

‘ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS’

I N D E X

「一國兩制」指數

2022 | H2 下半年



2022 年下半年 (第十一版)
2022 H2 (Eleventh Edition)

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前言 Preface

The unprecedented pursuit of 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) demands unyielding exploration and persistence from stakeholders. Since 1997, we have made headway in the realization of 1C2S, but at the same time, have also encountered many challenges. To assist full implementation of 1C2S, in July 2017, Path of Democracy established the 1C2S Index and released its first report in relation thereto with a view to conduct an objective evaluation of the continued implementation of 1C2S by reviewing its accomplishments and shortfalls.

The 1C2S Index is based on both local opinion and international perception on the current state of 1C2S. Periodic public surveys are conducted to measure local people's attitude. We also look at how global studies carried out by international think tanks rate Hong Kong. These independent evaluations are incorporated into the Index to give a more balanced view on how the World including Hong Kong people look at the state of 1C2S. We have devised and introduced a 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) by making use of big data analytics to measure Hong Kong and overseas media sentiment towards 1C2S. In compiling our reports, views on current issues related to 1C2S are also sought, such as the public's emigration plans, national security and economic integration.

A comprehensive review was conducted in 2022 to ensure alignment with societal and global development after five years of impartial measurement. The main Index will adopt a more timely, objective, distinctive and extensive construction method. We innovate the study of media sentiment by expanding coverage of 1C2S MMI to reflect the changing media landscape and readership. An online data portal is launched to better inform policymakers, researchers, media, and the public through data visualizations and customized analysis with an open and transparent approach.

We extend our sincere gratitude to the research team involved in the production of our 11th edition of the 1C2S Index report: Christina Chan, Martin Cheung, Ting Hin Yan, Ian Chan and Benson Lam. We are also grateful to Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong for completing the telephone polls and sentiment.ai for measuring media sentiment on our behalf.

Going forward, we will continue to conduct public surveys and update international indices every six months, and to monitor media sentiment regularly to gauge the latest perceptions of the public, the international community and the media on 1C2S.

Ray Poon

Co-convenor (Research)

February 2023

「一國兩制」是前無古人的嘗試，1997年實踐至今，有成果亦有挑戰，過程需要社會各界不斷參與及探索。民主思路在2017年7月首次發布關於「一國兩制」概況的客觀評價，希望探討其成就與缺失，為全面及準確貫徹此方針略盡綿力。

我們定期向香港市民進行民意調查，亦參考國際機構對香港的評分，揉合以上獨立意見編製成「一國兩制」指數，持平反映香港及世界各地對「一國兩制」現狀的觀感。我們借助大數據技術，編製「一國兩制」輿情指數去衡量新聞情緒，追蹤香港和海外媒體相關報道。編製報告時，我們亦探討「一國兩制」實踐中的熱門議題，例如移民海外、國家安全、經濟融合等。

經過五年的中肯評估，我們在2022年進行全面檢討，確保指數能夠與香港社會和全球發展保持一致。調整後的編製方法令「一國兩制」指數的更新更及時、來源更客觀、指標更鮮明和層面更廣闊。因應傳媒生態和閱讀習慣改變，我們亦擴大輿情指數的數據範圍，為輿情研究帶來突破。另外，我們推出網上數據平台，遵循公開透明的原則，提供數據視覺化和專屬定制分析，讓決策者、研究員、媒體和公眾參考。

我們衷心感謝研究團隊：陳慧盈、張達明、甄定軒、陳譽仁及林康聖，亦謹此向執行電話調查的香港中文大學香港亞太研究所及衡量新聞情緒的輿情科技致以謝意。

展望未來，我們會繼續每半年進行民意調查及更新國際指數，亦會定期追蹤新聞輿情，從而反映香港市民、國際社會及各地媒體對「一國兩制」的最新觀感。


潘學智

聯席召集人（研究）

2023年2月


摘要 Key Findings






摘要


Executive Summary



1. 1C2S Index rebounded remarkably to 5.92 from a low of 5.45 in the first half of 2020 due to the massive protest and riot. Overwhelmingly, 50.6% of the respondents considered maintaining economic prosperity and stability the most important condition for 1C2S to continue beyond 2047.
2. International perception of the situation in Hong Kong deteriorated to 6.87 versus 7.52 two years ago, driven by sizeable drop in the categories of 'expression, association & assembly'; 'political pluralism'; and 'constraints on powers'. The need to tell a better HK story is as urgent as it is challenging. PoD recommends the creation of a 1C2S Office to engage with the western media on a continuing basis to rectify misperceptions.
3. The political landscape changed with moderates representing a historical high of 77.2% of population, a half-year increase of 5.4 percentage points, while both the pro-establishment and the non-establishment camps witnessed a decline. This is an opportunity to build on this rise of moderates to reduce polarization in our society.
4. People identifying themselves as having dual Chinese and Hong Kong identities decreased by 13.2 percentage points to 47.5% largely because of a weakened Hong Kong identity. Markedly, the gap between those who saw themselves as only Chinese or only Hong Kongers narrowed steadily over the years.
5. People planning to emigrate dropped from 34.5% in June 2020 to 12.3% in January 2023, suggesting a return to the historical norm as an international city with freedom of movement. This is an opportunity to attract new talents to come to HK as we move toward a new, innovative economy.
6. People with an interest to study, work or retire in the GBA area dropped from 11.9% in June 2020 to 3.4% in January 2023, which might be due to prolonged border closure. The government should undertake a sustained campaign to highlight the career success stories of HK youths in GBA area, and also create job placement platforms to help our youths in finding GBA jobs easily.
1. 因為大規模示威和騷亂，2020上半年的「一國兩制」指數處於5.45分的低位，最近半年回升至5.92分。大部分受訪者（50.6%）認為經濟維持繁榮穩定，將會是2047年後繼續落實「一國兩制」的最有利因素。
2. 相較兩年前的7.52分，國際社會對香港的評價惡化至最近的6.87分，受累於「表達、結社和集會」、「政治多元」、「權力制約」的評分大幅下跌。講好香港故事既是燃眉之急，亦具挑戰性。民主思路建議政府成立「一國兩制」辦公室，與西方媒體保持聯繫，消弭誤解。
3. 香港的政治版圖正在改變，溫和派上升5.4個百分點，達到全港人口77.2%的歷史新高。建制派和非建制派陣營則錄得下跌。溫和派興起，將會是社會減少政治兩極化的契機。
4. 主要由於香港人身分認同減弱，對中國人與香港人身分擁有雙重認同的市民，下降13.2個百分點至47.5%。認為他們只是中國人或只是香港人的比例差距，在過去幾年期間不斷收窄。
5. 有計劃移民的市民，由2020年6月的34.5%下跌至2023年1月的12.3%，象徵這座擁有遷徙自由的國際城市重回歷史常態。這是香港吸引外來人才的機會，推進創新經濟發展。
6. 可能受到長期封關影響，有興趣前往大灣區發展的市民由2020年6月的11.9%下跌至2023年1月的3.4%。政府應該加大宣傳，強調香港青年在大灣區成功就業的故事，為青年成立職業配對平台，協助他們在區內更易尋找工作。



指數概覽 Index At-a-Glance



1C2S Index
「一國兩制」指數

5.92

(↑ 1.7%)

2022 H2

1C2S Mass Media Index
「一國兩制」輿情指數

150.1

(↑ 2.9%)

2022 Q4

Moderates
溫和派

77.2%

(↑ 5.4%)


2023.1

Dual Identity
雙重身分認同

47.5%

(↓ 13.2%)

2023.1



**Public
Opinion
民意調查**

High Degree of Autonomy

高度自治

4.82

(↑ 4.6%)

Human Rights and Freedom

人權自由

4.94

(↑ 7.2%)

Hong Kong - Mainland Relations

陸港關係

5.19

(↑ 5.5%)

**International
Perception
國際評價**

Economic Openness

經濟開放

9.20

(↓ 0.9%)

Civil Liberty

公民權利

6.28


(↓ 1.1%)

Democratic Development

民主發展


5.12

(↓ 1.0%)



2022 下半年回顧

2022 H2 Overview



In the second half of 2022, Hong Kong sought to restore pre-COVID economic normalcy. Travellers welcomed the removal of compulsory quarantine. Contact tracing and vaccination requirements were also lifted. The John Lee administration introduced new set-ups to scout for overseas and mainland talents and persuade companies to move to Hong Kong. In an attempt to rebuild investor confidence, the Global Financial Leaders' Investment Summit confirmed government's top priority in developing our economy.

A round of study sessions on the 20th CCP National Congress mobilized local authorities, business sectors and social groups into political activity. Yet, wider political attention was drawn to media tycoon Jimmy Lai's national security trial which led to the first interpretation of the National Security Law by the National People's Congress Standing Committee. A series of national anthem blunders also caused chaos at international sporting events and concerns over the reawakening of separatism when a pro-democracy protest song was wrongly played.

Pressure from the international community persisted as US' Congressional-Executive Commission on China called for sanctions on Hong Kong's prosecutors who were responsible for NSL and protest-related charges. Hong Kong's adaptation of 1C2S was once again examined under the backdrop of heightened cross-strait tension. US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi quoted it as a failed protection of political freedoms and human rights during her visit to Taiwan, and subsequently China's white paper on Taiwan praised it as a resounding success for national reunification.

2022年下半年，香港力求恢復新冠疫情前的經濟常態。旅客歡迎取消強制檢疫措施，「安心出行」和疫苗接種要求亦告終結。現屆政府設置新部門去招攬海外及內地人才，並說服重點企業進駐香港。為重建投資者信心，政府舉辦「國際金融領袖投資峰會」，將經濟一環放在施政首位。

一系列的中共二十大精神宣讀會及學習班，動員政府機構、工商界和社會團體，促進政治參與。傳媒大亨黎智英的國安案件觸發全國人大常委會首次解釋《港區國安法》，引起更廣泛的政治關注。幾場國際體育賽事上，主辦方誤播民主派示威歌曲，帶來一陣紛擾混亂，更令人擔憂分離主義重新抬頭。

國際社會的壓力仍然緊張，美國國會及行政當局中國委員會呼籲新一輪制裁，針對執行《港區國安法》起訴及示威案件的檢控官員。兩岸局勢持續惡化，香港的「一國兩制」現狀再受多方審視，美國眾議院議長佩洛西訪問台灣期間，批評「一國兩制」未能保障政治自由和人權。中國馬上推出《台灣問題與新時代中國統一事業》白皮書，肯定「一國兩制」取得舉世公認的成功，是國家統一的基本方針。

Further discrepancy between local and international confidence in 1C2S

Hong Kong was getting ready to reopen border after almost three years of closures. The city's momentum was slowly gathering but the international community was impatient. Blessed by a lack of political controversy, citizens' confidence in John Lee's new government was consolidating. Despite a gradual decline in international perception, stronger local support contributed to an overall growth in the 1C2S Index. The latest reading rose by 1.7% from 5.82 to 5.92.

All pillars on public opinion continued the rebound from previous rounds. Strong recovery from past weaknesses boosted 'human rights and freedom' (+7.2%). Mass fear for decline of democratic development, freedom of speech and freedom of association and assembly stemming from past social instability appeared to have slightly faded. Other pillars, 'Hong Kong-Mainland relationship' (+5.5%) and 'high degree of autonomy' (+4.6%) also increased greatly.

Due to time lag in the compilation of international indices, negative impacts from earlier events started to catch up at the international level and began to affect various pillars. Both 'civil liberty' (-1.1%) and 'democratic development' (-1.0%) continued their downward trend. With one of the most stringent anti-pandemic regulations in the world, Hong Kong fell behind in 'economic openness' (-0.9%).

Political moderation reached all-time high

The exit of the pro-democracy camp on the political stage resulted in mass apathy and political demobilization. The gap between moderates and non-establishment supporters widened further, as the two moved away from each other with a rise of 5.4 percentage points for the former and a decrease of 0.1 percentage points for the latter. As a result, moderates remained the largest group with a greater dominance (77.2%), followed by non-establishment supporters (13.0%) and pro-establishment supporters (6.6%).

The rise of moderation was also seen among youths (aged 18 to 29), along with the continuous easing of political tension. Moderates rose by 9.0 percentage points to 70.3%. Among non-establishment supporters, democrats fell by 2.3 percentage points to 18.4% and localists by 9.1 percentage points to 6.9%. The rise of moderation among 18-29 age group has been a healthy development; nevertheless, one should remain vigilant to the possibility of re-radicalization in the near future.

國際信心脫離本地民意

邊境關閉近三年後，香港正準備重新對外開放。城市活力慢慢凝聚，但國際社會期待更快步伐。政治爭議鮮有耳聞，市民對現屆政府的信心正在鞏固。雖然國際評價轉差，但是本地信心強勁，令「一國兩制」指數整體有所增長，最新讀數從5.82上升1.7%至5.92。

所有民意調查的支柱延續上輪升勢。以往處於低位的「人權自由」攀升強勁（+7.2%）。社會動盪曾令市民擔憂民主發展、言論自由、結社和集會自由倒退，這份公眾恐慌現在似乎稍微退減。其他支柱，包括「陸港關係」（+5.5%）和「高度自治」（+4.6%）也大幅上升。

整合全球評分時，國際智庫數據一般滯後，早期事件的負面影響始於國際層面浮現。「公民權利」（-1.1%）和「民主發展」（-1.0%）繼續下降。香港採取的防疫措施屬全球最嚴格之一，「經濟開放」（-0.9%）難免落後大勢。

溫和政治力量創歷史新高

民主派從政治舞台退場，群眾關注和政治動員均有消減。溫和派及非建制派的佔比差距進一步拉闊，前者經歷5.4個百分點升幅，後者經歷0.1個百分點跌幅。溫和派（77.2%）繼續成為最大群組，其次為非建制派（13.0%）及建制派（6.6%）。

18-29歲年輕人中，溫和力量同樣冒起，舒緩政治繃緊氣氛。溫和派上升9.0個百分點至70.3%。至於非建制支持者中，民主派下跌2.3個百分點至18.4%，本土派下跌9.1個百分點升至6.9%。18-29歲年輕人中，溫和政治力量再現，無疑是良好的發展，但我們仍需保持警惕，以防激進力量重臨。

Reconvergence of citizens' identity as Hongkongers or Chinese

Citizens' self-identification as Hongkongers or Chinese started to converge after a period of departure. The gap was closing after a two-year convergence. In this round, both the 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' identities decreased. The former fell by 9.4% from 7.99 to 7.24 and the latter declined significantly by 4.3% from 6.47 to 6.19.

Most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both Hongkongers and Chinese. Over half of the public acknowledged dual identity in earlier surveys. This had gradually changed since 2019 and hit rock bottom in mid-2020 but had since rebounded. People who recognized their dual identity declined from last round's peak by 13.2 percentage points to 47.5%. This was contrasted by the continual decline of 'Hongkonger only' for 2 years to 24.1%.

Implications and recommendations

The substantial growth in public opinion against a repeated decline in international perception signified the disparity between how local people and the international community looked at 1C2S. Nonetheless, we still found that people's perception to the current state of 1C2S was less than satisfactory. What the majority desired for the long-term continuation of 1C2S were prosperity and stability. While various social groups often displayed different expectations, there is common ground to bring people together.

Many indicators returned to early-2019 level. Public discontent sparked by the governance crisis appeared to be relieved. People with emigration plans kept on declining. The proportion of moderates continued to grow while non-establishment supporters steadily declined. More people attributed equal responsibility to both Hong Kong and Mainland when conflicts arise in the implementation of 1C2S. The proportion of population identifying themselves as 'Chinese' also embarked on a modest rate of increase.

Two rival camps showed extreme views over recent political events. Moderates was the only group countering this juxtaposition. A rational voice appears to exist in the society at large, but it is vulnerable to populist narratives. Policymakers must take care to ensure that moderate opinions continue to enjoy the benefit of a nourishing and safe environment in a divided culture.

香港人與中國人身分認同的重新匯合

市民對香港人和中國人兩種身分認同曾經背馳，最近兩年開始匯合，兩者的差距正在縮小。這輪調查中，香港人和中國人的認同感雙雙下降，前者從7.99分下降9.4%至7.24分，後者從6.47分下降4.3%至6.19分。

香港市民普遍擁有香港人和中國人雙重身分認同，過往調查均超過一半。情況自2019年起急遽下跌，於2020年中觸底後反彈。擁有雙重身分認同的市民，較上輪的高峰下跌13.2個百分點至47.5%，而「只有香港人」連續兩年下跌，跌至24.1%。

啟示及建議

民意評分大幅改善，而國際評價持續下跌，突顯本地和國際社會對如何理解「一國兩制」存在差異。我們發現市民對「一國兩制」的現狀仍未滿意，而他們最渴望的是維持繁榮和穩定，使「一國兩制」長期延續。雖然社會上不同群體抱有多種期望，我們仍有共通點可以將彼此拉近，同心同德。

許多指標回復至修例風波前的水平，反映這場管治危機所引發的不滿情緒似已舒緩。有計劃移民的市民繼續減少。溫和派的佔比持續增加，非建制派則持續下降。當「一國兩制」在實踐上出現矛盾時，更多人認為內地和香港有共同責任。對中國人身分的認同感亦有穩健增長。

兩大政治陣營對近期政治事件的反應極端，溫和派則少受政治立場綑綁。社會存在理性聲音，但極容易受到民粹摧毀。決策者應確保溫和意見能夠在撕裂的社會上有一隅之地。

It is important for the HKSAR government to capitalize on the growing confidence and build further momentum by spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of Hong Kong including the business community, the academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs to promote the image of Hong Kong under 1C2S. Such effort may include:


- Setting up an Office of 1C2S for sustained outreach effort both locally and in the APEC region to mobilize support and enhance Hong Kong's presence. This dedicated office will actively participate in foreign think tank forums directly or through the business community to promote the Hong Kong narrative in the international arena;
- Creating a Press Secretary for the CE Office to hold daily press briefings with local and international media to tackle latest policy issues timely, fully and properly, including the National Security Law to address the fear and anxiety of the foreign community in Hong Kong;
- Providing advanced training to our senior officials of how to counter the negative narrative in the western media with positive HK stories; and
- Educating young members of the public on 1C2S basics, understanding of rule of law, human rights and freedoms and broadening awareness of social, national and global issues.

政府應乘勢領導香港各界，如商界、學術界、專業團體、理念相近的智庫和民間組織，共同努力闡釋「一國兩制」的實況，提升香港形象。措施包括：


- 設立「一國兩制」辦公室，專門進行本地及亞太區的推廣及聯絡工作，動員社會各界支持及強化香港的影響力。此專責辦公室將會直接或通過商界積極參與外國智庫論壇，就香港事務在國際舞台發聲；
- 增設特首辦新聞發言人，每天主持記者會，面向本地及國際傳媒，適時、充分及恰當地解釋及回應政策議題，包括外國社群對《國安法》的疑慮；
- 提供進階培訓予高級官員，運用正面的香港故事，以回應西方媒體的負面論述；及
- 著重青年教育，擴闊他們對「一國兩制」的基本認識，豐富對法治、人權和自由的理解，增強社會觸覺、國際視野及國情認識。

第十一版報告
Eleventh Edition





簡介 Introduction



This is the 11th edition of our 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) Index report. The purpose of the 1C2S Index is to provide an objective assessment on the implementation of 1C2S. Our first report was released in mid-2017, on the 20th anniversary of the return of Hong Kong to China. We update the 1C2S Index every six months, at mid-year and year end.

Every half year, we update the 1C2S Index through updating public opinion and international perception respectively with a new public survey and with the latest data from international indices. To complement our main Index, we have also introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) that uses big-data techniques to measure the sentiment of Hong Kong and overseas printed, electronic and online media.

We commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct telephone poll between December 2022 to January 2023 to compile scores on public opinion. We updated scores on international perception to 2022 H2 by scoring and ranking 148 countries and territories based on 9 comprehensive data sources and 127 indicators compiled by some international think tanks. MMI was measured by sentiment.ai and updated to the end of December 2022.

In our latest survey, we continued to include topical issues related to 1C2S, such as the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047, citizen's identity, attitude towards emigration and public opinions on the Greater Bay Area. To fully capture the socio-political reality of the city, we introduced new questions to gauge the impact of recent socio-political changes, such as China's long-term adherence to 1C2S, admission of overseas lawyers in Hong Kong and the legislation on combating false information.

香港回歸20週年之際，民主思路於2017年中首次發布「一國兩制」指數，旨在為香港實踐「一國兩制」作客觀評價。是次為第十一版報告，其指數於年中與年底，每半年更新。

我們每半年進行電話調查及收集國際指數的最新數據，更新民意調查及國際評價，從而更新「一國兩制」指數。我們還推出嶄新的「一國兩制」輿情指數，檢視香港和海外報章、電子傳媒和網絡媒體對「一國兩制」的情緒，利用大數據技術去補充指數之不足。

本報告委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所，在2022年12月至2023年1月進行電話調查，從而取得民意評分。我們運用國際智庫編製的9個綜合數據庫和127個指標，為148個國家和地區評分和排名，從而計算國際評價，資料已更新至2022年下半年。由輿情科技量度的「一國兩制」輿情指數則更新至2022年12月底。

電話調查也一併探討其他關乎「一國兩制」的重要議題，包括2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」、市民的身分認同、移民海外與及粵港澳大灣區發展。為更準確拿捏近期的社會及政治變化所帶來的影響，本輪新增國家長期堅持「一國兩制」、認許海外大律師及立法打擊假資訊等議題。

It should be stressed that public opinion, international perception and MMI are determined by perceptions and may or may not reflect actual reality. Even so, changes in perceptions of 1C2S of the Hong Kong public, of international think tanks, and of the Hong Kong and overseas media are nevertheless important. We will analyse the reasons for the changes as they are crucial for the implementation of 1C2S.

In our report, all scores are expressed in a scale of 0-10. An asterisk (*) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant. If there is no mentioning of statistical significance about a score, it means that the change concerned is statistically insignificant.

Some scores are decomposed by age group, educational attainment and political inclination for further analysis. In the past, the non-establishment camp was divided into 'democrats' and 'others'. This division is abolished in this report as the size of the latter is too small to support any meaningful analysis, but it is preserved in our online data portal for reference purposes.


Readers may visit the webpage of Path of Democracy (<http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/>) to access our data portal for historical data of the 1C2S Index series. An extensive report on the survey results is also available.

民意調查、國際評價及輿情指數的評分取決於觀感，可能不完全反映現實。儘管如此，香港市民、國際智庫和本地媒體的觀感變化對實施「一國兩制」仍然至關重大，所以我們也會分析其背後的變化原因。

本報告的所有評分尺度為0至10分。如不同輪次調查之間的評分差異達統計上顯著水平，將會以星號（「*」）註明。未有註明者，則代表評分差異在統計上並不顯著。


部分數字將根據年齡組別、教育程度和政治傾向劃分，再作分析。以往，政治傾向中的非建制派會細分為「民主派」和「其他」。由於後者人數過少，難以作出有意義的分析，因此本報告不再將非建制派細分為兩組，但仍於網上數據平台保留以作參考。

「一國兩制」指數的歷年數據已經上載至我們的數據平台，電話調查的詳細報告亦刊於「調查結果：頻數及百分比分佈」，歡迎參閱民主思路網頁。
(<http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/>)



2. 「一國兩制」指數

2. 1C2S Index



The 1C2S Index is the average score of three pillars on public opinion and three pillars on international perception. The three pillars on public opinion, namely 'high degree of autonomy', 'human rights and freedom' and 'Hong Kong-Mainland relationship' are the evaluation by Hong Kong public on different dimensions of 1C2S. The three pillars on international perception, namely 'economic openness', 'civil liberty' and 'democratic development', are the evaluation by international think tanks on various aspects of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.


「一國兩制」指數為民意調查3項支柱及國際評價3項支柱的平均值。民意調查的3項支柱為「高度自治」、「人權自由」及「陸港關係」，用以量度公眾對「一國兩制」的評價。國際評價的3項支柱為「經濟開放」、「公民權利」及「民主發展」，是國際智庫對香港自由和民主程度的評估。指數的編製方法詳見附件I。

Figure 1 shows scores of the 1C2S Index since 2020 H2. The latest reading in 2022 H2 was 5.92 with an increase of 1.7% from 5.82 half year ago. After a prolonged trough, the Index continued to soar and returned to mid-2019 level. This rise in the latest round was contributed by an improvement in public opinion, especially on human rights and freedom, which offset the sustained downgrading of international perception. Results obtained in these pillars will be detailed in the following sub-sections.

圖1顯示「一國兩制」指數2020下半年至今的變化。2022年下半年的最新讀數為5.92分，較半年年前的5.82分上升1.7%。經過一段低潮，「一國兩制」指數繼續上升，回復至2019年中的水平。本輪的上升出於民意評分，尤其是「人權自由」的大幅改善，抵銷了國際評價的持續下跌。各項支柱評分的變化將於以下章節詳細解釋。

Figure 1: 1C2S Index

圖1：「一國兩制」指數



2.1 民意調查 Public opinion

Table 1 shows all pillar and sub-pillars scores. All three pillars grew and two of them grew with statistical significance. 'Human rights and freedom' increased by 7.2% to 4.94, the highest among others, while 'Hong Kong-Mainland relationship' and 'high degree of autonomy' rose by 5.5% to 5.19 and by 4.6% to 4.82 respectively.

All sub-pillars continued to rise since the last round. Three sub-pillars with the largest increases were 'democratic development' (+11.0%), 'freedom of speech, association and assembly' (+9.5%) and 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' (+8.8%). None of the sub-pillars decreased. Three sub-pillars with the smallest increases were 'independent judiciary' (+1.4%), 'equal protection of the law' (+3.0%) and 'independent legislature' (+3.2%).

Three sub-pillars with highest scores were 'safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests' (6.24), 'maintaining long-term prosperity and stability' (5.84) and 'equal protection of the law' (5.82). Three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were 'democratic development' (4.15), 'freedom of speech, association and assembly' (4.26) and 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' (4.31).

表1顯示民意調查的支柱和子支柱評分。三項支柱評分均上升，而其中兩項改變達統計顯著水平。

「人權自由」的增幅最大，增加7.2%至4.94分，而「陸港關係」和「高度自治」的評分，則分別上升5.5%至5.19分及4.6%至4.82分。

所有子支柱延續了上輪的升幅。三項升幅最大的子支柱為「民主發展」（+11.0%）、「言論、結社及集會自由」（+9.5%）和「港人治港」（+8.8%）。沒有子支柱評分下跌。三項升幅最小的子支柱為「獨立司法權」（+1.4%）、「法律平等保護」（+3.0%）及「獨立立法權」（+3.2%）。

三項分數最高的子支柱為「維護國家主權、安全和發展利益」（6.24）、「維持長期繁榮穩定」（5.84）及「法律平等保護」（5.82）。三項分數最低的子支柱為「民主政制發展」（4.15）、「言論、結社及集會自由」（4.26）和「港人治港」（4.31）。



Table 1: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on public opinion

表1：民意調查的支柱及子支柱分數

	2020 H2	2021 H1	2021 H2	2022 H1	2022 H2	
Overall 總分	3.62	3.62	4.02	4.71	4.98	
A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治	3.43	3.39	3.75	4.61	4.82	
A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務	3.34	3.42	3.89	4.84	5.07	
A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權	4.00	3.80	4.09	4.92	4.99	
A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權	3.62	3.55	3.84	4.74	4.89	
A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」	2.77	2.80	3.18	3.96	4.31	 *
B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由	3.83	3.71	4.02	4.61	4.94	 *
B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式	4.41	4.33	4.51	5.13	5.52	 *
B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社及集會自由	3.92	3.61	3.67	3.89^	4.26	 *
B3. Democratic development 民主政制發展	3.01	3.09	3.47	3.74	4.15	 *
B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護	3.98	3.80	4.43	5.65^	5.82	
C. Hong Kong - Mainland Relations 陸港關係	3.61	3.77	4.30	4.92	5.19	 *
C1. Resolving via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾	2.59	2.81	3.45	4.06	4.24	
C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益	4.99	5.20	5.47	5.81	6.24	 *
C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定	4.15	4.22	4.75	5.61	5.84	
C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落实「一國兩制」	2.70	2.85	3.54	4.19	4.45	

Note: Wordings of two indicators marked '^' were revised, namely from 'freedom of speech' to 'freedom of speech, association and assembly' and from 'equality before the Law' to 'equal protection of the Law'. Readers should take careful note of these changes and their interpretations.

註：兩項子支柱標有「^」，用字經過修訂，分別由「言論自由」改為「言論、集會及結社自由」及「法律面前一律平等」改為「法律平等保護」。讀者應注意這些改變及其含意。

2.1.1 Generation gap and political divide


Figure 2 shows average scores of public opinion by age group. There was a rise for all age groups except the 60-69 age group. Growth in the 18-29 age group was the strongest, with an increase of 12.6% to 3.49, but still the lowest among all. In contrast, the 60-69 age group fell by 7.7% to 5.55 but still scored the second highest.

Figure 3 shows average scores of public opinions by political inclination. Average scores produced by political groups increased with an exception of pro-establishment supporters. Pro-establishment supporters fell from last round's peak by 9.1% to 7.58 with statistical significance, whereas moderates rose by 6.3% to 5.20 also represents statistical significance. Non-establishment supporters had a strong boost by 21.9% to 2.39.

Statistical tests revealed that there was a clear and consistent divide in evaluation scores between younger and older age groups, and across all political inclinations. Not only were scores increased with age, scores of the three younger age group were also statistically lower than the three older ones. In comparison with moderates, the evaluations of pro-establishment supporters were significantly higher. On the other hand, evaluations of non-establishment supporters were significantly lower.

Figure 2: Public opinion (by age group)

圖2：民意調查（按年齡組別劃分）



2.1.1. 代溝及政治鴻溝

圖2顯示了各個年齡組別在民意調查的總分。除了60-69歲以外，所有年齡組的評分都有所增加。其中，18-29歲組別的增長最為強勁，增幅為12.6%至3.49分，但其評分仍是所有年組別中最低的。60-69歲組別的評分下降了7.7%至5.55，但仍排名第二高。


圖3顯示過去調查中，不同政治傾向在民意調查的總分。除建制派支持者外，其他政治傾向組別的分數有所上升。建制派支持者的分數，從上一輪的峰值下降了9.1%至7.58分，達統計顯著水平；而溫和派則上升了6.3%至5.20分，也達統計顯著水平。非建制派支持者的評分增長強勁，上升了21.9%至2.39分。

經統計檢測，年輕和年長組別之間及所有政治傾向之間均存在明顯且一致的差異。三個年輕組別的評分不僅評分隨著年齡而增加，在統計學上也低於三個年長組別。與溫和派比較，建制派評分比溫和派顯著較高，而非建制派評分則比溫和派顯著較低。

Scores 評分	Changes 變化
3.49	+0.39 (↑ 12.6%)
4.02	+0.19 (↑ 5.0%)
4.62	+0.19 (↑ 4.3%)
5.44	+0.38 (↑ 7.5%)
5.55	-0.46 (↓ 7.7%)
7.22	+0.45 (↑ 6.6%)
4.98	+0.27 (↑ 5.7%)

Figure 3: Public opinion (by political inclination)

圖3：民意調查（按政治傾向劃分）



2.2 國際評價 International perception

Table 2 shows Hong Kong's pillar and sub-pillar scores on international perception. The downward trend of all pillars continued. Compared to the last round, both 'civil liberty' and 'democratic development' continued to fall from 6.35 to 6.28 by 1.1% and from 5.17 to 5.12 by 1.0% respectively. 'Economic openness' dropped slightly from 9.28 to 9.20 by 0.9%.

Most sub-pillars fell. Three sub-pillars with the greatest drop were 'expression, association and assembly' (-3.1%), 'constraints on powers' (-2.5%) and 'rule of law' (-1.7%). The only rising sub-pillar was 'security and safety' (+0.2%). 'Regulatory quality' and 'political pluralism' remained unchanged.

Three sub-pillars with highest scores were 'market access' (9.72), 'financial stability' (9.58) and 'regulatory quality' (8.83). Three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were 'expression, association and assembly' (3.15), 'political pluralism' (3.51) and 'democratic development' (5.12).

表2顯示香港在國際評價的支柱和子支柱分數。所有支柱的下跌趨勢持續。與上輪比較，「公民權利」和「民主發展」分別由6.35分下跌1.1%至6.28分和由5.17分下降1.0%至5.12分。「經濟開放」則由9.28分略微下降0.9%至9.20分。

大多數子支柱的評分均下降。評分降幅最大的三個子支柱是「表達、結社和集會」（-3.1%）、「權力制約」（-2.5%）和「法治」（-1.7%）。唯一一個評分上升的子支柱是「安全」（+0.2%）。「監管質素」和「政治多元」保持不變。

三項評分最高的子支柱為「市場門檻」（9.72）、「金融穩定」（9.58）和「監管質素」（8.83）。三項分數最低的子支柱為「表達、結社和集會」（3.15）、「政治多元」（3.51）和「民主發展」（5.12）。

Table 2: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on international perception

表2：國際評價的支柱和子支柱分數

	2020 H2	2021 H1	2021 H2	2022 H1	2022 H2	
Overall 總分	7.52 (33)	7.30 (35)	7.25 (36)	6.93 (39)	6.87 (39)	
D. Economic Openness 經濟開放	9.41 (2)	9.36 (2)	9.34 (2)	9.28 (2)	9.20 (2)	
D1. Business environment 營商環境	8.99 (2)	9.02 (2)	8.97 (2)	8.85 (2)	8.68 (2)	
D2. Market access 市場門檻	9.83 (1)	9.74 (1)	9.74 (1)	9.73 (1)	9.72 (1)	
D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素	8.99 (2)	8.95 (2)	8.95 (2)	8.83 (2)	8.83 (3)	
D4. Financial stability 金融穩定	9.82 (1)	9.75 (1)	9.71 (1)	9.70 (1)	9.58 (1)	
E. Civil Liberty 公民權利	7.25 (46)	6.92 (56)	6.80 (60)	6.35 (72)	6.28 (72)	
E 1. Rule of law 法治	7.52 (31)	6.87 (38)	6.82 (38)	6.44 (42)	6.33 (43)	
E2. Security and safety 安全	8.22 (34)	8.24 (33)	8.00 (39)	8.07 (36)	8.09 (36)	
E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會	5.06 (109)	4.60 (111)	4.49 (113)	3.25 (123)	3.15 (124)	
E4. Individual rights 個人權利	8.21 (37)	7.97 (37)	7.89 (39)	7.64 (43)	7.56 (47)	
F. Democratic Development 民主發展	5.91 (69)	5.61 (77)	5.59 (77)	5.17 (90)	5.12 (91)	
F1. Constraints on powers 權力制約	6.62 (44)	6.22 (49)	6.17 (49)	5.64 (56)	5.50 (60)	
F2. Political pluralism 政治多元	4.69 (111)	4.38 (114)	4.38 (114)	3.51 (123)	3.51 (123)	
F3. Civic participation 公民參與	6.31 (37)	6.14 (46)	6.14 (46)	5.82 (56)	5.79 (57)	
F4. Democratic culture 民主文化	6.03 (66)	5.70 (73)	5.69 (72)	5.73 (72)	5.67 (80)	

Note: World ranking in parentheses.

註：括號數字為世界排名。

2.2.1. Comparison with selected regions

As Hong Kong is a highly developed region and given that highly developed regions tend to have comparatively higher scores in freedom and democracy as compared with developing regions – we have selected certain neighbouring developed countries and territories (namely, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) as benchmarks for comparison and assessment of Hong Kong’s performance in international perception. We compared the respective scores of the Mainland and the US, for the purpose of identifying the position of Hong Kong under 1C2S relative to the major powers.

Table 3 compares Hong Kong and its neighbours by pillars on international perception. Hong Kong’s superlative performance in ‘economic openness’ made it one of the world leaders with a score of 9.20. It ranked second after Singapore’s 9.43 and was way ahead of Taiwan’s 8.13, Japan’s 7.56 and Korea’s 7.24. The score of ‘economic openness’ for all developed neighbours fell in the last half year.

Hong Kong’s score for ‘civil liberty’ was 6.28, close to Singapore’s 6.81, but much lower than Japan’s 9.03, Korea’s 8.38 and Taiwan’s 8.21. The performance of Hong Kong’s neighbours in ‘civil liberty’ was at par in the past half year as scores of all of them fell.

For ‘democratic development’, Hong Kong’s score of 5.12 was not keeping in pace with its developed neighbours (Japan’s 8.67, Taiwan’s 8.30, Korea’s 7.85 and Singapore’s 6.91).

2.2.1. 選定地區比較

一般而言，發達地區的自由與民主評價均高於發展中地區。由於香港是高度發展的地區，所以我們選取鄰近的發達國家及地區，包括日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣作比較，藉以評價香港的表現。我們亦比較中國內地與美國的評分，以觀察在「一國兩制」之下的香港相對於兩個大國的發展。

表3比較香港和鄰近地區在國際評價支柱的分數。香港在「經濟開放」表現非常突出，以9.20分在全球中名列前茅，緊接新加坡的9.43分排名第二，大幅領先台灣的8.13分、日本的7.56分和南韓的7.24分。大部分鄰近已發展地區的「經濟開放」評分均較半年前下降。

香港的「公民權利」評分為6.28分，雖然接近新加坡的6.81，權利仍低於日本的9.03分、南韓的8.38分和台灣的8.21分。過去半年，香港的鄰近地區在「公民權利」方面的表現不相上下，所有分數均有所下降。

香港在「民主發展」評分為5.12分，未能與其他鄰近地區看齊（日本8.67分、台灣8.30分、南韓7.85分、新加坡6.91分）。

Table 3: Pillar scores on international perception of selected regions

表3：選定地區之國際評價支柱分數

	D. Economic Openness 經濟開放				E. Civil Liberty 公民權利				F. Democratic Development 民主發展				Overall 總分	
	Score 分數	Rank 排名			Score 分數	Rank 排名			Score 分數	Rank 排名			Score 分數	Rank 排名
Hong Kong 香港	9.20	↓	(2)	-	6.28	↓	(72)	-	5.12	↓	(91)	↓	6.87	↓ (39) -
Mainland China 中國內地	6.68	↑	(43)	↑	3.04	↓	(141)	↑	2.55	↑	(139)	-	4.09	↑ (126) -
Japan 香港	7.56	↓	(22)	-	9.03	↓	(13)	-	8.67	↑	(11)	↑	8.42	↓ (14) -
Korea 日本	7.24	↓	(29)	↓	8.38	↓	(27)	↓	7.85	↓	(30)	↓	7.82	↓ (24) ↑
Singapore 新加坡	9.43	↓	(1)	-	6.81	↓	(58)	-	6.91	↓	(46)	↓	7.72	↓ (28) ↑
Taiwan 台灣	8.13	↓	(11)	-	8.21	↓	(30)	↓	8.30	↓	(20)	-	8.22	↓ (19) -
United States 美國	8.22	↓	(9)	↑	8.13	↑	(33)	↑	7.55	↑	(36)	↓	7.97	↑ (21) -

Note: World ranking in parentheses.

註：括號數字為世界排名。

2.2.2. Global trend


Figure 4 shows the global trend of the pillar scores on international perception. The decoupling of global trade and investment and a synchronised slowdown in the world marked a rapid fall of 'economic openness' since 2019. Although relaxed travel bans and social distancing measures showed hope, disruptions in supply chains and business operations caused by COVID-19 outbreak had not been recovered. Thus, global average score fell by 1.9% to 5.79. The top performers for 'economic openness' were Singapore (9.43), Hong Kong (9.20) and Denmark (8.72).

A sustained downward trend in 'civil liberty' was recorded in face of repeated occasions of infringement of citizens' and reporters' rights, as well as ethnic conflicts around the world. This is a reflection of people's growing concerns over pandemic-related sacrifice of individual liberties. The global score in 'civil liberty' continued to slip by 1.3% and reached its new bottom at 6.12. The top countries were Finland (9.70), Norway (9.60) and Sweden (9.51).

'Democratic development' reflected a stagnation of democratic system in the world. Dozens of mass protests erupted throughout the world since 2019 with varied degree of success. Some turned violent and met with crackdowns, dampening political pluralism and the democratic culture. Global average score in 'democratic development' fell by 0.9% to 5.68 in the latest round. Similar to 'civil liberty', Nordic countries performed well in this pillar. Norway (9.58), Denmark (9.48) and Sweden (9.33) were the top three in the world.

Figure 4: Global trend of pillar scores on international perception

圖4：國際評價支柱分數的全球趨勢



2.2.2. 全球趨勢

圖4顯示國際評價的全球趨勢。全球貿易和投資脫鉤，經濟同步放緩，導致「經濟開放」的評分於2019年下半年迅速滑落。儘管旅遊禁令和社交距離措施開始放寬，新冠疫情對全球供應鏈及商務往來的破壞未能完全恢復。因此，全球平均分下降了1.9%至5.79。「經濟開放」表現最佳的是新加坡（9.43）、香港（9.20）和丹麥（8.72）。

全球各地屢屢發生侵犯公民和記者權利及種族衝突事件，令「公民權利」評分持續下滑。人們開始反思疫情防控下所犧牲的個人自由。「公民權利」的全球得分繼續下滑1.3%，跌至6.12的新低。排名靠前的國家是芬蘭（9.70）、挪威（9.60）和瑞典（9.51）。

全球各地的民主化程度停滯，反映於「民主發展」的評分之中。自2019年起，大量民眾示威爆發，成效有異。部分示威涉及暴力因而受到壓制，令政治多元和民主文化受到打擊。最新一輪「民主發展」的全球平均得分下降了0.9%至5.68。與「公民權利」相似，北歐國家表現突出，挪威（9.58）、丹麥（9.48）和瑞典（9.33）得分為全球最高。

2.3 重大事件 Significant events

Changes in scores in the indices are likely to be affected by significant political and other landmark events that occurred during the relevant period. Listed below are major events that occurred since the last report from July to December 2022.

Internal governance issues that are not strictly related to 1C2S appear to have important effects on evaluations of the Hong Kong public and media, but do not necessarily affect international evaluations as much. On the other hand, evaluations of international think tanks may not be free of western ideological biases against the rise of China, but they may also reflect genuine weaknesses in the implementation of 1C2S. It is important to bear these impacts in mind when reading the findings identified in this report.

報告期間發生不少政治爭議和重大事件，與「一國兩制」指數的變化有一定關係。上期報告至今，即2022年7月至12月的重大事件臚列如下。


與「一國兩制」無直接關係的內部管治問題，對香港市民和輿情的評價似乎有一定影響，但對國際評價影響不大。西方愈來愈擔心中國崛起會挑戰其優勢，所以對中國的態度由合作轉向對抗。西方智庫對「一國兩制」的評價不能完全擺脫此意識形態的轉向，但也可能反映「一國兩制」在實踐上的真正弱點。在解讀此報告的結論時，應予以考慮。

Table 4: Significant events

表4：重大事件一覽


7.1	Xi Jinping reassured 1C2S will be adhered to over the long term.	國家主席習近平表明「一國兩制」必須長期堅持。
7.21	US Congressional-Executive Commission on China urged sanctions against Hong Kong prosecutors handling protest cases.	美國國會及行政當局中國委員會敦促制裁處理示威案件的香港檢控人員。
7.27	The United Nations Human Rights Committee's periodic review on Hong Kong criticized the lack of clarity of the Hong Kong national security law.	聯合國人權事務委員會發布香港人權報告，批評《港區國安法》條文模糊。
8.9 & 8.10	Several social media pages closed down following administrators of 'Civil Servant Secrets' arrested for publication of seditious content.	警方拘捕「公務員Secrets」專頁管理員，涉嫌發布煽動意圖的帖文，多個社交媒體專頁隨即關閉。
9.26	The court seized about \$70 million from Spark Alliance, a crowd-funding initiatives in support of pro-democracy protesters.	高等法院頒令充公「星火同盟」約7,000萬元的款項。
10.5	Students were given a three-day suspension by a local secondary school for disrespectful behaviours during a flag raising ceremony. Concerns over freedom under the national security law were aroused.	本地一所中學升旗禮，多名學生被指不尊重國旗國歌，被校方勒令停課3天，引發社會討論《港區國安法》下的自由的議題。
10.8	Members of pro-independence group Returning Valiant campaigned armed revolutions and were found guilty for conspiracy to incite subversion.	「光城者」成員提倡「武裝起義」，被控串謀煽動顛覆國家罪成。
10.19	In his maiden Policy Address, John Lee set up the Talents Service Unit and the Office for Attracting Strategic Enterprises to attract overseas talents and foreign investment.	李家超發表首份施政報告，設立人才服務窗口和引進重點企業辦公室，吸引海外人才和投資者。

11.2 & 11.7	Hong Kong hosted the Global Financial Leaders' Investment Summit and the Hong Kong Sevens rugby tournament, signaling the city was open to the world.	香港舉辦「國際金融領袖投資峰會」和香港國際七人欖球賽，標誌著這座城市向世界開放。
11.14, 11.20, 11.21 & 11.22	At a rugby match between Hong Kong and South Korea in Incheon, a pro-democracy protest song was mixed up with China's national anthem. Similar incidents were discovered. The Hong Kong Olympic Committee issued guidelines to provide clear instructions for all athletes, teams, sports associations on the playing of national anthem.	仁川亞洲七人欖球賽中，錯將民主派示威歌曲當作中國國歌。類似事件陸續出現，香港奧委會發布指引，為所有運動員、隊伍和體育會就播放國歌提供明確指示。
11.25	Trustees and secretary of the 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund were fined \$4,000 and \$2,500 respectively for failing to register it as a society.	「612人道支援基金」受託人和秘書因未能將其註冊為社團，分別被罰款4,000元和2,500元。
11.30	Several small demonstrations were organized on campuses and streets in Hong Kong to commemorate the residential fire in Xinjiang and support the outcry against strict lockdowns in mainland China.	為悼念新疆住宅火災，並支援反對內地嚴格封控的群眾活動，香港校園和街頭組織了數次小型示威。
12.13 & 12.29	A former student leader was sentenced to two months' imprisonment for urging others to cast blank ballots in the 2021 Legislative Council election. The court ruled that this law was constitutional upon his constitutionality challenge.	前大學學生領袖涉嫌於2021年立法會選舉期間煽惑他人投白票，他質疑控罪違憲，法院裁定合憲，判囚2個月。
12.14	Chow Hang-tung, former organizer of June 4 vigil, won appeal against charges of inciting others to take part in an unauthorized assembly in 2021.	前支聯會副主席鄒幸彤，涉於2021年呼籲市民出席被禁止的6.4集會，被裁定煽惑集結罪成，上訴得直。
12.15	The Education Bureau revised guidelines on teachers' professional conduct, stating teachers should have the self-awareness to safeguard national security and social order.	教育局修訂《教師專業操守指引》，指出教師應自覺維護國家安全和社會秩序。
12.18	A consultation on enhancing crowdfunding regulation had started. All crowdfunding activities, online or offline, would require prior approval from the proposed Crowdfunding Affairs Office. Individuals who fund unlawful crowdfunding activities would face criminal charges.	政府開展加強規管眾籌活動的公眾諮詢，建議設立眾籌事務辦公室，所有線上或線下的眾籌活動均須事先獲得批准。捐款予非法眾籌活動將列為刑事罪行。
12.18 & 12.20	A by-election was held to fill 4 vacancies in the LegCo due to appointments to the executive branch.	立法會進行補選，以填補因四名議員加入問責團隊而產生之空缺。
12.28	Preventive measures in response to COVID-19, including the vaccine pass, contact tracing and mandatory quarantine, were lifted.	政府宣布放寬疫苗通行證、「安心出行」和強制隔離等防疫措施。
11.28 & 12.30	As British barrister Tim Owen would represent Jimmy Lai in a national security trial, the Chief Executive requested an interpretation of the National Security Law from the NPCSC. Regarding admission of overseas lawyers in cases concerning national security offenses, it ruled that a certificate of approval from the CE is required and reiterated powers already conferred to the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the HKSAR.	行政長官提請全國人大常委會解釋《港區國安法》，以處理英國大律師Tim Owen於國安案件中代表黎智英抗辯。全國人大常委會解釋，海外律師如要參與涉及國家安全罪行的案件，應當取得行政長官的證明書，亦重申多項已授予香港國安委的權力。



3. 「一國兩制」輿情指數

3. 1C2S Mass Media Index



Media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion. We attempt to use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S and monitor how performance of 1C2S is covered in the mass media to provide a timely barometer of public sentiment. 1C2S MMI measures daily net sentiment of media reports. A quarterly average is reported in this section to dovetail and complement with our main Index, which is compiled biannually. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素，故此，我們嘗試利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒，藉此透視大眾傳媒對「一國兩制」的感受及意見，編製輿論情緒對「一國兩制」的晴雨表。「一國兩制」輿情指數為每天媒體文章的情緒淨值，此章節顯示季度平均值，以配合和補充我們每半年出版的主指數。編製方法詳見附錄I。

3.1 近期趨勢 Recent trend

Despite mass arrests against democrat primaries, an upward trend continued after the decision on electoral reform that foregrounded the principle of ‘patriots administering Hong Kong’. MMI briefly went down in the first quarter as District Councillors assessed whether to resign or pledge allegiance. Nonetheless, overall sentiment has increased to 124.6 in 2021 Q2 and this appeared to coincide with an apparent adjustment of reporting style of media that used to be highly critical of 1C2S.

The triumph of 1C2S was repeatedly applauded during CCP’s 100th anniversary events, from the grand celebration to the landmark resolution on its significant achievements and historic experiences. There were high hopes for newly elected members of the Election Committee and Legislative Council, followed by Beijing’s white paper on the democratic development under 1C2S that endorsed the overhaul of Hong Kong’s electoral system. These official messages prevailed most news sources in 2021 Q4 and boosted MMI to 134.5.

儘管「民主派初選」觸發大規模拘捕，彰顯「愛國者治港」原則的選舉制度改革在2021年初公布，持續輿情指數的升勢。指數在第一季短暫下降，期間區議員正考慮是否辭職或宣誓效忠。總括而言，2021年第2季的輿情指數上升至124.6點，而同期部分對「一國兩制」向來較嚴厲的媒體，於評論風格上有所調整。

從周年慶典到歷史決議，中共建黨百年華誕不停褒揚「一國兩制」的勝利。新當選的選委會成員和立法會議員被寄予厚望，隨後國新辦發布《「一國兩制」下香港的民主發展》白皮書，認同完善後的選舉制度。這類官方表述覆蓋2021年第4季大多數新聞來源，將輿情指數提高至134.5點。

A quiet beginning in 2022 softened the positive sentiment from the previous peak. It did not take long for the Chief Executive race to boost popularity of the incoming leadership and confidence in 1C2S during the so-called honeymoon period. Despite grave concerns expressed by G7 foreign ministers over this election, the visit of Xi Jinping for the 25th anniversary of HKSAR overwhelmed media discussion, pushing MMI to 93.5 in 2022 Q2.


On the 25th anniversary of the HKSAR, Western leaders criticised China for failing to respect 1C2S, whereas President Xi Jinping guaranteed his commitment in this good system over the long term. Reassurance from the Chinese leadership gathered media optimism to a new high. But the uplift was soon interrupted by geopolitical struggles as US House speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan and subsequently China's white paper on the Taiwan issue heightened cross-strait tensions. Nonetheless, MMI regained its upward momentum and reached 150.1 in 2022 Q4 after the 20th National Congress of the CCP which proclaimed 1C2S a great innovation of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the best arrangement for national reunification.

2022年開局平靜，新聞情緒自之前的頂峰轉弱。不久，特首選舉後的蜜月期帶起新政府的民望和對「一國兩制」的信心。雖然G7外長就是次選舉表達嚴重關注，習近平視察香港回歸25周年的討論佔據大部分媒體版面，輿情指數在2022年第2季上升至93.5點的新高。

在香港慶祝回歸25周年之際，西方領袖批評中國未能尊重「一國兩制」，而國家主席習近平則保證這樣的好制度必須長期堅持。中國領導人的承諾使樂觀情緒充斥媒體，推至新高，惟升勢不久被地緣政治矛盾暫緩。美國眾議院議長佩洛西訪問台灣，以及中國發布台灣問題白皮書，加劇兩岸緊張局勢。中共二十大高舉「一國兩制」為中國特色社會主義的偉大創舉和祖國統一的最佳安排，輿情指數恢復上升勢頭，並在2022年第4季達到150.1點。

Figure 5: 1C2S MMI (quarterly average)

圖5：「一國兩制」輿情指數（季度結）



3.2 傳播媒介變化 Channel variations

Figure 6 shows 1C2S MMI by media channels, namely TV and radio, newspaper and online-only media. A general pattern emerged as news reported by TV and radio were persistently more positive while online-only media were more critical. This media landscape changed during the year between the second quarters of 2019 and 2020. TV stations and radios and newspapers joined chorus of criticism towards 1C2S and produced more negative sentiment than online-only media. After this period, TV stations and radios resumed their regular reporting style. Their sentiment score grew stronger than other channels in a generally positive news event. The distinction between newspapers and online-only media, however, were less and less noticeable. The trend of sentiment generated by these two channels were often intertwined with each other.


In the recent quarter, the overall growth in 1C2S MMI was contributed by TV & radio and newspaper. Net sentiment displayed in TV and radio increased by 8.6 points to 159.9, newspaper by 6.2 points to 139.4 and online-only media fell by 6.5 points to 139.5.


圖6顯示按傳播媒介劃分的「一國兩制」輿情指數，即電視電台、報紙和純網媒。普遍現象是電視電台所報道的新聞長期較正面，而純網媒則較嚴厲。這種傳媒生態於2019年第2季至2020年第2季的一年間有所改變。電視台和電台加入對「一國兩制」的集體批評，而且新聞情緒比純網媒更負面。自此之後，電視台和電台回復原先的報道風格，在較為正面的新聞事件中，情緒分數的增幅比其他媒介更強。但是，報紙和純網媒之間的差異則越來越少，這兩種媒介的情緒比過往交疊得更多。

最近季度，輿情指數的總增長源自電視、電台與報紙。電視電台上升8.6點到159.9點，報紙上升6.2點到139.4點，純網媒則下降6.5點至139.5點。

Figure 6: 1C2S MMI (by media channels)

圖6：「一國兩制」輿情指數（按傳播媒介劃分）





4. 政治傾向

4. Political Orientation




Figure 7 shows the composition of Hong Kong population by political inclination. Moderates (which include centrists and those without specific political inclination) remained the largest group (77.2%), followed by non-establishment supporters (13.0%) and pro-establishment supporters (6.6%).

Over the last half year, the gap between the moderates and non-establishment supporters was steadily widening, as the two diverged from each other with a rise of 5.4 percentage points of the former and a drop of 0.1 percentage points of the latter. The size of pro-establishment supporters fell slightly by 0.9 percentage points. Some pro-establishment and non-establishment supporters started to identify themselves as moderates, resulting in a driving force of political moderation.

A hopeful trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation endured from mid-2017 to early 2019. The proportion of moderates and pro-establishment in the population rose while that of non-establishment supporters declined. Radicalism resurged abruptly since then leading to a reversal of trend until the political rift began to heal in early 2020. The pro-establishment camp regained supporters, while the non-establishment shrank from its peak and the moderates rebounded from its bottom.

In the latest round, moderates and non-establishment supporters continued their respective trends of rise and decline. The steadily declining population in support of political extremity pointed to a narrowing political divide and polarization. It appeared that the subsiding momentum of political controversies, such as the enactment of NSL and electoral reform, began to show in the political makeup of the population.

圖7顯示香港市民的政治傾向。溫和派繼續成為最大組別（77.2%），包括「中間派」和「沒有政治傾向」的市民。非建制派排列第二（13.0%），建制派佔最少（6.6%）。


在過去半年，溫和派及非建制派的佔比差距穩定地擴闊，前者上升5.4個百分點，而後者下降0.1個百分點。建制派的比例下跌0.9個百分點。部分建制派和非建制派開始自認為溫和派，推動政治緩和。

去激進化及溫和政治在2017年中至2019年初興起，溫和派與建制派的比例上升，而非建制派則下降。激進主義的突然冒起逆轉了形勢，直至2020年初，政治撕裂才開始癒合。建制派開始增加，而非建制派則由高峰開始收縮，溫和派也從谷底回升。

最新一輪，溫和派及非建制派維持各自的升勢及跌勢。光譜兩極的支持者下跌，政治分野和激進化有收窄的跡象。政治爭議逐步冷卻，這趨勢在《港區國安法》的實施和選舉改革中，開始顯現出來。

Figure 7: Political inclination of population

圖7：香港市民政治傾向



4.1 香港青年的去激進化 De-radicalisation of youths


Figure 8 shows the change in the composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by political inclination. The proportion of moderates continued to rise by 9.0 percentage points to a historic high of 70.3%. Non-establishment supporters were further divided into 'democrats' and 'others', which represented mostly the localist camp. Democrats fell by 2.3 percentage points to 18.4% and other non-establishment supporters fell by 9.1 percentage points to 6.9%. The proportion of pro-establishment rose to 2.6% by 2.3 percentage points.


From mid-2017 to early 2019, there had been encouraging signs of de-radicalization of youths, when population of moderates was high and rising. This trend, however, was reversed as the proportion of non-establishment supporters witnessed a steep rise, surpassing moderates for some time. Furthermore, within the non-establishment group, localists overtook democrats in certain periods. Since mid-2020, the situation of radicalisation clearly eased as the proportion of localists subsided and moderates surpassed the entire non-establishment group.

圖 8顯示青年（18至29歲）的政治傾向變化。溫和派的比例繼續上升9.0個百分點到70.3%，達致歷史高位。非建制派可再劃分為「民主派」和「其他」，後者絕大部分為本土派。民主派下跌2.3個百分點至18.4%，而本土派下跌9.1個百分點至6.9%。建制派上升2.3個百分點至2.6%。

由2017年中至2019年初，青年溫和派勢頭不但高企，還慢慢攀升，呈現令人鼓舞的去激進化跡象。但趨勢急速扭轉，溫和派屈居於急速增長的非建制派之後。更甚者，青年本土派在部分時期超越民主派。2020年中開始，激進化局面緩和，本土派比例下降，溫和派規模更超越整個非建制陣營。


Figure 8: Political inclination of youths
圖8：青年的政治傾向





5. 延續「一國兩制」

5. Continuation of 1C2S



An issue of utmost importance for the future of Hong Kong is the continuation of 1C2S. In previous surveys, respondents were asked about whether this constitutional arrangement should be continued beyond 2047, and those who answered 'should' would be asked further about favourable conditions to such as a goal. This set of questions became irrelevant after the central government assured that this policy must be preserved over the long term. However, it may still serve the purpose of improving and upholding 1C2S by understanding people's needs for a preferred future. Therefore, all respondents were asked to choose what conditions would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S from the following list (they were allowed to choose more than one item):

- Maintaining a high degree of autonomy;
- Maintaining economic prosperity and stability;
- Political system democratises further;
- Maintaining national security; and
- Others (please specify).

Figure 9 shows the percentages of respondents who chose each of the five conditions. Overall, 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (50.6%) ranked first. 'Maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (47.6%) was a close second. 'Political system democratises further' continued its downward trend and fell further (21.7%). 'Maintaining national security' (18.2%) fell slightly.

Figure 10 shows how the patterns of choice and their stark contrast differed by political inclination. Moderates viewed 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' and 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' as almost equally important. Pro-establishment supporters pursued the former above every other choice. Non-establishment supporters shared moderates' view by ranking the latter as a key condition but also placed similar emphasis to 'political system democratises further'.

「一國兩制」長期延續乃關乎香港前途的關鍵議題。過去的問卷調查中，受訪者被問及這個制度安排應否延續至2047年後，而回答「應該」的受訪者，會再被邀請選擇對此目標的有利條件。在中央政府保證必須長期堅持「一國兩制」後，這些題目已經變得意義不大。然而，明白市民關注的議題和對未來的期盼，或有助於維護和改善「一國兩制」。因此，所有受訪者會被邀從下列清單中選出有利於繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（可選擇多於一項）：

- 維持高度自治；
- 經濟維持繁榮穩定；
- 政制進一步民主化；
- 維持國家安全；及
- 其他（請註明）。

圖9顯示市民選擇各條件的比例。「經濟維持繁榮穩定」排行第一（50.6%），緊接的是「維持高度自治」（47.6%）。「政制進一步民主化」繼續下跌（21.7%），「維護國家安全」亦輕微下跌（18.2%）。

圖10按政治傾向顯示市民選擇各條件的比例，他們的差異鮮明。溫和派認為「經濟維持繁榮穩定」和「維持高度自治」同等重要。建制派堅持「經濟維持繁榮穩定」，重要程度凌駕於其他因素。非建制派與溫和派同樣認為「維持高度自治」重要，但亦重視「政制進一步民主化」。

For pro-establishment supporters, 'maintaining national security' rose sharply by 18.1 percentage points to a record high (68.9%). Other conditions fluctuated moderately, including a slight fall in 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (72.6%) by 1.9 percentage points and a rise in 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (38.0%) by 4.2 percentage points.

Moderates' view remained largely stable but the share of all conditions decreased. 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (53.3%) fell by 13.1 percentage points, but it still surpassed 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (49.0%) and ranked first.

Non-establishment supporters toned down the importance on 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (55.8%) with a drop by 22.6 percentage points, matching 'political system democratises further' (55.6%) which fell by 8.1 percentage points. 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (38.2%) also by 8.2 percentage points.


建制派對「維持國家安全」的重視程度繼續上升，上升18.1個百分點至記錄高位（68.9%）。其他因素輕微變動，包括「經濟維持繁榮穩定」下跌1.9個百分點（72.6%）和「維持高度自治」上升4.2個百分點（38.0%）。

溫和派對上述各項條件的評價保持穩定，但所有條件的比例皆下跌。「經濟維持繁榮穩定」下跌13.1個百分點（53.3%），但依然超越「維持高度自治」（49.0%），排名第一。

非建制派減少對「維持高度自治」的重視，大幅下跌了22.6個百分點（55.8%）。「政制進一步民主化」下跌了8.1個百分點（55.6%），「經濟維持繁榮穩定」亦（38.2%）分別大幅度下跌8.2個百分點。

Figure 9: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047

圖9：2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件




Note: Answers before 2023 did not include those believed 1C2S 'should not' be continued beyond 2047 (about a quarter of respondents). Readers should take careful note of these changes and their interpretations.

註：2023年前的問卷回答並不包括「一國兩制」「不應該」在2047年後延續（大約四份之一的受訪者選擇此答案）。讀者需小心留意這些改變和其解釋。


Figure 10: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047 (by political inclination)

圖10：有利於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（按政治傾向劃分）




Note: Answers before 2023 did not include those believed 1C2S 'should not' be continued beyond 2047 (about a quarter of respondents). Readers should take careful note of this change and its interpretations.

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6. 市民的身分認同

6. Citizens' Identity



We also surveyed how citizens identify themselves: whether as Hongkongers or Chinese. Figure 11 shows members of the public continued to identify themselves much more strongly as Hongkongers than as Chinese. The scores for these identities started to reconverge after a period of departure. In the latest round, the divide between them further narrowed as rating for Hongkongers fell by 9.4% to 7.24 and that for Chinese more slowly by 4.3% to 6.19. Both identity changes were statistically significant.

The extent to which the public identified themselves as Hongkongers and Chinese can be better demonstrated by Figure 12, a graph mapping the mix of identities rated by respondents against time. On a 0 to 10 scale, the median score of 5 indicates a moderate level of identification. Ratings that are higher than the median indicate relatively strong identification; ratings that are lower than the median indicate relatively weak identification. These levels of strength can be grouped into four categories, dual identity (strong in both identifications), stronger identification as Hongkongers only, stronger identification as Chinese only, and others which include those without a dominant identity.

Earlier surveys showed a clear pattern that most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both Hongkongers and Chinese. This had gradually changed since mid-2019 and rebounded after hitting rock bottom in mid-2020. Dual identity became the dominant identity again by overtaking 'Hongkonger only' since 2022. The share for dual identity fell sharply by 13.2 percentage points to 47.5% in this round, but still exceeded the early 2022 level.

Identification as Chinese may not be the same as patriotic, but identification as both Hongkongers and Chinese is a pre-requisite for 'devotion to China and Hong Kong'. The fact that the proportion of Hong Kong people with dual identity is continuing to rebound after months of sharp decline since December 2018 suggests easing societal tension that would doubtlessly be beneficial to the implementation of 1C2S. We have not overlooked a possibility that current persistent international condemnation of China also has an impact on how Hongkongers look at themselves. The importance or otherwise of this will hopefully become clearer in time.

我們分別詢問市民對香港人及中國人身分的認同程度。圖11顯示市民對香港人的認同感繼續強於中國人。兩種身分認同曾經背馳，最近開始匯合。最新一輪結果顯示兩種身分的分野縮小，香港人及中國人分別下跌9.4%至7.24分及稍為下跌4.3%至6.19分，而兩者的變幅達統計上顯著水平。


圖12更清晰地呈現市民對兩種身分的認同程度。按0分至10分的尺度，中位數為5，代表中等認同。高於中位數代表較強認同，低於則代表較弱認同。對兩種身分不同程度的認同可歸為四類：雙重身分（對兩種身分均擁有較強認同）、只對香港人身分有較強認同、只對中國人身分有較強認同，以及包括沒有主要身分的其他身分認同。

香港市民普遍擁有香港人和中國人雙重身分認同，情況自2019年起逐步轉變，從2020年中起呈現反彈。自2022年起，雙重身分超過「只有香港人」，重新變成香港市民的主流身分。是次調查中，雙重身分的比例大幅下滑，下跌了13.2個百分點至47.5%，但依然超越2022年早期的佔比。

認同「中國人」身分未必等於「愛國」，不過同時認同「中國人」及「香港人」兩種身分卻是「愛國愛港」的先決條件。市民的雙重認同自2018年12月後下跌，現時逐漸回升；顯示「社會緊張」慢慢的放緩無疑地有利實施「一國兩制」。現在，國際社會對中國口誅筆伐，對塑造香港人自我認同的作用不能忽略，其影響力需時瞭解。

Figure 11: Citizens' identity scores


圖11：市民的身分認同評分



	Scores 評分	Changes 變化
Hongkonger 香港人	7.24	-0.75 (↓ 9.4%)
Chinese 中國人	6.19	-0.28 (↓ 4.3%)

Figure 12: Citizens' identity mix

圖12：市民的混合身分認同



	Share 佔比	Changes 變化
Dual identity 雙重認同	47.5%	(↓ 13.2%)
Hongkonger only 只有香港人	24.1%	(↓ 1.7%)
Chinese only 只有中國人	7.7%	(↑ 5.8%)
Others 其他	20.7%	(↑ 9.2%)

6.1 等級相關係數 Rank correlation


Statistical analysis yields the observation that there was a positive correlation between identification as a Hongkonger and a Chinese. The converse also held as the rank correlation coefficient was 0.332 and was statistically very significant. The finding that the two identities as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' were mutually reinforcing each other again provided a strong basis for the implementation of 1C2S.

統計分析發現市民對香港人及中國人身分認同呈現正相關，即越認同香港人身分的市民亦越認同中國人身分，反之亦然。等級相關係數為0.332，統計上非常顯著。結果證實香港人及中國人身分認同相輔相成，是落實「一國兩制」的有利條件。


Table 5: Rank correlation of citizens' identity
表5：市民的身分認同等級相關係數

	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1	2022.7	2023.1
Correlation 相關係數	-0.068	-0.027	0.141	0.430	0.332
t-statistic t 檢定統計	-2.26	-0.83	4.39	14.25	10.32





7. 熱門議題 7. Topical Issues



7.1 出現矛盾的責任 Responsibility of conflicts

Table 6 shows allocation of blame between Mainland and Hong Kong when conflicts arise in the implementation of 1C2S. 17.8% of the public suggested that Mainland would be responsible while 12.3% assigned the responsibility to Hong Kong. There were more people attributing equal responsibility to both Hong Kong and Mainland, as the latest round recorded a rise of 3.5 percentage points to 55.8%.

表6顯示當實踐「一國兩制」出現矛盾時，市民認為應歸咎予內地或香港。17.8%市民認為責任屬於內地，12.3%則認為責任屬於香港。選擇「一半半」的人數稍微上升，在最新一輪調查中錄得3.5個百分點的升幅至55.8%。

Table 6: Responsibility for conflicts

表6：出現矛盾時的責任

	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1	2022.7	2023.1
The Mainland 內地	46.6%	40.2%	30.8%	21.2%	17.8%
Hong Kong 香港	14.2%	18.5%	19.0%	15.8%	12.3%
Equally Responsible 一半半	34.2%	37.7%	43.4%	52.3%	55.8%
Don't Know 唔知道	5.0%	3.6%	6.8%	10.7%	14.2%
Net Value 淨值	32.4%	21.6%	11.9%	5.4%	5.5%

Net Value: Percent who chose 'The Mainland' less percent who chose 'Hong Kong'. Higher (lower) value means greater responsibility lies with the Mainland (Hong Kong)

淨值：認為屬「內地」的百分比減去認為屬「香港」的百分比，比例越高代表內地（香港）需負較大責任

7.2 移民海外 Emigration

Table 7 shows public's emigration plans. Those who had 'no plans' to emigrate remained the majority (78.1%), exceeding those who 'have plans' (12.3 %). The two groups recorded an increase of 3.7 percentage points and a drop of 3.5 percentage points respectively. As a result, their net value experienced a fall of 7.2 percentage points since last round to -65.8%.

表7顯示市民的移民計劃。「無打算」移民的人數（78.1%）依然是多數，遠遠拋離「有打算」者（12.3%），兩者分別錄得3.7個百分點升幅及3.5個百分點跌幅。比較上一輪調查，淨值下降7.2個百分點至-65.8%。

Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the net value of different age groups and political inclinations who planned to emigrate respectively. Net values of all age groups fell, except the 60-69 age group. Greatest declines were witnessed among 40-49 and 30-39. The former decreased 15.0 percentage points to -73.9% and the latter 13.2 percentage points to -48.5%. For 60-69 age group, its net value rose to -76.0% by 1.9 percentage points.

Expectedly, non-establishment supporters were more likely to have plans to emigrate than respondents of other political inclinations. Their net value fell by 28.9 percentage points to -13.1%. For moderates, their net value decreased by 2.3 percentage points to -73.1%.

Past studies have suggested that surveys often inaccurately amplify the number of individuals who seek to emigrate, for only a fraction of those who express interest in emigrating eventually do so in reality. Caution should therefore be exercised in interpreting the above findings, though they still provide valuable references of degree and extent of concern. The laxing of immigration requirements by 'popular' countries in response to the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law might also mean that plans to emigrate might not necessarily be induced by a lack of confidence in 1C2S or the socio-political situation of Hong Kong but simply seen as 'opportunities not to be missed' by those who had wanted to immigrate in any event.

圖13和圖14分別顯示按年齡組別及政治派別劃分的市民移民計劃的百分比。除60-69歲組別外，所有年齡組別的淨值也下降。30-39歲和40-49歲的跌幅最大，前者下跌了15.0個百分點至-73.9%，後者下跌了13.2個百分點到-48.5%。至於60-69歲，其淨值則上升了1.9個百分點到-76.0%。

一如預期，非建制派比其他派別更有計劃移民。該組別的移民淨值為-13.1%，下跌了28.9個百分點。溫和派的移民淨值下跌2.3個百分點至-73.1%。

根據過往研究，在民調中聲稱移民的人數，往往遠超真正移民的人數。民調結果雖有一定參考價值，但要小心解讀。溫和派聲稱無信心而計劃移民，一方面可能是對中央政府及建制派不滿，另一方面亦可能是擔心非建制派破壞社會穩定，例如覺得激進政治將會損害香港法治及經濟，兩種可能性皆不能排除。除此之外，就《港區國安法》的實施，多國以放寬移民門檻向北京施壓，不能排除有人視之為不能缺失的機會，並不一定是對「一國兩制」失去信心的表現。

Table 8: Public's emigration plans

表8：市民移民海外的計劃

	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1	2022.7	2023.1
Have Plans 有打算	32.7%	32.9%	23.0%	15.8%	12.3%
No Plans 無打算	61.1%	58.4%	65.7%	74.4%	78.1%
Don't Know 唔知道	6.2%	8.7%	11.3%	9.8%	9.5%
Net Value 淨值	-28.4%	-25.5%	-42.7%	-58.6%	-65.8%

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Have Plans' less percent who chose 'No Plans'

淨值：認為「有打算」的百分比減去認為「無打算」的百分比

Figure 13: Public's emigration plans (by age group)

圖13：市民移民海外的計劃（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 14: Public's emigration plans (by political inclination)

圖14：市民移民海外的計劃（按政治傾向劃分）



7.3 前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願 Willingness of living or working in other cities of Greater Bay Area (GBA)

Table 8 shows willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA. The proportion for those who were 'willing' to live or work in GBA was 3.4% and those 'unwilling' was 75.2%, leading to a fall in net willingness by 6.6 percentage points to -71.8%.

Figure 15 and Figure 16 show the willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA by age group and by political inclination respectively. Net values of all age groups fell. Those who aged 70 or above experienced the strongest fall among all age groups with a decline in net value by 14.5 percentage points to -72.8%. Net willingness of 30-39 and 40-49 decreased by 7.5 and 7.3 percentage points to -74.6% and -73.7% respectively.

Net willingness of supporters of all political camps also fell. Pro-establishment supporters fell by 7.5 percentage points to -25.5%. Moderates decreased by 6.9 percentage points to -73.7%. Non-establishment supporters reduced by 5.8 percentage points to -91.7%.

表8顯示受訪者前往大灣區居住或工作的意願。願意前往大灣區的受訪者有3.4%，不願意的則有75.2%，導致淨值下跌6.6個百分點到-71.8%。

圖15和圖16分別顯示按不同年齡組別和政治傾向劃分的北上大灣區居住或發展的意願。所有年齡組別的淨值皆下降。在所有組別中，70歲以上的淨值下跌幅度最大，下跌了14.5個百分點至-72.8%。30-39歲和40-49歲組別分別下跌了7.5和7.3個百分點至-74.6%和-73.7%。

所有政治傾向組別的淨值也下跌。建制派的淨值下跌了7.5個百分點至-25.5%，溫和派的淨值下跌了6.9個百分點至-73.7%，而非建制派的淨值減少了5.8個百分點至-91.7%。

Table 8: Willingness of living or working in other cities of Greater Bay Area (GBA)

表8：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願

	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1	2022.7	2023.1
Willing 會考慮	8.2%	7.0%	5.6%	4.5%	3.4%
Not willing 不會考慮	67.8%	68.6%	66.5%	69.6%	75.2%
Maybe / Don't Know 或者 / 唔知道	24.0%	24.4%	27.9%	25.9%	21.3%
Net Value 淨值	-59.6%	-61.6%	-60.9%	-65.2%	-71.8%

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Willing' less Percent who chose 'Not willing'

淨值：「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比

Figure 15: Willingness of living or working in GBA (by age group)

圖15：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 16: Willingness of living or working in GBA (by political inclination)

圖16：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願（按政治傾向劃分）



7.4 對香港教育制度的信心 Confidence in the education system of Hong Kong

Table 9 shows the level of confidence the public displayed in relation to the education system of Hong Kong. Respondents showing confidence in the education system of Hong Kong rose by 2.9 percentage points to 29.6%. Those who opted for the opposite was about the same level as the previous round at 40.8%. Thus, it led to an increase of 2.7 percentage points in net value to -11.2%.

Figure 17 and Figure 18 show the level of confidence in the education system of Hong Kong by age group and by political inclination respectively. Most age groups experienced an increase in net value. The net value of those who aged 70 or above increased by 15.7 percentage points to 34.0%, while that of the 60-69 age group dropped by 12.4 percentage points to -2.2%. Both changes were statistical significant.

The net value of non-establishment supporters rose by 16.1 percentage points to -67.5%, while the net value of moderates increased by 2.0 percentage points to -7.5%. In contrast, the net value of pro-establishment supporters dropped by 6.5 percentage points to 57.8%.

表9顯示市民對香港教育制度的信心。對教育制度有信心的受訪者增加2.9個百分點至29.6%，無信心的比例與前期相約（40.8%）。因此，淨值上升了2.7個百分點至-11.2%。

圖17和圖18分別顯示按不同年齡組別和政治傾向劃分的對香港教育制度的信心。大部份的年齡組別的淨值皆上升。70歲以上的淨值上升了15.7個百分點至34.0%，而60-69歲組別下跌了12.4個百分點至-2.2%，兩者的變動達致統計上顯著水平。

非建制派支持者的淨值上升了16.1個百分點至-67.5%，而溫和派淨值則上升了2.0個百分點至-7.5%。相比之下，建制派的淨值下跌了6.5個百分點至57.8%。

Table 9: Confidence in the education system of Hong Kong

表9：對香港教育制度的信心

	2021.7	2022.1	2022.7	2023.1
Confident 有信心	14.6%	18.7%	26.7%	29.6%
Not Confident 無信心	74.8%	67.8%	40.6%	40.8%
Unchanged 沒有改變	7.9%	11.3%	29.5%	24.2%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	2.7%	2.2%	3.2%	5.5%
Net Value 淨值	-60.1%	-49.2%	-13.9%	-11.2%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Confident' less percent who chose 'Not Confident'

淨值：「有信心」的百分比減去「無信心」的百分比

Figure 17: Confidence in the education system of Hong Kong (by age group)

圖17：對香港教育制度的信心（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 18: Confidence in the education system of Hong Kong (by political inclination)

圖18：對香港教育制度的信心（按政治傾向劃分）



7.5 對公務員服務水平的滿意度 Satisfaction with the performance of civil service

Table 10 shows the level of satisfaction the respondents demonstrated in the performance of civil service. Respondents who were satisfied with the performance fell by 2.3 percentage points to 40.3%. Those who were dissatisfied reduced by 2.9 percentage points to 26.9%. These changes resulted in a small increase in net value to 13.4%.

Figure 19 and Figure 20 show the level of satisfaction in performance of civil service by age group. The net value for those who aged 70 or above rose by 10.2 percentage points to 53.6%, which reached at statistical significant level. Net values for the 18-29 and 30-39 age groups were -12.5% and -32.7% respectively, which were the only two negative net values among all ages. Those who aged 30-39 and 40-49 experienced the greatest changes in net values, as the former fell by 20.7 percentage points to -32.7% and the latter gained 21.1 percentage points to 21.1%.

Net values for supporters of all stances rose. For non-establishment supporters, their net value rose by 6.6 percentage points to -44.6%, while net values of moderates and pro-establishment supporters increased by 2.4 and 6.1 percentage points to 19.3% and 58.7% respectively.

表10顯示受訪者對公務員服務水平的滿意度。表示滿意的受訪者下跌2.3個百分點至40.3%。不滿意的受訪者亦大幅下跌了2.9個百分點至26.9%。因此，淨值輕微上升至13.4%。

圖19和圖20分別顯示按不同年齡組別和政治傾向劃分的對公務員服務水平的滿意度。70歲以上的淨值上升了10.2個百分點至53.6%，達致統計上顯著水平。18-29歲和30-39歲組別的淨值分別為-12.5%和-32.7%，是在所有組別中唯一兩個擁有負數淨值。30-39歲和40-49歲組別的淨值則大幅變動，前者下跌了20.7個百分點至-32.7%而後者增加了21.1個百分點至21.1%。

所有政治傾向的支持者淨值皆上升。非建制派支持者的淨值上升了6.6個百分點至-44.6%，溫和派和建制派的淨值分別上升了2.4和6.1個百分點至19.3%和58.7%。

Table 10: Level of satisfaction in the performance of civil service

表10：對公務員服務水平的滿意度

	2021.7	2022.1	2022.7	2023.1
Satisfied 滿意	26.2%	26.2%	42.6%	40.3%
Dissatisfied 不滿意	52.7%	49.2%	29.8%	26.9%
Half-half 一半半	19.9%	21.7%	25.8%	29.9%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	1.2%	3.0%	1.7%	3.0%
Net Value 淨值	-26.5%	-23.0%	12.8%	13.4%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Satisfied' less percent who chose 'Dissatisfied'

淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比

Figure 19: Level of satisfaction in the performance of civil service (by age group)

圖19：對公務員服務水平的滿意度（按年齡組別劃分）






Figure 20: Level of satisfaction in the performance of civil service (by political inclination)


圖20：對公務員服務水平的滿意度（按政治傾向劃分）





8. 近期政治事件

8. Recent Political Events



8.1 國家長期堅持「一國兩制」 China's long-term adherence to 1C2S

In both the 20th National Congress of CCP and President Xi Jinping's visit to Hong Kong, China reassured its commitment to 1C2S over the long-term. Table 11 shows the perceived impact of this reassurance to Hong Kong's business environment. More respondents (40.6%) believed that it would bring a positive impact than a negative impact (10.1%). About one-third of respondents (31.4%) deemed that it had no impact. As a result, the net value was 30.5%.

中共二十大和國家主席習近平訪港時，國家保證「一國兩制」必須長期堅持。表11顯示市民認為此承諾對香港營商環境的影響。較多受訪者認為（40.6%）此承諾會帶來正面影響多於負面影響（10.1%）。大約三分之一的受訪者（31.4%）認為沒有影響。因此，淨值為30.5%。

Table 11: Impact of China's long-term adherence to 1C2S to Hong Kong's business environment

表11：國家長期堅持「一國兩制」對香港營商環境的影響

	All Respondents 所有受訪者
Positive impact 正面影響	40.6%
Negative impact 負面影響	10.1%
No impact 沒有影響	31.4%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	17.8%
Net Value 淨值	30.5%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' less percent who chose 'Negative impact'
淨值：「正面影響」的百分比減去「負面影響」的百分比

8.2 海外大律師參與不涉國安案件 Admission of overseas barristers in Hong Kong

Table 12 shows the perceived impact to rule of law if overseas barristers were allowed to handle non-national security cases in Hong Kong. More respondents (44.2%) believed that it would bring a positive impact than a negative impact (19.8%). At the same time, 19.4% of respondents deemed that there would have no impact. Together, the net value was recorded at 24.4%.

表12顯示市民認為容許海外大律師參與不涉國安案件對香港法治的影響。較多受訪者（44.2%）相信這會帶來正面影響多於負面影響（19.8%）。同一時間，19.4%的受訪者認為這會沒有影響。因此，淨值為24.4%。

Table 12: Impact of admission of overseas barristers handling non-national security cases to Hong Kong’s rule of law

表12：海外大律師參與不涉國安案件對香港法治的影響

	All Respondents 所有受訪者
Positive impact 正面影響	44.2%
Negative impact 負面影響	19.8%
No impact 沒有影響	19.4%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	16.6%
Net Value 淨值	24.4%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' less percent who chose 'Negative impact'
淨值：「正面影響」的百分比減去「負面影響」的百分比

8.3 研究虛假資訊立法 Potential legislation against false information

Table 13 shows the perceived impact of a potential legislation against false information to 1C2S. More respondents (35.1%) believed that it would bring a negative impact than a positive impact (24.4%). 19.3% of respondents deemed that there would have no impact. Together, the net value was recorded at -10.7%.

表13顯示市民認為政府研究虛假資訊立法對「一國兩制」的影響。較多受訪者（35.1%）相信這會帶來負面影響多於正面影響（24.4%）。同一時間，19.3%的受訪者認為這會沒有影響。因此，淨值為-10.7%。

Table 13: Impact of potential legislation against false information to 1C2S

表13：假資訊和虛假資訊立法對「一國兩制」的影響

	All Respondents 所有受訪者
Positive impact 正面影響	24.4%
Negative impact 負面影響	35.1%
No impact 沒有影響	19.3%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	21.2%
Net Value 淨值	-10.7%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' less percent who chose 'Negative impact'
淨值：「正面影響」的百分比減去「負面影響」的百分比

8.4 代溝與政治鴻溝 Satisfaction with the performance of civil service

Table 14 and Table 15 are summaries of the net values generated from questions about selected political controversies, further categorized by age and political inclination.

表14及表15總結市民對近期政治爭議的淨值，並按年齡及政治傾向劃分。

There were unambiguous patterns in how respondents of different ages and political inclinations react to these controversial events. Generally, the net values increase with age and decrease as the political inclination moves away from the pro-establishment end. For instance, the 18-29 age group and non-establishment supporters were the most critical about the political controversies while pro-establishment supporters tended to produce the highest net values, often the only positive net values in any category.

Taking into account the extreme views displayed by different political camps, the stance of moderates has value as a reference point signalling the general public's opinions towards the topical issues. As for this round, moderates' view towards the impact of a potential legislation against false information was again independent from the pro-establishment and non-establishment camps, suggesting rationality and pragmatism were rooted in the Hong Kong community.

受訪者的年齡及政治傾向對於爭議事件的取態有明確關係。一般而言，淨值隨年齡增加而上升，並隨政治傾向偏離建制派而下降。例如，18-29歲組別及非建制派對政治爭議評價尤其負面。建制派通常給予最高淨值，有時更是所有組別中唯一的正值。

有別於其他政治派別的極端觀點，溫和派在這些熱點問題上的立場甚具參考價值，表明公眾的看法。就今輪而言，溫和派對研究虛假資訊立法有別於建制派與非建制派，反映社會仍有理性務實的聲音。

Table 14: Generation gap over selected political controversies (by age group)


表14：對選定政治爭議之代溝（按年齡劃分）

	LegCo Election 立法會選舉 (2022.1)	National Security Law 《港區國安法》 (2022.7)	Long-Term Adherence to 1C2S 長期堅持「一國兩制」 (2023.1)	Admission of Overseas Barristers 認許海外大律師 (2023.1)	Legislation against False Information 虛假資訊立法 (2023.1)
18-29	-50.9%	-64.1%	3.8%	22.8%	-40.3%
30-39	-52.4%	-42.9%	15.6%	26.6%	-40.1%
40-49	-26.2%	-24.7%	31.7%	25.8%	-7.8%
50-59	-15.6%	-4.3%	37.1%	23.8%	-5.6%
60-69	-4.0%	15.2%	41.4%	28.1%	1.6%
≥ 70	11.4%	18.5%	45.2%	18.3%	18.8%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-22.2%	-15.3%	30.5%	24.3%	-10.7%

Table 15: Political divide over selected political controversies (by political inclination)


表15：對選定政治爭議之政治鴻溝（按政治傾向劃分）

	LegCo Election 立法會選舉 (2022.1)	National Security Law 《港區國安法》 (2022.7)	Long-Term Adherence to 1C2S 長期堅持「一國兩制」 (2023.1)	Admission of Overseas Barristers 認許海外大律師 (2023.1)	Legislation against False Information 虛假資訊立法 (2023.1)
Pro-establishment 建制派	63.8%	80.5%	82.5%	20.4%	65.0%
Moderates 溫和派	-19.1%	-13.0%	35.1%	24.9%	-8.2%
Non-establishment 非建制派	-81.9%	-88.2%	-11.2%	22.5%	-56.6%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-22.2%	-15.3%	30.5%	24.3%	-10.7%



I. 編製方法

I. Methodology



1. 編製「一國兩制」指數

1. Construction of 1C2S Index

We construct a conceptual framework to capture the current situation of 1C2S through 3 pillars based on public opinion and 3 pillars based on international perception. The 3 pillars on public opinion are Hong Kong public's evaluation compiled from telephone polls on the implementation of 1C2S. The 3 pillars on international perception are compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on the state of freedom and democracy in the world. Each pillar has 4 sub-pillars. As such, we create a measurement system comprising 6 pillars and 24 sub-pillars. An equal weight is given to sub-pillars to produce a pillar score. The 1C2S Index is the simple average of all 6 pillar scores. Table 16 below lists out the 6 pillars and 24 sub-pillars used in our index.

我們建構一個觀念框架以量度香港實踐「一國兩制」的情況，基於民意調查的3項支柱及國際評價的3項支柱。民意調查的3項支柱是取自香港市民在電話調查中對落實「一國兩制」的評分。國際評價的3項支柱取自國際智庫就全球自由和民主狀況而製作的相關指數。每項支柱各設4項子支柱，使此指標體系共6項支柱和24項子支柱。每項子支柱賦予均等權重，以計算支柱的分數。「一國兩制」指數是6項支柱的簡單平均分數。表16列出指數所使用的6項支柱和24項子支柱。



Table 16 : Pillars and sub-pillars of 1C2S Index

表16：「一國兩制」指數的支柱和子支柱

	Pillar 支柱	Sub-pillar 子支柱
民意調查 Public Opinion	A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治	A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務
		A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權
		A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權
		A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」
	B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由	B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式
		B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社和集會自由
		B3. Democratic development 民主發展
	C. Hong Kong-Mainland Relations 陸港關係	B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護
		C1. Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾
		C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益
		C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定
國際評價 Perception International	D. Economic Openness 經濟開放	C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落實「一國兩制」
		D1. Business environment 營商環境
		D2. Market access 市場門檻
		D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素
	E. Civil Liberty 公民權利	D4. Financial stability 金融穩定
		E1. Rule of law 法治
		E2. Security and safety 安全
		E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會
	F. Democratic Development 民主發展	E4. Individual rights 個人權利
		F1. Constraints on power 權利制約
		F2. Political pluralism 政治多元
		F3. Civic participation 公民參與
		F4. Democratic culture 民主文化

1.1. Public Opinion

We obtain 3 pillar and 12 sub-pillar scores on the implementation of 1C2S from our telephone polls conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Every sub-pillar is represented by one survey question. Table 17 shows the survey questions asked to obtain the sub-pillar scores. Each round, about 1,000 individuals will be randomly sampled by the CATI (computer-assisted telephone interviewing) system. All of the respondents aged 18 or above and spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin. To better represent the distribution of the Hong Kong population, all data are weighted by the proportion of gender and age of people aged 18 or above (excluding foreign domestic helpers) according to the Census and Statistics Department.

Table 18 shows the statistical and scientific standards of each survey. The telephone surveys have started to employ a dual-frame sampling design since 2021 H1. It randomly selects phone numbers from a combined sample of residential landline and mobile phone numbers. Given many individuals may own both landline and mobile phone numbers, additional steps are taken in the weighting method to avoid estimation inaccuracy caused by double-counting or other unknown factors. The calculations are detailed in the below sub-section.

In the telephone poll, many questions employed 1 to 7 as the rating scale in the survey process, with 4 as the median. This scale, which is known as the Likert scale, is commonly adopted for psychological assessments. This scale is used instead of a 0 to 10 scale as the latter is deemed too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents to choose from. However, to better conform to existing indices – which tend to be expressed on a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median) – we converted the results mathematically into the popular 0 to 10 scale.

1.1. 民意調查

我們委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查，以整合市民對落實「一國兩制」的3項支柱和12項子支柱評分。每一條問卷問題代表一項子支柱。表17顯示每項子支柱相應的問卷問題。每輪的電話調查會以電腦輔助電話訪問系統，隨機抽樣，訪問大約1,000人，全部皆屬18歲或以上，能操廣東話或普通話。進行分析時，數據依照香港政府統計處的18歲或以上性別及年齡分佈（扣除外籍家庭傭工）作加權處理，以更符合香港人口分佈的真實情況。

表18每輪電話調查的統計和科學標準。電話調查部分於2021上半年起採用雙框抽樣設計，從家居固網電話號碼及流動電話號碼的結合樣本群中隨機抽取號碼。由於大部分人同時擁有家居固網電話號碼及流動電話號碼，為免重複計算或其他不明原因帶來的估算偏差，加權的計算方法將於下一個章節詳細解釋。

電話調查中，多數題目採用1至7分的評分尺度，以4分為中位數。這是心理學常用的科學尺度，稱為李克特量尺。現時編製指數常採用0至10分的尺度，其實分類過於細緻，令市民難以選擇。不過為了與現行指數匹配，是以我們利用數學方法將調查結果轉換成為常見的0至10分尺度（以5分為中位數）。

Table 17: Questions on public opinion

表17：民意調查問題

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Survey Question 民調問題
A1 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to practice a high degree of autonomy, and has been able to handle its own internal administrative affairs. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港實行到高度自治，自行處理特區嘅行政事務。你有幾同意呢？」
A2 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent judiciary powers. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅司法權。你有幾同意呢？」
A3 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent legislative powers. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅立法權。你有幾同意呢？」
A4 'How successful has the practice of "Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong" been?'	「整體嚟講，你認為落實『港人治港』有幾成功呢？」
B1 'After the handover, the original ways of life of the Hong Kong people have maintained. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港人繼續維持原有嘅生活方式。你有幾同意呢？」
B2 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論、結社同集會自由。你有幾同意呢？」
B3 'After the handover, the development of Hong Kong's democratic system has been progressively implemented, following the provision of the Basic Law. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港嘅民主政制發展，正係按照基本法嘅規定，循序漸進地落實。你有幾同意呢？」
B4 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capabilities, identities and social classes. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港人不論經濟能力、身份同社會地位都能夠得到法律保護。你有幾同意呢？」
C1 'When conflicts between mainland China and Hong Kong arise, how confident are you that the conflicts can be resolved through consultation and dialogue?'	「對於當內地同香港出現嘅矛盾時，兩地可透過對話協商得以解決，你有幾大信心呢？」
C2 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to keep intact the sovereignty of China, national security and profits from development projects. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港可以做到維護國家主權、安全和發展利益。你有幾同意呢？」
C3 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain long-term prosperity and stability. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港能夠維持到長期繁榮穩定。你有幾同意呢？」
C4 'How confident are you in the full implementation of "One Country, Two Systems" in Hong Kong in the future (before 2047)?'	「你有幾大信心香港嚟未來（即2047年前）能全面落实『一國兩制』呢？」

Table 18: Survey details

表18：調查概況

Round 輪次	Survey Period 調查日期	Number of Respondents 受訪人數			Response Rates 回應率		Confidence Level 置信水平	Sampling Error 抽樣誤差
		Landline 固網	Mobile 手機	Total 總數	Landline 固網	Mobile 手機		
2017 H1	5.23 - 6.3	1,002	-	1,002	36.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2017 H2	12.11 - 12.23	1,006	-	1,006	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018 H1	5.23 - 6.2	1,004	-	1,004	37.2%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018 H2	12.3 - 12.12	1,001	-	1,001	38.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2019 H1	5.27 - 6.6	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
*	7.24 - 8.7	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
*	10.17 - 10.31	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2019 H2	12.10 - 12.20	1,000	-	1,000	40.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2020 H1	6.9 - 6.29	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2020 H2	12.22 - 1.13	1,002	-	1,002	32.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2021 H1	6.21 - 7.9	498	503	1,001	30.9%	31.4%	95.0%	±3.10%
2021 H2	12.20 – 1.10	497	506	1,003	30.6%	30.0%	95.0%	±3.09%
2022 H1	6.23 – 7.11	481	521	1,002	26.9%	28.2%	95.0%	±3.10%
2022 H2	12.15 – 1.18	474	531	1,005	24.4%	26.7%	95.0%	±3.09%

Note: ‘*’ denotes surveys conducted in addition to the biannual exercise.

註：「*」為半年調查的額外輪次。

1.1.1. Weighting method for dual-frame sampling

In dual-frame sampling, weighting adjustments are made for the ownership of phone numbers in addition to the distribution of the Hong Kong population. Since each individual owns a different amount of landline and mobile numbers, each has a different probability of selection as respondents. To eliminate over-representation of any individual, the first weight factor (WT1) approximates the probability of selection for each respondent. It is a ratio of the amount of landline and mobile numbers owned by a respondent to the total number of those in the territory. WT1_i is calculated by the inverse of probability of selection of individual *i*, i.e. $WT1_i = \pi_i^{-1}$.

1.1.1.1. 框電話號碼取樣的加權方法

在雙框電話號碼取樣中，除了以香港人口的分布作調整外，亦需要為擁有手提電話這個因素作出調整。由於每人擁有不同數目的固網及流動電話號碼，他們被抽中的機率也有不同。為剔除任何一人被超額代表的機會，第一步驟是估算每名受訪者被隨機抽中的機會率，即以每位受訪者擁有家居固網電話號碼和手機號碼數目，對比全港家居固網電話及手機號碼總數。加權因子1 (WT1_i) 之計算方式為受訪者*i*被抽中訪問的逆向機會率，即 $WT1_i = \pi_i^{-1}$ 。

$$\pi_i = \frac{n_L}{N_L} \times \frac{t_i^L}{e_i^L} + \frac{n_m}{N_m} \times t_i^m$$

Where 當中 i = i -th person selected 第*i*名被抽中的人士
 n_L = amount of sample's landline numbers 家居固網電話號碼樣本數目
 N_L = amount of population's landline numbers 全部家居固網電話號碼總數
 t_i^L = amount of i -th person's landline numbers 第*i*名人士家中擁有的固網電話號碼數目
 e_i^L = amount of eligible respondents in the household 住戶中合資格受訪人數
 n_m = amount of sample's mobile numbers 手機號碼樣本數目
 N_m = amount of population's mobile numbers 全部手機號碼總數
 t_i^m = amount of i -th person's mobile numbers 第*i*名人士個人擁有的手機號碼數目

Sampling in telephone surveys is randomized by phone numbers without demographic consideration. The second weight factor (WT2) adjusts the size of every sample group to match population distribution in terms of gender and age. WT2 is calculated by dividing the population estimates of a gender and age group by its sample size and the sample's probability of selection.

電話調查的隨機抽樣是電話號碼，沒有考慮人口特徵。加權因子2（WT2）按性別和年齡，調整每一個抽樣群組以配合人口分布。加權因子2是將性別和年齡分布的人口估算中除以樣本大小和樣本的選擇概率。

$$WT2 = \frac{\text{group population estimates}}{\text{group sample size} \times WT1}$$

$$WT2 = \frac{\text{每組人口估算}}{\text{每組樣本大小} \times WT1}$$

The final weighting factor (WT_F) is calculated by the following formula.

最後加權因子計算如下。

$$WT_F = WT1 \times WT2 \times \frac{\text{total sample size}}{\text{total population estimates}}$$

$$WT_F = WT1 \times WT2 \times \frac{\text{總樣本大小}}{\text{總人口估算}}$$

Where 當中 WT_F = final weighting factor 最後加權因子
 WT1 = weight factor adjusting for the ownership of phone numbers 調整電話號碼的加權因子
 WT2 = weight factor adjusting for the distribution of the Hong Kong population 調整香港人口分布的加權因子

1.2 International perception

We obtain 3 pillar and 12 sub-pillar scores on the state of freedom and democracy in the world from tracking indices compiled by international think tanks. Every sub-pillar is derived from multiple indicators. They offer a wide coverage of scopes and territories enabling us to compare Hong Kong's position on the global stage with an 1C2S perspective. There are two selection criteria for data sources. First, their datasets must cover Hong Kong to allow a direct comparison. Second, their indicators must capture key areas of 1C2S that draw international attention. Also, every data source has a different geographic coverage, only locations observed by at least three quarters of all data sources are included. As a result, 127 indicators from 9 data sources are adopted in our model to score and rank 148 countries and territories. Tables below show the list of indicators and their sources. Data sources include:

1.2. 國際評價

我們收集國際智庫編製的長期追蹤指數，以整合國際社會對世界自由民主狀況的3項支柱和12項子支柱評分。每項子支柱均由多個指標組成，這些指標涵蓋廣泛的範疇和地區，使我們能夠用「一國兩制」視角，在全球舞台上比較香港的地位。我們按兩個原則選擇數據來源：一、它們的數據集必須涵蓋香港，以便進行直接比較；二、它們的指標必須涵蓋國際社會所關心的「一國兩制」關鍵領域。此外，每個數據來源也有不同的地理覆蓋範圍，我們只採納所有數據來源中，最少獲四分之三涵蓋的地區。因此，我們的模型採用來自9個數據來源的127個指標對148個國家和地區進行評分和排名。以下列表顯示指標清單及其來源。數據來源包括：

- Cato Institute and Fraser Institute: Human Freedom Index (HFI);
- Economist Intelligence Unit: Democracy Index (DI);
- Freedom House: Freedom in the World (FiW);
- International Institute for Management Development (IMD): World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY);
- Reporters Without Borders: World Press Freedom Index (WPFI);
- V-Dem Institute: V-Dem Dataset (V-Dem);
- World Bank: Doing Business Index (DB);
- World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Index (GCI); and
- World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index (RoLI).

Table 19: List of indicators on international perception (D. Economic Openness)

表19：國際評價之指標列表（D. 經濟開放）

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
D1. Business Environment 營商環境	Business facilitation 方便營商	D1.1	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.10 Burden of government regulation	GCI	1-7
		D1.2	5C Business regulations	EFW	0-10
		D1.3	Paying Taxes	DB	0-100
		D1.4	Resolving Insolvency	DB	0-100
	Labour market 勞動市場	D1.5	Pillar 8: Labour market	GCI	0-100
		D1.6	Business Efficiency - 3.2 Labor Market	WCY	0-100
D2. Market Access 市場門檻	Free trade 自由貿易	D2.1	4 Freedom to trade internationally	EFW	0-10
		D2.2	Pillar 7: Product market - Trade openness	GCI	0-100
		D2.3	Trading across Borders	DB	0-100
	Market competition 市場競爭	D2.4	Starting a Business	DB	0-10
		D2.5	Government Efficiency - 2.4 Business Legislation	WCY	0-100
		D2.6	Business Efficiency - 3.5 Attitudes and Values	WCY	0-100
		D2.7	Pillar 7: Product market - Domestic competition	GCI	0-100
D3. Regulatory Quality 監管質素	Protection of property rights 保障私有產權	D3.1	2C Protection of property rights	EFW	0-10
		D3.2	Infrastructure- 4.3.21 Intellectual property rights	WCY	0-10
		D3.3	Pillar 1: Institutions - Property rights	GCI	0-100
	Enforcement of contracts 履行合約	D3.4	2F Legal enforcement of contracts	EFW	0-10
		D3.5	Government Efficiency - 2.3.09 Legal and regulatory framework	WCY	0-10
		D3.6	Enforcing Contracts	DB	0-100
		D3.7	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes	GCI	1-7
	Corporate governance 企業管治	D3.8	Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Auditing and accounting practices	WCY	0-10
		D3.9	Pillar 1: Institutions - Corporate governance	GCI	0-100
		D3.10	Protecting Minority Investors	DB	0-100
D4. Financial Stability 金融穩定	Public finance 公共財政	D4.1	3 Sound Money	EFW	0-10
		D4.2	Government Efficiency - 2.1.07 Public finance	WCY	0-10
		D4.3	Pillar 4: Macroeconomic stability	GCI	0-100
	Money market 金融市場	D4.4	5A Credit market regulations	EFW	0-10
		D4.5	Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Banking and financial services	WCY	0-10
		D4.6	Getting Credit	DB	0-100
		D4.7	Pillar 9: Financial system	GCI	0-100

Table 20: List of indicators on international perception (E. Civil Liberty)

表20：國際評價之指標列表（E. 公民權利）

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
E1. Rule of Law 法治	Judicial independence 司法獨立	E1.1	F. Rule of Law - F1. Is there an independent judiciary?	FiW	0-4
		E1.2	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.07 Judicial independence	GCI	0-100
	Civil and criminal justice 民事與刑事公義	E1.3	F. Rule of Law - F2. Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?	FiW	0-4
		E1.4	Government Efficiency - 2.5.01 Justice	WCY	0-10
		E1.5	Factor 7: Civil Justice	RoLI	0-1
		E1.6	Factor 8: Criminal Justice	RoLI	0-1
	Equal protection 平等保障	E1.7	F. Rule of Law - F4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?	FiW	0-4
		E1.8	Access to justice	V-Dem	0-1
	Regulatory enforcement 監管執法	E1.9	Factor 6: Regulatory Enforcement	RoLI	0-1
		E1.10	Rigorous and impartial public administration	V-Dem	0-4
		E1.11	Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	V-Dem	0-4
E2. Security and Safety 安全	Absence of crime 杜絕犯罪	E2.1	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.01 Organized crime	GCI	1-7
		E2.2	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.04 Reliability of police services	GCI	1-7
		E2.3	Factor 5: Order and Security - 5.1 Crime is effectively controlled	RoLI	0-1
	Right to life 生存權利	E2.4	B Security and Safety - Bi Homicide	PFI	0-10
		E2.5	F. Rule of Law - F3. Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?	FiW	0-4
		E2.6	Physical violence index	V-Dem	0-1
		E2.7	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights - 4.2 The right to life and security of the person is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Civil conflict and terrorism 內戰與恐怖主義	E2.8	B Security and Safety - Bii. Disappearances, conflicts, and terrorism	PFI	0-10
		E2.9	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.03 Terrorism incidence	GCI	0-100
		E2.10	Factor 5: Order and Security - 5.2 Civil conflict is effectively limited	RoLI	0-1
E3. Expression, Association and Assembly 表達、結社與集會	Expression 表達	E3.1	F Freedom of Expression - Fi Press Killed	PFI	0-10
		E3.2	F Freedom of Expression - Fii Press Jailed	PFI	0-10
		E3.3	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief - D1. Are there free and independent media?	FiW	0-4
		E3.4	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief - D3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?	FiW	0-4
		E3.5	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief - D4. Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?	FiW	0-4
		E3.6	World Press Freedom Index	WPFI	0-100
		E3.7	Freedom of expression index	V-Dem	0-1
		E3.8	Alternative sources of information index	V-Dem	0-1
		E3.9	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights - 4.4 Freedom of opinion and expression is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Association and Assembly 結社和集會	E3.10	E. Associational and Organizational Rights	FiW	0-12
		E3.11	Freedom of peaceful assembly	V-Dem	0-4
		E3.12	CSO entry and exit	V-Dem	0-4
		E3.13	CSO repression	V-Dem	0-4
		E3.14	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights - 4.7 Freedom of assembly and association is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
E4. Individual Rights 個人權利	Religion 宗教	E4.1	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbeli in public and private?	FiW	0-4
		E4.2	Freedom of religion	V-Dem	0-4
		E4.3	Religious organization repression	V-Dem	0-4
		E4.4	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights- 4.5 Freedom of belief and religion is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Movement 遷徙	E4.5	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the abi to change their place of residence, employment, or education?	FiW	0-4
		E4.6	Freedom of domestic movement	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.7	Freedom of foreign movement	V-Dem	0-4
	Labour 勞動	E4.8	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights G4. Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation?	FiW	0-4
		E4.9	Government Efficiency 2.5.11 Equal opportunity	WCY	0-10
		E4.10	Freedom from forced labor	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.11	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights 4.8 Fundamental labor rights are effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Property rights 私有產權	E4.12	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights G2. Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property ar establishprivate businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors?	FiW	0-4
		E4.13	Property rights	V-Dem	0-1
	Relationship 關係	E4.14	Relationship Freedoms	PFI	0-10
		E4.15	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choi of marriage partner and size of family, protection fro domestic violence, and control over appearance?	FiW	0-4
	Privacy, non-discrimination and equal treatment 私隱、非歧視和平等對待	E4.16	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights- 4.1 Equal treatment and absence of discrimination	RoLI	0-1
		E4.17	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights- 4.6 Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1

Table 21: List of indicators on international perception (F. Democratic Development)

表21：國際評價之指標列表（F. 民主發展）

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
F1. Constraints on Power 權力制約	Executive check 制約行政權	F1.1	Functioning of government	DI	0-100
		F1.2	Factor 1: Constraints on Government Powers	RoLI	0-1
		F1.3	Judicial constraints on the executive index	V-Dem	0-1
		F1.4	Legislative constraints on the executive index	V-Dem	0-1
		F1.5	C. Functioning of Government C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?	FiW	0-4
		F1.6	Pillar 1: Institutions 1.08 Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations	GCI	0-100
	Absence of corruption 杜絕貪腐	F1.7	C. Functioning of Government C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?	FiW	0-4
		F1.8	Government Efficiency 2.3.13 Bribery and corruption	WCY	0-10
		F1.9	Political corruption index	V-Dem	0-1 (inverted 倒數)
		F1.10	Factor 2: Absence of Corruption	RoLI	0-1

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
F2. Political Pluralism 政治多元	Electoral process 選舉過程	F2.1	A. Electoral Process	FiW	0-12
		F2.2	Electoral process and pluralism	DI	0-100
		F2.3	Clean elections index	V-Dem	0-1
		F2.4	Share of population with suffrage	V-Dem	0-1
		F2.5	Disclosure of campaign donations	V-Dem	0-4
	Political competition 政治競爭	F2.6	B. Political Pluralism and Participation B2. Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?	FiW	0-4
		F2.7	B. Political Pluralism and Participation- B3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?	FiW	0-4
		F2.8	Public campaign finance	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.9	Divided party control index	V-Dem	z score z 分數
		F2.10	Elected officials index	V-Dem	0-1
	Party development 政團發展	F2.11	B. Political Pluralism and Participation- B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?	FiW	0-4
		F2.12	Barriers to parties	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.13	Party ban	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.14	Opposition parties autonomy	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.15	Party institutionalization index	V-Dem	0-1
F3. Civic Participation 公民參與	Political rights and awareness 政治權利與意識	F3.1	B. Political Pluralism and Participation- B4. Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?	FiW	0-4
		F3.2	Political participation	DI	0-100
		F3.3	Mass mobilization	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.4	Civil society participation index	V-Dem	0-1
	Citizen engagement 公民參與	F3.5	Engagement in state-administered mass organizations	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.6	Engagement in independent trade unions	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.7	Engagement in independent political associations	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.8	Engagement in independent non-political associations	V-Dem	0-4
	Transparency and open government 政務公開	F3.9	Pillar 1: Institutions- 1.06 Budget transparency	GCI	0-100
		F3.10	Pillar 1: Institutions- 1.12 E-participation	GCI	0-100
F4. Democratic Culture 民主文化	Public attitude 大眾態度	F3.11	C. Functioning of Government- C3. Does the government operate with openness and transparency?	FiW	0-4
		F3.12	Factor 3: Open Government	RoLI	0-1
		F3.13	Government Efficiency- 2.3.11 Transparency	WCY	0-10
		F4.1	Political culture	DI	0-100
		F4.2	Deliberative component index	V-Dem	0-1
	Political equality 政治平等	F4.3	Political Polarization	V-Dem	0-4 (inverted 倒數)
		F4.4	Political violence	V-Dem	0-4 (inverted 倒數)
		F4.5	Factor 5: Order and Security - 5.3 People do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances	RoLI	0-1
		F4.6	Equal protection index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.7	Equal access index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.8	Equal distribution of resources index	V-Dem	0-1

1.2.1. Aggregation method for composite indicators

International indices are often released with a considerable time lag due to the extensive data compilation from a large number of countries. Very few indicators are collected for release in the immediate index period. Hence, we offset the time difference by rolling data forward to the release date. In other words, indicators are assigned to the index period in which they become available. Figure 21 shows the number of indicators by years offset. An alternative approach is to backdate data to the collection period. However, this approach has three disadvantages. No change will be observed in the latest issue because new scores are applied to an earlier period. Our biannual report will always record identical values in the first and second halves because most datasets are compiled on a yearly basis. Published scores will be revised substantially in the subsequent issue because indicators are updated retrospectively. It is noteworthy that backdating or time offsetting affects only the presentation of historical scores. Both approaches produce the latest pillar scores based on the latest available data.

Countries and territories covered by insufficient data sources are omitted in our model. An imputation process is carried out to replace missing data. Countries and territories are categorized into 7 regions according to the World Bank region groups. When a missing value arises, it is substituted with the regional average of recorded values. To standardize the range of data values, the complete dataset is transformed into a common scale by min-max normalisation as the below formula. For each indicator in each index period, the frontier value will be rescaled to 10 and the bottom value to 0. Even if a country or territory has the same raw score over time, its normalized score can be changed due to a change in the minimum or maximum value of the data series.

1.2.1. 綜合指數的整合方法

搜集大量國家數據需時，因此國際指數出版的時一般會滯後，只有少數指標能夠即期發布。因此，我們會將數據向前滾動至出版日期，以補上時間落差。換言之，當國際智庫一發布最新指標，我們便會馬上更新至即期指數。圖21顯示經年期調整之指標數目。另外值得考慮的方法，是將數據回溯至它們的收集時期，但是有三個缺點。第一，我們的評分在每次發布時不會有改變，因為新分數只會被更新至較早的收集時期。第二，我們在上半年和下半年公布的數字往往會相同，因為大部分國際指數只會每年更新一次。第三，已發布的數字會在期後報告大幅修訂，因為指標只會往後更新。值得注意的是，向前滾動或向後回溯只會影響歷史分數如何呈現。發布時，它們的最新評分將會相同，因為兩者皆以最新數據去計算最新分數。

數據來源不足的國家或地區均會被省略，如尚有缺失的數據，我們將會以插補方式填補。我們根據世界銀行的標準將所有地區歸類為7個地理組別，並以該地理組別中有紀錄的平均值去填補缺失的數據。為將各個指標的高低範圍標準化，整個數據庫會以最小—最大標準化方式轉換至一個共同尺度，公式如下。每個時期的每個指標中，最高的數值將會被縮放為10，最低的數值則會是0。隨著一項指標的最低或最高值改變，即使一個國家或地區在不同時期擁有相同的原始分數，經標準化後的分數亦有機會改變。


$$\text{normalized score 標準化分數} = \frac{x_i - \min(x)}{\max(x) - \min(x)}$$

A sub-pillar score is generated by its indicators with weights determined by principal component analysis. It is a standard statistical method that processes and simplifies data scientifically in index construction. It extracts a dataset's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains variations across the data through the below statistical analysis. Table 22 shows the weights of every indicator in recent index periods. Measuring about 60 countries and territories only, the coverage of IMD's World Competitiveness Yearbook is significantly smaller than other data sources. As there are more missing than recorded entries, we will assign a zero weight to IMD indicators for unobserved countries and territories instead of imputing with sub-regional average. The weights of available indicators from the remaining data sources will be enlarged proportionately.

子支柱分數整合來自多個指標，而各個指標的權重由主成分分析產生。這是一種分析和簡化數據的統計技術，是以科學化方式編製指數的標準方法。此方法通過對數據進行特徵分解，以得出數據的主要成分與它們的權值，優點是揭露數據的內部結構，從而更好解釋數據的變化。表22顯示近期指數的各個指標權重。IMD世界競爭力年報只覆蓋約60個國家和地區，比其他數據來源的覆蓋量顯然較少，缺失的數值比有紀錄的更多。所以，未被收錄的國家或地區，我們會將相關指標的權重調整為零，而非以地理組別的平均值填補，其他數據來源的權重則會按比例地增大。

Figure 21: Number of indicators by offsetting years

圖21：經年期調整之指標數目



	Offsetting Years 年期調整	Changes 變化
2020 H1	0.61	-0.23
2020 H2	1.02	+0.41
2021 H1	0.91	-0.11
2021 H2	1.20	+0.29
2022 H1	1.09	-0.11
2022 H2	1.35	+0.27

Table 22: PCA weights (%)

表22：主成分權重 (%)

D. Economic Openness 經濟開放						E. Civil Liberty 公民權利						F. Democratic Development 民主發展					
	2020 H2	2021 H1	2021 H2	2022 H1	2022 H2		2020 H2	2021 H1	2021 H2	2022 H1	2022 H2		2020 H2	2021 H1	2021 H2	2022 H1	2022 H2
D1.1	12.7	12.1	11.8	12.1	12.9	E1.1	9.0	9.1	9.1	9.4	9.4	F1.1	12.6	12.5	12.4	12.4	12.5
D1.2	20.7	19.8	20.2	20.6	19.4	E1.2	7.6	7.5	7.4	7.1	7.1	F1.2	12.2	12.3	12.6	12.6	12.8
D1.3	19.1	18.8	18.6	18.8	19.1	E1.3	10.3	10.5	10.4	10.6	10.6	F1.3	11.4	11.2	11.1	11.1	11.1
D1.4	17.1	16.8	16.9	17.3	16.9	E1.4	2.9	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.5	F1.4	9.1	8.8	8.6	9.3	9.3
D1.5	23.5	22.5	22.2	22.5	22.7	E1.5	10.4	10.3	10.5	10.5	10.5	F1.5	9.6	10.0	10.0	10.1	10.1
D1.6	7.0	10.1	10.4	8.7	9.1	E1.6	10.6	10.6	10.8	10.8	10.8	F1.6	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.9	4.8
D2.1	13.6	13.7	14.8	14.6	14.5	E1.7	8.4	8.7	8.6	8.7	8.7	F1.7	12.4	12.7	12.5	12.6	12.5
D2.2	16.1	15.9	15.3	15.2	15.1	E1.8	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	F1.8	4.4	4.0	4.2	3.6	3.6
D2.3	13.2	13.3	13.5	13.8	13.2	E1.9	10.7	10.7	10.9	10.9	10.9	F1.9	12.5	12.7	12.6	12.4	12.3
D2.4	9.6	9.4	9.9	11.6	11.2	E1.10	10.6	10.7	10.5	10.5	10.5	F1.10	10.7	10.8	11.1	11.0	11.1
D2.5	17.7	17.3	17.1	16.2	16.9	E1.11	10.1	9.7	9.6	9.5	9.5	F2.1	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.7
D2.6	11.2	11.7	11.5	9.6	10.1	E2.1	9.7	9.9	10.2	10.2	10.1	F2.2	9.4	9.3	9.4	9.3	9.2
D2.7	18.6	18.7	17.9	18.9	19.1	E2.2	10.4	10.5	10.6	10.6	10.5	F2.3	8.0	8.0	8.1	8.0	8.0
D3.1	13.6	13.3	13.3	13.1	13.1	E2.3	10.6	10.6	11.1	11.2	11.1	F2.4	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5
D3.2	9.7	11.7	11.7	10.7	10.7	E2.4	5.2	5.3	5.1	5.1	4.6	F2.5	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.2
D3.3	13.8	13.8	13.7	13.5	13.5	E2.5	13.0	13.4	13.6	13.6	13.9	F2.6	9.3	9.5	9.5	9.4	9.4
D3.4	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.3	10.3	E2.6	11.6	11.1	11.1	10.8	11.0	F2.7	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.7	8.7
D3.5	6.6	4.6	4.5	6.5	6.5	E2.7	13.6	13.6	14.2	14.3	14.2	F2.8	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8
D3.6	8.1	8.2	8.2	8.0	8.0	E2.8	13.6	13.5	12.7	12.8	13.1	F2.9	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
D3.7	10.9	9.9	9.7	10.5	10.5	E2.9	5.8	5.8	5.2	5.1	4.8	F2.10	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.4	4.4
D3.8	9.4	9.8	9.8	9.6	9.6	E2.10	6.4	6.3	6.3	6.4	6.8	F2.11	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.9	9.9
D3.9	10.4	10.9	10.9	10.4	10.4	E3.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.8	F2.12	8.4	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3
D3.10	7.0	7.5	7.7	7.3	7.3	E3.2	2.9	2.9	3.2	3.0	-	F2.13	6.3	6.3	6.1	6.2	6.2
D4.1	16.8	16.4	15.6	15.9	15.5	E3.3	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.4	8.4	F2.14	9.1	9.0	8.9	8.9	8.9
D4.2	13.0	8.6	9.2	7.0	8.6	E3.4	8.5	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	F2.15	6.7	6.9	6.9	6.5	6.6
D4.3	21.9	21.9	21.3	21.6	22.1	E3.5	8.2	8.4	8.3	8.3	8.3	F3.1	13.0	13.3	13.3	12.9	12.8
D4.4	11.7	11.5	11.8	12.6	8.8	E3.6	8.3	8.2	8.0	7.7	7.7	F3.2	13.0	13.0	13.0	13.0	13.0
D4.5	10.3	14.6	14.9	15.5	17.1	E3.7	8.9	8.9	8.8	8.9	8.9	F3.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0
D4.6	5.4	5.3	5.8	6.5	6.3	E3.8	7.6	7.7	7.6	7.9	7.8	F3.4	11.2	11.4	11.1	10.8	10.8
D4.7	21.0	21.6	21.4	21.0	21.7	E3.9	7.0	6.9	7.1	7.1	7.2	F3.5	7.1	7.0	7.0	6.3	6.3
						E3.10	8.7	8.8	8.7	8.7	8.7	F3.6	4.5	4.7	4.4	4.8	4.8
						E3.11	7.5	7.6	7.6	7.7	7.7	F3.7	4.4	4.0	4.0	3.8	3.7
						E3.12	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.0	F3.8	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.8
						E3.13	8.4	8.5	8.4	8.5	8.5	F3.9	10.3	10.5	10.5	10.3	10.2
						E3.14	7.3	7.2	7.4	7.4	7.6	F3.10	7.4	7.4	7.5	7.5	7.4
						E4.1	6.0	6.4	6.1	6.1	6.0	F3.11	14.2	14.0	13.9	14.1	14.1
						E4.2	5.7	5.9	5.6	5.6	5.6	F3.12	11.8	11.7	12.2	12.1	12.3
						E4.3	6.2	6.0	5.7	6.0	5.9	F3.13	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6
						E4.4	6.1	6.2	6.5	6.6	6.6	F4.1	12.5	12.7	12.6	13.3	13.1
						E4.5	8.2	8.2	8.1	7.9	7.9	F4.2	13.6	13.0	12.8	13.1	13.0
						E4.6	7.4	6.2	6.0	6.2	6.1	F4.3	8.2	8.3	8.2	7.2	7.1
						E4.7	6.2	5.5	5.4	5.6	5.6	F4.4	10.3	10.8	10.8	11.0	10.9
						E4.8	7.7	7.9	8.0	7.9	7.9	F4.5	8.2	8.4	9.0	8.7	9.2
						E4.9	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	F4.6	17.4	17.1	17.0	16.3	16.4
						E4.10	5.5	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.3	F4.7	14.4	13.8	13.8	14.1	13.9
						E4.11	5.6	5.8	6.3	6.2	6.2	F4.8	15.5	15.9	15.8	16.3	16.4
						E4.12	7.8	8.2	8.2	8.0	7.9						
						E4.13	5.9	6.2	6.2	6.3	6.2						
						E4.14	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.3						
						E4.15	7.0	7.2	7.1	7.0	7.0						
						E4.16	3.7	3.7	4.4	4.3	4.6						
						E4.17	6.3	6.5	6.6	6.5	6.6						

1.3. Revisions and refinement

After the first survey in June 2017, our questionnaire for public opinion was refined in the 2017 H2, 2020 H2 and 2022 H1 rounds to increase validity. These refinements include change of wordings and addition and removal of questions, affecting five of the twelve questions used to compute public opinion scores. Scores of the other seven questions are directly comparable as they are identical in all surveys. Table 23 and Table 24 show the history of the refinement of our questionnaire and the score differences from it respectively.

We have expanded the measurement system for international perception with more indicators and data sources since the 2022 H1 report to enhance objectivity. Figure 22 compares every country's score in the original and revised measurement systems in the same index period. The overall correlation is very strong. Despite a broader selection of indicators leading to slight score differences, both systems are consistent with the performance of a country.

1.3. 修訂與調整

在2017年6月進行第一次調查之後，我們的民意調查問卷在2017下半年、2021上半年和2022上半年的輪次中經歷三次修訂，以提高調查的應用性。修訂包括更改調查問題的用字，增加或移除問題，過程影響到民意調查評分中的5條問題，另外7條問題在所有調查均相同，評分可以直接比較。表23和表24分別顯示調查問題的修訂歷史和得分差異。

為加強國際評價的客觀性，我們在2022上半年擴展了國際評價的指標體系，採納更多的指標和數據來源。圖22比較每個國家在原有和修訂後的指標體系中，同一指數時期的得分，顯示整體相關性非常強。儘管指標數量增加導致分數略有差異，但每個地區的得分在兩個指標體系之中表現一致。

Table 23: Revisions of questions on public opinion

表23：民意調查問題之修訂

Round 輪次	Revision 修訂	
2017 H2	Removed 'After the handover, the internal affairs of Hong Kong have not been interfered with by the central and local governments of China. To what extent would you agree?'	移除「回歸之後，特區內部事務並無受到中央各部門同其他內地省市嘅干預。你有幾同意呢？」
2017 H2	Revised 'After the handover, the way of life of the Hong Kong people has not been affected by mainland China. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain their original way of life. To what extent would you agree?'	修訂「回歸之後，香港人原有嘅生活方式受到內地影響。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港人繼續維持原有嘅生活方式。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?'	新增「回歸之後，香港人繼續喺法律面前一律平等。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests. To what extent would you agree?'	新增「回歸之後，香港可以做到維護國家主權、安全和發展利益。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain prosperity and stability in the long term. To what extent would you agree?'	新增「回歸之後，香港能夠維持到長期繁榮穩定。你有幾同意呢？」
2022 H1	Revised 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedom of speech.' to 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly.'	修訂「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論自由。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論、結社同集會自由。你有幾同意呢？」
2022 H1	Revised 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capability, identity and social status. To what extent would you agree?'	修訂「回歸之後，香港人繼續喺法律面前一律平等。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港人不論經濟能力、身份同社會地位都能夠得到法律保護。你有幾同意呢？」

‘ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS’

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「一國兩制」指數

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2022 | H2 下半年

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