2 HK public's evaluation of 1C2S: Generation gap and political divide

Figure 1 Public's evaluation of 1C2S by age



- (6) The average scores over 8 items of Young Adults (age 18 to 29) was only around 4, while those of old people (over 70) were around 6. The difference was statistically significant.
- (7) Since the last survey, the evaluation score of Young Adults (age 18 to 29) rose, while the scores of all older age groups fell, shrinking the generation gap. This development is consistent with the de-radicalisation of HK youths that will be analysed in section 3.2 below.

Figure 2 Public's evaluation of 1C2S by political inclination



- (8) Compared to Moderates, which include ‘Centrists’ and ‘No political inclination’, the evaluations of Pro-establishment supporters were significantly higher, while the evaluations of Non-establishment supporters were significantly lower.
- (9) Within Non-establishment supporters, the ‘Others’ group, which consists of mostly Localists or Self-Determinists, have lower evaluations (scores around 2 to 3) in comparison with Democrats (scores around 3 to 4).
- (10) Changes over time: The evaluation scores of Moderates declined from 5.16 in the 1st round to 4.87 in the 4th round, and the decline was statistically significant.
- (11) The Pro-establishment – Non-establishment political divide is big and widening: The high scores of Pro-establishment supporters rose significantly higher (rising by 8.7% since the 1st round), and the low scores of Non-establishment supporters fell significantly lower (falling by 24.0% since the 1st round).

2.3 Index (B): Evaluations of international think tanks

Table 2 HK's scores and ranks in major international indices

Index (B): Freedom and Democracy Index 指數 B—自由民主指數					
	Human Freedom Index 「人類自由指數」			Democracy Index 民主指數	Aggregate 總分
	Economic Freedom 經濟自由	Personal Freedom 個人自由	Sub-aggregate 分數		
2010	9.02 (1)	9.04 (18)	9.03 (1)	5.92 (80)	7.99
2011	8.99 (1)	9.07 (17)	9.03 (1)	5.92 (80)	7.99
2012	8.96 (1)	9.04 (14)	9.00 (1)	6.42 (63)	8.14
2013	8.96 (1)	8.98 (18)	8.87 (1)	6.42 (65)	8.12
2014	9.00 (1)	8.78 (29)	8.89 (2)	6.46 (66)	8.08
2015	8.97 (1)	8.75 (28)	8.86 (2)	6.50 (67)	8.07
2016	8.97 (1)	8.58 (32)	8.78 (3)	6.42 (68)	7.99
2017	9.01 ^a	8.52 ^a	8.76	6.31 (71)	7.95 ^a
2018	9.01 ^a	8.52 ^b	8.76	6.15 (73)	7.89 ^b

^a Updates based on comparable international indices.

^b Estimated on the assumption that the Personal Freedom Index is unchanged from 2017 to 2018.

Note: The latest 2018 Human Freedom Index only reflected conditions in 2016. The Economic Freedom and Personal Freedom Indices are updated with comparable international indices. The Economic Freedom Index can be updated to 2018, but the Personal Freedom Index can only be updated to 2017.

- (12) Index (B), the evaluation of international think tanks on freedom and democracy, is the average of 3 indices, namely, the Economic Freedom Index, and the Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser Institutes, and the Democracy Index of the EIU (Economic Intelligence Unit).
- (13) The average of the Economic Freedom and Personal Freedom Indices is known as the Human Freedom Index, which is the most comprehensive index of freedom available.
- (14) HK is always ranked world's number one in Economic Freedom, and she is also ranked highly in Personal Freedom. As a result, HK has also been world's number one in Human Freedom from 2008 to 2013.
- (15) HK has always ranked number 1 in Economic Freedom, with a score of around 9.
- (16) Personal Freedom Index: Score peaked at 9.07 in 2011; declined to 8.52 in 2017 (falling by 6.1%). Rank peaked at 14th in 2012; fell to 32th in 2016. Decline has been steep since 2013.
- (17) HK's rank in the Democracy Index has been mediocre, behind Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. This is expected as HK's Chief Executive is not elected by universal suffrage.

(18) Democracy Index: Score peaked at 6.50 in 2015; fell to 6.15 in 2018 (falling by 5.4%). Decline in both score and rank have been steep since 2015.

(19) Index (B) has been declining since 2012. Decline has been steep since 2015.

2.4 Personal Freedom Index: Its components

Table 3 HK's scores and ranks in Personal Freedom Index


Year 年份	Personal Freedom Index 個人自由指數							Aggregate 總分
	Rule of Law 法治	Security & Safety 安全	Movement 遷徙自由	Religion 宗教自由	Association, Assembly, & Civil Society 結社、集會及公民社會自由	Expression & Information 言論自由	Identity & Relationships 性別認同及關係	
2010	7.50 (18)	9.66 (33)	10.00 (1)	9.02 (35)	9.42 (25)	9.05 (42)	10.00 (1)	9.04 (18)
2011	7.50 (18)	9.69 (26)	10.00 (1)	8.92 (30)	9.75 (24)	9.01 (41)	10.00 (1)	9.07 (17)
2012	7.39 (19)	9.67 (27)	10.00 (1)	9.04 (24)	9.75 (24)	8.94 (45)	10.00 (1)	9.04 (14)
2013	7.39 (19)	9.33 (41)	10.00 (1)	9.19 (19)	10.00 (1)	8.86 (48)	10.00 (1)	8.98 (18)
2014	7.80 (14)	9.39 (39)	10.00 (1)	8.13 (80)	8.00 (62)	8.74 (51)	10.00 (1)	8.78 (29)
2015	7.79 (16)	9.40 (38)	10.00 (1)	8.43 (68)	8.00 (62)	8.77 (48)	9.25 (34)	8.75 (28)
2016	7.14 (23)	9.39 (36)	10.00 (1)	8.59 (40)	8.00 (62)	8.67 (51)	9.25 (35)	8.58 (32)
2017	6.54 ^a	9.77 ^a	10.00 ^a	8.59 ^a	8.00 ^a	8.54 ^a	9.25 ^a	8.52 ^a

^a Updates based on comparable international indices.

(20) Five components (out of 7) exhibited substantial declines in scores and ranks since 2013, namely, 'Rule of Law', 'Religion', 'Association & Assembly', 'Expression & Information', and 'Identity & Relationships'.

2.5 Fall in the 1C2S Index


Figure 3 1C2S Index



- (21) From 2017 to 2018, Index (A) (average of 8 dimensions) fell from 4.88 to 4.70, falling by 3.7%; Index (B) declined from 7.95 in to 7.89, falling by 0.8%.
- (22) The 2018 score of Index (B) is likely to be biased upwards as it is estimated on the assumption that the Personal Freedom Index in 2018 is the same as that in 2017, notwithstanding likely downgrades that will come out later. As a result, the decline in Index (B) shown in Figure 2 is likely to be understated.
- (23) The 1C2S Index, which is the average of Indices (A) and (B), declined from 6.42 in the first round to 6.30 in the fourth round, falling by 1.9 %. The decline is also likely to be understated.

2.6 The Mass Media Index (MMI)

Figure 4 1C2S MMI (2016 – 18)



- (24) MMI: Compiled from data-mining around 132,500 news articles and 66 million words in 20 local daily newspapers.
- (25) After reaching a nadir (73 points) in mid-2016 after the 'Causeway Bay Bookstore' incident and Mongkok riot, MMI bottomed out and rose strongly in late 2016, when CY Leung announced that he would not run for a second term.
- (26) After the CE election, MMI rose to a peak of 105 points in March 2018, before declining to 90 points in late 2018.
- (27) Events that appear to play an important part in the downturn include the controversies in disbanding the Nationalist Party and rejecting visa renewal of Victor Mallet.

2.7 Evaluations of 1C2S

- (28) 1C2S is unprecedented in history. There have always been doubts if HK can remain a free city as part of a country ruled by a Communist Party. Problems and difficulties in the implementation of 1C2S are to be expected.
- (29) 21 years after HK's return to China, despite some declines in scores in selected international indices, HK still ranked world's number 1 in Economic Freedom, and also ranked very well in Personal Freedom. According to the 2018 Human Freedom Index (the average of Economic and Personal Freedom Indices), HK ranked world's number 3 after New Zealand and Switzerland. HK is still one of the freest territories in the world.
- (30) Though HK's Index (B), the Freedom and Democracy Index, declined somewhat lately, HK's 2018 score at 7.89 was still high. It was in the same league as HK's developed neighbours: above Singapore's 7.56, but slightly lower than Japan's 8.16, Korea's 7.99, and Taiwan's 8.23. It was much higher than Mainland's 5.12, showing that the allegation of 'Mainlandisation' is unfounded.
- (31) Index (A), evaluations of the HK public, were around 5, the median of the 0 to 10 scale. Four items have consistently scored slightly higher than 5 in all surveys, namely, maintaining original ways of life, freedom of speech, judicial independence, legislative independence. On the other hand, five items scored slightly below 5 in all surveys, namely, a high degree of autonomy in the executive branch, the successful implementation of 'Self-Governance, High Autonomy' principles, progress in democratisation, the full implementation of 1C2S in the future, and the ability for the Mainland and Hong Kong to resolve differences via dialogue and negotiation.
- (32) In comparison to the evaluations of international thinktanks, the evaluations of the HK public are less positive, suggesting that the public is more demanding in their assessments due to their high expectations of 1C2S. HK's people's starting point is a system with a sophisticated legal system that enshrines both rule of law and personal freedoms, and gradual democratization that had already been in progress prior to the return to China. These in turn induced greater expectations amongst the public with respect to self-governance and human rights enshrined by the Basic Law.
- (33) As will be seen below in section 4, more than 76% of the public agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. Support was high across all groups in HK, including 'Localists or Self-determinists', who are known to be highly critical of 1C2S. Though the public's current evaluation of 1C2S is quite critical, they still regard 1C2S as the system for HK's future.
- (34) Though the Index declined from 6.42 in the first round to 6.30 in the fourth round, it is still well over the median of 5. While 1C2S has problems in implementation, as could be expected of any unprecedented system, it is clearly not unworkable. The decline in the 4th round should be viewed in this context.

2.8 Reasons for declines in Index (A), Index (B), and MMI

- (35) Declines in the indices in the latter half of 2018 are likely to be affected by recent controversial political events.
- (36) Internal governance issues that are not strictly related to 1C2S appear to have important effects on evaluations of the HK public (Index A) and MMI, but do not affect international evaluations (Index B) as much.

2.8.1 Evaluations of the HK public (Index A), and of local newspapers (The MMI)

- (37) In the period before mid-2018, both the MMI and Index (A) performed well despite the many political controversies that occurred in that period (the disqualification of 6 LegCo members from late 2016 to mid-2017, and the sentencing of the 3 student protestors in the Civic Square occupation to prison by the Court of Appeals on August 2017).
- (38) The announcement of CY Leung in late 2016 that he would not run for a second term, and the subsequent election of the new CE had strong positive effects on the MMI that outweighed the effect of the above controversies.
- (39) The honeymoon period of the new administration from mid-2017 to mid-2018 also appeared to have an important positive effect on Index (A).
- (40) The sharp declines in the MMI and Index (A) in the second half of 2018 can be attributed to the controversies over the rejection of work visa for Victor Mallet and also internal governance issues as reflected in the sharp declines in approval ratings of the government in late 2018.

2.8.2 Evaluations of international think tanks (Index B)


- (41) There are close interactions between the local media and the international media, and also close associations between local sentiments and international sentiments.
- (42) The Personal Freedom Index was only updated to 2017. New international indices that reflect the situation in HK's rule of law, freedom of the press, and freedom of association and assembly in 2018 will soon be released. Further sharp falls can be expected.
- (43) Evaluations of international think tanks may not be free of western ideological biases against the rise of China, but they may also reflect genuine weaknesses in the implementation of 1C2S. Furthermore, their effects on international investors cannot be underestimated as HK is an easy target in the 'New Cold War'.
- (44) Recently, western think tanks have downgraded HK's scores on 'Rule of Law', citing the interpretation of the Basic Law by Beijing in 2016. However, interpretation of the Basic Law first occurred in 1999 and it is nothing new. The HK judiciary is still the same judiciary which had received high scores from western think tanks just a few years back, and it is as independent as always as demonstrated by recent prosecutions and convictions of a former Chief Executive and other high-ranking officials of the HKSAR Government. It appears that western perceptions of China and HK have changed.

2.8.3 Suggestions to tackle the misunderstanding on 1C2S

- (45) The HKSAR Government should spearhead a concerted effort involving all sectors of HK including the business community, the academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs to promote the image of HK under 1C2S. Such effort may include:
- Setting up a broadly representative committee to advise the HKSAR Government on all issues relating to 1C2S;
 - Motivating HK’s business communities from western countries who are willing to defend HK in the international arena;
 - Establishing a semi-official high-level think tank on external relations to undertake various private initiatives such as being responsible for mounting and coordinating outreach efforts, mobilizing support from all sectors of our and international communities, and enhancing HK’s presence in APEC related networks;
 - Promoting, assisting and encouraging local think tanks to conduct periodical exchanges with influential foreign think tanks interested in HK affairs, especially the Heritage Foundation and the CATO-Fraser Institutes, which are sympathetic to HK as they value economic and personal freedoms highly;
 - Setting up an early warning system within government to alert and manage expectation of public on all possible issues which might affect 1C2S or the perception of quality of governance;
 - Setting up a system whereby international media would be timely, fully and properly briefed on issues affecting 1C2S;
 - Enhancing HK’s presence in APEC related networks and forums, e.g., the APEC Business Advisory Councils (ABAC), APEC Study Centres, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and other tripartite forums that involve business people, academics, and NGOs in the Asia-Pacific. As a free economy and global city, HK should find a sympathetic hearing in the vast APEC related networks in the Asia-Pacific.


3. Rapid trend of de-radicalisation and rise of moderation

Figure 5 Composition of population by political inclination in 4 surveys



- (1) Relative size of political groups: Moderates (60% or more), Non-establishment group (less than 30%), Pro-establishment group (10% or more).
- (2) Non-establishment supporters include Democrats (16% or more) and ‘Others’ (5% or more), mostly Localists or Self-Determinists.
- (3) From mid-2017 to end of 2018: Moderates increased by 5.7 percentage points (rising from 58.4% to 64.1%); Pro-establishment supporters increased by 1.3 percentage points (rising from 10.0% to 11.3%); but Non-establishment supporters decreased by 6.6 percentage points (falling from 28.3% to 21.7%).
- (4) In absolute numbers, Moderates and the Pro-establishment group respectively gained 335,000 and 79,000 supporters, while the Non-establishment group lost 403,000 supporters.

Figure 6 Composition of population of Non-establishment supporters in 4 surveys




- (5) Non-establishment supporters: Democrats decreased by 4.5 percentage points (falling from 21.1% to 16.6%); ‘Others’ decreased by 2.1 percentage points (falling from 7.2% to 5.1%).

- (6) Within the Non-establishment group, Democrats lost 274,000 supporters while ‘Others’ lost 128,000 supporters.

3.1 HKU Public Opinion Program (HKUPOP) Surveys on Political Inclination


- (7) Our results on political inclination are similar to those of HKUPOP, which has collected data on political inclination on a bi-weekly basis since late October 2016. In the HKUPOP surveys, around 30% of respondents were ‘Inclined towards the Pro-democracy camp’ (analogous to our ‘Non-establishment’ group) while 15% or less were ‘Inclined towards the Pro-establishment camp’ (analogous to our ‘Pro-establishment’ group). Around half of the respondents were ‘Inclined towards the centrist’ (analogous to our ‘Moderates’ group). The pattern is similar to our surveys: ‘Centrists’ was by far the largest group, followed by the ‘Pro-democracy camp’ and the ‘Pro-establishment camp’.
- (8) We are not able to test if the trend of de-radicalisation found in our 4 surveys is statistically significant as we only have 4 observations in time. However, the HKUPOP surveys have accumulated 55 bi-weekly observations on the proportions of the 3 camps from October 2016 to December 2018. We use this data to study the trend of each camp. Statistical analysis confirmed that the proportion to population of the Pro-democracy camp exhibited a decreasing trend that was statistically significant whereas the proportion to population of the Centrist camp exhibited an increasing trend that was also statistically significant. However, the proportion of the Pro-establishment camp did not exhibit a definite trend that was statistically significant.

Figure 7 Composition of population by political inclination (HKUPOP) surveys



3.2 De-radicalisation of HK Youths

Figure 8 Composition of youths (age 18 to 29) by political inclination in 4 surveys




- (9) From mid-2017 to the end of 2018, the proportion of Moderates rose from 50.8% to 66.4% (increasing by 15.6 percentage points), while the proportion of the Non-establishment group fell from 44.1% to 29.7% (falling by 14.4 percentage points).
- (10) Within the Non-establishment group, the proportions of Democrats and ‘Others’ fell from 22.6% to 19.6% (falling by 3 percentage points), and from 21.5% to 10.1% (falling by 11.4 percentage points).
- (11) In absolute numbers, Moderates gained 154,000 youths while the Non-establishment group lost 143,000 youths.
- (12) Result is tentative as the changes are only notable in the latter half of 2018 (from 3rd to 4th survey). We only observe changes over two points in time.

4. Continuation of 1C2S after 2047


- (1) The support for continuation of 1C2S was high across age groups, educational attainment, and political inclination.
- (2) Support was high across the entire political spectrum, including ‘Localists or Self-determinists’ who are known to be highly critical of 1C2S.

Figure 9 Support for continuation of 1C2S by political inclination



4.1 Conditions that would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S after 2047


Figure 10 Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 by political inclination



- (3) For all respondents, ‘Maintaining a high degree of autonomy’ (33.6%), and ‘Maintaining economic prosperity and stability’ (31.3%) were close first and second choices. ‘Political system democratises further’ (19.5%) was a distant third. ‘Completing legislation of Article 23’ (6.5%) came in last.
- (4) Across the political spectrum, there is a consensus on the importance of ‘maintaining a high degree of economy’.
- (5) ‘Maintaining economic prosperity’ was important for all groups except for ‘Other Non-establishment’.
- (6) ‘Political system democratises further’ was the first choice for ‘Localists or Self-determinists’ (40.4%), but it was the last choice for Pro-establishment supporters (10.7%).
- (7) ‘Completing legislation of Article 23’ was the last choice of Moderates (5.5%) and Non-establishment supporters (0.5%), but it was more important for Pro-establishment supporters (21.7%).

5. Public's identification as 'Hongkongers' and as 'Chinese'

Figure 11 Public's identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' (sample: 983)



- (1) The public identify themselves strongly as 'Hongkongers' as well as 'Chinese'. This double identity is best shown by a scatter plot on the 1 to 7 Likert scale, which is the scientific scale used in our survey. This scale was used instead of a 0 to 10 scale as the latter is deemed too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents to choose from. However, to better conform to existing indices – which tend to be expressed on a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median) – we converted the results mathematically into the popular 0 to 10 scale whenever appropriate.
- (2) In Figure 11, the x-axis shows the strength of self-identification as a 'Hongkonger'; the y-axis, self-identification as Chinese. On the 1 to 7 scale, the median is 4, which indicates a moderate level of identification. Ratings that are higher than 4 indicate relatively strong identification; ratings that are lower than 4 indicate relatively weak identification. A majority of the public (from 55% to 57% in the 4 rounds) have relatively a strong identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', with both identity scores greater than the median of 4. Double identity is the norm.
- (3) The public's self-identification as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' have shown continuous improvement over the 4 surveys. Since mid-2017, on the 0 to 10 scale, the identity as 'Hongkongers' rose from 7.75 to 8.06, and the identity as 'Chinese' rose slightly from 6.63 to 6.83.
- (4) In all 4 rounds of surveys, there is a significant and positive correlation between the two identities – the more strongly one is identified with 'Hongkonger', the more strongly one is identified with 'Chinese'; the converse also holds. This is a favourable condition for the implementation of 1C2S.
- (5) Traditional surveys that compel interviewees to choose between the two identities ('Hongkonger' and 'Chinese') are misleading as they cannot reveal a rise in strength of both identities, which has been the case in HK.

- (6) Political divide in the self-identity as ‘Chinese’ widened: Self-identity as ‘Chinese’ of Pro-establishment supporters was high and rising, but that of Non-establishment supporters was low and falling.
- (7) Generation gap in self-identity as ‘Chinese’ shrunk: Though self-identity as ‘Chinese’ in the younger age groups (18 to 29) was not high, it had risen from 4.96 to 5.29. This is consistent with the de-radicalisation of HK youths. Meanwhile, the self-identity as ‘Chinese’ in older age groups (40 or above) remained high albeit a slight decline from the last survey.

6. Attitudes towards initiating Article 23 public consultation

Table 4 Attitudes towards initiating Article 23 consultation

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12
Necessary 有需要	35.5%	37.1%	34.5%	34.0%
Unnecessary 無需要	45.5%	44.4%	45.3%	47.9%
Don't Know 唔知道	5.9%	5.2%	5.5%	5.3%
Net Value 淨值	-10.6%	-7.7%	-11.4%	-14.7%
Mean Score 平均分	4.74	4.66	4.49	4.37

Net value: Percent who chose ‘Necessary’ less percent who chose ‘Unnecessary’

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater necessity

- (1) In the 4 surveys, opinions are divided without a clear majority: Slightly less than half chose ‘Unnecessary’ while slightly more than a third chose ‘Necessary’.
- (2) Public opinion has been highly divided on whether it is necessary to initiate the consultation. Policy makers should exercise caution in approaching this subject.
- (3) Changes over time: Slight rise in ‘Unnecessary’ over ‘Necessary’.

7. Impact of Carrie Lam’s appointment as CE on societal division

Table 5 Impact of Carrie Lam’s appointment as CE on societal division

	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12
Decreased 減少	49.0%	42.1%	37.5%
Increased 增加	7.6%	9.1%	12.4%
Unchanged 無變	41.0%	46.5%	47.6%
Don't Know 唔知道	2.4%	2.3%	2.4%
Net Value 淨值	42.4%	33.1%	25.1%

Net Value: Percent who chose ‘Decreased’ less percent who chose ‘Increased’

- (1) Those who chose ‘Decreased’ vastly exceeded those who chose ‘Increased’.
- (2) Change over time: Fall in those who chose ‘Decreased’ and rise in those who chose ‘Increased’.
- (3) Gap or Net Value between ‘Decreased’ and ‘Increased’ fell: Shift towards less favourable impact on societal division. Those who chose ‘Decreased’ vastly exceeded those who chose ‘Increased’.

8. Emigration and confidence in 1C2S

Table 6 Public's emigration plans in 4 surveys

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12
No Plans 無打算	85.3%	86.4%	86.1%	84.0%
Have Plans 有打算	13.6%	12.6%	13.0%	14.9%
Don't Know 唔知道	1.0%	0.9%	0.9%	1.2%
Net Value 淨值	71.7%	74.5%	73.1%	69.1%

Net Value: Percent who chose 'No Plans' less percent who chose 'Have Plans'

- (1) Those who have 'No plans' to emigrate vastly exceeded those who 'Have plans'.
- (2) Changes over time: A slight fall in those who have 'No plans' to emigrate and a slight rise in those who 'Have plans'.

Table 7 Public's emigration plans due to lack of confidence in 1C2S by political inclination

	All Respondents 全部受訪人數				Have Emigration Plans due to the Lack of Confidence in 1C2S 因對「一國兩制」缺乏信心而 計劃移民的比例			
	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12
Pro-establishment 建制派	101	97	105	111	1.0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%
Moderates 中間派	580	600	617	637	7.9%	5.8%	6.8%	9.3%
Non-establishment 非建制派	279	265	248	215	14.3%	16.8%	19.9%	23.8%
Of which: Democrats 其中：民主派	207	200	184	164	14.0%	14.3%	14.9%	21.8%
Of which: Others 其中：其他非建制派	72	65	64	51	15.3%	24.6%	34.3%	30.3%
Others 其他	33	35	30	28	3.1%	2.5%	3.2%	0.0%
Total 整體市民	996	998	1000	991	8.8%	8.0%	9.2%	11.2%

- (3) Compared to the last survey, the Emigration Ratio (planning to emigrate due to lack of confidence in 1C2S) has risen from 9.2% to 11.2%.
- (4) Emigration Ratio of Non-establishment supporters much higher than Moderates and Pro-establishment supporters.
- (5) For Moderates and Non-establishment supporters, the Ratios rose respectively from 6.8% to 9.3%, and from 19.9% to 23.8%.

9. Attitudes towards the GBA (Greater Bay Area)

Table 8 Familiarity with the GBA

	2018.6	2018.12
Familiar 認識較深	24.5%	26.6%
Unfamiliar 認識較淺	55.5%	54.9%
Don't Know 唔知道	1.3%	1.2%
Net Value 淨值	-31.4%	-28.6%
Mean Score 平均分	3.85	3.94

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Familiar' less percent who chose 'Unfamiliar'

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater familiarity

- (1) The public is not familiar with the GBA. Over time, there has been a slight rise in 'Familiar' and a slight fall in 'Unfamiliar'. More promotion of the GBA is needed.

Table 9 HK's participation in the development of the GBA

	2018.6	2018.12
Support 支持	56.4%	54.0%
Oppose 反對	23.6%	24.7%
Don't Know 唔知道	7.0%	7.2%
Net Value 淨值	35.4%	31.6%
Mean Score 平均分	6.30	6.27

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Support' less percent who chose 'Oppose'

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means stronger support

- (2) The majority supports development of the GBA. Over time, there was a slight fall in 'Support' and slight rise of 'Oppose' for participation in the GBA. Net support fell from 35.4% to 31.6%.
- (3) Pro-establishment camp's support was high and rising. Moderates were mildly positive. However, the Non-establishment camp switched from mild agreement to mild disagreement.

9.1 Willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA

Table 10 Willingness of living or working in other cities of the GBA

	2018.6	2018.12
Will consider 會考慮	12.2%	13.0%
Won't consider 不會考慮	63.1%	62.6%
Maybe 或者	11.9%	13.4%
Don't Know 唔知道	12.8%	11.0%
Net Value 淨值	-51.0%	-49.5%

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Willing' less Percent who chose 'Not willing'.

- (4) The majority of respondents are not willing to live or move to BBA.
- (5) Changes over time: Slight rise in 'Willing' & slight fall in 'Not willing'.
- (6) Net unwillingness to living/moving to BBA fell slightly by 1.5%.

9.2 Willingness of youths to live or work in other cities of the GBA

Table 11 Willingness of youths (age 18 to 19) to live or work in other cities of the GBA

	2018.6	2018.12
Will consider 會考慮	8.1%	14.9%
Won't consider 不會考慮	61.0%	48.8%
Maybe 或者	15.0%	23.5%
Don't Know 唔知道	15.9%	12.7%
Net Value 淨值	-52.9%	-33.9%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Willing' *less* percent who chose 'Not willing'

- (7) In the 3rd survey in mid-2018, only 8.1% of youths were willing to live or work in other cities of the BBA, the lowest ratio among all age groups.
- (8) Attitude of youths changed rapidly in the 6 months. At year end, 14.9% of youths were willing, the highest ratio among all age groups; 48.8% were unwilling, the lowest ratio among all age groups.
- (9) Fall in net unwillingness of youths was large (19%), and the change was statistically significant. This is consistent with de-radicalisation of HK youths.

10. Should HK take part in the development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)?

Table 12 HK's participation in the development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

	2018.6	2018.12
Support 支持	56.5%	53.1%
Oppose 反對	21.6%	28.3%
Don't Know 唔知道	7.1%	5.6%
Net Value 淨值	37.6%	26.2%
Mean Score 平均分	6.37	6.02

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Support' *less* percent who chose 'Oppose'

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means stronger support

- (1) The majority supported the development of BRI. Over time, the net support fell from 37.6% to 26.2%. This may be related to the problems that the BRI encountered in a number of countries.
- (2) Pro-establishment camp's support was high and rising. Moderates were mildly positive. However, the Non-establishment camp switched from mild agreement to mild disagreement.

10.1 Summary of attitudes towards GBA and BRI

- (3) Pro-establishment supporters and Moderates, who together constitute over 75% of the adult population, agreed that HK should take part in the GBA and the BRI. The proportion of the public that would or may consider moving to other cities in the GBA to live, work, or retire was still small (around a quarter), but the proportion was rising. The rise in willingness among youths was especially strong. This shows that efforts to promote the integration of the GBA has bear some fruits.

- (4) However, the attitude of Non-establishment supporters has turned negative. Non-establishment supporters appeared to see the GBA and BRI as schemes that would threaten HK's autonomy.

11. Disaffection of Non-establishment supporters

- (1) Non-establishment supporters in HK appear to be increasingly alienated: Besides their high and rising Emigration Ratios and their low and falling evaluations of 1C2S, their identity as 'Chinese' has also fallen, contrary to the trend of the majority. Their attitudes towards the Greater Bay Area and Belt and Road Initiative have also increasingly diverged from that of the majority.
- (2) Though Non-establishment supporters are in the minority, they are more likely to vote in elections and voice their opinions. They command around half of the votes in most elections and are influential in shaping public opinion. Their increasing disaffection is a serious social and political issue that the Central government and the HKSAR government must take careful note.