


“ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS”

I N D E X

「一國兩制」指數

AUGUST 8月 | 2018



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前言

Preface

The pursuit of "One Country Two Systems" (henceforth 1C2S) is unprecedented in the history of mankind. Over the past two decades, we have made headway under the auspices of 1C2S, but at the same time, encountered many challenges. The implementation of 1C2S requires unyielding exploration and the persistence of stakeholders. To ensure its full implementation, the first critical step is to review and evaluate its accomplishments and shortfalls since the handover of Hong Kong 20 years ago.

At the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong SAR, Path of Democracy released its first report on its attempt to conduct an objective evaluation of 1C2S. We developed an index of 1C2S based on a public opinion survey in Hong Kong on 1C2S, and also international indices that compare Hong Kong with other countries and territories in relation to human rights, various freedoms and democracy.

In the second report, we have refined and improved our public opinion survey, updated the relevant international indices, and also launched a new 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) by making use of big-data to measure the sentiment of Hong Kong newspapers towards 1C2S from 1988 to the end of 2017 as news sentiment has very significant influences on public opinion.

「一國兩制」是人類史無前例的嘗試，在香港已實踐20年，取得不少成就，同時亦遇到不少困難。「一國兩制」的實踐除了需要不斷探索，亦要所有持份者的努力。要確保「一國兩制」能全面、準確地實踐，首先要總結香港回歸20年施行「一國兩制」之成就與缺失。

民主思路在香港回歸20年之際發布第一份關於「一國兩制」概況的民意調查及編製「一國兩制」指數，希望為總結20年的得失謹盡綿力。指數的數據來自兩方面，一方面是進行有關「一國兩制」的民意調查，另一方面則參考國際性的人權、自由及民主指數，並比較香港與其他國家或地區的表現。

在第二份報告，我們改善及修訂了民意調查、更新了相關的國際指數，及借助大數據方法推出嶄新的「一國兩制」輿情指數。輿情對民意有重要影響，是以我們使用大數據技術衡量1998年至2017年底香港報章對「一國兩制」的情緒，以探索新聞情緒對民意的影響。

In this third report, we have conducted a third round public opinion survey, further updated the international indices, and have extended the MMI to cover the sentiment of Hong Kong newspapers till June 30, 2018. As our three surveys and our MMI cover the first year of Carrie Lam's administration, the results can be used to evaluate her performance and the general political sentiment in Hong Kong under the first year of her administration.

Our 1C2S survey covers nine different dimensions of implementation, including freedom of speech, judiciary independence, legislative independence and high degree of autonomy. We also asked for views on controversial issues, for example: whether or not they would like the consultation on Article 23 to go ahead; whether or not misalignments around 1C2S could be resolved through negotiations. The aim was to reflect public views on the implementation of 1C2S in a comprehensive manner.

We also looked to global studies carried out by overseas institutions and incorporated their evaluation of Hong Kong into ours. Specifically, we considered how Hong Kong was rated for democratic development, economic freedom and personal freedom (which would encompass human rights, rule of law, freedom of speech, freedom of association amongst other aspects). The final index score provides an aggregate evaluation of 1C2S in its implementation, based on both local public opinion and global perceptions.

Going forward, for the reference of policy makers and the public, we will update and refine data collection and construction methodologies of the Index every six months through public surveys, updating international indices, and also updating the MMI to gauge the latest sentiments of the media on 1C2S.

Professor Sung Yun-Wing
Co-convenor (Research) of Path of Democracy

在第三份報告，我們進行第三輪電話民調、進一步更新相關的國際指數，並更新「一國兩制」輿情指數至2018年6月30日的報章報道為止。三輪電話民調及輿情指數涵蓋林鄭月娥的首年施政，結果能用作評估她的表現和她執政下香港普遍的政治情緒。

我們設計的「一國兩制」民調，就著九個不同項目（包括言論自由、司法獨立、立法獨立及高度自治等）評價「一國兩制」落實的概況，亦調查市民對「一國兩制」實踐中具爭議性議題的意見，包括是否同意進行23條立法諮詢、是否同意「一國兩制」的矛盾可通過洽商解決等，希望能夠較為全面地反映市民對「一國兩制」實踐的評價。

我們亦參考國際性的研究機構對香港的民主發展、經濟自由及個人自由（包括人權、法治、言論自由和結社自由等項目）的評價。編制的指數綜合地反映了市民對「一國兩制」的評價，也反映了國際的研究機構按照國際比較的標準對香港的人權、自由及民主現況的評價。

展望未來，我們會每半年進行民意調查及更新國際指數，以更新並改善「一國兩制」指數，亦會更新輿情指數以衡量媒體的最新情緒，以供決策者及公眾參考。

民主思路聯席召集人（研究）
宋恩榮教授

「一國兩制」概況：民意調查及指數編制
報告三
第一部分：摘要

“One Country Two Systems” Overview :
Public Survey and Index Construction
Third Report
Part I : Summary



「一國兩制」概況：民意調查及指數編制報告三

“One Country Two Systems” Overview : Public Survey and Index Construction Third Report

This is our third Report on the ‘One Country Two Systems’ (henceforth 1C2S) Index (henceforth the Index). The purpose of the Index is to provide an objective assessment on the implementation of 1C2S. Our first Report was released in mid-2017, on the 20th anniversary of HK’s return to China. It is our intention to update the Index once every six months. This will be our third Report on the Index. We constructed the Index as the average of the following two indices:

1) Index (A), an index of HK public’s evaluation of 1C2S: Compiled from a telephone poll on various dimensions of 1C2S; and

2) Index (B), the Freedom and Democracy Index,

Every half year, we update the Index through updating indices (A) and (B) respectively with a new public survey and with the latest data from international indices. In our second Report on the Index released in early 2018, besides updating the Index, we also introduced a new 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) that use big-data techniques to measure the sentiment of Hong Kong newspapers as regards 1C2S from 1988 to the end of 2017 as we consider news sentiment has very significant influences on public opinion.

In this third Report on the Index, we have conducted a third telephone poll to compile Index (A), reflecting conditions in mid-2018. We also updated Index (B) with the latest international data. For the MMI, we include newspaper reports up to the end of June 2018 to capture the latest news sentiment on 1C2S.

In our Report, differences in scores at a particular point in time, or changes in scores over time that are big enough to be statistically significant will be noted explicitly. If there is no mentioning of statistical significance about a score, it means that the difference or change concerned is statistically insignificant.

這是我們有關「一國兩制」指數的第三份報告，為香港實踐「一國兩制」作客觀評價。香港回歸20週年之際，民主思路於2017年中首次發佈「一國兩制」指數，並將會每六個月更新指數。「一國兩制」指數為以下A、B兩項指數的平均值：

1) 指數A—評分取自電話民調，為香港市民對「一國兩制」各個方面的評價指數；

2) 指數B—「自由民主指數」，取自國際智庫對自由民主水平所編製的指數。

我們每半年進行民意調查及收集國際指數的最新數據，更新指數A及指數B，從而更新「一國兩制」指數。2018年初，我們發佈了第二份報告。除了更新指數外，還推出了嶄新的「一國兩制」輿情指數，使用大數據技術衡量1998年至2017年底香港報紙對「一國兩制」的情緒，進而探索對民意的影響。

在本報告中，我們委託中文大學亞太研究所進行第三輪電話調查編製指數A，反映2018年中的狀況。我們亦根據國際數據更新指數B。在「一國兩制」輿情指數方面，我們收錄了截至2018年六月底的報章報導，檢視報章對「一國兩制」的情緒。

在本報告中，當不同組別之間或不同調查之間評分的差異達統計上的顯著水平，將會特別註明。如未有註明，則代表評分差異在統計上不顯著。

圖一：「一國兩制」指數

Figure 1 : 1C2S Index




Figure 1 shows Indices (A), (B) and the 1C2S Index in the 2nd and 3rd rounds. From the end of 2017 to mid-2018, Index (A) rose from 4.98 to 5.05 while Index (B) fell from 8.04 to 8.01. The Index consequently rose from 6.51 to 6.53, rising by 0.3%.

The evaluation of the HK public of 1C2S has improved. From the MMI, the sentiments of HK newspapers on 1C2S has also improved. However, international perception has diverged from local perception in HK. This is likely a result of the adverse publicity in the international media on trials of protesters who participated in 'Occupy Central' and the civil unrest in Mongkok.

圖一顯示第二輪和第三輪的指數A、指數B及「一國兩制」指數。從2017年末至2018年中，指數A由4.98上升至5.05，指數B則由8.04下降至8.01。「一國兩制」指數因此由6.51升至6.53，增加了0.3%。

由此可見，香港市民對「一國兩制」的評價有所改善。從「一國兩制」輿情指數可見，香港報章對於「一國兩制」的情緒也有改善。可是，國際社會的見解有別於本地觀感，這相信與國際媒體對「佔中」和旺角騷亂案件的負面報導有關。

A 三份報告的評分變化 Change in scores in the three rounds

Changes in scores in the Index are likely to be affected by the controversial political events that occurred from mid-2017 to mid-2018. Between the first and second rounds, the following events generated a lot of attention:

- Disqualification of four LegCo members by the High Court;
- Prison sentences on the (13 + 3) protesters: The violent demonstrations of 13 protesters in relation to East North Territories Development, and the three student leaders (Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, and Alex Chow) in the Civic Square occupation. The (13 + 3) protesters were initially spared imprisonment and were sentenced to perform community service. However, the government won a sentence review pushing for tougher punishment. In August 2017, the Court of Appeals sentenced them to 6 to 13 months imprisonment. The court also gave new tougher sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence.
- 高等法院裁定四名立法會議員宣誓無效；
- 「13+3」示威者被判入獄：13名反新界東北發展及涉暴力的示威者與強行進入公民廣場示威的「雙學三子」（黃之鋒、羅冠聰及周永康）被判入獄；他們16人本來被判處社會服務，免受監禁，然而政府成功覆核刑期。2017年8月，上訴法庭判處他們6至13個月監禁，更提出更嚴厲的量刑準則予未來涉及暴力的大型非法集會案件；

- Emphasis on 'overall jurisdiction over Hong Kong' in the Work Report of 19th CPC National Congress;
- Amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Council to restrict filibustering;
- China's enactment of the national anthem law; and
- LegCo's passage of the non-binding motion on the high-speed rail co-location arrangement

Between the second and third rounds, from late 2017 to mid-2018, the following controversies are noteworthy:

- The case of the three student leaders was brought to the Court of Final Appeals (CFA). The CFA overturned the prison sentences on the trio on a technicality but ruled that the Court of Appeals was entitled to give tough sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence;
- LegCo's passage of the co-location bill on June 14 after protracted debates;
- Hong Kong is due to start the local legislative process to implement the national anthem law in the second half of 2018;
- Edward Leung, leader of HK Indigenous, was given a prison sentence of 6 years on June 11 for his role in the civil unrest in Mongkok.

The above events may have adversely affected the evaluations of 1C2S by the public and also by international think tanks. However, the sentencing of Edward Leung on June 11 occurred after our 3rd survey was carried out and therefore could not affect the results of the 3rd survey, which was conducted from May 23 to June 2. However, the MMI does capture the effect of the sentencing as the MMI covers news sentiment up to the end of June.

(1) Index (A): Public Survey

Index (A) is a composite score of 9 sub-scores obtained from 9 questions on different dimensions of 1C2S in our survey (Figure 2). We used 3 alternative methods, namely, Simple Average, Principal Component Analysis, and Factor Analysis to compute Index (A). The first method of Simple Average

- 中共十九大工作報告強調對香港的「全面管治權」；
- 立法會透過修訂議事規則限制拉布；
- 中國訂立國歌法；
- 立法會通過關於高鐵「一地兩檢」安排的無約束力議案。

從2017年末至2018年中，即第二份與第三份報告之間，以下爭議也值得關注：

- 「雙學三子」案件上訴至終審法院。終審法院以技術因素推翻監禁判決，但認可上訴法院對未來涉及暴力的大規模非法集會案件所提出的更嚴厲判刑指引；
- 立法會經過漫長辯論後，於6月14日通過「一地兩檢」議案；
- 《國歌法》的本地立法程序將於2018年下半年展開；
- 本土民主前線領袖梁天琦參與旺角騷亂，於6月11日被判處6年監禁。

上述事件可能令市民和國際智庫對「一國兩制」的評價有負面影響，惟第三輪調查於5月23日至6月2日進行，未能涵蓋6月11日裁決的梁天琦案，因此事件帶來的影響未能納入調查結果。不過，「一國兩制」輿情指數涵蓋截至六月底的新聞情緒，能夠反映判決帶來的影響。

(1) 指數A—民意調查


指數A為是次調查就「一國兩制」各方面九條問題的平均分（圖二）。我們考慮三種方式計算指數A，分別為簡單平均數、「主成分分析」及「因子分析」。簡單平均數給各個項目相同權重，容易理解，是最常見的方式。

assigns equal weight to each of the 9 sub-scores. It is easily understood and is the most commonly used method. The latter two methods use statistical techniques to assign different weights to the sub-scores based on the variations in the sub-scores. Details of computations are in the Methodological Note at the end of this Report as they are highly technical. As the differences in the results of using the 3 different methods are small and negligible, we adopt the simplest and most commonly used method, i.e., the average of the 9 items, in constructing Index (A).

後兩種方式基於統計理論按各個項目的差異給予不同權重。由於高度技術性，詳細統計方法可參閱本報告最後的方法註解。因為三種方式編制的指數A的結果十分接近，所以我們選取最簡單常用的方法，即九個項目的簡單平均數來編制指數A。

圖二：市民對「一國兩制」概況的評價（比較三輪調查）

Figure 2: Public's evaluation of 1C2S (comparison of three rounds of survey)





Of the 9 questions in the survey, the score on Q4 in the first survey is not comparable to those in the second and third rounds due to refinement of question 4 ('original way of life in HK remained unchanged') after the first survey. In Figure 2, for comparison with the 1st survey, we also show the average scores of the other 8 questions that are identical across the 3 surveys.

From the 2nd to the 3rd round, the scores of all questions, except the score on 'freedom of speech', rose. Index (A) rose from 4.98 to 5.05, the first time that the Index exceeded the mid-point score of 5. The general improvement in scores is likely to be associated with the decrease in societal division after the appointment of Carrie Lam as CE (Chief Executive), as will be detailed later. The fall in the score on 'freedom of speech', which is statistically significant, is likely to be related to two incidents in which HK reporters were roughed up on the mainland in May, shortly before the commencement of our survey. It is to be noted, however, that although the reporters were from Hong Kong, those events strictly speaking, affected the freedom of the press on the Mainland rather than Hong Kong.

The scores of all items on 1C2S questions are quite stable, suggesting that the questionnaire design is robust. Four items consistently scored higher than 5; from the highest to the lowest, they are: maintaining original ways of life, freedom of speech, judicial independence, legislative independence – these results suggest the public holds relatively positive opinions with respect to the above four items.

On the other hand, five items score below 5 in all 3 rounds: they are, from the highest to lowest, a high degree of autonomy in the executive branch, the successful implementation of 'Self-Governance, High Autonomy' principles, progress in democratization, the full implementation of 1C2S in the future, and the ability for the Mainland and Hong Kong to resolve differences via dialogue and negotiation. The results suggest that the public holds relatively negative views with respect to these five items. Although the average across the 9 items has risen to 5.05, just above the half way mark, the rating is still not high, a fact which policy makers ought to take note.

The range of the ratings is relatively narrow, ranging from 4 to 6 plus, most plausibly because the public generally hold a 'holistic rating' on 1C2S, such that regardless of the specific item surveyed, the answers are nevertheless shaped by their 'holistic ratings', such that the range across their answers for each specific item is relatively small.

九條題目中的第四題「維持原有生活方式」於第一輪後經過修訂，因此第一輪調查的第四題評分不能跟第二輪和第三輪直接比較。為與第一輪結果比較，圖二展示其他八條在三輪調查均相同的問題的平均分。

比較第二輪與第三輪，所有題目的評分皆上升，只有「言論自由」例外。指數A由4.98升至5.05，首次超越中位數5分。整體評分提升相信是由於林鄭月娥被委任為行政長官後，社會撕裂緩和（詳見下文）。「言論自由」評分下降，達統計上的顯著水平，這很可能是因為第三輪調查於五月下旬展開前，有兩位香港記者在內地遇襲。雖然遇襲記者來自香港，但嚴格來說，這些事件反映內地而非香港的言論或新聞自由。

有關「一國兩制」所有項目評分相當平穩，證明問卷設計穩當。四項評分一貫高於5分，由高至低順序排列如下：「維持原有生活方式」、「言論自由」、「司法獨立」及「立法獨立」。從結果可見，大眾對以上四個項目的態度相對正面。

另一方面，五項得分在三輪調查中都低於5分，由高至低順序排列如下：「特區自行處理行政事務」、「成功落實『港人治港、高度自治』」、「循序漸進落實民主政制發展」、「全面落實『一國兩制』」，及「透過對話協商解決內地與香港矛盾的信心」。以上結果顯示市民對以上五項的態度相對負面。雖然九個項目的平均分上升至5.05，但只僅僅高於中位數，評分不算高，值得決策者關注。

評分高低差別不大，在4分和6分多之間。相信市民心中對「一國兩制」有一個概括評分，無論詢問甚麼項目，市民的答案也會受到心中的概括評分影響，因此對各細項的評分也不會過於偏離整體上的概括評分。

(2) Polarization of public's evaluation of 1C2S across generations and across political inclinations

Figures 3 and 4 show public's evaluations of 1C2S respectively by age and by political inclination in the 3 surveys. The figures show that the generation gap and the political divide in evaluations of 1C2S are big and widening.

In Figure 3, the generation gap in evaluation of 1C2S is obvious: The average scores of younger age groups are lower than those of older age groups. The difference between the 18-49 age group and the over 50 age group is statistically significant. The average scores over 8 items of Young Adults (age 18 to 29) is only around 4, while those of old people (over 70) are above 6. Moreover, from the 1st survey to the 3rd, the evaluation scores of all 3 younger age groups (18-29, 30-39, and 40-49) fell, while the scores of 2 older age groups (50-59 and 60-69) rose, showing polarization across generations.

(2) 不同世代及政治傾向的市民對「一國兩制」評價趨向兩極化

圖三和圖四分別顯示三輪調查中，各個年齡組別及政治傾向的市民對「一國兩制」的評價。從圖中可見，對「一國兩制」評價的代溝與政治鴻溝頗大，並不斷加深。

對「一國兩制」評價的代溝從圖三顯而易見：年輕一代的平均分低於較年長的組別，18至49歲組別與50歲或以上組別的差異達統計上的顯著水平。青年（18至29歲）的八個項目平均分只有4分左右，而長者（70歲或以上）的平均分則高於6分。此外，從第一輪至第三輪調查，最年輕的三個組別（18至29歲、30至39歲及40至49歲）評分全部下降，而較年長的兩個組別（50至59歲及60至69歲）評分皆上升，顯示代溝加劇。

圖三：按年齡組別劃分的「一國兩制」市民評價

Figure 3: Public's evaluation of 1C2S by age





Figure 4 shows public's evaluations of 1C2S by political inclinations in the 3 surveys. Statistical tests reveal that, in comparison with Moderates, the evaluations of Pro-establishment supporters are significantly higher, while the evaluations of Non-establishment supporters are significantly lower. Non-establishment supporters are divided into 'Democrats' and 'Others' (mostly localists/self-determinists). Within Non-establishment supporters, the 'Others' group have lower evaluations (scores around 2 to 3) in comparison with Democrats (scores around 3 to 4). The evaluation scores of Moderates (which include Centrists and those without political inclination) are quite stable in the 3 rounds, hovering slightly above 5.1.

圖四為三輪調查中不同政治傾向的市民對「一國兩制」的評價。統計分析顯示，與中間派相比，建制派評分顯著較高，而非建制派評分則顯著較低。非建制派分為「民主派」及「其他非建制派」（主要是本土派及自決派）。非建制派當中，「其他非建制派」的評價（大約2分至3分）比「民主派」（大約3分至4分）低。三輪調查中，中間派（包括「中間派」及沒有政治傾向的市民）的評分頗平穩，徘徊在略高於5.1分的範圍。

圖四：按政治傾向劃分的「一國兩制」市民評價

Figure 4: Public's evaluation of 1C2S by political inclination



The Pro-establishment – Non-establishment political divide is big and widening: Statistical tests reveal that the high scores of Pro-establishment supporters rose significantly higher (rising by 7.6% from the 1st to the 3rd round), and the low scores of Non-establishment supporters fell significantly lower (falling by 10.4% from 1st to 3rd round). The trend of polarization is evident.

From the 1st to the 3rd round, although the average score over 8 items for our entire sample is stable and has risen slightly from 4.88 to 4.90, there is evident polarization across generations and across political inclinations. This is a very serious problem.

建制派與非建制派之間有相當大的政治鴻溝，且正在加深。統計分析顯示，建制派的高評分顯著增長（由第一輪至第三輪調查上升7.6%），而非建制派的低評分則顯著下降（由第一輪至第三輪調查下降10.4%）。兩極化趨勢明顯。

從第一輪至第三輪調查，雖然市民對八個項目的整體平均分平穩，並由4.88稍微上升至4.90，但是代溝及政治鴻溝不斷加深，問題嚴重。



(3) Index (B): Freedom and Democracy Index

Index (B) is the average of 3 indices, namely, the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser Institutes, and the Democracy Index of the EIU (Economic Intelligence Unit). Hong Kong has always ranked world's number one in Economic Freedom, and has also ranked highly in Personal Freedom.

The latest Economic Freedom and Personal Freedom indices only reflect conditions up to 2015. In the second and third Reports, we updated both indices to 2016 and to 2017 respectively. Hong Kong's Personal Freedom Index rose from 2008 to a peak in 2014, but fell thereafter. The Democracy Index rose from 2008 to a peak in 2015, but declined thereafter. Given the adverse publicity in the international media in relation to recent political controversies in Hong Kong, the recent declines are expected.

- The Personal Freedom Index climbed from 8.87 in 2008 to a peak of 9.08 in 2014, but fell to 8.58 in 2017, falling by 5.5% from the 2014 peak. Among the 7 sub-indices of this Index, the scores of 4 sub-indices fell, namely, rule of law (falling by 16.0%), freedom of religion (falling by 7.4%), freedom of association (falling by 22%), and gender identity & relationship (falling by 7.5%). However, the scores of 2 sub-indices rose, namely, security (rising by 4.8%), and freedom of speech (rising by 6.9%).
- Despite the decline from 2014 to 2017, Hong Kong's score in personal freedom is still decent, close to those of neighboring developed countries/territories such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. This is testament to Hong Kong's preservation of high levels of human rights and personal freedoms under 1C2S.
- Hong Kong's Democracy Index rose from 5.85 in 2008 to a peak of 6.50 in 2015, and rank from the 84th to the 67th. This may be due to the increase in the number of directly elected seats in the Legislature. However, the score fell slightly to 6.42 in 2016, and fell further to 6.31 in 2017. Hong Kong's scores were lower than those of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, but was close to that of Singapore. Hong Kong's mediocre ranking is expected given that the Chief Executive is not elected by universal suffrage.

(3) 指數B —「自由民主指數」

指數B為三項指數的平均分，分別為卡托研究所及菲沙研究所編制的「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」和經濟學人智庫編制的「民主指數」。香港在經濟自由方面一直名列世界第一，在個人自由方面也名列前茅。

最新發表的「經濟自由指數」和「個人自由指數」只反映2015年的數據。我們參照卡托研究所及菲沙研究所的計算方法，在第二份報告將兩項指數更新至2016年，在本報告則進一步更新至2017年。香港的「個人自由指數」從2008年攀升至2014年的高峰，隨後回落。「民主指數」從2008年攀升至2015年的高峰，隨後同樣回落。鑑於國際社會對香港近期的政治事件反應負面，這些指數下降並不令人感意外。

- 「個人自由指數」從2008年的8.87攀升至2014年9.08的高峰，再回落到2017年的8.58，自2014年的高峰下降了5.5%。七個子項目中，有四個下降，包括法治（下降16.0%）、宗教自由（下降7.4%）、結社自由（下降22%）和性別認同及關係（下降7.5%）。兩個子項目上升，分別是安全（上升4.8%）和言論及資訊自由（上升6.9%）。
- 儘管2014年至2017年錄得跌幅，香港在個人自由方面的得分仍然良好，接近日本、台灣、南韓及新加坡等發達鄰近地區，證明香港能夠在「一國兩制」下捍衛高水平的人權與個人自由。
- 「民主指數」由2008年的5.85上升至2015年6.5分的頂點，排名由第84位提升至第67位，相信與立法會增加直選議席有關。但此評分在2016年回落至6.42，在2017年再降至6.31。香港的得分低於日本，台灣和韓國，與新加坡相約。由於香港未能普選行政長官，所以香港在「民主指數」中的排名不算突出。

- HK's economic freedom index rose from 9.09 in 2016 to 9.13 in 2017. Index [B], which is the average of the Economic Freedom Index, Personal Freedom Index, and Democracy Index, fell from 8.04 in 2016 to 8.01 in 2017.

- 「經濟自由指數」由2016年的9.09上升至2017的9.13。指數B是「經濟自由指數」、「個人自由指數」和「民主指數」的平均分，由2016年的8.04下降至2017年的8.01。

B 電話調查的熱門議題 Topical questions in the telephone survey

(1) Topical questions asked in all 3 rounds of surveys

- When conflicts arise in 1C2S, a majority believes that the Central Government and Hong Kong are equally responsible, which reflects the need for both parties to reconsider their own obligations and positions.
- The percentage of the public who plans to emigrate due to lack of confidence in 1C2S has fallen from 9.4% in the first round to 7.7% in the second round, but has rebounded back to 9.4% in the 3rd round.
- The public remains deeply divided over whether the current government ought to initiate public consultation for Article 23 legislation. The absence of consensus should be a cause for concern to policy makers.

(1) 三輪調查的共同熱門議題

- 在實踐「一國兩制」過程中，當內地與香港出現矛盾時，最多市民認為兩者的責任「一半半」，反映中央政府與香港雙方均需反思自身責任。
- 因對「一國兩制」缺乏信心而計劃移民的比例由第一輪調查的9.4%下降至第二輪的7.7%，卻在第三輪回升至9.4%。
- 三輪調查的結果均顯示，市民對今屆政府是否需要就《基本法》第二十三條立法進行諮詢的取態兩極化，未有共識，執政者要小心行事。

(2) Topical questions asked in the 2nd and 3rd surveys

- Public opinion on appointment of Carrie Lam as CE is positive: In the 2nd survey, 49.0% indicated that social divisions remained unchanged; 41.0% indicated that they had decreased; only 7.6% indicated that they had increased. The respective figures for the 3rd survey are 46.5%, 42.1%, and 9.1%. In both surveys, those who chose 'decreased' vastly outnumbered those who chose 'increased'.
- In the 2nd survey, the public tend to believe that the enactment of national anthem law in HK has a negative impact on 1C2S: 42.7% indicate negative impact; 34.3% indicate no impact; only 16.3% indicate positive impact. In the 3rd survey, public perception is still negative, though less than before. The respective figures are: 39.1%, 38.1%, and 15.7%.

(2) 第二輪及第三輪調查的共同熱門議題

- 市民對林鄭月娥被委任為行政長官的觀感普遍正面：第二輪調查中，49.0%市民認為社會撕裂沒有改變，41.0%認為「減少」，只有7.6%認為「增加」。第三輪調查的相應數字分別為46.5%、42.1%及9.1%。兩輪調查中，認為「減少」者都大幅多於「增加」者。
- 第二輪調查中，市民對香港訂立《國歌法》有一定擔憂：42.7%市民認為訂立《國歌法》對「一國兩制」有「負面影響」，34.3%認為「冇影響」，只有16.3%認為有「正面影響」。第三輪調查中，雖然認為訂立《國歌法》對「一國兩制」有「負面影響」的市民稍為下降，大眾觀感仍然負面，相應數字是：39.1%、38.1%及15.7%。

(3) Topical questions asked in the 3rd survey (scale of score from 0 to 10):

- The public is not familiar with the 'Guangdong-HK-Macau' Big Bay Area (BBA) (mean score is 3.85). Only 12.2% of the public would consider moving there, another 11.9% may consider moving, but 63.1% would not consider moving there.
- The public agrees that HK should take part in the development of the Area (mean score is 6.3), and in the development of the Belt and Road Initiative (mean score is 6.37).
- The public is mildly positive that the open day of the Central Liaison Office (CLO) held in April can bring the CLO and the public closer (mean score is 5.32).

Despite worries about the freedom of speech and the enactment of the national anthem law, Hong Kong people appear to be very pragmatic in the reaction to recent controversies. In the topical questions of the second survey, they appear to place efficiency of operating the Express Rail Link over political concerns on whether the 'co-location arrangement' would infringe the Basic Law. They also value the effective functioning of the LegCo over lengthy filibustering (see second Report, pp. 35-42).

In this 3rd survey, the HK people have softened their negative view on the enactment of the national anthem law. They are positive that HK should take part in both the development of the BBA and the Belt and Road Initiative. They continue to have a positive view of Carrie Lam, who set aside political controversies on constitutional reforms and focus on improving people's livelihood. This pragmatic approach is consistent with the improvement in the people's evaluation of 1C2S despite the many political shocks and controversies that happened between the surveys.

(3) 第三輪調查的新議題 (0 至 10 分)

- 市民對粵港澳大灣區認識不深 (平均分為 3.85 分)。只有 12.2% 市民「會」考慮前往大灣區發展, 11.9%「或者會」, 但 63.1%「不會」。
- 市民同意香港應該參與粵港澳大灣區的發展 (平均分為 6.3 分) 及參與「一帶一路」的發展 (平均分為 6.37 分)。
- 對於中聯辦於四月舉行的開放日能否拉近與公眾的距離, 市民反應稍微正面 (平均分為 5.32 分)。

雖然香港市民對言論自由及《國歌法》立法有擔憂, 但是他們對近期爭議依然務實。在第二輪調查的熱門議題中, 市民比較重視高鐵「一地兩檢」安排的運作效率, 而非政策會否抵觸《基本法》。他們亦重視立法會的有效運作, 多於無休止的拉布 (詳見第二份報告, 第 35 至 42 頁)。

第三輪調查中, 香港人對制訂《國歌法》的負面看法也有所緩和。他們同意香港應該參與粵港澳大灣區及「一帶一路」倡議的發展。面對閣下政改爭議, 轉而聚焦改善民生的林鄭月娥, 市民繼續抱有正面態度。即使三輪調查之間出現不少政治爭議, 市民的務實態度與他們對「一國兩制」的評價有所改善相當一致。

C 市民對「香港人」及「中國人」的身份認同 Citizen's self-identification as Hongkongers and as Chinese

(1) Double identity as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese'

- On a scale of 0 to 10, the public's self-identifications as 'Hongkongers' and as 'Chinese' have both increased continuously in the last year. From mid-2017 to mid-2018, identity as 'Hongkongers' rose from 7.75 to 8.02, and identity as 'Chinese' rose slightly from 6.63 to 6.78. The increase in identity as 'Hongkongers' is statistically significant.
- An increasing majority of the public (55.9%, 56.1%, and 57.5% respectively in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd rounds) have relatively strong identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', with both identity scores greater than 5.
- In all 3 rounds of surveys, there is a significant positive correlation between the two identities -- the more strongly one is identified with 'Hongkonger', the more strongly one is identified with 'Chinese'; the converse also holds. This is a favourable condition for the implementation of 1C2S.
- As double identity as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' is the norm in Hong Kong, results of traditional surveys that compel interviewees to choose between two identities ('Hongkonger' and 'Chinese') or choose one among four identities ('Hongkonger', 'Hong Kong Chinese', 'Chinese Hongkonger', and 'Chinese') are misleading as they implicitly put the 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' identity as mutually exclusive. Traditional surveys cannot reveal a situation in which the strength of both identities has increased, as is the case in the last year.

(1) 對「香港人」和「中國人」的雙重身份認同

- 以10分為滿分，市民對「香港人」及「中國人」的身份認同在過去一年持續上升。從2017年中至2018年中，「香港人」身份認同由7.75分上升至8.02分，「中國人」身份認同由6.63分上升至6.78分。「香港人」身份認同的增幅達統計上的顯著水平。
- 愈來愈大部分市民對「香港人」及「中國人」身份均有較高認同（第一輪、第二輪及第三輪分別為55.9%、56.1%及57.5%），對兩種身份的身份認同皆高於中位數5分。
- 三輪調查中，市民對「香港人」和「中國人」的認同均呈現統計上顯著的正相關，即愈認同「香港人」身份的市民亦愈認同「中國人」的身份，反之亦然。市民對「香港人」和「中國人」的認同相輔相成，是落實「一國兩制」的有利條件。
- 由於多數香港人擁有「香港人」和「中國人」的雙重身份認同，傳統民調限制受訪者在兩個身分（「香港人」和「中國人」），或者四個身分（「香港人」、「中國的香港人」、「香港的中國人」和「中國人」）之間作出選擇容易出現偏頗。這是因為它們隱然把「香港人」和「中國人」的身份對立，未能反映兩種身份認同在過去一年皆有所加強。



(2) Identity as Chinese across different groups

- In all 3 surveys, all age groups except Young Adults (18 years to 29 years old), and also all groups by educational background (from primary level to graduate school), have relatively strong identity as 'Chinese', with ratings above the median.
- Pro-establishment supporters and Moderates strongly and increasingly identify themselves as 'Chinese'. The increase in the strength of the identification of Pro-establishment supporters is statistically significant.
- Non-establishment supporters do not identify themselves strongly as 'Chinese'. The strength of their identity has fallen and the decline is also statistically significant. Among Non-establishment supporters, the strength of identification of Democrats is slightly above the median, but the strength of their identification has fallen. The 'Others' group (mostly localists/self-determinists) has relatively weak identity as 'Chinese'. The strength of their identification has fallen continuously over the 3 surveys, and the decline is statistically significant. The self-identity as 'Chinese' of Non-establishment supporters (25.2% of our sample in the 3rd survey) is moving further away from that of the majority. This is a cause for concern.
- The identity of Young Adults (18 to 29 years old) as 'Chinese' continues to hover around the median (score of 4). Policy makers need to work hard to cultivate national identity among Young Adults.

(2) 不同組別對中國人的身份認同

- 三輪調查中，除了青年（18歲至29歲）外，所有年齡組別及所有教育程度（由小學程度至研究院）的受訪者對「中國人」身份均有較強認同，評分均高於中位數。
- 建制派與中間派強烈認同「中國人」身份。建制派認同感的增幅達統計上的顯著水平。
- 非建制派的「中國人」身份認同不強，認同感不斷下降，跌幅達統計上的顯著水平。民主派對「中國人」身份認同的評分雖然稍高於中位數，但其認同感整體上有所減弱。「其他非建制派」（主要是本土派及自決派）對「中國人」身份認同較弱，其認同感在三輪調查中持續下降，跌幅達統計上的顯著水平。非建制派（佔第三輪調查受訪者的25.2%）的「中國人」身份認同與大眾愈來愈偏離，情況令人擔憂。
- 青年（18至29歲）的「中國人」身份認同繼續徘徊於中位數（5分）。決策者須努力培育青年的國民身份認同。



D 「一國兩制」輿情指數 1C2S MMI (Mass Media Index)

- By surveying over 128,000 news articles and 64 million words from 20 local daily newspapers, 1C2S MMI monitors how '1C2S' is perceived in the mass media. The MMI complements our 1C2S Index as media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion.
- 「一國兩制」輿情指數從20家本地報章搜集128,000多篇報導，逾6,400萬字，藉此透視大眾傳媒對「一國兩制」的感受及意見。媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素，故此，「一國兩制」輿情指數有補充我們的「一國兩制」指數不足之處的功能。
- In the longer run, subject to resource availability, the MMI opens up many opportunities of further research in public opinion formation. The MMI can be compiled at high frequency intervals (e.g. monthly) as it is not subject to the long time lags of ordinary surveys. It is also possible to investigate the effect of specific significant events (e.g., co-location arrangement for the Express Rail link) on media sentiment, or to compare sentiments in the local and overseas media.
- 長遠而言，如資源許可，輿情指數能為民意形成開拓更多研究機會。輿情指數能以高頻率編製（如每月），因為它不受以調查方式收集民意時所產生的滯後影響。它亦可以調查特定重大事件（例如高鐵「一地兩檢」安排）對媒體情緒的影響，或比較本地及海外媒體的情緒。



- The base month of 1C2S is set at July 2017, the 20th anniversary of the HKSAR. We, however, compiled the MMI from April 1998 to June 2018. The overall trend of MMI is compared to two well-known opinion polls on public's views towards 1C2S, namely, the polls of RTHK and HKU Public Opinion Programme. The trend of the MMI is similar to that of the two polls: Rising in the early 2000's to a peak around 2007, then falling to a trough around 2014-16 with Occupy Central and the civil unrest in Mongkok, then recovering thereafter.
- The recent trend of 1C2S MMI correlates quite closely with significant events. In particular, it dropped sharply by over 20 points from December 2016 to June 2017 when the 'Causeway Bay Bookstore' incident and the civil unrest in Mongkok aroused widespread concern. However, 1C2S MMI bottomed out in July 2016, and has risen strongly since December 2016, when CY Leung declared that he would not run for a second term. This rise was further boosted in 2017 when Carrie Lam was elected CE. Despite there were controversies such as the passage of the co-location bill in the LegCo and the trial of the civil unrest in Mongkok under Carrie Lam's first year of administration, 1C2S MMI rose from the nadir of 73 points in July 2016 to 99 points in June 2018.
- 與情指數的基數月份定於2017年7月，即香港特區成立二十周年。數值由1998年4月開始至2018年6月。我們將「一國兩制」與情指數的整體趨勢與兩項常用的民調進行比較，即香港電台和香港大學民意研究計劃就市民對「一國兩制」看法的調查。「一國兩制」與情指數的趨勢與兩項民意調查相似：2000年初上升至2007年左右的高峰，然後在2014至2016年，「佔領中環」及「旺角騷亂」期間跌至低谷，隨後復蘇。
- 「一國兩制」與情指數的趨勢與近期的重大事件息息相關，尤其是2016年12月至2017年6月，「銅鑼灣書店」事件和「旺角騷亂」引起廣泛關注，使指數大幅下跌超過20點。然而，「一國兩制」與情指數自2016年7月起反彈。梁振英在2016年12月宣布放棄連任後，指數有明顯升幅。2017年，林鄭月娥當選為行政長官時，升勢更進一步提升。林鄭的首年施政期間，雖然面對「一地兩檢」條例及「旺角騷亂」案件等爭議，指數仍從2016年7月的73點上升至2018年6月的99點。

E 林鄭月娥施政下的去激進化與溫和政治 De-radicalization and rise of moderation under Carrie Lam's administration

Our 3 surveys cover the first year of Carrie Lam's administration and the results can be used to evaluate her performance and the general political sentiment in Hong Kong under her administration. As mentioned above, the public believes that societal division has decreased. Moreover, Hong Kong people support the major government initiatives in development, including the co-location arrangement for the Express Rail Link, and the development of the BBA as well as the BRI. Both public's evaluation and newspaper sentiment of 1C2S have improved.

Furthermore, in our surveys, the proportion of Moderates has increased and the proportion of the 'Non-establishment' supporters have decreased over the last year. Figure 5A shows the change in the proportions of different groups in terms of political inclination, and Figure 5B shows the change in the proportions of different types of Non-establishment supporters in the population.

三輪調查涵蓋林鄭月娥的首年施政，結果能用作評估她的表現和她執政下香港普遍的政治情緒。如前文所述，市民相信社會撕裂經已減輕。此外，香港人普遍支持由政府提出的主要發展計劃，包括高鐵一地兩檢安排、粵港澳大灣區和「一帶一路」倡議。有關「一國兩制」的公眾評價和新聞情緒皆有改善。

再者，中間派在調查中的比例有所增加，非建制派支持者的比例則較去年減少。圖五A顯示不同政治傾向佔人口的比例，圖五B則顯示不同類別的非建制派佔人口之比例。

圖五A : 三輪調查中按政治傾向的人口構成 (%)

Figure 5A : Composition of population by political inclination in 3 surveys (%)




Figure 5A shows that Moderates have been the largest group, and its proportion of the population has risen continuously from 58.4% in mid-2017 to 61.9% in mid-2018. The proportion of Non-establishment supporters has declined continuously from 28.3% to 25.2%, while the proportion of Pro-establishment supporters has risen slightly from 10.0% to 10.5%. Such trends indicate de-radicalization and the rise of moderation in the first year of Carrie Lam's administration. However, as we only have observations over three points in time, we cannot determine if the above trends are statistically significant. We need to view the results as tentative rather than definitive.

圖五A顯示中間派屬最大組別，而它的比例由2017年中的58.4%持續上升至2018年中的61.9%。同期，非建制派的比例由28.3%持續下降至25.2%，而建制派的比例則由10.0%輕微上升至10.5%。以上趨勢明確顯示去激進化與溫和政治在林鄭月娥首年施政下逐漸出現。不過因為我們只有三個日子的數據，不能斷定以上的趨勢在統計上是否達到顯著水平，以上的只能視為初步趨勢而非確定結果。

圖五B : 三輪調查中非建制派的人口構成 (%)

Figure 5B : Composition of population of Non-establishment supporters in 3 surveys (%)




Figure 5B shows that, within Non-establishment supporters, the proportions of Democrats and 'Others' fell from 21.0% to 18.6%, and from 7.2% to 6.5% respectively. The proportion of Moderates in the population has risen by 3.5 percentage points, gaining 212,000 supporters, and that of Non-establishment supporters has fallen by 3.1 percentage points, losing 188,000 people. It appears that the Non-establishment group is gradually and consistently losing their supporters to the Moderates. This appears to be in line with recent by-election results and may be a reason why the general perception is that societal division is improving.

圖五B顯示非建制派當中，「民主派」及「其他非建制派」的比例分別由21.0%降至18.6%，以及由7.2%降至6.5%。中間派的比例上升3.5個百分點（增加人數達21萬2千人），與此同時，非建制派的比例下降3.1個百分點（流失人數達18萬8千人），非建制派支持者有逐漸轉投中間派的跡象，與最近的補選結果相符，也可能是市民認為社會撕裂改善的原因。

In our samples, the proportions of Non-establishment supporters have always been less than 30%. This appears to be much less than the 54% of votes that Non-establishment candidates got in the 2016 LegCo election. However, a substantial portion of Hong Kong adults are not registered voters or may not vote even if they are registered. In the 2016 LegCo election, there were around 4.8 million eligible voters, of whom only 3.8 million were registered. Only 2.2 million of registered voters voted, and Non-establishment candidates got 1.19 million votes, which were less than 25% of all eligible voters and less than 20% of the adult population (excluding foreign domestic helpers). People who do not bother to vote are much more likely to be Moderates than Non-establishment supporters. As Non-establishment supporters are more likely to vote and voice their opinions, political sentiments in Hong Kong are generally more likely to be shaped or influenced by them. In this respect, much of the perceived political sentiment can be said to be misleading.

在我們的調查樣本中，非建制派的比例一直少於30%，似乎比2016立法會選舉中非建制派候選人所獲得的54%選票少得多。然而，不少香港成年人並非登記選民，或者已登記卻沒有投票。在2016立法會選舉中，香港有大約480萬合資格選民，其中登記選民只有380萬，之中只有220萬登記選民投票。非建制派候選人在該次選舉取得119萬票，數量少於全部合資格選民的25%，更少於成年人口（外來家庭傭工除外）的20%。不熱衷投票的市民有較大可能屬於中間派，而不是非建制派。因為非建制派較積極投票及發聲，香港的政治情緒容易受到他們影響。有鑑於此，不少政治情緒可能具誤導性。

F

林鄭月娥首年施政：民情與輿情

First year of Carrie Lam's administration: Public Sentiment and Mass Media Sentiment

Although our three surveys show a trend of de-radicalization and rise of moderation in the first year of Carrie Lam's administration, they only cover one year and cannot reflect developments in previous years. Our MMI can reflect developments in the past as it spans 20 years and it shows that media sentiment on 1C2S rose strongly from a low of 73 points in mid-2016 to 99 points in mid-2018. However, the scope of the MMI is somewhat narrow as it only covers sentiments of newspapers on 1C2S instead of the sentiments of the public.

While our Index and MMI focused primarily on public's evaluations on 1C2S, the Public Sentiment Index (PSI) of HKUPOP focused generally on public's evaluations of the political, social, and economic environment. It also covers a substantial time span, from 1992 to mid-2018, providing a general background for us to interpret changes in the Index and the MMI.

我們的三輪調查顯示，林鄭月娥施政首年，逐漸出現去激進化和溫和政治。不過三輪調查只涵蓋一年時間，不能追溯往年的發展。我們的「一國兩制」輿情指數涵蓋過去20年，能夠反映往年的發展：報章對「一國兩制」的情緒從2016年年中73點的低點上漲至2018年年中的99點。然而，輿情指數的覆蓋面有其不足，因為它只檢視報章對「一國兩制」的情緒，而不是大眾的情緒。

我們的主指數及輿情指數聚焦公眾對「一國兩制」的評價，而港大民研的「民情指數」則反映公眾對政治、社會和經濟環境的概括評價。「民情指數」覆蓋時期較長（1992年至2018年中），能勾畫香港社會的概括狀況，協助我們解讀主指數及輿情指數的變化。

In the words of HKUPOP, the PSI “aims at quantifying Hong Kong people’s sentiments, in order to explain and predict the likelihood of collective behaviour. PSI comprises 2 components: one being Government Appraisal (GA) Score and the other being Society Appraisal (SA) Score. GA refers to peoples’ appraisal of society’s governance while SA refers to peoples’ appraisal of the social environment. Both GA and SA scores are compiled from a variety of opinion survey figures. All PSI, GA and SA scores range between 0 to 200, with 100 meaning normal”

根據港大民研，「民情指數」旨在「量化香港市民對香港社會的情緒反應，以解釋及預視社會出現集體行動的可能性。『民情指數』包涵了『政通』和『人和』兩個概念，分別以『政評數值（GA）』和『社評數值（SA）』顯示。『政評數值（GA）』泛指市民對整體政府管治的表現評價，而『社評數值（SA）』則泛指市民對整體社會狀況的評價，由多項民意數字組合而成。指數本身及兩項數值均以0至200顯示，100代表正常」。

(<https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release980.html>)

圖六：港大民研「民情指數」（按月）
Figure 6：Monthly PSI scores (HKUPOP)




Figure 6 shows monthly PSI scores in the past seven years, going from mid-2011 to mid-2018, covering administrations of three CE's, namely, the last year of Donald Tsang's administration, the 5 years of C.Y. Leung's administration, and the first year of Carrie Lam's administration. Before Carrie's Lam's administration, the PSI score was consistently way below 100, but it jumped above 100 after Carrie Lam became CE.

圖六顯示過去七年間每月的「民情指數」。從2011年中到2018年中，涵蓋三位行政長官的任期，即曾蔭權的最後一年，梁振英的五年，及林鄭月娥的第一年。在林鄭月娥上台前，「民情指數」一直低於100，林鄭月娥上任後始超越100。

To identify the underlying trend of PSI scores, we compute 3 linear trends that best fit the scores under the 3 administrations with the Least Squares Method. The PSI scores of the last year of Donald Tsang's administration declined from 81 points to 75 points, and scores of the first year of CY Leung's administration remained around that level. Statistical test (Chow test) shows that there was no structural break in the transition from Donald Tsang to C.Y. Leung as the scores before and after the change of CE were similar.

The trend under CY Leung was decreasing, and the decline was statistically significant. The score fell from 89, the first month of his administration, to 66 in June 2017, the last month of his administration; but it soared to 106 in July 2017, the first month of Carrie Lam's administration. The structural break in the transition from CY Leung to Carrie Lam was statistically highly significant. In the first year of Carrie Lam's administration, the PSI fluctuated from a low of 102 to a high of 116; it stood at 108 in June 2017, slightly higher than the score of 106 a year before. There is no statistically significant change in PSI in the first year of her administration.

為剖析「民情指數」得分的根本趨勢，我們採用最小二乘法計算出最匹配三任特首得分的三組線性趨勢。曾蔭權最後一年任期的得分由81跌至75，梁振英第一年的得分停留在相約水平。統計測試（鄒氏檢驗）顯示，由於曾蔭權與梁振英交接前後的「民情指數」得分相近，所以特首換人沒有帶來結構性變化。

梁振英任期內「民情指數」的趨勢下降，達統計上的顯著水平。得分從他施政第一個月的89降至2017年6月，即最後一個月的66。林鄭月娥上任的第一個月，得分飆升至106。梁振英至林鄭月娥的交接期出現結構性變化，達統計上非常顯著的水平。林鄭月娥首年施政期間，「民情指數」得分在102的低點及116的高點之間上落。2017年6月的得分為108，稍高於一年前的106，得分沒有統計上的顯著變化。

圖七：民主思路「一國兩制」輿情指數（按月）
Figure 7: Monthly 1C2S MMI scores (Path of Democracy)






Figure 7 shows the time trends of MMI (6 month moving average scores). As in the case of PSI, we compute 3 linear trends that best fit the MMI scores under the 3 administrations with the Least Squares Method. Statistical tests reveal that there was no structural break in the transition from Donald Tsang to CY Leung, but the structural break in the transition from CY Leung to Carrie Lam was statistically highly significant.

The time trend of MMI under Donald Tsang was declining. The time trend under CY Leung appeared to be rising, though the level of scores was low. However, the rise of the trend under CY Leung was mainly due to the jump in MMI when CY Leung announced that he would not run for another term in December 2016. The MMI jumped from 80 in November 2016 to 100 in June 2017 as the public knew that there would be a change of CE. If we exclude the MMI scores after November 2016, the trend under CY Leung would be horizontal instead of rising. The trend under Carrie Lam was slightly upwards, but the rise was not statistically significant.

To summarize, our statistical analyses indicate that the dramatic jumps in the PSI and MMI scores in the transition from CY Leung to Carrie Lam reflected structural breaks in the data that were statistically highly significant. This again underlines our finding that the political and social environment has shifted significantly towards de-radicalization and moderation under Carrie Lam.

圖七顯示輿情指數（6個月平均數）的趨勢。與分析「民情指數」一樣，我們採用最小二乘法計算出最匹配三任特首得分的三組線性趨勢。統計測試顯示，從曾蔭權到梁振英的交接沒有結構性變化，而從梁振英到林鄭月娥的交接卻出現結構性變化，變化達統計上非常顯著的水平。

曾蔭權任期內輿情指數的趨勢下降，而梁振英任期內的得分雖然處於低水平，但其趨勢似乎上升。不過此升幅主要源自2016年12月，梁振英宣布放棄競逐連任而來。公眾得悉特首將會換人後，輿情指數由2016年11月的80點躍升至2017年6月的100點。如果我們剔除2016年11月以後的得分，梁振英得分的趨勢變成水平而非上升。林鄭月娥得分的趨勢輕微上升，但漲幅並未達統計上的顯著水平。

我們的統計分析顯示，從梁振英到林鄭月娥的交接期間，「民情指數」與輿情指數得分急升，反映統計上非常顯著的結構性變化，再一次印證在林鄭月娥施政下，政治與社會環境顯著走向去激進化與溫和的方向。



G 非建制派支持者的不滿情緒 Disaffection of Non-establishment supporters

Our surveys indicate that Non-establishment supporters in HK appear to be increasingly alienated. As mentioned above, their evaluations of 1C2S have declined, contrary to the trend of the general population. Their identity as 'Chinese' has fallen, again contrary to the trend of the general population. As will be detailed later, their intention to migrate overseas on the other hand, is much higher than that of the general population. In fact, the proportion of them who plan to migrate rose substantially from 19.0% in mid-2017 to 21.9% in late 2017 and rose further to 25.2% in mid-2018.

Though Non-establishment supporters are in the minority, their numbers are substantial. Moreover, they command more than half of the votes in most elections and as pointed out above are more influential in shaping public opinion. Their increasing disaffection is a serious social and political problem that the Central government and the HKSAR government have to tackle.

我們的調查顯示非建制派似乎愈來愈不滿現狀。如前文所述，他們對「一國兩制」評價下降，跟普羅大眾的趨勢相反。他們對「中國人」的身份認同也下降，同樣跟大眾趨勢相反。他們比一般市民更希望移民海外：非建制派希望移民的比例由2017年中的19.0%大幅升至2017年底的21.9%，再進一步上升至2018年中的25.2%，詳見下文。

雖然非建制派屬少數，但為數也可觀。此外，他們在大部分選舉得到多於一半的選票，對民意有較大影響力。他們的不滿持續升溫，實屬中央政府及特區政府需要解決的嚴重社會及政治問題。

H 「一國兩制」評價的分歧：香港市民與國際智庫

Divergence in evaluations of 1C2S: HK public vs. international think tanks

Both our survey and the international indices have unique features; whilst their findings are certainly different, there nonetheless exist certain similarities. First, both the Hong Kong public and international think tanks regard HK as a free society. HK's Human Freedom Index (average of Economic Freedom and Personal Freedom) has been among the highest in the world. The HK public also give relatively high scores to 'freedom of speech' and 'original way of life has remained unchanged' (It is widely recognized that HK's 'original ways of life' has been characterized by a high degree of freedom). Second, both international think tanks and the HK public give relatively low scores to the progress of democratization.

As to differences, international think tanks tend to give markedly higher scores to HK than that of the public. However, the evaluations of the HK public have improved while the evaluations of international think tanks have deteriorated.

The higher level of scores of international think tanks may be explained by the aggregative and universal nature of international indices: their measurements encompass a large number of developing countries and regions, and given HK's highly developed status, its relative placing in comparison against these developing states is high. Furthermore, given the Hong Kong public's relatively high expectations of 1C2S, the public may be more demanding in their assessment in the public surveys. Hong Kong people's starting point is a system with a sophisticated legal system that enshrines both rule of law and personal freedoms, and gradual democratization that had already been in progress prior to the handover. These in turn induced greater expectations amongst the public with respect to self-governance and human rights enshrined by the Basic Law.

我們的民調與國際指數各有特點，雖然大異其趣，但兩者的結果也有相同之處。第一，香港市民與國際智庫均視香港為自由社會。香港的「人類自由指數」（「個人自由指數」與「經濟自由指數」的平均）評分居世界前列，香港市民對「言論自由」及「維持原有生活方式」的評分也較高（高度自由向來被視為香港「原有生活方式」的特點）。第二，香港市民與國際指數對民主發展的評分均較低。

至於不同之處，是國際指數對香港的評分整體比民調較高，不過香港市民對「一國兩制」的評價有所改善，國際智庫的評分卻趨向負面。

國際指數評分較高，相信是由於其整體性及廣泛性：當中涵蓋大量發展中國家及地區，而香港已屬發達地區之列，社會經濟發展比其他國家及地區領先一定水平，所以得分會處於較高的區間。另外，因為市民心目中對「一國兩制」有較高要求，所以可能在民調上給予比較嚴格的評分。香港在回歸前已有成熟的法治基礎和人身自由，政制亦逐步民主化，所以市民對基本法承諾的高度自治和保障人權及自由有更高期望。

Though the level of scores of international think tanks is higher than that of the HK public, the evaluations of 1C2S of the HK public have improved while the evaluations of international think tanks have deteriorated. It appears that there are at least three reasons for the divergence. First, the Hong Kong public places a lot of weight on the change of CE, which has ushered in a trend of de-radicalization. International think tanks have mostly neglected the change. Second, the attitude of the West towards China has been shifting from that of engagement to confrontation as the West increasingly fears that its supremacy would be challenged by the rise of China. The evaluations of western think tanks on 1C2S cannot be entirely free from the influence of the shift in the attitude of the West towards China. Naturally, Hong Kong becomes an easy target in this confrontation. Third, traditionally, both the SAR Government and the Central Government have neglected defense of the OCTS in the western mass media which leads to a situation that media attacks by influential opinion leaders in the West are often left undefended or unexplained.

While the evaluations of the western think tanks on 1C2S may not be free of ideological biases, it would be a mistake to write off their evaluations as mere propaganda. Their evaluations may contain biases, but may also reflect genuine weaknesses in the implementation of 1C2S. Furthermore, their effect on the international investor cannot be underestimated. Under 1C2S, Hong Kong is China's most open and international city; it is also China's bridge to the world. We need to take the evaluations of western think tanks seriously to reflect on possible shortcomings in the implementation of 1C2S.

This divergence in evaluations underlines the importance of including the opinions of both the Hong Kong public and international think tanks in a balanced index of 1C2S.

雖然國際指數對香港評分較高，但是香港市民對「一國兩制」的評價正上升，而國際智庫的評分卻下跌，背後有三個可能性。首先，香港市民對於行政長官的人選變動非常重視，帶來去激進化的趨勢，而國際智庫大都忽略了這個轉變。其次，西方國家愈來愈擔心中國崛起將會挑戰其優勢，所以對中國的態度由合作轉向對抗。西方智庫對「一國兩制」的評價不能完全擺脫此態度轉變的影響，而香港首當其衝成為戰靶。第三，傳統以來，中央政府和特區政府均忽視透過西方大眾傳媒捍衛「一國兩制」，往往未能適時駁斥或解釋有影響力的意見領袖在西方媒體的批評。

儘管西方智庫對「一國兩制」的評價可能難以擺脫意識形態上的偏見，但僅僅視之為政治宣傳而漠視其評價則大錯特錯。它們的評價可能帶有偏見，但也可能反映實踐「一國兩制」中的真正弱點。此外，它們對國際投資者的影響不容低估。在「一國兩制」下，香港是中國最開放與國際化的城市，也是中國通往世界的橋樑。我們需要認真對待西方智庫的評估，以反思實踐「一國兩制」中可能存在的不足。


這種分歧亦突顯了編製一個均衡的「一國兩制」指標需要同時納入香港市民和國際智庫的意見。

「一國兩制」概況：民意調查及指數編制 報告三 第二部分：主報告

- I. 「一國兩制」概況：電話民調
- II. 國際自由民主指數
- III. 「一國兩制」輿情指數
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“One Country Two Systems” Overview : Public Survey and Index Construction Third Report Part II: Main Report

- I. 1C2S overview: Telephone survey
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- IV. Methodological Note



I. 「一國兩制」概況：電話民調

主報告 Main Report



I. 1C2S Overview: Telephone survey

In order to fully access the public's assessment of 1C2S, we commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct a telephone survey from May 23 to June 2 in 2018. 1,004 individuals were successfully and randomly sampled, all aged 18 or above; all of them spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin (the sampling error is $\pm 3.09\%$ within a 95% confidence level); the response rate was 37.2%, satisfying both statistical and scientific standards. For a more extensive report on the survey results, please see Appendix, which can be found on the homepage of the Path of Democracy (<http://pathofdemocracy.hk/>).

Rating scales:

The survey employed 1 to 7 as the rating scale in the data collection process, with 4 as the median; this scale is commonly adopted for most psychological assessments. During the actual surveying process, this scale was used instead of a 0 to 10 scale as the latter is deemed too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents to choose from. For statistical analysis, we continue to employ the 1 to 7 scale. However, to better conform to existing indices – which tend to be expressed on a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median) – we converted the results mathematically into the 0 to 10 scale for index compilation purposes.

Summary of key survey findings:

為了解市民對「一國兩制」的評價，我們委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所於2018年5月23日至6月2日進行電話調查，以隨機抽樣方式訪問了1,004名18歲以上操粵語或普通話的市民（在95%置信水平下，抽樣誤差為 $\pm 3.09\%$ ），回應率為37.2%，符合統計學及科學化的調查標準。詳細的調查結果（附錄）已上載至民主思路網站 <http://pathofdemocracy.hk/>。

評分尺度：

調查的數據收集過程按1至7分為評分尺度，以4分為中位數，是心理學調查常用的尺度。在實際調查過程，我們不採用0至10分的尺度，因為分類太細緻，市民難以選擇。統計分析上，我們繼續採用1至7分的尺度。不過，由於現有指數多以0至10分呈現（5分為中位數），是以我們在編制指數時，利用數學方法將調查結果由1至7分的尺度轉換成為0至10分的尺度。

調查結果摘要：

1

市民的「香港人」及「中國人」身份認同（Q12、Q13）

Public's identification as 'Hongkongers' and as 'Chinese' (Questions 12 & 13)

We respectively surveyed how citizens identify themselves, whether as 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese', or both (Table 1). The public identified themselves strongly as 'Hongkongers' as well as 'Chinese'. From the 1st round to the 3rd round, the public's strength of identification as 'Hongkongers' rose from 5.65 to 5.81 on the 1 to 7 scale (and therefore from 7.75 to 8.02 on the 0 to 10 scale). In the same period, the public's strength of identification as 'Chinese' rose from 4.96 to 5.07 on the 1 to 7 scale (and therefore from 6.63 to 6.78 on the 0 to 10 scale).

我們分別詢問市民對「香港人」及「中國人」身份認同程度：見表一。市民對「香港人」及「中國人」身份均有較高認同。從第一輪至第三輪調查，按1分至7分的尺度，市民的「香港人」身份認同由5.65分上升至5.81分（按0分至10分的尺度即由7.75分上升至8.02分）。同期，按1分至7分的尺度，市民的「中國人」身份認同由4.96分上升至5.07分（按0分至10分的尺度即由6.63分上升至6.78分）。

表一：市民的「香港人」及「中國人」身份認同：比較三輪調查

Table 1: Public's identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' (Comparison of 3 Rounds of Survey)

	平均分 Average (1-7)			平均分 Average (0-10)		
	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6
「我係香港人」 'I am a Hongkonger'	5.65	5.76	5.81	7.75	7.93	8.02
「我係中國人」 'I am a Chinese'	4.96	5.00	5.07	6.63	6.71	6.78

The extent to which the public identified themselves as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' can be better denoted by a scatter plot. The x-axis in Figure 8 constitutes the strength of self-identification as a Hongkonger; the y-axis, self-identification as Chinese. On the 1 to 7 scale, the median is 4, which indicates a moderate level of identification. Ratings that are higher than 4 indicate relatively strong identification; ratings that are lower than 4 indicate relatively weak identification. Figure 8 shows the scatter plot of the 3rd round survey. The largest group of citizens identify themselves very strongly as both Hongkongers and Chinese, with 233 individuals selecting 7 for both categories (23.8% of the total).

市民對「香港人」及「中國人」的認同程度可以利用散佈圖 (scatter plot) 顯示。圖八的橫軸為對「香港人」的認同程度，縱軸為對「中國人」的認同程度。按1至7分的尺度，4分為中位數，表示中等認同。高於4分代表較高認同，低於4分代表較低認同。圖六為第三輪調查的散佈圖，對「香港人」及「中國人」身份均擁有高度認同的組別人數最多，共233人兩者均選擇最高的7分（佔總數23.8%）。

圖八：第三次調查中市民的身份認同散佈圖（有效樣本：981）

Figure 8: Scatter plot for public's identification in the 3rd survey (valid sample: 981)




Figure 8 clearly depicts that most Hong Kong citizens are cognizant of their double identities as both Hongkongers and Chinese. The pattern of the scatter plots of the 1st and 2nd surveys (reported in previous reports) are very similar to that of the 3rd. The percentage of individuals in the 3 rounds that hold relatively strong levels of identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' (both scores higher than 4) has risen from 55.9% in the 1st round to 56.1% in the second round, and has risen further to 57.5% in the 3rd round.


Identification as Chinese may not be the same as 'devotion to China', but identification as both Chinese and Hongkongers is a pre-requisite for 'devotion to China and Hong Kong'. The fact that a majority of Hong Kong people identify themselves as both 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' provides a strong basis for implementation of 1C2S.

圖八清楚顯示大部份香港市民同時認同自己擁有「香港人」及「中國人」的雙重身分。第一輪及第二輪調查的結果（見早前報告）與第三輪調查非常相似。對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身分均擁有較高認同（兩者皆高於4分）的市民由第一輪調查的55.9%上升至第二輪調查的56.1%，再上升至第三輪調查的57.5%。

認同「中國人」身份未必等於「愛國」，不過同時認同「中國人」及「香港人」兩種身份卻是「愛國愛港」的先決條件。香港大部份市民均同時認同「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份，是落實「一國兩制」的有利條件。

圖九：市民的身份認同等級相關係數（有效樣本：981）

Figure 9: Rank correlation of public's identification [valid sample: 981]



Statistical analysis yields the observation that there exists a significant positive correlation between identification as a Hongkonger and identification as Chinese, suggesting that the more strongly one identifies with Hong Kong, the more strongly one also identifies with China (see Figure 9). The converse also holds. The rank correlation coefficient is 0.174 and is statistically very significant at the 99.9% confidence level, which is similar to the 1st and 2nd surveys where the corresponding coefficients were 0.132 and 0.184 respectively and were also highly significant. The finding that the two identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' are mutually reinforcing each other and again provides a strong basis for the implementation of 1C2S.

統計分析發現市民的「香港人」及「中國人」身份認同呈現顯著的正相關，即愈認同「香港人」身份的市民亦愈認同「中國人」身份（見圖九），反之亦然。等級相關係數（rank correlation coefficient）為0.174，統計上非常顯著，達到 99% 的置信水平。與第一輪及第二輪調查相似，該系數分別為0.132及0.184，同樣非常顯著。結果證實「香港人」及「中國人」身份認同相輔相成，也是落實「一國兩制」的有利條件。

2

問卷設計：比較其他調查

Survey design: Comparison with other public surveys

In HK, there are two types of questionnaire design to track the self-identity of the public, the 'dominant identity' design and the 'multiple identity' design. The 'dominant identity' design classifies identity into two categories, namely 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese', or four categories, adding two mixed identities ('Hong Kong Chinese' and 'Chinese Hongkonger') to the 'Hongkonger', and 'Chinese' identities. Interviewees are compelled to choose one identity among the two, or one identity among the four. The two-category option explicitly assumes that the 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' identities are mutually exclusive: the more strongly one identifies himself as 'Hongkonger', the less strongly one identifies himself as 'Chinese' (and vice versa). Even though the four-category option admits mixed identities ('Hong Kong Chinese' and 'Chinese Hongkonger'), it still treats different identities as mutually exclusive one or the other: If proportionally more people choose one category, the proportions of the other categories must go down. The 'dominant identity' design cannot allow for a situation in which the public's self-identification with 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' both strengthens (or both weakens) simultaneously.

Our survey adopts the 'multiple identity' design while the majority of other surveys in HK adopt the 'dominant identity' design. One exception is the HKU Public Opinion Programme (HKUPOP) survey on self-identity, which adopts both the 'dominant identity' and 'multiple identity' designs. Though the HKUPOP survey reports the results of both designs, the HK media focuses its attention on the 'dominant identity' design as it is more popular in public surveys.

Our research and analysis suggest that the 'multiple identity' design is more appropriate for two reasons. First, multiple identity is the norm in HK. An increasing majority of HK citizens identify themselves strongly as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' – to ask that citizens choose one amongst the four categories (or one amongst the two categories) can easily lead to bias. Second, in our 3 rounds of surveys, the public's self-identification with 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' has strengthened simultaneously – a fact that cannot be reflected in the 'dominant identity' design.

在香港，調查市民的身份認同有兩種問卷設計：「主要身份」及「多元身份」設計。

「主要身份」將身份認同歸類為「香港人」及「中國人」兩種，或者基於「香港人」及「中國人」再加入兩種混合身份（「香港的中國人」及「中國的香港人」）共四種。受訪者被要求從這兩種或四種身份中選擇一種。二擇其一的問卷設計隱然假設「香港人」及「中國人」身份對立：如果認同「香港人」的比例增加，認同「中國人」的比例必定減少（反之亦然）。雖然四擇其一的問卷接受混合身份（「香港的中國人」及「中國的香港人」），但各種身份仍然對立：如果認同其中一種身份的比例增加，認同其他身份的比例必定減少。採用「主要身份」的調查無法反映市民可能對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身分認同同時加強（或同時減弱）。

我們的調查採用「多元身份」的問卷設計，而香港其他調查多數採用「主要身份」設計。其中例外是香港大學民意研究計劃（港大民研）的身份認同調查，同時採用「主要身份」及「多元身份」兩種問卷設計。雖然港大民研會公佈兩種結果，但是由於「主要身份」為多數調查所採用，所以香港傳媒側重報道「主要身份」的結果。

我們的調查及分析顯示「多元身份」是更合適的問卷設計，原因有二：第一，多元身份是香港的常態。愈來愈多的大多數市民對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份均有較高認同，要求市民從以上四種身份（或兩種身份）選擇一種容易出現偏頗。第二，我們的三輪調查中，市民對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份認同同時加強，此乃採用「主要身份」的調查未能反映的事實。



Besides possible bias, the 'dominant identity' questionnaire design also does not allow researchers to answer the following two important questions on identity raised in this study:

- i. What is the proportion of the public that strongly (or relatively strongly) identify themselves as both 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese'?
- ii. Is the identification with 'Hongkonger' and with 'Chinese' correlated?

Though the HKUPOP survey also adopts the 'multiple identity' design, it has not released any analyses on the above two issues. To our knowledge, our survey is the only one that adopts the 'multiple identity' design to analyse the above two important issues.

Our survey finds that, over the last year, the public have identified themselves more strongly as 'Hongkonger' and also as 'Chinese'. On the other hand, surveys that adopt the 'dominant identity' design found that the strength of identities has gone in opposite directions: Identity as 'Hongkonger' has strengthened and identity as 'Chinese' has weakened. This is because the rise in citizens' identity as 'Hongkonger' is bigger than the rise in their identity as 'Chinese'. In such a situation, when interviewees are compelled to choose one identity over the other, more will choose 'Hongkongers' and less will choose 'Chinese'. The 'dominant identity' design can thus produce highly misleading results.

除了容易出現偏頗外，採用「主要身份」的調查都不能回答由本研究提出，有關身份認同的兩個重要問題：

- i. 有多少市民同時對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份擁有高度認同（或較高認同）？
- ii. 市民對「香港人」及「中國人」的身份認同是否相關？

雖然港大民研也採用「多元身份」作調查，但從未發佈對以上兩個問題的分析。就我們所知，本研究為目前唯一採用「多元身份」框架去分析以上兩個問題的調查。

我們的調查發現最近一年，市民對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份認同同時上升。另一方面，採用「主要身份」的調查卻發現兩者出現此消彼長的情況：市民的「香港人」身份認同上升，而「中國人」身份認同則下降。這是由於市民對「香港人」身份認同的升幅高於對「中國人」身份認同的升幅。這種情況下，如受訪者被要求作出非此即彼的選擇，更多人會選擇「香港人」，更少人會選擇「中國人」，是以採用「主要身份」的調查得出非常誤導性的結果。

3

各年齡、教育及政治傾向組別的「中國人」身份認同：比較三輪調查（表二）

Self-identity as 'Chinese' across groups by age, by educational attainment, and by political inclination: Comparison of 3 rounds of surveys (Table 2)

Table 2 shows that, in the 3 surveys, all age groups except Young Adults (18 years to 29 years old), and also all groups by educational background (from primary level to graduate school), have relatively strong identity as 'Chinese', with ratings above the mid-point of 5. The identity as 'Chinese' of older age groups (age 50 and over) is significantly higher than that of younger age groups (age 18 to 49).

表二顯示在三輪調查中，除青年人（18歲至29歲）外的所有年齡組別，以及所有教育組別（小學到研究院）對「中國人」身份皆有較高認同，評分都高於中位數5分。年齡較高的組別（50歲或以上）對「中國人」身份的認同明顯地高於青壯年（18歲至49歲）。

表二 各年齡、教育及政治傾向組別的「中國人」身份認同

Table 2 Self-identity as 'Chinese' of groups by age, by education, and by political inclination

		受訪人數 Respondents			平均分 (0-10) Score (0-10)		
		2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6
所有市民	All Respondents	979	986	981	6.63	6.71	6.78
年齡	18 to 29	176	169	169	4.93	5.06	4.96
Age	30 to 39	165	166	165	5.92	6.26	6.30
	40 to 49	173	174	172	6.73	6.56	6.71
	50 to 59	204	201	201	7.06	7.14	7.35
	60 to 69	142	147	147	7.40	7.57	7.88
	70 or above	120	129	127	8.04	7.70	7.76
教育程度	小學或以下 primary or below	125	121	112	7.74	8.03	8.00
Education	初中 Lower secondary	116	121	111	7.26	7.58	7.44
	高中 Higher secondary	294	295	301	6.79	6.54	6.95
	專上非學位 Non-degree tertiary	116	116	127	6.08	6.49	6.35
	大學學位 Bachelor's degree	270	274	275	5.70	5.87	6.10
	研究院 Postgraduate degree	55	53	49	7.08	6.64	6.17
政治傾向	建制派 Pro-establishment	98	95	101	8.86	9.43	9.50
Political	中間派 Moderates	569	592	603	6.93	7.09	7.18
Inclination	非建制派 Non-establishment	279	263	248	5.16	4.63	4.50
	其中：民主派 of which: Democrats	207	198	184	5.74	5.16	5.16
	其中：其他非建制派 of which: Others	72	65	64	3.50	3.01	2.61

The identity of Young Adults (18 to 29 years old) as 'Chinese' continues to hover around the mid-point of 5. Policy makers need to work hard to cultivate national identity among Young Adults. Young Adults' identification as 'Chinese' appears to be deeply polarized in all 3 surveys. In the present survey, 38.0% identify themselves relatively strongly as Chinese (above 5); 40.9% identify themselves relatively weakly (below 5), with the remaining 21.1% identifying themselves moderately so.

For political inclination, Pro-establishment supporters very strongly identify themselves as 'Chinese'. The identity as 'Chinese' of Pro-establishment supporters is significantly higher than that of Moderates. Moreover, the identity as 'Chinese' of Pro-establishment supporters has strengthened further over the 3 surveys, and the rise is statistically significant.

Moderates identify themselves strongly as 'Chinese', and their identity has strengthened over the 3 surveys. The increase in the strength of identity as 'Chinese' of the public reflects the trend of Moderates and Pro-establishment supporters, as the two groups constitute over 70% of the population.

For Non-establishment supporters, their identity as 'Chinese' is weak and is significantly lower than that of Moderates. Moreover, their identity has further weakened over the 3 surveys, and the fall is statistically significant.

Among Non-establishment supporters, the strength of identification of Democrats as 'Chinese' is slightly above the midpoint of 5, but the strength of their identification has fallen. The 'Others' group (mostly localists/self-determinists) has very weak identity as 'Chinese'. Moreover, their identity has weakened further over the 3 surveys, and the fall is statistically significant. The self-identity as 'Chinese' of Non-establishment supporters (25.2% of our sample in the 3rd survey) are moving further and further away from that of the majority. This is a cause for concern.

青年人對「中國人」的認同維持徘徊於中位數5分，決策者須努力培養青年的國民身份認同。三輪調查中，青年對「中國人」的認同非常兩極化。在最近一輪調查，對「中國人」身份有較高認同（高於5分）的有38.0%，較低認同（低於5分）的有40.9%，中度認同的有21.1%。

在政治傾向方面，建制派對「中國人」的身份有極高認同，其認同感顯著高於中間派。經過三輪調查，建制派的認同感進一步加強，其上升程度達統計上的顯著水平。

中間派對「中國人」的身份有較高認同，其認同感在三輪調查中逐步加強。市民的「中國人」身份認同上升，主要反映建制派及中間派（佔人口超過70%）的趨勢。

非建制派對「中國人」身份的認同感較弱（統計上顯著低於中間派的認同感），並在第三輪調查中進一步減弱，下跌幅度達統計上的顯著水平。

非建制派當中，民主派對「中國人」的身份認同雖然稍高於中位數5分，不過其認同感亦有所減弱。「其他非建制派」（主要是本土派者及自決派）對「中國人」的身份認同甚弱，其認同感在第三輪調查更持續下降，下跌幅度達統計上的顯著水平。非建制派（佔第三輪調查受訪者的25.2%）對「中國人」的身份認同與大部分市民愈走愈遠，情況令人擔憂。



4 對第二十三條立法諮詢的取態（Q10） Attitudes towards Article 23 public consultation (Question 10)

Figure 10 shows that, on the scale of 1 to 7, the opinions of whether the government should initiate public consultation for Article 23 legislation are clearly divided, with 16.1%, 18.4%, and 19.0% in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd surveys respectively selecting 1 ('very unnecessary'), and 15.5%, 16.3%, and 14.1% in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd surveys respectively opting for 7 ('very necessary').

從圖十可見，按1至7分的尺度，香港市民對今屆政府是否需要就第二十三條立法進行諮詢的取態兩極化。第三輪調查中，給予1分（「非常無需要」諮詢）的市民依次為16.1%、18.4%及19.0%；給予7分（「非常需要」諮詢）的市民依次為15.5%、16.3%及14.1%。

圖十：對第二十三條立法諮詢的取態（百分比分佈）

Figure 10 : Attitudes towards Article 23 consultation (percentage distribution)





The reason for such polarization plausibly is due to the fact that a considerable proportion of the public is strongly opposed to having Article 23 legislated at all, and hence is opposed to any consultation, whilst those in favour hold that – given the inevitability of Article 23’s legislation under the Basic Law, it is marginally better to have at least some consultation, as opposed to none.

Compared with Moderates, Pro-establishment supporters are more inclined towards ‘very necessary’, whilst Non-establishment supporters are more inclined towards ‘very unnecessary’. Amongst samples that explicitly state their political stance, 53.9%, 58.4%, and 50.3% in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd surveys respectively of those who answered ‘very unnecessary’ were Moderates, whilst 60%, 57.5%, and 62.4% in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd surveys respectively of those who answered ‘very necessary’ were also Moderates – constituting roughly the same proportion in both extremes. With regards to public consultation on Article 23 legislation, Moderates – as with the general Hong Kong public – remain deeply divided. In view of this, policy makers should exercise caution in approaching this subject.

取態兩極化的原因相信是部分市民十分反對第二十三條立法，是以反對任何諮詢。贊成諮詢的市民卻認為第二十三條立法是香港的憲制責任，不能避免，有諮詢總比無諮詢好。

與中間派比較，建制派較為同意「非常有需要」諮詢，非建制派則較為同意「非常無需要」諮詢。僅計算表明政治傾向的受訪者，在三輪調查中，認為「非常無需要」諮詢的市民依次有53.9%、58.4%及50.3%是中間派；認為「非常有需要」諮詢的市民亦依次有60%、57.5%及62.4%是中間派。對第二十三條立法諮詢的問題，中間派在兩個極端的佔比旗鼓相當，與全港市民一樣未有共識，決策者需要小心從事。

5 對《基本法》的認識 (Q11) Knowledge of Basic Law (Question 11)

Though the public's self-rating (on a scale of 1 to 10) of its familiarity with the Basic Law has increased slightly from 4.45 in the 1st survey to 4.53 in the 2nd survey and has risen further to 4.63 in the 3rd survey, the rating is still below the median of 5, indicating that the public's knowledge of Basic Law is inadequate.

雖然市民對《基本法》認識程度的自我評價，由第一輪調查的4.45分微升至第二輪調查的4.53分，再上升至第三輪調查的4.63分，評分仍然低於中位數5分，反映市民對《基本法》的認識並不足夠。


6 出現矛盾的責任屬內地或香港？(Q14) Whose responsibility is it when conflicts arise between Hong Kong and the Mainland? (Question 14)

Figure 11 shows that, in our 3 surveys, in allocating blame between the Mainland and Hong Kong when conflicts arise in the implementation of 1C2S, roughly half or more of the public selected 'Equally Responsible'. A quarter or more of the public think that the Mainland is responsible while 1/6 or more think that HK is responsible.

圖十一顯示在三輪調查中，當實踐「一國兩制」出現矛盾時，歸咎責任於內地或香港，大概一半或以上市民選擇「一半半」。四分之一或以上市民認為責任屬於內地，而六分之一或以上市民認為責任屬於香港。

圖十一：出現矛盾時內地與香港的責任

Figure 11: Responsibility for conflicts between HK and the Mainland





From the 1st to the 2nd rounds, public opinions moved towards polarization as those who chose 'Equally Responsible' fell from 57.9% to 49%, while the proportions of those who held that the responsibility lay either with the Mainland or with HK both rose. In other words, more people were blaming either the Mainland or Hong Kong, indicating that public opinions were moving towards polarization. This is a worrying trend. However, from the 2nd to the 3rd rounds, the polarizing trend was slightly moderated as those who chose 'Equally Responsible' rose slightly from 49% to 50.7%, and slightly less people were blaming either the Mainland or HK. However, from the 1st to the 3rd round as a whole, opinions were still polarized.

As expected, Pro-establishment supporters tend to blame HK while Non-establishment supporters tend to blame the Mainland. Among Moderates, a declining majority (declining from 65.9% to 60.8% from the 1st to the 2nd round and declining further to 60.1% in the 3rd round) held that both parties were equally to blame. Opinions within Moderates were also polarizing.

The results suggest that both the Central Government and Hong Kong ought to reflect on its own responsibility for deadlocks and conflicts between the two.

從第一輪到第二輪調查，民意趨向兩極化，認為「一半半」的人從57.9%下降至49%，而認為責任屬於內地或香港的兩者皆升。換言之，更多人指責內地或香港，顯示民意趨向兩極化，令人擔憂。不過，從第二輪至第三輪調查，這股兩極化趨勢有輕微緩和跡象；認為兩者責任「一半半」的由49%輕微上升至50.7%，對內地或香港的指責則輕微減少。但是，從第一輪至第三輪調查整體而言，民意仍然兩極化。

一如預期，建制派傾向指責香港，而非建制派則傾向指責內地。在中間派中，多數人認為雙方擁有同樣責任，不過此比例逐步遞減（從第一輪的65.9%下降至第二輪的60.8%，再進一步下降至第三輪的60.1%），顯示中間派的態度亦逐漸兩極化。

結果反映中央政府與香港均需就雙方的僵局和矛盾反思自身責任。

7 移民與「一國兩制」信心 (Q21、Q22)

Emigration and confidence in 1C2S (Questions 21 & 22)

Table 3 shows the percentages of different groups who plan to emigrate due to lack of confidence in 1C2S. For the community as a whole, the ratio of those who plan to emigrate due to their lack of confidence in 1C2S (henceforth Emigration Ratio for brevity) hover around 8% to 9% in the 3 surveys. The Emigration Ratios are very different for people of different political inclinations. In the third survey, the Emigration Ratios for Pro-establishment supporters, Moderates, Democrats, and 'Non-establishment: Others' (mostly localists and self-determinists) were 0%, 6.8%, 14.9%, and 34.4% respectively. The Emigration Ratio for 'Non-establishment: Others' is 5 times that of Moderates in the 3rd survey.

From the 1st to the 3rd survey, the Emigration Ratio of Pro-establishment supporters and Moderates declined, but that of 'Non-establishment: Others' rose from 15.3% to 34.3%. The Emigration Ratio, however, of Democrats are stable round 14% to 15%. The intention to migrate of 'Non-establishment: Others' is diverging from the rest of the community.

表三為不同群體因對「一國兩制」缺乏信心而計劃移民的百分比。就整體市民而言，因對「一國兩制」缺乏信心而計劃移民的人數（以下簡稱為移民比率）在三輪調查中徘徊在8%至9%。不同政治傾向的移民比率亦大不相同。在第三輪調查中，建制派、中間派、民主派及「其他非建制派」（主要是本土派者及自決派）的移民比率分別為0%，6.8%，14.9%和34.4%。「其他非建制派」在第三次調查的移民比率是中間派的五倍。

從第一輪至第三輪調查，建制派與中間派的移民比率有所下降，但「其他非建制派」則由15.3%上升至34.3%。民主派的移民比率維持在14%至15%水平。「其他非建制派」的取態與大部分市民背道而馳。

表三：因對「一國兩制」缺乏信心而計劃移民的人數

Table 3: Public's emigration plans due to the lack of confidence in 1C2S

	受訪人數 Respondents			對「一國兩制」缺乏信心而計劃移民的比例 (%) Due to the Lack of Confidence in 1C2S (%)		
	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6
建制派 Pro-establishment	98	95	101	8.86	9.43	9.50
中間派 Moderates	569	592	603	6.93	7.09	7.18
非建制派 Non-establishment	279	263	248	5.16	4.63	4.50
其中：民主派 of which: Democrats	207	198	184	5.74	5.16	5.16
其中：其他非建制派 of which: Others	72	65	64	3.50	3.01	2.61
所有市民 All Respondents	996	998	999	8.8	8.0	9.2



In the 3rd survey, among those who plan to emigrate due to their lack of confidence in 1C2S, 45% were Moderates, and 52% were Non-establishment supporters.

Past studies have suggested that surveys often inaccurately amplify the number of individuals who seek to emigrate, for only a fraction of those who express interest in emigrating eventually do so in reality – as such, caution should be exercised in interpreting the findings, though they still provide valuable reference of the degree and extent of concern. Amongst the Moderates, those who confess to having plans to emigrate due to their lack of confidence in 1C2S may do so due to – on one hand – their disillusionment towards the Central Government and the Pro-Establishment, but also – on the other hand – disillusionment towards perceived instability caused by the Non-establishment supporters, or ‘Yellow Ribbons’; the latter may cause disaffection amongst the Moderates due to the perceived damage of radical politics on the rule of law and Hong Kong’s economy. Neither of the possibilities above could be ruled out.

因對「一國兩制」缺乏信心而計劃移民的人士中，在第三輪調查有45%為中間派，52%為非建制派。

根據過往研究，在民調中聲稱移民的人數，往往遠超真正移民的人數。儘管如此，民調結果仍有一定參考價值，但需小心解讀。中間派聲稱「冇信心」而計劃移民，一方面可能是對中央政府及建制派不滿，另一方面亦可能是擔心非建制派，或俗稱「黃絲帶」破壞社會穩定，例如覺得激進政治將會損害香港法治及經濟，兩種可能性皆不能排除。

8

第二輪及第三輪調查的熱門議題

Topical questions asked in the 2nd and 3rd surveys

After the first survey, some hot topics have arisen which may influence the public's assessment of 1C2S. The following two questions were asked in the 2nd and 3rd surveys to collect public's opinions:

1. Impact of Carrie Lam's appointment as CE on societal division (Question 15)
2. Impact of enactment of National Anthem Law in HK on 1C2S (Question 16)

8.1 The impact of Carrie Lam's appointment as CE on societal division (Question 15)

Figure 12 shows the impact of Carrie Lam's appointment as CE on societal division in the 2nd and 3rd surveys. Most people chose 'unchanged' (49.0% in the 2nd survey and 46.5% in the 3rd survey) or 'decreased' (41.0% in the 2nd survey and 42.1% in the 3rd survey). A small minority chose 'increased' (7.6% in the 2nd survey and 9.1% in the 3rd survey). The change from the 2nd to the 3rd survey was small: Those who chose 'decreased' rose slightly by 1.1 percentage points, and those who chose 'increased' rose slightly by 1.5 percentage points. In both surveys, those who chose 'decreased' far outnumbered those who chose 'increased'. On the whole, the public tends to think that the appointment of Carrie Lam as CE has decreased societal division.

As expected, Non-establishment supporters are more critical of Carrie Lam than Moderates and Pro-establishment supporters. However, even among Non-establishment supporters, those who chose 'decreased' (33.8% in 2nd survey and 30.6% in 3rd survey) were twice the number of those who chose 'increased' (14.3% in 2nd survey 15.5% in 3rd survey). Within Non-establishment supporters, Democrats are positive towards Carrie Lam: those who chose 'decreased' (35.8% in the 2nd survey and 34.6% in the 3rd survey) were three times the number of those who chose 'increased' (10% in the 2nd survey and 12.1% in the 3rd survey). However, the 'Others' group (mostly localists/self-determinists) was negative towards Carrie Lam: those who chose 'decreased' (20% in 2nd survey and 19% in 3rd survey) were much less than those who chose 'increased' (43.3% in 2nd survey and 25.4% in 3rd survey).

第一輪調查後，有不少可能影響市民對「一國兩制」評價的新熱門議題出現。第二輪及第三輪調查加入了以下兩條問題以檢視民意。

1. 林鄭月娥上台對社會撕裂的影響 (Q15)
2. 香港訂立《國歌法》對「一國兩制」的影響 (Q16)

8.1 林鄭月娥上台對社會撕裂的影響 (Q15)

圖十二顯示兩輪調查中，林鄭月娥上台對社會撕裂的影響。多數人認為「冇變」（第二輪：49.0%，第三輪：46.5%）或「減少」（第二輪：41.0%，第三輪：42.1%）。少數人認為「增加」（第二輪：7.6%，第三輪：9.1%）。第二輪與第三輪調查的變化不大：認為「減少」的輕微上升1.1個百分點，認為「增加」的輕微上升1.5個百分點。兩輪調查中，認為「減少」的遠超認為「增加」的。整體而言，市民認為林鄭月娥上台令社會撕裂減少。


與預期一樣，非建制派比中間派及建制派對林鄭月娥有更多批評。不過即使就非建制派而言，認為「減少」的（第二輪：33.8%，第三輪：30.6%）也比認為「增加」的（第二輪：14.3%，第三輪：15.5%）高出一倍有多。非建制派當中，民主派也對林鄭月娥反應正面：認為「減少」的（第二輪：35.8%，第三輪：34.6%）比認為「增加」的（第二輪：10%，第三輪：12.1%）高出兩倍。然而，「其他非建制派」（主要是本土派及自決派）對林鄭月娥卻感到負面：認為「減少」的（第二輪：20%，第三輪：19%）比較認為「增加」的（第二輪：43.3%，第三輪：25.4%）少得多。

Our results show that Pro-establishment supporters, Moderates, and Democrats (i.e., the entire political spectrum excepting localists/self-determinists) who together constitute over 90% of our adult population regard Carrie Lam as a CE who can mend societal division. Even for localists/self-determinists, their negative view of Carrie Lam has moderated somewhat: From the 2nd survey to the 3rd survey, those who chose 'increased' fell from 43.3% to 25.4%.

以上結果顯示，合共超過90%成年人口的建制派、中間派及民主派（即本土派與自決派以外之政治光譜上所有組別），視林鄭月娥為一位能夠修補社會撕裂的行政長官。即使是本土派與自決派，他們對林鄭月娥的負面態度也有所緩和：從第二輪至第三輪調查，認為「增加」的由43.3%大幅下降至25.4%。

圖十二：林鄭月娥上台對社會撕裂的影響

Figure 12: Impact of Carrie Lam's appointment on societal division



8.2 Impact of enactment of the National Anthem Law in HK on 1C2S (Question 16)


Figure 13 shows that in both surveys, those who chose 'negative impact' (42.7% in 2nd survey and 39.1% in 3rd survey) far exceeded those who chose 'positive impact' (16.3% in 2nd survey and 15.7% in 3rd survey). Public opinion on the impact of the enactment of the National Anthem Law in HK on 1C2S was negative, though it has turned slightly less negative in the 3rd survey.

8.2 香港訂立《國歌法》對「一國兩制」的影響 (Q16)

圖十三顯示兩輪調查中，認為有「負面影響」的（第二輪：42.7%，第三輪：39.1%）遠高於認為有「正面影響」的（第二輪：16.3%，第三輪：15.7%）。市民認為香港訂立《國歌法》對「一國兩制」有負面影響，雖然第三輪調查的負面情緒輕微減弱。

圖十三：香港訂立《國歌法》對「一國兩制」的影響

Figure 13: Impact of enactment of the National Anthem Law in HK on 1C2S





As expected, Pro-establishment supporters were positive towards the enactment of the Law while Non-establishment supporters were highly negative. Among the Moderates (over 60% of our population), those who chose 'negative impact' (27.8% in 2nd survey and 34.2% in 3rd survey) still far exceeded those who chose 'positive impact' (17.2% in 2nd survey and 20.1% in 3rd survey). In conclusion, the public has a certain degree of worry on the enactment of the national anthem law.

一如所料，建制派對訂立《國歌法》反應正面，而非建制派的反應則非常負面。在中間派當中（佔人口超過60%），認為有「負面影響」的（第二輪：27.8%，第三輪：34.2%）仍然遠高於認為有「正面影響」的（第二輪：17.2%，第三輪：20.1%）。總括而言，市民對訂立《國歌法》有一定擔憂。

9

第三輪調查的新熱門議題

New topical questions asked in the 3rd survey

Five new questions were asked in the 3rd survey to gauge public opinions on current topics:

1. How familiar are you with the Guangdong-HK-Macau Big Bay Area (BBA)? [Question 20]
2. Should HK take part in the development of the BBA? [Question 21]
3. Would you consider living or moving to other cities of the BBA? [Question 22]
4. Should HK take part in the development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)? [Question 23]
5. Can the open day of the Central Liaison Office (CLO) bring the CLO closer to the public? [Question 24]

第三輪調查加入以下五條新問題以詢問市民對熱門議題的意見：

1. 是否認識粵港澳大灣區？(Q20)
2. 香港應否參與粵港澳大灣區發展？(Q21)
3. 會否考慮到粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展？(Q22)
4. 香港應否參與「一帶一路」發展？(Q23)
5. 中聯辦開放日能否拉近與市民距離？(Q24)

9.1 Are you familiar with the BBA? (Question 20)

The public is not familiar with the BBA: The mean score is only 3.85 (scale of 0 to 10). Pro-establishment supporters are slightly more familiar with the BBA (mean score of 4.65). This shows that more promotion of the BBA is needed.

9.2 Should HK take part in the development of the BBA? (Question 21)

The public agrees that HK should take part in the development of the BBA: The mean score is 6.37 (scale of 0 to 10). Pro-establishment supporters are highly positive (mean score of 8.08) while Non-establishment supporters are mildly positive (mean score of 5.43). Within Non-establishment supporters, Democrats are mildly positive (mean score of 5.86), but the 'Others' group (mostly localists/self-determinists) are mildly negative (mean score of 4.3).

9.3 Would you consider living or moving to other cities of the BBA (for study, employment, business, or retirement)? (Question 22)

9.1 是否認識粵港澳大灣區？(Q20)

市民對大灣區認識不深，平均分為3.85分（0到10分）。建制派比其他派別支持者較為認識大灣區（4.65分），反映政府在宣傳方面需要更多努力。

9.2 香港應否參與粵港澳大灣區發展？(Q21)

市民同意香港應該參與大灣區發展，平均分為6.37分（0到10分）。建制派相當正面（8.08分），非建制派偏向正面（5.43分）。非建制派當中，民主派偏向正面（5.86分），但「其他非建制派」（主要是本土派及自決派）則偏向負面（4.3分）。

9.3 會否考慮到粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展（升學、就業、做生意、退休）？(Q22)

圖十四：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願
Figure 14: Willingness to move to other cities in the Big Bay Area




Figure 14 shows that only 12.2% of the public would consider moving there; another 11.9% may consider moving, but 63.1% would not consider moving. Among different age groups, two age groups are more inclined to move: Those aged 30 to 39 (16.1% would consider moving) and those aged 60 to 69 (18.5% would consider moving). The results are expected as the 30 to 39 age group are more experienced than students or young adults and they are better equipped to move; the 60 to 69 age group consists of 'young olds' who may retire across the border. For the over 70 age group, only 13.6% would consider moving. The group consists of 'old olds' who have great need for medical services, and they are not very willing to move.

圖十四顯示只有12.2%的市民「會」考慮前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展，另有11.9%「或者會」考慮，但63.1%「不會」考慮。在不同年齡組別中，有兩個年齡組別更傾向考慮前往：30至39歲（16.1%「會」），60至69歲（18.5%「會」）。此結果符合預期，因為30至39歲組別比學生和青年更有經驗，有更好的裝備往大灣區居住或發展；60至69歲組別包括將會退休的「年輕長者」，他們有興趣退休至大灣區也可理解。至於70歲或以上組別，只有13.6%「會」考慮前往，這個組別包括那些需求醫療服務的「老年長者」，他們不太願意遷居。



9.4 Should HK take part in the development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)? (Question 23)

The public agrees that HK should take part in the development of the BRI: Mean score of 6.3 (scale of 0 to 10). Pro-establishment supporters are highly positive (mean score of 8.06) while Non-establishment supporters are mildly positive (mean score of 5.43). Among Non-establishment supporters, Democrats are mildly positive (mean score of 5.87), but the 'Others' group (mostly localists and self-determinists) are mildly negative (mean score of 4.27).

9.5 Can the opening of the Central Liaison Office bring it closer to the public? (Question 24)

The public is mildly positive that the open day of the CLO can bring it closer to the public (mean score of 5.32, scale of 0 to 10). Pro-establishment supporters and Moderates are mildly positive (mean scores of 5.68 and 5.38 respectively), but Non-establishment supporters are mildly negative (mean score of 4.32). Among Non-establishment supporters, Democrats are mildly negative (mean score of 4.65) while the 'Others' group (mostly localists/self-determinists) are highly negative (mean score of 3.32).

Pro-establishment supporters and Moderates together constitute over 70% of our population. Our results show that the open day of CLO can bring it closer to the majority of the public.

9.4 香港應否參與「一帶一路」發展？(Q23)

市民同意香港應參與「一帶一路」發展，平均分為6.3分（0到10分）。建制派相當正面（8.06分）。非建制派當中，民主派偏向正面（5.87分），但「其他非建制派」（主要是本土派及自決派）則偏向負面（4.27分）。

9.5 中聯辦開放日能否拉近與市民距離？(Q24)

市民偏向同意中聯辦開放日能拉近與公眾距離，平均分為5.32分（0到10分）。建制派及中間派偏向正面（分別為5.68分及5.38分），非建制派卻偏向負面（4.32分）。非建制派當中，民主派偏向負面（4.65分），而「其他非建制派」（主要是本土派及自決派）則相當負面（3.32分）。

建制派與中間派合共超過人口70%，結果顯示中聯辦開放日能拉近與大多數市民距離。

10 總結市民對新議題的意見 Summary of Opinion on New Topics

To summarize, Pro-establishment supporters, Moderates, and Democrats (i.e., the entire political spectrum excepting localists/self-determinists), who together constitute over 90% of the adult population, regard Carrie Lam as a CE who can mend social division. They agree that HK should take part in the BBA and the BRI. The results indicate that Carrie Lam, and HK's participation in the BBA and the BRI have very widespread public support. However, the public is not familiar with the BBA, pointing to the need for more efforts in promotion. Only 12.2% and 11.9% of the public respectively would consider and may consider moving to other cities in the BBA to live, work, or retire. This points to the need for effective measures to facilitate integration.

總括而言，佔成年人口超過90%的建制派、中間派及民主派（即除本土派及自決派以外的整個政治光譜）認為林鄭月娥是一位能夠修補社會撕裂的行政長官；他們亦同意香港應該參與粵港澳大灣區及「一帶一路」倡議的發展。然而，市民對粵港澳大灣區認識不深，政府在宣傳方面需要更努力。市民中「會」及「或者會」考慮前往粵港澳大灣區內其他城市居住、工作或退休的分別只有12.2%和11.9%，顯示促進大灣區融合需要更有效的措施。



II. International freedom and democracy indices

Under 1C2S, HK is China's most open and international city. Freedoms and democracy are core components of 1C2S, and international perception of freedoms and democracy in HK is very important for the implementation of 1C2S. Hence, we give equal weight to scores obtained from polls of the HK public, namely Index (A), and scores computed from international indices, namely Index (B).

Index (B) is the average of 3 indices, namely, the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser Institutes, and the Democracy Index of the EIU (Economic Intelligence Unit). The average of the Economic Freedom and Personal Freedom Indices is known as the Human Freedom Index, which is the most comprehensive index of freedom available. Hong Kong is always ranked world's number one in Economic Freedom, and is also ranked highly in Personal Freedom. As a result, Hong Kong has also been world's number one in Human Freedom from 2008 to 2014.

Hong Kong's rank in the Democracy Index has been mediocre, behind Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. This is expected as Hong Kong's Chief Executive is not elected by universal suffrage.

As Hong Kong is a highly developed region and given that highly developed regions tend to have comparatively higher Freedom and Democracy Indices as compared with developing regions – we have selected certain neighbouring developed countries and territories (namely, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) as the benchmarks for comparison and assessment of Hong Kong's performance. We have also compared the respective scores of the Mainland and Hong Kong under the indices, so as to identify whether Hong Kong has become increasingly 'Mainlandised' under 1C2S. For brevity, we will refer to Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and the Chinese mainland as 'neighbouring territories'.

在「一國兩制」下，香港是中國最開放及國際化的城市。自由與民主是「一國兩制」的重要部分，而國際社會對香港自由與民主的觀感對落實「一國兩制」尤其重要。所以，我們將公眾調查所得的評分（指數A）與國際指數所得的評分（指數B）給予相同比重。

指數B為三項指數的平均分，分別為卡托研究所（Cato Institute）及菲沙研究所（Fraser Institute）編制的「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」和經濟學人智庫編制的「民主指數」。「經濟自由指數」和「個人自由指數」的平均值被稱為「人類自由指數」，是目前衡量自由的指數中最全面的一種。香港在經濟自由方面一直名列世界第一，在個人自由方面也名列前茅。因此，香港在2008年至2014年期間一直在「人類自由指數」排名世界第一。

由於香港未能普選行政長官，所以香港在「民主指數」中的排名不算突出。香港的得分低於日本、台灣和韓國，與新加坡相若。

因為香港是高度發展的地區，一般而言，發達地區的自由與民主指數，均高於發展中的地區，是以我們選取香港鄰近的發達國家及地區，包括日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣作比較，藉以評價香港的表現。我們亦比較內地與香港的自由指數與民主指數，以觀察在「一國兩制」之下的香港是否趨向「大陸化」。為簡便起見，我們將日本、南韓、新加坡、台灣與中國內地稱為「鄰近地區」。

As the Human Freedom Index covers a very large number of countries, there is a two-year time lag in data compilation. The latest 2017 Human Freedom Index only reflects conditions in 2015. In our second Report released in early 2018, we have updated the Human Freedom Index of Hong Kong and neighbouring territories to 2016 according to the methodology of CATO-Fraser Institutes. In this Report, we will first update the Personal Freedom Index to 2017, and then update the Economic Freedom Index to 2017 (the Human Freedom Index is the average of the Personal Freedom and Economic Freedom Indices). There is no need to update the Democracy Index as it already reflects conditions in 2017.

由於「人類自由指數」覆蓋大量國家，數據整合滯後兩年。最新發表的「2017人類自由指數」，只反映2015年的數據。2018年初發佈的《「一國兩制」指數》第二份報告中，我們已參照卡托研究所及菲沙研究所的編制方法，將香港與鄰近地區的「人類自由指數」更新至2016年。在本報告中，我們將更新香港及鄰近地區的「個人自由指數」及「經濟自由指數」至2017年。「人類自由指數」為這兩個指數的平均值。「民主指數」已經反映2017年的情況，所以毋須更新。

1

更新「個人自由指數」(表四)

Updating the Personal Freedom Index (Table 4)

The Personal Freedom Index is composed of 7 items: they are respectively, rule of law, security and safety, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom of association, freedom of expression and information, and gender identity and relationships – all key components of human rights and individual freedoms. Table 4 shows the updated 2017 scores of Hong Kong (see footnotes of the Table for the updating methodology) and of neighboring territories. We also show the 2014 to 2016 scores of HK to show the trend for each of the 7 items. The 2014 and 2015 scores are taken from the Reports of the Cato-Fraser Institutes. The 2016 scores are updates estimated in our second Report. The 2017 scores are updates of this Report.

「個人自由指數」由七個子項目組成，分別為法治、安全、遷徙、宗教自由、結社自由、言論及資訊自由和性別認同及關係，均是人權和人身自由的重要元素。表四為香港及鄰近地區更新至2017年的評分（更新方法見註釋）。香港於2014年至2016年的評分亦一併表列，2014年及2015年評分取自卡托研究所及菲沙研究所報告，2016年評分為《「一國兩制」指數》第二份報告的推算，2017年評分則為本報告的更新。

The Personal Freedom Index climbed from 8.87 in 2008 to a peak of 9.08 in 2014, but fell to 8.58 in 2017, falling by 5.5% from the 2014 peak. Among the 7 sub-indices of this Index, the scores of 4 sub-indices fell, namely, rule of law (falling by 16.0%), freedom of religion (falling by 7.4%), freedom of association (falling by 22%), and gender identity & relationship (falling by 7.5%). However, the scores of 2 sub-indices rose, namely, security (rising by 4.8%), and freedom of speech (rising by 6.9%). The substantial declines in the scores of rule of law and freedom of association is likely a result of adverse publicity in the international media on trials of HK protestors who participated in 'Occupy Central' and the civil unrest in Mongkok.

香港的「個人自由指數」由2008年的8.87分攀升至2014年9.08分的高峰，隨後回落至2017年的8.58分，相當於自2014年的高峰下降了5.5%。七個子項目中，有四個下降：即法治（下降16.0%）、宗教自由（下降7.4%）、結社自由（下降22%）和性別認同及關係（下降7.5%）；兩個子項目上升，分別是安全（上升4.8%）和言論及資訊自由（上升6.9%）。法治與結社自由的大幅下跌，很可能是由於國際媒體對「佔中」及旺角騷亂案中的負面報導所致。

表四 : 更新香港與鄰近地區的「個人自由指數」*

Table 4 : Updating the Personal Freedom Index for HK & neighbouring territories*

「個人自由指數」 Personal Freedom Index

	年份 Year	法治 Rule of Law	安全 Security & Safety	遷徙 Freedom of Movement	宗教自由 Religion Freedom	結社自由 Freedom of Association & Assembly	言論及資訊 Freedom of Expression & Information	性別認同 及關係 Gender Identity & Relationships	總分 Aggregate
香港 Hong Kong	2014	7.80	9.33	10.00	10.00	9.79	8.23	10.00	9.08
	2015	7.79	9.40	10.00	9.26	7.64	8.77	9.25	8.79
	2016	7.14	9.40	10.00	9.26	7.64	8.67	9.25	8.62
	2017	6.55	9.78	10.00	9.26	7.64	8.80	9.25	8.58
中國內地 Mainland China	2017	4.70	7.93	3.33	4.94	1.67	6.03	10.00	5.75
日本 Japan	2017	7.64	9.82	10.00	8.75	8.89	9.27	9.25	8.98
韓國 Korea	2017	7.44	9.58	8.33	9.26	9.44	10.58	9.25	8.94
新加坡 Singapore	2017	7.68	9.35	8.33	7.69	3.61	7.51	8.00	7.77
台灣 Taiwan	2017	7.62	9.5	10.00	9.19	9.86	9.73	10.00	9.16

*Updating methodology: Data on 'Security & Safety' come from the 'Security' sub-index of the Rule of Law Index of the World Justice Report. Data on 'Expression & Information' come from the World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders. Data on the other 5 items come from relevant indices of the Freedom in the World Report of Freedom House. For each of the 7 items, we compute the percentage change of the relevant index in 2017 over that in 2016, and then apply the change to each of the seven 2016 scores estimated in our second Report to obtain the 2017 scores.

*更新方法：「安全」取自世界正義項目「法治指數」的「安全」數據，「言論及資訊自由」取自無國界記者「全球新聞自由指數」，其餘五項取自自由之家「世界自由調查報告」的相關數據。我們計算七個項目在相關報告自2016年至2017年的百分比變化，套用於《「一國兩制」指數》第二份報告中對各個項目的2016年推算的評分，從而得出2017年的評分

Despite the decline from 2014 to 2017, Hong Kong's score in personal freedom is still decent, close to those of neighboring territories. This is testament to Hong Kong's preservation of high levels of human rights and personal freedoms under 1C2S.

儘管2014年至2017年錄得跌幅，香港在個人自由方面的得分仍然良好，接近日本、台灣、南韓及新加坡等發達鄰近地區，證明香港能夠在「一國兩制」下捍衛高水平的人權與個人自由。



2 更新「經濟自由指數」 Updating the Economic Freedom Index

The Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom Index is very similar to that of CATO-Fraser Institutes, but the former only has a one-year time lag instead of the two-years. From 2016 to 2017, Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom Index has risen by 0.45%. We apply this percentage change to the 2016 Economic Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser, and the updated 2017 score is 9.13 (see Table 5).

傳統基金會的「經濟自由指數」與卡托研究所及菲沙研究所的同名指數非常相似，而前者只有一年時差，而非後者的兩年。從2016年到2017年，傳統基金會的「經濟自由指數」上升了0.45%。我們將這百分比變化套用於卡托研究所及菲沙研究所的2016年「經濟自由指數」，更新後的2017年得分為9.13（見表五）。

3 更新指數 B—「自由民主指數」（表五） Updating Index (B): The Freedom and Democracy Index (Table 5)

The 2017 Democracy Index was released by the EIU. From the updated Economic Freedom and Personal Freedom Indices, we can obtain the updated Human Freedom Index and Index (B). In 2017, Hong Kong's score in the Human Freedom Index was 8.85, higher than all neighboring territories. Hong Kong's score in Index (B): The Freedom and Democracy Index was 8.01, is lower than Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan but above Singapore

2017年的「民主指數」已由經濟學人智庫發表。憑更新後的「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」，我們可以計算更新的「人類自由指數」及指數B。2017年，香港的「人類自由指數」得分為8.85，高於所有鄰近地區。香港的指數B—「自由民主指數」為8.01，低於台灣、南韓及日本，卻高於新加坡。



表五 : 更新香港與鄰近地區的國際指數
Table 5 : Updated 2017 international indices of HK and neighbouring territories

指數 B—「自由民主指數」 Index B- Freedom and Democracy Index

	「人類自由指數」 (2017) Human Freedom Index (2017)			民主指數 (2017) Democracy Index	總分 Aggregate
	經濟自由 Economic Freedom	個人自由 Personal Freedom	總分 Aggregate		
香港 Hong Kong	9.13	8.58	8.85	6.31 (71)	8.01
中國內地 Mainland China	7.11	5.75	6.43	3.10 (139)	5.32
日本 Japan	7.39	8.98	8.19	7.88 (23)	8.08
韓國 Korea	7.76	8.94	8.35	8.00 (20)	8.23
新加坡 Singapore	8.91	7.77	8.34	6.32 (69)	7.67
台灣 Taiwan	7.90	9.16	8.53	7.73 (33)	8.26

4

香港各指數近年的趨勢（表六）

HK's trends in terms of different international indices (Table 6)

Over the past decade, Hong Kong has made some progress in its democratization, with its Democracy Index score increasing from 5.85 in 2008 to a peak of 6.5 in 2015, and rank from the 84th to the 67th. This was probably due to the increase of directly elected seats in our Legislature. However, the score fell slightly to 6.31 in 2017, falling by 2.9%. Index (B), the Freedom and Democracy Index, rose from 7.96 in 2008 to a peak of 8.19 in 2014, but declined to 8.01 in 2017, falling by 2.2%.

Given the adverse publicity in the international media on recent political events in HK, the declines in these indices are not surprising. Hong Kong's Personal Freedom Index, Democracy Index, and Index (B): The Freedom and Democracy Index, have declined respectively by 6.1%, 2.2%, and 2.2% from their peaks. Even though the Personal Freedom Index has the largest decline, the 2017 score of 8.58 is still quite decent, close to those of developed neighbouring territories.

Looking into the change in the seven sub-indices of the Personal Freedom Index from 2014 to 2017, four sub-indices have substantial declines, namely, rule of law, religious freedom, freedom of association and assembly, and gender identity and relationships. From this, one can see the international community does have concerns on personal freedoms in Hong Kong.

Despite recent declines, Hong Kong's scores and rankings in the Personal Freedom Index, Democracy Index, and Index (B): The Freedom and Democracy Index, remain way above those of the Mainland. The fear that Hong Kong has become 'Mainlandised' is vastly exaggerated.

過去十年，香港的民主發展有一定成果。

「民主指數」由2008年的5.85上升至2015年6.5分的頂點，排名由第84位提升至第67位，相信與立法會增加直選議席有關。但此評分之後回落至2017年的6.31分，下降2.9%。指數B—「自由民主指數」從2008年的7.96分上升至2014年8.19分的高峰，但隨後又下降至2017年的8.01分，下降2.2%。

鑑於國際社會對香港近期的政治事件反應負面，這些指標錄得跌幅並不令人意外。香港的「個人自由指數」、「民主指數」及指數B—「自由民主指數」分別自高峰下降6.1%，2.2%和2.2%。儘管「個人自由指數」的跌幅最大，但2017年的8.58分仍然不俗，與發達鄰近地區相若。

縱觀2014年至2017年期間，「個人自由指數」七個子項目的變化，有四項得分下降，分別是法治水平、宗教自由、結社自由及性別認同及關係，顯示國際社會對香港的個人自由有所顧慮。

儘管近年得分下跌，香港的「個人自由指數」、「民主指數」和指數B—「自由民主指數」的得分和排名仍然高於內地不少，印證香港被「大陸化」的說法缺乏根據。

表六 : 香港近年在國際指數的評分及排名

Table 6 : HK's scores and ranks in major international indices

指數 B—「自由民主指數」 Index B- Freedom and Democracy Index

	「人類自由指數」 Human Freedom Index			民主指數 Democracy Index	總分 Aggregate
	經濟自由 Economic Freedom	個人自由 Personal Freedom	總分 Aggregate		
2008	9.17 (1)	8.87 (26)	9.02 (1)	5.85 (84)	7.96
2010	8.96 (1)	8.90 (26)	8.93 (1)	5.92 (81)	7.93
2011	8.92 (1)	9.14 (18)	9.03 (1)	5.92 (80)	7.99
2012	8.98 (1)	9.09 (18)	9.04 (1)	6.42 (63)	8.16
2013	8.97 (1)	9.01 (20)	8.99 (1)	6.42 (65)	8.13
2014	9.03 (1)	9.08 (20)	9.06 (1)	6.46 (66)	8.19
2015	8.97 (1)	8.79 (26)	8.88 (2)	6.50 (67)	8.09
2016	9.09	8.62	8.85	6.42 (68)	8.04
2017	9.13	8.58	8.85	6.31 (71)	8.01

III. 「一國兩制」輿情指數

主報告 Main Report

III

III. 1C2S Mass Media Index (1C2S MMI)

Media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion. We attempt to use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S and monitor how 1C2S is conveyed in the mass media to provide a timely barometer of public sentiment. 1C2S MMI is a net sentiment index of newspaper articles over a given time. To dovetail with our main Index, we will compile the MMI half yearly.

In the longer run, subject to resource availability, the MMI opens up many opportunities of further research in public opinion formation. The MMI can be compiled at high frequency intervals (e.g. monthly) as it is not subject to the long time lags of surveys. It is also possible to investigate the effect of specific significant events (e.g., co-location arrangement for the Express Rail link) on media sentiment, or to compare sentiments in the local and overseas media.

1C2S MMI mines close to 128,000 news articles and around 64 million words from 20 local daily newspapers. Newspaper is only part of the media, and the MMI does not cover news reported by traditional media such as television and radio, as well as news carried by new media. Measuring the sentiments of news reported by television and radio is very difficult as there is no comprehensive text-based data base available. Measurement of sentiments of new media is also very difficult as it will be very demanding on resources. Furthermore, while widely accepted credibility ratings of different newspapers are available through regular opinion polls, comparable ratings on the credibility of different new media outlets are not available. We will thus confine our study to newspaper articles on 1C2S.

It should be noted that many newspapers have also broadcasted their news through online outlets such as websites and mobile apps. In so far as the news articles of these online outlets are the same as their printed versions, the sentiments of these articles are already included in our MMI regardless of whether they are printed or broadcasted online. 1C2S MMI currently only gauges sentiment of an important subset of mass media, printed newspapers, as a general representation of sentiment in mass media.

媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素，故此，我們嘗試利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒，藉此透視大眾傳媒對「一國兩制」的感受及意見，編製輿論情緒對「一國兩制」的晴雨表。「一國兩制」輿情指數為一段時間內所有報紙文章的情緒淨值指數，以半年結為基礎，配合我們的主指數及補充其不足之處。

長遠而言，如資源許可，輿情指數能為民意形成開拓更多研究機會。輿情指數不受以傳統調查方式收集民意時所產生的滯後影響，因此能以高頻率編製（例如每月）。它亦可以調查特定重大事件（例如高鐵一地兩檢安排）對媒體情緒的影響，或比較本地及海外媒體的情緒。

「一國兩制」輿情指數從20家本地報章搜集128,000多篇報導，逾6,400萬字。報紙只是媒體的一部分，輿情指數不包括電視、電台等傳統電子媒體報導的新聞，也不包括新媒體所報導的新聞。由於電視和電台沒有全面的文本數據庫，所以要衡量它們的新聞情緒非常困難。衡量新媒體的情緒則對資源有較高要求，所以也非常困難。此外，民意調查定期評估不同報紙的公信力，得到廣泛認可，新媒體的公信力卻沒有可比的評價。故此，我們的研究將會聚焦於與「一國兩制」有關的報紙文章。

值得注意的是，不少報紙也透過網站、手機程式等網上媒介傳播。這些網上媒介的報導與印刷版本大多相同，所以無論是印刷或網上版本，其情緒已經涵括在輿情指數之中。目前，輿情指數只衡量大眾傳媒的一個重要部分——印刷報紙，以評估大眾傳媒整體的輿情。



1 最新評分 Latest figures

1C2S MMI in the first half of 2018 comes in at 99.22, a slight increase from 97.14 recorded in the previous 6 months and is consistent with the rise of the main Index (Table 7). The following events influenced media sentiment towards 1C2S in the first half of 2018:

- The NPC Standing Committee approved the co-location arrangement. The Hong Kong Bar Association criticized that it will undermine public confidence in 1C2S severely;
- Agnes Chow of Demosistō was disqualified from running in the LegCo by-election;
- During the closing meeting and the press conference of the Two Sessions, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang reiterated the principles of 1C2S, 'Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong' and the 'high degree of autonomy';
- The Education Bureau demanded History textbook publishers to change inaccurate phrases used in their textbooks, raising concerns about political censorship;
- The National Security Education Day Hong Kong Symposium was first held in Hong Kong;
- The European Union published its annual report on Hong Kong suggesting a potential erosion of Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy in the long term;
- The Ministry of Science & Technology and the Ministry of Finance enabled cross-boundary remittance of national science and technology funding to higher education and research institutions in Hong Kong;
- LegCo's passage of the co-location bill;
- Edward Leung, leader of HK Indigenous, was given a prison sentence of 6 years for his role in the civil unrest in Mongkok.
- 全國人大常委會通過「一地兩檢」合作安排，大律師公會批評方案衝擊「一國兩制」；
- 有意代表香港眾志出選立法會港島區補選的周庭，被裁定參選提名無效；
- 兩會閉幕，國家主席習近平及國務院總理李克強分別重提「一國兩制」、「港人治港」及「高度自治」；
- 教育局審批高中歷史科教科書，對部分內文及字句的評語引起風波；
- 舉辦「全民國家安全教育日香港研討會」，為香港首次舉辦國家安全教育日活動；
- 歐盟發表《2017年香港特區年度報告》，擔憂「高度自治」被逐步蠶食；
- 國家科技部、財政部批准國家科研項目經費過境香港使用，支持香港成為國際創新科技中心；
- 立法會審議及通過「一地兩檢」條例草案；
- 本土民主前線領袖梁天琦參與旺角騷亂暴動罪成，判囚六年。

2018年上半年的「一國兩制」輿情指數為99.22，比半年前的97.14上升，與主指數同樣錄得升幅（表七）。2018年上半年發生以下影響「一國兩制」輿情的事件：


表七 「一國兩制」輿情指數（半年結）

Table 7 : 1C2S MMI (Half-Yearly)

2017 H1	2017 H2	2018 H1
99.96	97.14	99.22

圖十五 「一國兩制」輿情指數（月結）

Figure 15 : 1C2S MMI (Monthly)



2 輿情趨勢 Sentiment trend

2.1 Comparison with public surveys

Media coverage will shape public opinion and the effect of media priming is observed in Hong Kong.¹ A local study also suggests that sentiment analyses will lead telephone surveys by about 2 weeks.² Figure 14 juxtaposes 1C2S MMI with survey results regarding views towards 1C2S by two organizations, namely Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK)³ and Public Opinion Programme by the University of Hong Kong (HKUPOP).⁴ Remarkably, these series depict a similar overall trend of public views – albeit with some quantitative differences across the 3 samples. All three series rose in the early 2000's to a peak around 2007; then fell to a trough around 2014-16 with Occupy Central and the civil unrest in Mongkok, and then recovered thereafter.

As for quantitative differences, 1C2S MMI tends to reveal the immediate effect of speeches and activities of high-ranking officials, especially those of the Chinese leaders which have extensive coverage in mass media. Survey-based indicators might be affected by events with no direct relevance to 1C2S such as the re-election of Donald Tsang with high popularity in 2007. 1C2S MMI also serves as a better proxy for cases with high newsworthiness, while survey-based indicators trace incidents which impose more universal impacts. For example, 1C2S MMI gives a more negative rating during the civil unrest in Mongkok, which came as a shock yet affected only limited parties. Survey-based indicators, on the other hand, show a more negative rating during the "Occupy Central" movement, which affected the general public in various aspects.

2.1 比較現有民調

在香港進行的研究顯示，媒體報導具有塑造民意的預示效果（priming effect）¹，而輿情分析的結果將會領先電話調查大約兩個星期²。圖十六比較「一國兩制」輿情指數與兩個團體，分別為香港電台³和香港大學民意研究計劃⁴，關於「一國兩制」的民意調查。結果顯示，儘管三項結果在數字上存在差異，但均呈現相似的整體趨勢。三組數字均由2000年初上升至大概2007年的頂點，隨著「佔領中環」與旺角騷亂下降至2014-16年的低谷，隨後回升。

就三項結果的差異而言，「一國兩制」輿情指數較能反映高級官員講話和活動的即時影響，尤其是受媒體廣泛報道的中國領導人。民調所顯示的整體觀感則有可能受到與「一國兩制」無直接關係的事件影響，例如民望高企的曾蔭權在2007年再次當選行政長官，令市民對未來感到樂觀。「一國兩制」輿情指數亦較能呈現新聞性高的事件，而民調則體現較有普遍影響的事件。例如，突發性高卻牽連較少群眾的旺角騷亂時，「一國兩制」輿情指數給予較負面的評價，而在各方面也影響廣大公眾的「佔領中環」運動中，民調給予較負面的評價。

¹ Willnat, L., & Zhu, J. H. (1996). Newspaper coverage and public opinion in Hong Kong: A time-series analysis of media priming. *Political Communication*, 13(2), 231-246.

² Fu, K. W., & Chan, C. H. (2013). Analyzing online sentiment to predict telephone poll results. *Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking*, 16(9), 702-707.

³ RTHK commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (HKIAPS) to conduct an annual survey. The related question is: 'Satisfactory to the overall development of Hong Kong after the handover' (「對回歸以來香港整體發展的滿意度」). 香港電台每年委託香港亞太研究所就香港現況及前景進行調查，相應問題為「對回歸以來香港整體發展的滿意度」。

⁴ In the survey conducted by HKUPOP, the related question is: 'Generally speaking, are you confident in "One Country, Two Systems"? (「咁整體黎講，你對一國兩制有冇信心？」)'. 香港大學民意研究計劃近年每三個月就市民對「一國兩制」信心進行調查，相應問題為「咁整體黎講，你對一國兩制有冇信心？」。

2.2 Historical performance

Figure 16 shows that the MMI was on an upward trend from April 1998 (inception date of MMI) to 2001. When the discussion and consultation of Article 23 began in 2002, 1C2S MMI started to fall until the government withdrew the legislation in September 2003. The NPC Standing Committee's interpretation of the Basic Law on constitutional development in April 2004 caused a certain drop in 1C2S MMI, but it continued to rise after Tung Chee Hwa resigned as CE in March 2005. In March 2006, a designated chapter was written for Hong Kong and Macau in the national 11th 'Five-Year Plan', boosting 1C2S MMI to reach the second highest point after the handover. In October 2009, the celebrations for the 60th anniversary of the PRC further raised 1C2S MMI to the peak.

The 'Five Constituencies Resignation' campaign, which attempted to mobilise support for universal suffrage, was followed by a period of sentiment downturn for several years beginning in 2010. Despite the temporary relief provided by the successful political reform proposal, 1C2S MMI was pushed to the lowest point of the period after activists from the Chinese mainland were denied entry to HK to attend Szeto Wah's memorial service in January 2011. The problems of 'anchor babies', the 'Reclaim Sheung Shui' movement and the infant formula shortage exacerbated the drop.

Although the knife attack on Kevin Lau and the 'Reclaim Yuen Long' and 'Reclaim Tuen Mun' movements led to some fluctuations in 1C2S MMI between 2014 and 2015, the overall level was relatively stable because the media did not present a one-sided view of the 'White Paper on "One Country, Two Systems"', the NPC Standing Committee's '8.31' decision and the 'Occupy Central' movement. MMI rose somewhat after Queen Elizabeth II affirmed that 1C2S was a historical achievement during her meeting with Xi Jinping in October 2015.

2.2 歷年變化

圖十六顯示自1998年起，「一國兩制」輿情指數整體向好。《基本法》第二十三條立法的討論與諮詢於2002年展開，輿情指數從高位轉跌，直至政府於2003年9月撤回立法草案後短暫反彈。全國人大常委會於2004年4月就政制發展釋法，令輿情指數有一定跌幅，及在董建華於2005年3月辭去行政長官後止跌回升。2006年3月，國家「十一五」規劃首次納入港澳專章，推動輿情指數達到回歸後第二高位。2009年10月，一系列國慶60周年慶祝活動更令輿情指數攀上頂點。


為爭取「雙普選」而發起的「五區總辭」，開啟了自2010年起為期數年的低潮。雖然政改方案獲得通過後一度回暖，但是2011年1月的悼念司徒華活動中，民運人士被拒絕入境，隨後「雙非嬰」問題、「光復上水」運動和「奶粉荒」將輿情指數推到該段時期的最低點。2014至2015年間發生劉進圖遇襲案及「光復元朗」、「光復屯門」運動，不過報章對《「一國兩制」白皮書》、人大「8.31」決定和「佔領中環」的報導並非一面倒，是以這一年多的輿情指數在波幅中維持相對平穩水平。輿情指數要在習近平與英女王於2015年10月會面，肯定「一國兩制」的歷史成就後才見上升。

1C2S encountered the most severe challenge in the beginning of 2016 when 1C2S MMI plummeted to the lowest level ever since the handover. The 'Causeway Bay Bookstore' incident aroused widespread media attention in January. The civil unrest in Mongkok evolved into a clash between civilians and the police in February. The award of the independent film 'Ten Years' as the best film in Hong Kong Film Awards in April aggravated the negative sentiment in the mass media.


The MMI bottomed out and rose strongly when CY Leung announced that he would not run for a second term and when Carrie Lam was elected CE. Despite the NPC Standing Committee's interpretation of the Basic Law in response to the oath-taking row in the LegCo in November 2016, the 'democracy walls' incidents in universities in September 2017, and the trial of the civil unrest in Mongkok in early 2018 occurred, 1C2S MMI still rose to a high level in the first half of 2018 under the new administration of Carrie Lam.

「一國兩制」在2016年年初面臨最大的挑戰，輿情指數接連急跌。「銅鑼灣書店」事件在1月引起傳媒廣泛關注，旺角騷亂在2月演變成警民流血衝突，再加上獨立電影《十年》在4月獲獎，讓「一國兩制」蒙上陰霾，達到比2003年更負面的低谷。

輿情指數自此從谷底反彈，由2016年12月梁振英宣布放棄連任後至2017年7月林鄭月娥上任，輿情指數更大幅上升。期間，2016年11月全國人大常委會就立法會宣誓風波釋法，2017年9月數所大學的民主牆出現「港獨」標語，及2018年初旺角騷亂案的審訊與判刑，均令輿情指數錄得跌幅。不過在林鄭月娥的新政府下，2018年首半年輿情指數仍然企穩於2009年以來的高水平。



圖十六：比較「一國兩制」輿情指數與其他民調
Figure 16: 1C2S MMI and other public surveys



表八 「一國兩制」輿情指數數表 (2014年至今)

Table 8 : Time Series of 1C2S MMI since 2014

年份 Year	半年 Half-Year	「一國兩制」輿情指數 (2017年7月=100) 1C2S MMI (2017-Jul = 100)		
		月份 Month	月結 Monthly	半年平均數 6-Month
2014	H2	Jul 七月	83.46	82.28
		Aug 八月	88.12	84.61
		Sep 九月	84.98	82.68
		Nov 十月	81.82	82.65
		Oct 十一月	85.67	84.73
		Dec 十二月	92.29	86.06
2015	H1	Jan 一月	75.30	84.70
		Feb 二月	77.80	82.98
		Mar 三月	94.43	84.55
		Apr 四月	87.11	85.43
		May 五月	84.35	85.21
		Jan 六月	69.72	81.45
	H2	Jul 七月	85.16	83.10
		Aug 八月	71.31	82.01
		Sep 九月	93.72	81.89
		Oct 十月	119.39	87.27
		Nov 十一月	105.59	90.81
		Dec 十二月	86.43	93.60
2016	H1	Jan 一月	65.41	90.31
		Feb 二月	62.97	88.92
		Mar 三月	84.60	87.40
		Apr 四月	67.90	78.82
		May 五月	90.49	76.30
		Jan 六月	67.87	73.21
	H2	Jul 七月	82.53	76.06
		Aug 八月	74.79	78.03
		Sep 九月	90.05	78.94
		Oct 十月	90.74	82.75
		Nov 十一月	71.54	79.59
		Dec 十二月	94.74	84.06
2017	H1	Jan 一月	100.73	87.10
		Feb 二月	86.41	89.03
		Mar 三月	96.44	90.10
		Apr 四月	107.89	92.96
		May 五月	104.60	98.47
		Jan 六月	103.72	99.96
	H2	Jul 七月	100	99.84
		Aug 八月	86.38	99.84
		Sep 九月	81.64	97.37
		Oct 十月	103.44	96.63
		Nov 十一月	104.57	96.63
		Dec 十二月	106.79	97.14
2018	H1	Jan 一月	103.41	97.71
		Feb 二月	98.56	99.74
		Mar 三月	113.21	105.00
		Apr 四月	76.76	100.55
		May 五月	104.08	100.47
		Jan 六月	99.28	99.22

Our sample consists of around 128,000 newspaper articles related to 1C2S from 20 local daily newspapers that were published between April 1998 and June 2018.

Each article undergoes a 'tokenisation' process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of approximately 21 years, our text corpus contains around 64 million tokens. From this massive dataset, common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as '我', '你', '的', are first removed before further analysis.

To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: 'positive', 'negative' or 'neutral' (not a sentiment word). A positive word is then given a sentiment score of 1, a negative word is assigned a score of -1, and a neutral word has a score of 0. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by Ku et al. (2009).⁵

The positive, or negative as the case may be, sentiment of a paragraph is quantified via a count of the number of positive (negative) words it contains, adjusted by the total word count. The sentiment score of an article is calculated as the average difference between positive and negative proportions among constituent paragraphs. 1C2S MMI is derived as an index that captures the weighted average sentiment score among newspapers in a given month. The base month is set at July 2017 to indicate 20 years after the establishment of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Table 9 reveals substantial differences in the number of news articles published by newspapers during the sample period. Article count of a newspaper alone could be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure 1C2S MMI's reliability, the sentiment score for each newspaper is further weighted by public perceptions of its credibility based on the survey 'Public Evaluation on Media Credibility' conducted by Centre for Communication Research, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

「一國兩制」輿情指數的資料由新聞文章組成，包含1998年4月至2018年6月期間，來自本地20份日報關於「一國兩制」，約128,000份報導及評論。

我們就每篇文章進行「分詞」(tokenization)，通過電腦運算將文章分解成語例(token，為單詞或短語)。我們利用約21年的資料組成語料庫，包含大約6,400萬個語例。在進一步分析這個龐大的語料庫之前，我們首先剔除無助理解文章的常見單詞(如「我」、「你」、「的」)。

為了辨別一篇文章的情緒，我們採用由古倫維、何修維及陳信希(2009)開發的繁體中文情緒字典，把語例分類為「正面」、「中立」(非情感詞)或「負面」。「正面」的語例得1分，「中立」得0分，「負面」得-1分⁵。

我們計算每段落所包含的正、負面語例數量，每篇文章的情緒評分則為各個段落經字數調整後的淨值。「一國兩制」輿情指數即為當月所有文章的平均情緒評分，基數月訂為2017年7月，基數為100，以標誌回歸20周年的情況。從表三可以看到，不同報章所刊登的文章數目有明顯差別。因此，只考慮文章數目不足以呈現不同報章對讀者觀感的影響力。為確保可靠性，本指數將採用由香港中文大學傳播與民意調查中心「市民對傳媒公信力的評分」為每份報章的情緒評分加權。

⁵ Ku, Lun-Wei, Ho, Xiu-Wei and Chen, Hsin-His (2009). Opinion Mining and Relationship Discovery Using CopeOpi Opinion Analysis System, *Journal of American Society for Information Science and Technology*, 60(7), pp1486-1503.

表九 : 報章來源
Table 9 : Data Source

報章 Newspaper	文章篇數 Number of Articles
A報 A Daily	81
am730	1,847
蘋果日報 Apple Daily	8,131
頭條日報 Headline Daily	892
香港商報 Hong Kong Commercial Daily	12,312
新報 Hong Kong Daily News	4,476
信報 Hong Kong Economic Journal	8,929
經濟日報 Hong Kong Economic Times	3,788
公正報 Hong Kong Globe	194
都市日報 Metro Daily	1,253
明報 Ming Pao Daily News	10,492
東方日報 Oriental Daily News	7,240
爽報 Sharp Daily	152
成報 Sing Pao	4,670
星島日報 Sing Tao Daily	6,712
晴報 Sky Post	407
大公報 Ta Kung Pao	25,701
太陽報 The Sun	4,828
天天日報 Tin Tin Daily News	452
文匯報 Wen Wei Po	25,396
總數 Total	127,953

表十 : 按年份劃分的資料字數
Table 10 : Number of Words

年份 Year	字數 Number of Words
1998	669,676
1999	2,498,254
2000	2,320,584
2001	2,640,690
2002	2,545,546
2003	2,713,403
2004	4,801,621
2005	2,874,994
2006	1,879,834
2007	2,797,512
2008	1,446,629
2009	1,815,839
2010	1,880,198
2011	2,040,824
2012	3,441,893
2013	3,312,415
2014	5,386,835
2015	4,411,567
2016	5,590,354
2017	6,204,647
2018	2,456,416
總數 Total	63,729,731

4 準確度覆查 Accuracy test

1C2S MMI index is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict.

In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time. As shown in Table 11, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as 'positive' whereas 1,472 were classified as 'negative.'

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be.

「一國兩制」輿情指數是建基於由詞彙組成的模型。此模型視每段落為一籃子的詞語，從而抽離整篇文章的脈絡。其中一個效果是可能無法辨認到如諷刺等寫作手法，因而不能完全理解每一個段落的真正含義。這個局限在分析小說及文學作品時可能較為明顯，但對於寫作手法較直接的新聞文章而言，相信不是一個大問題。

為證實此詞彙模型辨別情緒的準確度，我們兩位研究員從語料庫中隨機抽取了約18,000個段落，親自分類為「正面」、「負面」和「中立」，再與詞彙模型比較。各段落的出處在給予研究員之前已經被隱藏。假如兩名研究員對同一個段落的情緒判斷有異，第三名研究員將會重讀並作出判斷。

是次覆查中，兩名研究員在大約八成的情況下均能作出相同的判斷。如表五所顯示，2,363及1,472個段落分別被判決為「正面」及「負面」。

我們利用與「一國兩制」輿情指數相同的詞彙模型為此等段落的情緒評分。在模型中，情緒評分為正、負面詞語量的淨值，所以評分愈高代表情緒愈正面。

表十一：覆查結果

Table 11: Results of Accuracy Test

	正面 Positive	中立 Neutral	負面 Negative
真人研究員對情緒的判斷 No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers	2,363	14,202	1,472
情緒淨值（基於詞彙模型計算） Net Value	21.76%	14.42%	2.92%

Table 11 also shows the average sentiment scores of these 3 groups of paragraphs. In particular, 'positive' paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as 'negative' paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these 3 groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.

表十一顯示利用詞彙模型計算的情緒評分。被研究員判斷為「正面」的段落，情緒評分為21.76%，約為「負面」段落的7.5倍。再者，利用多變量回歸分析，三個類別的情緒評分發現具統計學上的顯著差異，證實詞彙模型的計算結果與我們研究員的人手分類一致。



IV. Methodological Note : Different methods of constructing Index (A)

Index (A), the composite score of 1C2S from public's evaluation, is computed from scores of 9 sub-items. Conceptually, there are different ways to combine the 9 sub-items into a composite score. We have chosen the method of simple average, which simply gives equal weight to each sub-item. Conceptually, simple average may not be the best as different items may carry different weights. Here, we compare the method of simple average to two alternatives methods that are more sophisticated, namely, Principal Component Analysis and Factor Analysis. Table 1 shows the scores of Index (A) computed by the three methods. The results of the three methods are highly similar and we adopt the simple average as it is the most common and most easily understood.

指數A為香港市民對「一國兩制」的綜合評價，由九個項目構成。概念上，有不同方式將九個項目計算為綜合評分，我們採用每個項目權重相同的簡單平均數。因為理論上不同項目可能帶有不同比重，簡單平均數未必是最好的編制方式，是以我們考慮兩種更複雜的方式與簡單平均數比較，分別為「主成分分析」與「因子分析」。表一是以三種方式計算指數A的評分，結果非常相似，所以我們採用最常見及最容易理解的簡單平均數。

表一 : 不同方式編制的民調評分 (有效樣本: 901人)
Table 1 : Score constructed from public survey with different methods (valid sample: 901)

	評分 (1-7) Score (1-7)	評分 (0-10) Score (0-10)
簡單平均數 Simple Average	4.03	5.05
主成分分析 Principal Component Analysis	4.04	5.06
因子分析 Factor Analysis	4	5

The results of all three methods are highly similar, largely due to the clustered nature of the public's assessments of the nine items (cf. the distributions of the nine items are highly correlated), which causes the core components or sub-items across all three methods to be highly similar.

三種方式編制的結果十分接近，相信是由於市民對九個項目的評價相當近似（九個項目的分佈高度相關），是以其主要成分或主要因子與各個項目都十分接近。

Simple Average (of the Nine Items)

This is the most common method employed in constructing indices – its strength lies in its parsimony and accessibility; its weakness is that it assigns equal weighting to all items (i.e. it assumes equal importance for all items).

Principal Component Analysis

Principal Component Analysis is a statistical method that processes and simplifies data; it is the standard scientific method employed in constructing indices. Through statistical analysis, it extracts the data set's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains the variations across the data; its flaw lies in the complex calculations involved, which render the method inaccessible to laypersons. After complex calculations, we have found that there is negligible difference between results arrived at by using the average approach, and the results acquired via Principal Component Analysis

Factor Analysis

Factor Analysis extracts common factors from the data, and shares a similar methodology with Principal Component Analysis. Its strength lies in its ability to identify hidden and representative factors amongst the many variables and group variables of a similar nature and converting the same into a common factor, which reduces the total number of variables. Its weakness is that its complex calculations are difficult to navigate for laypersons. After complex calculations, we have found that there is negligible difference between the results arrived at by using the average approach, and the results acquired using Factor Analysis.

Given the similarity of the results from all three methods, we adopted the simplest and most commonly used method – i.e. the average of the nine items – in constructing the Index.

簡單平均數(九個項目)

這是編制指數最常用的方法，優點是簡單及容易明白，缺點是假定所有項目都同等重要（即所有項目的權重相等）。

「主成分分析」

主成分分析是一種分析和簡化數據的統計技術，是以科學化方式編制指數的標準方法，其方法是通過對數據進行特徵分解，以得出數據的主要成分與它們的權值，優點是揭露數據的內部結構，從而更好解釋數據的變化，缺點是計算繁複，一般人難以掌握。經過繁複計算後，我們發現數據的主要成分與九個項目的每一個項目都十分接近，是以計算的結果與採用簡單平均數沒有大分別。

「因子分析」

因子分析是從數據中提取公性因子的統計方法，技術與主成分分析類似，其優點是在多項變量中找出隱藏及具有代表性的因子，將相同本質的變量歸入一個因子，從而減少變量的數目，缺點是計算十分繁複，外行人亦難以明白。經過繁複計算後，我們發現數據的主要因子與九個項目的每一個項目都十分接近，是以計算的結果與採用簡單平均數沒有大分別。

因為三種方式編制指數結果十分接近，我們選取最簡單常用的方法，即九個項目的簡單平均數編制「一國兩制」指數。

“ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS”

I N D E X

「一國兩制」指數

- Project Leader 項目負責人 -

民主思路聯席召集人(研究)

宋恩榮教授

Professor Sung Yun-Wing

Co-convenor (Research) of Path of Democracy

- Contributors -

香港中文大學香港亞太研究所

Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

香港中文大學滬港發展聯合研究所研究助理

潘學智先生

Mr. Ray Poon, Research Assistant of Shanghai-Hong Kong Development Institute,

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

香港中文大學劉佐德全球經濟及金融研究所研究助理

甄定軒先生

Mr. Ting Hin Yan, Research Assistant of Lau Chor Tak Institute of Global Economics and Finance,

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

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「一國兩制」指數

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民主思路 PATH OF DEMOCRACY

18/F, Concord Commercial Building,
157 King's Road, North Point, Hong Kong
香港北角英皇道157號六合商業大廈18樓

Tel : (852) 2509 3131
Fax: (852) 2509 3130

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