

‘ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS’

I N D E X

「一國兩制」指數

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前言

Preface

The unprecedented pursuit of 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) demands unyielding exploration and persistence from stakeholders. Since 1997, we have made headway in the realization of 1C2S, but at the same time, have also encountered many challenges. To assist full implementation of 1C2S, in July 2017, Path of Democracy established the 1C2S Index and released its first report in relation thereto with a view to conduct an objective evaluation of the continued implementation of 1C2S by reviewing the accomplishments and shortfalls of 1C2S at the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong SAR.

The 1C2S Index is based on both local opinion and international perception on the current state of 1C2S. In order to measure local sentiment, we conduct periodic public surveys in Hong Kong on aspects such as 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong', judiciary independence, the high degree of autonomy and other important issues. We also looked at global studies carried out by international think tanks and how Hong Kong is being rated on aspects like human rights, rule of law, freedom of speech and freedom of association. These independent evaluations are also incorporated into the Index to give a more balanced view on how the World including Hong Kong people look at the state of 1C2S.

We also devised and introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) by making use of big data analytics to measure the media sentiment of Hong Kong towards 1C2S since 1998 with real-time monitoring and predictive alerts. In compiling our reports, we also sought views on current issues related to 1C2S, such as the public's emigration plans, national security and economic integration.

We extend our sincere gratitude to the research team involved in the production of our ninth edition of the 1C2S Index report: Christina Chan, Ting Hin Yan, Ian Chan and Benson Lam. We are also grateful to Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong for completing the telephone polls and Sentiment.AI for measuring media sentiments on our behalf.

Going forward, to better inform policy makers and the public, we will continue to conduct public surveys and update international indices every six months, and to monitor media sentiment regularly to gauge the latest perceptions of the public, the international community and the media on 1C2S.

Ray Poon
Co-convenor (Research)

「一國兩制」是前無古人的嘗試，1997年至今既取得成果，也遇到挑戰，實踐過程需要社會各界不斷探索。民主思路在香港回歸20年之際發布第一份關於「一國兩制」概況的客觀評價，希望鑑察其成就與缺失，為全面準確貫徹此方針謹盡綿力。

「一國兩制」指數編製自關於「一國兩制」現狀的本地民意及國際評價。我們定期進行民意調查，就港人治港、高度自治、司法獨立及其他重要範疇了解香港市民想法。我們亦參考國際機構對香港在人權、法治、言論自由和結社自由等範疇的評分，把以上獨立意見揉合於指數之中，為香港及世界各地對「一國兩制」現狀的觀感作出中肯評估。

除此之外，我們借助大數據技術，推出「一國兩制」輿情指數去衡量新聞情緒，追溯自1998年迄今香港媒體的有關報導，實現即時觀測與預警。編製報告時，我們亦探討「一國兩制」實踐中的熱門議題，例如移民海外、國家安全、經濟融合等。


報告更新至第九版，我們衷心感謝研究團隊：陳慧盈、甄定軒、陳譽仁及林康聖，亦謹此向執行電話調查的香港中文大學香港亞太研究所及衡量新聞情緒的輿情科技致以謝意。

展望未來，我們會繼續每半年進行民意調查及更新國際指數，亦會定期追蹤輿情指數，從而反映香港市民、國際社會及本地媒體對「一國兩制」的最新觀感，供決策者及公眾參考。


潘學智
民主思路聯席召集人（研究）

摘要 Key Findings





摘要 Key Findings



Solid steps towards 'patriots administering Hong Kong' were taken in the second half of 2021. The Election Committee and Legislative Council were reformed and their first elections were conducted. Pro-Beijing candidates claimed landslide victory as pro-democracy parties refused to take part. A mandatory oath of allegiance was arranged for district councillors in batches, unseating 49 opposition members and urging more than 200 to resign.

Two major online media halted operations, following police investigations in relation to national security. A number of Tiananmen monuments in university campuses were also removed or demolished. Some claimed that these will commence the de-politization of Hong Kong youth and the education system. On the other side of the coin, scepticism about the future of press freedom and academic freedom grew stronger.

The ideological battle over democracy went head-to-head when US' Summit for Democracy was met with China's 'China: Democracy That Works' white paper. The state of democracy in Hong Kong inevitably became an argument point by Western politicians. Citing closures of media outlets and results of the legislative election, UN Commission on Human Rights, EU, US and UK expressed concerns over freedom of the press and democratic elements under Hong Kong's national security law and electoral reform.

Expectations of government performance were higher than ever as patriots gained complete influence in the governance system. In the meantime, political apathy was slowly developing in the midst of the dissolution of opposition parties, unions and civil society groups. In our ninth edition of the 1C2S Index report, we hope to shed some light on the subject with substantial quantitative data from our latest round of survey conducted from December 2021 to January 2022, scores given by international think tanks and sentiments expressed by local media.

2021年下半年，「愛國者治港」原則在香港有實質的推展。改革後的選舉委員會和立法會進行了首次選舉，在民主派政黨缺席下，建制派候選人獲得了壓倒性勝利。政府安排區議員分批宣誓，49名民主派議員因此失去資格，超過200人主動辭職。

與國家安全相關的警方調查引致兩家主要網媒停運，大學校園內一些「六四」紀念雕塑也被移走或拆除。有些人認為此等行動象徵香港青年和教育系統開始去政治化，亦有些人對新聞自由和學術自由的未來愈來愈懷疑。

正值美國主持民主峰會之時，中國發布《中國的民主》白皮書，展開圍繞民主觀念的意識形態之爭。香港的民主狀況無可避免成為西方政客的議論題材。因應傳媒機構的關閉和立法會的選舉結果，聯合國人權委員會、歐盟、美國和英國就香港在國安法和選舉改革後的新聞自由和民主元素表達關注。

現在，愛國者於治理體系中具備全面影響力，市民對政府的表現充滿期望。與此同時，不少民主派政黨、工會和公民團體陸續解散，一股政治冷感正在慢慢滋長。第九版「一國兩制」指數報告整合2021年12月至2022年1月民意調查的結果、國際智庫的評分及本地媒體的輿情，希望藉著客觀數據探討香港與「一國兩制」何去何從。

V-shaped recovery of confidence in 1C2S

Despite limited participation from the opposition, completion of two territory-wide elections had won people's confidence in central-local relations and the high degree of autonomy that Hong Kong enjoys. Convictions of protest cases, while unwelcomed by their supporters, also brought perceived restoration of law and order. A strong rebound of 1C2S Index close to the pre-extradition level was witnessed. The latest reading rose from 5.56 to 5.76.

All twelve indicators in Index (A) rose with statistical significance in nine of them. The greatest increases came from 'full implementation of 1C2S in the future' (+24.2%), 'resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation' (+22.8%) and 'equality before the law' (+16.6%).

From our past reports, it has been a consistent pattern that the Hong Kong public harboured much higher expectations and much more critical view on the integrity of 1C2S while changes in Index (B), namely, International Perception, tend to be more diverse and less drastic. Due to time lag in the compilation of international indices, negative impacts due to anti-extradition movement have now caught up at the international level and begins to affect the various indices.

Strong support for the continuation of 1C2S

Despite series of political controversies in the second half of 2021, there was almost no change to the support for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047, which remained high at 67.4%. With fewer people opted for opposing continuation at 13.9%, net support increased by 4.2 percentage points to 53.5%. An overwhelming majority of over two-thirds of the respondents still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

For most people, 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (63.3%) remained the most favourable condition to the continuation of 1C2S. 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' rose to a close second and reached its historical high (60.6%). 'Political system democratises further' (40.9%) dropped continuously, mirrored by a sustained growth in 'maintaining national security' (24.1%).

「一國兩制」信心 V 型反彈

儘管缺乏民主派參與，兩次全港性選舉順利完成，爭取到市民對陸港關係與高度自治的信心。被定罪示威案件一宗接一宗，雖然難令支持者滿意，但是令人感到香港正重構法律和秩序。「一國兩制」指數錄得強勁反彈，重上接近修例風波前水平。最新的指數由5.56分升至5.76分。

指數 (A) 的十二個範疇全數上升，其中九個達統計上顯著水平。最大的增幅是來自「未來全面落实一國兩制」(+24.2%)、「對話協商解決矛盾」(+22.8%)和「法律面前一律平等」(+16.6%)。

在過去的報告中，香港市民一直比國際社會對「一國兩制」有更高期望，評分亦因而較嚴格。所以，指數 (B)：國際評價的變化相對錯綜和平穩。國際智庫在整合全球評分時，數據一般滯後，修例風波對各個子成份所帶來的負面影響，在今輪始於國際社會的評價上反映。

廣泛支持繼續實行「一國兩制」

儘管2021年下半年發生連串政治爭議，市民對2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度改變不大，仍然高達67.4%。由於反對的市民稍為減少至13.9%，淨值增加4.2個百分點至53.5%。超過三分之二的絕大多數受訪者依然認為「一國兩制」是適合香港未來的制度。

對大部分市民而言，「維持高度自治」(63.3%)仍然是有利於繼續實行「一國兩制」的首要選項，「經濟維持繁榮穩定」(60.6%)上升至歷史高位並尾隨其後。「政制進一步民主化」(40.9%)持續下降，「維護國家安全」的趨勢與之相反並持續上升(24.1%)。

Easing political polarization

Political polarization continued to cool down after the exit of opposition parties on the political stage. The gap between moderates and non-establishment supporters continued to widen, as the two moved away from each other with a rise of 7.6 percentage points for the former and a large drop of 11.1 percentage points for the latter. As a result, moderates remained the largest group (62.1%), followed by non-establishment supporters (19.6%) and pro-establishment supporters (12.4%).

The rise of moderation was also seen among youths (aged 18 to 29), again corresponding to the subsiding political tension. Moderates regained dominance with a rise of 12.6 percentage points to 57.1%. Non-establishment supporters fell to the second largest group with a massive drop of 18.9 percentage points to 33.3%. The democrat-localist split within the non-establishment group was 22.4%-10.9%. The rise of moderation among 18-29 age group has been a healthy development; nevertheless, one should remain vigilant to the possibility of re-radicalization in the near future.

Reconvergence of citizens' identity as Hongkongers or Chinese

Citizens' self-identification as Hongkongers or Chinese started to converge after a period of parallel increase and opposing movement. Although the previous divergence appeared to stop, the gap was still wide. Since July 2021, the public's self-identification as 'Hongkongers' dropped from 8.23 to 7.84 while that as 'Chinese' rose from 4.87 to 5.59.

Most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both Hongkongers and Chinese. This had gradually changed since 2019. While over half of the public acknowledged dual identity in earlier surveys, this hit rock bottom in June 2020 but has since rebounded. Although still less than half, dual identity with the latest reading of 45.5% became the dominant identity in this round by overtaking 'Hongkonger only', which dropped to 36.1%.

政治兩極化緩和

隨著民主派在政治舞台上退場，政治兩極化情況有所緩解。溫和派及非建制派的佔比進一步拉闊，前者經歷7.6個百分點升幅，後者經歷11.1個百分點跌幅。溫和派（62.1%）繼續成為最大群組，其次為非建制派（19.6%）及建制派（12.4%）。

18-29歲年輕人中，溫和派同樣冒起，呼應冷卻中的政治氣氛。溫和派重新成為主流，上升12.6個百分點至57.1%。非建制派下降18.9個百分點至33.3%，跌至第二大組別。非建制派當中，民主—本土的比例為22.4%-10.9%。18-29歲年輕人中，溫和政治再現，無疑是良好的發展，但我們仍需保持警惕，以防激進主義再次主導。

香港人與中國人身分認同重新匯合

經過一段時間的同步增強和反向而行後，市民對香港人和中國人兩種身分認同的分歧開始匯合。雖然過去的背馳傾向乎已終止，但差距仍然不少。自2021年7月，大眾對香港人的認同感由8.23分回落至7.84分。同期，對中國人的認同感則由4.87分上升至5.59分。

香港市民普遍擁有香港人和中國人雙重身分認同，情況自2019年起逐步轉變。過往調查中，擁有雙重身分認同的市民由超過一半，於2020年6月觸底後反彈。雙重認同雖然仍未過半，不過最新佔比為45.5%，取代下跌至36.1%的「只有香港人」，重新成為最主要的身分。

Implications and recommendations

The rebound in all indicators in our latest report suggested that the crises of confidence in the future of 1C2S and Hong Kong may have come to an end. However, we still found that people's perception to the current state of 1C2S was unsatisfactory. It is difficult to reconcile the fact that despite what appeared to be a marked decline in confidence of the 1C2S, people of Hong Kong still overwhelmingly indicated they are in favour of the continuation of the same beyond 2047. A possible explanation is that while the immediate perception is bad, the longer view of 1C2S still holds good.

Public discontent appeared to be tapering down. People with emigration plans started to decline. The proportion of moderates continued to grow while non-establishment supporters steadily declined. More people attributed equal responsibility to both Hong Kong and Mainland when conflicts arise in the implementation of 1C2S. The proportion of population identifying themselves as 'Chinese' also embarked on a modest rate of increase.

The two rival camps showed extreme views over the impact of the Northern Metropolis and recent LegCo election. Moderates was the only group countering this juxtaposition. A rational voice exists in the wider society, but it is vulnerable to populist narratives. Policymakers must take care to ensure that moderate opinions continue to enjoy the benefit of a nourishing and safe environment in a divided culture.

啟示及建議

本報告中所有指標全體回升，反映市民對香港和「一國兩制」未來的信心危機可能已經終結。但是，我們仍然發現「一國兩制」現狀的觀感並不盡如人意。儘管對「一國兩制」信心驟降，我們同時發現香港市民更廣泛地支持於2047年後延續「一國兩制」。兩種取態看似不容易調和，可能說明市民對「一國兩制」的即時印象轉差，但是長遠評價仍然不俗。

公眾的不滿情緒似乎稍微減弱。移民意願開始下降。溫和派的佔比繼續增加、非建制派支持者則持續下降。面對「一國兩制」的實踐矛盾時，更多人認為內地和香港有共同責任。對中國人身分的認同感亦有穩健增長。

雖然兩大政治陣營對北部都會區及最近的立法會選舉的反應極端，溫和派對以上事件則少受政治立場綑綁。社會仍然存在理性聲音，但極容易受到民粹摧毀。決策者應確保溫和意見能夠在在撕裂的社會上有一隅之地。




Over the past half year, a major turnaround in the perception of 1C2S was witnessed after the implementation of electoral reform. It is important for the HKSAR government to capitalize on the growing confidence and build further momentum by spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of Hong Kong including the business community, the academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs to promote the image of Hong Kong under 1C2S. Such effort may include:

- Setting up the Office of 1C2S for sustained outreach effort both locally and in the APEC region to mobilize support and enhance Hong Kong's presence. This dedicated office will actively participate in foreign think tank forums directly or through the business community to promote the Hong Kong narrative in the international arena;
- Creating a Press Secretary for the CE Office to hold daily press briefings with local and international media to tackle latest policy issues timely, fully and properly, including the National Security Law to address the fear and anxiety of the foreign community in Hong Kong; and
- Educating young members of the public on 1C2S basics, understanding of rule of law, human rights and freedoms and broadening awareness of social, national and global issues.


過去半年，「一國兩制」的觀感在完善選舉制度後有重大轉向。市民的信心增強，政府應乘勢領導香港各界，如商界、學術界、專業團體、目標相近的智庫和民間組織，共同努力闡釋「一國兩制」的實況，提升香港形象。措施包括：

- 設立「一國兩制」辦公室，專門進行本地及亞太區的推廣及聯絡工作，動員社會各界支持及強化香港的影響力。此專責辦公室將會直接或通過商界積極參與外國智庫論壇，就香港事務在國際舞台發聲；
- 增設特首辦新聞發言人，每天主持記者會面向本地及國際傳媒，適時、充分及恰當地解釋及回應政策議題，例如外國社群對《國安法》的疑問；及
- 注重青年教育，擴闊對「一國兩制」的基本認識，豐富對法治、人權和自由的理解，增強社會觸覺、國際視野及國情認識。





「一國兩制」概覽 1C2S at a Glance



1C2S Index
「一國兩制」指數

5.76
(↑ 3.6%)

2022.1

1C2S Mass Media Index
「一國兩制」輿情指數

97.5
(↑ 9.1)

2021.12

Moderates
溫和派

62.1%
(↑ 7.6%)

2022.1

Continuation of 1C2S
延續「一國兩制」


67.4%
(↓ 0.3%)

2022.1

Dual Identity
雙重身分認同

45.5%
(↑ 7.6%)

2022.1



「一國兩制」指數元素 Components of 1C2S Index

Public Opinion
民意調查

High Degree of autonomy
高度自治

3.75
(↑ 10.6%)

Human Rights and Freedom
人權自由

4.02
(↑ 8.4%)

Hong Kong- Mainland Relations
陸港關係

4.30
(↑ 14.1%)

International Perception
國際評價

Economic Freedom
經濟自由

8.91
(-)

Personal Freedom
個人自由

8.00
(↓ 0.5%)

Democracy Index
民主指數

5.06
(↑ 0.5%)



第九版報告
Ninth Edition

1 簡介 Introduction

This is the ninth edition of our 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) Index report. The purpose of the 1C2S Index is to provide an objective assessment on the implementation of 1C2S. Our first Report was released in mid-2017, on the 20th anniversary of the return of Hong Kong to China. We update the 1C2S Index every six months, at mid-year and year end.

Every half year, we update the 1C2S Index through updating Index (A): Public Opinion and Index (B): International Perception respectively with a new public survey and with the latest data from international indices. To complement our Index, we also introduced a new index: 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) that uses big-data techniques to measure the sentiment of Hong Kong newspapers since 1998.

We commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct telephone poll between December 2021 to January 2022 to compile Index (A). On the other hand, not every indicator of Index (B) can be updated to 2022 because international indices are released with a considerable time lag. MMI was measured by Sentiment.AI and updated to the end of December 2021.

香港回歸20週年之際，民主思路於2017年中首次發布「一國兩制」指數，旨在為香港實踐「一國兩制」作客觀評價。指數於年中與年底，每半年更新，這是第九版報告。

我們每半年進行電話調查及收集國際指數的最新數據，更新指數（A）：民意調查及指數（B）：國際評價，從而更新「一國兩制」指數。我們還推出嶄新的「一國兩制」輿情指數，檢視從1998年起香港報章對「一國兩制」的情緒，利用大數據技術去補充指數之不足。

本報告委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查，反映2021年12月至2022年1月的狀況而編製指數（A）。另外，由於各項國際指數整合數據存有時差，不是所有指數（B）的指標均能更新至2022年。由輿情科技量度的「一國兩制」輿情指數則更新至2021年12月底。



In our latest survey, we continue to include topical issues related to 1C2S, such as the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047, citizen's identity, attitude towards emigration and public opinions on the Greater Bay Area. To fully capture the socio-political reality of the city, we introduced new questions to gauge the impact of recent socio-political changes, like the electoral reform and the Northern Metropolis.

It should be stressed that Index (A), Index (B) and MMI are determined by perception and may or may not reflect the reality. Even so, changes in perceptions of 1C2S of the Hong Kong public, of international think tanks, and of the Hong Kong press are nevertheless important. We will analyse the reasons for the changes as they are crucial for the implementation of 1C2S.

In our report, all scores are expressed in a scale of 0-10. An asterisk (*) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant. If there is no mentioning of statistical significance about a score, it means that the change concerned is statistically insignificant.

電話調查也一併探討其他關乎「一國兩制」的重要議題，包括2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」、市民的身分認同、移民海外與及粵港澳大灣區發展。為更準確拿捏近期的社會及政治變化所帶來的影響，本輪新增圍繞完善選舉制度和北部都會區的題目。

指數（A）、指數（B）及輿情指數的評分取決於觀感，可能不完全反映現實。儘管如此，香港市民、國際智庫和本地媒體的觀感變化對實施「一國兩制」仍然至關重大，所以我們也會分析其背後的變化原因。

本報告的所有評分尺度為0至10分。如不同輪次調查之間的評分差異達統計上顯著水平，將會以星號（「*」）註明。未有註明者，則代表評分差異在統計上並不顯著。



2 「一國兩制」指數 1C2S Index

The 1C2S Index is the average of Index (A): Public Opinion, the evaluation of the Hong Kong public on different dimensions of 1C2S, and Index (B): International Perception, the evaluation of international think tanks on various aspects of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

Figure 1 shows the scores of the 1C2S Index since its inception. The latest reading in January 2022 was 5.76 with an increase of 3.6% from 5.56 in July 2021. Results obtained in Indices (A) and (B) will be detailed in the following sub-sections.

Due to increasing scepticism towards 1C2S and time lag in data availability, the estimated score of Index (B) is likely to be upwardly biased. In this respect, decision makers in Hong Kong should take careful note of the declining trend and its ramifications.


「一國兩制」指數為指數（A）：民意調查及指數（B）：國際評價的平均值。前者為香港市民對「一國兩制」不同範疇的評分，後者為國際智庫對香港自由民主水平的評分。編製方法詳見附件I。

圖 1顯示「一國兩制」指數自編製迄今的變化。2022年1月的最新讀數為5.76分，較2021年7月的5.56 分上升了3.6%。指數（A）及指數（B）的變化將於以下章節詳細解釋。

鑑於國際社會對「一國兩制」的疑慮未見好轉，以及整合全球評分的數據滯後，指數（B）的估算分數可能偏高。此跌勢及其影響值得決策者關注。

Figure 1: 1C2S Index

圖 1：「一國兩制」指數



Note: Dotted line indicates a revision in indicators

註：虛線為指標經過修訂



2.1. Index (A): Public Opinion

Table 1 shows that all indicators experienced a rise since July 2021. The three highest increases were 'full implementation of 1C2S in the future' (+24.2%), 'resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation' (+22.8%) and 'equality before the law' (+16.6%).

Overall, only one indicator scored higher than the median of 5, namely, 'safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests'. Other relatively well-perceived indicators scoring over 4 included 'Maintaining prosperity and stability' (4.75) and 'Original ways of life' (4.51). Indicators scoring the lowest were: 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' (3.18), 'resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation' (3.45) and 'democratic development' (3.47).

2.1. 指數 (A)：民意調查

表 1顯示指數 (A) 自2021年7月起所有範疇均上升，三個升幅最高的範疇為「未來全面落實一國兩制」(+24.2%)、「對話協商解決矛盾」(+22.8%)和「法律面前一律平等」(+16.6%)。

整體來說，只有一個範疇高於5分中位數，即「維護國家主權、安全和發展利益」。超過4分的範疇包括「維持繁榮穩定」(4.75)及「維持原有生活方式」(4.51)。評分最低的範疇為「港人治港」(3.18)、「對話協解決矛盾」(3.45)及「民主政制發展」(3.47)。

Table 1 : Index (A): Public Opinion

表 1：指數（A）：民意調查

	2019.12	2020.6	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1		
Average 平均分	3.53	3.39	3.62	3.62	4.02		*
A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治	3.63	3.52	3.43	3.39	3.75		*
A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務	3.49	3.40	3.34	3.42	3.89		*
A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權	4.27	4.16	4.00	3.80	4.09		*
A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權	3.75	3.71	3.62	3.55	3.84		*
A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」	2.99	2.82	2.77	2.80	3.18		*
B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由	-	-	3.83	3.71	4.02		*
B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式	4.55	4.39	4.41	4.33	4.51		
B2. Freedom of speech 言論自由	4.36	4.04	3.92	3.61	3.67		
B3. Democratic development 民主政制發展	3.21	3.08	3.01	3.09	3.47		*
B4. Equality before the law 法律面前一律平等	-	-	3.98	3.80	4.43		*
C. Hong Kong - Mainland Relations 陸港關係	-	-	3.61	3.77	4.30		*
C1. Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾	2.63	2.53	2.59	2.81	3.45		*
C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益	-	-	4.99	5.20	5.47		
C3. Maintaining prosperity and stability 維持繁榮穩定	-	-	4.15	4.22	4.75		*
C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落实「一國兩制」	2.53	2.37	2.70	2.85	3.54		*



2.1.1. Generation gap and political divide

Figure 2 shows Index (A) by age group. There was a rise for all age groups except the 30-39 age group which continued its downward trend in previous rounds and decreased by 10.2%. The strongest growth belonged to the 18-29 age group which rose by 25.1% to 2.64. The only change that reached statistical significance was in the 70 or above age group, which grew by 16.4% to 5.74.

Figure 3 shows Index (A) by political inclination. Average scores produced by all political groups collectively increased except democrats. Pro-establishment supporters, whose scores never dropped lower than 7, produced a score of 7.42 after a 3.1 percent rise from July 2021. Moderates remained steady with a 1.4 percent increase to 4.33. The 1.4 percent increase in the score by non-establishment supporters to 1.46 was mainly contributed by localists, which recorded a sharp rise of 50% to 1.35. Democrats were the only group which had a declined score of 1.50, after falling by 7.5%.

Statistical tests revealed that there was a clear and consistent divide in evaluation scores between younger and older age groups, and across all political inclinations. Not only were scores increased with age, scores of the three younger age group were also statistically lower than the three older ones. In comparison with moderates, the evaluations of pro-establishment supporters were significantly higher. On the other hand, evaluations of non-establishment supporters were significantly lower.

2.1.1. 代溝及政治鴻溝

圖 2顯示各個年齡組別在指數（A）的評分。30-39歲組別延續前幾輪的下降趨勢，跌幅為10.2%。除此之外，所有年齡組別的評分均有上升。評分增長最強勁的是18-29歲組別，增加25.1%至2.64分。唯一變化達到統計學顯著水平的是 70 歲或以上組別，增長 16.4% 至 5.74分。

圖 3顯示過去調查中，不同政治傾向在指數（A）的評分。除民主派外，所有政治傾向的平均得分均集體上升。建制派支持者從未低於7分，自2021年7月起上升3.1%至7.42分。溫和派保持穩定，上升1.4%至4.33分。非建制派上升1.4%至1.46分，主要來自得分大幅上升50%至1.35分的本土派。民主派是唯一得分下降的組別，下降7.5%至1.50分。

經統計檢測，年輕和年長組別之間及所有政治傾向之間，存在明顯且一致的差異。不僅評分隨著年齡而增加，三個年輕組別的評分，在統計學上也低於三個年長組別。與溫和派比較下，建制派評分比溫和派顯著較高，而非建制派評分則比溫和派顯著較低。

Figure 2: Index (A): Public Opinion (by age)

圖 2：指數（A）：民意調查（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 3: Index (A): Public Opinion (by political inclination)

圖 3：指數（A）：民意調查（按政治傾向劃分）



2.2. Index (B): International Perception

We obtain scores on Hong Kong's freedoms and democracy from international think tanks to compile Index (B). These scores are derived from Cato-Fraser Institutes' Human Freedom Index, which comprises the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index, and the Economic Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index. The scores and ranks of Hong Kong since 2010 are shown in Table 2.

As international studies cover a very large number of countries, they do not always reflect the latest conditions. We will update the indices with data from comparable international indicators whenever possible. The method of updating is detailed in Appendix I.

Hong Kong has always ranked number one in Economic Freedom Index, with a score of around 9, the latest score dropped to its lowest since 2010 but is still relatively high at 8.91. The drop in the index score perhaps reflected downgrades of credit rating of Hong Kong in late 2019 and early 2020, but the high score also reflected the economic resilience of Hong Kong.

Hong Kong's score in Personal Freedom Index peaked at 8.95 in 2010, dropped to an estimated score of 8.00 in 2021. Given the adverse publicity in the international media on recent political events in Hong Kong, the decline of 10.6% from its peak is not surprising. Nonetheless, Hong Kong's latest score was still relatively high.

The Democracy Index rose from 5.92 in 2012 to a peak of 6.50 in 2017, rising by 9.8%, reflecting that Hong Kong made some progress in democratisation vis-à-vis the increase of directly elected seats in the legislature. Hong Kong's score fell to 5.57 in 2020, dropping by 14.3% from the peak in 2017. The latest score recorded a slight recovery to 5.60.

Index (B) rose from 7.96 in 2010 to a peak of 7.99 in 2014, rising by 1.1%, largely as a result of the rise in Hong Kong's Democracy Index. Since then, it has embarked on a declining trend. The latest reading came in at 7.50, representing a drop of 6.1% from the peak.

2.2. 指數 (B)：國際評價

我們從國際智庫對香港自由民主水平的評分編製指數 (B)。評分分別取自卡托研究所及菲沙研究所編製的「人類自由指數」，由「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」組合而成，及經濟學人智庫編製的「民主指數」。表 2 顯示香港由2010年起的分數和排名。

由於國際調查覆蓋大量國家，數據不一定反映最新情況，我們將按其他相應的國際指數估算香港最新的評分。更新方法詳見附錄 I。

香港在「經濟自由指數」長期名列世界第一，評分約為9分。最新評分雖跌至2010年起最低位，但仍處於相當高的位置，有8.91分。跌勢或者反映2019年底及2020年初不同國際機構對香港降低信用評級，但此高分數說明香港的經濟抗逆力。

香港的「個人自由指數」評分最高為2010年的8.95分，下滑至2021年估算的8.00分。鑒於國際社會對香港近期的政治事件反應負面，由最高位下跌10.6%並不令人意外。儘管如此，香港的最新分數仍然不俗。

香港的「民主指數」由2012年的5.92分上升至2017年6.50分的頂點，升幅為9.8%，反映立法會增加直選議席令民主化取得一定進展。其後，評分由2017年的高峰下降14.3%至2020年的5.57分，至最近稍為回升至5.60分。

指數 (B) 由2010年的7.96分上升至2014年7.99分的頂點，升幅為1.1%，主要因為香港的「民主指數」上升。其後持續下跌，最新評分下降至7.50分，自高峰下跌6.1%。

Table 2: Index (B): International Perception

表 2：指數（B）：國際評價

	Human Freedom Index 「人類自由指數」			Democracy Index 「民主指數」	Aggregate 總分
	Economic Freedom 「經濟自由」	Personal Freedom 「個人自由」	Sub-aggregate 分數		
2010	9.03 (1)	8.99 (35)	8.95 (4)	5.85 (84)	7.96
2011	9.00 (1)	8.89 (34)	8.94 (5)	-	-
2012	8.95 (1)	8.80 (35)	8.87 (8)	5.92 (80)	7.89
2013	8.93 (1)	8.73 (37)	8.81 (11)	5.92 (80)	7.86
2014	8.97 (1)	8.57 (41)	8.74 (17)	6.42 (63)	7.99
2015	8.96 (1)	8.40 (44)	8.63 (21)	6.42 (65)	7.92
2016	8.96 (1)	8.37 (46)	8.62 (24)	6.46 (66)	7.93
2017	8.98 (1)	8.45 (45)	8.67 (20)	6.50 (67)	7.98
2018	9.03 (1)	8.39 (46)	8.66 (20)	6.15 (73)	7.86
2019	8.91 (1)	8.06 (57)	8.41 (30)	6.02 (73)	7.66
2020	8.91 [^]	8.04 [^]	8.48 [^]	5.57 (87)	7.51
2021	8.91 [^]	8.00 [^]	8.46 [^]	5.60 (85)	7.50

Note: ‘^’ denotes updates based on comparable indicators

註：「^」為更新自相應的國際指標



2.2.1. Components of Personal Freedom Index

Table 3 shows Hong Kong's scores and ranks in seven components of the Personal Freedom Index from 2010 to 2021. During this period, the score of 'security & safety' dropped by 0.46 as HK fell sharply from the fourteenth to the forty-fourth place in the category. Since 2017, 'rule of law' dropped further from 7.14 to 6.76, 'association & assembly' from 6.27 to 4.88 and 'expression & information' from 7.55 to 6.99, suggesting concerns on personal freedoms in Hong Kong from the international community. Scores for 'movement', 'religion' and 'identity & relationships' were fairly stable.

2.2.1. 「個人自由指數」的子項目

表 3顯示從2010年至2021年，香港在「個人自由指數」七個子項目上的分數和排名。期間，「安全」評分下跌0.46分，排名由第14名大幅滑落至第44名。自2017年起，「法治」由7.14分下跌至6.76分、「結社、集會及公民社會自由」由6.27分跌至4.88分、「言論自由」由7.55分跌至6.99分，跌幅顯示國際社會對香港的個人自由有所顧慮。「遷徙自由」、「宗教」及「性別認同及關係」的分數則相對穩定。

Table 3: Personal Freedom Index

表 3：「個人自由指數」

Year 年份	Rule of Law 法治	Security & Safety 安全	Movement 遷徙自由	Religion 宗教自由	Association, Assembly & Civil Society 結社、集會及公民社會自由	Expression & Information 言論自由	Identity & Relationships 性別認同及關係	Aggregate 總分
2010	7.50 (18)	9.77 (14)	9.70 (61)	8.98 (83)	8.10 (85)	8.14 (60)	10.00 (16)	8.89 (35)
2011	7.50 (18)	9.80 (10)	9.70 (61)	8.98 (85)	8.10 (85)	8.14 (55)	10.00 (15)	8.89 (34)
2012	7.39 (19)	9.78 (14)	9.65 (63)	8.98 (85)	7.83 (93)	8.01 (61)	10.00 (16)	8.80 (35)
2013	7.39 (19)	9.71 (17)	9.65 (63)	8.98 (81)	7.65 (92)	7.94 (62)	9.38 (50)	8.73 (37)
2014	7.80 (16)	9.74 (15)	9.63 (66)	8.91 (81)	6.96 (108)	7.58 (72)	9.38 (51)	8.57 (41)
2015	7.79 (23)	9.75 (17)	9.63 (62)	8.91 (79)	6.43 (114)	7.55 (72)	9.38 (51)	8.40 (44)
2016	7.14 (23)	9.74 (16)	9.63 (64)	8.91 (83)	6.27 (117)	7.55 (75)	9.38 (52)	8.37 (46)
2017	7.14 (23)	9.75 (13)	9.59 (67)	8.91 (75)	6.27 (118)	7.55 (74)	10.00 (29)	8.45 (45)
2018	7.07 (23)	9.69 (21)	9.51 (67)	8.91 (81)	5.59 (121)	7.55 (71)	10.00 (30)	8.39 (46)
2019	7.07 (23)	9.31 (44)	9.58 (64)	8.55 (87)	4.88 (134)	6.99 (85)	10.00 (33)	8.06 (57)
2020	7.07 [^]	9.31 [^]	9.58 [^]	8.55 [^]	4.88 [^]	6.89 [^]	10.00 [^]	8.04 [^]
2021	6.76 [^]	9.31 [^]	9.58 [^]	8.55 [^]	4.88 [^]	6.89 [^]	10.00 [^]	8.00 [^]

Note: Number in brackets indicates world ranking; '[^]' indicates updates based on comparable indicators

註：括號為國際排名；「[^]」為更新自相應的國際指標

2.2.2. Comparison with Hong Kong's neighbours

As Hong Kong is a highly developed region and given that highly developed regions tend to have comparatively higher scores in freedom and democracy as compared with developing regions – we have selected certain neighbouring developed countries and territories (namely, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) as benchmarks for comparison and assessment of Hong Kong's performance. We have also compared the respective scores of the Mainland and Hong Kong under the indices, for the purpose of identifying whether Hong Kong has become increasingly 'mainlandised' under 1C2S. For brevity, we will refer to Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and the Chinese mainland as 'neighbours'.

Table 4 compares Hong Kong and its neighbours in the various indices of Index (B) in 2021. Hong Kong's score in Economic Freedom was world leading while its score in Personal Freedom Index was at par with its developed neighbours. Due to Hong Kong's superlative performance in Economic Freedom Index, its score in Human Freedom Index was comparable to the four developed neighbours. However, Hong Kong's Democracy Index was lower than its developed neighbours, even Singapore who always used to score lower than Hong Kong surpassed Hong Kong in the latest index score. Consequently, Hong Kong's Index (B) score of 7.50 was lower than Japan's 8.47, Korea's 8.25, and Taiwan's 8.72, but above Singapore's 7.41 and was much higher than Mainland's 4.53.

Table 5 compares the 2021 Personal Freedom Index of Hong Kong with its neighbours. Hong Kong's scores were in the same league as those of our developed neighbours (Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), and were much higher than those of the Mainland. Hong Kong's aggregate score of 8.00 was higher than that of Singapore's 7.19 but lower than Japan's 9.27, Korea's 8.97, and Taiwan's 9.14.

In comparison with its four developed neighbours, Hong Kong was relatively strong in 'security & safety' and 'movement', but relatively weak in 'rule of law' and 'association, assembly & civil society'. Hong Kong was more or less at par with others in the remaining four components, namely, 'religion', 'expression & information', and 'identity & relationships'. Hong Kong's relatively low score in 'rule of law' and 'association, assembly & civil society' nevertheless warrants concern.

2.2.2. 比較鄰近地區

一般而言，發達地區的自由與民主指數，均高於發展中的地區。由於香港是高度發展的地區，所以我們選取鄰近的發達國家及地區，包括日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣作比較，藉以評價香港的表現。我們亦比較中國內地與香港的自由民主指數，以觀察在「一國兩制」之下的香港是否趨向「大陸化」。為簡便起見，我們將日本、南韓、新加坡、台灣與中國內地稱為「鄰近地區」。

表 4比較2021年香港和鄰近地區的指數（B）。香港的經濟自由名列世界前列，個人自由亦媲美鄰近發達地區。香港的經濟自由卓越，使其「人類自由指數」與四個鄰近發達地區相約。不過香港的「民主指數」則低於它們，包括以往香港經常超越的新加坡。整體來說，香港7.50的指數（B）評分落後於日本的8.47分、南韓的8.25分和台灣的8.72分，但領先新加坡的7.41分。香港在各種指數的評分則比中國內地的4.53分高出不少。

表 5比較2021年香港和鄰近地區的「個人自由指數」。香港評分良好，接近日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣等鄰近發達地區，並大幅拋離內地。香港的總分為8.00分，遠遠高於新加坡的7.19分，但低於日本的9.27分、南韓的8.97分及台灣的9.14分。

比較四個鄰近發達地區，香港在「安全」和「遷徙自由」較優勝，「法治」及「結社、集會及公民社會自由」則相對遜色。其餘四項，即「宗教自由」、「言論自由」和「性別認同及關係」，香港與鄰近發達地區不相伯仲。儘管「法治」及「結社、集會及公民社會自由」的評分低的情況亦令人擔憂。

Table 4 : Index (B): International Perception of Hong Kong and neighbours (2021)

表 4：香港與鄰近地區之指數（B）：國際評價（2021）

	Human Freedom Index 「人類自由指數」			Democracy Index 「民主指數」	Aggregate 總分
	Economic Freedom 「經濟自由」	Personal Freedom 「個人自由」	Sub-aggregate 分數		
Hong Kong 香港	8.91	8.00	8.46	5.60 (85)	7.50
Mainland China 中國內地	6.53	4.86	5.50	2.21 (148)	4.53
Japan 日本	7.98	9.27	8.63	8.15 (17)	8.47
Korea 韓國	7.61	8.97	8.29	8.16 (16)	8.25
Singapore 新加坡	8.81	7.19	8.00	6.23 (66)	7.41
Taiwan 台灣	8.02	9.14	8.58	8.99 (8)	8.72

Note: Updates based on comparable indicators

註：更新自相應的國際指標

Table 5 : Comparing Personal Freedom Index of Hong Kong and neighbours (2021)

表 5：比較香港與鄰近地區之「個人自由指數」（2021）

	Rule of Law 法治	Security & Safety 安全	Movement 遷徙自由	Religion 宗教自由	Association, Assembly & Civil Society 結社、集會及公民社會自由	Expression & Information 言論自由	Identity & Relationships 性別認同及關係	Aggregate 總分
Hong Kong 香港	6.76	9.31	9.58	8.55	4.88	6.89	10.00	8.00
Mainland China 中國內地	4.35	8.52	5.12	1.71	1.67	2.65	10.00	4.86
Japan 日本	7.96	9.87	9.86	9.56	9.65	8.57	9.38	9.27
Korea 韓國	7.82	9.66	8.51	9.89	8.25	8.69	10.00	8.97
Singapore 新加坡	7.60	9.79	8.38	7.82	4.61	4.61	8.13	7.19
Taiwan 台灣	6.97	9.63	9.86	9.90	8.84	8.84	9.38	9.14

Note: Updates based on comparable indicators

註：更新自相應的國際指標

2.3. 1C2S Mass Media Index

Media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion. We attempt to use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S and monitor how performance of 1C2S is covered in the mass media to provide a timely barometer of public sentiment. This opens up many opportunities of further research in public opinion formation. Indices constructed from media sentiment can be compiled at high frequency intervals (e.g. monthly) as they are not subject to long time lags as found in surveys. They are also possible to investigate the effect of a specific event on media sentiment, or to compare sentiments in local and overseas media.

1C2S MMI measures net sentiment of media articles over six months. This is to dovetail with our main Index, which is compiled biannually. We have mined over 175,500 news articles and around 85 million words from 21 local daily newspapers. MMI is set at 100 in the base month of July 2017, the first launch of our report series and the 20th anniversary of HKSAR. The methodology is explained in Appendix I. A preliminary assessment of the sentiment from electronic and online media has also been carried out and is detailed in the said Appendix.

Our study only gauges sentiment of an important subset of mass media, namely, printed newspapers, as a general representation of sentiment in mass media. It should be noted that many newspapers have broadcasted their news through online outlets such as websites and mobile apps. In so far as the news articles of these online outlets are the same as their printed versions, the sentiment of these articles are already included in our MMI regardless of whether they are printed or broadcasted online.

2.3. 「一國兩制」輿情指數

媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素，故此，我們嘗試利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒，藉此透視大眾傳媒對「一國兩制」的感受及意見，編製輿論情緒對「一國兩制」的晴雨表。長遠而言，輿情指數能為民意形成開拓更多研究機會。輿情指數不受以傳統調查方式收集民意時所產生的滯後影響，因此能以高頻率編製（例如每月）。它亦可以調查特定重大事件對媒體情緒的影響，或比較本地及海外媒體的情緒。

「一國兩制」輿情指數為六個月內媒體文章的情緒淨值指數，以配合我們的主指數及補充其不足之處。輿情指數從21家本地報章搜集超過175,500篇報導，逾8,500萬字。輿情指數的基數月訂為2017年7月，基數為100，以標誌我們首次發布此系列報告及回歸20周年的情況。編製方法詳見附錄I。我們同時就電子傳媒及網絡媒體的輿情進行初步評估，結果亦載於該附錄。

目前，輿情指數只衡量大眾傳媒的一個重要部分——印刷報紙，以評估大眾傳媒整體的輿情。值得注意的是，不少報紙也透過網站、手機程式等網上媒介傳播。這些網上媒介的報導與印刷版本大多相同，所以無論是印刷或網上版本，其情緒已經涵括在輿情指數之中。

2.3.1. Recent trend

Year 2020 began with personnel change in the central government responsible for Hong Kong affairs, involving the upgrade of the central committee on Hong Kong and Macau affairs from 'coordination group' to 'leading group', and a restructuring of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and new directorship of the Hong Kong Liaison Office. After this, a massive wave of news coverage pushed MMI upward to 73.0 before it showed a minor drop as COVID-19 crisis management aroused debates over cross-border visitor control, followed by speculations about the impact of National Security Law which pushed MMI down to 66.7 in June 2020.

The latter half of 2020 was no less controversial as the much-feared National Security Law was eventually enacted and the LegCo election was postponed for a year. The argument over 'executive-led system' and 'separation of powers' caused unease among some. Such sentiment peaked when the HKSAR government announced immediate disqualification of four lawmakers following an NPCSC decision and the arrest of newspaper mogul Jimmy Lai. Notwithstanding the shock these events induced, MMI steadily rose and reached 78.0 by the end of the year. The rise coincided with Xi's assuring remark on the future of 1C2S in a speech he delivered for the 40th anniversary of Shenzhen SEZ as well as the inclusion of 1C2S in China's 14th Five-Year Plan and the 2035 Vision.

The upward trend continued after the decision on electoral reform that foregrounded the principle of 'patriots administering Hong Kong', despite mass arrests against democrat primaries. MMI briefly went down between the first and second quarters as District Councillors assessed whether to resign or pledge allegiance. Nonetheless, overall sentiment have increased by 10.4% to 88.4 from January to June 2021 and this appeared to coincide with an apparent adjustment of reporting style of media that used to be highly critical of 1C2S.

The triumph of 1C2S was repeatedly applauded during CCP's 100th anniversary events, from the grand celebration to the landmark resolution on its significant achievements and historic experiences. There were high hopes for newly elected members of the Election Committee and Legislative Council, followed by Beijing's white paper on the democratic development under 1C2S that endorsed the overhaul of Hong Kong's electoral system. These official messages prevailed most news sources and boosted MMI by 9.1% to 97.5.

2.3.1. 近期趨勢

2020年始於中央涉港部門的人事變動，包括中央港澳工作協調小組升格為領導小組、港澳辦改組、中聯辦任命新主任。連日的傳媒報道一度把輿情指數推高至73.0點，但於新冠肺炎的封關爭議中稍微回落，緊接後來對《港區國安法》的各種揣測，令輿情指數於2020年6月跌至66.7點。


2020年下半年同樣不乏爭議，廣受恐懼的《國家安全法》終於實施、立法會選舉被推遲一年、有關「行政主導」及「三權分立」的爭論等都引起了公眾的不安。不安的情緒更在特區政府宣佈人大常委會取消立法會四名議員資格以及傳媒大亨黎智英被捕後達至頂峰。儘管這些事件引起了重大的迴響，輿情指數卻穩步上升，年底更達78點。升幅與習近平在深圳經濟特區成立40週年致辭中就「一國兩制」未來的發言、「一國兩制」在中國的「十四五規劃」中的「2035年遠景」中所佔位置等事件重疊。

儘管「民主派初選」觸發大規模拘捕，彰顯「愛國者治港」原則的選舉制度改革在2021年初公布，持續輿情指數的升勢。第一季至第二季之間，指數短暫下降，期間區議員正考慮是否辭職或宣誓效忠。總括而言，2021年1月至6月的輿情指數上升10.4%至88.4點，而同期部分對「一國兩制」向來較嚴厲的媒體，於評論風格上有所調整。

從周年慶典到歷史決議，中共建黨百年華誕不停褒揚「一國兩制」的勝利。新當選的選委會成員和立法會議員被寄予厚望，隨後國新辦發布《「一國兩制」下香港的民主發展》白皮書，認同完善後的選舉制度。這類官方表述覆蓋大多數新聞來源，將輿情指數提高9.1%至97.5。

Figure 4: 1C2S MMI (2019-2021)

圖 4：「一國兩制」輿情指數（2019-2021）



Scores	Changes
評分	變化
2019.12	67.2 (↓ 17.4%)
2020.6	66.7 (↓ 0.5%)
2020.12	78.0 (↑ 11.3%)
2021.6	88.4 (↑ 10.4%)
2021.12	97.5 (↑ 9.1%)

2.4. Significant events

Changes in scores in the indices are likely to be affected by significant political and other landmark events that occurred during the relevant period. Listed below are major events that occurred since the last report from July to December 2021. Major events that occurred in previous reports from mid-2017 to mid-2021 are listed in Appendix II.

Internal governance issues that are not strictly related to 1C2S appear to have important effects on evaluations of the Hong Kong public and media, but do not necessarily affect international evaluations as much. On the other hand, evaluations of international think tanks may not be free of western ideological biases against the rise of China, but they may also reflect genuine weaknesses in the implementation of 1C2S. It is important to bear these impacts in mind when reading the findings identified in this Report.

2.4. 「一國兩制」的評價

報告期間發生不少政治爭議和重大事件，與「一國兩制」指數的變化有一定關係。上期報告至今，即2021年7月至12月的重大事件臚列如下。早輪調查期間，即2017年中至2021年中的重大事件詳見附錄II。

與「一國兩制」無直接關係的內部管治問題，對香港市民和輿情的評價似乎有一定影響，但對國際評價影響不大。西方愈來愈擔心中國崛起將會挑戰其優勢，所以對中國的態度由合作轉向對抗。西方智庫對「一國兩制」的評價不能完全擺脫此意識形態的轉向，但也可能反映「一國兩制」在實踐上的真正弱點。在解讀此報告的結論時，應予以考慮。

Table 6: Significant events (2021 H2)

表 6：重大事件一覽（2021 H2）

7.1, 7.7 & 8.18	The HKU Students' Union Council expressed 'deep condolences' over the dead suspect in the police stabbing incident in Causeway Bay. Four undergraduates were arrested for advocating terrorism.	香港大學學生會評議會通過動議，向銅鑼灣刺警案疑兇逝世表示「深切哀悼」。警方拘捕四名相關學生，指他們涉嫌違反宣揚恐怖主義罪。
7.6 & 7.22	Police cracked down the pro-independence group Returning Valiant and arrested members of the General Union of Hong Kong Speech Therapists for conspiring to publish seditious publications.	警方搗破「港獨」組織「光城者」及拘捕涉嫌發布煽動刊物的香港言語治療師總會成員。
7.16	The US Treasury imposed sanctions on seven deputy directors of the Hong Kong Liaison Office. The US Departments of State, Commerce, Homeland Security and the Treasury jointly issued a business report to warn of the risks of US investors in Hong Kong.	美國財政部宣布制裁七名香港中聯辦副主任。美國國務院、商務部、國土安全部及財政部聯合發表營商報告，警告美資在香港的活動風險。
7.21 & 10.19	University students involved 2019's CUHK siege were convicted of rioting and sentenced from 3 years and 9 months to 4 years and 11 months in prison.	2019年香港中文大學衝突中，多名大學生暴動罪成，判監3年9個月至4年11個月。
7.22	Seven white-clad attackers involved in the 7.21 Yuen Long assault were found guilty of rioting and sentenced from 3 years and 6 months to 7 years in prison.	元朗「7.21」事件中，七名白衣人暴動罪成，判囚3年半至7年。
7.26	The first person to be charged under the national security law was convicted of inciting secession and terrorism after riding a motorcycle into police and flying a flag with a protest slogan.	香港首宗國安法案件裁決，駕駛插有示威旗幟的電單車，衝擊警方防線的被告被判煽動分裂及恐怖活動罪名成立。
8.10, 8.13, 8.18, 9.25 & 10.3	A few pro-democracy groups were disbanded, namely the Federation for a Democratic China, Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions and Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union. After being requested to disclose donation information, the Alliance for True Universal Suffrage and 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund also filed for liquidation and suspended operations respectively.	民陣、支聯會、職工盟及教協先後宣布解散。真普選聯盟及612人道支援基金被要求提交捐款資料後，亦分別申請清盤及停止運作。
8.5 & 10.20	US President Joe Biden offered a safe haven programme to Hongkongers residing in the US by extending their stay for 18 months and allowing them to apply for work permits.	美國總統拜登為在美港人提供「臨時避風港」，可獲延期逗留18個月並申請工作許可。
8.10 & 8.20	The HKSAR government revealed that it had submitted a report to the central government in support of the introduction of the anti-sanctions law in Annex III of the Basic Law. However, the law had not been implemented because the NPC Standing Committee postponed the decision.	政府透露已向中央提交意見，支持將《反外國制裁法》納入《基本法》附件三。惟全國人大常委會暫緩表決，因此法例未有在香港實施。
8.24 & 10.27	The Film Censorship Ordinance was revised to allow the Chief Secretary to revoke the certificate of approval or exemption issued to a film on the ground of national security.	政府修訂《電影檢查條例》草案，政務司司長能以國家安全因素，撤銷已向電影發出的核准證明書或豁免證明書。
8.26 & 9.3	Lawmaker Cheng Chung Tai's registration with the Election Committee was invalidated and he was so disqualified from LegCo. Civic Passion announced its dissolution.	政府宣告立法會議員鄭松泰在選舉委員會的登記無效，喪失議員資格。熱血公民隨即宣布解散。
9.24	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs released the 'Fact Sheet: U.S. Interference in Hong Kong Affairs and Support for Anti-China, Destabilizing Forces'.	外交部發布〈美國干預香港事務、支持反中亂港勢力事實清單〉，列出干涉香港事務的事項。

7.28 & 12.15	In pursuant to the power conferred by Companies Ordinance, the Financial Secretary investigated the business of Next Digital, which was subsequently ordered for liquidation by the court.	壹傳媒被財政司司長引用《公司條例》調查業務，遭頒令清盤。
9.15, 9.24 & 10.8	District Councillors completed their oath-taking ceremonies. 49 were disqualified and more than 200 resigned.	香港區議員完成宣誓儀式，49位被判宣誓無效，逾200名自行辭職。
10.8, 12.22 & 12.24	Tiananmen monuments in universities were removed, including 'Pillar of Shame' in HKU, 'Goddess of Democracy' in CUHK and a wall mural about June 4 in Lingnan University.	放置於香港大學校園的「國殤之柱」、香港中文大學的「民主女神像」及嶺南大學的「六四浮雕」被移除。
10.11 & 10.23	The Democratic Party and the ADPL announced that no member signed up for the upcoming LegCo election.	民主黨及民協表示，黨內無人報名參與立法會換屆選舉。
9.15, 10.16 & 12.9	25 pro-democracy activists pleaded guilty and were sentenced from 4 to 14 months in prison for illegal assemblies on June 4 and July 1 in 2020.	2020年六四及七一集結案，25名民主派人士認罪，被判囚4至14個月。
11.9, 12.9 & 12.15	ICAC arrested ten people for inciting others on the Internet to cast blank votes at the LegCo election.	廉政公署先後拘捕十人，涉嫌網上呼籲他人於立法會選舉中投白票。
11.13	The Economist stated that the authorities refused to issue a working visa to one of their journalists.	英國《經濟學人》雜誌發表聲明，表示香港當局拒絕簽發一名記者的工作簽證。
12.19 & 12.20	The 2021 Legislative Council election was successfully held after a one-year deferral and a electoral overhaul. The pro-establishment camp had a sweeping victory. Foreign ministers of the Five Eyes expressed serious concerns about the erosion of democratic elements in Hong Kong.	2021年的立法會選舉，在延期一年和完善選舉制度後，順利舉行。建制派獲得幾乎所有議席。五眼聯盟外長就選舉結果發表聲明，嚴重關切香港的民主元素受侵蝕。
12.20	The State Council Information Office released the white paper on "Hong Kong Democratic Progress Under the Framework of One Country, Two Systems".	國務院新聞辦發布《一國兩制下香港的民主發展白皮書》，回顧香港民主發展的歷程。
12.21 & 12.30	The US State Department and the Treasury sanctioned five deputy directors of the Hong Kong Liaison Office, accusing them of undermining Hong Kong's autonomy. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs imposed reciprocal sanction on 5 US individuals.	美國國務院和財政部宣布制裁五名香港中聯辦副主任，指他們削弱香港自治權。中國外交部採取對等反制，制裁五名美方人員。
12.29 - 12.31	Six current and former management of Stand News were arrested on conspiring to publish seditious publications. Stand News announced immediate cessation of operations. United Nations, UK, US, Germany, Canada and other countries expressed concerns about the situation of civil society and press freedom in Hong Kong.	六名立場新聞現任及前任高層被拘捕，涉嫌串謀發布煽動性刊物。立場新聞宣布即時停止運作。聯合國、英美德加等國發表聲明，關注香港的公民社會及新聞自由。

3 去激進化跡象 Sign of De-radicalization

Figure 5 shows the composition of Hong Kong population by political inclination. Moderates (which include centrists and those without specific political inclination) remained the largest group (62.1%), followed by non-establishment supporters (19.6%) and pro-establishment supporters (12.4%). Non-establishment supporters were further divided into democrats (14.8%) and 'others' (4.8%), which constituted mostly the localist camp.

Over the last half year, the gap between the moderates and non-establishment supporters were steadily widening, as the two diverge from each other with a rise of 7.6 percentage points of the former and a drop of 11.1 percentage points of the latter. Among non-establishment supporters, the proportion of democrats and others dropped by 8.1 percentage points to 14.8% and 3.0 percentage points to 4.8% respectively. Pro-establishment supporters remained at a similar level as 12.4%.

A hopeful trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation endured from mid-2017 to early 2019. The proportion of moderates and pro-establishment in the population rose while that of non-establishment supporters declined. Radicalism resurged abruptly since then leading to a reversal of trend until the political rift began to heal in early 2020. The pro-establishment started to regain supporters from late 2019, while the moderates rebounded from its bottom and the non-establishment shrank from its peak in mid-2020.

In the latest round, moderates and non-establishment supporters continued their respective trends of rise and decline. In combination with a steadily declining population of other non-establishment supporters, the overall trajectory points to a narrowing political divide. It appeared that the subsiding momentum of political controversies, such as the anti-extradition movement and the enactment of NSL, is beginning to show in the political makeup of the population.

圖 5顯示香港市民的政治傾向。溫和派繼續成為最大組別（62.1%），包括「中間派」和「沒有政治傾向」的市民。非建制派排列第二（19.6%），建制派佔最少（12.4%）。非建制派可以再細分為民主派（14.8%）和以本土派為主的其他非建制派（4.8%）。


在過去半年，溫和派及非建制派支持者的佔比差距穩定地擴闊，前者上升7.6個百分點，而後者下降11.1個百分點。在非建制派支持者中，民主派和其他其他非建制派支持者分別下跌8.1個百分點到14.8%及3.0個百分點到4.8%。建制派支持者則維持在相約的水平，即12.4%。

去激進化及溫和政治在2017年中至2019年初興起，溫和派與建制派支持者的比例上升，而非建制派支持者則下降。激進主義的突然冒起逆轉了形勢，直至2020年初，政治撕裂才開始癒合。建制派支持者率先於2019年底開始增加，溫和派自2020年年中起也從谷底回升，非建制派則由高峰收下滑。

最新一輪，溫和派及非建制派維持各自的升勢及跌勢，結合其他建制派佔比的持續下降，政治分野整體上有收窄的跡象。社會運動的休整及《港區國安法》的實施似乎也反映於市民的政治傾向。

Figure 5: Political inclination of population

圖 5：香港市民政治傾向



3.1. De-radicalisation of youths

Figure 6 shows the change in the composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by political inclination. The proportion of moderates rose by 12.6 percentage points to 57.1%, overtaking the non-establishment group which dropped sharply by 18.9 percentage points to 33.3%. Within the non-establishment group, youths identified as democrats and other non-establishment fell to early-extradition level. Proportions of the former fell by 10.2 percentage points to 22.4% while the latter decreased further by 8.7 percentage points to 10.9%.

From mid-2017 to early 2019, there had been encouraging signs of de-radicalization of youths, when population of moderates was high and rising. This trend, however, was reversed as the proportion of non-establishment supporters witnessed a steep rise, surpassing moderates for some time. Furthermore, within the non-establishment group, localists overtook democrats in certain periods. Since mid-2020, the situation of radicalisation clearly eased as the proportion of localists subsided and moderates surpassed the entire non-establishment group. Nonetheless, despite some steady decline in the proportion of other non-establishment population, the fact that almost one-tenth of youths continued to identify themselves as belonging to the localist camp is still a worrisome phenomenon.


3.1. 香港青年的去激進化

圖 6顯示青年（18至29歲）的政治傾向變化。溫和派的比例上升12.6 個百分點到57.1%，超越大幅下跌18.9個百分點至33.3%的非建制派組別。非建制陣營中，自稱民主派和其他非建制派的青年下跌至修例風波早期水平。前者下跌10.2個百分點至22.4%，後者下跌8.7個百分點至10.9%。

由2017年中至2019年初，青年溫和派不但高企，還慢慢攀升，呈現令人鼓舞的去激進化跡象。但趨勢急速扭轉，溫和派屈居於急速增長的非建制派之後。更甚者，青年本地派在部分時期超越民主派。2020年中開始，激進化局面緩和，本土派比例下降，溫和派規模更超越整個非建制陣營。儘管其他非建制派持續下降，約十分之一的年輕人仍定位自己為本土派，情況仍然令人擔憂。

Figure 6: Political inclination of youths

圖 6：青年的政治傾向



4 2047年後延續「一國兩制」 Continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047

An issue of utmost importance for the future of Hong Kong is the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047. Table 7 shows that 67.4% agreed to the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047, while 13.9% held the opposite view, leading to an increase of 4.2 percentage points in net support rate to 53.5%. An overwhelming majority of over two-thirds of the respondents still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

Figure 7 shows the net support produced by respondents of different age groups. Half of the age groups recorded an increase. Net support for the 18-29, 40-49 and 60-69 age groups were 51.2%, 60.4% and 61.8% respectively, having increased between 10.4 and 16.1 percentage points. A bigger drop in net support was recorded for the 70 or above age groups, which decreased by 11.6 percentage points to 44.5%.

Figure 8 shows the net support produced by respondents of different political inclinations. Moderate became the highest group with a significant increase of 10.3 percentage points to 57.5%. The net support for pro-establishment and non-establishment supporters decreased by 10 percentage points and 7.9 percentage points respectively to 53.9% and 42.2%, where the drop of the latter was statistically significant.

2047年後是否繼續實行「一國兩制」乃關乎香港前途的關鍵議題。表 7顯示67.4%市民同意香港應該於2047年後延續「一國兩制」，反對的下跌至13.9%，因此支持淨值最新上升4.2個百分點至53.5%。超過三分之二的絕大部分市民依然相信「一國兩制」是適合香港未來的體制。

圖 7顯示不同年齡組別的支持淨值變化。一半的年齡組別的支持率均上升，18-29、40-49及60-69歲組別的支持率分別為51.2%、60.4%及61.8%，上升幅度介乎10.4至16.1個百分點。70歲或以上組別的跌幅較大，下跌11.6個百分點至44.5%。

圖 8顯示不同政治派別的支持度淨值變化。溫和派的支持淨值顯著上升10.3個百分點達57.5%，成為數值最高的組別。建制派和非建制派的支持淨值分別下跌10個和7.9個百分點，至53.9%和42.2%，後者的跌幅達統計上顯著水平。

Table 7: Attitudes towards the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047

表 7：2047 年後香港應否繼續實行「一國兩制」

	2019.10	2020.6	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1
Should 應該	73.5%	77.2%	74.1%	67.7%	67.4%
Should not 不應該	14.1%	11.3%	14.3%	18.4%	13.9%
Don't know 唔知道	12.4%	11.5%	11.6%	14.0%	2.4%
Net value 淨值	59.5%	65.9%	59.9%	49.3%	53.5%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Should' /less percent who chose 'Should Not'

淨值：認為「應該」的百分比減去認為「不應該」的百分比

Figure 7: Net support for continuation of 1C2S (by age)

圖 7：繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度淨值（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 8: Net Value of support for continuation of 1C2S by political inclination

圖 8：繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度淨值（按政治傾向劃分）



4.1. Favourable conditions to the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047

If respondents agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2017, they were then asked to choose what conditions would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S from the following list (they were allowed to choose more than 1 item):

- Maintaining a high degree of autonomy;
- Maintaining economic prosperity and stability;
- Political system democratises further;
- Maintaining national security; and
- Others (please specify).

Figure 9 shows the percentages of respondents who chose each of the five conditions. For all respondents, 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (64.1%) remained the most important item. 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (60.6%) rose to a close second and reached its historical high. 'Political system democratises further' (40.9%) dropped continuously. Since the enactment of NSL, the importance of 'maintaining national security' (24.1%) continued to rise. In the latest round, it grew by 3.6 percentage points to a historic high.

Figure 10 shows how the pattern of choice differed by political inclination and the increasingly stark contrast among groups of different political inclinations. Pro-establishment supporters differed their views on 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' with other political inclinations. Only slightly more than 40% of them favoured this condition, while that of moderates and non-establishment supporters were 64.0% of and 78.4% respectively. As with the overall trend, all political inclinations gave their respective record high level of importance to 'maintaining national security'.

For pro-establishment supporters, the pursuit of 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (81.2%) continued to rise. 'Maintaining national security' replaced 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' as the second most important condition, but a distant second.

4.1. 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件

如果受訪者同意於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」，他們會進一步被邀從下列清單中選出有利於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（可選擇多於一項）：

- 維持高度自治；
- 經濟維持繁榮穩定；
- 政制進一步民主化；
- 維持國家安全；及
- 其他（請註明）。

圖 9顯示受訪者可選的五項因素所佔的比例。對所有市民而言，「維持高度自治」（64.1%）仍然是首要選項，「經濟維持繁榮穩定」（60.6%）上升至歷史高位並尾隨其後。「政制進一步民主化」（40.9%）持續下降。自《港區國安法》實施後，「維護國家安全」持續上升，最新佔比上升3.6 個百分點至歷史高位。

圖 10按政治傾向顯示市民選擇各條件的比例，他們的差異愈來愈鮮明。建制派支持者對「維持高度自治」的重要程度有別於其他政治派別，只有稍多於40%選擇此條件，而溫和派和非建制派支持者則有64.0%和78.4%。不論政治派別，受訪者對「維護國家安全」的重視程度一致上升至歷史高位，與整體趨勢相似。

建制派支持者對「經濟維持繁榮穩定」（81.2%）的追求繼續上升。「維持國家安全」取代「維持高度自治」成為第二重要條件，但與首要條件有一定距離。

Moderates' view on the favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S remained largely stable, with 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (64.0%) as the most important condition, followed by 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (62.8%).


Despite a sharp rise for 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability', both democrats and other non-establishment supporters rated 'political system democratizing further' to be the more important condition. In the latest round, the greatest importance was given to 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' which recorded at 78.0% and 79.7% for the two groups respectively.

溫和派對有利於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的不同條件有平穩的評價，「經濟維持繁榮穩定」（62.8%）繼續緊次於排名第一的「維持高度自治」（64.0%）。

儘管「維持高度自治」的重要程度急速提升，民主派及其他非建制派均認為「政制進一步民主化」比之更為重要。在最新一輪調查中，「維持高度自治」被視為最重要的條件，民主派和非建制派支持者的淨值分別為78.0%和79.7%。

Figure 9: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047


圖 9：2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件



	Share 佔比	Changes 變化
■ Maintaining a high degree of autonomy 維持高度自治	63.3%	(↓ 0.8%)
■ Maintaining economic prosperity and stability 經濟維持繁榮穩定	60.6%	(↑ 2.7%)
■ Political system democratizing further 政制進一步民主化	40.9%	(↓ 7.9%)
■ Maintaining national security 維護國家安全	24.1%	(↑ 3.6%)
■ Others / Don't know 其他 / 唔知道	9.8%	(↑ 4.0%)

Figure 10: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047 (2018.12-2022.1 by political inclination)

圖 10：有利於 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件 (2018.12-2022.1，按政治傾向劃分)



5 市民的身分認同 Citizens' Identity

We also surveyed how citizens identify themselves: whether as Hongkongers or Chinese. Figure 11 shows members of the public continued to identify themselves much more strongly as Hongkongers than as Chinese. The scores for these identities started to reconverge after a period of parallel increase and opposing movements. In the latest round, the divide between them narrowed as ratings for Hongkongers and Chinese dropped by 4.7% to 7.84 and increased by 14.8% to 5.59 respectively. These changes were statistically significant.

The extent to which the public identified themselves as Hongkongers and Chinese can be better demonstrated by Figure 12, a graph mapping the mix of identities rated by respondents against time. On the 0 to 10 scale, the median is 5, which indicates a moderate level of identification. Ratings that are higher than the median indicate relatively strong identification; ratings that are lower than the median indicate relatively weak identification. These levels of strength can be grouped into four categories, dual identity (strong in both identifications), stronger identification as Hongkongers only, stronger identification as Chinese only, and others which include those without a dominant identity.

Earlier surveys showed a clear pattern that most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both Hongkongers and Chinese. This had gradually changed since mid-2019 and rebounded after hitting rock bottom in mid-2020. Although still less than half, dual identity with the latest reading of 45.5% became the dominant identity again by overtaking 'Hongkonger only', which dropped to 36.1% since July 2021.

Identification as Chinese may not be the same as patriotic, but identification as both Hongkongers and Chinese is a pre-requisite for 'devotion to China and Hong Kong'. The fact that the proportion of Hong Kong people with dual identity is continuing to rebound for three consecutive rounds after months of sharp decline since December 2018 suggests easing societal tension that would doubtlessly be beneficial to the implementation of 1C2S. We have not overlooked a possibility that current persistent international condemnation of China also has an impact on how Hongkongers look at themselves. The importance or otherwise of this will hopefully become clearer in time.

我們分別詢問市民對香港人及中國人身分的認同程度。圖 11顯示市民繼續對香港人的認同強於中國人，經過一段時間的同步增強和反向而行後，兩種身分認同的分歧開始匯合。最新一輪結果顯示兩種身分的分野縮小，香港人及中國人分別下跌4.7個百分點至7.84分及上升14.8個百分點至5.59分，變幅達統計上顯著水平。


圖 12更清晰地呈現市民對兩種身分的認同程度。按 0分至10分的尺度，中位數為5，代表中等認同。高於中位數代表較強認同，低於則代表較弱認同。對兩種身分不同程度的認同可歸為四類：雙重身分（對兩種身分均擁有較強認同）、只對香港人身分有較強認同、只對中國人身分有較強認同，以及包括沒有主要身分的其他身分認同。

香港市民普遍擁有香港人和中國人雙重身分認同，情況自2019年起逐步轉變。過往調查中，擁有雙重身分認同的市民由超過一半，於2020年6月觸底後反彈。雙重認同雖然仍未過半，不過最新佔比為45.5%，取代下跌至36.1%的「只有香港人」，重新成為最主要的身分。

認同「中國人」身分未必等於「愛國」，不過同時認同「中國人」及「香港人」兩種身分卻是「愛國愛港」的先決條件。市民的雙重身分認同在短短八個月持續下跌，反映社會與政治環境對落實「一國兩制」的重大挑戰。現在，國際社會對中國口誅筆伐，對塑造香港人自我認同的作用不能忽略，其影響力需時瞭解。

Figure 11: Citizens' identity scores


圖 11：市民的身分認同評分



Scores 評分	Changes 變化
Hongkonger 香港人 7.84	-0.39 (↓ 4.7%) *
Chinese 中國人 5.59	0.72 (↑ 14.8%) *

Figure 12: Citizens' identity mix

圖 12：市民的混合身分認同



Share 佔比	Changes 變化
Dual Identity 雙重認同 45.5%	(↑ 7.6%)
Hongkonger Only 只有香港人 36.1%	(↓ 11.5%)
Chinese Only 只有中國人 5.7%	(↑ 0.4%)
Others 其他 12.8%	(↑ 3.5%)

5.1. Rank correlation

Statistical analysis yields the observation that there is a positive correlation between identification as a Hongkonger and a Chinese, suggesting that the more strongly one identifies with Hong Kong, the more strongly one identifies with China. The converse also holds as the rank correlation coefficient is 0.141 and is statistically very significant. The finding that the two identities as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese ' were mutually reinforcing each other and again provides a strong basis for the implementation of 1C2S.

5.1. 等級相關係數

統計分析發現市民對香港人及中國人身分認同呈現正相關，即越認同香港人身分的市民亦越認同中國人身分，反之亦然。等級相關係數為0.141，統計上非常顯著。結果證實香港人及中國人身份認同相輔相成，是落實「一國兩制」的有利條件。

Table 8: Rank correlation of citizens' identity

表 8：市民的身分認同等級相關係數

	2019.10	2020.6	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1
Correlation 相關係數	-0.022	-0.059	-0.068	-0.027	-0.141
t-statistic t檢定統計	-0.69	-1.82	-2.26	-0.83	4.39



6 熱門議題 Topical Issues

6.1. Responsibility of conflicts

Table 9 shows allocation of blame between Mainland and Hong Kong when conflicts arise in the implementation of 1C2S. 30.8% of the public suggested that Mainland would be responsible while 19.0% assigned the responsibility to Hong Kong. There were more people attributing equal responsibility to both Hong Kong and Mainland, as January 2022 recorded a rise of 5.7 percentage points to 43.4%. The tendency of blaming only Mainland continued to subside in this round and the decrease in net value was also statistically significant.

Table 9: Responsibility for conflicts

表 9：出現矛盾的責任

	2019.10	2020.6	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1
The Mainland 內地	45.4%	50.1%	46.6%	40.2%	30.8%
Hong Kong 香港	11.5%	8.3%	14.2%	18.5%	19.0%
Equally Responsible 一半半	36.4%	35.7%	34.2%	37.7%	43.4%
Don't Know 唔知道	6.7%	5.8%	5.0%	3.6%	6.8%
Net Value 淨值	33.8%	41.8%	32.4%	21.6%	11.9% *

Net Value: Percent who chose 'The Mainland' /less percent who chose 'Hong Kong'. Higher (lower) value means greater responsibility lies with the Mainland (Hong Kong)

淨值：認為屬「內地」的百分比 減去 認為屬「香港」的百分比，比例越高代表內地（香港）需負較大責任

6.1. 出現矛盾的責任

表 9顯示當實踐「一國兩制」出現矛盾時，市民認為應歸咎責任予內地或香港。30.8%市民認為責任屬於內地，19.0%則認為責任屬於香港。選擇「一半半」的人數稍微上升，2022年1月雖然錄得5.7個百分點的升幅至43.4%。將矛盾責任歸咎於內地的傾向在本輪調查維持跌勢，淨值的降幅達統計上顯著水平。

6.2. Emigration

Table 10 shows public's emigration plans. Those who had 'no plans' to emigrate remained the majority (65.7%), exceeding those who 'have plans' (23.0%). The two groups recorded an increase of 7.3 percentage point and a drop of 9.9 percentage point respectively. As a result, the net value experienced a fall of 17 percentage points since July 2021 to -42.7%. These changes were statistically significant.

Figure 13 shows the net value of groups of different political inclination who planned to emigrate. Expectedly, non-establishment supporters were more likely to have plans to emigrate than respondents of other political inclinations. Their net value of -2.9% consisted of -13.2% and 21.4% produced by democrats and other non-establishment supporters respectively. For moderates, the net value decreased by a statistically significant level of 13.8 percentage points to -47.7%.

6.2. 移民海外

表 10顯示市民的移民計劃。「無打算」移民的人數（65.7%）遠遠拋離「有打算」者（23.0%），兩者分別錄得7.3個百分點升幅及9.9個百分點跌幅。比較2021年7月，淨值下降17個百分點至-42.7%。這些變化皆達到統計上顯著水平。

圖 13顯示不同政治派別有打算移民的百分比。一如預期，非建制派支持者比其他派別更有計劃移民。該組別的移民淨值為-2.9%，分別來自民主派的-13.2%及其他非建制派的21.4%。溫和派的移民淨值下跌13.8個百分點至-47.7%，變幅達到統計上顯著水平。

Past studies have suggested that surveys often inaccurately amplify the number of individuals who seek to emigrate, for only a fraction of those who express interest in emigrating eventually do so in reality. Caution should therefore be exercised in interpreting the above findings, though they still provide valuable references of degree and extent of concern. The laxing of immigration requirements by 'popular' countries in response to the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law might also mean that plans to emigrate might not necessarily be induced by a lack of confidence in 1C2S or the socio-political situation of Hong Kong but simply seen as 'opportunities not to be missed' by those who had wanted to immigrate in any event.

根據過往研究，在民調中聲稱移民的人數，往往遠超真正移民的人數。民調結果雖有一定參考價值，但要小心解讀。溫和派聲稱無信心而計劃移民，一方面可能是對中央政府及建制派不滿，另一方面亦可能是擔心非建制派破壞社會穩定，例如覺得激進政治將會損害香港法治及經濟，兩種可能性皆不能排除。除此之外，就《港區國安法》的實施，多國以放寬移民門檻向北京施壓，不能排除有人視之為不能缺失的機會，並不一定是對「一國兩制」失去信心的表現。

Table 10: Public's emigration plans

表 10：市民移民海外的計劃


	2019.10	2020.6	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1
Have Plans 有打算	28.6%	34.5%	32.7%	32.9%	23.0%
No Plans 無打算	69.3%	62.5%	61.1%	58.4%	65.7%
Don't Know 唔知道	2.1%	3.0%	6.2%	8.7%	11.3%
Net Value 淨值	-40.7%	-28.0%	-28.4%	-25.5%	-42.7%

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Have Plans' /less percent who chose 'No Plans'

淨值：認為「有打算」的百分比 減去認為「無打算」的百分比

Figure 13: Public's emigration plans (by political inclination)

圖 13：市民移民海外的計劃（按政治傾向劃分）





6.3. Willingness of living or working in other cities of Greater Bay Area (GBA)

Table 11 shows willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA. The proportion for those who were 'willing' to live or work in GBA was 5.6% and those 'unwilling' was 66.5%, leading to a decrease in net willingness by 0.7 percentage points to -60.9%.

Figure 14 highlights the willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA by age group. Net willingness of youths (aged 18 to 29) increased by 12.4 percentage points to -69.0% at a statistically significant level. Other groups fell, except for the 60-69 age group which rose slightly by 3.7 percentage points to -57.5%.

6.3. 前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願

表 11顯示受訪者前往大灣區居住或工作的意願。願意前往大灣區的受訪者有5.6%，不願意的則有66.5%，導致淨值下跌0.7 個百分點到-60.9%。

圖 14顯示不同年齡組別北上大灣區居住或發展的意願。青年（18至29歲）的意願淨值上升了12.4個百分點至-69.0%，達統計上顯著水平。60-69歲組別的淨值上升3.7 個百分點至-57.5%，除此之外，其他年齡組別皆錄得下跌。

Table 11: Willingness of living or working in the GBA

表 11：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願


	2019.8	2020.6	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1
Willing 會考慮	7.8%	11.9%	8.2%	7.0%	5.6%
Not willing 不會考慮	73.9%	72.6%	64.8%	68.6%	66.5%
Maybe / Don't Know 或者 / 唔知道	18.2%	15.6%	24.0%	24.4%	27.9%
Net Value 淨值	-66.1%	-60.7%	-59.6%	-61.6%	-60.9%

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Willing' /less/ Percent who chose 'Not willing'

淨值：「會考慮」的百分比 減去 「不會考慮」的百分比

Figure 14: Willingness of living or working in GBA (by age)

圖 14：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願（按年齡組別劃分）



6.4. Confidence in the education system of Hong Kong

Table 12 shows the level of confidence the public displayed in relation to the education system of Hong Kong. Respondents showing confidence in the education system of Hong Kong rose by 4.1 percentage points to 18.7%. Those opted for the opposite dropped by 7 percentage points to 67.8%. These changes were statistically significant, leading to an increase of 10.9 percentage points in net value to -49.2%.

6.4. 對香港教育制度的信心

表 12顯示市民對香港教育制度的信心。對教育制度有信心的受訪者增加4.1個百分點至18.7%，無信心的下跌7個百分點至67.8%。淨值增加了10.9個百分點到-49.2%，變幅達統計上顯著水平。

Table 12: Confidence in the educational system in Hong Kong

表 12：對香港教育制度的信心

	2021.7	2022.1
Confident 有信心	14.6%	18.7%
Not Confident 無信心	74.8%	67.8%
Unchanged 沒有改變	7.9%	11.3%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	2.7%	2.2%
Net Value 淨值	-60.1%	-49.2% *

Net value: Percent who chose 'Confident' less percent who chose 'Not Confident'

淨值：「有信心」的百分比 減去「無信心」的百分比

6.5. Satisfaction with the quality of civil service

Table 13 shows the level of satisfaction the respondents demonstrated in the performance of civil service. Respondents who were satisfied with the performance remained unchanged at 26.2%. Those who were dissatisfied reduced slightly by 3.5 percentage points to 49.2%. These changes led to an increase of 3.5 percentage points in net value to -23.0%.

Table 13: Level of satisfaction in the quality of the work of civil servants

表 13：對公務員服務水平的滿意度

	2021.7	2022.1
Satisfied 滿意	26.2%	26.2%
Dissatisfied 不滿意	52.7%	49.2%
Half-half 一半半	19.9%	21.7%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	1.2%	3.0%
Net Value 淨值	-26.5%	-23.0%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Satisfied' /less percent who chose 'Dissatisfied'

淨值：「滿意」的百分比 減去「不滿意」的百分比

6.5. 對公務員水平的滿意度

表 13顯示受訪者對公務員服務水平的滿意度。26.2%的受訪者表示滿意，與上一輪沒有改變。不滿意的受訪者稍為下降3.5個百分點至49.2%。淨值增加3.5個百分點至-23.0%。

6.6. Recent political controversies

6.6.1. Northern Metropolis Development Strategy

Table 14 shows the public's reception of the impact of the Northern Metropolis Development Strategy on Hong Kong's future. Most respondents believed that the Strategy would either bring a negative impact or no impact to Hong Kong's future, both contributing a third at 34.8% and 32.1% respectively. Only 21.8% of respondents believed that the Strategy could benefit Hong Kong.

Table 14: Impact of Northern Metropolis Development Strategy on Hong Kong's Future

表 14：北部都會區發展策略對香港前景的影響

	All respondents 所有受訪者
Positive impact 正面影響	21.8%
Negative impact 負面影響	34.8%
No impact 沒有影響	32.1%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	11.3%
Net Value 淨值	-13.0%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' /less percent who chose 'Negative impact'

淨值：「正面影響」的百分比 減去「負面影響」的百分比

6.6. 近期政治爭議

6.6.1. 北部都會區發展策略

表 14顯示市民認為北部都會區發展策略對香港前景所帶來的影響。大部分受訪者覺得北部都會區會為香港前景帶來負面或沒有影響，各佔約三分之一，分別為34.8%和32.1%。只有21.8%的受訪者認為對香港有正面影響。

6.6.2. Impact of the recent Legislative Council election on Hong Kong's governance

Table 15 shows the perceived impact of the recent LegCo election after electoral reform. More respondents (45.2%) believed that it would bring a negative impact than a positive impact (23.0%). At the same time, 22.4% of respondents deemed that there would have no impact. Together, the net value was recorded at -22.2%.

Table 15: Impact of the recent LegCo election on Hong Kong's governance

表 15: 新一屆立法會選舉對香港管治的影響

	All respondents 所有受訪者
Positive impact 正面影響	23.0%
Negative impact 負面影響	45.2%
No impact 沒有影響	22.4%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	9.4%
Net Value 淨值	-22.2%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' /less percent who chose 'Negative impact'

淨值：「正面影響」的百分比 減去「負面影響」的百分比

6.6.3. Generation gap and political divide

Table 16 and Table 17 are summaries of the net values generated from questions about recent political controversies, further categorized by age and political inclination.

There were unambiguous patterns in how respondents of different age and political inclinations react to these controversial events. Generally, the net values increase with age and decrease as the political inclination move away from the pro-establishment end. For instance, 18-29 age group and the non-establishment supporters were the most critical about the political controversies while pro-establishment supporters tend to produce the highest net values, often the only positive net values in any category.

Taking the extreme views displayed by groups of other political inclinations into accounts, the stance of moderates on these topical issues are of value as reference points signalling the general public's opinions towards the said issues. As for this round, moderates' view towards the Northern Metropolis was inclined to the opposition rather than the pro-government camp, so was the recent LegCo election.

6.6.2. 新一屆立法會選舉對香港管治的影響

表 15顯示市民認為新一屆立法會選舉對香港管治所帶來的影響。多數受訪者（45.2%）認為負面影響多於正面影響（23.0%）。與此同時，22.4%的受訪者認為沒有影響。淨值為-22.2%。

6.6.3. 代溝及政治鴻溝

表 16及表 17總結市民對近期政治爭議的淨值，並按年齡及政治傾向劃分。

受訪者的年齡及政治傾向對於爭議事件的取態有明確關係。一般而言，淨值隨年齡增長而上升，並隨政治傾向偏離建制派而下降。例如，18-29歲組別及非建制派支持者對政治爭議評價尤其負面。建制派支持者通常給予最高淨值，有時更是所有組別中唯一的正值。

有別於其他政治派別的極端觀點，溫和派在這些熱點問題上的立場甚具參考價值，表明公眾的看法。就今輪而言，溫和派對北部都會區及新一屆立法會選舉態度，均更傾向民主派而非建制派。

Table 16: Generation gap over recent political controversies (by age)

表 16：對近期政治爭議之代溝（按年齡劃分）

	Public officers' pledge of allegiance 公職人員宣誓 (2021.1)	National Security Law 《港區國安法》 (2021.7)	Improvement of Electoral System 完善選舉制度 (2021.7)	Northern Metropolis 北部都會區 (2022.1)	LegCo Election 立法會選舉 (2022.1)
18-29	-36.0%	-73.5%	-73.5%	-36.7%	-50.9%
30-39	-29.2%	-56.4%	-52.5%	-41.5%	-52.4%
40-49	-28.6%	-39.2%	-45.9%	-20.8%	-26.2%
50-59	-27.8%	-29.9%	-25.8%	-9.2%	-15.6%
60-69	-13.3%	-12.6%	-18.1%	1.5%	-4.0%
≥70	-3.1%	-12.6%	-14.5%	25.6%	11.4%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-23.3%	-37.0%	-38.1%	-13.0%	-22.2%


Table 17: Political divide over recent political controversies (by political inclination)

表 17：對近期政治爭議之政治鴻溝（按政治傾向劃分）


	Public officers' pledge of allegiance 公職人員宣誓 (2021.1)	National Security Law 《港區國安法》 (2021.7)	Improvement of Electoral System 完善選舉制度 (2021.7)	Northern Metropolis 北部都會區 (2022.1)	LegCo Election 立法會選舉 (2022.1)
Pro-establishment 建制派	58.8%	56.3%	52.8%	61.6%	63.8%
Moderates 溫和派	-1.8%	-29.2%	-28.9%	-10.2%	-19.1%
Non-establishment 非建制派	-76.9%	-84.9%	-87.8%	-64.8%	-81.9%
Non-est.: Democrats 非建制派：民主派	-76.6%	-84.0%	-88.0%	-63.6%	-81.3%
Non-est.: Others 非建制派：其他	-77.8%	-87.5%	-87.0%	-67.5%	-83.5%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-23.3%	-37.0%	-38.1%	-13.0%	-22.2%

附錄 Appendices





附錄 Appendices



編製方法 Methodology

1. Construction of 1C2S Index

To understand the implementation of 1C2S comprehensively, we measure how the public in HK evaluate the current situation from various dimensions. International perception of freedom and democracy in HK is also pivotal as these are core components of 1C2S. Hence, we give an equal weight to scores obtained from the following two indices:

- Index (A): Public Opinion: Hong Kong public's evaluation of 1C2S compiled from telephone polls on 12 dimensions of 1C2S; and
- Index (B): International Perception: Compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on various dimensions of freedom and democracy in HK.

1.1. Index (A): Public Opinion

Index (A) is the average of sub-scores obtained from different dimensions of 1C2S in our telephone polls conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Each round, about 1,000 individuals will be randomly sampled by the CATI (computer assisted telephone interviewing) system, all aged 18 or above; all of them spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin. To better represent the distribution of the Hong Kong population, all data were weighted by the proportion of gender and age of people aged 18 or above (excluding foreign domestic helpers) according to the Census and Statistics Department.

1. 編製「一國兩制」指數

為綜合掌握香港實踐「一國兩制」的情況，我們從不同範疇衡量市民對香港現狀的評價。自由與民主是「一國兩制」的重要元素，國際社會對香港自由民主程度的觀感亦尤其重要。因此，「一國兩制」指數為以下兩項評分給予相同比重：

- 指數（A）：民意調查—香港市民在電話調查中對十二個「一國兩制」範疇的評分；及
- 指數（B）：國際評價—國際智庫對香港的自由民主水平所編製的評分。

1.1. 指數（A）：民意調查

指數（A）是香港市民對「一國兩制」的綜合評價，由九個範疇構成。我們委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查，每輪以電腦輔助電話訪問系統，隨機抽樣，訪問大約1,000人，全部皆屬18歲或以上，能操廣東話或普通話。進行分析時，數據依照香港政府統計處的18歲或以上性別及年齡分佈（扣除外籍家庭傭工）作加權處理，以更符合香港人口分佈的真實情況。表 18顯示每次調查的統計和科學標準。

The telephone survey uses a dual-frame sampling design since the July 2021 round. It randomly selects phone numbers from a combined sample of residential landline and mobile phone numbers. Given many individuals may own both landline and mobile phone numbers, steps were added in the weighting method to avoid estimation inaccuracy caused by double-counting or other unknown factors. Table 18 shows the statistical and scientific standards of each survey.

In the telephone polls, many questions employed 1 to 7 as the rating scale in the survey process, with 4 as the median. This scale, which is known as the Likert scale, is commonly adopted for psychological assessments. This scale was used instead of a 0 to 10 scale as the latter is deemed too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents to choose from. However, to better conform to existing indices – which tend to be expressed on a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median) – we converted the results mathematically into the popular 0 to 10 scale.

For a more extensive report on the survey results, please see Survey Results: Frequency and Percentage Distribution, which can be found on the webpage of Path of Democracy (<http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/>).

電話調查部分採用雙框抽樣設計，從家居固網電話號碼及流動電話號碼的結合樣本群中隨機抽取號碼。依照標準做法，數據在進行分析時依香港的人口分佈作加權處理。由於大部分人同時擁有家居固網電話號碼及流動電話號碼，為免重複計算或其他不明原因帶來的估算偏差，加權方法將按兩個步驟調整。

電話調查中，多數題目採用1至7分的評分尺度，以4分為中位數。這是心理學常用的科學尺度，稱為李克特量尺（Likert scale）。現時編製指數常採用0至10分的尺度，其實分類過於細緻，令市民難以選擇。不過為了與現行指數匹配，是以我們利用數學方法將調查結果轉換成為常見的0至10分尺度（以5分為中位數）。

如欲取得電話調查的詳細結果，請參閱民主思路網頁上的「調查結果：頻數及百分比分佈」（<http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/>）。

Table 18: Survey details

表 18: 調查概況

Round 輪次	Survey Period 調查日期	Number of Respondents 受訪人數			Response Rates 回應率		Confidence Level 置信水平	Sampling Error 抽樣誤差
		Landline 固網	Mobile 手機	Total 總數	Landline 固網	Mobile 手機		
2017.06	5.23 - 6.3	1,002	-	1,002	36.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2017.12	12.11 - 12.23	1,006	-	1,006	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018.06	5.23 - 6.2	1,004	-	1,004	37.2%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018.12	12.3 - 12.12	1,001	-	1,001	38.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2019.06	5.27 - 6.6	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2019.08	7.24 - 8.7	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2019.10	10.17 - 10.31	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2019.12	12.10 - 12.20	1,000	-	1,000	40.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2020.06	6.9 - 6.29	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2021.01	12.22 - 1.13	1,002	-	1,002	32.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2021.07	6.21 - 7.9	498	503	1,001	30.9%	31.4%	95.0%	±3.10%
2022.01	12.20 - 1.10	497	506	1,003	30.6%	30.0%	95.0%	±3.09%

1.1.1. Alternative methods of constructing Index (A)

Conceptually, there are different ways to compute the multiple dimensions into a composite score as Index (A). We have chosen the method of simple average, which is the most common method employed in constructing indices. Its strength lies in its parsimony and accessibility. It may not be the best method as it assigns equal weighting to all items (i.e. assuming equal importance for all items). Here, we compare the method of simple average to two alternatives methods that are more sophisticated, namely, principal component analysis and factor analysis.

Principal component analysis is a statistical method that processes and simplifies data; it is the standard scientific method employed in constructing indices. Through statistical analysis, it extracts the data set's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains the variations across the data.

Factor analysis extracts common factors from the data, and it shares a similar methodology with Principal component analysis. Its strength lies in its ability to identify hidden and representative factors amongst the many variables and group variables of a similar nature and converting the same into a common factor, which reduces the total number of variables.

Table 19 shows the negligible difference in scores acquired by the three methods. The results of all three methods are highly similar, largely due to the clustered nature of the public's assessments of the multiple dimensions (cf. the distributions of the dimensions are highly correlated), which causes the core components or sub-items across all three methods to be highly similar. Both alternative methods involve complex calculations, which render the methods inaccessible to laymen. Given the similarity of the results from all three methods, we adopted the simplest and most commonly used method – i.e. the average of the dimensions – in constructing Index (A).

1.1.1. 指數（A）的不同編製方式

指數（A）是香港市民對「一國兩制」的綜合評價，由多個範疇構成。要將各個範疇計算為指數（A）的綜合評分，在概念上有不同方式。我們採用了編製指數時最常見的簡單平均數，優點是簡單及容易明白。理論上，不同範疇可能有不同比重，簡單平均數未必是最好的編製方式，是以我們考慮兩種更複雜的方式與簡單平均數比較，分別為主成分分析與因子分析。

主成分分析是一種分析和簡化數據的統計技術，是以科學化方式編製指數的標準方法，其方法是通過對數據進行特徵分解，以得出數據的主要成分與它們的權值，優點是揭露數據的內部結構，從而更好解釋數據的變化。

因子分析是從數據中提取公性因子的統計方法，技術與主成分分析類似，其優點是在多項變量中找出隱藏及具有代表性的因子，將相同本質的變量歸入一個因子，從而減少變量的數目。

表 19顯示三種方式所得出的結果，只有微不足道的差異。三種方式的結果十分接近，相信是由於市民對多個範疇的評分相當近似（即各個範疇的分佈高度相關），是以主要成分或主要因子都十分接近。主成分分析及因子分析牽涉複雜計算，一般人難以明白。因為三種方式編製指數結果十分接近，我們選取最簡單常用的方法，即簡單平均數來編製「一國兩制」指數。

Table 19: Index (A): Public Opinion computed by different methods

表 19: 指數 (A) : 民意調查以不同方式編制

Round 輪次	Simple Average 簡單平均數	Principal Component Analysis 主成分分析	Factor Analysis 因子分析
2017.06	4.84	4.83	4.82
2017.12	4.98	4.99	4.94
2018.06	5.05	5.06	5.00
2018.12	4.84	4.84	4.76
2019.06	4.58	4.58	4.53
2019.08	3.98	3.96	3.91
2019.10	3.26	3.23	3.18
2019.12	3.53	3.51	3.47
2020.06	3.39	3.37	3.30
2021.01	3.37	3.53	3.48
2021.07	3.62	3.55	3.50

1.2. Index (B): International Perception

Index (B) is the average of 3 indices, namely, the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser Institutes, and the Democracy Index of the Economic Intelligence Unit. The average of the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index is known as the Human Freedom Index, which is the most comprehensive index of freedom available.

As the Human Freedom Index covers a very large number of countries, the latest Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index only reflect conditions two years ago. These two indices are updated based on the latest comparable indicators from other international think tanks. When updating is not possible, the relevant figures are assumed to be unchanged.

1.2.1. Comparable indicators

To obtain the updated scores of Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index, we first calculate the percentage changes in the comparable indicators for the respective years; then we apply these changes to the latest Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser. The comparable indicators for the Economic Freedom Index and each of the seven components of the Personal Freedom Index are listed in Table 20.

1.2. 指數 (B) : 國際評價

指數 (B) 是「經濟自由指數」、「個人自由指數」及「民主指數」三項指數的平均分。首兩項指數由卡托研究所 (Cato Institute) 及菲沙研究所 (Fraser Institute) 編製，第三項指數則由經濟學人智庫編製。「經濟自由指數」和「個人自由指數」的平均分被稱為「人類自由指數」，是目前衡量自由的指數中最全面的一種。

由於「人類自由指數」覆蓋大量國家，「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」只反映兩年前的狀況。這兩項指數將按相應的國際指標更新，如未能更新，我們假設相關數值不變。

1.2.1. 相應指標

為更新「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」，我們計算相應指標於相關年份的百分比變化，並將之套用於卡托研究所及菲沙研究所的「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」。Table 20顯示「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」中七個項目的相應指標。

Table 20: Comparable indicators of Index (B): International Perception

表 20: 指數 (B) : 國際評價之相應指標

Indicators 指標	Comparable Indicators 相應指標
Economic Freedom Index 經濟自由指數	The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom 傳統基金會經濟自由指數
Rule of Law 法治	World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index – 'Procedural Justice', 'Civil Justice' and 'Criminal Justice' 世界正義項目「法治指數」—「程序公義」、「民事司法」及「刑事司法」
Security and Safety 安全	World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index – 'Order and Security' 世界正義項目「法治指數」—「秩序與治安」
Movement 遷徙自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report - 'G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「G1. 人民是否享有遷徙自由，包括改變居所、就業或教育的能力？」
Religion 宗教自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「D2. 人民能否在公開或私人場合自由地實踐和表達宗教信仰或非信仰？」
Association, Assembly, & Civil Society 結社、集會及公民社會自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'E. Associational and Organizational Rights' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「E. 結社及組織權利」
Expression and Information 言論自由	Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index 無國界記者「全球新聞自由指數」
Identity and Relationships 性別認同及關係	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「G3. 人民是否享有個人社交自由，包括選擇婚姻對象及家庭人數、免受居所暴力及自主改變外貌？」

1.3. Refinement and Estimation

After the first survey in June 2017, our questionnaire for Index (A) was refined in the December 2017 and January 2021 rounds to increase validity. These refinements include change of wordings and addition and removal of questions, affecting four of the twelve questions used to compute Index (A). Scores of the other eight questions are directly comparable as they are identical in all surveys.

To adjust for the time lag of international indices, scores of Index (B) in previous reports were estimated with data available then. In every report, scores will be revised with latest updates from international think tanks.

For the convenience of comparison, Table 21 shows Index (A) computed by the identical eight questions and the refined questionnaire, the estimated and revised scores of Index (B), and the 1C2S Index constructed by the combination of them. The table also shows the differences in scores due to question change and updating.

1.3. 修訂與估算

於2017年6月第一輪調查後，電話調查於2017年12月及2021年1月經歷兩次修訂，以提高調查的正當性。修訂包括更改調查問題的用字，增加或移除問題，過程影響到指數（A）十二範疇中的四個範疇，另外八條問題在所有調查均相同，評分可以直接比較。

指數（B）的評分乃基於當時可得的數據而作出，以修正國際指數的滯後。該估算值將於其後的報告按最新的國際指數更新。

以便比較，Table 21顯示八個相同範疇及已修訂問數（A）、估算及修訂的指數（B），以及由它們所編製的「一國兩制」指數。結果顯示評分因為題目修訂和數據更新而帶來的差異。

Table 21: Refinement and estimation of 1C2S Index

表 21: 「一國兩制」指數之修訂與估算

Round 輪次	Index (A): Public Opinion 指數 (A) : 民意調查		Index (B): International Perception 指數 (B) : 國際評價		1C2S Index 「一國兩制」指數		Difference 差距
	Identical 相同	Refined 修訂	Estimates 估算	Revised 修訂	Maximum 最大值	Identical 相同	
2017.06	4.88	4.84	8.04	7.94	6.46	6.41	0.03
2017.12	4.84	4.98	8.04	7.94	6.51	6.39	0.10
2018.06	4.90	5.05	8.01	7.87	6.53	6.39	0.12
2018.12	4.70	4.84	7.89	7.87	6.37	6.29	0.08
2019.06	4.43	4.58	7.87	7.66	6.23	6.05	0.18
2019.08	3.81	3.98	7.87	7.66	5.93	5.84	0.09
2019.10	3.13	3.26	7.87	7.66	5.57	5.50	0.06
2019.12	3.40	3.53	7.87	7.66	5.70	5.53	0.17
2020.06	3.26	3.39	7.76	7.51	5.58	5.38	0.19
2021.01	3.24	3.62	7.59	7.51	5.61	5.38	0.23
2021.07	3.21	3.62	7.58	7.50	5.60	5.36	0.25
2022.01	3.64	4.02	7.50	7.50	5.76	5.57	0.19

2. Construction of 1C2S Mass Media Index

We build up a massive dataset by collecting media articles that contain the keyword ‘One Country, Two Systems’ from news database. Our sample consists of around 175,500 newspaper articles from 21 local daily newspapers that were published between April 1998 and December 2021. Each article undergoes a ‘tokenisation’ process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of over 20 years, our text corpus contains around 85 million tokens. The number of articles processed in each newspaper and the number of words processed each year are listed in Table 22 and Table 23.

Common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as pronouns, prepositions and particles, are first removed before further analysis. To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘neutral’. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by the Natural Language Processing and Sentiment Analysis Lab, Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica.

An article is made up of paragraphs. For each paragraph, net sentiment is calculated by the difference between the number of positive and negative words divided by the total word count. At the article level, a net sentiment score is then derived by averaging the net sentiment of its constituent paragraphs, where:

$$\text{Net sentiment score 情緒評分} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \frac{(a_i - b_i)}{w_i}}{N}$$

N = total number of paragraphs 段落總數

i = the i^{th} paragraph 第 i 個段落

a_i = number of positive words 正面語例數目

b_i = number of negative words 負面語例數目

w_i = total number of words 正面語例數目

2. 編製「一國兩制」輿情指數

我們以關鍵字「一國兩制」搜集新聞文章，組成龐大數據庫，包含1998年4月至2021年12月期間，來自本地21份日報關於「一國兩制」，約175,500份報導及評論。我們就每篇文章進行「分詞」（tokenization），通過電腦運算將文章分解成語例（token，為單詞或短語）。我們利用超過20年的資料組成語料庫，包含大約8,500萬個語例。表22及表23分別顯示每份報章所運算的文章數量及各年所運算的文字數量。

在進一步分析這個龐大的語料庫之前，我們首先剔除無助理解文章的常見單詞，如代詞、介詞和助詞。為了辨別一篇文章的情緒，我們採用由台灣中央研究院資訊科學研究所自然語言處理與情感分析實驗室開發的繁體中文情緒字典，把語例分類為「正面」、「中立」或「負面」。

每篇文章由段落組成。我們首先計算每一段落中，正負語例數量的相差，再除以整個段落的字數。每篇文章的情緒評分則為所有段落的平均值，即：

To each news source, a daily net sentiment score is further assigned by averaging the score of all articles published on a given day. Since there are substantial differences in the number of news articles published by various agencies, the article count of a news source alone could be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure 1C2S MMI's reliability, the sentiment score for each news source is weighted by public perceptions of its credibility based on the survey 'Public Evaluation on Media Credibility' conducted by Centre for Communication Research, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

1C2S MMI captures the weighted average sentiment score over 6 months. The base day is set on 1 July 2017 to correspond with the first launch of our report series and indicate 20 years after the establishment of HKSAR.

我們為每個新聞來源計算每天的情緒評分，為當天出版之文章的平均值。由於不同報章所刊登的文章數目有明顯差別，因此，只考慮文章數目不足以呈現不同報章對讀者觀感的影響力。為確保可靠性，本指數將採用由香港中文大學傳播與民意調查中心「市民對傳媒公信力的評分」為每份報章的情緒評分加權。

「一國兩制」輿情指數為六個月的加權平均情緒評分，基數月訂為2017年7月，基數為100，以標誌本系列報告的首次發布及回歸20周年的情況。

Table 22: Printed sources of 1C2S MMI

表 22：輿情指數之報章來源

Newspaper 報章	Article Count 文章篇數
A Daily A 報	81
am730	2,817
Apple Daily 蘋果日報	11,392
Headline Daily 頭條日報	1,631
Hong Kong Commercial Daily 香港商報	17,469
Hong Kong Daily News 新報	4,476
Hong Kong Economic Journal 信報	12,237
Hong Kong Economic Times 經濟日報	4,823
Hong Kong Globe 公正報	194
Lion Rock Daily 香港仔	392
Metro Daily 都市日報	1,436
Ming Pao Daily News 明報	14,464
Oriental Daily News 東方日報	10,045
Sharp Daily 爽報	152
Sing Pao 成報	5,500
Sing Tao Daily 星島日報	10,359
Sky Post 晴報	702
Ta Kung Pao 大公報	35,210
The Sun 太陽報	4,828
Tin Tin Daily News 天天日報	452
Wen Wei Po 文匯報	36,880
Total 總數	175,540

Table 23: Number of words processed for printed sources

表 23：報章新聞之處理資料字數

Year 年份	Word Count 字數
1998	669,676
1999	2,498,254
2000	2,320,584
2001	2,640,690
2002	2,545,546
2003	2,713,403
2004	4,801,621
2005	2,874,994
2006	1,879,834
2007	2,797,512
2008	1,446,629
2009	1,815,839
2010	1,880,198
2011	2,040,824
2012	3,441,893
2013	3,312,415
2014	5,386,835
2015	4,411,567
2016	5,590,354
2017	6,204,647
2018	4,932,978
2019	7,086,984
2020	5,901,439
2021	5,972,290
Total 總數	85,072,236

2.1. Preliminary assessment of electronic and online media

Currently, 1C2S MMI is confined to measure sentiment of newspaper articles. It does not cover news reported by electronic media such as television and radio, nor news carried by online media. At the time when MMI was created in 2017, measuring the sentiment of news reported by electronic and online media was very difficult because there was no comprehensive text-based database available and their sheer scale made it very demanding on resources.

As an attempt to overcome the above technical challenges, a preliminary assessment on the inclusion of electronic and online media is conducted to reflect the changing media landscape and readership. A comparison of sentiment indices between TV & radio stations, newspapers and online media is presented in Figure 15. Although there are differences in magnitude, the impact of news events on their overall trends is consistent regardless of media platforms.

We collected 39,900 articles from six television and radio stations and 13 online media that were published between January 2016 and December 2021. Due to data availability, most news sources have entered our database only since 2019 and thus the base month is tentatively set on July 2019. Our text corpus contains around 10 million tokens. The start year and the number of articles processed of each news source and the number of words processed each year are listed in Table 24 and Table 25.

2.1. 電子傳媒及網絡媒體之初步評估

目前，本報告的輿情指數只聚焦於報紙文章，不包括電視、電台等電子傳媒報導的新聞，也不包括網絡媒體所報導的新聞。在2017年輿情指數首次出版時，由於電視和電台沒有全面的文本數據庫，網絡媒體的海量數據對人手要求亦高，所以要衡量它們的新聞情緒非常困難。

為克服上述技術障礙，我們嘗試納入電子傳媒及網絡媒體並進行初步評估，以反映變化中的傳媒生態和閱讀習慣。圖 15比較電台電視、報紙和純網媒的輿情指數。它們的變幅在個別新聞事件有異，但不同媒體平台的總體趨勢基本一致。

我們收錄 2016 年 1 月至 2021 年 12 月期間39,900 篇文章，來自六個電視台和電台以及 12 個純網媒。由於數據供應所限，大多數新聞來源自 2019 年起才錄入數據庫，因此基數月訂暫為2019年7月。語料庫共約1千萬個語例。各個新聞來源的起始年份、處理文章數目和每年的處理資料字數見表 24及表 25。

Figure 15: Sentiment indices of electronic and onlinemedia (2019-2021)

圖 15：電子及網絡媒體之輿情指數（2019-2021）




Table 24: Electronic and online news sources of 1C2S MMI

表 24：輿情指數之電子及網絡新聞來源

News Source 新聞來源	Start Year 起始年份	Article Count 文章篇數
Cable TV / Hong Kong Open 有線電視/香港開電視	2019	657
Commercial Radio 商業電台	2019	3,652
Metro Radio 新城電台	2018	1,628
Now TV	2016	2,794
RTHK 香港電台	2018	3,296
TVB 無線電視	2016	3,723
Bastille Post 巴士的報	2019	7,153
Citizen News 眾新聞	2019	935
Dot Dot News 點新聞	2019	4,219
HK01 香港 01	2017	6,135
Hong Kong Free Press 香港自由新聞	2021	106
Initium Media 端傳媒	2020	124
In-Media 獨立媒體	2019	423
Passion Times 熱血時報	2019	418
Post 852 852 郵報	2018	625
Radio Free Asia 亞洲自由電台	2017	1,791
Speak Out HK 港人講地	2021	366
Stand News 立場新聞	2019	1,855
Total 總數		39,900

Table 25: Number of words processed for electronic and online news sources

表 25：電子及網絡新聞之處理資料字數

Year 年份	Word Count 字數
2016	30,181
2017	420,185
2018	344,031
2019	1,882,838
2020	3,527,310
2021	3,848,056
Total 總數	10,052,601

2.2. Accuracy test

1C2S MMI is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

2.2. 準確度覆查

「一國兩制」輿情指數是建基於由詞彙組成的模型。此模型視每段落為一籃子的詞語，從而抽離整篇文章的脈絡。其中一個效果是可能無法辨認到如諷刺等寫作手法，因而不能完全理解每一個段落的真正含義。這個局限在分析小說及文學作品時可能較為明顯，但對於寫作手法較直接的新聞文章而言，相信不是一個大問題。

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into ‘positive’, ‘neutral’ and ‘negative’ categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict.

In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time. As shown in Table 26, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as ‘positive’ whereas 1,472 were classified as ‘negative.’

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be.

Table 26 also shows the average sentiment scores of these 3 groups of paragraphs. In particular, ‘positive’ paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as ‘negative’ paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these 3 groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.

為證實此詞彙模型辨別情緒的準確度，我們兩位研究員從語料庫中隨機抽取了約18,000個段落，親自分類為「正面」、「負面」和「中立」，再與詞彙模型比較。各段落的出處在給予研究員之前已經被隱藏。假如兩名研究員對同一個段落的情緒判斷有異，第三名研究員將會重讀並作出判斷。是次覆查中，兩名研究員在大約八成的情況下均能作出相同的判斷。

我們利用與「一國兩制」輿情指數相同的詞彙模型為此等段落的情緒評分。在模型中，情緒評分為正、負面詞語量的淨值，所以評分愈高代表情緒愈正面。表 26顯示利用詞彙模型計算的情緒評分。2,363及1,472個段落分別被判決為「正面」及「負面」。被研究員判斷為「正面」的段落，情緒評分為21.76%，約為「負面」段落的7.5倍。再者，利用多變量回歸分析，三個類別的情緒評分發現具統計學上的顯著差異，證實詞彙模型的計算結果與我們研究員的人手分類一致。

Table 26: Results of accuracy test

表 26: 覆查結果

	Positive 正面	Neutral 中立	Negative 負面
No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers 真人研究員對情緒的判斷	2,363	14,202	1,472
Net Value 情緒淨值	21.76%	14.42%	2.92%

重大事件一覽

List of significant events

2017 H2

7.14	Disqualification of four LegCo members by the High Court.	高等法院裁定四名立法會議員宣誓無效。
8.15 & 8.17	Prison sentences of the '13+3' protestors in relation to the demonstration against the Northeast Territories Development and the Civic Square occupation. The court also gave new tougher sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence.	反新界東北發展示威者與強行進入公民廣場示威的「13+3」示威者被判入獄。上訴法庭更提出更嚴厲的量刑準則予未來涉及暴力的大型非法集會案件。
9.1	China's enactment of the national anthem law.	中國訂立國歌法。
10.19	Emphasis on 'overall jurisdiction over Hong Kong' in the Work Report of 19th CPC National Congress.	中共十九大工作報告強調對香港的「全面管治權」。
11.15	LegCo's passage of the non-binding motion on the high-speed rail co-location arrangement.	立法會通過關於高鐵「一地兩檢」安排的無約束力議案。
12.15	Amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Council to restrict filibustering.	立法會透過修訂議事規則限制拉布。

2018 H1

1.27	Agnes Chow Ting, a pro-democracy activist, was banned from running for the LegCo by-election on the grounds that her party, Demosisto, had called for 'self-determination'.	有意代表香港眾志出選立法會港島區補選的周庭，被裁定參選提名無效。
2.6	The case of the three student leaders was brought to the Court of Final Appeal (CFA). The CFA overturned the prison sentences on the trio on a technicality but ruled that the Court of Appeal was entitled to give tough sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence.	「雙學三子」案件上訴至終審法院。終審法院以技術因素推翻監禁判決，但認可上訴法院對未來涉及暴力的大規模非法集會案件所提出的更嚴厲判刑指引。
6.11	Edward Leung, leader of Hong Kong Indigenous, was given a prison sentence of 6 years on June 11 for his role in the civil unrest in Mongkok.	本土民主前線領袖梁天琦參與旺角騷亂，被判處6年監禁。
6.14	LegCo's passage of the co-location bill on June 14 after protracted debates.	立法會經過漫長辯論後，通過「一地兩檢」議案。

2018 H2

8.14	Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, delivered a speech hosted by the Foreign Correspondents' Club.	支持「港獨」的香港民族黨召集人陳浩天受邀於香港外國記者會演講。
9.24	The Hong Kong National Party was banned on national security grounds.	基於維護國家安全，香港民族黨被禁止運作。
10.5	Visa renewal of Victor Mallet, the Financial Times' Asia News Editor and Vice President of the Foreign Correspondents' Club (FCC), was rejected. He had chaired a talk by pro-independence activist Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the Hong Kong National Party, at the FCC.	《金融時報》亞洲總編輯、香港外國記者會副主席馬凱的簽證續期遭拒。他早期主持主張「港獨」的香港民族黨召集人陳浩天於香港外國記者會的演講。
10.12	Lau Siu Lai, a Democrat who had called for Hong Kong self-determination, was barred from running the LegCo by-election.	提倡香港「自決」的民主派候選人劉小麗於立法會補選中的被裁定提名無效。
10.23	Opening of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge.	港珠澳大橋啟用。
11.14	The United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended the US Congress to assess its export policy on technology with regard to Hong Kong's status as a separate customs area.	美中經濟與安全審查委員會向美國國會建議，重新審視高科技出口政策，評估香港的獨立關稅區地位。
11.19	Trial of 9 key figures of the 'Occupy Central' movement started.	「佔中九子」案開審。
12.4	Public education campaigns to promote the country's Constitution and Hong Kong's Basic Law were initiated on the National Constitution Day.	「國家憲法日」舉辦宣傳活動，推廣國家《憲法》與香港《基本法》。
12.12	Corruption investigation against Leung Chun-ying, former chief executive of HKSAR, for receiving a HK\$50 million payment from an Australian engineering firm was dropped due to lack of sufficient evidence.	前行政長官梁振英涉嫌收取澳洲工程公司5,000萬港元，案件因證據不足不進行檢控。

2019 H1

1.2	Xi Jinping marked the 40th anniversary of the 'Message to Compatriots' by upholding 1C2S as the best solution to cross-strait unification.	習近平於《告台灣同胞書》發表40周年紀念會指「一國兩制」為兩岸統一的最佳方式。
2.18	Promulgation of the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area.	《粵港澳大灣區發展規劃綱要》發布。
3.22	Kaohsiung mayor and Taiwan leader hopeful Han Kuo-yu's visited the central government's Liaison Office in Hong Kong.	高雄市市長、台灣總統熱門候選人韓國瑜拜訪香港中聯辦。
4.9	The 'Umbrella nine' (key leaders of the Occupy Central movement) were found guilty as the District Court ruled that civil disobedience was an invalid defence.	區域法院裁定「佔中九子」罪成，指出公民抗命不屬抗辯理由。
5.11 - 5.14	Attempts to start bills committee proceedings in LegCo for the controversial amendments to the extradition law erupted into chaos.	立法會法案委員會開展審議《逃犯條例》修訂案，發生衝突。

5.17 - 5.21	Han Zheng, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Wang Zhimin, Director of the central government's Liaison Office, both confirmed that the central government was supportive of the extradition law amendments.	國務院副總理韓正及香港中聯辦主任王志民開腔支持《逃犯條例》修訂。
6.9, 6.15 & 6.16	Record-setting demonstrations against the extradition law were staged. The government eventually announced the suspension of the amendment bill.	反修例遊行集會連破人數紀錄，政府最終決定暫緩修例。
6.12, 7.21, 8.31, 10.1, 11.11 - 11.15 & 11.17 - 11.29	Accusations of police misconduct accentuated after major collisions, including the 6.12 LegCo protest, 7.21 Yuen Long incident, 8.31 Prince Edward station incident, 10.1 and 11.11 gunshot incidents, confrontation in the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University.	連串衝突引起針對警察濫權失德的投訴，包括6.12立法會示威、7.21元朗事件、8.31太子站事件、10.1及11.11槍傷事件、香港中文大學衝突及香港理工大學衝突。

2019 H2

7.1 & 7.21	Protesters broke into the LegCo Chamber and vandalized the Hong Kong emblem on 1 July and laid siege to the central government's Liaison Office and defaced the Chinese emblem on 21 July.	示威者分別於7月1日及21日闖入立法會及包圍中聯辦大樓，塗污香港特區區徽及中國國徽。
8.5, 8.9 - 8.13, 9.1 & 9.7	Protesters called for a general strike and began a new campaign to paralyze the airport, inflicting citywide and international disruptions in transportation.	示威者發動「三罷」行動及癱瘓機場，令本地及國際交通受阻。
9.4	Carrie Lam officially announced the withdrawal of the amendment bill of the extradition law.	林鄭月娥正式宣布撤回《逃犯條例》修訂案。
10.4 & 11.18	The government enacted the anti-mask law under the Emergency Regulations Ordinance but was ruled unconstitutional by the High Court.	特區政府引用《緊急情況規例條例》訂立《反蒙面法》，及後被高等法院裁定違憲。
11.4 & 11.14	Carrie Lam met with Xi Jinping for the first time since the eruption of the social unrest. Xi said the most pressing task is to end violence and restore order. The message was reiterated in his speech in the BRICS summit in Brazil.	習近平於反修例風波爆發後首次與林鄭月娥會面，指出止暴制亂為最迫切任務，並在巴西舉行的金磚國家峰會上重申。
11.24	Pan-democrats scored a landslide victory in the District Council election with the highest voter turnout of 71.2%.	泛民主派於區議會選舉得到壓倒性勝利，投票率達71.2%，為歷來最高。
11.27	US President Donald Trump signed the 'Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act'.	美國總統特朗普簽署《香港人權及民主法案》。
12.19	The bank account of Spark Alliance, fundraising platform for protesters, was froze due to accusation of money laundering.	反修例運動的籌款平台星火同盟的銀行戶口，涉嫌洗黑錢被凍結。

2020 H1

2.13	The State Council restructured the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and appointed Xia Baolong as the new director and the directors of Liaison Offices in Hong Kong and Macau as deputy directors.	國務院重組港澳辦並委任夏寶龍為主任，香港及澳門中聯辦主任同列為副主任。
2.1 - 2.7	In fighting the COVID-19 crisis, staff of the Hospital Authority went on a five-day strike in the attempt to push for complete closure of border with mainland. HKSAR implemented border closure to some borders and ordered all arrivals to observe fortnight-long quarantine order.	新型冠狀病毒擴散，醫管局員工發動五天罷工，要求政府全面封關。政府宣布關閉部分口岸，並要求所有入境人士強制隔離14天。
2.28 & 4.18	A group of pan-democrat leaders, including Martin Lee, Jimmy Lai, Margaret Ng, Lee Cheuk-yan and Yeung Sum, were charged with participation in unauthorized assembly in relation to the anti-extradition bill movement.	多名民主派人士，包括李柱銘、黎智英、吳靄儀、李卓人及楊森，被控參與反修例運動的「未經批准集結」。
3.18	US-China media row deepened after five Chinese media agents in the US were declared propaganda outlets and the opinion piece titled "China is the real sick man of Asia" was published by the Wall Street Journal in February. China expelled US journalists in retaliation and barred them from journalism in Hong Kong and Macau. Four more Chinese media entities were designated as foreign missions by the US in June.	自2月初《華爾街日報》發表〈China is the real sick man of Asia〉文章及美國將五家中國新聞機構列為官方宣傳媒體後，中美媒體關係繼續緊張。中國驅逐數名駐華美籍記者，並禁止在港澳境內採訪。6月，美國再列四家中國媒體為外交使團。
4.9	Countering High Court's ruling last year of the unconstitutionality of anti-mask ban, the Court of Appeal ruled that the ban was constitutional at unlawful gatherings.	上訴庭推翻高等法院去年的判決，裁定政府引用《緊急法》訂立《禁蒙面法》合憲，並適用於非法集會中。
4.13, 4.17 & 4.21	The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the Liaison Office in Hong Kong issued statements condemning LegCo member Dennis Kwok for preventing the House Committee from electing a chairman for more than six months. The pro-democracy camp challenged that the two Offices were violating Article 22 of the Basic Law by intervening the internal operation of LegCo. In the subsequent statements, they positioned that they were bodies authorised by the central government to handle Hong Kong affairs, leading to further controversy over the applicability of the Article. The filibustering ended in May with the appointment of election host by the LegCo president after seeking external legal advice.	港澳辦及中聯辦發表聲明，譴責郭榮鏗拖延立法會內務委員會主席選舉六個月。民主派質疑兩辦干預立法會運作，違反《基本法》第22條。兩辦表示它們是中央授權專責處理香港事務的機構，引起該法的適用性爭議。尋求外間法律意見後，立法會主席指派另一名議員主持選舉，拉布於5月結束。
4.20	Fitch downed the investment grade of HK twice within the past 7 months to AA-, the HKSAR government expressed disappointment at Fitch's exaggeration of the ongoing political issues in its rating.	惠譽在七個月內再度調低香港評級至AA-，港府對其「過度着眼於社會政治議題」表示失望。
4.24 & 5.25	In response to the controversial district court verdict that expressed sympathy with a knifeman who was jailed over triple stabbing, Chief Justice Geoffrey Ma warned that judges should refrain from unnecessary political views to maintain the public's confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.	區域法官對斬人案被告判囚表示同情後，終審法院首席法官馬道立告戒法官應避免做不必要的政治表態，以免影響大眾對司法獨立失去信心。
5.14	The People's Bank of China, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Administration of Foreign Exchange promulgated "Opinions on Financial Support to the Development of Guangdong-HK-Macau Greater Bay Area" promoting financial cooperation, openness and innovation in the area.	人民銀行、銀保監會、中證監及外匯局發布《關於金融支持粵港澳大灣區建設的意見》提出深化內地與港澳金融合作並發展金融開放創新，支持粵港澳大灣區建設力度，提升大灣區在國家經濟發展和對外開放中的引領作用。

- 5.15 - 5.22 An HKDSE history question on Sino-Japanese relations in a period including Japanese invasion of China in World War II was criticized to have provided 'biased' sources that were overwhelmingly positive of Japan. The question was subsequently withdrawn. Xinhua News Agency stated that Hong Kong should establish a new education system in accordance to 1C2S.
- 5.28 The Commerce and Economic Development Bureau announced the establishment of a task force to review the governance and management of RTHK, inviting concerns over political censorship after suspected police insult in an episode of 'Headliner' and infringement of the one-China principle in 'The Pulse'.
- 5.28 The US State Secretary, Mike Pompeo, submitted the 2020 Hong Kong Policy Act Report to Congress, certifying that HK no longer warrants separate treatment from mainland China under US laws.
- 6.4 Enactment of the Anthem Law.
- 6.30 The Hong Kong National Security Law was introduced, passed and enacted. The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government of the HKSAR will be established. The self-determination group Demosistō announced its dissolution shortly after the enactment.

香港中學文憑試歷史科一條中日關係題目，牽涉二戰日本侵華時期，所提供的資料被批評具引導性，對日本偏向正面。該題最後被考評局取消。新華社文章指出「香港必須建立與一國兩制相適應的新教育體制」。

商務及經濟發展局宣布成立專責小組，檢討香港電台管治及管理，惹來政治審查的嫌疑。較早前，香港電台節目《The Pulse》被指違反「一中原則」及《頭條新聞》內容被指侮辱警方。

美國國務卿蓬佩奧向國會提交《2020年香港政策法報告》，宣布不再承認香港擁有高度自治，並要求取消對香港的特殊待遇。

通過《國歌法》。

《港區國安法》宣布、通過及執行。中央駐港維護國家安全公署成立。提倡自決的香港眾志，於法案生效後馬上宣布解散。

2020 H2

- 7.9, 10.22 & 11.13 Australia, UK and Canada offered express immigration channels to Hong Kong residents. China indicated that BNO might no longer be recognized as valid travel document.
- 7.11 & 7.16 More than 600,000 casted ballots in the two-day pro-democracy primaries. The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the Liaison Office condemned the illegality of the primaries, after which the former LegCo councillor, Au Nok Hin and the convenor of Power for Democracy, Andrew Chiu resigned from the coordination work.
- 7.15, 8.7 & 8.11 The US president, Donald Trump, signed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, with which eleven mainland and Hong Kong officials were financially sanctioned. Products labelled as 'Made in Hong Kong' are also forbidden to be imported into the US.
- 7.31 & 8.11 HKSAR government announced the postponement of LegCo election for a year, with the NPCSC deciding to extend the term of office of all LegCo members for not less than one year.
- 8.10 Nine people, including the founder of Apple Daily, Jimmy Lai, were arrested and charged of conspiring with foreign forces to endanger national security and conspiring to defraud. A police raid consisting of 200 officers was performed on the Apple Daily headquarter.
- 8.17 After reviewed by the Education Bureau, content touching upon 'the separation of powers' in liberal studies textbooks was omitted and clarified that the HKSAR has an 'executive-led government'.

澳洲、英國及加拿大提出便利港人移居當地措施，中方表示考慮不承認BNO作為有效旅行證件。

為期兩天的民主派初選結束，超過60萬人投票。港澳辦及中聯辦指控初選違法，前立法會議員區諾軒和民主動力召集人趙家賢先後退出協調工作。

美國總統特朗普簽署《香港自治法案》，以金融方式制裁11位中港官員，並禁止進口美國產品貼上「香港製造」標籤。

特區政府押後立法會選舉一年，全國人大常委會決定全體議員延任至少一年。

壹傳媒創辦人黎智英等9人被拘捕，涉勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全及串謀欺詐等罪。警方高調派遣200人搜查壹傳媒大樓。

高中通識課本經教育局閱覽後，部分刪走關於三權分立的內容，指香港偏向行政主導。

8.23 & 12.30	12 anti-extradition protesters were arrested in China's territorial waters on suspicion of illegal border crossing to Taiwan. They were in detention until December, ten of them were sentenced for imprisonment from seven months to three years by the mainland court. Two cases involving underage suspects were extradited to Hong Kong.	12名反修例示威人士，涉嫌非法越境往台灣，於中國海域內被海警逮捕，拘留至12月。其中10人於內地法庭判處七個月至三年囚禁，另外兩名未成年人士移交予香港警方。
9.18 & 9.24	James Spigelman, non-permanent judge of the Court of Final Appeal resigned, foreign newsagent rumoured that his resignation was related to the National Security Law. Another non-permanent judge, Peter Millett, also announced that he would no longer hear cases in Hong Kong due to old age and long travels.	終審法院海外非常任法官施覺民辭任，外媒指事件與《港區國安法》有關。另一名非常任法官苗禮治亦指年邁不宜長途旅程，不再來港審案。
9.22	The Police amended the definition of 'media representatives' and would no longer acknowledge membership issued by the Hong Kong Journalists Association and Hong Kong Press Photographers Association. Only media outlets registered under the government news system and internationally reputable non-local news agents would be recognized.	警方修訂《警察通例》下「傳媒代表」的定義，不再承認記協和攝記協會會員證，只有向政府登記及國際認可及知名的非本地新聞機構才獲得承認。
10.5	Education Bureau cancelled the registration of a teacher for the first time with the reason of 'promoting pro-independence message'.	教育局首次以「教材散播港獨信息」名義取消一名教師的註冊。
11.11	NPCSC declared that LegCo councillor who does not fulfil the legal requirements of upholding the Basic Law will be immediately stripped of their qualifications as LegCo Councillor. HKSAR subsequently disqualified Kenneth Leung, Alvin Yeung, Dennis Kwok and Kwok Ka Ki. 15 other pro-democratic camp LegCo councillors resigned en masse in protest, leaving only Cheng Chung-tai and Pierre Chan remained.	全國人大常委會決定，凡依法認定不擁護《基本法》、不效忠香港特別行政區者，即時喪失議員資格。特區政府隨即取消梁繼昌、楊岳橋、郭榮鏗及郭家麒四人議席。15名民主派議員集體辭職以示抗議，只有鄭松泰和陳沛然留任。
11.21	Online radio host was arrested on suspicion of money laundering and providing financial support for anti-extradition youth protesters in exile to Taiwan and secession.	網台主持等人發起眾籌，支援出走台灣的反修例青年，涉嫌洗黑錢及資助分裂國家而被捕。
11.26	Civil Service Bureau demanded that all civil servants will have to sign declaration of loyalty to government.	公務員事務局決定，全體現職公務員簽署效忠聲明。
12.3 & 12.11	Former LegCo Councillor, Ted Hui announced his resignation from the Democratic Party and went into exile in Denmark with his family. Sixtus Leung of Youngspiration also indicated his wish to seek political asylum in the US.	前立法會議員許智峯宣布退出民主黨，與家人流亡丹麥。青年新政梁頌恆也表示身處美國，計劃尋求政治庇護。
12.8	Former LegCo councillor, Wu Chi Wai, Eddie Chu, Leung Kwok Hung and the convenor of Civil Human Rights Front, Figo Chan and other District Councillors were arrested for their suspected participation in an illegal assembly on 1 July.	前立法會議員胡志偉、朱凱迪、梁國雄、民陣召集人陳皓桓等多名區議員因涉及七一非法集結等多項罪行而被捕。
12.21	The Court of Final Appeal ruled that the Emergency Regulations Ordinance and the Anti-mask Law are both constitutional. Wearing of facial coverings is prohibited at protests and rallies, whether authorized or not.	終審法院裁定《緊急法》與《禁蒙面法》均合憲，合法與非法遊行集會皆不可以蒙面。
12.31	After Home Affairs Bureau had declared its illegality, Hong Kong Citizens' Deliberative Platform announced that due to failure to reach consensus, the platform will terminate their fundraising work and will immediately dissolve.	民政事務局形容「香港公民議政平台」屬非法後，平台宣布因無法達到共識，終止籌組工作，即時解散。

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1.6	Over 50 pro-democracy figures were rounded up over alleged subversion through participating in pro-democratic primaries. Kickstart Wan Chai announced its disbandment.	超過50人因參與民主派初選，被指違反「顛覆國家政權罪」而被捕，灣仔起步宣布解散。
1.16	US Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on 6 additional Hong Kong and Mainland officials, citing their roles in damaging the autonomy of Hong Kong.	美國財政部再以破壞香港自治為由，制裁多6名內地與香港官員。
1.29, 2.4 & 6.8	China announced that they would no longer recognize BNO as valid travel document and proof of identity as the UK started accepting applications for BNO visa from Hong Kong people. The Canadian government launched new pathways for graduates of tertiary levels from Hong Kong to apply for work permits and for those who work in and graduate from the country for permanent residence.	英國開始接受BNO簽證申請，中國隨即宣布不再承認BNO護照為有效旅遊證件及身份證明。加拿大則宣布新措施，提供工作簽證予香港大專畢業生，及永久居留權予當地工作或畢業的港人。
2.22, 3.11, 3.30 & 5.27	After HKMAO director Xia Baolong delivered a speech at the symposium on implementing principle of 'patriots administering Hong Kong', the NPC and its standing committee passed the Decision on Improving the Electoral System of the HKSAR and the amendment of the Basic Law. LegCo of HKSAR subsequently passed the local legislation.	港澳辦主任夏寶龍發表「愛國者治港」講話後，全國人大及其常委會通過《關於完善香港特別行政區選舉制度的決定》及修改香港《基本法》，並由香港立法會通過本地立法。
2.23, 5.12, 5.21, 6.20 & 6.26	The Hong Kong government introduced legislative amendments stipulating oath-taking requirements for public officers including District Council members. The possibility to return salary due to disqualification prompted large scale resignation. Over 10 district councillors quitted the Civic Party while Neo Democrats and Community Sha Tin announced disbandment.	政府修訂公職人員宣誓規定，涵蓋至區議員。被取消資格者或被追討薪津，觸發大規模辭職潮。約十名公民黨區議員宣布退黨，新民主同盟及沙田區政則宣布解散。
2.25 & 4.30	The University of Hong Kong and the Chinese University of Hong Kong decided to stop collecting fees on behalf of respective student unions, to halt the provision of venues and facilities and to remove duties of office bearers within university committees.	香港大學及香港中文大學決定停止為學生會代收會費、暫停場地設施支援及取消校內委員會職務。
4.16, 5.6 & 5.28	Pro-democrats including Jimmy Lai, Martin Lee and Joshua Wong were convicted of offences related to unauthorised assemblies on August 18, 2019, October 1, 2019 and/or June 4, 2020, and have been sentenced to 4 to 18-month jail terms.	黎智英、李柱銘、黃之鋒等多名民主派人士，各就2019年8月18日、2019年10月1日及2020年六四集會案，被裁定多項與未經批准集結有關之罪行，判監4至18個月。
5.14, 6.17 & 6.27	Pursuant to the NSL, Secretary for Security froze assets of Next Digital founder Jimmy Lai including his shares in the media and assets of three other firms. Hong Kong Police also arrested five senior staff at Next Digital, with another two arrested at their home and airport. They were suspected of violating the NSL. 26-year-old Apple Daily eventually ceased its publication on June 24.	保安局局長運用國安法凍結黎智英持有的壹傳媒股份和三間公司資產。警方以涉嫌違反國安法拘捕壹傳媒5名高層，另外兩人於寓所及機場被捕。創刊26年的《蘋果日報》於6月24日停刊。
5.18 & 6.20	The Hong Kong Economic, Trade and Cultural Office (Taiwan) temporarily suspended operations. Taipei Economic and Cultural Office adjusted their business in Hong Kong, preserving only the essential operations.	香港經濟貿易文化辦事處（台灣）停止運作。台北經濟文化辦事處調整駐港業務，只保留必要運作。
6.11	Amendments to the guidelines for film censors were gazetted to vet films for national security breaches.	政府修訂《電影檢查條例》檢查員指引，如上映影片相當可能構成危害國家安全的罪行會被視為不宜上映。

- 6.25 Major changes were made to the principal officials. Secretary for Security John Lee replaced Matthew Cheung as Chief Secretary while Commissioner of Police Chris Tang was promoted to Secretary for Security. All the promoted officials are of security backgrounds and roused concerns for the unravelling of a 'police government'.
- 6.27 Six board members of the parent company of the online media outlet, Stand News, resigned. Stand News put down commentaries previously published and ceased to accept donations at the same time.

問責團隊換班，保安局局長李家超接替張建宗為政務司司長，警務處處長鄧炳強擔任保安局局長。獲提拔的官員均為保安背景出身，引發外界對「警察政府」擔憂。

網媒立場新聞的母公司六位董事辭任，並將評論文章下架，暫停接受會員資助。



'ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS'

I N D E X

「一國兩制」指數

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