

‘ONE COUNTRY
TWO SYSTEMS’

I N D E X

「一國兩制」指數

2023 | H2 下半年



2023 下半年 (第十三版)
2023 H2 (Thirteenth Edition)

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前言 Preface

The unprecedented pursuit of 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) demands unyielding exploration and persistence from stakeholders. Since 1997, we have made headway in the realization of 1C2S, but at the same time, have also encountered many challenges. To assist full implementation of 1C2S, in July 2017, Path of Democracy established the 1C2S Index and released its first report in relation thereto with a view to conduct an objective evaluation of the continued implementation of 1C2S by reviewing its accomplishments and shortfalls.

The 1C2S Index is based on both local opinion and international perception on the current state of 1C2S. Periodic public surveys are conducted to measure local people's attitude. We also look at how global studies carried out by international think tanks rate Hong Kong. These independent evaluations are incorporated into the Index to give a more balanced view on how the World including Hong Kong people look at the state of 1C2S. We have devised and introduced a 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) by making use of big data analytics to measure Hong Kong and overseas media sentiment towards 1C2S. In compiling our reports, views on current issues related to 1C2S are also sought, such as the public's emigration plans, national security and economic integration.

A comprehensive review was conducted in 2022 to ensure alignment with societal and global development after five years of impartial measurement. The main Index will adopt a more timely, objective, distinctive and extensive construction method. We innovate the study of media sentiment by expanding coverage of 1C2S MMI to reflect the changing media landscape and readership. An online data portal is launched to better inform policymakers, researchers, media, and the public through data visualizations and customized analysis with an open and transparent approach.

We are grateful to Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong for completing the telephone polls and sentiment.ai for measuring media sentiment on our behalf. Going forward, we will continue to conduct public surveys and update international indices every six months, and to monitor media sentiment regularly to gauge the latest perceptions of the public, the international community and the media on 1C2S.

Ray Poon

Co-convenor (Research)

March 2024

「一國兩制」是前無古人的嘗試，1997年實踐至今，有成果亦有挑戰，過程需要社會各界不斷參與及探索。民主思路在2017年7月首次發布關於「一國兩制」概況的客觀評價，希望探討其成就與缺失，為全面及準確貫徹此方針略盡綿力。

我們定期向香港市民進行民意調查，亦參考國際機構對香港的評分，揉合以上獨立意見編製成「一國兩制」指數，持平反映香港及世界各地對「一國兩制」現狀的觀感。我們借助大數據技術，編製「一國兩制」輿情指數去衡量新聞情緒，追蹤香港和海外媒體相關報道。編製報告時，我們亦探討「一國兩制」實踐中的熱門議題，例如移民海外、國家安全、經濟融合等。

經過五年的中肯評估，我們在2022年進行全面檢討，確保指數能夠與香港社會和全球發展保持一致。調整後的編製方法令「一國兩制」指數的更新更及時、來源更客觀、指標更鮮明和層面更廣闊。因應傳媒生態和閱讀習慣改變，我們亦擴大輿情指數的數據範圍，為輿情研究帶來突破。另外，我們推出網上數據平台，遵循公開透明的原則，提供數據視覺化和專屬定制分析，讓決策者、研究員、媒體和公眾參考。

我們謹此向執行電話調查的香港中文大學香港亞太研究所及衡量新聞情緒的聲聞科技致以謝意。展望未來，我們會繼續每半年進行民意調查及更新國際指數，亦會定期追蹤新聞輿情，從而反映香港市民、國際社會及各地媒體對「一國兩制」的最新觀感。


潘學智

聯席召集人（研究）

2024年3月


摘要 Key Findings






摘要


Executive Summary



1. 1C2S Index rose slightly from 6.02 in the first half of 2023 to 6.04 in the second half of 2023. Overwhelmingly, 56.6% of the respondents considered maintaining economic prosperity and stability the most important condition for 1C2S to continue beyond 2047.
 2. International perception of the situation in Hong Kong rebounded from 6.82 to 6.87 when compared to last report, driven by an increase in economic openness. The need to tell a better HK story is as urgent as it is challenging. PoD recommends the creation of a 1C2S Office to engage with the western media on a continuing basis to rectify misperceptions.
 3. The political landscape changed with moderates representing 74.6% of population. Despite a half-year fall of 4 percentage points, there is an opportunity to build on this high proportion of moderates to reduce polarization in our society.
 4. People identifying themselves as having dual Chinese and Hong Kong identities increased by 0.6 percentage points to 60.0%. Markedly, the gap between those who saw themselves as only Chinese or only Hong Kongers narrowed steadily over the years.
 5. People planning to emigrate dropped from 34.5% in June 2020 to 17.9% in February 2024, suggesting a return to the historical norm as an international city with freedom of movement. This is an opportunity to attract new talents to come to HK as we move toward a new, innovative economy.
 6. People with an interest to study, work or retire in the GBA area dropped from 11.9% in June 2020 to 6.9% in February 2024. The government should undertake a sustained campaign to highlight the career success stories of HK youths in GBA area, and also create job placement platforms to help our youths in finding GBA jobs easily.
1. 2023下半年的「一國兩制」指數，由2023年上半年的6.02分微升至6.04分。大部分受訪者（56.6%）認為經濟維持繁榮穩定，將會是2047年後繼續落實「一國兩制」的最有利因素。
 2. 國際社會對香港的評價由6.82分回升至最近的6.87分，受惠於經濟開放的評分上升。講好香港故事既是燃眉之急，亦具挑戰性。民主思路建議政府成立「一國兩制」辦公室，與西方媒體保持聯繫，消弭誤解。
 3. 香港的政治版圖正在改變，溫和派以全港人口的74.6%佔據首位。雖然下跌4個百分點，溫和派仍然保持高百分比，將會是社會減少政治兩極化的契機。
 4. 對中國人與香港人身分擁有雙重認同的市民，上升0.6個百分點至60.0%。認為他們只是中國人或只是香港人的比例差距，在過去幾年期間不斷收窄。
 5. 有計劃移民的市民，由2020年6月的34.5%下跌至2024年2月的17.9%，象徵這座擁有遷徙自由的國際城市重回歷史常態。這是香港吸引外來人才的機會，推進創新經濟發展。
 6. 可能受到長期封關影響，有興趣前往大灣區發展的市民由2020年6月的11.9%下跌至2024年2月的6.9%。政府應該加大宣傳，強調香港青年在大灣區成功就業的故事，為青年成立職業配對平台，協助他們在區內更易尋找工作。



「一國兩制」概覽 Index At-a-Glance



1C2S Index
「一國兩制」指數

6.04

(↑ 0.3%)

2023 H2

1C2S Mass Media Index
「一國兩制」輿情指數

155.3

(↑ 12.1%)

2023 Q4

Moderates
溫和派

74.6%

(↓ 4.0%)

2024.2

Dual Identity
雙重身分認同

60.0%

(↑ 0.6%)

2024.2



**Public
Opinion
民意調查**

High Degree of Autonomy

高度自治

5.02

(↓ 0.8%)

Human Rights and Freedom

人權自由

5.26

(↑ 2.9%)

Hong Kong - Mainland Relations

陸港關係

5.34

(↓ 2.4%)

**International
Perception
國際評價**

Economic Openness

經濟開放

9.31

(↑ 1.5%)

Civil Liberty

公民權利

6.24


(↑ 0.2%)

Democratic Development

民主發展


5.06

(↑ 0.4%)



2023 下半年回顧

2023 H2 Overview



The Night Vibes campaign represented Hong Kong's attempt to revitalize economy by promoting local consumption and attracting visitors since mid-2023. The Chief Executive's visits to ASEAN countries closed several bilateral deals, while the second Global Financial Leaders' Investment Summit showcased boundless opportunities available in the city. Efforts like a development plan for innovation and technology sector in Shenzhen and Hong Kong as well as a standard contract for cross-border data flow further strengthen connectivity with mainland China.

In the political realm, patriotic education emerged as a crucial component of the local education system. President Xi encouraged Hong Kong students in a letter to gain deeper understanding of the history, culture and current affairs of their motherland. Patriotic Education Law in the mainland clarified objectives of nurturing patriotism in Hong Kong. Approaching year-end, local governance saw the first District Council elections and appointments after electoral overhaul to complete the final part of 'patriots administering Hong Kong'.

Law enforcement actions against political activists sparked international attention. Individuals in self-imposed exile were placed on a wanted list. Prominent cases include Agnes Chow and Tony Chung who fled and sought refuge overseas. The trial of Jimmy Lai under the national security law raised concerns globally, with a UK report and a United Nations Human Rights Council sideline meeting addressing Hong Kong's press freedom. Debates surrounding privileges and immunities of Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices continued in US Senate, fuelling the ongoing dialogue about Hong Kong's political climate.

香港在2023年下半年開展「香港夜繽紛」，嘗試促進本地消費及吸引遊客以重振經濟。特首出訪東盟國家促成多項雙邊貿易合作，第二屆國際金融領袖投資峰會亦向世界展示香港無限的商機。政府推出深港科技創新合作規劃及跨境數據流動標準合約，進一步加強大灣區的互聯互通。

國家主席習近平回信予本港學生，鼓勵他們深入瞭解祖國歷史文化及現實國情，呼應愛國主義教育融入本地教育制度。內地通過《愛國主義教育法》，也為香港培養愛國主義定下目標。年底，完善地區治理後的區議會選舉與委任首屆議員，落實「愛國者治港」的最後一環。

與政治人物有關的執法行動廣受國際關注：警方通緝自我流亡人士，例如周庭及鍾翰林潛逃海外尋求庇護、黎智英的國安法案件開審。英國的「香港半年報告」和聯合國人權理事會場邊會議聚焦討論香港的新聞自由。美國參議院考慮終止香港經貿辦的特權及豁免權，令香港政治局勢的討論增添新議題。

International confidence catching up with local

Business promotion after border reopening appeared to be more successful in building overseas image than expediting local growth. Hongkongers' confidence eventually lost momentum after two years of continued growth. Budding international perception shored up an overall growth in 1C2S Index. The latest reading rose by 0.3% from 6.02 to 6.04..

Public opinion viewed 'human rights and freedom' (+2.9%) more positively. Civic space and local networks were regenerating as dysfunctional district councils were reinstalled. 'Hong Kong-Mainland relations' (-2.4%) and 'high degree of autonomy' (-0.8%) fell. While citizens longed for an immediate success in economic recovery, repeated bail jumping of political activists exposed loopholes in legal systems.

Due to time lag in the compilation of international indices, negative impacts from the pandemic dissipated in this round as 'economic openness' (+1.5%) increased. Massive promotional campaigns to attract overseas investment earned confidence in business environment. Other pillars, namely 'democratic development' (+0.4%) and 'civil liberty' (+0.2%), rose slightly.

Political moderation plateaued

Mass apathy from a depoliticized society contributed to political moderation. Moderates remained the largest group with an overwhelming dominance (74.6%), followed by non-establishment supporters (13.7%) and pro-establishment supporters (8.1%). Both non-establishment and pro-establishment supporters increased by 2.8 and 1.4 percentage points respectively. As a result, the size of moderates shrank by 4 percentage points.

The reduction of moderates was also seen among youths (aged 18 to 29). Moderates fell by 6.7 percentage points to 66.0%. Among non-establishment supporters, democrats rose by 5.2 percentage points to 18.5% and localists increased by 0.2 percentage points to 11.3%. A one-time fall of moderation among the 18-29 age group may not suggest re-radicalization, nevertheless, one should remain vigilant of such a possibility in the near future.

國際信心回轉追上民意趨勢

開關之後，香港加強商業推廣，在海外重塑國際形象的成效，比促進本地增長更加明顯。本港居民的信心連升兩年後，升勢最終停止。國際評價有所改善，從而支撐「一國兩制」指數的整體增長，最新讀數從6.02分上升0.3%至6.04分。

在這輪調查中，本地民意對「人權自由」的評分上升(+2.9%)。重塑後的區議會產生新一屆議員，再次凝聚公民空間和地區網絡。「陸港關係」(-2.4%)與「高度自治」(-0.8%)的評分下降。市民渴望經濟能夠瞬間復甦，展現「兩制」優勢。政治人物多次棄保，也突顯暴露現時的法律漏洞。

由於國際指數編製的時間滯後，「經濟開放」(+1.5%)上升，反映疫情帶來的負面影響才開始消散。大量的招商資項目吸引海外投資者，國際社會對香港的營商環境開始回復信心。其餘支柱，即「民主發展」(+0.4%)和「公民權利」(+0.2%)亦輕微上升。

溫和政治力量趨於穩定

政治冷感而來的去激進化似乎並未結束，但增長有緩和跡象。溫和派(74.6%)繼續成為最大群組，其次為非建制派(13.7%)及建制派(8.1%)。非建制派和建制派的佔比分別上升2.8個百分點和1.4個百分點，令溫和派下跌了4個百分點。

18-29歲年輕人中，溫和力量同樣減少。溫和派下跌6.7個百分點至66.0%。至於非建制派支持者中，民主派上升5.2個百分點至18.5%，本土派上升0.2個百分點升至11.3%。18-29歲年輕人中，溫和政治力量的一次下降未必代表重新激進化，雖然如此，但我們仍需保持警惕，以防激進力量重臨。

Reconvergence of citizens' identity as Hongkongers or Chinese

Citizens' self-identification as Hongkongers or Chinese started to converge after a period of divergence. The gap was closing after a two-year convergence. In this round, both the 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' identities increased. The former rose by 5.6% from 7.79 to 8.23 and the latter rose by 3.7% from 6.78 to 7.03.

Most Hong Kong citizens are cognizant of their dual identity as both Hongkongers and Chinese. Over half of the public acknowledged dual identity in earlier surveys. This had gradually changed since 2019 and hit rock bottom in mid-2020 but had since rebounded. People who recognized their dual identity rose from last round's 59.4% by 0.6 percentage points to 60.0%. 'Hongkonger only' rose to 24.7% by 1.9%.

Implications and recommendations

The substantial growth in public opinion against a repeated decline in international perception signified the disparity between how local people and the international community looked at 1C2S. Nonetheless, we still found that people's perception to the current state of 1C2S was less than satisfactory. What the majority desired for the long-term continuation of 1C2S was prosperity and stability. While various social groups often displayed different expectations, there is common ground to bring people together.

Many indicators returned to early-2019 level. Public discontent sparked by the governance crisis appeared to be relieved. People with emigration plans kept on declining. The proportion of moderates continued to grow while non-establishment supporters steadily declined. The proportion of population identifying themselves as 'Chinese' also embarked on a modest rate of increase.

Two rival camps showed extreme views over recent political events. Moderates were the only group countering this juxtaposition. A rational voice appears to exist in the society at large, but it is vulnerable to populist narratives. Policymakers must take care to ensure that moderate opinions continue to enjoy the benefit of a nourishing and safe environment in a divided culture.

香港人與中國人身分認同的重新匯合

市民對香港人和中國人兩種身分認同曾經背馳，最近兩年開始匯合，兩者的差距正在縮小。這輪調查中，香港人和中國人的認同感雙雙上升，前者從 7.79分上升 5.6% 至 8.23分，後者從 6.78分上升 3.7% 至 7.03分。

香港市民普遍擁有香港人和中國人雙重身分認同，過往調查均超過一半。情況自2019年起急遽下跌，於2020年中觸底後反彈。擁有雙重身分認同的市民，較上輪的59.4%上升0.6個百分點至60.0%。「只有香港人」的比例則上升了1.9%至24.7%。

啟示及建議

民意評分大幅改善，而國際評價持續下跌，突顯本地和國際社會對如何理解「一國兩制」存在差異。我們發現市民對「一國兩制」的現狀仍未滿意，而他們最渴望的是維持繁榮和穩定，使「一國兩制」長期延續。雖然社會上不同群體抱有多種期望，我們仍有共通點可以將彼此拉近，同心同德。

許多指標回復至修例風波前的水平，反映這場管治危機所引發的不滿情緒似已舒緩。有計劃移民的市民繼續減少。溫和派的佔比持續增加，非建制派則持續下降。當「一國兩制」在實踐上出現矛盾時，更多人認為內地和香港有共同責任。對中國人身分的認同感亦有穩健增長。

兩大政治陣營對近期政治事件的反應極端，溫和派則少受政治立場網綁。社會存在理性聲音，但極容易受到民粹摧毀。決策者應確保溫和意見能夠在撕裂的社會上有一隅之地。

It is important for the HKSAR government to capitalize on the growing confidence and build further momentum by spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of Hong Kong including the business community, the academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs to promote the image of Hong Kong under 1C2S. Such effort may include:

- Setting up an Office of 1C2S for sustained outreach effort both locally and in the APEC region to mobilize support and enhance Hong Kong’s presence. This dedicated office will actively participate in foreign think tank forums directly or through the business community to promote the Hong Kong narrative in the international arena;
- Creating a Press Secretary for the CE Office to hold daily press briefings with local and international media to tackle latest policy issues in a timely, full, and proper manner to address the fear and anxiety of the foreign community in Hong Kong;
- Providing advanced training to our senior officials on how to counter the negative narrative in the western media by using positive HK stories; and
- Educating young members of the public on 1C2S basics, including importance of our constitutional order, the understanding of the rule of law, human rights, freedoms, corresponding obligations and broadening awareness of social, national, and global issues.


政府應乘勢領導香港各界，如商界、學術界、專業團體、理念相近的智庫和民間組織，共同努力闡釋「一國兩制」的實況，提升香港形象。措施包括：

- 設立「一國兩制」辦公室，專門進行本地及亞太區的推廣及聯絡工作，動員社會各界支持及強化香港的影響力。此專責辦公室將會直接或通過商界積極參與外國智庫論壇，就香港事務在國際舞台發聲；
- 增設特首辦新聞發言人，每天主持記者會，面向本地及國際傳媒，適時、充分及恰當地解釋及回應政策議題，包括外國社群的疑慮；
- 提供進階培訓予高級官員，運用正面的香港故事，以回應西方媒體的負面論述；及
- 著重青年教育，擴闊他們對「一國兩制」的基本認識，豐富對我們的憲制秩序、法治、人權和自由、相應義務的理解，增強社會觸覺、國際視野及國情認識。






第十三版報告
Thirteenth Edition



1. 簡介

1. Introduction



This is the 13th edition of our 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) Index report. The purpose of the 1C2S Index is to provide an objective assessment on the implementation of 1C2S. Our first report was released in mid-2017, on the 20th anniversary of the return of Hong Kong to China. We update the 1C2S Index every six months, at mid-year and year end.

Every half year, we update the 1C2S Index by updating public opinion with a new public survey and international perception with the latest data from international indices. To complement our main Index, we have also introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) that uses big-data techniques to measure the sentiment of Hong Kong and overseas printed, electronic and online media.

We commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct a telephone poll between January 2024 and February 2024 to compile scores on public opinion. We updated scores on international perception to 2023 H2 by scoring and ranking 148 countries and territories based on 9 comprehensive data sources and 127 indicators compiled by international think tanks. MMI was measured by sentiment.ai and updated to the end of December 2023.

In our latest survey, we continued to include topical issues related to 1C2S, such as the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047, citizen's identity, attitude towards emigration and public opinions on the Greater Bay Area. To fully capture the socio-political reality of the city, we introduced new questions to gauge the impact of recent socio-political changes, such as public's knowledge about the National Constitution, satisfaction of the performance of Legislative Council and impacts of new electoral systems to Hong Kong's governance.

香港回歸20週年之際，民主思路於2017年中首次發布「一國兩制」指數，旨在為香港實踐「一國兩制」作客觀評價。指數於年中與年底，每半年更新，這是第十三版報告。

我們每半年進行電話調查及收集國際指數的最新數據，更新民意調查及國際評價，從而更新「一國兩制」指數。我們還推出嶄新的「一國兩制」輿情指數，檢視香港和海外報章、電子傳媒和網絡媒體對「一國兩制」的情緒，利用大數據技術去補充指數之不足。

本報告委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所，在2024年1月至2024年2月進行電話調查，從而取得民意評分。我們運用國際智庫編製的9個綜合數據庫和127個指標，為148個國家和地區評分和排名，從而計算國際評價，資料已更新至2023下半年。由輿情科技量度的「一國兩制」輿情指數則更新至2023年12月底。

電話調查也一併探討其他關乎「一國兩制」的重要議題，包括2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」、市民的身分認同、移民海外與粵港澳大灣區發展。為更準確拿捏近期的社會及政治變化所帶來的影響，本輪新增公眾對國家《憲法》的認識、對現屆立法會表現的滿意程度和新選舉制度對香港管治的影響等議題。

It should be stressed that public opinion, international perception and MMI are determined by perceptions and may or may not reflect actual reality. Even so, changes in perceptions of 1C2S of the Hong Kong public, of international think tanks, and of the Hong Kong and overseas media are nevertheless important. We will analyse the reasons for the changes as they are crucial for the implementation of 1C2S.

In our report, all scores are expressed in a scale of 0-10. An asterisk (*) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant. If there is no mention of statistical significance about a score, it means that the change concerned is statistically insignificant.

Some scores are decomposed by age group, educational attainment and political inclination for further analysis. In the past, the non-establishment camp was divided into 'democrats' and 'others'. This division is abolished in this report as the size of the latter is too small to support any meaningful analysis, but it is preserved in our online data portal for reference purposes.

Readers may visit the webpage of Path of Democracy (<http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/>) to access our data portal for historical data of the 1C2S Index series. An extensive report on the survey results is also available.


民意調查、國際評價及輿情指數的評分取決於觀感，可能不完全反映現實。儘管如此，香港市民、國際智庫和本地媒體的觀感變化對實施「一國兩制」仍然至關重大，所以我們也會分析其背後的變化原因。

本報告的所有評分尺度為0至10分。如不同輪次調查之間的評分差異達統計上顯著水平，將會以星號（「*」）註明。未有註明者，則代表評分差異在統計上並不顯著。

部分數字將根據年齡組別、教育程度和政治傾向劃分，再作分析。以往，政治傾向中的非建制派會細分為「民主派」和「其他」。由於後者人數過少，難以作出有意義的分析，因此本報告不再將非建制派細分為兩組，但仍於網上數據平台保留以作參考。


「一國兩制」指數的歷年數據已經上載至我們的數據平台，電話調查的詳細報告亦刊於「調查結果：頻數及百分比分佈」，歡迎讀者參閱民主思路網頁 (<http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/>)。





2. 「一國兩制」指數

2. 1C2S Index



The 1C2S Index is the average score of three pillars on public opinion and three pillars on international perception. The three pillars on public opinion, namely 'high degree of autonomy', 'human rights and freedom' and 'Hong Kong-Mainland relationship' are the evaluation by Hong Kong public on different dimensions of 1C2S. The three pillars on international perception, namely 'economic openness', 'civil liberty' and 'democratic development', are the evaluation by international think tanks on various aspects of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.


「一國兩制」指數為民意調查3項支柱及國際評價3項支柱的平均值。民意調查的3項支柱為「高度自治」、「人權自由」及「陸港關係」，用以量度公眾對「一國兩制」的評價。國際評價的3項支柱為「經濟開放」、「公民權利」及「民主發展」，是國際智庫對香港自由和民主程度的評估。指數的編製方法詳見附件I。

Figure 1 shows scores of the 1C2S Index since 2021 H2. The latest reading in 2023 H2 was 6.04, an increase of 0.3% from 6.02 half year ago. After a prolonged trough, the Index continued to soar and returned to mid-2019 level. This rise in the latest round was contributed by an improvement in international perception, especially on economic openness. Results obtained in these pillars will be detailed in the following sub-sections.

圖1顯示「一國兩制」指數2021下半年至今的變化。2023下半年的最新讀數為6.04分，較半年前的6.02分上升0.3%。經過一段低潮，「一國兩制」指數繼續上升，回復至2019年中的水平。本輪的上升出於國際評價的改善，尤其是「經濟開放」的上升。各項支柱評分的變化將於以下章節詳細解釋。

Figure 1: 1C2S Index

圖 1：「一國兩制」指數



	Scores 評分	Changes 變化
2021 H2	5.63	+0.17 (↑ 3.1%)
2022 H1	5.82	+0.19 (↑ 3.4%)
2022 H2	5.92	+0.10 (↑ 1.7%)
2023 H1	6.02	+0.10 (↑ 1.7%)
2023 H2	6.04	+0.02 (↑ 0.3%)

2.1 民意調查 Public opinion

Table 1 shows all pillar and sub-pillars scores. Two pillars fell and one pillar grew. 'Human rights and freedom' increased by 2.9% to 5.26. 'High degree of autonomy' and 'Hong Kong-Mainland relations' fell by 0.8% to 5.02 and by 2.4% to 5.34 respectively.

Three sub-pillars with the largest increases were 'democratic development' (+8.1%), 'freedom of speech association and assembly' (+5.6%) and 'resolving via dialogue and negotiation' (+2.9%). Three sub-pillars with the largest decreases were 'maintaining long-term prosperity and stability' (-10.9%), 'self-conduct of administrative affairs' (-4.7%) and 'safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests' (-1.3%). Of which, the changes of 'democratic development' and 'maintaining long-term prosperity and stability' were statistically significant.

Three sub-pillars with highest scores were 'safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests' (6.31), 'equal protection of the Law' (5.96) and 'original ways of life' (5.77). Three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' (4.49), 'freedom of speech, association and assembly' (4.51) and 'democratic development' (4.78).

表 1顯示民意調查的支柱和子支柱評分。一項支柱評分上升，兩項支柱評分下跌。「人權自由」的評分上升，增加2.9%至5.26分，而「高度自治」和「陸港關係」的評分，則分別下跌0.8%至5.02分及2.4%至5.34分。

三項升幅最大的子支柱為「民主政制發展」(+8.1%)、「言論、結社及集會自由」(+5.6%)和「透過對話協商解決矛盾」(+2.9%)。三項跌幅最大的子支柱為「維持長期繁榮穩定」(-10.9%)、「自行處理行政事務」(-4.7%)及「維護國家主權、安全和發展利益」(-1.3%)。其中，「民主政制發展」和「維持長期繁榮穩定」分數的變化達到統計學上的顯著水平。

三項分數最高的子支柱為「維護國家主權、安全和發展利益」(6.31)、「法律平等保護」(5.96)及「原有生活方式」(5.77)。三項分數最低的子支柱為「港人治港」(4.49)、「言論、結社及集會自由」(4.51)及「民主政制發展」(4.78)。



Table 1: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on public opinion

表1：民意調查的支柱及子支柱分數

	2021 H2	2022 H1	2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2	
Overall 總分	4.02	4.71	4.98	5.22	5.21	
A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治	3.75	4.61	4.82	5.06	5.02	
A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務	3.89	4.84	5.07	5.48	5.22	
A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權	4.09	4.92	4.99	5.25	5.29	
A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權	3.84	4.74	4.89	5.13	5.09	
A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」	3.18	3.96	4.31	4.38	4.49	
B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由	4.02	4.61	4.94	5.11	5.26	
B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式	4.51	5.13	5.52	5.77	5.77	
B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社及集會自由	3.67	3.89 [^]	4.26	4.27	4.51	
B3. Democratic development 民主政制發展	3.47	3.74	4.15	4.42	4.78	*
B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護	4.43	5.65 [^]	5.82	6.00	5.96	
C. Hong Kong - Mainland Relations 陸港關係	4.30	4.92	5.19	5.47	5.34	
C1. Resolving via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾	3.45	4.06	4.24	4.75	4.89	
C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益	5.47	5.81	6.24	6.39	6.31	
C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定	4.75	5.61	5.84	5.94	5.29	*
C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落实「一國兩制」	3.54	4.19	4.45	4.81	4.88	

Note: An asterisk(*) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant.
註：如此輪次的評分差異達統計上顯著水平，將會以星號(「*」)註明。

2.1.1 Generation gap and political divide

Figure 2 shows average scores of public opinion by age group. Half of the age groups fell and rose for this round. 30-39 age group increased strongly by 12.5% to 4.05, while 40-49 age group fell sharply by 15.7% to 4.28 with statistical significance.

Figure 3 shows average scores of public opinions by political inclination. Average scores produced by all political groups increased. Pro-establishment supporters increased by 5.3% to 8.17, whereas moderates rose slightly by 0.2% to 5.39. Non-establishment supporters had an increase by 3.7% to 2.54.

Statistical tests revealed that there was a clear and consistent divide in evaluation scores between younger and older age groups, and across all political inclinations. Not only did scores increase with age, but the scores of the three younger age groups were also statistically lower than those of the three older ones. In comparison with moderates, the evaluations of pro-establishment supporters were significantly higher. On the other hand, evaluations of non-establishment supporters were significantly lower.

2.1.1. 代溝及政治鴻溝

圖2顯示了各個年齡組別在民意調查的總分。在是次調查結果中，一半的年齡組別得分上升，另外一半的組別則下降。其中，30-39歲組別的增長最為強勁，增幅為 12.5% 至 4.05分；而40-49歲組別大幅下跌了15.7%至4.28分，達到統計學的顯著程度。

圖3顯示過去調查中，不同政治傾向在民意調查的總分。所有政治傾向組別的分數有所上升。建制派支持者的分數，上升了5.3%至8.17分，溫和派則輕微上升了0.2%至5.39分。非建制派支持者的評分上升了 3.7% 至 2.54分。

經統計檢測，年輕和年長組別之間及所有政治傾向之間，存在明顯且一致的差異。不僅評分隨著年齡而增加，三個年輕組別的評分，在統計學上也低於三個年長組別。與溫和派比較下，建制派評分比溫和派顯著較高，而非建制派評分則比溫和派顯著較低。

Figure 2: Public opinion (by age group)

圖2：民意調查（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 3: Public opinion (by political inclination)

圖3：民意調查（按政治傾向劃分）



2.2 國際評價 International perception

Table 2 shows Hong Kong's pillar and sub-pillar scores on international perception. Compared to the last round, 'economic openness' rose by 1.5% to 9.31, 'democratic development' by 0.4% to 5.06, 'civil liberty' by 0.2% to 6.24.

All sub-pillars rose slightly except 'expression, association and assembly' (-4.2%) and 'financial stability' (-0.1%). Three sub-pillars with the greatest increase were 'business environment' (+3.7%), 'regulatory quality' (+2.5%) and 'security and safety' (+1.1%).

Three sub-pillars with highest scores were 'market access' (9.71), 'financial stability' (9.36) and 'regulatory quality' (9.17). Three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were 'expression, association and assembly' (2.95), 'political pluralism' (3.23) and 'constraints on powers' (5.43).

表 2顯示香港在國際評價的支柱和子支柱分數。與上輪比較，「經濟開放」上升1.5% 至 9.31分，「民主發展」上升0.4%至5.06分，「公民權利」上升0.2%至6.24分。

除了「表達、結社和集會」(-4.2%)和「金融穩定」(-0.1%)外，所有子支柱的評分均上升。三個評分上升幅度最大的子支柱是「營商環境」(+3.7%)、「監管質素」(+2.5%)和「安全」(+1.1%)。

三項評分最高的子支柱為「市場門檻」(9.71)、「金融穩定」(9.36)和「監管質素」(9.17)。三項分數最低的子支柱為「表達、結社和集會」(2.95)、「政治多元」(3.23)和「權力制約」(5.43)。

Table 2: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on international perception

表2：國際評價的支柱和子支柱分數

	2021 H2	2022 H1	2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2	
Overall 總分	7.25 (36)	6.93 (39)	6.87 (39)	6.82 (42)	6.87 (39)	
D. Economic Openness 經濟開放	9.34 (2)	9.28 (2)	9.20 (2)	9.17 (2)	9.31 (2)	
D1. Business environment 營商環境	8.97 (2)	8.85 (2)	8.68 (2)	8.66 (2)	8.98 (2)	
D2. Market access 市場門檻	9.74 (1)	9.73 (1)	9.72 (1)	9.70 (1)	9.71 (1)	
D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素	8.95 (2)	8.83 (2)	8.83 (2)	8.95 (2)	9.17 (2)	
D4. Financial stability 金融穩定	9.71 (1)	9.70 (1)	9.58 (1)	9.37 (4)	9.36 (4)	
E. Civil Liberty 公民權利	6.80 (60)	6.35 (72)	6.28 (72)	6.23 (73)	6.24 (73)	
E1. Rule of law 法治	6.82 (38)	6.44 (42)	6.33 (43)	6.40 (43)	6.42 (43)	
E2. Security and safety 安全	8.00 (39)	8.07 (36)	8.09 (36)	8.11 (36)	8.20 (35)	
E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會	4.49 (113)	3.25 (123)	3.15 (124)	3.08 (126)	2.95 (126)	
E4. Individual rights 個人權利	7.89 (39)	7.64 (43)	7.56 (47)	7.34 (55)	7.41 (51)	
F. Democratic Development 民主發展	5.59 (77)	5.17 (90)	5.12 (91)	5.04 (91)	5.06 (90)	
F1. Constraints on powers 權力制約	6.17 (49)	5.64 (56)	5.50 (60)	5.39 (64)	5.43 (63)	
F2. Political pluralism 政治多元	4.38 (114)	3.51 (123)	3.51 (123)	3.23 (125)	3.23 (125)	
F3. Civic participation 公民參與	6.14 (46)	5.82 (56)	5.79 (57)	5.74 (55)	5.77 (55)	
F4. Democratic culture 民主文化	5.69 (72)	5.73 (72)	5.67 (80)	5.81 (75)	5.81 (73)	

Note: World ranking in parentheses.

註：括號數字為世界排名。

2.2.1. Comparison with selected regions

As Hong Kong is a highly developed region and given that highly developed regions tend to have comparatively higher scores in freedom and democracy as compared with developing regions – we have selected certain neighbouring developed countries and territories (namely, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) as benchmarks for comparison and assessment of Hong Kong’s performance in international perception. We compared the respective scores of the Mainland and the US, for the purpose of identifying the position of Hong Kong under 1C2S relative to the major powers.

Table 3 compares Hong Kong and its neighbours by pillars on international perception. Hong Kong’s superlative performance in ‘economic openness’ made it one of the world leaders with a score of 9.31. It ranked second after Singapore’s 9.46 and was way ahead of Taiwan’s 8.00, Japan’s 7.49 and Korea’s 6.98. There was a slight increase in score for both Hong Kong and Singapore, while ‘economic openness’ of other developed neighbours performed variedly in the last half year.

Hong Kong remained as 73 in ‘civil liberty’. Its score was 6.24, close to Singapore’s 6.82, but much lower than Japan’s 9.04, Korea’s 8.37 and Taiwan’s 8.24. Half of Hong Kong’s neighbours rose in ‘civil liberty’ score but all rankings remained unchanged.

Hong Kong’s score of 5.06 in ‘democratic development’ was not keeping pace with its developed neighbours (Japan’s 8.64, Taiwan’s 8.28, Korea’s 7.63 and Singapore’s 6.86). Our developed neighbours performed variedly in the last half year.

2.2.1. 選定地區比較

一般而言，發達地區的自由與民主評價均高於發展中地區。由於香港是高度發展的地區，所以我們選取鄰近的發達國家及地區，包括日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣作比較，藉以評價香港的表現。我們亦比較中國內地與美國的評分，以觀察在「一國兩制」之下的香港相對於兩個大國的發展。

表3 比較香港和鄰近地區在國際評價支柱的分數。香港在「經濟開放」表現非常突出，以9.31分在全球中排名第二，緊接9.46分排名第一的新加坡，大幅領先台灣的8.00分、日本的7.49分和南韓的6.98分。在過去半年，香港和新加坡的分數稍為上升，而其他的鄰近發達地區的表現則不等。

香港的「公民權利」的排名維持第73名，評分為6.24分。雖然接近新加坡的6.82分，仍低於日本的9.04分、南韓的8.37分和台灣的8.24分。即使香港一半的鄰近發達地區在「公民權利」的評分上升，但是所有的排名維持不變。

香港在「民主發展」評分為5.06分，未能與其他鄰近發達地區看齊（日本8.64分、台灣8.28分、南韓7.63分、新加坡6.86分）。所有鄰近發達地區的分數皆維持不變。

Table 3: Pillar scores on international perception of selected regions

表3：選定地區之國際評價支柱分數

	D. Economic Openness 經濟開放				E. Civil Liberty 公民權利				F. Democratic Development 民主發展				Overall 總分			
	Score 分數	Rank 排名			Score 分數	Rank 排名			Score 分數	Rank 排名			Score 分數	Rank 排名		
Hong Kong 香港	9.31	↑	(2)	-	6.24	↑	(73)	-	5.06	↑	(90)	↑	6.87	↑	(39)	↑
Mainland China 中國內地	6.87	↑	(38)	↑	3.00	↓	(140)	-	2.50	↑	(138)	↑	4.13	↑	(125)	↑
Japan 日本	7.49	↓	(25)	↓	9.04	↑	(14)	-	8.64	↑	(10)	↑	8.39	↓	(15)	-
Korea 南韓	6.98	↓	(33)	↓	8.37	↑	(28)	-	7.63	↓	(34)	↓	7.66	↓	(28)	↓
Singapore 新加坡	9.46	↑	(1)	-	6.82	↑	(58)	-	6.86	↑	(45)	↑	7.71	↑	(26)	↑
Taiwan 台灣	8.00	↓	(13)	↓	8.24	↓	(30)	-	8.28	↓	(20)	-	8.17	↓	(19)	-
United States 美國	8.31	↑	(7)	↑	8.14	↓	(34)	-	7.66	↑	(32)	↑	8.03	↓	(20)	-

Note: World ranking in parentheses.

註：括號數字為世界排名。

2.2.2. Global trend

Figure 4 shows the global trend of the pillar scores on international perception. Inflation rates were expected to be slowed down, yet there were other risks for economic recession, such as wars in Eastern Europe and Middle East, and withdrawal of fiscal support. Thus, the global economic outlook became dimmer so the global average score of 'economic openness' fell by 0.9% to 5.79. The top performers for 'economic openness' were Singapore (9.46), Hong Kong (9.31) and Finland (8.65).

There were reports that citizens' political rights and civil liberties were clamped by governments. However, the global score in 'civil liberty' regained by 0.2% and reached a score of 6.14. The top countries were Finland (9.71), Norway (9.65) and Denmark (9.57).

'Democratic development' reflected a continuous stagnation of democratic system in the world. Elections of some countries were said to be problematic, as well as military forces ousted incumbent government and gained power. Moreover, regional armed conflicts were leading to an unsafe world for democracy. Global average score in 'democratic development' remained unchanged as 5.67 in the latest round. Similar to 'civil liberty', Nordic countries performed well in this pillar. Denmark (9.49), Norway (9.47) and Finland (9.28) were the top three in the world.

2.2.2. 全球趨勢


圖4顯示國際評價的全球趨勢。通脹預期會回落，但依然存在導致阻礙經濟發展的因素，包括東歐和中東的武裝衝突，以及各國政府不再使用財政政策刺激經濟。因此，全球經濟增長展望變得暗淡，而全球的「經濟開放」平均分下跌了0.9%至5.79分。「經濟開放」表現最佳的是新加坡（9.46）、香港（9.31）和芬蘭（8.65）。

全球各地屢屢發生侵犯公民和記者權利及種族衝突事件，令「公民權利」評分持續下滑。然而，「公民權利」的全球得分上升了0.2%，至6.14分。排名靠前的國家是芬蘭（9.71）、挪威（9.65）和瑞典（9.57）。

全球各地的民主化程度繼續停滯，反映於「民主發展」的評分之中。部份國家的選舉被質疑，亦出現軍事力量推翻民主政權事件。而且，地區性的武裝衝突令地緣局勢變得緊張，不利民主。最新一輪「民主發展」的全球平均得分維持不變，為5.67分。與「公民權利」相似，北歐國家表現突出，丹麥（9.49）、挪威（9.47）和芬蘭（9.28）得分為全球最高。

Figure 4: Global trend of pillar scores on international perception

圖4：國際評價支柱分數的全球趨勢



2.3 重大事件 Significant events

Changes in scores in the indices are likely to be affected by significant political and other landmark events that occurred during the relevant period. Listed below are major events that occurred since the last report from July to December 2023.

Internal governance issues that are not strictly related to 1C2S appear to have important effects on evaluations of the Hong Kong public and media, but do not necessarily affect international evaluations as much. On the other hand, evaluations of international think tanks may not be free of western ideological biases against the rise of China, but they may also reflect genuine weaknesses in the implementation of 1C2S. It is important to bear these impacts in mind when reading the findings identified in this report.

報告期間發生不少政治爭議和重大事件，與「一國兩制」指數的變化有一定關係。上期報告至今，即2023年7月至12月的重大事件臚列如下。


與「一國兩制」無直接關係的內部管治問題，對香港市民和輿情的評價似乎有一定影響，但對國際評價影響不大。西方愈來愈擔心中國崛起會挑戰其優勢，所以對中國的態度由合作轉向對抗。西方智庫對「一國兩制」的評價不能完全擺脫此意識形態的轉向，但也可能反映「一國兩制」在實踐上的真正弱點。在解讀此報告的結論時，應予以考慮。

Table 4: Significant events

表4：重大事件一覽


7.2 & 12.14	The police put individuals who are currently residing overseas in exile on the wanted list. Online subscribers of Nathan Law and Ted Hui were arrested for alleged involvement in aiding the wanted activists.	警方懸紅通緝多名流亡海外人士，並且拘捕涉於網上平台資助許智峯及羅冠聰的訂閱者。
7.5 & 8.10	Police arrested members of 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund, Demosisto and a Chinese medicine practitioner group for conspiracy to commit collusion with foreign forces.	警方拘捕612人道支援基金、香港眾志及「國難忠醫」成員，涉嫌串謀勾結外國勢力。
7.28 & 9.22	After initial decline from the High Court, the Department of Justice filed an appeal for an injunction to prohibit the dissemination of the protest anthem 'Glory to Hong Kong'.	律政司入稟高等法院申請禁制令，禁止傳播反修例歌曲《願榮光歸香港》，高院拒批臨時禁制令，律政司提出上訴。
10.27	Universities from Taiwan were prohibited from using the term 'National' in their names in the Hong Kong Taiwan Higher Education Exhibition, resulting in withdrawal of 19 of them from the event.	香港舉辦台灣高等教育展，有公立大學未能以「國立」頭銜參展，最後19間大學退展。
10.30	Four members of HKU Student Union Council who mourned a dead suspect of police stabbing were pleaded guilty to inciting to wound police officers and sentenced to two years of imprisonment.	香港大學學生會評議會4名成員涉致謝銅鑼灣刺警察案的疑犯，各被告承認煽惑傷警，被判處監禁兩年。
11.6	Hong Kong Monetary Authority held 2nd Global Financial Leaders' Investment Summit with an attendance of about 300 financial industry professionals.	香港金融管理局舉辦第2屆國際金融領袖投資峰會，約300名金融界人士出席。

11.29	US House Foreign Affairs Committee passed the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Certification Act to consider whether the Offices deserve the privileges and immunities granted.	美國眾議院外事務委員會通過《香港經濟貿易辦事處認證法案》草案，考慮三所香港駐美經貿辦應否繼續享有特權與豁免權。
12.3 & 12.29	Agnes Chow jumped bail, fled to Canada and refused to report to police as scheduled. Tony Chung violated post-prison supervision order and sought asylum in UK.	正被警方調查的周庭宣布棄保，前往加拿大求學，拒絕回港報到。鍾翰林涉嫌違反懲教署監管令，轉機到英國尋求庇護。
12.10, 12.11 & 12.18	District council reform concluded a combination of direct elections, indirect elections and appointments.	香港區議會換屆，透過直選、間選及委任，產生完善地區治理後的議員。《區議員履職監察制度指引》公布，列出多項工作要求。
12.18	Performance monitoring guidelines were released and outlined job requirements for district councillors.	壹傳媒創辦人黎智英被控勾結外國勢力及串謀煽動一案開審。



3. 「一國兩制」輿情指數

3. 1C2S Mass Media Index



Media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion. We attempt to use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S and monitor how performance of 1C2S is covered in the mass media to provide a timely barometer of public sentiment. 1C2S MMI measures daily net sentiment of media reports. A quarterly average is reported in this section to dovetail and complement with our main Index, which is compiled biannually. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素，故此，我們嘗試利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒，藉此透視大眾傳媒對「一國兩制」的感受及意見，編製輿論情緒對「一國兩制」的晴雨表。「一國兩制」輿情指數為每天媒體文章的情緒淨值，此章節顯示季度平均值，以配合和補充我們每半年出版的主指數。編製方法詳見附錄I。

3.1 近期趨勢 Recent trend

A quiet beginning in 2022 softened the positive sentiment from the previous peak. It did not take long for the Chief Executive race to boost the popularity of the incoming leadership and confidence in 1C2S during the so-called honeymoon period. Despite grave concerns expressed by G7 foreign ministers over this election, the visit of President Xi for the 25th anniversary of HKSAR overwhelmed media discussion, pushing MMI to 138.7 in 2022 Q2.

2022年開局平靜，新聞情緒自之前的頂峰轉弱。不久，特首選舉後的蜜月期帶起新政府的民望和對「一國兩制」的信心。雖然G7外長就是次選舉表達嚴重關注，習近平主席將會視察香港回歸25周年的討論佔據大部分媒體版面，輿情指數在2022年第2季上升至138.7點的新高。

On the 25th anniversary of the HKSAR, Western leaders criticised China for failing to respect 1C2S, whereas President Xi guaranteed his commitment in this good system over the long term. Reassurance from the Chinese leadership gathered media optimism to a new high. But the uplift was soon interrupted by geopolitical struggles as US House speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan and China's subsequent white paper on the Taiwan issue heightened cross-strait tensions. Nonetheless, MMI regained its upward momentum and reached 150.1 in 2022 Q4 after the 20th National Congress of the CCP which proclaimed 1C2S a great innovation of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the best arrangement for national reunification.

在香港慶祝回歸25周年之際，西方領袖批評中國未能尊重「一國兩制」，而國家主席習近平則保證這樣的好制度必須長期堅持。中國領導人的承諾使樂觀情緒充斥媒體，推至新高，惟升勢不久被地緣政治矛盾暫緩。美國眾議院議長佩洛西訪問台灣，以及中國發布台灣問題白皮書，加劇兩岸緊張局勢。中共二十大高舉「一國兩制」為中國特色社會主義的偉大創舉和祖國統一的最佳安排，輿情指數恢復上升勢頭，並在2022年第4季達到150.1點。

MMI continued its rising trend with the restructuring of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. Following Director Xia Baolong's visit to Hong Kong, these gestures from the central government were warmly welcomed by media reports and commentaries. Discussion of different views entered the collectively positive media scene when the proposed reform plan of District Council sparked widespread debate on the new local administration measures. The all-time peak was followed by a steep fall, with a recording of 139.7 in 2023 Q2, as reports released by foreign governments levelled constant criticisms against the state of rule of law and freedoms in Hong Kong.


The previous fall sustained in the second half of 2023 until President Xi's reply letter to Hong Kong students expressed his care to the younger generation and the Chief Executive's overseas visit to ASEAN expanded business opportunities. Despite foreign concerns regarding the city's political landscape and human rights development, MMI continued to soar as a new development plan for synergistic growth of Shenzhen and Hong Kong's innovative and technology sector and the completed election and appointment of new District Council members gathered hopeful news. Consequently, MMI recovered to 155.3 in 2023 Q4.

輿情指數隨著港澳辦重組繼續上升趨勢，夏寶龍主任訪港亦受到媒體報道和評論熱烈歡迎。後來的區議會改革方案引起廣泛辯論，對地區治理新措施有不同觀點，為整體正面的輿情帶來改變。外國政府不斷發表報告批評香港的法治和自由狀況，使輿情指數從歷史高峰急劇下跌，並在2023年第2季度記錄為139.7點。

習近平向本港學生回信，表達他對年輕一代的殷切期盼，加上特首到東盟外訪拓展商機，令輿情指數早前的跌勢停止。雖然外國持續關注政治發展及人權問題，但是隨著深港河套的創新發展規劃出台及新一屆區議會選舉和委任工作圓滿完成，輿情指數繼續飆升，並在2023年第4季度達到155.3點。

Figure 5: 1C2S MMI (quarterly average)

圖5：「一國兩制」輿情指數（季度結）



	Scores 評分	Changes 變化
2022 Q1	121.4	(↓ 13.1%)
2022 Q2	138.7	(↑ 17.5%)
2022 Q3	146.4	(↑ 7.7%)
2022 Q4	150.1	(↑ 2.9%)
2023 Q1	162.5	(↑ 13.1%)
2023 Q2	139.7	(↓ 22.8%)
2023 Q3	143.2	(↑ 3.5%)
2023 Q4	155.3	(↑ 12.1%)

3.2 傳播媒介變化 Channel variations

Figure 6 shows MMI by media channels, namely TV and radio, newspaper and online-only media. A general pattern emerged as news reported by TV and radio were persistently more positive while online-only media were more critical. This media landscape changed during the year between the second quarters of 2019 and 2020. TV stations, radios, and newspapers joined the chorus of criticism towards 1C2S and produced more negative sentiment than online-only media. After this period, TV stations and radios resumed their regular reporting style. Their sentiment score grew stronger than other channels in a generally positive news event. The distinction between newspapers and online-only media, however, was less and less noticeable. The trend of sentiment generated by these two channels was often intertwined with each other.


In the recent quarter, all channels rose and contributed to an overall increase in MMI. Net sentiment displayed in TV and radio rose by 15.5 points to 160.0, newspaper by 5.5 points to 149.5 and online-only media by 9.5 points to 150.5.


圖6顯示按傳播媒介劃分的輿情指數，即電視電台、報紙和純網媒。普遍現象是電視電台所報道的新聞長期更正面，而純網媒則較嚴厲。這種傳媒生態於2019年第2季至2020年第2季的一年間有所改變。電視台和電台加入對「一國兩制」的集體批評，而且新聞情緒比純網媒更負面。自此之後，電視台和電台回復原先的報道風格，在較為正面的新聞事件中，情緒分數的增幅比其他媒介更強。但是，報紙和純網媒之間的差異則越來越小，這兩種媒介的情緒比過往交疊得更多。

最近季度，所有媒介的評分上升，共同導致輿情指數上升。電視電台上升15.5點到160.0點，報紙上升5.5點到149.5點，純網媒上升9.5點到155.3點。

Figure 6: 1C2S MMI (by media channels)

圖 6：「一國兩制」輿情指數（按傳播媒介劃分）





4. 政治傾向

4. Political Orientation




Figure 7 shows the composition of Hong Kong population by political inclination. Moderates (which include centrists and those without specific political inclination) remained the largest group (74.6%), followed by non-establishment supporters (13.7%) and pro-establishment supporters (8.1%).

Over the last half year, the gap between the moderates and non-establishment supporters narrowed, as the two diverged from each other with a fall of 4 percentage points of the former and an increase of 2.8 percentage points of the latter. The size of pro-establishment supporters expanded by 1.4 percentage points. Some pro-establishment and non-establishment supporters started to identify themselves as moderates, resulting in a driving force of political moderation.

A hopeful trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation continued from mid-2017 to early 2019. The proportion of moderates and pro-establishment in the population rose while that of non-establishment supporters declined. Radicalism resurged abruptly since then, leading to a reversal of trend until the political rift began to heal in early 2020. The pro-establishment camp regained supporters, while the non-establishment shrank from its peak and the moderates rebounded from their bottom.

The steadily declining population in support of political extremity pointed to a narrowing political divide and polarization. It appeared that the subsiding momentum of political controversies, such as the enactment of NSL and electoral reform, began to show in the political makeup of the population.

圖7顯示香港市民的政治傾向。溫和派繼續成為最大組別（74.6%），包括「中間派」和「沒有政治傾向」的市民。非建制派排列第二（13.7%），建制派佔最少（8.1%）。


在過去半年，溫和派及非建制派的佔比差距收窄，前者下跌4個百分點，而後者上升2.8個百分點。建制派的比例上升1.4個百分點。部分建制派和非建制派開始自認為溫和派，推動政治緩和。

去激進化及溫和政治在2017年中至2019年初興起，溫和派與建制派的比例上升，而非建制派則下降。激進主義的突然冒起逆轉了形勢，直至2020年初，政治撕裂才開始癒合。建制派開始增加，而非建制派則由高峰開始收縮，溫和派也從谷底回升。

最新一輪，溫和派及非建制派維持各自的升勢及跌勢。光譜兩極的支持者下跌，政治分野和激進化有收窄的跡象。政治爭議逐步冷卻，例如《港區國安法》的實施和選舉改革，開始在市民的政治面貌中反映出來。

Figure 7: Political inclination of population

圖7：香港市民政治傾向



4.1 香港青年的去激進化 De-radicalisation of youths

Figure 8 shows the change in the composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by political inclination. The proportion of moderates fell by 6.7 percentage points to 66.0%. Non-establishment supporters were further divided into ‘democrats’ and ‘others’, with the latter representing the localist camp. Democrats increased by 5.2 percentage points to 18.5% while other non-establishment supporters rose by 0.2 percentage points to 11.3%. The proportion of pro-establishment supporters fell by 0.2 percentage points to 1.6%.


From mid-2017 to early 2019, there had been encouraging signs of de-radicalization of youths, when the population of moderates was high and rising. This trend, however, was reversed as the proportion of non-establishment supporters witnessed a steep rise, surpassing moderates for some time. Furthermore, within the non-establishment group, localists sometimes overtook democrats. Since mid-2020, the situation of radicalisation clearly eased as the proportion of localists subsided and moderates surpassed the entire non-establishment group.

圖 8顯示青年（18至29歲）的政治傾向變化。溫和派的比列下跌6.7個百分點到66.0%。非建制派可再劃分為「民主派」和「其他」，後者大多為本土派。民主派上升5.2個百分點至18.5%，而本土派上升0.2個百分點至11.3%。建制派下跌0.2個百分點至1.6%。

由2017年中至2019年初，青年溫和派不但高企，還慢慢攀升，呈現令人鼓舞的去激進化跡象。但趨勢急速扭轉，溫和派屈居於急速增長的非建制派之後。更甚者，青年本土派在部分時期超越民主派。2020年中開始，激進化局面緩和，本土派比例下降，溫和派規模更超越整個非建制陣營。


Figure 8: Political inclination of youths

圖8：青年的政治傾向




	Share 佔比	Changes 變化
Pro-establishment 建制派	1.6%	(↓ 0.2%)
Moderates 溫和派	66.0%	(↓ 6.7%)
Non-establishment: Democrats 非建制派：民主派	18.5%	(↑ 5.2%)
Non-establishment: Others 非建制派：其他	11.3%	(↑ 0.2%)





5. 延續「一國兩制」

5. Continuation of 1C2S



An issue of utmost importance for the future of Hong Kong is the continuation of 1C2S. In previous surveys, respondents were asked about whether this constitutional arrangement should be continued beyond 2047, and those who answered 'should' would be asked further about favourable conditions toward such as a goal. This set of questions became irrelevant after the central government assured that this policy must be preserved over the long term. However, it may still serve the purpose of improving and upholding 1C2S by understanding people's needs for a preferred future. Therefore, all respondents were asked to choose what conditions would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S from the following list (they were allowed to choose more than one item):

- Maintaining a high degree of autonomy;
- Maintaining economic prosperity and stability;
- Political system democratises further;
- Maintaining national security; and
- Others (please specify).

Figure 9 shows the percentages of respondents who chose each of the five conditions. Overall, people's preference remained unchanged. 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (56.6%) ranked first. 'Maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (42.5%) came second. 'Maintaining national security' (31.6%) ranked as third and it overtook 'political system democratises further' (29.0%).

Figure 10 shows how the patterns of choice and their stark contrast differed by political inclination. Moderates viewed 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' and 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' as almost equally important. Pro-establishment supporters pursued the former and equally favoured 'maintaining national security'. Non-establishment supporters shared moderates' view by ranking the latter as a key condition but also placed similar emphasis on 'political system democratises further'.

「一國兩制」長期延續乃關乎香港前途的關鍵議題。過去的問卷調查中，受訪者被問及這個制度安排應否延續至2047年後，而回答「應該」的受訪者，會再被邀請選擇對此目標的有利條件。在中央政府保證必須長期堅持「一國兩制」後，這些題目已經完成歷史作用。然而，明白市民關注的議題和對未來的期盼，或有助於維護和改善「一國兩制」。因此，所有受訪者會被邀從下列清單中選出有利於繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（可選擇多於一項）：

- 維持高度自治；
- 經濟維持繁榮穩定；
- 政制進一步民主化；
- 維持國家安全；及
- 其他（請註明）。

圖9顯示市民選擇各條件的比例，受訪者的偏好維持不變。「經濟維持繁榮穩定」排行第一（56.6%），緊接的是「維持高度自治」（42.5%）。「維護國家安全」（31.6%）超越「政制進一步民主化」（29.0%），排行第三。

圖10按政治傾向顯示市民選擇各條件的比例，他們的差異鮮明。溫和派認為「經濟維持繁榮穩定」和「維持高度自治」同等重要。建制派重視「經濟維持繁榮穩定」，亦對「維持國家安全」感到同等重要。非建制派與溫和派同樣認為「維持高度自治」重要，但亦重視「政制進一步民主化」。

For pro-establishment supporters, 'maintaining national security' fell by 12.3 percentage points to 61.1%. Other conditions fluctuated, including a fall in 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (61.6%) by 10.1 percentage points and a fall in 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (43.4%) by 3.8 percentage points.

建制派對「維持國家安全」的重視程度下降，下跌12.3個百分點至61.6%。其他因素亦有變動，包括「經濟維持繁榮穩定」下跌了10.1個百分點（61.6%）和「維持高度自治」下跌3.8個百分點（43.4%）。

Moderates' view remained largely stable, and shares of most of conditions decreased. 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' experienced a decrease of 9.3% but remained the top-ranked condition, surpassing 'maintaining a high-deegree of autonomy' (42.2%)


溫和派對上述項條件的評價保持穩定，幾乎所有條件的比例皆下跌。「經濟維持繁榮穩定」雖下跌9.3個百分點（58.9%），繼續超越「維持高度自治」（42.2%），仍排名第一。

Non-establishment supporters continued to place higher importance on 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (52.2%) with a fall by 6.8 percentage points, matching with a fall of 'political system democratises further' (47.2%) by 13.9 percentage points. 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (50.2%) increased by 5.8 percentage points.

非建制派繼續重視「維持高度自治」，下跌了6.8個百分點（52.2%）。「政制進一步民主化」下跌了13.9個百分點（47.2%），「經濟維持繁榮穩定」（50.2%）則上升5.8個百分點。

Figure 9: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047

圖9：2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件




Note: Answers before 2023 did not include those believed 1C2S 'should not' be continued beyond 2047 (about a quarter of respondents). Readers should take careful note of these changes and their interpretations.

註：2023年前的回應並不包括認為「一國兩制」「不應該」在2047年後延續者（大約四分之一的受訪者選擇此答案）。讀者需小心留意這些改變和其解釋。


Figure 10: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047 (by political inclination)

圖10：有利於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（按政治傾向劃分）




Note: Answers before 2023 did not include those believed 1C2S ‘should not’ be continued beyond 2047 (about a quarter of respondents). Readers should take careful note of this change and its interpretations.

註：2023年前的回應並不包括認為「一國兩制」「不應該」在2047年後延續者（大約四份之一的受訪者選擇此答案）。讀者需小心留意這些改變和其解釋。



6. 市民的身分認同

6. Citizens' Identity



We also surveyed how citizens identify themselves: whether as Hongkongers or Chinese. Figure 11 shows members of the public continued to identify themselves much more strongly as Hongkongers than as Chinese. The scores for these identities started to reconverge since 2022 H2. In the latest round, the divide between them further narrowed as the rating for Hongkongers rose by 5.6% to 8.23, and the rating for Chinese rose by 3.7% to 7.03. The increase of rating for Hongkongers reached a statistically significant level.

The extent to which the public identified themselves as Hongkongers and Chinese can be better demonstrated by Figure 12, a graph mapping the mix of identities rated by respondents against time. On a 0 to 10 scale, the median score of 5 indicates a moderate level of identification. Ratings that are higher than the median indicate relatively strong identification; ratings that are lower than the median indicate relatively weak identification. These levels of strength can be grouped into four categories: dual identity (strong in both identifications), stronger identification as Hongkongers only, stronger identification as Chinese only, and others, which include those without a dominant identity.

Earlier surveys showed a clear pattern that most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both Hongkongers and Chinese. This had gradually changed since mid-2019 and rebounded after hitting rock bottom in mid-2020. Dual identity became the dominant identity again by overtaking 'Hongkonger only' since 2022. The share for dual identity continued to rise by 0.6 percentage points to 60.0% in this round.

Identification as Chinese may not be the same as patriotic, but identification as both Hongkongers and Chinese is a pre-requisite for 'devotion to China and Hong Kong'. The fact that the proportion of Hong Kong people with dual identity is continuing to rebound after months of sharp decline since December 2018 suggests easing societal tension that would doubtlessly be beneficial to the implementation of 1C2S. We have not overlooked the possibility that current persistent international condemnation of China also has an impact on how Hongkongers look at themselves. The importance or otherwise of this will hopefully become clearer in time.

我們分別詢問市民對香港人及中國人身分的認同程度。圖11顯示市民對香港人的認同感繼續強於中國人。兩種身分認同曾經背馳，由2022年下半年開始匯合。最新一輪結果顯示兩種身分的分野縮小，香港人及中國人分別上升5.6%至8.23分及上升3.7%至7.03分。香港人評分的上升達到統計學上的顯著程度。


圖12更清晰地呈現市民對兩種身分的認同程度。按0分至10分的尺度，中位數為5，代表中等認同。高於中位數代表較強認同，低於則代表較弱認同。對兩種身分不同程度的認同可歸為四類：雙重身分（對兩種身分均擁有較強認同）、只對香港人身分有較強認同、只對中國人身分有較強認同，以及包括沒有主要身分的其他身分認同。

香港市民普遍擁有香港人和中國人雙重身分認同，情況自2019年起逐步轉變，從2020年中起重新反彈。自2022年起，雙重身分超過「只有香港人」，重新變成香港市民的主流身分。是次調查中，雙重身分的比例上升0.6個百分點至60.0%。

認同「中國人」身分未必等於「愛國」，不過同時認同「中國人」及「香港人」兩種身分卻是「愛國愛港」的先決條件。市民的雙重認同自2018年12月後下跌，現時逐漸回升；顯示社會緊張慢慢的放緩，無疑地會對有利實施「一國兩制」。現在，國際社會對中國口誅筆伐，對塑造香港人自我認同的作用不能忽略，其影響力需時瞭解。

Figure 11: Citizens' identity scores


圖11：市民的身分認同評分



Note: An asterisk(*) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant.
 註：如此輪次的評分差異達統計上顯著水平，將會以星號(「*」)註明。

Figure 12: Citizens' identity mix

圖12：市民的混合身分認同



6.1 等級相關係數 Rank correlation

Statistical analysis yields the observation that there was a positive correlation between identification as a Hongkonger and as a Chinese. The converse also held true, as the rank correlation coefficient was 0.242 and this was statistically very significant. The finding that the two identities as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' were mutually reinforcing each other provided a strong basis for the implementation of 1C2S.


統計分析發現市民對香港人及中國人身分認同呈現正相關，即越認同香港人身分的市民亦越認同中國人身分，反之亦然。等級相關係數為0.242，統計上非常顯著。結果證實香港人及中國人身分認同相輔相成，是落實「一國兩制」的有利條件。

Table 5: Rank correlation of citizens' identity


表5：市民的身分認同等級相關係數

	2022.1	2022.7	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2
Correlation 相關係數	0.141	0.430	0.332	0.374	0.242
t-statistic t 檢定統計	4.39	14.25	10.32	12.21	7.77





7. 熱門議題 7. Topical Issues



7.1 移民海外 Emigration

Table 6 shows the public's emigration plans. Those who had 'no plans' to emigrate remained the majority (80.8%), exceeding those who 'have plans' (17.9%). The two groups recorded an increase of 5.2 percentage points and an increase of 3 percentage points, respectively. As a result, their net value experienced a fall of 2.1 percentage points since the last round to -62.9%.

Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the net value of different age groups and political inclinations that planned to emigrate, respectively. The greatest increases were witnessed among the 40-49 and 60-69 age groups. The former increased by 5.1 percentage points to -57.3% and the latter by 4.4 percentage points to -77.4% with a statistical significance. For 30-39 age group and 70 or above age groups, the former fell by 15.2 percentage points to -42.5% and the latter fell by 9.7 percentage points to -90.0%.

Expectedly, non-establishment supporters were more likely to have plans to emigrate than respondents of other political inclinations. Their net value fell by 10.1 percentage points to -24.1%. For pro-establishment camp, the net value increased by 1.7 percentage points to -90.3%.

Past studies have suggested that surveys often inaccurately amplify the number of individuals who seek to emigrate, as only a fraction of those who express interest in emigrating eventually do so in reality. Caution should therefore be exercised in interpreting the above findings, though they still provide valuable references of degree and extent of concern. The relaxing of immigration requirements by 'popular' countries in response to the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law might also mean that plans to emigrate might not necessarily be induced by a lack of confidence in 1C2S or the socio-political situation of Hong Kong but simply seen as 'opportunities not to be missed' by those who had wanted to immigrate in any event.

表6顯示市民的移民計劃。「無打算」移民的人數(80.8%)依然是多數,遠遠拋離「有打算」者(17.9%),兩者分別錄得5.2及3個百分點升幅。比較上一輪調查,淨值下跌了2.1個百分點至-62.9%。

圖13和圖14分別顯示按年齡組別及政治派別劃分的市民移民計劃的百分比。最大的上升來自40-49歲和60-69歲組別,前者上升了5.1個百分點至-57.3%,後者上升了4.4個百分點到-77.4%,而且達到統計學上顯著程度。至於30-39歲及70歲或以上,前者淨值下跌了15.2個百分點到-42.5%,而後者淨值則下跌了9.7個百分點到-90.0%。

一如預期,非建制派比其他派別更有計劃移民。該組別的移民淨值為-24.1%,下跌了10.1個百分點。建制派的移民淨值上升1.7個百分點至-90.3%。

根據過往研究,在民調中聲稱移民的人數,往往遠超真正移民的人數。民調結果雖有一定參考價值,但要小心解讀。溫和派聲稱無信心而計劃移民,一方面可能是對中央政府及建制派不滿,另一方面亦可能是擔心非建制派破壞社會穩定,例如覺得激進政治將會損害香港法治及經濟,兩種可能性皆不能排除。除此之外,就《港區國安法》的實施,多國以放寬移民門檻向北京施壓,不能排除有人視之為不能缺失的機會,並不一定是對「一國兩制」失去信心的表現。

Table 6: Public's emigration plans

表6：市民移民海外的計劃

	2022.1	2022.7	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2
Have Plans 有打算	23.0%	15.8%	12.3%	14.9%	17.9%
No Plans 無打算	65.7%	74.4%	78.1%	75.6%	80.8%
Don't Know 唔知道	11.3%	9.8%	9.5%	9.5%	1.3%
Net Value 淨值	- 42.7%	-58.6%	-65.8%	-60.8%	-62.9%


Net Value: The percentage of those who chose 'Have Plans' minus the percentage of those who chose 'No Plans'.

淨值：認為「有打算」的百分比減去認為「無打算」的百分比



Figure 13: Public's emigration plans (by age group)


圖 13：市民移民海外的計劃（按年齡組別劃分）



Note: An asterisk(*) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant.
 註：如此輪次的評分差異達統計上顯著水平，將會以星號(「*」)註明。

Figure 14: Public's emigration plans (by political inclination)

圖 14：市民移民海外的計劃（按政治傾向劃分）



7.2 前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願 Willingness of living or working in other cities of Greater Bay Area (GBA)

Table 7 shows the willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA. The proportion of those who were 'willing' to live or work in the GBA was 6.9%, and those 'unwilling' was 57.7%, leading to an increase in net willingness by 5.3 percentage points to -50.9%. This result is statistically significant.

Figure 15 and Figure 16 show the willingness to live or work in other cities of the GBA by age group and by political inclination, respectively. Net values of all age groups rose. Those who aged 30-39 experienced the strongest increase among all age groups, with a rise in net value by 12.6 percentage points to -54.1%. Net willingness of those aged 60-69 and 50-59 increased by 9.4 and 7.9 percentage points to -47.0% and -40.8% respectively. The changes in 30-39 and 60-69 age groups reached statistical significance.

Net willingness of supporters of all political camps also increased, except for non-establishment supporters. The net willingness of pro-establishment supporters rose by 3 percentage points to -25.0%. Among moderates, it increased by 9 percentage points to -47.4% with statistical significance. Non-establishment supporters saw a fall of 4.5 percentage points to -79.8%.

表7顯示受訪者前往大灣區居住或工作的意願。願意前往大灣區的受訪者有6.9%，不願意的則有57.7%，導致淨值上升5.3個百分點到-50.9%，達統計學上顯著水平。

圖15和圖16分別顯示按不同年齡組別和政治傾向劃分的北上大灣區居住或發展的意願。所有年齡組別的淨值皆上升。在所有組別中，30-39歲以上的淨值上升幅度最大，上升了12.6個百分點至-54.1%。60-69歲和50-59歲組別則分別上升了9.4和7.9個百分點至-47.0%和-40.8%。30-39歲及60-69歲組別淨值的改變達到統計學上的顯著程度。

除了非建制派外，其餘政治傾向組別的淨值上升。建制派的淨值上升了3個百分點至-25.0%；溫和派的淨值上升了9個百分點至-47.4%，達到統計學上顯著程度；而非建制派的淨值下跌了4.5個百分點至-79.8%。

Table 7: Willingness of living or working in other cities of Greater Bay Area (GBA)

表7：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願

	2022.1	2022.7	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2
Willing 會考慮	5.6%	4.5%	3.4%	5.1%	6.9%
Not willing 不會考慮	66.5%	69.6%	75.2%	61.3%	57.7%
Maybe / Don't Know 或者 / 唔知道	27.9%	25.9%	21.3%	33.6%	34.2%
Net Value 淨值	-60.9%	-65.2%	-71.8%	-56.2%	-50.9%*

Net Value: The percentage of those who chose 'Willing' minus the percentage of those who chose 'Not willing'.

淨值：「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比

Note: An asterisk(*) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant.
註：如此輪次的評分差異達統計上顯著水平，將會以星號(「*」)註明。

Figure 15: Willingness of living or working in GBA(by age group)
圖 15：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 16: Willingness of living or working in GBA(by political inclination)
圖 16：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願（按政治傾向劃分）



Note: An asterisk(*) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant.
註：如此輪次的評分差異達統計上顯著水平，將會以星號(「*」)註明。

7.3 對香港教育制度的信心 Confidence in the education system of Hong Kong

Table 8 shows the level of confidence that the public displayed in relation to the education system of Hong Kong. Respondents showing confidence in the education system of Hong Kong fell with a drop of 2.5 percentage points to 39.1%. Those who opted for the opposite rose by 6.2 percentage points to 43.6%. Thus, this led to a sharp decrease of 8.7 percentage points in net value, reaching -4.5% with statistical significance.

Figure 17 and Figure 18 show the level of confidence in the education system of Hong Kong, segmented by age group and by political inclination, respectively. All age groups experienced a fall in net value except aged 70 or above. The net value of the 40-49 age group had the greatest fall among all groups, with a decrease by 16.5 percentage points to -26.1%. Age groups of 60-69 and 50-59 experienced falls over 10 percentage points, and their net values were 17.8% and -0.9% respectively. The changes for 40-49 and 60-69 age groups reached statistically significant level.

The net value of non-establishment supporters rose by 14.4 percentage points to -57.6%, while the net value of moderates decreased by 8.9 percentage points to -2.6% and it was statistically significant. In addition, the net value of pro-establishment supporters increased by 7.6 percentage points to 58.6%.

表8顯示市民對香港教育制度的信心。對教育制度有信心的受訪者下跌，減少了2.5個百分點至39.1%，無信心的比例上升了6.2個百分點至43.6%。因此，淨值大幅下跌了8.7個百分點至-4.5%，達統計學上的顯著水平。

圖17和圖18分別顯示按不同年齡組別和政治傾向劃分的對香港教育制度的信心。除70歲或以上外，所有年齡組別的淨值皆下跌。40-49歲的淨值下跌了16.5個百分點至-26.1%。60-69歲及50-59歲組別則分別下跌了超過10個百分點至17.8%及-0.9%。而其中，40-49歲至60-69歲淨值的改變達到統計學上的顯著程度。

非建制派支持者的淨值上升了14.4個百分點至-57.6%，而溫和派淨值則下跌了8.9個百分點至-2.6%，其改變達到統計學上顯著程度。除此之外，建制派的淨值上升7.6個百分點至58.6%。

Table 8: Confidence in the education system of Hong Kong

表8：對香港教育制度的信心

	2022.1	2022.7	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2
Confident 有信心	18.7%	26.7%	29.6%	41.6%	39.1%
Not Confident 無信心	67.8%	40.6%	40.8%	37.4%	43.6%
Half-half 一半半	11.3%	29.5%	24.2%	18.7%	14.8%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	2.2%	3.2%	5.5%	2.3%	2.6%
Net Value 淨值	-49.2%	-13.9%	-11.2%	4.2%	-4.5% *

Net value: The percentage of those who chose 'Confident' minus the percentage of those who chose 'Not Confident'.
淨值：「有信心」的百分比減去「無信心」的百分比

Note: An asterisk(*) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant.
註：如此輪次的評分差異達統計上顯著水平，將會以星號(「*」)註明。

Figure 17: Confidence in the education system of Hong Kong (by age group)

圖 17：對香港教育制度的信心（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 18: Confidence in the education system of Hong Kong (by political inclination)

圖 18：對香港教育制度的信心（按政治傾向劃分）



Note: An asterisk(*) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant.
 註：如此輪次的評分差異達統計上顯著水平，將會以星號(「*」)註明。

7.4 對公務員服務水平的滿意度 Satisfaction with the performance of civil service

Table 9 shows the level of satisfaction that the respondents demonstrated in the performance of the civil service. Respondents who were satisfied with the performance decreased by 8.7 percentage points to 40.7%. Those who were dissatisfied increased by 8.3 percentage points to 35.9%. These changes resulted in a large fall in net value to 4.8% and such a change was statistically significant.

Figure 19 and Figure 20 show the level of satisfaction with the performance of the civil service by age group. Net values of all age groups fell sharply except aged 30-39. The net value for 30-39 age group rose by 8.6 percentage points to -14.8%. Net values for the 60-69 and 50-59 age groups were 13.4% and 8.3% respectively despite of decreases of 29.4 percentage points and 21.8 percentage points, the only two positive net values among all ages. The changes of 40-49, 50-59 and 60-69 age groups reached statistical significance.

Net values for supporters of all stances varied in changes. For non-establishment supporters, their net value fell by 4.4 percentage points to -33.1%. Meanwhile, net values of pro-establishment rose by 6 percentage points to 58.0%, and those of moderates fell by 14.5 percentage points to 6.5%.

表9顯示受訪者對公務員服務水平的滿意度。表示滿意的受訪者下跌8.7個百分點至40.7%。不滿意的受訪者上升了8.3個百分點至35.9%。因此，淨值大幅下跌至4.8%，達至統計學上的顯著程度。

圖19和圖20分別顯示按不同年齡組別和政治傾向劃分的對公務員服務水平的滿意度。除了30-39歲外，其餘年齡組別的淨值大幅下降。30-39歲的淨值上升了8.6個百分點至-14.8%。60-69歲和50-59歲組別的淨值，雖然分別大幅下跌了29.4個百分點和21.8個百分點至13.4%和8.3%，它們依然在所有組別中唯一兩個擁有正數淨值。40-49歲、50-59歲和60-69歲淨值的變動達到統計學上顯著程度。

不同政治傾向的支持者淨值亦有變動。非建制派支持者的淨值下跌了4.4個百分點至-33.1%，溫和派和建制派的淨值分別下跌了14.5個百分點和上升6個百分點至6.5%和58.0%。其中，溫和派淨值的變動達到統計學上顯著程度。

Table 9: Level of satisfaction in the performance of civil service

表9：對公務員服務水平的滿意度

	2022.1	2022.7	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2
Satisfied 滿意	26.2%	42.6%	40.3%	49.4%	40.7%
Dissatisfied 不滿意	49.2%	29.8%	26.9%	27.6%	35.9%
Half-half 一半半	21.7%	25.8%	29.9%	19.7%	21.5%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	3.0%	1.7%	3.0%	3.3%	1.9%
Net Value 淨值	-23.0%	12.8%	13.4%	21.8%	4.8%*

Net value: The percentage of those who chose 'Satisfied' minus the percentage of those who chose 'Dissatisfied'.

淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比

Note: An asterisk(*) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant.

註：如此輪次的評分差異達統計上顯著水平，將會以星號(「*」)註明。

Figure 19: Level of satisfaction in the performance of civil service (by age group)

圖19：對公務員服務水平的滿意度（按年齡組別劃分）






Figure 20: Level of satisfaction in the performance of civil service (by political inclination)

圖20：對公務員服務水平的滿意度（按政治傾向劃分）




Note: An asterisk(*) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant.
 註：如此輪次的評分差異達統計上顯著水平，將會以星號(「*」)註明。



8. 近期政治事件

8. Recent Political Events



8.1 公眾對國家《憲法》的認識

Public's knowledge about National Constitution

Table 10 shows public's knowledge about the National Constitution. Respondents opted for 'familiar' and 'unfamiliar' both increased, along with a decrease in 'don't know / difficult to say'. More respondents (48.5%) believed that they were unfamiliar with the Constitution than those who felt familiar (30.1%). 18.9% of respondents deemed half-half. As a result, the net value was -18.3%.

表10顯示公眾對國家《憲法》的認識。較多受訪者表示不認識（48.5%），而表示認識（30.1%）受訪者大約為三成。18.9%的受訪者表示一半半。因此，淨值為-18.3%。

Table 10: Public's knowledge about National Constitution

表 10：公眾對國家《憲法》的認識

	2023.7	2024.2
Familiar 認識	28.9%	30.1%
Unfamiliar 不認識	47.6%	48.5%
Half-half 一半半	15.5%	18.9%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	7.9%	2.5%
Net Value 淨值	-18.7%	-18.3%
Average 平均分	4.15	4.22

Net value: The percentage of those who chose 'Familiar' minus the percentage of those who chose 'Unfamiliar'.
淨值：「認識」的百分比減去「不認識」的百分比

8.2 新選舉制度對香港管治的影響

Impact of new electoral systems to Hong Kong's governance

Table 11 shows the perceived impact of new electoral systems for Legislative Council and District Council to the governance of Hong Kong. More respondents believed that it would have a negative impact (31.9%) than a positive impact (25.0%). 30.3% of respondents deemed that there would be no impact. Altogether, the net value was recorded at -6.9%.

表11顯示公眾認為立法會和區議會的新選舉制度對香港管治的影響。較多受訪者相信這會帶來負面影響（31.9%）多於正面影響（25.0%），30.3%的受訪者認為這會沒有影響。因此，淨值為-6.9%。

Table 11: Impact of new electoral systems to Hong Kong’s governance

表 11：新選舉制度對香港管治的影響

	All Respondents 所有受訪者
Positive impact 正面影響	25.0%
Negative impact 負面影響	31.9%
No impact 沒有影響	30.3%
Don’t know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	12.9%
Net Value 淨值	-6.9%

Net value: The percentage of those who chose ‘Positive Impact’ minus the percentage of those who chose ‘Negative Impact’.
淨值：「正面影響」的百分比減去「負面影響」的百分比

8.3 對立法會表現的滿意度 Satisfaction with the performance of Legislative Council

Table 12 the level of satisfaction that the respondents demonstrated in the performance of Legislative Council. More respondents (49.1%) felt dissatisfied than the ones who felt satisfied (31.9%). 15.6% of respondents deemed that it was half-half. Altogether, the net value was recorded at -17.2%.

表12顯示公眾對立法會的滿意度。較多受訪者（49.1%）感到不滿，感到滿意的受訪者只有31.9%。同一時間，15.6%的受訪者認為一半半。因此，淨值為-17.2%。

Table 12: Level of satisfaction in the performance of Legislative Council

表 12：對立法會的滿意度

	All Respondents 所有受訪者
Satisfied 滿意	31.9%
Dissatisfied 不滿意	49.1%
Half-half 一半半	15.6%
Don’t know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	3.4%
Net Value 淨值	-17.2%

Net value: The percentage of those who chose ‘Satisfied’ minus the percentage of those who chose ‘Dissatisfied’.
淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比

8.4 代溝與政治鴻溝 Generation gap and political divide

Table 13 and Table 14 are summaries of the net values generated from questions about selected political controversies, further categorized by age and political inclination.

表13及表14總結公眾對近期政治爭議的淨值，並按年齡及政治傾向劃分。

There were unambiguous patterns in how respondents of different ages and political inclinations react to these controversial events. Generally, the net values increase with age and decrease as the political inclination move away from the pro-establishment end. For instance, the 18-29 age group and non-establishment supporters were the most critical about the political controversies, while pro-establishment supporters tended to produce the highest net values, often the only positive net values in any category.

受訪者的年齡及政治傾向對於爭議事件的取態有明確關係。一般而言，淨值隨年齡增長而上升，並隨政治傾向偏離建制派而下降。例如，18-29歲組別及非建制派對政治爭議評價尤其負面。建制派通常給予最高淨值，有時更是所有組別中唯一的正值。

Taking the extreme views displayed by different political camps into account, the stance of moderates is valuable as a reference point signalling the general public's opinions towards the topical issues. As for this round, moderates' view towards the impact of new electoral systems on governance was again independent from the pro-establishment and non-establishment camps, suggesting that rationality and pragmatism are rooted in the Hong Kong community.

有別於其他政治派別的極端觀點，溫和派在這些熱點問題上的立場甚具參考價值，表明公眾的看法。就今輪而言，溫和派對新選舉制度如何影響香港管治有別於建制派與非建制派，反映社會仍有理性務實的聲音。

Table 13: Generation gap over selected political events (by age group)


表 13：對選定政治事件之代溝（按年齡劃分）

	Legislation against False Information 虛假資訊立法 (2023.1)	Public's knowledge about Constitution 對《憲法》的認識 (2023.7)	National Security Law 《港區國安法》 (2023.7)	Legislation on crowdfunding activities 立法規管眾籌活動 (2023.7)	New electoral systems 新選舉制度 (2024.2)
18-29	-40.3%	-48.9%	-41.5%	-35.8%	-26.1%
30-39	-40.1%	-49.4%	-50.5%	-35.0%	-23.7%
40-49	-7.8%	-31.2%	-6.5%	-9.8%	-20.0%
50-59	-5.6%	-17.4%	3.7%	-1.5%	-7.1%
60-69	1.6%	9.5%	25.2%	0.0%	5.3%
≥ 70	18.8%	15.2%	16.3%	2.2%	21.0%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-10.7%	-18.7%	-6.8%	-12.3%	-6.9%


Table 14: Political divide over selected political events (by political inclination)

表 14：對選定政治事件之政治鴻溝（按政治傾向劃分）

	Legislation against False Information 虛假資訊立法 (2023.1)	Public's knowledge about Constitution 對《憲法》的認識 (2023.7)	National Security Law 《港區國安法》 (2023.7)	Legislation on crowdfunding activities 立法規管眾籌活動 (2023.7)	New electoral systems 新選舉制度 (2024.2)
Pro-establishment 建制派	65.0%	48.6%	81.5%	48.3%	46.3%
Moderates 溫和派	-8.2%	-23.1%	-6.0%	-12.3%	-4.1%
Non-establishment 非建制派	-56.6%	-33.0%	-68.6%	-53.1%	-57.1%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-10.7%	-18.7%	-6.8%	-12.3%	-6.9%



I. 編製方法 I. Methodology



1. 編製「一國兩制」指數 1. Construction of 1C2S Index

We construct a conceptual framework to capture the current situation of 1C2S through 3 pillars based on public opinion and 3 pillars based on international perception. The 3 pillars on public opinion are Hong Kong public's evaluation compiled from telephone polls on the implementation of 1C2S. The 3 pillars on international perception are compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on the state of freedom and democracy in the world. Each pillar has 4 sub-pillars. As such, we create a measurement system comprising 6 pillars and 24 sub-pillars. An equal weight is given to sub-pillars to produce a pillar score. The 1C2S Index is the simple average of all 6 pillar scores. Table 15 below lists out the 6 pillars and 24 sub-pillars used in our index.

我們建構一個觀念框架以量度香港實踐「一國兩制」的情況，基於民意調查的3項支柱及國際評價的3項支柱。民意調查的3項支柱是取自香港市民在電話調查中對落實「一國兩制」的評分。國際評價的3項支柱取自國際智庫就全球自由和民主狀況而製作的相關指數。每項支柱各設4項子支柱，使此指標體系共6項支柱和24項子支柱。每項子支柱賦予均等權重，以計算支柱的分數。「一國兩制」指數是6項支柱的簡單平均分數。表 15 列出指數所使用的6項支柱和24項子支柱。



Table 15 : Pillars and sub-pillars of 1C2S Index

表15：「一國兩制」指數的支柱和子支柱

Pillar 支柱	Sub-pillar 子支柱			
Public Opinion 民意調查	A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治	A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務 A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權 A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權 A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」		
	B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由	B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式 B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社和集會自由 B3. Democratic development 民主發展 B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護		
	C. Hong Kong-Mainland Relations 陸港關係	C1. Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾 C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益 C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定 C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落实「一國兩制」		
	Perception International 國際評價	D. Economic Openness 經濟開放	D1. Business environment 營商環境 D2. Market access 市場門檻 D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素 D4. Financial stability 金融穩定	
		E. Civil Liberty 公民權利	E1. Rule of law 法治 E2. Security and safety 安全 E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會 E4. Individual rights 個人權利	
		Perception International 國際評價	F. Democratic Development 民主發展	F1. Constraints on power 權利制約 F2. Political pluralism 政治多元 F3. Civic participation 公民參與 F4. Democratic culture 民主文化

1.1. Public Opinion

We obtain 3 pillar and 12 sub-pillar scores on the implementation of 1C2S from our telephone polls conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Every sub-pillar is represented by one survey question. Table 16 shows the survey questions asked to obtain the sub-pillar scores. Each round, about 1,000 individuals will be randomly sampled by the CATI (computer-assisted telephone interviewing) system. All of the respondents aged 18 or above and spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin. To better represent the distribution of the Hong Kong population, all data are weighted by the proportion of gender and age of people aged 18 or above (excluding foreign domestic helpers) according to the Census and Statistics Department.

Table 17 shows the statistical and scientific standards of each survey. The telephone surveys have started to employ a dual-frame sampling design since 2021 H1. It randomly selects phone numbers from a combined sample of residential landline and mobile phone numbers. Given many individuals may own both landline and mobile phone numbers, additional steps are taken in the weighting method to avoid estimation inaccuracy caused by double-counting or other unknown factors. The calculations are detailed in the below sub-section.

In the telephone poll, many questions employed 1 to 7 as the rating scale in the survey process, with 4 as the median. This scale, which is known as the Likert scale, is commonly adopted for psychological assessments. This scale is used instead of a 0 to 10 scale as the latter is deemed too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents to choose from. However, to better conform to existing indices – which tend to be expressed on a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median) – we converted the results mathematically into the popular 0 to 10 scale.

1.1. 民意調查

我們委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查，以整合市民對落實「一國兩制」的3項支柱和12項子支柱評分。每一條問卷問題代表一項子支柱。表 16顯示每項子支柱相應的問卷問題。每輪的電話調查會以電腦輔助電話訪問系統，隨機抽樣，訪問大約1,000人，全部皆屬18歲或以上，能操廣東話或普通話。進行分析時，數據依照香港政府統計處的18歲或以上性別及年齡分佈（扣除外籍家庭傭工）作加權處理，以更符合香港人口分佈的真實情況。

表17每輪電話調查的統計和科學標準。電話調查部分於2021上半年起採用雙框抽樣設計，從家居固網電話號碼及流動電話號碼的結合樣本群中隨機抽取號碼。由於大部分人同時擁有家居固網電話號碼及流動電話號碼，為免重複計算或其他不明原因帶來的估算偏差，加權的計算方法將於下一個章節詳細解釋。

電話調查中，多數題目採用1至7分的評分尺度，以4分為中位數。這是心理學常用的科學尺度，稱為李克特量尺。現時編製指數常採用0至10分的尺度，其實分類過於細緻，令市民難以選擇。不過為了與現行指數匹配，是以我們利用數學方法將調查結果轉換成為常見的0至10分尺度（以5分為中位數）。

Table 16: Questions on public opinion

表16：民意調查問題

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Survey Question 民調問題
A1	'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to practice a high degree of autonomy, and has been able to handle its own internal administrative affairs. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港實行到高度自治，自行處理特區嘅行政事務。你有幾同意呢？」
A2	'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent judiciary powers. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅司法權。你有幾同意呢？」
A3	'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent legislative powers. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅立法權。你有幾同意呢？」
A4	'How successful has the practice of "Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong" been?' 「整體嚟講，你認為落實『港人治港』有幾成功呢？」
B1	'After the handover, the original ways of life of the Hong Kong people have maintained. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港人繼續維持原有嘅生活方式。你有幾同意呢？」
B2	'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論、結社同集會自由。你有幾同意呢？」
B3	'After the handover, the development of Hong Kong's democratic system has been progressively implemented, following the provision of the Basic Law. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港嘅民主政制發展，正係按照基本法嘅規定，循序漸進地落實。你有幾同意呢？」
B4	'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capabilities, identities and social classes. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港人不論經濟能力、身份同社會地位都能夠得到法律保護。你有幾同意呢？」
C1	'When conflicts between mainland China and Hong Kong arise, how confident are you that the conflicts can be resolved through consultation and dialogue?' 「對於當內地同香港出現嘅矛盾時，兩地可透過對話協商得以解決，你有幾大信心呢？」
C2	'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to keep intact the sovereignty of China, national security and profits from development projects. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港可以做到維護國家主權、安全和發展利益。你有幾同意呢？」
C3	'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain long-term prosperity and stability. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港能夠維持到長期繁榮穩定。你有幾同意呢？」
C4	'How confident are you in the full implementation of "One Country, Two Systems" in Hong Kong in the future (before 2047)?' 「你有幾大信心香港嚟未來（即2047年前）能全面落實『一國兩制』呢？」

Table 17: Survey details

表17：調查概況

Round 輪次	Survey Period 調查日期	Number of Respondents 受訪人數			Response Rates 回應率		Confidence Level 置信水平	Sampling Error 抽樣誤差
		Landline	Mobile	Total	Landline	Mobile		
		固網	手機	總數	固網	手機		
2017 H1	5.23 - 6.3	1,002	-	1,002	36.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2017 H2	12.11 - 12.23	1,006	-	1,006	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018 H1	5.23 - 6.2	1,004	-	1,004	37.2%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018 H2	12.3 - 12.12	1,001	-	1,001	38.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2019 H1	5.27 - 6.6	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
*	7.24 - 8.7	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
*	10.17 - 10.31	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2019 H2	12.10 - 12.20	1,000	-	1,000	40.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2020 H1	6.9 - 6.29	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2020 H2	12.22 - 1.13	1,002	-	1,002	32.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2021 H1	6.21 - 7.9	498	503	1,001	30.9%	31.4%	95.0%	±3.10%
2021 H2	12.20 - 1.10	497	506	1,003	30.6%	30.0%	95.0%	±3.09%
2022 H1	6.23 - 7.11	481	521	1,002	26.9%	28.2%	95.0%	±3.10%
2022 H2	12.15 - 1.18	474	531	1,005	24.4%	26.7%	95.0%	±3.09%
2023 H1	6.13 - 7.18	432	578	1,010	16.6%	23.3%	95.0%	±3.08%
2023 H2	1.12 - 2.29	248	763	1,011	31.4%	38.2%	95.0%	±3.08%

Note: “*” denotes surveys conducted in addition to the biannual exercise.

註：「*」為半年調查的額外輪次。

1.1.1. Weighting method for dual-frame sampling

In dual-frame sampling, weighting adjustments are made for the ownership of phone numbers in addition to the distribution of the Hong Kong population. Since each individual owns a different amount of landline and mobile numbers, each has a different probability of selection as respondents. To eliminate over-representation of any individual, the first weight factor (WT1) approximates the probability of selection for each respondent. It is a ratio of the amount of landline and mobile numbers owned by a respondent to the total number of those in the territory. WT1i is calculated by the inverse of probability of selection of individual i, i.e. $WT1i = \pi_i^{-1}$.

1.1.1. 雙框電話號碼取樣的加權方法

在雙框電話號碼取樣中，除了以香港人口的分布作調整外，亦需要為擁有手提電話這個因素作出調整。由於每人擁有不同數目的固網及流動電話號碼，他們被抽中的機率也有不同。為剔除任何一人被超額代表的機會，第一步驟是估算每名受訪者被隨機抽中的機會率，即以每位受訪者擁有家居固網電話號碼和手機號碼數目，對比全港家居固網電話及手機號碼總數。加權因子1 (WT1i) 之計算方式為受訪者i被抽中訪問的逆向機會率，即 $WT1i = \pi_i^{-1}$ 。

$$\pi_i = \frac{n_L}{N_L} \times \frac{t_i^L}{e_i^L} + \frac{n_m}{N_m} \times t_i^m$$

Where 當中 i = *i-th person selected* 第*i*名被抽中的人士
 n_L = *amount of sample's landline numbers* 家居固網電話號碼樣本數目
 N_L = *amount of population's landline numbers* 全部家居固網電話號碼總數
 t_i^L = *amount of i-th person's landline numbers* 第*i*名人士家中擁有的固網電話號碼數目
 e_i^L = *amount of eligible respondents in the household* 住戶中合資格受訪人數
 n_m = *amount of sample's mobile numbers* 手機號碼樣本數目
 N_m = *amount of population's mobile numbers* 全部手機號碼總數
 t_i^m = *amount of i-th person's mobile numbers* 第*i*名人士個人擁有的手機號碼數目

Sampling in telephone surveys is randomized by phone numbers without demographic consideration. The second weight factor (WT2) adjusts the size of every sample group to match population distribution in terms of gender and age. WT2 is calculated by dividing the population estimates of a gender and age group by its sample size and the sample's probability of selection.

電話調查的隨機抽樣是電話號碼，沒有考慮人口特徵。加權因子2 (WT2) 按性別和年齡，調整每一個抽樣群組以配合人口分布。加權因子2是將性別和年齡分布的人口估算中除以樣本大小和樣本的選擇概率。

$$WT2 = \frac{\text{group population estimates}}{\text{group sample size} \times WT1}$$

$$WT2 = \frac{\text{每組人口估算}}{\text{每組樣本大小} \times WT1}$$

The final weighting factor (WT_F) is calculated by the following formula.

最後加權因子計算如下。

$$WT_F = WT1 \times WT2 \times \frac{\text{total sample size}}{\text{total population estimates}}$$

$$WT_F = WT1 \times WT2 \times \frac{\text{總樣本大小}}{\text{總人口估算}}$$

Where 當中 WT_F = final weighting factor 最後加權因子
 WT1 = weight factor adjusting for the ownership of phone numbers 調整電話號碼的加權因子
 WT2 = weight factor adjusting for the distribution of the Hong Kong population 調整香港人口分布的加權因子

1.2 International perception

We obtain 3 pillar and 12 sub-pillar scores on the state of freedom and democracy in the world from tracking indices compiled by international think tanks. Every sub-pillar is derived from multiple indicators. They offer a wide coverage of scopes and territories enabling us to compare Hong Kong's position on the global stage with an 1C2S perspective. There are two selection criteria for data sources. First, their datasets must cover Hong Kong to allow a direct comparison. Second, their indicators must capture key areas of 1C2S that draw international attention. Also, every data source has a different geographic coverage, only locations observed by at least three quarters of all data sources are included. As a result, 127 indicators from 9 data sources are adopted in our model to score and rank 148 countries and territories. Tables below show the list of indicators and their sources. Data sources include:

1.2. 國際評價

我們收集國際智庫編製的長期追蹤指數，以整合國際社會對世界自由民主狀況的3項支柱和12項子支柱評分。每項子支柱均由多個指標組成，這些指標涵蓋廣泛的範疇和地區，使我們能夠用「一國兩制」視角，在全球舞台上比較香港的地位。我們按兩個原則選擇數據來源：一、它們的數據集必須涵蓋香港，以便進行直接比較；二、它們的指標必須涵蓋國際社會所關心的「一國兩制」關鍵領域。此外，每個數據來源也有不同的地理覆蓋範圍，我們只採納所有數據來源中，最少獲四分之三涵蓋的地區。因此，我們的模型採用來自9個數據來源的127個指標對148個國家和地區進行評分和排名。以下列表顯示指標清單及其來源。數據來源包括：

- Cato Institute and Fraser Institute: Human Freedom Index (HFI);
- Economist Intelligence Unit: Democracy Index (DI);
- Freedom House: Freedom in the World (FiW);
- International Institute for Management Development (IMD): World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY);
- Reporters Without Borders: World Press Freedom Index (WPF);
- V-Dem Institute: V-Dem Dataset (V-Dem);
- World Bank: Doing Business Index (DB);
- World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Index (GCI); and
- World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index (RoLI).

Table 18: List of indicators on international perception (D. Economic Openness)

表18：國際評價之指標列表（D. 經濟開放）

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
D1. Business Environment 營商環境	Business facilitation 方便營商	D1.1	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.10 Burden of government regulation	GCI	1-7
		D1.2	5C Business regulations	EFW	0-10
		D1.3	Paying Taxes	DB	0-100
		D1.4	Resolving Insolvency	DB	0-100
	Labour market 勞動市場	D1.5	Pillar 8: Labour market	GCI	0-100
		D1.6	Business Efficiency- 3.2 Labor Market	WCY	0-100
D2. Market Access 市場門檻	Free trade 自由貿易	D2.1	4 Freedom to trade internationally	EFW	0-10
		D2.2	Pillar 7: Product market - Trade openness	GCI	0-100
		D2.3	Trading across Borders	DB	0-100
	Market competition 市場競爭	D2.4	Starting a Business	DB	0-10
		D2.5	Government Efficiency - 2.4 Business Legislation	WCY	0-100
		D2.6	Business Efficiency - 3.5 Attitudes and Values	WCY	0-100
		D2.7	Pillar 7: Product market - Domestic competition	GCI	0-100
D3. Regulatory Quality 監管質素	Protection of property rights 保障私有產權	D3.1	2C Protection of property rights	EFW	0-10
		D3.2	Infrastructure- 4.3.21 Intellectual property rights	WCY	0-10
		D3.3	Pillar 1: Institutions - Property rights	GCI	0-100
	Enforcement of contracts 履行合約	D3.4	2F Legal enforcement of contracts	EFW	0-10
		D3.5	Government Efficiency - 2.3.09 Legal and regulatory framework	WCY	0-10
		D3.6	Enforcing Contracts	DB	0-100
		D3.7	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes	GCI	1-7
	Corporate governance 企業管治	D3.8	Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Auditing and accounting practices	WCY	0-10
		D3.9	Pillar 1: Institutions - Corporate governance	GCI	0-100
		D3.10	Protecting Minority Investors	DB	0-100
D4. Financial Stability 金融穩定	Public finance 公共財政	D4.1	3 Sound Money	EFW	0-10
		D4.2	Government Efficiency - 2.1.07 Public finance	WCY	0-10
		D4.3	Pillar 4: Macroeconomic stability	GCI	0-100
	Money market 金融市場	D4.4	5A Credit market regulations	EFW	0-10
		D4.5	Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Banking and financial services	WCY	0-10
		D4.6	Getting Credit	DB	0-100
		D4.7	Pillar 9: Financial system	GCI	0-100

Table 19: List of indicators on international perception (E. Civil Liberty)

表19：國際評價之指標列表（E. 公民權利）

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
E1. Rule of Law 法治	Judicial independence 司法獨立	E1.1	F. Rule of Law - F1. Is there an independent judiciary?	FiW	0-4
		E1.2	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.07 Judicial independence	GCI	0-100
	Civil and criminal justice 民事與刑事公義	E1.3	F. Rule of Law - F2. Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?	FiW	0-4
		E1.4	Government Efficiency - 2.5.01 Justice	WCY	0-10
		E1.5	Factor 7: Civil Justice	RoLI	0-1
		E1.6	Factor 8: Criminal Justice	RoLI	0-1
	Equal protection 平等保障	E1.7	F. Rule of Law - F4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?	FiW	0-4
		E1.8	Access to justice	V-Dem	0-1
	Regulatory enforcement 監管執法	E1.9	Factor 6: Regulatory Enforcement	RoLI	0-1
		E1.10	Rigorous and impartial public administration	V-Dem	0-4
		E1.11	Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	V-Dem	0-4
E2. Security and Safety 安全	Absence of crime 杜絕犯罪	E2.1	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.01 Organized crime	GCI	1-7
		E2.2	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.04 Reliability of police services	GCI	1-7
		E2.3	Factor 5: Order and Security - 5.1 Crime is effectively controlled	RoLI	0-1
	Right to life 生存權利	E2.4	B Security and Safety - Bi Homicide	PFI	0-10
		E2.5	F. Rule of Law - F3. Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?	FiW	0-4
			E2.6	Physical violence index	V-Dem
		E2.7	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights - 4.2 The right to life and security of the person is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Civil conflict and terrorism 內戰與恐怖主義	E2.8	B Security and Safety - Bii. Disappearances, conflicts, and terrorism	PFI	0-10
		E2.9	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.03 Terrorism incidence	GCI	0-100
		E2.10	Factor 5: Order and Security - 5.2 Civil conflict is effectively limited	RoLI	0-1
E3. Expression, Association and Assembly 表達、結社與集會	Expression 表達	E3.1	F Freedom of Expression- Fi Press Killed	PFI	0-10
		E3.2	F Freedom of Expression- Fii Press Jailed	PFI	0-10
		E3.3	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief - D1. Are there free and independent media?	FiW	0-4
		E3.4	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief - D3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?	FiW	0-4
		E3.5	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief - D4. Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?	FiW	0-4
		E3.6	World Press Freedom Index	WPFI	0-100
		E3.7	Freedom of expression index	V-Dem	0-1
		E3.8	Alternative sources of information index	V-Dem	0-1
		E3.9	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights - 4.4 Freedom of opinion and expression is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Association and Assembly 結社和集會	E3.10	E. Associational and Organizational Rights	FiW	0-12
		E3.11	Freedom of peaceful assembly	V-Dem	0-4
		E3.12	CSO entry and exit	V-Dem	0-4
		E3.13	CSO repression	V-Dem	0-4
		E3.14	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights - 4.7 Freedom of assembly and association is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1

* Combined with E3.1 to reflect a revision from Cato Institute.

* 因應卡托研究所之修訂，與E3.1合併。

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
E4. Individual Rights 個人權利	Religion 宗教	E4.1	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief- D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?	FiW	0-4
		E4.2	Freedom of religion	V-Dem	0-4
		E4.3	Religious organization repression	V-Dem	0-4
		E4.4	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights- 4.5 Freedom of belief and religion is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Movement 遷徙	E4.5	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights- G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?	FiW	0-4
		E4.6	Freedom of domestic movement	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.7	Freedom of foreign movement	V-Dem	0-4
	Labour 勞動	E4.8	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights- G4. Do individuals enjoy equality opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation?	FiW	0-4
		E4.9	Government Efficiency- 2.5.11 Equal opportunity	WCY	0-10
		E4.10	Freedom from forced labor	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.11	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights- 4.8 Fundamental labor rights are effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Property rights 私有產權	E4.12	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights- G2. Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors?	FiW	0-4
		E4.13	Property rights	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.14	Relationship Freedoms	PFI	0-10
	Relationship 關係	E4.15	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights- G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?	FiW	0-4
		Privacy, non-discrimination and equal treatment 私隱、非歧視和平等對待	E4.16	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights- 4.1 Equal treatment and absence of discrimination	RoLI
	E4.17		Factor 4: Fundamental Rights- 4.6 Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1

Table 20: List of indicators on international perception (F. Democratic Development)

表20：國際評價之指標列表（F. 民主發展）

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
F.1. Constraints on Power 權利制約	Executive check 制約行政權	F1.1	Functioning of government	DI	0-100
		F1.2	Factor 1: Constraints on Government Powers	RoLI	0-1
		F1.3	Judicial constraints on the executive index	V-Dem	0-1
		F1.4	Legislative constraints on the executive index	V-Dem	0-1
		F1.5	C. Functioning of Government- C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?	FiW	0-4
	F1.6	Pillar 1: Institutions- 1.08 Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations	GCI	0-100	
	Absence of corruption 杜絕貪腐	F1.7	C. Functioning of Government- C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?	FiW	0-4
		F1.8	Government Efficiency- 2.3.13 Bribery and corruption	WCY	0-10
		F1.9	Political corruption index	V-Dem	0-1 (inverted 倒數)
		F1.10	Factor 2: Absence of Corruption	RoLI	0-1

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
F2. Political Pluralism 政治多元	Electoral process 選舉過程	F2.1	A. Electoral Process	FiW	0-12
		F2.2	Electoral process and pluralism	DI	0-100
		F2.3	Clean elections index	V-Dem	0-1
		F2.4	Share of population with suffrage	V-Dem	0-1
		F2.5	Disclosure of campaign donations	V-Dem	0-4
	Political competition 政治競爭	F2.6	B. Political Pluralism and Participation - B2. Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?	FiW	0-4
		F2.7	B. Political Pluralism and Participation - B3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?	FiW	0-4
		F2.8	Public campaign finance	V-Dem	0-4 z score
		F2.9	Divided party control index	V-Dem	z 分數
		F2.10	Elected officials index	V-Dem	0-1
	Party development 政團發展	F2.11	B. Political Pluralism and Participation - B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?	FiW	0-4
		F2.12	Barriers to parties	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.13	Party ban	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.14	Opposition parties autonomy	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.15	Party institutionalization index	V-Dem	0-1
F3. Civic Participation 公民參與	Political rights and awareness 政治權利與意識	F3.1	B. Political Pluralism and Participation - B4. Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?	FiW	0-4
		F3.2	Political participation	DI	0-100
		F3.3	Mass mobilization	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.4	Civil society participation index	V-Dem	0-1
	Citizen engagement 公民參與	F3.5	Engagement in state-administered mass organizations	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.6	Engagement in independent trade unions	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.7	Engagement in independent political associations	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.8	Engagement in independent non-political associations	V-Dem	0-4
	Transparency and open government 政務公開	F3.9	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.06 Budget transparency	GCI	0-100
		F3.10	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.12 E-participation	GCI	0-100
		F3.11	C. Functioning of Government - C3. Does the government operate with openness and transparency?	FiW	0-4
		F3.12	Factor 3: Open Government	RoLI	0-1
		F3.13	Government Efficiency - 2.3.11 Transparency	WCY	0-10
F4. Democratic Culture 民主文化	Public attitude 大眾態度	F4.1	Political culture	DI	0-100
		F4.2	Deliberative component index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.3	Political Polarization	V-Dem	0-4 (inverted 倒數)
		F4.4	Political violence	V-Dem	0-4 (inverted 倒數)
		F4.5	Factor 5: Order and Security - 5.3 People do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances	RoLI	0-1
Political equality 政治平等	F4.6	Equal protection index	V-Dem	0-1	
	F4.7	Equal access index	V-Dem	0-1	
	F4.8	Equal distribution of resources index	V-Dem	0-1	

1.2.1. Aggregation method for composite indicators

International indices are often released with a considerable time lag due to the extensive data compilation from a large number of countries. Very few indicators are collected for release in the immediate index period. Hence, we offset the time difference by rolling data forward to the release date. In other words, indicators are assigned to the index period in which they become available. Figure 21 shows the number of indicators by years offset. An alternative approach is to backdate data to the collection period. However, this approach has three disadvantages. No change will be observed in the latest issue because new scores are applied to an earlier period. Our biannual report will always record identical values in the first and second halves because most datasets are compiled on a yearly basis. Published scores will be revised substantially in the subsequent issue because indicators are updated retrospectively. It is noteworthy that backdating or time offsetting affects only the presentation of historical scores. Both approaches produce the latest pillar scores based on the latest available data.

Countries and territories covered by insufficient data sources are omitted in our model. For remaining included locations, an imputation process is carried out to replace missing data. Countries and territories are categorized into 7 regions according to the World Bank region groups. When a missing value arises, it is substituted with the regional average of recorded values. To standardize the range of data values, the complete dataset is transformed into a common scale by min-max normalisation as the below formula. For each indicator in each index period, the frontier value will be rescaled to 10 and the bottom value to 0. Even if a country or territory has the same raw score over time, its normalized score can be changed due to a change in the minimum or maximum value of the data series.

1.2.1. 綜合指數的整合方法

搜集大量國家數據需時，因此國際指數出版的時一般會滯後，只有少數指標能夠即期發布。因此，我們會將數據向前滾動至出版日期，以補上時間落差。換言之，當國際智庫一發布最新指標，我們便會馬上更新至即期指數。圖21顯示經年期調整之指標數目。另外值得考慮的方法，是將數據回溯至它們的收集時期，但是有三個缺點。第一，我們的評分在每次發布時不會有改變，因為新分數只會被更新至較早的收集時期。第二，我們在上半年和下半年公布的數字往往會相同，因為大部分國際指數只會每年更新一次。第三，已發布的數字會在期後報告大幅修訂，因為指標只會往後更新。值得注意的是，向前滾動或向後回溯只會影響歷史分數如何呈現。發布時，它們的最新評分將會相同，因為兩者皆以最新數據去計算最新分數。

數據來源不足的國家或地區將會被省略，如尚有缺失的數據，我們將會以插補方式填補。我們根據世界銀行的標準將所有地區歸類為7個地理組別，並以該地理組別中有紀錄的平均值去填補缺失的數據。為將各個指標的高低範圍標準化，整個數據庫會以最小—最大標準化方式轉換至一個共同尺度，公式如下。每個時期的每個指標中，最高的數值將會被縮放為10，最低的數值則會是0。隨著一項指標的最低或最高值改變，即使一個國家或地區在不同時期擁有相同的原始分數，經標準化後的分數亦有機會改變。


$$\text{normalized score 標準化分數} = \frac{x_i - \min(x)}{\max(x) - \min(x)}$$

A sub-pillar score is generated by its indicators with weights determined by principal component analysis. It is a standard statistical method that processes and simplifies data scientifically in index construction. It extracts a dataset's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains variations across the data through the below statistical analysis. Table 21 shows the weights of every indicator in recent index periods. Measuring about 60 countries and territories only, the coverage of IMD's World Competitiveness Yearbook is significantly smaller than other data sources. As there are more missing than recorded entries, we will assign a zero weight to IMD indicators for unobserved countries and territories instead of imputing with sub-regional average. The weights of available indicators from the remaining data sources will be enlarged proportionately.

子支柱分數整合自多個指標，而各個指標的權重由主成分分析產生。這是一種分析和簡化數據的統計技術，是以科學化方式編製指數的標準方法。此方法通過對數據進行特徵分解，以得出數據的主要成分與它們的權值，優點是揭露數據的內部結構，從而更好解釋數據的變化。表21顯示近期指數的各個指標權重。IMD世界競爭力年報只覆蓋約60個國家和地區，比其他數據來源的覆蓋量顯然較少，缺失的數值比有紀錄的更多。所以，未被收錄的國家或地區，我們會將相關指標的權重調整為零，而非以地理組別的平均值填補，其他數據來源的權重則會按比例地增大。

Figure 21: Number of indicators by offsetting years

圖21：經年期調整之指標數目



Offsetting Years 年期調整	Changes 變化
2021 H2	1.20 +0.29
2022 H1	1.09 -0.11
2022 H2	1.35 +0.27
2023 H1	1.27 +0.08
2023 H2	1.53 +0.18

Table 21: PCA weights(%)

表 21：主成分權重（%）

D. Economic Openness 經濟開放						E. Civil Liberty 公民權利					F. Democratic Development 民主發展						
	2021 H2	2022 H1	2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2	2021 H2	2022 H1	2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2	2021 H2	2022 H1	2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2		
D1.1	11.8	12.1	12.9	13.9	21.8	E1.1	9.1	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.2	F1.1	12.4	12.4	12.5	12.4	12.4
D1.2	20.2	20.6	19.4	19.8	21.7	E1.2	7.4	7.1	7.1	7.0	7.2	F1.2	12.6	12.6	12.8	12.5	12.5
D1.3	18.6	18.8	19.1	19.6	16.1	E1.3	10.4	10.6	10.6	10.5	10.5	F1.3	11.1	11.1	11.1	10.8	10.8
D1.4	16.9	17.3	16.9	17.0	10.4	E1.4	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.8	2.9	F1.4	8.6	9.3	9.3	9.6	9.5
D1.5	22.2	22.5	22.7	23.2	19.7	E1.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.6	10.7	F1.5	10.0	10.1	10.1	10.0	9.9
D1.6	10.4	8.7	9.1	6.6	10.3	E1.6	10.8	10.8	10.8	10.9	10.8	F1.6	5.0	4.9	4.8	4.9	4.9
D2.1	14.8	14.6	14.5	14.7	15.9	E1.7	8.6	8.7	8.7	8.7	8.6	F1.7	12.5	12.6	12.5	12.4	12.4
D2.2	15.3	15.2	15.1	15.3	15.3	E1.8	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	F1.8	4.2	3.6	3.6	4.1	4.2
D2.3	13.5	13.8	13.2	13.5	13.4	E1.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	F1.9	12.6	12.4	12.3	12.2	12.2
D2.4	9.9	11.6	11.2	11.1	11.5	E1.10	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.1	10.0	F1.10	11.1	11.0	11.1	11.0	11.1
D2.5	17.1	16.2	16.9	16.7	16.0	E1.11	9.6	9.5	9.5	9.7	9.7	F2.1	9.6	9.6	9.7	9.5	9.5
D2.6	11.5	9.6	10.1	9.6	9.0	E2.1	10.2	10.2	10.1	10.2	9.8	F2.2	9.4	9.3	9.2	9.2	9.1
D2.7	17.9	18.9	19.1	19.2	18.8	E2.2	10.6	10.6	10.5	10.6	10.2	F2.3	8.1	8.0	8.0	7.7	7.7
D3.1	13.3	13.1	13.1	13.2	12.7	E2.3	11.1	11.2	11.1	11.2	11.2	F2.4	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.5
D3.2	11.7	10.7	10.7	11.2	10.8	E2.4	5.1	5.1	4.6	4.7	5.2	F2.5	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.3	5.4
D3.3	13.7	13.5	13.5	13.8	13.8	E2.5	13.6	13.6	13.9	13.6	13.6	F2.6	9.5	9.4	9.4	9.4	9.3
D3.4	10.5	10.3	10.3	10.3	12.2	E2.6	11.1	10.8	11.0	10.8	10.7	F2.7	8.6	8.7	8.7	8.6	8.6
D3.5	4.5	6.5	6.5	5.3	4.7	E2.7	14.2	14.3	14.2	14.1	13.7	F2.8	3.7	3.8	3.8	4.1	4.1
D3.6	8.2	8.0	8.0	8.1	8.0	E2.8	12.7	12.8	13.1	13.0	13.8	F2.9	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
D3.7	9.7	10.5	10.5	10.2	9.5	E2.9	5.2	5.1	4.8	4.9	4.4	F2.10	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.9	5.0
D3.8	9.8	9.6	9.6	10.0	9.6	E2.10	6.3	6.4	6.8	7.0	7.3	F2.11	9.8	9.9	9.9	9.8	9.8
D3.9	10.9	10.4	10.4	10.6	10.7	E3.1	0.0	0.0	2.8	2.8	2.8	F2.12	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.2	8.1
D3.10	7.7	7.3	7.3	7.4	7.8	E3.2	3.2	3.0	-	-	-	F2.13	6.1	6.2	6.2	6.0	6.1
D4.1	15.6	15.9	15.5	15.9	17.4	E3.3	8.5	8.4	8.4	8.3	8.3	F2.14	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.9
D4.2	9.2	7.0	8.6	7.4	6.0	E3.4	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.2	8.2	F2.15	6.9	6.5	6.6	6.7	6.7
D4.3	21.3	21.6	22.1	23.0	22.5	E3.5	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.4	8.3	F3.1	13.3	12.9	12.8	12.7	12.7
D4.4	11.8	12.6	8.8	9.0	11.1	E3.6	8.0	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.8	F3.2	13.0	13.0	13.0	12.7	12.8
D4.5	14.9	15.5	17.1	16.3	14.8	E3.7	8.8	8.9	8.9	8.7	8.8	F3.3	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.2
D4.6	5.8	6.5	6.3	6.4	7.0	E3.8	7.6	7.9	7.8	7.6	7.6	F3.4	11.1	10.8	10.8	10.3	10.2
D4.7	21.4	21.0	21.7	22.2	21.3	E3.9	7.1	7.1	7.2	7.2	7.1	F3.5	7.0	6.3	6.3	7.3	7.2
						E3.10	8.7	8.7	8.7	8.7	8.8	F3.6	4.4	4.8	4.8	5.1	4.8
						E3.11	7.6	7.7	7.7	8.1	8.1	F3.7	4.0	3.8	3.7	4.9	4.7
						E3.12	8.1	8.1	8.0	8.1	8.1	F3.8	2.6	2.8	2.8	3.3	3.1
						E3.13	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	F3.9	10.5	10.3	10.2	9.8	10.3
						E3.14	7.4	7.4	7.6	7.6	7.5	F3.10	7.5	7.5	7.4	7.0	7.4
						E4.1	6.1	6.1	6.0	6.0	5.9	F3.11	13.9	14.1	14.1	13.5	13.4
						E4.2	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.5	F3.12	12.2	12.1	12.3	11.7	11.7
						E4.3	5.7	6.0	5.9	5.9	5.8	F3.13	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.5
						E4.4	6.5	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	F4.1	12.6	13.3	13.1	13.1	12.8
						E4.5	8.1	7.9	7.9	7.8	7.8	F4.2	12.8	13.1	13.0	13.4	13.5
						E4.6	6.0	6.2	6.1	6.9	6.9	F4.3	8.2	7.2	7.1	6.3	6.4
						E4.7	5.4	5.6	5.6	5.9	6.0	F4.4	10.8	11.0	10.9	10.3	10.3
						E4.8	8.0	7.9	7.9	7.8	7.8	F4.5	9.0	8.7	9.2	9.1	9.3
						E4.9	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	F4.6	17.0	16.3	16.4	16.7	16.6
						E4.10	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.1	5.1	F4.7	13.8	14.1	13.9	14.4	14.3
						E4.11	6.3	6.2	6.2	6.1	6.1	F4.8	15.8	16.3	16.4	16.5	16.7
						E4.12	8.2	8.0	7.9	7.9	7.8						
						E4.13	6.2	6.3	6.2	6.3	6.3						
						E4.14	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.1	4.3						
						E4.15	7.1	7.0	7.0	6.8	6.8						
						E4.16	4.4	4.3	4.6	4.4	4.5						
						E4.17	6.6	6.5	6.6	6.6	6.6						

1.3. Revisions and refinement

After the first survey in June 2017, our questionnaire for public opinion was refined in the 2017 H2, 2020 H2 and 2022 H1 rounds to increase validity. These refinements include change of wordings and addition and removal of questions, affecting five of the twelve questions used to compute public opinion scores. Scores of the other seven questions are directly comparable as they are identical in all surveys. Table 22 and Table 23 show the history of the refinement of our questionnaire and the score differences from it respectively.

We have expanded the measurement system for international perception with more indicators and data sources since the 2022 H1 report to enhance objectivity. Figure 22 compares every country's score in the original and revised measurement systems in the same index period. The overall correlation is very strong. Despite a broader selection of indicators leads to slight score differences, both systems are consistent with the performance of a country.

Table 22: Revisions of questions on public opinion

表22：民意調查問題之修訂

Round 輪次	Revision 修訂
2017 H2	Removed 'After the handover, the internal affairs of Hong Kong have not been interfered with by the central and local governments of China. To what extent would you agree?'
2017 H2	Revised 'After the handover, the way of life of the Hong Kong people has not been affected by mainland China. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain their original way of life. To what extent would you agree?'
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?'
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests. To what extent would you agree?'
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain prosperity and stability in the long term. To what extent would you agree?'
2022 H1	Revised 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedom of speech.' to 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly.'
2022 H1	Revised 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capability, identity and social status. To what extent would you agree?'

1.3. 修訂與調整

在2017年6月進行第一次調查之後，我們的民意調查問卷在2017下半年、2021上半年和2022上半年的輪次中經歷三次修訂，以提高調查的應用性。修訂包括更改調查問題的用字，增加或移除問題，過程影響到民意調查評分中的5條問題，另外7條問題在所有調查均相同，評分可以直接比較。表 22和表 23分別顯示調查問題的修訂歷史和得分差異。

為加強國際評價的客觀性，我們在2022上半年擴展了國際評價的指標體系，採納更多的指標和數據來源。圖22比較每個國家在原有和修訂後的指標體系中，同一指數時期的得分，顯示整體相關性非常強。儘管指標數量增加導致分數略有差異，但每個地區的得分在兩個指標體系之中表現一致。


Table 23: Score difference due to revisions of questions on public opinion

表23：修訂民意調查問題之評分差距

Round 輪次	Identical 相同	Revised 修訂	Difference 差距
2017 H1	4.70	4.84	0.14
2017 H2	4.67	4.98	0.31
2018 H1	4.78	5.05	0.27
2018 H2	4.59	4.84	0.25
2019 H1	4.30	4.58	0.28
2019 H2	3.27	3.53	0.26
2020 H1	3.15	3.39	0.24
2020 H2	3.15	3.62	0.47
2021 H1	3.19	3.62	0.43
2021 H2	3.64	4.02	0.38
2022 H1	4.35	4.71	0.36
2022 H2	4.59	4.98	0.39
2023 H1	4.89	5.22	0.33
2023 H2	4.95	5.21	0.26

Figure 22: Score difference of revised measurement systems on international perception

圖22：修訂國際評價指標體系後之評分差距



2. 編製「一國兩制」輿情指數 2. Construction of 1C2S Mass Media Index

We build up a massive dataset by collecting media articles that contain the keyword ‘One Country, Two Systems’ from news database. Our sample consists of 244,505 news reports from 6 television and radio stations, 21 local daily newspapers and 10 online-only media that were published between April 1998 and June 2023. Each article undergoes a ‘tokenisation’

我們以關鍵字「一國兩制」搜集新聞文章，組成累計244,505篇報道的龐大數據庫，包含1998年4月至2023年6月期間，來自本地6間電視電台、21份日報和10間純網媒。我們就每篇文章進行「分詞」，通過電腦運算將文章分解成語例（單詞或短語）。我們利用超過20年的資料組成語料庫，

process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of over 20 years, our text corpus contains around 118 million tokens. The number of articles processed from each media source is listed in Table 25.

Common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as pronouns, prepositions and particles, are first removed before further analysis. To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: 'positive', 'negative' or 'neutral'. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by the Natural Language Processing and Sentiment Analysis Lab, Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica.

An article is made up of paragraphs. For each paragraph, net sentiment is calculated by the difference between the number of positive and negative words divided by the total word count. At the article level, a net sentiment score is then derived by averaging the net sentiment of its constituent paragraphs with the below equation. To each news source, a daily net sentiment score is further assigned by averaging the score of all articles published in the past 30 days. This time frame of 30 days is a reporting standard of the media industry. MMI is set at 100 on the base day of 1 January 2021.

$$\text{net sentiment score 情緒評分} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \frac{(a_i - b_i)}{w_i}}{N}$$

People often receive news from multiple sources and channels. Since there are substantial differences in the number of news articles published by various sources and in the number of viewership via various channels, the article count of a news source alone could be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure 1C2S MMI's reliability, the sentiment score for each news source is weighted by public perceptions of its credibility based on the survey 'Public Evaluation on Media Credibility' conducted by the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, The Chinese University of Hong Kong and each media channel is weighted based on people's main sources of news from the survey 'Appraisal of the Local News Media' conducted by Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute.

包含大約1億180萬個語例。表25顯示每份報章所運算的文章數量。

在進一步分析這個龐大的語料庫之前，我們首先剔除無助理解文章的常見單詞，如代詞、介詞和助詞。為了辨別一篇文章的情緒，我們採用由台灣中央研究院資訊科學研究所自然語言處理與情感分析實驗室開發的繁體中文情緒字典，把語例分類為「正面」、「中立」或「負面」。

每篇文章由段落組成。我們首先計算每一段落中，正負語例數量的相差，再除以整個段落的字數。每篇文章的情緒評分則為所有段落的平均值，見以下方程式。每個新聞來源的每日情緒評分為過去30日所有出版文章的平均分數。媒體行業習慣以30日作為報告單位。輿情指數在2021年1月1日設定為基數日。

N = total number of paragraphs 段落總數

i = the *i*th paragraph 第*i* 個段落

a_i = number of positive words 正面語例數目

b_i = number of negative words 負面語例數目

w_i = total number of words 正面語例數目

市民一般從多個新聞來源和傳播媒介取得資訊。由於不同媒體在不同媒介刊登的文章數目、接觸人數有明顯差別，因此，只考慮文章數目不足以呈現不同媒體對讀者觀感的影響力。為確保可靠性，本指數將採用由香港中文大學傳播與民意調查中心「市民對傳媒公信力的評分」為每個新聞來源的情緒評分加權，以及由香港民意調查中心「新聞傳媒評價」中市民的主要新聞來源為每個傳播媒介的覆蓋度加權。

Table 24: Articles processed in 1C2S MMI

表24：輿情指數之處理報道數

	2022 Q4	2023 Q1	2023 Q2	2023 Q3	2023 Q4	Database Total 數據庫總量
TV & Radio 電視電台	888	649	544	478	765	26,973
Cable TV / Hong Kong Open TV 有線電視 / 香港開電視	57	69	29	22	42	996
Commercial Radio 商業電台	88	90	72	59	90	3,565
Metro Radio 新城電台	130	104	75	81	80	2,478
Now TV	149	124	94	119	181	5,697
RTHK 香港電台	313	214	180	150	280	8,968
TVB 無綫電視	151	48	94	47	92	5,269
Newspaper 報章	4,240	3,083	2,884	2,527	3,185	209,229
am730	115	78	78	73	106	5,131
Apple Daily 蘋果日報	-	-	-	-	-	13,076
Headline Daily 頭條日報	24	28	16	-	-	1,721
Hong Kong Commercial Daily 香港商報	298	208	141	160	218	19,153
Hong Kong Daily News 新報	-	-	-	-	-	4,476
Hong Kong Economic Journal 信報	183	118	122	129	141	6,133
Hong Kong Economic Times 經濟日報	70	64	71	64	60	9,395
Lion Rock Daily 香港仔	58	33	26	20	42	651
Metro Daily 都市日報	-	-	-	-	-	1,528
Ming Pao Daily News 明報	191	137	126	118	156	15,655
Oriental Daily News 東方日報	113	74	44	22	28	10,345
South China Morning Post 南華早報	35	19	21	13	18	707
Sharp Daily 爽報	-	-	-	-	-	152
Sing Pao 成報	32	50	31	32	59	5,464
Sing Tao Daily 星島日報	425	277	289	202	260	16,494
Sky Post 晴報	17	11	10	7	-	833
Ta Kung Pao 大公報	1,321	920	957	823	1,018	47,192
The Standard 英文虎報	5	4	-	5	3	107
The Sun 太陽報	-	-	-	-	-	4,828
Tin Tin Daily News 天天日報	-	-	-	-	-	452
Wen Wei Po 文匯報	1,353	1,062	952	859	1,076	45,736
Online-Only Media 純網媒	602	794	629	513	776	25,130
Bastille Post 巴士的報	227	504	389	246	388	11,422
Citizen News 眾新聞	-	-	-	-	-	1,186
HK01 香港01	318	246	199	225	306	8,586
Hong Kong Free Press 香港自由新聞	-	2	4	5	6	44
Initium Media 端傳媒	9	2	4	3	9	177
In-Media 獨立媒體	-	-	-	4	28	510
Passion Times 熱血時報	35	37	30	29	38	659
Post 852 852 郵報	-	-	-	-	-	631
Speak Out HK 港人講地	13	3	3	1	1	55
Stand News 立場新聞	-	-	-	-	-	1,860
Total 總數	5,730	4,526	4,057	3,518	4,726	261,332

2.1. Accuracy test

1C2S MMI is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict. In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time. As shown in Table 26, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as 'positive' whereas 1,472 were classified as 'negative.'

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be. Table 26 also shows the average sentiment scores of these three groups of paragraphs. In particular, 'positive' paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as 'negative' paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these three groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.

Table 25: Results of accuracy test

表25：覆查結果



	Positive 正面	Neutral 中立	Negative 負面
No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers 真人研究員對情緒的判斷	2,363	14,202	1,472
Net Value 情緒淨值	21.76%	14.42%	2.92%

2.1. 準確度覆查

「一國兩制」輿情指數是建基於由詞彙組成的模型。此模型視每段落為一籃子的詞語，從而抽離整篇文章的脈絡。其中一個效果是可能無法辨認到如諷刺等寫作手法，因而不能完全理解每一個段落的真正含義。這個局限在分析小說及文學作品時可能較為明顯，但對於寫作手法較直接的新聞文章而言，相信不是一個大問題。

為證實此詞彙模型辨別情緒的準確度，我們請兩位研究員從語料庫中隨機抽取了約18,000個段落，親自分類為「正面」、「負面」和「中立」，再與詞彙模型比較。各段落的出處在給予研究員之前已經被隱藏。假如兩名研究員對同一個段落的情緒判斷有異，第三名研究員將會重讀並作出判斷。是次覆查中，兩名研究員在大約八成的情況下均能作出相同的判斷。

我們利用與「一國兩制」輿情指數相同的詞彙模型為此等段落的情緒評分。在模型中，情緒評分為正、負面詞語量的淨值，所以評分愈高代表情緒愈正面。表25顯示利用詞彙模型計算的情緒評分。2,363及1,472個段落分別被判決為「正面」及「負面」。被研究員判斷為「正面」的段落，情緒評分為21.76%，約為「負面」段落的7.5倍。再者，利用多變量回歸分析，三個類別的情緒評分發現具統計學上的顯著差異，證實詞彙模型的計算結果與我們研究員的人手分類一致。



II. 相應調查

II. Comparable Surveys

1. 「一國兩制」觀感


1. Perception of 1C2S

Our 1C2S Index reflects local and international perceptions of areas such as Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, human rights and freedom, democratic development, economic openness, and Hong Kong-Mainland relations. We conduct telephone surveys and collect data from international think tanks every six months. Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (HKPORI, formerly Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong) also conducts telephone surveys quarterly to gauge public confidence in 1C2S. Respondents are asked, 'Generally speaking, are you confident in "One Country Two Systems"?' Figure 23 shows that these surveys display a similar trend with a decline from mid-2017 to late-2019 followed by a gradual rebound.

我們的「一國兩制」指數每半年進行電話調查及收集國際數據，為高度自治、人權自由、民主發展、經濟開放、陸港關係等範疇評分，反映香港市民與世界各地對「一國兩制」的觀感。香港民意研究所（香港民研，前身為香港大學民意研究計劃）亦有訪問香港市民對「一國兩制」的信心，每三個月進行電話調查，問題為「咁整體黎講，你對一國兩制有冇信心？」。圖 23顯示這兩項調查的趨勢相近，自2017年中開始下滑至2019年底，其後慢慢上升。

Figure 23: Comparable survey on perception of 1C2S

圖23：「一國兩制」觀感的相應調查




2. 輿情與民情 Media sentiment and public opinion

We use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S covered by TV stations, radios, newspapers and online media. 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) measures daily net sentiment of media reports. It is calculated monthly and reported quarterly. As media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion, we compare it with HKPORI's Public Sentiment Index (PSI). PSI quantified Hong Kong people's sentiments towards the prevailing societal, economic and political climate. It appraises the concepts of 'good governance' and 'social harmony' by evaluating the overall government performance and social conditions. Figure 24 shows both MMI and PSI oscillated in 2017 and 2018, bottomed in 2019 and embarked on a path of recovery.

我們利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒，計算電視電台、報紙和純網媒上所有與「一國兩制」有關文章的情緒淨值，每月編製「一國兩制」輿情指數，每季度結算。媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素，我們將之與香港民研的「民情指數」比較。「民情指數」反映公眾對政治、社會和經濟環境的情緒反應，包涵「政通」和「人和」兩個概念，評價整體政府管治表現和整體社會狀況。圖24顯示輿情指數與民情指數於2017年及2018年上下浮動，2019年觸底並自此復甦。

Figure 24: Changes of MMI and PSI

圖 24：輿情指數與民情指數走勢



3. 政治傾向 Political Orientation

We ask citizens about their political inclination in our half-yearly survey and classify them as pro-establishment supporters, non-establishment supporters (including democrats, localists, and self-determinists), and moderates (including centrists and those without specific political inclination). HKUPOP conducted telephone surveys every two

我們在每半年的電話調查中詢問市民的政治傾向，統稱為建制派、非建制派（包括民主派、本土派和自決派）和溫和派（包括中間派和沒有政治取態）。港大民研每兩星期進行電話調查，其間統計市民的政治傾向，並對外公布2016年10月至2019年6月的數據。脫離香港大學後，香港民研

weeks to collect citizens' political inclination and results from October 2016 to June 2019 were released. After spinning off from the University of Hong Kong, HKPORI launches the 'We Hong Kongers' series and invites citizens to fill out questionnaires via email almost every week. Results are rim-weighted to obtain political inclination of the online group. The Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (HKIAPS) of the Chinese University of Hong Kong conducts regular telephone surveys to assess popularity of the chief executive of the HKSAR government. Political inclination of respondents has become part of its release since 2020.


Political inclination identified by HKPORI and HKIAPS, while termed differently, aligned closely with our classification. Moderates in our survey correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the centrist camp' and 'no political inclination / politically neutral / not belong to any camp' and HKIAPS' 'no specific inclination'. Non-establishment supporters correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the pro-democracy camp' and 'inclined towards the localist camp' and HKIAPS' 'non-establishment'. Pro-establishment supporters correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the pro-establishment camp' and HKIAPS' 'pro-establishment'. Figure 25 shows that both surveys are consistent with our findings. A trend of deradicalization was witnessed from mid-2017 to late-2019, followed by a rapid formation and dissolution of non-establishment supporters in the immediate year and the rise of moderate politics since mid-2020.

的「我們香港人」計劃接近每星期以電郵邀請市民填寫問卷，數據經過反覆多重加權，得出網上群組的政治傾向。香港中文大學香港亞太研究所（亞太所）定期就特首民望進行電話調查，自2020年起同時公布訪者的政治傾向。

雖然香港民研與亞太所對各種政治傾向有不同名稱，但是大致能夠對應我們的分類。我們的建制派對應前者的「傾向建制派」和後者的「建制」，非建制派對應前者的「傾向民主派」與「傾向本土派」和後者的「非建制」，溫和派對應前者的「偏向中間派」與「沒有政治傾向／政治中立／不屬於任何派別」和後者的「沒有明確傾向」。圖 25顯示兩項調查與我們的發現吻合，同時反映2017年中至2019年中的去激進化，其後非建制在一年間急速冒起並退減，以及自2020年中興起的溫和政治。

Figure 25: Comparable surveys on citizen's political inclinations

圖25：市民政治傾向的相應調查



4. 身份認同 Citizens' Identity

Two types of questionnaire design are commonly used to track citizens' self-identity in Hong Kong, the 'dominant identity' design and the 'multiple identity' design. A 'dominant identity' design classifies one's identity either as 'Hongkonger' or 'Chinese', and in some cases, includes certain mixed identities, e.g. 'Chinese in Hong Kong', 'Hongkonger in China' and 'both'. Respondents are compelled to select only one among two or more identities. If proportionally more people choose one category, the proportions of other categories must go down.

We adopt a 'multiple identity' design which uses separate questions to measure citizens' identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese'. This approach allows a possible scenario where a citizen identifies oneself more or less strongly as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' simultaneously. Furthermore, the source data enable us to categorize citizens into four dominant identities: strong identification as Hongkongers only, strong identification as Chinese only, dual identity with strong identifications in both and others which include those without a dominant identity.

HKPORI's identity survey employs both the 'multiple identity' and 'dominant identity' questionnaire designs. Respondents first rate their identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' separately. After that, they will choose one amongst these four categories: 'Hongkonger', 'Chinese', 'Chinese in Hong Kong and 'Hongkonger in China'. Although HKPORI releases results of both designs, media in Hong Kong focuses on the first part only as it is more popular in public surveys. The proportion of citizens that identify themselves strongly as both 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' cannot be reflected.

Figure 26 shows the ratings of citizens' identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' from HKPORI and us using a 'multiple identity' design. Both surveys suggest that the 'Hongkonger' identity maintained high in 2020 and then declined. The 'Chinese' identity recovered from its lowest level in 2019 and 2020. Figure 27 shows results from HKPORI and us using a 'dominant identity' design. HKPORI refers 'Chinese in Hong Kong' and 'Hongkongers in China' as 'mixed identities', which corresponds to our 'dual identity'. Both surveys suggest that the majority of Hong Kong society possess a 'dual identity', while being temporarily overtaken by 'Hongkonger only' from 2019 to mid-2021, it has resurged to become the primary identity since late-2021.

香港的身分認同調查有兩種問卷設計：「主要身分」及「多元身分」兩種。以「主要身分」設計的調查一般將身分認同歸類為「香港人」及「中國人」兩種，或者再加入「香港的中國人」、「中國的香港人」、「兩者皆是」等多種混合身分。受訪者需要從兩種或多種身分中，選擇其中一種，如果認同其中一種身分的比例增加，認同其他身分的比例必定減少。

我們的調查採用「多元身分」的問卷設計，用獨立問題要求市民分別對「香港人」及「中國人」的認同感評分，能夠反映市民可能對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身分認同同時加強，或同時減弱。然後利用原始數據判斷市民的「主要身分」，歸為四類：只對香港人身分有較強認同、只對中國人身分有較強認同、對兩種身分均擁有較強認同的雙重認同，以及包括沒有主要身分的其他身分認同。

香港民研的身分認同調查同時採用「多元身分」及「主要身分」兩種問卷設計。受訪市民先對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身分分別評分，再從四種身分中選擇其中一種，包括「香港人」、「中國人」、「香港的中國人」及「中國的香港人」。雖然香港民研公布兩種問卷結果，但是由於「主要身分」為多數調查所採用，所以香港傳媒側重報道後者的結果，未能反映有多少市民同時對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身分擁有高度認同。

圖26為我們和香港民研的「多元身分」調查結果，顯示市民對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身分的評分。兩項調查同樣反映「香港人」評分在2020年維持高位後回落，而「中國人」評分則在2019年及2020年墮入谷底後逐漸回升。圖27顯示為我們和香港民研的「主要身分」調查結果，香港民研將「香港的中國人」及「中國的香港人」合稱為「混合身分」，對應我們的「雙重認同」。兩項調查同樣反映「雙重認同」是香港社會的大多數，在2019年至2021年中被「只有香港人」短暫取代，並於2021年底再次成為主流身分。

Figure 26: Changes of scores with 'dominant identity' design

圖 26：「主要身分」評分的變動





Figure 27: Changes of proportions with 'multiple identity' design

圖 27：「多元身分」比例的變動



'ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS'

I N D E X

「一國兩制」指數

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