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前言

Preface

The pursuit of 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) is unprecedented in the history of mankind. Over the past two decades, we have made headway under the auspices of 1C2S, but at the same time, encountered many challenges. The implementation of 1C2S requires unyielding exploration and persistence of stakeholders. To ensure its full implementation, the first critical step is to review and evaluate its accomplishments and shortfalls since the handover of Hong Kong 21 years ago.

「一國兩制」是人類史無前例的嘗試,在香港實踐21年,取得不少成就,同時亦遇到不少困難。「一國兩制」的實踐需要不斷探索和所有持份者的努力。要確保「一國兩制」能全面、準確地實踐,首先要總結香港回歸21年施行「一國兩制」之成就與缺失。

At the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong SAR, Path of Democracy released its first report on its attempt to conduct an objective evaluation of 1C2S. We developed an index of 1C2S based on a public opinion survey in Hong Kong on 1C2S, and also international indices that compare Hong Kong with other countries and territories in relation to human rights, various freedoms and democracy.

民主思路在香港回歸20年之際發布第一份關於「一國兩制」概況的客觀評價,希望為總結過去的得失謹盡綿力。我們編制的「一國兩制」指數來自兩項數據,一方面是進行有關「一國兩制」的民意調查,另一方面則參考國際性的人權、自由及民主指數,並比較香港與其他國家或地區的表現。

To complement our public opinion survey on 1C2S, we also introduced a 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) by making use of big-data to measure the sentiment of Hong Kong newspapers towards 1C2S since 1988 as news sentiment has very significant influences on public opinion.

為補足「一國兩制」的民意調查,我們借助 大數據方法推出嶄新的「一國兩制」與情指 數。與情對民意有重要影響,是以我們使用 大數據技術衡量自1998年迄今香港報章對 「一國兩制」的情緒,以探索新聞情緒對民 意的影響。 This is our fourth Report on the 1C2S Index. Every half year, we conduct a public opinion survey, update the international indices, and the MMI to reflect the latest sentiments of the Hong Kong public, the international community and Hong Kong newspapers towards 1C2S.

Our 1C2S survey covers nine different dimensions of implementation, including freedom of speech, judiciary independence, legislative independence and high degree of autonomy. We also asked for views on controversial issues related to 1C2S, such as public views on initiating Article 23 consultation, on emigration and confidence in 1C2S, and on the Greater Bay Area and the Belt and Road Initiative. In this fourth survey, we have added new questions relating to possible continuation of 1C2S after 2047. The aim was to reflect public views on the implementation of 1C2S in a comprehensive manner.

We also looked to global studies carried out by international think tanks and incorporated their evaluation of Hong Kong into ours. Specifically, we considered how Hong Kong was rated for democratic development, economic freedom and personal freedom (which would encompass human rights, rule of law, freedom of speech, freedom of association amongst other aspects). The final index score provides an aggregate evaluation of 1C2S in its implementation, based on both local public opinion and global perceptions.

In this Report, we found that the Hong Kong public overwhelmingly supported the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. However, evaluations of 1C2S of the Hong Kong public, of international think tanks, and of Hong Kong newspapers have declined substantially. In our detailed analysis, we are unconvinced that the declines were not at least in part due to common misconception, biases and/or misunderstandings on the basic nature of 1C2S; for example, it is difficult to reconcile the fact that despite what appeared to be a marked decline in confidence of the OCTS, people of Hong Kong still overwhelmingly indicated they were in favour of the continuation of the same beyond 2047. We have thus included in our Report a list of suggested policies to tackle some common misunderstandings on 1C2S.

Going forward, for the reference of policy makers and the public, we will continue to update and refine data collection and construction methodologies of the Index every six months through public surveys, updating international indices, and also updating the MMI to gauge the latest sentiments of the media on 1C2S.

Professor Sung Yun-Wing Co-convenor (Research), Path of Democracy 「一國兩制」指數每半年更新,這是第四次 更新的報告。每次更新將進行新一輪電話調查、更新相關的國際指數及「一國兩制」與 情指數,以反映香港市民、國際社會及本地 報章對「一國兩制」的最新意見。

我們設計的「一國兩制」調查就九個範疇 (包括言論自由、司法獨立、立法獨立及高 度自治等)評價「一國兩制」落實的概況, 亦調查市民對「一國兩制」實踐中具爭議性 議題的意見,包括對第二十三條立法諮詢的 看法、移民海外及對「一國兩制」的信心、 對粵港澳大灣區及「一帶一路」的取態等, 希望能夠較為全面地反映市民對「一國兩 制」實踐的評價。


我們亦參考國際智庫對香港民主發展、經濟 自由及個人自由(包括人權、法治、言論自 由和結社自由等項目)的評價。編制的指數 綜合地反映了市民對「一國兩制」的評價, 也反映了國際研究機構按照國際比較的標準 對香港的人權、自由及民主現況的評價。

本報告中,我們發現香港市民廣泛支持於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」,但香港市民、國際社會及本地報章對「一國兩制」的評價皆錄得跌幅。經過詳細分析,我們難以相信指數下降與一些對「一國兩制」的普遍偏見或誤解無關。例如,為何市民對「一國兩制」信心驟降的同時,仍然廣泛認同於2047年後延續這樣的制度?兩種取態難以調和。所以,為釐清這些對「一國兩制」的常見誤解,本報告提供了一系列的建議措施。


展望未來,我們會繼續每半年進行民意調查 及更新國際指數,以更新並改善「一國兩 制」指數;亦會更新與情指數以衡量媒體的 最新情緒,以供決策者及公眾參考。

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摘要 Executive Summary



1 簡介 Introduction

- (1) This is our 4th Report on the 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) Index (henceforth the Index) to provide an objective assessment on the implementation of 1C2S.
- (2) The Index is the average of Index (A), which is the evaluation of the Hong Kong (henceforth HK) public obtained from a telephone poll on 9 dimensions of 1C2S, and Index (B), which is the evaluation of renowned international think tanks on freedom and democracy in HK.
- (3) Every half year, we update the Index through updating indices (A) and (B) respectively with a new telephone poll and with the latest data from international indices. We also include in the survey other important issues related to 1C2S, such as public opinions on initiating the Article 23 consultation, on emigration and confidence in 1C2S, and on the Greater Bay Area and the Belt and Road Initiative. This year, we have added a new topic relating to possible continuation of 1C2S after 2047.
- (4) To complement our Index (A), we have introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) that use big-data techniques to measure the sentiment of HK newspapers on 1C2S since 1998 as news sentiment has very significant influences on public opinion.
- (5) Evaluations on 1C2S of the HK public (Index A), of international think tanks (Index B), and of the HK press (MMI) are determined by perceptions that may or may not reflect the reality. However, policy makers need to take perceptions into account in policy design even if they are mistaken or misplaced.

- (1) 民主思路發佈「一國兩制」指數第四次報告, 為香港實踐「一國兩制」作客觀評價。
- (2) 「一國兩制」指數為指數A及指數B的平均 值。指數A為香港市民的評價指數,取自電話 調查內九個「一國兩制」範疇的評分。指數B 為「自由民主指數」,取自國際智庫對香港自 由民主水平所編制的指數。
- (3) 我們每半年進行民意調查及收集國際指數的最新數據,更新指數A及指數B,從而更新「一國兩制」指數。電話調查也一併探討其他關乎「一國兩制」的重要議題,包括《基本法》第23條立法諮詢的取態、移民海外與對「一國兩制」的信心及粵港澳大灣區與「一帶一路」發展等。今年,我們提出新議題,了解市民對2047年後是否繼續實行「一國兩制」的意見。
- (4) 媒體情緒對民意有深遠影響,所以我們還推出 「一國兩制」與情指數,衡量1998年迄今香 港報章對「一國兩制」的情緒,利用大數據技 術去補充指數A之不足。
- (5) 香港市民的評價(指數A)、國際智庫的評價 (指數B)及香港報章的評價(輿情指數)皆 有主觀成分,未必完全反映客觀事實;不過, 就是觀感有所偏差,決策者在制訂政策時,仍 然需要仔細考慮各持份者的評價。

- (6) The findings in this Report from our telephone poll and from Index compilation are presented in the following order:
 - i) Changes in Indices (A), (B), the 1C2S Index, and the Mass Media Index (MMI);
 - ii) Rapid trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation in HK;
 - iii) Overwhelming support for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047;
 - iv) Citizens' identity as 'Hongkonger' and as Chinese;
 - v) Other important findings related to 1C2S in our telephone poll, including attitudes towards initiating the Article 23 consultation, emigration and confidence in 1C2S, and attitudes towards the Greater Bay Area and the Belt and Road Initiative.

- (6) 民意調查及指數編制的結果按以下次序編排:
 - i) 指數A、指數B、「一國兩制」指數及「一 國兩制」與情指數的變化;
 - ii) 市民政治傾向改變:去激進化與溫和政治 迅速興起;
 - iii) 2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」得到廣泛 支持;
 - iv) 市民對「香港人」及「中國人」的身份認同;
 - v) 其他關乎「一國兩制」的重要結果,包括 《基本法》第23條立法諮詢的取態,移民 海外與對「一國兩制」的信心及粵港澳大 灣區與「一帶一路」發展。

2 「一國兩制」指數 1C2S Index

2.1 Index (A): Evaluation of the HK public (Table 1)

- (1) Index (A) (average of 9 dimensions) declined from 5.05 to 4.84, falling by 4.2% since the 3rd survey in mid-2018. This was the first time in the 4 surveys that the decline in Index (A) was statistically significant, sending a worrisome signal. Moreover, all 9 sub-scores declined. The declines in 3 items, namely, maintaining original ways of life, freedom of speech, and legislative independence, were statistically significant. Though people's support for continuation of 1C2S after 2017 was high, their evaluations of 1C2S as currently implemented were relatively low.
- (2) The range of the ratings of the 9 dimensions is relatively narrow, ranging from 4 to 6 plus, most plausibly because the public generally hold a 'holistic rating' on 1C2S.

2.1 指數A:香港市民的評價(表1)

- (1) 指數A(九個範疇的平均分)由上一輪的5.05 下降至4.84,跌幅為4.2%。四輪調查中,跌幅首次達統計上顯著水平,情況值得關注。同時,九個範疇於四次調查中首次全數下跌。 「維持原有生活方式」、「言論自由」及「獨立立法權」,三個範疇的跌幅達統計上顯著水平。雖然市民非常支持2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」,但是他們對當前「一國兩制」的實施狀況評價較低。
- (2) 九個範疇的評分在4至6分多之間,高低差別不大,相信市民心中對「一國兩制」有一個概括評分。

2.2 HK public's evaluation of 1C2S: Generation gap and political divide

- (3) The generation gap in the evaluation of 1C2S is obvious: The average score of youths (age 18 to 29), which was around 4, was significantly lower than that of old people (age over 70), which was around 6. Surprisingly, since the last survey, the evaluation score of youths rose slightly, while the score of older age groups also fell somewhat, shrinking the generation gap (Figure 1).
- (4) Political divide: Statistical tests reveal that, in comparison with Moderates, the evaluations of Pro-establishment supporters were significantly higher, while the evaluations of Non-establishment supporters were significantly lower (Figure 2).
- (5) Change over time: The evaluation score of Moderates declined significantly from 5.16 in the 1st round to 4.87 in the 4th round.
- (6) The Pro-establishment Vs Non-establishment political divide is big and widening: The high scores of Pro-establishment supporters rose significantly higher (rising by 8.7% since the 1st round), and the low scores of Non-establishment supporters fell even lower (falling by 24.0% since the 1st round). The trend of polarisation is a serious issue which the HKSAR Government must take note.

2.3 Index (B): Evaluations of international think tanks

- (7) Index (B) is the average of 3 indices, namely, the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser Institutes, and the Democracy Index of the EIU (Economic Intelligence Unit). HK is always ranked world's number one in Economic Freedom, with a score of around 9 (Table 2).
- (8) Personal Freedom Index: HK's score peaked at 9.07 in 2011, declining to 8.58 in 2016, and declined further to an estimated 8.54 in 2017. Hong Kong's rank peaked at 14th in 2012, falling to 32th in 2016. The decline since 2013 has been quite steep. Despite the decline, HK's 2017 score of 8.54 is still relatively high.

2.2 市民對「一國兩制」概況的評價: 代溝及政治鴻溝

- (3) 對「一國兩制」評價的代溝顯而易見:青年 (18至29歲)的平均分只有4分左右,而長者 (70歲或以上)的平均分則是6分左右,差距 達統計上顯著水平。自上輪調查後,青年 (18至29歲)的評分有所上升,而長者(70 歲或以上)有所下降,令代溝收窄(圖1)。
- (4) 政治鴻溝:經統計檢測,建制派評分比溫和派顯著較高,而非建制派評分則比溫和派顯著較低(圖2)。
- (5) 歷次變化:溫和派評分由第一輪的5.16分下跌至第四輪的4.87分,跌幅達統計上顯著水平。
- (6) 建制派與非建制派之間有相當大的政治鴻溝, 且正在加深。建制派的高評分顯著增長(與第 一輪相比上升8.7%),而非建制派的低評分 則顯著下降(與第一輪相比下降24.0%)。兩 極化趨勢明顯,問題嚴重,特區政府必須有所 警覺。

2.3 指數B:國際智庫的評價

- (7) 指數B為國際智庫對自由民主水平的評價,是「經濟自由指數」、「個人自由指數」及「民主指數」三項指數的平均分。首兩項指數由卡托研究所(Cato Institute)及菲沙研究所(Fraser Institute)編制,第三項指數則由經濟學人智庫編制。香港的「經濟自由指數」長期名列世界第一,得分約9分(表2)。
- (8)「個人自由指數」:評分最高為2011年的9.07 分,其後回落至2016年的8.58分,再下跌至 2017年的8.54分;排名最高為2012年的第14 位,其後下降至2016年的第32位。跌勢自 2013起較明顯。儘管錄得跌幅,香港於2017 年的8.54分仍然不俗。

- (9) Democracy Index: HK's score rose from 5.92 in 2010 to a peak of 6.50 in 2015, rising by 9.8%, reflecting that HK has made some progress in democratization via the increase of directly elected seats in the Legislature. However, HK's score fell to 6.15 in 2018, a drop of 5.4% from the peak in 2015, reflecting the disqualification of candidates running for the Legislature on allegations of supporting separatism. However, HK's 2018 score and rank are still better than those in 2011.
- (10) Index (B), the Freedom and Democracy Index: HK's score rose from 7.99 in 2010 to a peak of 8.14 in 2012, rising by 1.9%, largely as a result of the rise in HK's Democracy Index. In 2018, Index (B) declined to 7.89, falling by 3.1% from the peak.

2.4 Personal Freedom Index: Its components

(11) The Index can only be updated to 2017 as 2018 data are not yet available. Five components (out of 7) exhibited substantial declines in scores and ranks since 2013, namely, 'Rule of Law', 'Religion', 'Association & Assembly', 'Expression & Information', and 'Identity & Relationships' (Table 3). The declines show that the international community has relatively serious concerns on personal freedoms in HK.

2.5 International Indices: Comparison with neighbouring countries/territories

- (12) Personal Freedom Index (2017): HK's scores were in the same league as those of our developed neighbours (Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), and were much higher than those of the Mainland (Table 4).
- (13) Components of Personal Freedom Index (2017): HK's scores on all components were comparable to those of its developed neighbours, except for a relatively low score in 'Rule of Law', which may be unfair but is nevertheless worrisome.
- (14) Index (B): HK's 2018 score was lower than those of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, but above that of Singapore. The gaps between HK and the Mainland in all the above Indices remained substantial, showing that allegations of 'Mainlandisation' are unfounded (Table 5).

- (9)「民主指數」:香港評分由2010年的5.92分上 升至2015年6.50分的頂點,反映立法會增加 直選議席令民主化取得一定進展。不過, 2018年的評分由2015年的高峰下降5.4%至 6.15分,反映有立法會候選人被指鼓吹分離 主義,而被取消參選資格事件。縱使如此, 2018年香港所得的評分和排名仍勝過2011 年。
- (10) 指數B-「自由民主指數」:香港評分由2010 年的7.99分上升至2012年8.14分的頂點,升 幅為1.9%,主要緣於香港的「民主指數」上 升。2018年,指數B下降至7.89分,自高峰下 跌3.1%。

2.4 「個人自由指數」各子項目

(11) 由於2018年的數據尚未公布,所以「個人自由指數」只能更新至2017年。七個子項目中,五項的分數及排名自2013年起持續下跌,包括「法治」、「宗教自由」、「結社、集會及公民社會自由」、「言論自由」及「性別認同及關係」(表3)。跌幅顯示國際社會對香港的個人自由有所顧慮。

2.5 國際指標:比較鄰近地區

- (12)「個人自由指數」(2017):香港評分與日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣等鄰近發達地區不相伯仲,並大幅拋離中國內地(表4)。
- (13)「個人自由指數」子項目(2017):除「法治」相對遜色外,香港所有子項目的評分旨媲美鄰近發達地區。儘管「法治」的評分未必公允,但情況亦令人擔憂。
- (14) 指數B: 2018年,香港評分落後於日本、南韓和台灣,但領先新加坡。香港在各種指數的評分比中國內地高出不少,可見香港被「大陸化」的說法缺乏根據(表5)。



2.6 Changes in the 1C2S Index (Figure 3)

- (15) The current score of Index (B) is close to 8, which is much higher than the score of Index (A), which is only around 5. From 2017 to 2018, Index (A) fell by 3.7% while Index (B) fell by only 0.8%. The 1C2S Index, which is the average of Indices (A) and (B), thus have declined from 6.42 in the first round to 6.30 in the fourth round, falling by 1.9 percent.
- (16) The Personal Freedom Index, which is an important component of Index (B), is assumed to stay constant from 2017 to 2018, as updated data have not yet been released. However, given recent trends, further downgrades are likely. The estimated declines of Index (B) and the 1C2S Index in 2018 are likely to be understated. In this respect, decision makers in HK should take careful note of the declining trend and its ramifications.

2.7 1C2S Mass Media Index (1C2S MMI)

- (17) MMI shows media sentiments towards 1C2S since April 1998. It is compiled from data-mining 132,600 news articles and 66 million words in 21 local daily newspapers. MMI is set at 100 in the base month of July 2017, the 20th anniversary of HK's return to China.
- (18) After reaching a nadir of 73 points in mid-2016 after the 'Causeway Bay Bookstore' incident and Mongkok riot, MMI bottomed out and rose strongly in late 2016, when CY Leung announced that he would not run for a second term (Figure 5).
- (19) Subsequently, MMI rose to a peak of 105 points in March 2018 under the new administration of Carrie Lam. However, the trend reversed in mid-2018, declining to 90 points in late 2018, falling by 15%.

2.6 「一國兩制」指數的變化(圖3)

- (15) 指數B 最新評分接近8分,遠高於約5分的指數A。由2017年至2018年,指數A下降3.7%,指數B下降0.8%。「一國兩制」指數(指數A和指數B的平均分)由首輪調查的6.42下跌至第四輪調查的6.30,跌幅為1.9%。
- (16) 由於最新數據尚未公布,我們假設2018年的「個人自由指數」與2017年相同,是以可能低估了指數B和「一國兩制」指數的跌幅。此 跌勢及其影響值得決策者關注。

2.7 「一國兩制」 輿情指數

- (17) 「一國兩制」與情指數透視自1998年4月起關於「一國兩制」的媒體情緒,從21家本地報章搜集約 132,600多篇報導,逾6,600萬字。 與情指數的基數月訂為2017年7月,基數為 100,以標誌回歸20周年的情況。
- (18) 輿情指數在2016年中因「銅鑼灣書店」事件 及旺角騷亂跌至低谷(73點),其後從谷底 反彈,並隨著梁振英於2016年底宣佈放棄連 任行政長官而大幅上升(圖5)。
- (19) 新一屆行政長官選舉後,輿情指數於2018年3 月達到105點的高峰,其後回落到年終的90 點,跌幅為15%。

2.8 Evaluations of 1C2S

- (20) 1C2S is unprecedented in history. There have always been doubts if HK can remain a free city as part of a country ruled by a Communist Party. Problems and difficulties in the implementation of 1C2S are to be expected.
- (21) 21 years after HK's return to China, despite some declines in scores in selected international indices, HK stills ranked world's number 1 in Economic Freedom, and also ranked very well in Personal Freedom. According to the 2018 Human Freedom Index (the average of Economic and Personal Freedom Indices), HK ranked world's number 3 after New Zealand and Switzerland. HK is still one of the freest territories in the world.
- (22) Though HK's Index (B), the Freedom and Democracy Index, declined somewhat lately, HK's 2018 score at 7.89 was still high. It was in the same league as HK's developed neighbours such as Singapore, Japan, and Korea. It was much higher than Mainland's 5.12, showing that the allegation of 'Mainlandisation' is unfounded.
- (23) Index (A), evaluations of the HK public, were around 5, the median of the 0 to 10 scale. In comparison to the evaluations of international thinktanks, the evaluations of the HK public are less positive, suggesting that the public is more demanding in their assessments due to their high expectations of 1C2S. HK's people's starting point is a system with a sophisticated legal system that enshrines both rule of law and personal freedoms, and gradual democratization that had already been in progress prior to the return to China. These in turn induced greater expectations amongst the public with respect to self-governance and human rights enshrined by the Basic Law.
- (24) As will be seen below in section 4, more than 76% of the public agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. Support was high across all groups in HK, including 'Localists or Self-determinists', who are known to be highly critical of 1C2S. Though the public's current evaluation of 1C2S is quite critical, the still regard 1C2S as the system for HK's future.
- (25) Though the Index declined from 6.42 in the first round to 6.30 in the fourth round, it is still well over the median of 5. While 1C2S has problems in implementation, as could be expected of any unprecedented system, it is clearly not unworkable. The decline in the 4th round should be viewed in this context.

2.8 「一國兩制」的評價

- (20)「一國兩制」是史無前例的嘗試,輿論不斷 懷疑香港是否能夠在共產黨領導的國家之內 維持自由,「一國兩制」的實踐出現困難與 挑戰實屬意中事。
- (21) 回歸21年,儘管部分國際指標錄得下降,香港的經濟自由排名保持世界第一,個人自由排名仍然亮麗。跟據《2018人類自由指數》(「經濟自由指數」和「個人自由指數」的平均值),香港排名全球第三,僅次於新西蘭和瑞士。香港仍然是全球最自由的地區之一。
- (22) 雖然最近香港的指數B 「自由民主指數」下 跌,2018年的7.89分仍然不俗,與新加坡、 日本、南韓和台灣等鄰近香港的發達國家及 地區不相伯仲。評分比中國內地的5.12分高 出甚多,印證香港被「大陸化」的說法缺乏 根據。
- (23) 指數A一香港市民的評價在5分左右,是0至10 分尺度的中位數。香港市民的評價比國際智庫較低,可能因為他們心目中對「一國兩制」有較高標準,所以給予較嚴格的評分。香港在回歸前已有成熟的法治基礎和人身自由,政制亦逐步民主化,所以市民對基本法承諾的高度自治和在人權及自由方面的保障有更高期望。
- (24) 從下面報告第四部分可見,超過76%市民同意於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」。所有政治派別對繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度均高企,包括對「一國兩制」常有批評的「本土及自決派」。即使市民對當前「一國兩制」的實施狀況有一定批評,他們依然相信「一國兩制」是適合香港未來的體制。
- (25) 雖然「一國兩制」指數由第一輪的6.42分下 降至第四輪的6.30分,此分數比中位數5分仍 然高出不少。正如任何史無前例的制度一 樣,實踐「一國兩制」時遇到問題乃意料之 內,並非代表它不可行。第四輪調查評分的 下降應該由此角度解讀。

2.9 Reasons for declines in Index (A), Index (B), and the MMI

(26) Declines in the indices are likely to be affected by controversial political events that occurred since 2017, including the disqualification of pro-independence candidates running for LegCo, and trials of activists for riots or violence.

2.9.1 Effects of internal governance not strictly related to 1C2S

- (27) Internal governance issues that are not strictly related to 1C2S appear to have important effects on evaluations of the HK public (Index A) and the MMI, but do not affect international evaluations (Index B) as much. It is important to bear this in mind when reading the findings identified in this Report.
- (28) In the period before mid-2018, both MMI and Index (A) performed well despite many political controversies occurred in that period. The announcement of CY Leung in late 2016 that he would not run for a second term, and the subsequent election of the new CE had strong positive effects on MMI that outweighed the effect of the above controversies.
- (29) The sharp declines in MMI and Index (A) in the second half of 2018 can be attributed to controversies over the disbanding of the HK Nationalist Party and the rejection of work visa for Victor Mallet while other internal governance issues reflected in the sharp declines in approval ratings of the government in late 2018 may also have an effect.

2.9.2 Biases in evaluations of international think tanks (Index B)

- (30) The attitude of the West towards China has been shifting from engagement to confrontation as the West increasingly fears that its supremacy would be challenged by the rise of China. Evaluations of international think tanks may not be free of western ideological biases against the rise of China, but they may also reflect genuine weaknesses in the implementation of 1C2S. Furthermore, their effects on international investors cannot be underestimated as HK is an easy target in the 'New Cold War'.
- (31) Recently, western think tanks have downgraded HK's scores on 'Rule of Law', citing the interpretation of the Basic Law by Beijing in 2016. However, interpretation of the Basic Law first occurred in 1999 and it is nothing new. The HK judiciary is still the same judiciary which had received high scores from western think tanks just a few years back, and it is as independent as always as demonstrated by recent prosecutions and convictions of a former Chief Executive and other high-ranking officials of the HKSAR Government. It appears that western perceptions of China and HK have changed.

2.9 指數A、指數B及輿情指數下跌的原因

(26) 上述指數的下跌與2017起發生的政治爭議相信不無關係,包括支持「港獨」的立法會候選人被取消資格,以及參與騷亂或牽涉暴力的社運人士面臨起訴。

2.9.1與「一國兩制」無直接關係的內部管治影響

- (27)與「一國兩制」無直接關係的內部管治問題,對香港市民(指數A)和與情指數的評價似乎有一定影響,但對國際評價(指數B)影響不大。在解讀此報告的結論時,應予以考慮。
- (28) 儘管在2018年中之前發生不少政治爭議,指數A及與情指數皆表現良好。梁振英於2016年底宣佈不角逐連任,及後新一屆行政長官選舉對與情指數有明顯的正面作用,蓋過上述爭議的影響。
- (29) 輿情指數及指數A於2018年下半年的較大下降,可能歸因於香港民族黨被取締及馬凱簽證爭議。香港政府於2018年底支持度下降所反映的內部管治問題,亦有一定影響。

2.9.2 國際智庫評價的偏見(指數B)

- (30) 西方愈來愈擔心中國崛起將會挑戰其優勢, 所以對中國的態度由合作轉向對抗。西方智 庫對「一國兩制」的評價不能完全擺脫此意 識形態的轉向,但也可能反映「一國兩制」 在實踐上的真正弱點。它們對國際投資者的 影響不容小覷,因為香港很可能在「新冷 戰」下首當其衝成為戰靶。
- (31) 近年部分西方智庫基於2016年的人大釋法降低香港法治的評分,其實人大釋法早於1999年已經發生,並非新生事物;而直到2015年,香港司法仍然得到西方好評。近年香港部分高官及某前特首被起訴及定罪的案例,說明香港司法仍然與以往一般獨立,只是西方對中國及香港的觀感有所改變。

2.9.3 Suggestions to tackle the misunderstanding on 1C2S

- (32) Given the biases and misunderstandings identified above, it is important for the HKSAR Government to consider spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of HK including the business community, the academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs to promote the image of HK under 1C2S. Such effort may include:
 - Setting up a broadly representative committee to advise the HKSAR Government on all issues relating to 1C2S;
 - Motivating HK's business communities from western countries who are willing to defend HK in the international arena;
 - Establishing a semi-official high-level think tank on external relations to undertake various private initiatives such as being responsible for mounting and coordinating outreach efforts, mobilising support from all sectors of our and international communities, and enhancing HK's presence in APEC related networks;
 - Promoting, assisting and encouraging local think tanks to conduct periodical exchanges with influential foreign think tanks interested in HK affairs, especially the Heritage Foundation and the CATO-Fraser Institutes, which are sympathetic to HK as they value economic and personal freedoms highly;
 - Setting up an early warning system within government to alert and manage expectation of public on all possible issues which might affect 1C2S or the perception of quality of governance;
 - Setting up a system whereby international media would be timely, fully and properly briefed on issues affecting 1C2S; and
 - Enhancing HK's presence in APEC related networks and forums, e.g., the APEC Business Advisory Councils (ABAC), APEC Study Centres, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and other tripartite forums.

2.9.3.為「一國兩制」 釐清誤解的建議

- (32) 為釐清以上偏見與誤解,特區政府應領導香港各界,包括政府、商界、學界、專業團體、目標相近的智庫和民間組織,共同努力向國際社會闡釋香港在「一國兩制」下的實況,包括:
 - 設立具廣泛代表性的委員會,協助政府處理所有有關「一國兩制」的問題;
 - 鼓勵在香港經商的西方商人為香港發聲;
 - 成立專注香港涉外關係的半官方高層智庫,負責推動和協調涉外工作,動員社會各界支持,加強香港在APEC網絡中的角色;
 - 促進、協助和鼓勵本地智庫與關注香港事務的外國重要智庫定期交流,尤其是傳統基金會和卡托及菲沙研究所。出於對經濟和個人自由的重視,他們對香港的情況比較理解;
 - 政府內部建立監察系統,就可能影響「一國兩制」或治理質素的所有可能衝突,管理公眾的期望;
 - 建立機制使國際媒體能夠充分及恰當地知 悉影響「一國兩制」的議題;及
 - 強化香港在APEC龐大網絡內的影響力,例如 亞 太 經 合 組 織 商 業 諮 詢 理 事 會 (ABAC),亞太經合組織研究中心,太平洋經濟合作理事會(PECC)以及其他三方論壇。

3 市民政治傾向改變:去激進化與溫和政治迅速興起 Rapid trend of de-radicalization and rise of moderation

- (1) Composition of HK population by political inclination in the 4 surveys are divided into the following groups: Moderates being the largest group (about 60%), followed by the Non-establishment supporters (less than 30%), and Pro-establishment supporters (less than 12%). Non-establishment supporters are further divided into Democrats (16% or more) and 'Others' (5% or more), which are mostly Localists or Self-Determinists.
- (2) Over the 4 surveys, the percentage shares of Moderates and Pro-establishment supporters to HK's adult population have increased while that of 'Non-establishment' supporters have decreased. The change has been especially rapid since the 3rd survey (Figure 6).
- (3) From mid-2017 to end of 2018, in terms of the percentage composition of the adult population, Moderates increased by 5.7 percentage points, gaining roughly 335,000 supporters; Pro-establishment supporters increased by 1.3 percentage points, gaining roughly 79,000 supporters; but Non-establishment supporters decreased by 6.6 percentage points, losing roughly 403,000 supporters. Within the Non-establishment group, Democrats lost roughly 274,000 supporters while 'Others' lost roughly 128,000 supporters.
- (4) Our results on political inclination are similar to those of the HKU Public Opinion Programme (HKUPOP), which has been collecting data on political inclination on a bi-weekly basis. Their results showed that the proportion to population of the 'Pro-democracy camp' (analogous to our 'Non-establishment group') exhibited a decreasing trend that was statistically significant, whilst the proportion to population of the Centrist camp (analogous to our 'Moderates group') exhibited an increasing trend that was also statistically significant (Appendix VI).
- (5) The political inclination of HK youths (aged 18 to 29) also shows a trend of de-radicalisation (Figure 8). The trend is tentative as the changes are only notable in the latter half of 2018 (from 3rd to 4th survey). Furthermore, we have only observed changes over two points in time.
- (6) From mid-2017 to the end of 2018, in terms of percentage of youths, Moderates increased by 15.6 percentage points, gaining roughly 154,000 youths. Meanwhile, the Non-establishment group decreased by 14.4 percentage points, losing roughly 143,000 youths - of whom roughly 30,000 were Democrats and roughly 104,000 were 'Other Non-establishment' supporters.

- (1) 四輪調查中,香港市民的政治傾向按以下派別劃分:溫和派(60%上下),非建制派(不足30%)及建制派(12%以下)。非建制派支持者包括民主派(16%或以上)及以本土派和自決派為主的其他非建制派(5%或以上)。
- (2) 歷經四輪調查,溫和派和建制派佔成年人口 比例上升,而非建制派則下降。跌勢自第三 輪調查起更為明顯(圖6)。
- (3) 從2017年中至2018年底,按成年人口比例, 溫和派上升5.7個百份點,添加約335,000 人;建制派上升1.3個百份點,添加79,000 人;非建制派下跌6.6個百份點,流失約 403,000人。非建制派中,民主派流失約 274,000人,其他非建制派流失約128,000 人。
- (4) 香港大學民意研究計劃(港大民研)每兩星期統計有關政治傾向的數據,調查結果與我們吻合。在港大民研的調查中,民主派(對應我們的「非建制派」)佔人口比例呈下降趨勢,而中間派(對應我們的「溫和派」)則呈上升趨勢,兩者的升跌幅均達統計上顯著水平(附錄VI)。
- (5) 青年(18至29歲)的政治傾向亦有去激進化的跡象(圖8)。由於變化只有在2018年下半年較大(從第三輪到第四輪調查),所以結論仍有待觀察。是次結果只反映最近半年的情況。
- (6) 從2017年中至2018年底,按青年人口比例, 溫和派上升15.6個百份點,添加約154,000名 青年。非建制派下跌14.4個百份點,流失 143,000位青年支持者,其中30,000人曾屬民 主派、104,000人曾屬其他非建制派。

4 2047年後是否繼續實行「一國兩制」 Continuation of 1C2S after 2047

- (1) We introduce two new questions in the 4th round of our telephone poll to gauge public's opinion on continuation of 1C2S after 2047.
- (2) The support for continuation of 1C2S was high across all age groups, educational attainment, and political inclination. Surprisingly, this included the group of 'Localists or Self-determinists', who are known to be highly critical of 1C2S (Figure 9).
- (3) Among different conditions that would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S, the pattern of choice was pragmatic. 'Maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (33.6%), and 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (31.3%) were close first and second choices. 'Political system democratises further' (19.5%) was a distant third, though it was the first choice of 'Localists or Self-Determinists' (40.4%). 'Completing legislation of Article 23' (6.5%) came in last, though it was more important for Pro-establishment supporters (21.7%) (Figure 10).

- (1) 我們在第四輪電話調查提出兩條新題目,從 而衡量市民對2047年後是否繼續實行「一國 兩制」的取態。
- (2) 在不同年齡、教育程度和政治傾向的組別中,對繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度均高企,包括對「一國兩制」常有批評的「本土及自決派」(圖9)。
- (3) 在以下幾種有利於繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件中,市民的選擇頗為務實。「維持高度自治」(33.6%)和「經濟維持繁榮穩定」(31.3%)為首兩個選項,支持度非常接近。「政制進一步民主化」(19.5%)是相對次要的第三個選項,雖然對「本土及自決派」而言是首要選項(40.4%)。「完成23條立法」(6.5%)排列最後,但較受建制派重視(21.7%)(圖10)。

5 市民對「香港人」及「中國人」的身份認同 Public's identification as 'Hongkongers' and as 'Chinese'

- (1) The public identify themselves strongly as 'Hongkongers' as well as 'Chinese'. This double identity is best shown by a scatter plot on the Likert scale¹. A majority of the public (from 55% to 57% in the 4 rounds) have relatively a strong identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', with both identity scores greater than the median of 4 (Figure 11).
- (2) In all 4 rounds of surveys, there is a significant and positive correlation between the two identities the more strongly one is identified with 'Hongkonger', the more strongly one is identified with 'Chinese'; the converse also holds. This is a favourable condition for the implementation of 1C2S (Figure 12).
- (3) The public's self-identification as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' have shown continuous improvement over the 4 surveys. Since mid-2017, on the 0 to 10 scale, the identity as 'Hongkongers' rose from 7.75 to 8.06, and the identity as 'Chinese' rose slightly from 6.63 to 6.83 (Table 6).

- (1) 擁有「香港人」和「中國人」雙重身份認同 為社會主流。以 1 至 7 分的李克特量尺 1, 配 合散佈圖最能呈現這種雙重身份認同。大部 分市民對兩種身份均有較高認同, 皆高於中 位數 4 分(四輪調查均維持在 55% 至 57%)(圖 11)。
- (2) 四輪調查中,市民對「香港人」和「中國 人」的認同均呈現統計上顯著的正相關,即 愈認同「香港人」身份的市民亦愈認同「中 國人」的身份,反之亦然。這是落實「一國 兩制」的有利條件(圖12)。
- (3) 市民對「香港人」及「中國人」的身份認同 在過去四輪調查持續加強。自2017年中,按0 至10分的尺度,「香港人」身份認同由7.75 分上升至8.06分,「中國人」身份認同由6.63 分上升至6.83分(表6)。

¹ The Likert Scale (scale 1 to 7), which is used in our surveys, is more scientific than the popular 0 to 10 scale, which is too finely graduated for respondents to choose from. However, for convenience of exposition, we convert the results mathematically into the popular 0 to 10 scale when appropriate.

李克特量表 (Likert Scale,1至7分尺度),為我們電話調查所採用。現時常用的0至10分尺度其實分類過於細緻,令市民難以選擇。不過為便於呈現,我們利用數學方法將調查結果轉換成為常見的0至10分尺度。

- (4) Traditional surveys that compel interviewees to choose between the two identities ('Hongkonger' and 'Chinese') are misleading as they cannot reveal a rise in strength of both identities, which has been the case in HK.
- (5) Political divide in the self-identity as 'Chinese' widened: Self-identity as 'Chinese' of Pro-establishment supporters was high and rising, but that of Non-establishment supporters was low and falling (Table 7).
- (6) Since the last survey, generation gap in self-identity as 'Chinese' shrunk: Though self-identity as 'Chinese' in the younger age groups (18 to 29) was not high, it had risen from 4.96 to 5.29. This is consistent with the de-radicalisation of HK youths. Meanwhile, the self-identity as 'Chinese' in older age groups (40 or above) remained high albeit a slight decline from the last survey.

- (4) 傳統民調限制受訪者在兩個身分(「香港人」和「中國人」)作出選擇容易出現偏頗,未能反映兩種身份認同在過去一年皆有所加強。
- (5)「中國人」身份認同的政治鴻溝繼續兩極化: 建制派的「中國人」認同感強烈且正在上 升,而非建制派的「中國人」認同感不強且 不斷減弱(表7)。
- (6) 與上一輪調查比較,身份認同的代溝則有所 縮窄:雖然青年(18至29歲)的「中國人」 身份認同於低位徘徊,但認同感由4.96分上 升至5.29分,與他們的去激進化趨勢相乎。 較年長組別(40或以上)的「中國人」身份 認同強烈,但呈現輕微下降。

對第二十三條立法諮詢的取態 Attitudes towards initiating Article 23 public consultation

- (1) In the 4 surveys, opinions are divided without a clear majority: Slightly less than half chose 'unnecessary' while slightly more than a third chose 'necessary'. Over the 4 surveys, there has been a slight rise in 'unnecessary' over 'necessary' (Table 8).
- (2) Public opinion has been highly divided on whether it is necessary to initiate the consultation. Policy makers should exercise caution in approaching this subject (Figure 13).
- (1) 四輪調查結果均出現兩極化的傾向,未有過 半數的主流意見:認為「無需要」諮詢的市 民稍低於一半,認為「有需要」諮詢的市民 稍多於三分之一。歷經四輪調查,認為「無 需要」諮詢的市民較認為「有需要」的稍為 增多(表8)。
- (2) 全港市民對相關諮詢未有共識,決策者需要 小心從事(圖13)。

7 對《基本法》的認識(表9) Knowledge of Basic Law (Table 9)

- (1) The mean score of public's self-rating of their familiarity with the Basic Law rose continuously from 4.45 in the 1st survey to 4.69 in the 4th survey. The rise was statistically significant. However, the rating is still below the median of 5, indicating that the public's knowledge of Basic Law is still inadequate.
- (1) 市民對《基本法》認識程度的自我評價,由 第一輪調查的4.45分微升至第四輪調查的4.69 分,升幅達統計上顯著水平。不過評分仍然 低於中位數5分,反映市民對《基本法》的認 識並不足夠。

8 出現矛盾的責任屬內地或香港? (表10) Whose responsibility is it when conflicts arise between HK and the Mainland? (Table 10)

- (1) In the 4 surveys, roughly half selected 'Equally Responsible'; around a quarter thought that the Mainland was responsible while 1/6 thought that HK was responsible. Since the 2nd round, there was a very small shift in net blame towards the Mainland.
- (1) 四輪調查中,約一半市民選擇「一半半」; 約四分之一認為責任屬於內地,六分之一認 為責任屬於香港。從第二輪調查起,責任誰 屬的淨值輕微地由歸咎香港轉向歸咎於內 地。

- (2) The results suggest that both the Central Government and HKSAR Government ought to reflect on its own responsibility for deadlocks and conflicts between the two.
- (2) 結果反映中央政府與香港均需就雙方的僵局 和矛盾反思自身責任。

林鄭月娥上台對社會撕裂的影響(表11) Whose responsibility is it when conflicts arise between HK and the Mainland? (Table 11)

- (1) Those who chose 'Decreased' vastly exceeded those who chose 'Increased'.
- (1) 認為「減少」社會撕裂的遠超認為「增加」的。
- (2) Change over time: there has been a fall in those who chose 'Decreased' and rise in those who chose 'Increased', i.e., there has been a shift towards the less favourable impact on societal division.
- (2) 歷次變化:認為「減少」社會撕裂的下降, 認為「增加」的上升,即對社會撕裂的有利 影響有所減弱。

10 移民海外與「一國兩制」信心(表13) Emigration and confidence in 1C2S (Table 13)

- (1) The Emigration Ratio (planning to emigrate due to lack of confidence in 1C2S) of Non-establishment supporters was 2 to 3 times as high as that of Moderates, which was in turn much higher than that of Pro-establishment supporters.
- (1) 非建制派的移民比率(因對「一國兩制」缺乏信心而計劃移民的比例) 比溫和派高出1至 2倍,後者又比建制派高出相當多。
- (2) Compared to the last survey, the Emigration Ratio of the public has risen from 9.2% to 11.2%. For Moderates and Non-establishment supporters, the Ratios rose respectively from 6.8% to 9.3%, and from 19.9% to 23.8%.
- (2) 與上一輪相比,移民比率由9.2%上升至 11.2%。溫和派與非建制派的移民比率分別由 6.8%上升至9.3%及由19.9%上升至23.8%。

1 對粵港澳大灣區及「一帶一路」的取態 Attitudes towards the Greater Bay Area (GBA) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

- (1) The public is not familiar with the GBA. Over time, there has been a slight rise in 'familiar' and a slight fall in 'unfamiliar' (Table 14). More promotion of the GBA is needed.
- (1) 市民對大灣區認識不深。比較上輪,「認識較深」較微上升,「認識較淺」較微下降 (表14)。粵港澳大灣區需要更多宣傳。
- (2) The majority agreed to HK's participation in the development of the GBA (Table 15). Pro-establishment camp's support was high and rising. Moderates were mildly positive. However, the Non-establishment camp switched from mild agreement to mild disagreement.
- (2) 多數市民支持香港參與大灣區發展(表 15)。建制派的支持度較高,且正在上升。 溫和派傾向支持。但非建制派由傾向支持轉 為傾向反對。

11.1 Willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA

11.1 前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展 的意願

(3) A majority of respondents were not willing to live or move to GBA. Over time, there has been a slight rise in 'Willing' and a slight fall in 'Not willing' (Table 16). There is a need for more efforts in promotion.

(3) 多數市民不會考慮北上居住或發展。比較上輪,「會考慮」前往輕微上升,「不會考慮」輕微下降(表16)。政府有需要再作推廣。

(4) In the 3rd survey in mid-2018, only 8.1% of youths were willing to live or work in other cities of the GBA, the lowest ratio among all age groups. However, in the 4th survey at the end of 2018, 14.9% of youths were willing to live or work in other cities of the GBA, the highest ratio among all age groups. The net unwillingness of youths fell significantly by 19 percentage points. This is consistent with the de-radicalisation of HK youths (Table 17).

11.2 Should HK take part in the development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)?

- (5) The majority supported the development of BRI. Over time, the net support fell from 37.6% to 26.2% (Table 18). This may be related to the problems that the BRI encountered in a number of countries.
- (6) Pro-establishment camp's support was high and rising. Moderates were mildly positive. However, the Non-establishment camp switched from mild agreement to mild disagreement.

11.3 Summary of attitudes towards GBA and BRI

(7) Pro-establishment supporters and Moderates, who together constitute over 75% of the adult population, agreed that HK should take part in the GBA and the BRI. However, the attitude of Non-establishment supporters has turned negative. Non-establishment supporters appeared to see the GBA and BRI as schemes that would threaten HK's autonomy.

12 非建制派支持者的不滿情緒 Disaffection of Non-establishment supporters

- (1) Non-establishment supporters in HK appear to be increasingly alienated: Besides their high and rising Emigration Ratios and their low and falling evaluations of 1C2S, their identity as 'Chinese' has also fallen, contrary to the trend of the majority. As will be seen below, their attitudes towards the Greater Bay Area and Belt and Road Initiative have increasingly diverged from that of the majority.
- (2) Though Non-establishment supporters are in the minority, they are more likely to vote in elections and voice their opinions. They command around half of the votes in most elections and are influential in shaping public opinion. Their increasing disaffection is a serious social and political issue that the Central government and the HKSAR government must take careful note.

(4) 2018年中的第三輪調查中,只有8.1%的青年會考慮北上粵港澳大灣區居住或發展,是比例最低的年齡組別。2018年底的第四輪調查中,14.9%的青年會考慮前往,是比例最高的年齡組別;青年的不願意度淨值大幅下跌19個百分點,與他們的去激進化趨勢相乎(表17)。


11.2.香港應否參與「一帶一路」的發展?


- (5) 多數市民支持香港參與「一帶一路」發展。 比較上輪,淨支持值由37.6%下跌至26.2% (表18)。可能跟推行「一帶一路」時,與 部分沿線國家存在爭端有關。
- (6) 建制派的支持度較高,且正在上升。溫和派傾向支持。但非建制派由傾向支持轉為傾向反對。

11.3 總結對粵港澳大灣區和「一帶一路」的 取態

(7) 建制派及溫和派佔成年人口超過75%,他們認為香港應該參與粵港澳大灣區和「一帶一路」的發展。然而,非建制派支持者的態度轉趨負面。他們似乎認為粵港澳大灣區和「一帶一路」削弱香港的自主權。

- (1) 非建制派支持者似乎愈來愈不滿現狀:他們的移民比率偏高且上升,對「一國兩制」的評價低落且下降,對「中國人」的身份認同也在降低,跟普羅大眾的趨勢相反。他們對粵港澳大灣區和「一帶一路」發展的取態亦與大多數人背道而馳。
- (2) 雖然非建制派屬少數,不過較積極投票及發聲。他們在大部分選舉取得約一半的選票, 對民意有較大影響力。他們的不滿持續升溫,實屬中央政府及特區政府需要解決的嚴重社會及政治問題。





「一國兩制」概況:民意調查及指數編制 (第四次報告)

'One Country Two Systems' Overview : Public Survey and Index Construction (Fourth Report)



1 簡介 Introduction

This is our fourth Report on the 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) Index (henceforth the Index). The purpose of the Index is to provide an objective assessment on the implementation of 1C2S. Our first Report was released in mid-2017, on the 20th anniversary of the return of Hong Kong (henceforth HK) to China. We update the Index every six months, at mid-year and year end.

We constructed the Index as the average of the following two indices:

- i) Index (A), an index of HK public's evaluation of 1C2S: Compiled from a telephone poll on 9 dimensions of 1C2S; and
- ii) Index (B), the Freedom and Democracy Index: Compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on various dimensions of freedom and democracy in HK.

Every half year, we update the Index through updating indices (A) and (B) respectively with a new public survey and with the latest data from international indices. To complement our Index (A), we also introduced a new index: 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) that uses big-data techniques to measure the sentiment of Hong Kong newspapers since 1998 as news sentiment has very significant influences on public opinion.

In this fourth Report on the Index, we commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct a telephone poll to compile Index (A), reflecting conditions in December 2018. We included in the survey other important issues related to 1C2S, such as public opinions on initiating the Article 23 consultation, on emigration and confidence in 1C2S, and on the Greater Bay Area and the Belt and Road Initiative. In this fourth survey, we have added a new topic relating to the possible continuation of 1C2S after 2047.

香港回歸20週年之際,民主思路於2017年中首次發布「一國兩制」指數,旨在為香港實踐「一國兩制」作客觀評價。指數於年中與年底,每半年更新,這是第四次更新的報告。

「一國兩制」指數為以下兩項指數的平均值:

- i) 指數A-香港市民的評價指數,取自電話調查 內九個「一國兩制」範疇的評分;
- ii) 指數B—「自由民主指數」,取自國際智庫對 自由民主水平所編制的指數。

我們每半年進行民意調查及收集國際指數的最新數據,更新指數A及指數B,從而更新「一國兩制」指數。媒體情緒對民意有深遠影響,所以我們還推出了嶄新的「一國兩制」與情指數,檢視從1998年起香港報章對「一國兩制」的情緒,利用大數據技術去補充指數A之不足。

本報告委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查,反映2018年12月的狀況而編制指數A。電話調查也一併探討其他關乎「一國兩制」的重要議題,包括《基本法》第23條立法諮詢,移民海外與對「一國兩制」的信心及粵港澳大灣區與「一帶一路」發展。本報告亦增加新議題,了解2047年後是否繼續實行「一國兩制」的意見。

The telephone poll was conducted from December 3 to 12 in 2018. 1,001 individuals were successfully and randomly sampled, all aged 18 or above; all of them spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin (the sampling error is ±3.10% within a 95% confidence level); the response rate was 38.8%, satisfying both statistical and scientific standards. The questionnaire and the frequency distribution of survey results can be found in the 'Annex' uploaded on the homepage of Path of Democracy (http://pathofdemocracy.hk/one-country-two-systems-index-feb-2019/).

It should be stressed that Index (A), Index (B), and MMI are determined by perception and may or may not reflect the reality. Even so, changes in perceptions of 1C2S of the HK public, of international think tanks, and of the HK press are nevertheless important. We will analyse the reasons for the changes in these perceptions as they are crucial for the implementation of 1C2S.

The findings of this Report are presented in the following order:

- i) Changes in Indices (A), (B), the 1C2S Index, and the Mass Media Index (MMI);
- ii) Rapid trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation in HK;
- iii) Overwhelming support for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047;
- iv) Citizens' identity as 'Hongkonger' and as Chinese;
- Other important findings related to 1C2S in our telephone poll, including attitudes towards initiating Article 23 consultation, emigration and confidence in 1C2S, and attitudes towards the Greater Bay Area and the Belt and Road Initiative.

電話調查於2018年12月3至12日進行,隨機抽樣,成功訪問1,001人,全部皆屬18歲或以上,能操廣東話或普通話(在95%置信水平下,抽樣誤差為±3.10%)。回應率為38.8%,達統計和科學標準。調查問卷及調查結果的頻數分佈已上載到民主思路網頁上的《附件》(http://pathofdemocracy.hk/zh-hant/one-country-two-systems-index-feb-2019/)。

指數A、指數B及與情指數的評分取決於觀感,可能不完全反映現實。儘管如此,香港市民、國際智庫和本地媒體的觀感變化對實施「一國兩制」仍然至關重大,所以我們也會分析其背後的變化原因。

報告結果按以下次序編排:

- i) 指數A、指數B、「一國兩制」指數及「一國 兩制」與情指數的變化;
- ii) 市民政治傾向改變:去激進化與溫和政治的急速興起;
- iii) 2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」得到廣泛支持;
- iv) 市民對「香港人」及「中國人」的身份認同;
- v) 其他關乎「一國兩制」的重要結果,包括《基本法》第23條立法諮詢的取態,移民海外與對「一國兩制」的信心及粵港澳大灣區與「一帶一路」發展。

2「一國兩制」指數 1C2S Index

As mentioned above, the Index is the average of Index (A), the evaluation of the HK public and 1C2S, and Index (B), the evaluations of international think tanks on various dimensions of freedom and democracy in HK. Below, we will first detail the compilation of Indices (A) and (B).

2.1 Index (A): Evaluation of the HK public (Questions 1 to 9)

Index (A) is the average¹ of sub-scores obtained from 9 questions on different dimensions of 1C2S in our survey. Only 1 out of these 9 scores, namely the score on question 4 ('original way of life in HK remained unchanged') is not comparable between the first survey and subsequent ones due to refinements of the question introduced after the first survey. Table 1 shows the average of 9 questions in the latter three surveys as well as the average scores of the other 8 questions that are identical across all four surveys.

Index (A) (average of 9 dimensions) declined to 4.84 from 5.05 in the last round, falling by 4.2%. This was the first time in the 4 surveys that the decline in Index (A) was statistically significant, sending a worrisome signal. Moreover, all 9 sub-scores have declined in the latest round, which is again a point of concern. The declines in 3 items, namely maintaining original ways of life, freedom of speech, and legislative independence, were statistically significant.

In our Report, differences in scores at a particular point in time, or changes in scores over time that are big enough to be statistically significant will be noted explicitly. If there is no mentioning of statistical significance about a score, it means that the difference or change concerned is statistically insignificant.

如上所述,「一國兩制」指數是指數A及指數B的平均值。前者為香港市民對「一國兩制」九個方面的評價指數,後者為國際智庫對自由與民主的評價。我們將會詳細解釋指數A及指數B的編制方法。

2.1 指數A:香港市民的評價(題目1-9)

電話調查就「一國兩制」各個範疇提出九條題目,指數A為其平均分¹。九條題目中的第四題(「維持原有生活方式」)於第一輪調查後經過修訂,所以此題的評分不能與其後的調查直接比較。表1顯示最近三輪調查中九個範疇的平均分,同時顯示八個相同範疇的平均分,以便與第一輪調查比較。

指數A(九個範疇的平均分)由上一輪的5.05下降至4.84,跌幅為4.2%。四輪調查中,跌幅首次達統計上顯著水平,情況令人擔憂。九個範疇於四輪調查中首次全數下跌,同樣值得關注。「維持原有生活方式」、「言論自由」及「獨立立法權」,三個範疇的跌幅達統計上顯著水平。

如同一輪調查的不同組別或不同輪次調查之間的 評分差異達統計上顯著水平,報告將會特別註 明。未有註明者,則代表評分差異在統計上並不 顯著。

¹ We have explored 3 alternative methods, namely, Simple Average, Principal Component Analysis, and Factor Analysis to compute Index (A). The first method of Simple Average assigns equal weight to each of the 9 sub-scores. It is easily understood and is the most commonly used method. The latter two methods use statistical techniques to assign different weights to the sub-scores based on the variations in the sub-scores. Details of computations are in Appendix I as they are highly technical. As the differences in the results of using the 3 different methods are small and negligible, we adopt the simplest and most commonly used method, i.e., the average of the 9 items, in constructing Index (A).

我們考慮三種方式來計算指數A,包括簡單平均數、主成分分析及因子分析。簡單平均數給各個項目相同權重,容易理解,是最常見的方式。後兩種方式利用統計技術按照各個子項目的差異給予不同權重。由於高度技術性,詳細統計方法可參閱附錄II。以這三種方式編制的結果非常接近,所以我們利用最簡單常用的方法來編制指數A,即九個範疇的簡單平均數。

表 1 :市民對「一國兩制」概況的評價 Table 1 : Public's Evaluation of 1C2S

		2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	
	age (9 dimensions) 分(九範疇)	-	4.98	5.05	4.84	*
	age (8 dimensions) 分(八範疇)	4.88	4.84	4.9	4.7	
Q4	The original ways of life have remained unchanged 維持原有生活方式	-	6.21	6.25	5.96	*
Q5	A high degree of freedom of speech 言論自由	6.15	6.03	5.79	5.41	*
Q2	An independent judiciary 獨立司法權	5.61	5.43	5.59	5.39	
Q3	An independent legislature 獨立立法權	5.42	5.28	5.35	5.08	*
Q1	A high degree of autonomy in the executive branch 自行處理行政事務	4.82	4.73	4.84	4.82	
Q7	The successful implementation of the 'Self-Governance, High Autonomy' principles 落實「港人治港、高度自治」	4.43	4.42	4.57	4.38	
Q6	The gradual implementation of the politico institutional democratization process 民主政制發展	4.36	4.43	4.50	4.34	
Q8	The full implementation of 1C2S in the future 全面落實「一國兩制」	4.28	4.28	4.32	4.09	
Q9	Resolving differences between HK and the Mainland via dialogue and negotiation 透過對話協商解決矛盾	3.97	4.17	4.27	4.05	

Note: '*' denotes changes that are statistically significant compared with the previous round

註:「*」表示與上一輪比較,變化達統計上顯著水平


Item ratings vary in a relatively narrow band from 4 to 6 plus, most plausibly because the public generally holds a 'holistic rating' on IC2S. This implies that regardless of the specific item surveyed, their answers are shaped by the 'holistic rating', rendering the range across their answers for each specific item relatively small.

各範疇評分高低差別不大,在4分和6分多之間。相信市民心中對「一國兩制」有一個概括評分,無論詢問甚麼項目,市民的答案也會受到心中的概括評分影響,因此對各細項的評分也不會過於偏離整體上的概括評分。

圖1:市民對「一國兩制」的評價(按年齡組別劃分)

Figure 1 : Public's evaluation of 1C2S by age

市民對「一國兩制」的評價(按年齡組別劃分) Public's evaluation of 1C2S by age



2.2 HK public's evaluation of 1C2S: Generation gap and political divide

Figure 1 shows public's evaluations of 1C2S by age in the 4 surveys. The generation gap in evaluation of 1C2S is obvious: The average scores of younger age groups were lower than those of older age groups. The difference between the 18-49 age group and the over 50 age group was statistically significant. The average score over 8 items of Young Adults (aged 18 to 29) was only around 4, while those of old people (over 70) was around 6. However, since the last survey, the evaluation score of Young Adults (18-29) rose slightly, while the scores of all older age groups also fell somewhat, shrinking the generation gap. This is a surprising development.


Figure 2 shows the public's evaluation of 1C2S by political inclination in the 4 surveys. Political inclinations include Moderates, Pro-Establishment supporters, and Non-establishment supporters, which are further divided into Democrats and 'Others' (mostly Localists and Self-determinists).

2.2 市民對「一國兩制」概況的評價: 代溝及政治鴻溝

圖1顯示四輪調查中,各個年齡組別對「一國兩制」的評價。對「一國兩制」評價的代溝顯而易見:年輕一代的平均分低於較年長的組別,18至49歲組別與50歲或以上組別的差異達統計上的顯著水平。青年(18至29歲)在八個範疇的平均分只有4分左右,而長者(70歲或以上)的平均分則是6分左右,差距達統計上顯著水平。自上輪調查後,青年(18至29歲)的評分有所上升,而長者(70歲或以上)有所下降,令代溝意外地收窄。

圖2顯示四輪調查中,不同政治傾向對「一國兩制」的評價。政治傾向包括溫和派、建制派及非建制派。非建制派可再細分為民主派和其他非建制派(以本土派和自決派為主)。

市民對「一國兩制」的評價(按政治傾向劃分) Public's evaluation of 1C2S by political inclination



Statistical tests revealed that, in comparison with Moderates, the evaluations of Pro-establishment supporters were significantly higher, while the evaluations of Non-establishment supporters were significantly lower. Within Non-establishment supporters, the 'Others' group had lower evaluations (scores around 2 to 3) in comparison with Democrats (scores around 3 to 4).

非建制派評分則比溫和派顯著較低。非建制派當中,其他非建制派的評價(大約2分至3分)比民主派(大約3分至4分)為低。

經統計檢測,建制派評分比溫和派顯著較高,而

The evaluation scores of Moderates (which include Centrists and those without specific political inclination) declined from 5.16 in the 1st round to 4.87 in the 4th round, and the decline was statistically significant.

溫和派(包括「中間派」及「沒有政治傾向」的市民)評分由第一輪的5.16分下跌至第四輪的4.87分,跌幅達統計上顯著水平。

The Pro-establishment Vs Non-establishment political divide is big and widening: Statistical tests revealed that the high scores of Pro-establishment supporters rose significantly higher (rising by 8.7% since the 1st round), and the low scores of Non-establishment supporters fell significantly lower (falling by 24.0% since the 1st round). The trend of polarisation is evident. This is a serious issue which the HKSAR Government must take note.

建制派與非建制派之間有相當大的政治鴻溝,且正在加深。經統計檢測,建制派的高評分顯著增長(與第一輪相比上升8.7%),而非建制派的低評分則顯著下降(與第一輪相比下降24.0%)。兩極化趨勢明顯,問題嚴重,特區政府必須有所警覺。

2.3 Index (B): Evaluations of international think tanks

Under 1C2S, HK is China's most open and international city. Freedom and democracy are core components of 1C2S, and international perception of freedoms and democracy in HK is very important for the implementation of 1C2S. Hence, we give an equal weight to scores obtained from the poll of the HK public, namely Index (A), and scores computed from international indices, namely Index (B).

Index (B) is the average of 3 indices, namely, the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser Institutes, and the Democracy Index of the EIU (Economic Intelligence Unit). The average of the Economic Freedom and Personal Freedom Indices is known as the Human Freedom Index, which is the most comprehensive index of freedom available. HK is always ranked world's number one in Economic Freedom, and it has also ranked highly in Human Freedom. The scores and ranks of HK in these Indices since 2010 are shown in Table 2.

2.3 指數B:國際智庫的評價

在「一國兩制」下,香港是中國最開放與國際化的城市。自由與民主是「一國兩制」的重要元素,而國際社會對香港自由民主程度的觀感對落實「一國兩制」尤其重要。因此,由調查所得香港市民的評分(指數A)與計算國際指標所得的評分(指數B),將會給予相同比重。

指數B是「經濟自由指數」、「個人自由指數」及「民主指數」三項指數的平均分。首兩項指數由卡托研究所(Cato Institute)及菲沙研究所(Fraser Institute)編制,第三項指數則由經濟學人智庫編制。「經濟自由指數」和「個人自由指數」的平均分被稱為「人類自由指數」,是目前衡量自由的指數中最全面的一種。香港在經濟自由方面一直名列世界第一,在人類自由方面也名列前茅。表2顯示香港由2010年起在這些指標上的分數和排名。

表 2 : 香港於主要國際指數的分數及排名

Table 2 : HK's scores and ranks in major international indices

指數B—「自由民主指數」 Index (B): Freedom and Democracy Index

「人類自由指數」

	H	Human Freedom Index		民主指數	總分
Year	經濟自由	個人自由	分數	Democracy Index	Aggregate
年份	Economic Freedom	Personal Freedom	Sub-aggregate		
2010	9.02 (1)	9.04 (18)	9.03 (1)	5.92 (80)	7.99
2011	8.99 (1)	9.07 (17)	9.03 (1)	5.92 (80)	7.99
2012	8.96 (1)	9.04 (14)	9.00 (1)	6.42 (63)	8.14
2013	8.96 (1)	8.98 (18)	8.87 (1)	6.42 (65)	8.12
2014	9.00 (1)	8.78 (29)	8.89 (2)	6.46 (66)	8.08
2015	8.97 (1)	8.75 (28)	8.86 (2)	6.50 (67)	8.07
2016	8.97 (1)	8.58 (32)	8.78 (3)	6.42 (68)	7.99
2017	9.01ª	8.54ª	8.78	6.31 (71)	7.95ª
2018	9.01ª	8.54 ^b	8.78	6.15 (73)	7.89 ^b

a Updates based on comparable international indices (See Appendix II for details). 按相應的國際指數更新(詳見附錄II)。

b Estimated on the assumption that the Personal Freedom Index is unchanged from 2017 to 2018. 估算假定2018年2018年的「個人自由指數」與2017年相同。

As the Human Freedom Index covers a very large number of countries, there is a two-year time lag in data compilation. The latest 2018 Economic Freedom and Personal Freedom Indices only reflects conditions in 2016. We updated both Indices according to the methodology of CATO-Fraser Institutes with data from comparable international indices. The method of updating is detailed in Appendix II. The Economic Freedom Index can be updated to 2018, but the Personal Freedom Index can only be updated to 2017. There is no need to update the Democracy Index as it already reflects conditions in 2018. When computing the 2018 score of Index (B), we assumed that the 2018 score of the Personal Freedom Index was the same as that in 2017. Given the recent trend that international think tanks have been downgrading their evaluations of personal freedoms in HK, as will be detailed below, the above assumption would impart an upward bias to our 2018 estimated score of Index (B).

HK has always ranked number 1 in Economic Freedom, with a score of around 9. HK's score in Personal Freedom peaked at 9.07 in 2011, dropped to 8.58 in 2016, and declined further to an estimated score of 8.54 in 2017. Hong Kong's rank peaked at 14th in 2012, falling to 32th in 2016. The decline since 2013 has been quite steep. Despite the decline, HK's 2017 score of 8.54 is still relatively high.

HK's score in the Human Freedom Index also fell, largely due to the decline in the Personal Freedom Index. HK's rank fell from number 1 to number 3, trailing New Zealand and Switzerland. Despite the decline, HK still ranked very well in the Human Freedom Index.

The Democracy Index rose from 5.92 in 2010 to a peak of 6.50 in 2015, rising by 9.8%, reflecting that HK has made some progress in democratisation vis-à-vis the increase of directly elected seats in the Legislature. However, HK's score fell to 6.15 in 2018, falling by 5.4% from the peak in 2015, reflecting the disqualification of candidates running for the Legislature on allegations of supporting separatism. It should be noted that HK's 2018 score and rank are still better than those in 2011.

Given the adverse publicity in the international media on recent political events in HK, the declines in these indices are not surprising. HK's Personal Freedom Index and Democracy Index have declined respectively by 5.8%, and 5.4% from their peaks.

Index (B), our Freedom and Democracy Index, rose from 7.99 in 2010 to a peak of 8.14 in 2012, rising by 1.9%, largely as a result of the rise in HK's Democracy Index. Since then, it has embarked on a declining trend. The latest reading came in at 7.89, representing a drop of 3.1% from the peak.

由於「人類自由指數」覆蓋大量國家,數據整合滯後兩年。最新發表的「2018人類自由指數」,只反映2016年的數據。我們參照卡托研究所及菲沙研究所的編制方法,將香港的「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」按相應的國際指數更新,更新方法詳見附錄II。「經濟自由指數」已更新至2018年,但「個人自由指數」只能更新至2017年。最新的「民主指數」已經反映2018年的情況,所以毋須更新。計算2018年的 指數B時,我們假設2018年的「個人自由指數」與2017年相同。不過,國際智庫可能下調 2018年香港「個人自由指數」的評分,是以我們可能高估了2018年的指數B。

香港的「經濟自由指數」長期名列世界第一,得分約9分。「個人自由指數」評分最高為2011年的9.07分,其後回落至2016年的8.58分,再下跌至2017年的8.54分;排名最高為2012年的第14位,其後下降至2016年的第32位。跌勢自2013起較明顯。儘管錄得跌幅,香港於2017年的8.54分仍然不俗。

香港在「人類自由指數」的評分同樣下跌,主要 緣於「個人自由指數」下降。香港的排名由第一 跌至第三,僅次於紐西蘭和瑞士。縱使如此,香 港在「人類自由指數」上仍然名列前茅。

香港的「民主指數」由2010年的5.92分上升至2015年6.50分的頂點,升幅為9.8%,反映立法會增加直選議席令民主化取得一定進展。不過,2018年的評分由2015年的高峰下降5.4%至6.15分,反映有立法會候選人被指鼓吹分離主義,而被取消參選資格事件。縱使如此,2018年香港所得的評分和排名仍勝過2011年。

國際社會對香港近期的政治事件反應負面,這些 指標錄得下跌並不令人意外。香港的「個人自由 指數」及「民主指數」分別自高峰下降5.8%及 5.4%。

指數B—「自由民主指數」由2010年的7.99分上升至2012年8.14分的頂點,升幅為1.9%,主要緣於香港的「民主指數」上升。其後持續下跌,2018年的指數B下降至7.89分,自高峰下跌3.1%。

2.4 Personal Freedom Index: Its components

Table 3 shows HK's scores and ranks in the 7 components of the Personal Freedom Index from 2010 to 2017. During this time period, the score of 'Security & Safety' has risen while the score of 'Movement' has been constant at 10. Five components have exhibited substantial decline in scores and ranks since 2013, namely, 'Rule of law', 'Religion', 'Association & Assembly', 'Expression & Information', and 'Identity & Relationships'. The declines show that the international community does have relatively serious concerns on personal freedoms in HK.

2.4 「個人自由指數」各子項目

表3顯示香港從2010年至2017年在「個人自由指數」七個子項目上的分數和排名。期間,「安全」評分上升,「遷徙自由」評分保持10分。五項的分數及排名自2013年起持續下跌,包括「法治」、「宗教自由」、「結社、集會及公民社會自由」、「言論自由」及「性別認同及關係」。 跌幅顯示國際社會對香港的個人自由有所顧慮。

表 3 :香港於「個人自由指數」的分數及排名 Table 3 : HK's scores and ranks in Personal Freedom Index

「個人自由指數」 Personal Freedom Index

年份 Year	法治 Rule of Law	安全 Security & Safety	遷徙自由 Movement	宗教自由 Religion	結社、集會及 公民社會自由 Association, Assembly, & Civil Society	言論自由 Expression & Information	性別認同 及關係 Identity & Relationships	總分 Aggregate
2010	7.50 (18)	9.66 (33)	10.00 (1)	9.02 (35)	9.42 (25)	9.05 (42)	10.00 (1)	9.04 (18)
2011	7.50 (18)	9.69 (26)	10.00 (1)	8.92 (30)	9.75 (24)	9.01 (41)	10.00 (1)	9.07 (17)
2012	7.39 (19)	9.67 (27)	10.00 (1)	9.04 (24)	9.75 (24)	8.94 (45)	10.00 (1)	9.04 (14)
2013	7.39 (19)	9.33 (41)	10.00 (1)	9.19 (19)	10.00 (1)	8.86 (48)	10.00 (1)	8.98 (18)
2014	7.80 (14)	9.39 (39)	10.00 (1)	8.13 (80)	8.00 (62)	8.74 (51)	10.00 (1)	8.78 (29)
2015	7.79 (16)	9.40 (38)	10.00 (1)	8.43 (68)	8.00 (62)	8.77 (48)	9.25 (34)	8.75 (28)
2016	7.14 (23)	9.39 (36)	10.00 (1)	8.59 (40)	8.00 (62)	8.67 (51)	9.25 (35)	8.58 (32)
2017	6.54ª	9.77ª	10.00ª	8.59ª	8.00ª	8.79ª	9.25ª	8.54ª

a Updates based on comparable international indices (See Appendix III for details). 按相應的國際指數更新(詳見附錄II)。



International think tanks tend to give relatively higher scores to HK (e.g. 2017 Personal Freedom score of 8.54) while the HK public tends to give relatively low scores (around 5). This is because the contexts in which international think tanks and the HK public conduct their evaluations are quite different. Evaluations of international think tanks cover a large number of developing countries and territories, and given HK's status as a highly developed economy, its relative rank is high. On the other hand, HK public's evaluation is more demanding as HK already had a sophisticated system with rule of law, a high degree of personal freedoms, and partial democratization before its reversion. These induced high expectations amongst the public with respect to self-governance and human rights enshrined by the Basic Law.

國際智庫對香港的評分相對較高(例如2017年的「個人自由指數」為8.54分),而香港市民所給予的評分相對較低(約5分),是由於兩者的評價準則有所不同。國際智庫的評分涵蓋大量發展中國家及地區,而香港已屬發達地區之列,所以得分會處於較高的區間。另外,市民心目中對「一國兩制」有較高要求。香港在回歸前已有成熟的法治基礎和高度人身自由,政制亦逐步民主化,所以市民對基本法承諾的高度自治和保障人權及自由有更高期望。

2.5 Index (B): Comparison with neighbouring countries/territories

As Hong Kong is a highly developed region, and given that highly developed regions tend to have comparatively higher Freedom and Democracy Indices as compared with developing regions – we have selected certain neighbouring developed countries and territories (namely, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) as benchmarks for comparison and assessment of Hong Kong's performance. We have also compared the respective scores of the Mainland and Hong Kong under the indices, so as to identify whether Hong Kong has become increasingly 'Mainlandised' under 1C2S. For brevity, we will refer to Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and the Chinese mainland as 'neighbours'.

Table 4 compares the 2017 Personal Freedom Index of HK with its neighbours. HK's scores were in the same league as those of our developed neighbours (Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), and were much higher than those of the Mainland. HK's aggregate score of 8.54 was much higher than that of Singapore (7.38) but slightly lower than those of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.

2.5 指數B:比較鄰近國家或地區

一般而言,發達地區的自由與民主指數,均高於發展中的地區。由於香港是高度發展的地區,所以我們選取鄰近的發達國家及地區,包括日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣作比較,藉以評價香港的表現。我們亦比較中國內地與香港的自由民主指數,以觀察在「一國兩制」之下的香港是否趨向「大陸化」。為簡便起見,我們將日本、南韓、新加坡、台灣與中國內地稱為「鄰近地區」。

表4比較2017年香港和鄰近地區的「個人自由指數」。香港評分良好,接近日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣等鄰近發達地區,並大幅拋離內地。香港總分為8.54分,遠遠高於新加坡(7.38分),但略低於日本、南韓及台灣。

表 4 : 2017年「個人自由指數」:比較香港與鄰近地區。

Table 4 : 2017 Personal Freedom Index: Comparing HK and neighbours^a

「個人自由指數」 Personal Freedom Index

	法治 Rule of Law	安全 Security & Safety	遷徙自由 Movement	宗教自由 Religion	結社、集會及 公民社會自由 Association, Assembly, & Civil Society	言論自由 Expression & Information	性別認同 及關係 Identity & Relationships	總分 Aggregate
Hong Kong 香港	6.54	9.77	10.00	8.59	8.00	8.79	9.25	8.54
Mainland China 中國內地	4.76	7.95	3.33	3.67	1.50	5.13	9.25	5.47
Japan 日本	7.71	9.82	10.00	8.09	7.50	9.45	9.25	8.81
Korea 韓國	7.30	9.59	8.33	9.35	9.50	10.00	9.25	8.86
Singapore 新加坡	7.34	9.35	8.33	6.11	3.50	6.15	8.00	7.38
Taiwan 台灣	6.98	9.72	10.00	9.36	10.00	9.69	10.00	9.08

a Updates based on comparable international indices. 按相應的國際指數更新(詳見附錄II)。

In comparison with its four developed neighbours, HK was relatively strong in 'Security & Safety' and 'Movement', but relatively weak in 'Rule of Law'. HK was more or less at par with others in the remaining 4 components, namely, 'Religion', 'Association & Assembly', 'Expression & Information', and 'Identity & Relationships'. HK's relatively low score in 'Rule of Law' may be unfair but nevertheless warrants concern.

Table 5 compares HK and neighbours in the various indices of Index (B) in 2018. HK's score in Economic Freedom was world's number 1 while its score in Personal Freedom was at par with its developed neighbours. Due to HK's superlative performance in Economic Freedom, its score in Human Freedom was stronger than the four developed neighbours. However, HK's Democracy Index was lower than the four developed neighbours. Consequently, HK's Index (B) score was lower than those of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, but above that of Singapore. The gaps between HK and the Mainland in all the above Indices on freedom and democracy remained very big, showing that the allegation of 'Mainlandisation' is unfounded.

比較四個鄰近發達地區,香港在「安全」和「遷 徙自由」較優勝,「法治」則相對遜色。其餘四 項,即「宗教自由」、「結社、集會及公民社會 自由」、「言論自由」和「性別認同及關係」, 香港與鄰近發達地區不相伯仲。儘管「法治」的 評分未必公允,但情況亦令人擔憂。

表5比較2018年香港和鄰近地區的指數B。香港的經濟自由名列世界第一,個人自由亦媲美鄰近發達地區。香港的經濟自由卓越,使其「人類自由指數」勝過以上四個鄰近發達地區。不過,香港的「民主指數」則低於以上四者。2018年,香港的指數B評分落後於日本、南韓和台灣,但領先新加坡。香港在各種指數的評分比中國內地高出不少,可見香港被「大陸化」的說法缺乏根據。

表 5 : 比較 2018 年香港與鄰近地區的國際指數

Table 5 : Comparing 2018 international indices of HK and neighbours

指數(B)—「自由民主指數」(2018) Index (B): Freedom and Democracy Index(2018)

「人類自由指數」*

	H	Human Freedom Index*	民主指數	總分	
Year	經濟自由	個人自由	分數	Democracy Index	Aggregate
年份	Economic Freedom	Personal Freedom	Sub-aggregate	(2018)	(2018)
Hong Kong 香港	9.01	8.54	8.78	6.31 (71)	7.89
Mainland China 中國內地	6.57	5.47	5.99	3.32 (130)	5.12
Japan 日本	7.74	8.81	8.29	7.99 (22)	8.16
Korea 韓國	7.33	8.86	8.17	8.00 (21)	8.06
Singapore 新加坡	8.92	7.38	8.12	6.38 (66)	7.56
Taiwan 台灣	7.97	9.08	8.49	7.73 (32)	8.26

^{*} Estimated on the assumption that the Personal Freedom Index is unchanged from 2017 to 2018. 2018 scores were updated on comparable international indices (See Appendix II for details).

^{*}估算假定2018年的「個人自由指數」與2017年相同。2018年的評分按相應的國際指數更新(詳見附錄II)。

2.6 Changes in the 1C2S Index


Figure 3 shows the scores of the Index since mid-2017². Since mid-2017, Index (A) (average of 8 dimensions) fell from 4.88 to 4.70, falling by 3.7%. Index (B) declined from 7.95 in 2017 to 7.89 in 2018, falling by 0.8%. The 1C2S Index, which is the average of Indices (A) and (B), declined from 6.42 in the first round to 6.30 in the fourth round, falling by 1.9 percent. While the scores of international think tanks were much higher than those of the Hong Kong public, both scores showed a declining trend.

2.6 「一國兩制」指數的變化

圖3顯示2017年中迄今的「一國兩制」指數2。由2017年中起,指數A(八個範疇的平均分)由4.88 跌至4.70,跌幅為3.7%。指數B由2017年的7.95 跌至2018年的7.89,跌幅為0.8%。「一國兩制」指數(指數A和指數B的平均分)由首輪調查的6.42下跌至第四輪調查的6.30,跌幅為1.9%。雖然國際智庫的評價遠遠高於香港市民,但是兩者皆錄得下跌。

圖 3 : 「一國兩制」指數的變化 Figure 3 : Changes in 1C2S Index





As noted above, the 2018 estimated score of Index (B) is likely to be biased upwards. This implies the declines in Index (B) and in the 1C2S Index are likely to be understated. In this respect, decision makers in HK should take careful note of the declining trend and its ramifications.

如上所述,2018年指數B的估算分數可能偏高, 是以可能低估了指數B和「一國兩制」指數的跌 幅。此跌勢及其影響值得決策者關注。

² Scores of Index (B) and the 1C2S Index in the previous 3 reports were estimated with data available then. They are slightly different from those in Figure 3, which are latest updates. The scores estimated at the time of each report are shown in Appendix III, Though the scores are slightly different, the pattern of change is very similar.

2.7 1C2S Mass Media Index (1C2S MMI)

Media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion. We attempt to use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S and monitor how 1C2S is conveyed in the mass media to provide a timely barometer of public sentiment. 1C2S MMI is a net sentiment index of newspaper articles over a given time. To dovetail with our main Index, we will compile the MMI half yearly. We mined close to 132,600 news articles and around 66 million words from 21 local daily newspapers to compile the MMI (See Appendix IV for details). MMI is set at 100 in the base month of July 2017, the 20th anniversary of HK's return to China.

In the longer run, subject to resource availability, MMI opens up many opportunities of further research in public opinion formation. The MMI can be compiled at high frequency intervals (e.g. monthly) as it is not subject to the long time lags of surveys. It is also possible to investigate the effect of specific significant events (e.g., co-location arrangement for the Express Rail link) on media sentiment, or to compare sentiments in the local and overseas media.

Newspaper is only part of the media, and the MMI does not cover news reported by traditional media such as television and radio, as well as news carried by new media. Measuring the sentiments of news reported by television and radio is very difficult as there is no comprehensive text-based data base available. Measurement of sentiments of new media is also very difficult as it will be very demanding on resources. Furthermore, while widely accepted credibility ratings of different newspapers are available through regular opinion polls, comparable ratings on the credibility of different new media outlets are not available. We will thus confine our study to newspaper articles on 1C2S.

It should be noted that many newspapers have also broadcasted their news through online outlets such as websites and mobile apps. In so far as the news articles of these online outlets are the same as their printed versions, the sentiments of these articles are already included in our MMI regardless of whether they are printed or broadcasted online. 1C2S MMI currently only gauges sentiment of an important subset of mass media, printed newspapers, as a general representation of sentiment in mass media.

2.7 「一國兩制」 輿情指數

媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素,故此,我們嘗試利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒,藉此透視大眾傳媒對「一國兩制」的感受及意見,編制輿論情緒對「一國兩制」的晴雨表。「一國兩制」與情指數為一段時間內報紙文章的情緒淨值指數,以半年結為基礎,配合我們的主指數及補充其不足之處。與情指數從21家本地報章搜集約132,600多篇報導,逾6,600萬字(詳見附錄IV)。與情指數的基數月訂為2017年7月,基數為100,以標誌回歸20周年的情況。

長遠而言,如資源許可,與情指數能為民意形成開拓更多研究機會。與情指數不受以傳統調查方式收集民意時所產生的滯後影響,因此能以高頻率編制(例如每月)。它亦可以調查特定重大事件(例如高鐵一地兩檢安排)對媒體情緒的影響,或比較本地及海外媒體的情緒。

報紙只是媒體的一部分,與情指數不包括電視、電台等傳統電子媒體報導的新聞,也不包括新媒體所報導的新聞。由於電視和電台沒有全面的文本數據庫,所以要衡量它們的新聞情緒非常困難。衡量新媒體的情緒則對資源有較高要求,所以也非常困難。此外,民意調查定期評估不同報紙的公信力,得到廣泛認可,新媒體的公信力卻沒有相應的評價。故此,我們的研究將會聚焦於與「一國兩制」有關的報紙文章。

值得注意的是,不少報紙也透過網站、手機程式等網上媒介傳播。這些網上媒介的報導與印刷版本大多相同,所以無論是印刷或網上版本,其情緒已經涵括在輿情指數之中。目前,輿情指數只衡量大眾傳媒的一個重要部分——印刷報紙,以評估大眾傳媒整體的輿情。

2.7.1 Historical Trend

Media coverage will shape public opinion and the effect of media priming is observed in Hong Kong. A local study also suggests that sentiment analyses will lead telephone surveys by about 2 weeks.³ Figure 4 juxtaposes 1C2S MMI with survey results regarding views towards 1C2S by two organizations, namely Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) and Public Opinion Programme by the University of Hong Kong (HKUPOP).⁴ Remarkably, these series depict a similar overall trend of public views - albeit with some quantitative differences across the 3 samples. All three series rose in the early 2000's to a peak around 2007; then fell to a trough around 2014-16 with Occupy Central and the civil unrest in Mongkok, and then recovered thereafter.

As for quantitative differences, 1C2S MMI tends to reveal the immediate effect of speeches and activities of high-ranking officials, especially those of the Chinese leaders which have extensive coverage in mass media. Survey-based indicators might be affected by events with no direct relevance to 1C2S such as the re-election of Donald Tsang with high popularity in 2007. 1C2S MMI also serves as a better proxy for cases with high newsworthiness, while survey-based indicators trace incidents which impose more universal impacts. For example, 1C2S MMI gives a more negative rating during the civil unrest in Mongkok, which came as a shock yet affected only limited parties. Survey-based indicators, on the other hand, show a more negative rating during the 'Occupy Central' movement, which affected the general public in various aspects.


2.7.1 歷年變化

本地研究顯示,媒體報導具有塑造民意的預示效果(priming effect),而輿情分析的結果將會領先電話調查大約兩個星期³。圖4比較輿情指數及香港電台和港大民研關於「一國兩制」的電話調查⁴。儘管三項結果在數值上存在差異,但整體也呈現相似的趨勢。三組數值均由2000年初攀升至大概2007年的頂點,隨著「佔領中環」與旺角騷亂下降至2014至2016年的低谷,再逐步回升。

就三項結果的差異而言,與情指數較能反映高級官員講話和活動的即時影響,尤其是受媒體廣泛報導的中國領導人。電話調查所顯示的整體觀感則有可能受到跟「一國兩制」無直接關係的事件影響,例如曾蔭權挾高民望在2007年連任行政長官。與情指數亦較能呈現新聞性高的事件,而電話調查則體現較有普遍影響的事件。例如,突發性高但牽連群眾較少的旺角騷亂中,與情指數得出較負面的評價,而在多方面影響廣大公眾的「佔領中環」時,電話調查則得出較負面的評價。

圖 4 :「一國兩制」輿情指數與其他電話調查 Figure 4 : 1C2S MMI and other public surveys

「一國兩制」與情指數與其他電話調查 1C2S MMI and other public surveys



MMI was on an upward trend from April 1998 (inception date of MMI) to 2001. When the discussion and consultation of Article 23 began in 2002, 1C2S MMI started to fall until the government withdrew the legislation in September 2003. The NPC Standing Committee's interpretation of the Basic Law on constitutional development in April 2004 caused a certain drop in 1C2S MMI, but it continued to rise after Tung Chee Hwa resigned as CE in March 2005. In March 2006, a designated chapter was written for Hong Kong and Macau in the national 11th 'Five-Year Plan', boosting 1C2S MMI to reach the second highest point after the handover. In October 2009, the celebrations for the 60th anniversary of the PRC further raised 1C2S MMI to the peak.

自1998年4月開始至2001年,輿情指數整體向好。《基本法》第二十三條立法的討論與諮詢於2002年展開,輿情指數從高位轉跌,直至政府於2003年9月撤回立法草案後短暫反彈。全國人大常委會於2004年4月就政制發展釋法,令輿情指數有一定跌幅,及至董建華於2005年3月辭去行政長官後止跌回升。2006年3月,國家「十一五」規劃首次納入港澳專章,推動與情指數達到回歸後第二高位。2009年10月,一系列國慶60周年慶祝活動更令輿情指數攀上頂點。

The 'Five Constituencies Resignation' campaign, which attempted to mobilise support for universal suffrage, was followed by a period of sentiment downturn for several years beginning in 2010. Despite the temporary relief provided by the successful political reform proposal, 1C2S MMI was pushed to the lowest point of the period in 2013 with the problems of 'anchor babies', the 'Reclaim Sheung Shui' movement, and the infant formula shortage.

為爭取「雙普選」而發起的「五區總辭」,開啟了自2010年起為期數年的低潮。雖然政改方案獲得通過後一度回暖,但是2011年1月的悼念司徒華活動中,民運人士被拒絕入境,隨後「雙非嬰」問題、「光復上水」運動和「奶粉荒」將與情指數推到該段時期的最低點。

The 2014 to 2015 period were marked by many tumultuous events such as the knife attack on Kevin Lau, the 'Reclaim Yuen Long' and 'Reclaim Tuen Mun' movements, the Public Consultation on Constitutional Reform, the 'White Paper on 'One Country, Two Systems', the NPC Standing Committee's '8.31' decision and the 'Occupy Central' movement. Though such events led to some fluctuations in, the overall level was relatively stable because the media did not present a one-sided view of these events. MMI rose somewhat after Queen Elizabeth II affirmed that 1C2S was a historical achievement during her meeting with Xi Jinping in October 2015.

2014至2015年間發生劉進圖遇襲案及「光復元朗」、「光復屯門」運動,與情指數出現波動,不過報章對《「一國兩制」白皮書》、人大「8.31」決定和「佔領中環」的報導並非一面倒,是以這一年多的與情指數在波幅中維持相對平穩水平。與情指數在習近平與英女王於2015年10月會面,肯定「一國兩制」的歷史成就後方見上升。

³ Fu, K. W., & Chan, C. H. (2013). Analyzing online sentiment to predict telephone poll results. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 16(9), 702-707; Willnat, L., & Zhu, J. H. (1996). Newspaper coverage and public opinion in Hong Kong: A time-series analysis of media priming. Political Communication, 13(2), 231-246.

⁴ RTHK commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (HKIAPS) to conduct an annual survey. The related question is: 'Satisfactory to the overall development of Hong Kong after the handover' ('對回歸以來香港整體發展的滿意度'). In the survey conducted by HKUPOP, the related question is: 'Generally speaking, are you confident in 'One Country, Two Systems'?' ('咁整體黎講,你對一國兩制有有信心?').

香港電台每年委託香港亞太研究所就香港現況及前景進行調查,相應問題為「對回歸以來香港整體發展的滿意度」;香港大學民意研究計劃近年每三個月就市民對「一國兩制」信心進行調查,相應問題為「咁整體黎講,你對一國兩制有有信心?」



2.7.2 Recent Trend

1C2S encountered the most severe challenge in the beginning of 2016 when 1C2S MMI plummeted to 73 points, the lowest level ever since the handover. The 'Causeway Bay Bookstore' incident aroused widespread media attention in January. The civil unrest in Mongkok evolved into a clash between civilians and the police in February. The award of the independent film 'Ten Years' as the best film in Hong Kong Film Awards in April aggravated the negative sentiment in the mass media.

MMI bottomed out and rose strongly when CY Leung announced that he would not run for a second term and when Carrie Lam was elected CE. Despite the NPC Standing Committee's interpretation of the Basic Law in response to the oath-taking row in the LegCo in November 2016 and the 'democracy walls' incidents in universities in September 2017, 1C2S MMI still rose to a peak of 105 points in March 2018 under the new administration of Carrie Lam.

However, an alarming downward spiral started in July 2018 with the storm of controversies on the disbanding of the pro-independence HK National Party, the rejection of visa renewal for Victor Mallet, and the annual report of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission which recommended the assessment of Hong Kong's status as a separate customs area. MMI fell to 89 points in November 2018, a decline of 15% from the peak in March.


2.7.2 近期趨勢

「一國兩制」在2016年初面臨最大挑戰,與情指數接連急跌至73點,為回歸後的最低點。「銅鑼灣書店」事件在1月引起傳媒廣泛關注,旺角騷亂在2月演變成警民流血衝突,再加上獨立電影《十年》在4月獲獎,讓「一國兩制」矇上陰霾。

由2016年12月梁振英宣布放棄連任行政長官後,至2017年7月林鄭月娥上任,輿情指數從谷底反彈。期間,2016年11月全國人大常委會就立法會宣誓風波釋法,2017年9月數所大學的民主牆出現「港獨」標語,及2018年初旺角騷亂案的審訊與判刑,均令輿情指數錄得跌幅。不過在林鄭月娥的新政府下,2018年3月輿情指數仍然上漲至105點,是自2009年以來的高峰。

2018年7月起一連串政治爭議,令輿情指數拾級而下。鼓吹「港獨」的香港民族黨被取締、馬凱簽證續期遭拒、美中經濟與安全審查委員會建議重新審視香港獨立關稅區地位,觸發輿情指數跌至2018年11月的89點,相當於自同年3月的頂點下滑15%。





2.8 Evaluations of 1C2S

1C2S is unprecedented in history. There have always been doubts if HK can remain a free city as part of a country ruled by a Communist Party. Problems and difficulties in the implementation of 1C2S are to be expected.

21 years after HK's return to China, despite some declines in scores in selected international indices, HK stills ranked world's number 1 in Economic Freedom, and also ranked very well in Personal Freedom. According to the 2018 Human Freedom Index (the average of Economic and Personal Freedom Indices), HK ranked world's number 3 after New Zealand and Switzerland. HK is still one of the freest territories in the world.

Though HK's Index (B), the Freedom and Democracy Index, declined somewhat lately, HK's 2018 score at 7.89 was still high. It was in the same league as HK's developed neighbours: above Singapore's 7.56, but slightly lower than Japan's 8.18, Korea's 8.06, and Taiwan's 8.26. It was much higher than Mainland's 5.12, showing that the allegation of 'Mainlandisation' is unfounded.

Index (A), evaluations of the HK public, were around 5, the median of the 0 to 10 scale. Four items have consistently scored higher than 5 in all surveys, namely, maintaining original ways of life, freedom of speech, judicial independence, legislative independence – these results suggest that the public holds more positive opinions with respect to the above four items. On the other hand, five items scored below 5 in all surveys, namely, a high degree of autonomy in the executive branch, the successful implementation of 'Self-Governance, High Autonomy' principles, progress in democratisation, the full implementation of 1C2S in the future, and the ability for the Mainland and Hong Kong to resolve differences via dialogue and negotiation. The results suggest that the public holds less positive views with respect to these five items.

In comparison to the evaluations of international thinktanks, the evaluations of the HK public are less positive, suggesting that the public is more demanding in their assessments due to their high expectations of 1C2S. HK's people's starting point is a system with a sophisticated legal system that enshrines both rule of law and personal freedoms, and gradual democratization that had already been in progress prior to the return to China. These in turn induced greater expectations amongst the public with respect to self-governance and human rights enshrined by the Basic Law.

2.8 「一國兩制」的評價

「一國兩制」是史無前例的嘗試,輿論不斷懷疑 香港是否能夠在共產黨領導的國家之內維持自 由,「一國兩制」的實踐出現困難與挑戰實屬意 料中事。

回歸21年,儘管部分國際指標錄得下降,香港的經濟自由排名保持世界第一,個人自由排名仍然亮麗。跟據《2018人類自由指數》(「經濟自由指數」和「個人自由指數」的平均值),香港排名全球第三,僅次於新西蘭和瑞士。香港仍然是全球最自由的地區之一。

雖然最近香港的指數B-「自由民主指數」下跌, 2018年的7.89分仍然不俗,與鄰近香港的發達國 家及地區不相伯仲:高於新加坡的7.56分,但稍 低於日本的8.18分,南韓的8.06分和台灣的8.26 分。評分比中國內地的5.12分高出甚多,印證香 港被「大陸化」的說法缺乏根據。

指數A一香港市民的評價在5分左右,是0至10分尺度的中位數。所有調查中,有四個範疇皆稍高於5分,包括「維持原有生活方式」、「言論自由」、「司法獨立」及「立法獨立」。另一方面,有五個範疇皆稍低於5分,包括「特區自行處理行政事務」、「成功落實 『港人治港、 高度自治』」、「循序漸進落實民主政制發展」、「全面落實『一國兩制』」,及「透過對話協商解決內地與香港矛盾的信心」。

香港市民的評價比國際智庫較低,可能因為他們心目中對「一國兩制」有較高標準,所以給予較嚴格的評分。香港在回歸前已有成熟的法治基礎和人身自由,政制亦逐步民主化,所以市民對基本法承諾的高度自治和在人權及自由方面的保障有更高期望。

As will be seen below in section 4, more than 76% of the public agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. Support was high across all groups in HK, including 'Localists or Self-determinists', who are known to be highly critical of 1C2S. Though the public's current evaluation of 1C2S is quite critical, the still regard 1C2S as the system for HK's future.

Though the Index declined from 6.42 in the first round to 6.30 in the fourth round, it is still well over the median of 5. While 1C2S has problems in implementation, as could be expected of any unprecedented system, it is clearly not unworkable. The decline in the 4th round should be viewed in this context.

2.9 Reasons for declines in Index (A), Index (B), and the MMI

Change in scores in the indices are likely to be affected by controversial political events and other landmark events that occurred since 2017. We list below the major events that occurred since the last survey in mid-2018. The major events that occurred between previous surveys from mid-2017 to mid-2018 are listed in Appendix V.

- Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, delivered a speech hosted by the Foreign Correspondents' Club (14 August);
- The Hong Kong National Party was banned on national security grounds (24 September);
- Visa renewal of Victor Mallet, the Financial Times' Asia News Editor and Vice President of the Foreign Correspondents Club (FCC), was rejected. He had chaired a talk by pro-independence activist Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the Hong Kong National Party, at the FCC (5 October);
- Lau Siu Lai, a Democrat who had called for Hong Kong self-determination, was barred from running the LegCo by-election (12 October);
- Opening of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge (23 October);
- The United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended the US Congress to assess its export policy on technology with regard to Hong Kong's status as a separate customs area (14 November);

從下面報告第四節可見,超過76%市民同意於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」。所有政治派別對繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度均高企,包括對「一國兩制」常有批評的「本土及自決派」。即使市民對當前「一國兩制」的實施狀況有一定批評,他們依然相信「一國兩制」是適合香港未來的體制。

雖然「一國兩制」指數由第一輪的6.42分下降至 第四輪的6.30分,此分數比中位數5分仍然高出不 少。正如任何史無前例的制度一樣,實踐「一國 兩制」時遇到問題乃意料之內,並非代表它不可 行。第四輪調查評分的下降應該由此角度解讀。

2.9 指數A、指數B及輿情指數下跌的原因

2017年起發生不少政治爭議和重大事件,與上述 三項指數的變化有一定關係。上輪調查於2018年 中進行,其後發生的主要事件如下。早輪調查期 間,即2017年中至2018年中的主要事件詳見附錄 V。

- 支持「港獨」的香港民族黨召集人陳浩天受邀 於香港外國記者會演講(8月14日);
- 基於維護國家安全,香港民族黨被禁止運作 (9月24日);
- 《金融時報》亞洲總編輯、香港外國記者會副主席馬凱的簽證續期遭拒。他早期主持主張「港獨」的香港民族黨召集人陳浩天於香港外國記者會的演講。(10月5月);
- 提倡香港「自決」的民主派候選人劉小麗於立 法會補選中被裁定提名無效(10月12日);
- 港珠澳大橋啟用(10月23日);
- 美中經濟與安全審查委員會向美國國會建議, 重新審視高科技出口政策,評估香港的獨立關 稅區地位(11月14日);

- Trial of 9 key figures of the 'Occupy Central' movement started (19 November);
- Public education campaigns to promote the country's Constitution and Hong Kong's Basic Law were initiated on the National Constitution Day (4 December);
- A series of celebrations of the 40th anniversary of China's reform and opening up (December); and
- Corruption investigation against Leung Chun-ying, former chief executive of HKSAR, for receiving a HK\$50 million payment from an Australian engineering firm was dropped due to lack of sufficient evidence (12 December).

2.9.1 Effect of internal governance not strictly related to 1C2S

Internal governance issues that are not strictly related to 1C2S appear to have important effects on evaluations of the HK public (Index A) and MMI, but do not affect international evaluations (Index B) as much. It is important to bear this in mind when reading the findings identified in this Report. For example, in the period before mid-2018, both MMI and Index (A) performed well despite the many political controversies that occurred in that period.⁵ The announcement of CY Leung in late 2016 that he would not run for a second term, and the subsequent election of the new CE had strong positive effects on MMI that outweighed the effect of the above controversies. The honeymoon period of the new administration from mid-2017 to mid-2018 also appeared to have an important positive effect on Index (A).

The sharp declines in MMI and Index (A) in the second half of 2018 can be attributed to the controversies over the rejection of work visa for Victor Mallet and also internal governance issues as reflected in the sharp declines in approval ratings of the government in late 2018.

- 「佔中九子」案開審(11月19日);
- 「國家憲法日」舉辦宣傳活動,推廣國家《憲 法》與香港《基本法》(12月4日);
- 一系列改革開放 40 周年慶祝活動(12月);及
- 前行政長官梁振英涉嫌收取澳洲工程公司 5,000 萬港元,案件因證據不足不進行檢控 (12月12日)。

2.9.1 與「一國兩制」無直接關係的內部管治 影響

與「一國兩制」無直接關係的內部管治問題,對香港市民(指數A)和輿情指數的評價似乎有一定影響,但對國際評價(指數B)影響不大。在解讀此報告的結論時,應予以考慮。例如,儘管在2018年中之前發生不少政治爭議⁵,但指數A及輿情指數皆表現良好。梁振英於2016年底宣佈不角逐連任,及後新一屆行政長官選舉對輿情指數有明顯的正面作用,蓋過上述爭議的影響。新政府於2017年中至2018年中的蜜月期對指數A也有一定正面影響。

興情指數及指數A於2018年下半年的較大下降,可能歸因於香港民族黨被取締及馬凱簽證爭議。香港政府於2018年底支持度下降所反映的內部管治問題,亦有一定影響。

⁵ The disqualification of 6 LegCo members from late 2016 to mid-2017, and the sentencing of the 3 student protestors in the Civic Square occupation to prison by the Court of Appeals on August 2017.

2.9.2 Biases in evaluations of international think tanks (Index B)

The attitude of the West towards China has been shifting from engagement to confrontation as the West increasingly fears that its supremacy would be challenged by the rise of China. Evaluations of international think tanks may not be free of western ideological biases against the rise of China, but they may also reflect genuine weaknesses in the implementation of 1C2S. Furthermore, their effects on international investors cannot be underestimated as HK is an easy target in the 'New Cold War'.

Much of the negative international evaluation on 'Rule of Law' in HK can be attributed to a misunderstanding of the fundamental concept of 1C2S: HK is not an independent country; It is part of a Civil Law country but with an independent judiciary that practices Common Law in relation to self-autonomy issues. The Judiciary also has power to deal with constitutional issues but it must defer to interpretations of the National Constitution and the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. This is different in nature from courts of Common Law countries but not uncommon in Civil Law countries. This suggests the HK judiciary has a higher level of independence and judicial function than many courts at the district level of other Civil Law countries. This is not a weakness of the HK judicial system but rather a unique characteristic of the HK Court under 1C2S that the HKSAR Government needs to emphasize in the international arena.

Recently, western think tanks have downgraded HK's scores on 'Rule of Law', citing the interpretation of the Basic Law by Beijing in 2016. However, interpretation of the Basic Law first occurred in 1999 and it is nothing new. The HK judiciary is still the same judiciary which had received high scores from western think tanks just a few years back, and it is as independent as always as demonstrated by recent prosecutions and convictions of a former Chief Executive and other high-ranking officials of the HKSAR Government. It appears that western perceptions of China and HK have changed.

2.9.2 國際智庫評價的偏見(指數B)

西方愈來愈擔心中國崛起將會挑戰其優勢,所以 對中國的態度由合作轉向對抗。西方智庫對「一 國兩制」的評價不能完全擺脫此意識形態的轉向, 但也可能反映「一國兩制」在實踐上的真正弱點。 它們對國際投資者的影響不容小覷,因為香港很 可能在「新冷戰」下首當其衝成為戰靶。

部分負面評價源於「一國兩制」的概念和實踐存在誤解:香港並非獨立國家,而是擁有獨立司法權,以普通法實行內部自治的大陸法國家一部分。司法機構有權力處理憲制問題,但必須服膺人大常委會對國家《憲法》與香港《基本法》的解釋。此安排雖然與普通法國家的法庭存在本質上的不同,但在大陸法國家相當普遍。香港的司法機構比不少大陸法國家的地區法庭有更大的獨立性及司法權,此非香港司法制度的缺點,反倒是香港法庭在「一國兩制」下的獨特之處,值得特區政府向國際社會闡明。

近年部分西方智庫基於 2016 年的人大釋法降低香港法治的評分,其實人大釋法早於 1999 年已經發生,並非新生事物;而直到 2015 年,香港司法仍然得到西方好評。近年香港部分高官及某前特首被起訴及定罪的案例,說明香港司法仍然與以往一般獨立,只是西方對中國及香港的觀感有所改變。

2.9.3 Suggestions to tackle the misunderstanding on 1C2S

Given the biases and misunderstandings identified above, it is important for the HKSAR Government to consider spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of HK including the business community, the academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs to promote the image of HK under 1C2S. Such effort may include:

- Setting up a broadly representative committee to advise the HKSAR Government on all issues relating to 1C2S;
- Motivating HK's business communities from western countries who are willing to defend HK in the international arena;
- Establishing a semi-official high-level think tank on external relations to undertake various private initiatives such as being responsible for mounting and coordinating outreach efforts, mobilizing support from all sectors of our and international communities, and enhancing HK's presence in APEC related networks;
- Promoting, assisting and encouraging local think tanks to conduct periodical exchanges with influential foreign think tanks interested in HK affairs, especially the Heritage Foundation and the CATO-Fraser Institutes, which are sympathetic to HK as they value economic and personal freedoms highly;
- Setting up an early warning system within government to alert and manage expectation of public on all possible issues which might affect 1C2S or the perception of quality of governance;
- Setting up a system whereby international media would be timely, fully and properly briefed on issues affecting 1C2S; and
- Enhancing HK's presence in APEC related networks and forums, e.g., the APEC Business Advisory Councils (ABAC), APEC Study Centres, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and other tripartite forums that involve business people, academics, and NGOs in the Asia-Pacific. As a free economy and global city, HK should find a sympathetic hearing in the vast APEC related networks in the Asia-Pacific.

2.9.3 為「一國兩制」 釐清誤解的建議

為釐清以上偏見與誤解,特區政府應領導香港各界,包括政府、商界、學界、專業團體、目標相近的智庫和民間組織,共同努力向國際社會闡釋香港在「一國兩制」下的實況,包括:

- 設立具廣泛代表性的委員會,協助政府處理所有有關「一國兩制」的問題;
- 鼓勵在香港經商的西方商人為香港發聲;
- 成立專注香港涉外關係的半官方高層智庫,負 責推動和協調涉外工作,動員社會各界支持, 加強香港在 APEC 網絡中的角色;
- 促進、協助和鼓勵本地智庫與關注香港事務的 外國重要智庫定期交流,尤其是傳統基金會和 卡托及菲沙研究所。出於對經濟和個人自由的 重視,他們對香港比較同情;
- 政府內部建立監察系統,就可能影響「一國兩制」或治理質素的所有可能衝突,管理公眾的期望;
- 建立機制使國際媒體能夠充分及恰當地知悉影響「一國兩制」的議題;及
- 強化香港在 APEC 龐大網絡內的影響力,例如亞太經合組織商業諮詢理事會(ABAC),亞太經合組織研究中心,太平洋經濟合作理事會(PECC)以及其他三方論壇。作為一個自由經濟體和國際都會,亞太區內 APEC 龐大的網絡應該對香港有一定認同。

3 市民政治傾向改變:去激進化與溫和政治迅速興起 Rapid trend of de-radicalization and rise of moderation


Figure 6 shows the composition of HK population by political inclination in the 4 surveys. Moderates, which include 'Centrists' and 'No political inclination', have been the largest group (about 60%), followed by the Non-establishment supporters (less than 30%), and Pro-establishment supporters (less than 12%).

圖6顯示四輪調查中香港市民的政治傾向。溫和派 為最大組別(60%上下),包括「中間派」和 「沒有政治傾向」的市民。非建制派排列第二 (少於30%),建制派佔最少(少於12%)。

圖 6 : 香港市民的政治傾向

Figure 6 : Composition of population by political inclination

香港市民的政治傾向 Composition of population by political inclination




From mid-2017 to the end of 2018, the proportions of Moderates and Pro-establishment supporters in the population have risen while that of Non-establishment supporters has declined. As a percentage of the population, Moderates increased by 5.7 percentage points (rising from 58.4% to 64.1%); Pro-establishment supporters increased by 1.3 percentage points (rising from 10.0% to 11.3%); but Non-establishment supporters decreased by 6.6 percentage points (falling from 28.3% to 21.7%). The trends indicate rapid de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation. The change was especially rapid in the latter half of 2018.

從2017年中至2018年底,溫和派和建制派的人口比例上升,而非建制派則下降。按人口比例計算,溫和派增加5.7個百分點(由58.4%上升至64.1%),建制派增加1.3個百分點(由10.0%上升至11.3%),但非建制派減少6.6個百分點(由28.3%下降至21.7%)。此趨勢意味著去激進化與溫和政治的急速興起,在2018年下半年更進一步轉急。

圖 7 : 非建制派支持者的政治傾向

Figure 7 : Composition of population of Non-establishment supporters





In Figure 7, Non-establishment supporters are further divided into Democrats (16% or more) and 'Others' (5% or more), which are mostly Localists or Self-Determinists. Among Non-establishment supporters, the proportions of Democrats and 'Others' (mostly Localists or Self-Determinists) fell from 21.1% to 16.6% (decreasing by 4.5 percentage points), and from 7.2% to 5.1% (decreasing by 2.1 percentage points) respectively.

圖7顯示非建制派支持者中,民主派和其他非建制派(主要為本土派和自決派)的比例分別由21.1%下跌至16.6%(減少4.5個百分點),以及由7.2%下跌至5.1%(減少2.1個百分點)。

The above percentages can be translated into absolute numbers with reference to the size of the HK adult population. The size of the mid-2018 population aged 18 and above (excluding foreign domestic helpers) was 6,099,900. This implies that Moderates and the Pro-establishment group respectively gained roughly 335,000 and 79,000 supporters, while the Non-establishment group lost roughly 403,000 supporters. Within the Non-establishment group, Democrats lost roughly 274,000 supporters while 'Others' lost roughly 128,000 supporters. The Non-establishment group has rapidly lost supporters to the Moderates and the Pro-establishment group over the past one and half year. The trend is in line with recent by-election results and the general perception that the societal division is improving.

以上分佈可以根據香港成年人口轉換成絕對值。 2018年中,18歲或以上人口為6,099,900(不包括 外籍家庭傭工),表示溫和派和建制派陣營分別 大概添加335,000人和 79,000人,非建制派則大概 流失403,000人。非建制派組別中,民主派大概流 失274,000人,而其他非建制派大概流失128,000 人。過去一年半,大批非建制派支持者轉投溫和 派和建制派。此趨勢符合最近的補選結果,亦呼 應社會撕裂漸趨改善的普遍印象。 In our samples, the proportions of Non-establishment supporters have always been less than 30%. This appears to be at odds with the 54% of votes gained by Non-establishment candidates in the 2016 LegCo election. However, the view of the majority may not be reflected in election results as the majority do not vote. At the time of the 2016 LegCo election, the HK adult population (excluding foreign domestic helpers) was around 6 million. Only 4.8 million were eligible voters, of whom only 3.8 million registered; and only 2.2 million voted. To put this in perspective, Non-establishment candidates got 1.19 million votes, which were less than 25% of all eligible voters and less than 20% of the adult population. People who do not bother to vote are much more likely to be Moderates than Non-establishment supporters. As Non-establishment supporters are more likely to vote and voice their opinions, they tend to exert a disproportionate influence on the political sentiment in Hong Kong. In this respect, much of the perceived political sentiment can be said to be misleading.

3.1 HKU Public Opinion Program (HKUPOP) Surveys on Political Inclination

Our results on political inclination are similar to those of HKUPOP, which has collected data on political inclination on a bi-weekly basis since late October 2016. In the HKUPOP surveys, around 30% of respondents were 'Inclined towards the Pro-democracy camp' (analogous to our 'Non-establishment' group) while 15% or less were 'Inclined towards the Pro-establishment camp' (analogous to our 'Pro-establishment' group. Around half of the respondents were 'Inclined towards the centrist' (analogous to our 'Moderates' group). The pattern is similar to our surveys: 'Centrists' was by far the largest group, followed by the 'Pro-democracy camp' and the 'Pro-establishment camp'.

We are not able to test if the trend of de-radicalisation found in our 4 surveys is statistically significant as we only have 4 observations in time. However, the HKUPOP surveys have accumulated 55 bi-weekly observations on the proportions of the 3 camps from October 2016 to December 2018. We use this data to study the trend of each camp. Statistical analysis confirmed that the proportion to population of the Pro-democracy camp exhibited a decreasing trend that was statistically significant whereas the proportion to population of the Centrist camp exhibited an increasing trend that was also statistically significant. The results are similar to those obtained from our surveys (Appendix VI). However, the proportion of the Pro-establishment camp did not exhibit a definite trend that was statistically significant.

在我們的調查樣本中,非建制派的比例一直少於 30%,似乎比2016立法會選舉中非建制派候選人 所獲得的54%選票少得多。然而,由於大部分人 皆不參與投票,因此選舉結果未必能夠反映大部分人的想法。2016立法會選舉之際,香港成年人口(不包括外籍家庭傭工)大約為600萬,當中 480萬為合資格選民,其中380萬為登記選民, 中只有220萬人投票。非建制派候選人在該次選舉取得119萬票,數量少於全部合資格選民的25%,更少於成年人口的20%。不熱衷於投票的市民有較大機會屬於溫和派,而不是非建制派。因為非建制派較積極投票和發聲,香港的政治情緒可能具 設導性。

3.1 香港大學民意研究計劃有關政治傾向的 調查

香港大學民意研究計劃(港大民研)從2016年10 月下旬起,每兩星期統計有關政治傾向的數據, 調查結果與我們吻合。在港大民研的調查中,大 約30%受訪者「傾向民主派」(對應我們的「非 建制派」),15%或以下受訪者「傾向建制派」 (對應我們的「建制派」),大約一半受訪者選 擇「偏向中間派」(對應我們的「溫和派」)。 此分佈與我們的結果如出一轍:「中間派」佔最 多,其次為「民主派」,最後為「建制派」。

限於我們的調查只有四個觀測點,未足以證明這股去激進化趨勢是否達統計上顯著水平。不過,港大民研從2016年10月至2018年12月,有關三種政治傾向的雙周調查已累積55次,足以檢驗各個派別的變化趨勢。統計分析證實,民主派佔人口比例呈下降趨勢,而中間派則呈上升趨勢,兩者的升跌幅均達統計上顯著水平,與我們調查所得的趨勢相似(見附錄VI)。不過,建制派的變化未見達到統計上顯著水平的明顯趨勢。

3.2 De-radicalisation of HK Youths

Figure 8 shows the change in the composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by political inclination in the 4 surveys. The proportion of Moderates rose from 50.8% in mid-2017 to 66.4% at the end of 2018 (increasing by 15.6 percentage points) while the proportion of the Non-establishment group fell from 44.1% to 29.7% (falling by 14.4 percentage points). Within the Non-establishment group, the proportions of Democrats and 'Others' (mostly Localists or Self-Determinists) fell from 22.6% to 19.6% (falling by 3 percentage points), and from 21.5% to 10.1% (falling by 11.4 percentage points). In absolute numbers, Moderates gained 154,000 youths while the Non-establishment group lost 143,000 youths, of whom 30,000 were Democrats and 104,000 were 'Other Non-establishment' supporters. It must be stressed that our result is tentative as the changes are only notable in the latter half of 2018 (from 3rd to 4th survey). We only observe changes over two points in time.


3.2 香港青年的去激進化

圖8顯示四輪調查中,青年(18至29歲)的政治傾向變化。由2017年中至2018年底,溫和派的比例由50.8%上升至66.4%(上升了15.6個百分點),非建制派的比例由44.1%下降至29.7%(下跌了14.4個百分點)。非建制派中,民主派的比例由22.6%下降至19.6%(下跌了3個百分點),其他非建制派(主要是本土派和自決派)由21.5%下降至10.1%(下跌了11.4個百分點)。按絕對人數而言,溫和派添加154,000位青年支持者,而非建制派流失143,000位青年支持者,其中30,000人曾屬民主派、104,000人曾屬其他非建制派。由於相關變化只有在2018年下半年較大(從第三輪到第四輪調查),所以結論仍有待觀察。以上轉變只反映最近半年的情況。

圖 8 : 青年(18至29歲)的政治傾向

Figure 8 : Composition of youths (age 18 to 29) by political inclination





4 2047年後是否繼續實行「一國兩制」(題目23) Continuation of 1C2S after 2047 (Question 23)

An issue of utmost importance for the future of Hong Kong is the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. In view of the uncertainty on this important issue, we introduce two new questions in this round (4th round) of telephone poll to gauge public opinion on the continuation of 1C2S after 2047.

The great majority of respondents (76.5%) agreed that Hong Kong should continue to implement 1C2S after 2047. Only 8.1% disagreed, and the rest (15.4%) answered 'don't know'. The support for continuation of 1C2S was high across all age groups, educational attainment, and political inclination.

Figure 9 shows that among Pro-establishment supporters, Moderates, and Democrats, the percentages of those who agreed to the continuation of 1C2S were amazingly similar, ranging from 77% to 79%. Though 'localists or Self-Determinists' are known to be highly critical of 1C2S, 71.9% of the 'Non-establishment: Others' group still agreed to its continuation. Continuation of 1C2S after 2047 appears to be a common goal across the entire political spectrum in Hong Kong.


2047年後是否繼續實行「一國兩制」乃關乎香港前途的關鍵議題。鑒於現時這個重要議題仍然懸而未決,我們在此輪(第四輪)電話調查提出兩條新題目,從而衡量市民對2047年後是否繼續實行「一國兩制」的取態。

絕大部分市民(76.5%)同意香港應該於2047年 後繼續實行「一國兩制」。只有8.1%不同意,其 餘人士(15.4%)認為「不知道」。在不同年齡、 教育程度和政治傾向組別中,對繼續實行「一國 兩制」的支持度均高企。

圖9顯示,建制派、溫和派和民主派對繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度極之相近,介乎77%至79%之間。縱使本土派和自決派對「一國兩制」常有批評,「其他非建制派」仍然有71.9%同意繼續實行「一國兩制」。2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」似乎是香港整個政治光譜的共同目標。

圖 9 :繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度(按政治傾向劃分) Figure 9 : Support for continuation of 1C2S by political inclination

繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度(按政治傾向劃分) Support for continuation of 1C2S by political inclination





4.1 Conditions that would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 (Question 24)

If respondents agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2017, they were then asked to choose what conditions would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S from the following list (they were allowed to choose more than 1 item):

- i) Hong Kong's political system democratises further;
- ii) Hong Kong completing legislation of Article 23;
- iii) Hong Kong maintaining a high degree of autonomy;
- iv) Hong Kong maintaining economic prosperity and stability;
- v) Others (please specify).

Figure 10 shows the percentages of respondents who chose each of the 5 conditions by political inclination. For all respondents, 'Maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (33.6%), and 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (31.3%) were close first and second choices. 'Political system democratises further' (19.5%) was a distant third. 'Completing legislation of Article 23' (6.5%) came in last. The pattern of choice was quite pragmatic.

4.1 有利於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的 條件(題目24)

如果受訪者同意於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」,他們會進一步被邀從下列清單中選出有利 於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件 (可選 擇多於一項):


- i) 政制進一步民主化;
- ii) 完成 23 條立法;
- iii) 維持高度自治;
- iv) 經濟維持繁榮穩定;
- v) 其他 (請註明)。

圖10按各政治傾向,顯示市民選擇各條件的比例。就所有市民而言,「維持高度自治」(33.6%)和「經濟維持繁榮穩定」(31.3%)為首兩個選項,支持度非常接近。「政制進一步民主化」(19.5%)是相對次要的第三個選項。「完成23條立法」(6.5%)排列最後。市民的選擇頗為務實。

有利於2047年後落實「一國兩制」的條件(按政治傾向劃分) Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 by political inclination

- Maintaining a high degree of autonomy 維持高度自治
- Political system democratizes further 政制進一步民主化
- Others/Don't know 其他/唔知道

- Maintaining economic prosperity and stability 經濟維持繁榮穩定
- Completing legislation of Article 23 完成23條立法



The pattern of choice differed by political inclination. 'Maintaining a high degree of autonomy' was the most popular choice for Non-establishment supporters (36.0%) and Moderates (35.1%). However, for Pro-establishment supporters, 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (38.2%) was ranked higher than 'Maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (21.9%).

'Political system democratises further' was the first choice for 'Localists or Self-determinist' (40.4%), but it was the last choice for Pro-establishment supporters (10.7%). 'Completing legislation of Article 23' was the last choice for Moderates (5.5%) and Non-establishment supporters (0.5%), but it was more important for Pro-establishment supporters (21.7%). Across different political inclinations, the consensus for 'Maintaining a high degree of economy' and for 'Maintaining economic prosperity' was quite strong. 'Political system further democratises' and 'Completing legislation of Article 23' appear to be more controversial.

如按政治傾向劃分,市民的選擇則有不同的分佈。「維持高度自治」為非建制派(36.0%)及溫和派(35.1%)的首要選擇。然而對建制派而言,「經濟維持繁榮穩定」(38.2%)比「維持高度自治」(21.9%)重要。

「政制進一步民主化」是本土派和自決派的首要條件(40.4%),但也是建制派排列最後的條件(10.7%)。「完成23條立法」為溫和派(5.5%)及非建制派(0.5%)排列最後的條件,但較受建制派重視(21.7%)。「維持高度自治」及「經濟維持繁榮穩定」為不同政治派別的牢固共識。「政制進一步民主化」及「完成23條立法」似乎較具爭議性。

5 市民對「香港人」及「中國人」的身份認同(題目 12 和 13) Public's identification as 'Hongkongers' and as 'Chinese' (Questions 12 & 13)

We respectively surveyed how citizens identify themselves, whether as 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese', or both (Table 6). In the telephone poll, many questions including the questions on citizens self-identification, employed 1 to 7 as the rating scale in the survey process, with 4 as the median. This scale, which is known as the Likert scale, is commonly adopted for psychological assessments. This scale was used instead of a 0 to 10 scale as the latter is deemed too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents to choose from. However, to better conform to existing indices – which tend to be expressed on a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median) – we converted the results mathematically into the popular 0 to 10 scale whenever appropriate.

我們分別詢問市民對「香港人」及「中國人」身份的認同程度(見表 6)。我們的電話調查主要採用 1 至 7 分的評分尺度,以 4 分為中位數,包括身份認同在內的多數題目。這是心理學常用的科學尺度,稱為李克特量尺(Likert scale)。現時編制指數常採用 0 至 10 分的尺度(5 分為中位數),其實分類過於細緻,令市民難以選擇,所以我們在調查過程中採用 1 至 7 分的尺度。不過為了與現行指數匹配,是以我們利用數學方法將調查結果轉換成為常見的 0 至 10 分尺度。

表 6 : 市民對「香港人」及「中國人」的身份認同 Table 6 : Public's identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese'

	Score 分數 (1-7)			Score 分數 (0-10)				
	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12
Hongkonger 香港人	5.65	5.76	5.81	5.83	7.75	7.93	8.02	8.06
Chinese 中國人	4.96	5.00	5.07	5.10	6.63	6.71	6.78	6.83

Members of the public identify themselves strongly as 'Hongkongers' as well as 'Chinese'. From the $1^{\rm st}$ round to the $4^{\rm th}$ round, the public's strength of identification as 'Hongkongers' rose from 5.65 to 5.83 on the 1 to 7 scale (and therefore from 7.75 to 8.06 on the 0 to 10 scale). In the same period, the public's strength of identification as 'Chinese' rose from 4.96 to 5.10 on the 1 to 7 scale (and therefore from 6.63 to 6.83 on the 0 to 10 scale).

The extent to which the public identified themselves as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' can be better demostrated by a scatter plot. The x-axis in Figure 11 shows the strength of self-identification as a 'Hongkonger'; the y-axis, self-identification as Chinese. On the 1 to 7 scale, the median is 4, which indicates a moderate level of identification. Ratings that are higher than 4 indicate relatively strong identification; ratings that are lower than 4 indicate relatively weak identification. Figure 11 shows the scatter plot of the 4th round survey. Citizens identifying themselves very strongly as both 'Hongkongers' and Chinese represented the largest group in the sample, with 256 individuals selecting 7 for both categories (26.0% of the total).

大部分市民對「香港人」及「中國人」身份均有強烈認同。由第一輪至第四輪調查,按1分至7分的尺度,市民的「香港人」身份認同由5.65分上升至5.83分(按0分至10分的尺度即由7.75升至8.06)。同期,按1分至7分的尺度,市民的「中國人」身份認同由4.96分上升至5.10分(按0分至10分的尺度即由6.63升至6.83)。

市民對兩種身份的認同程度可以利用散佈圖顯示。圖11為第四輪調查的散佈圖,橫軸為對「香港人」的認同程度,縱軸為對「中國人」的認同程度。按1至7分的尺度,4分為中位數,表示中等認同。高於4分代表較高認同,低於4分代表較低認同。人數最多的組別是對兩種身份均擁有強烈認同,共256人對兩者均選擇最高的7分(佔總數26.0%)。

Figure 11 clearly depicts that most Hong Kong citizens are cognizant of their double identities as both 'Hongkongers' and Chinese. The patterns of the scatter plots from all 4 surveys are very similar. A majority of the public (55.9%, 56.1%, 57.5%, and 57.3% respectively in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th rounds) have relatively strong identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', with both identity scores greater than 4.

圖11清楚顯示大部分市民對兩種身份均有較高認同。全部四輪調查的散佈圖顯示相似的分佈。大部分市民(第一、二、三和四輪調查分別有55.9%、56.1%、57.5%和57.3%)對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身分均擁有較高認同,兩者皆高於4分。

圖 11 :市民的身份認同散佈圖(受訪人數:983)

Figure 11: Public's identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' (sample: 983)

市民的身份認同散佈圖 Public's identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese'






Figure 12:Rank correlation of public's identification (sample: 983) 市民的身份製品等级相關係數





Identification as Chinese may not be the same as 'devotion to China', but identification as both Chinese and 'Hongkongers' is a pre-requisite for 'devotion to China and Hong Kong'. The fact that a majority of Hong Kong people identify themselves as both 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' provides a strong basis for the implementation of 1C2S.

Statistical analysis showed that there existed a significant positive correlation between identification as a Hongkonger and identification as Chinese, suggesting that the more strongly one identifies with Hong Kong, the more strongly one also identifies with China (see Figure 12). The converse also holds. The rank correlation coefficient was 0.174 and was statistically very significant at the 99.9% confidence level. This result is similar to those of the previous 3 surveys. The finding that the two identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' are mutually reinforcing each other again provides a strong basis for the implementation of 1C2S.

認同「中國人」身份未必等於「愛國」,不過同時認同「中國人」及「香港人」兩種身份卻是「愛國愛港」的先決條件。擁有「香港人」和「中國人」雙重身份認同為社會主流,是落實「一國兩制」的有利條件。

統計分析發現,市民的「香港人」及「中國人」身份認同呈現顯著的正相關,即愈認同「香港人」身份的市民亦愈認同「中國人」身份(見圖 12),反之亦然。等級相關系數(rank correlation coefficient)為 0.174,統計上非常顯著,達到99%的置信水平,跟過往三輪調查相似。結果證實「香港人」及「中國人」身份認同相輔相成,也是落實「一國兩制」的有利條件。

5.1 Survey design: Comparison with other public surveys

In HK, there are two types of guestionnaire design to track the self-identity of the public, the 'dominant identity' design and the 'multiple identity' design. The 'dominant identity' design classifies identity into two categories, namely 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese', or four categories by adding two mixed identities ('Hong Kong Chinese' and 'Chinese Hongkonger') to the 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' identities. Interviewees are compelled to choose one identity among the two, or one identity among the four. The two-category option explicitly assumes that the 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' identities are mutually exclusive: the more strongly one identifies himself as 'Hongkonger', the less strongly one identifies himself as 'Chinese' (and vice versa). Even though the four-category option admits mixed identities ('Hong Kong Chinese' and 'Chinese Hongkonger'), it still treats different identities as mutually exclusive: If proportionally more people choose one category, the proportions of the other categories must go down. The 'dominant identity' design cannot allow for a situation in which the public's self-identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' both strengthens (or both weakens) simultaneously.

Our survey adopts the 'multiple identity' design while the majority of other surveys in HK adopt the 'dominant identity' design. One exception is the HKUPOP survey on self-identity, which adopts both the 'dominant identity' and 'multiple identity' designs. Though the HKUPOP survey reports the results of both designs, the HK media focuses its attention on the 'dominant identity' design as it is more popular in public surveys.

Our research and analysis suggest that the 'multiple identity' design is more appropriate for two reasons. First, multiple identity is the norm in HK. An increasing majority of HK citizens identify themselves strongly as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' – to compel citizens to choose one amongst the four categories (or one amongst the two categories) can easily lead to bias. Second, in our 4 rounds of surveys, the public's self-identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' has strengthened simultaneously – a fact that cannot be reflected in the 'dominant identity' design.

Figure 11 shows that 45.1% of the public have equally strong identification with both identities: compelling them to choose one over another would easily give misleading results. Moreover, in the scatter plot, the 3 largest groups are those giving equally high scores of 5, 6 or 7 to both identities. The 3 groups together account for 39.4% of our sample.

5.1 問券設計:比較其他民意調查

我們的調查採用「多元身份」的問卷設計,而香港其他調查多數採用「主要身份」設計。其中例外是港大民研的身份認同調查,同時採用「主要身份」及「多元身份」兩種問卷設計。雖然港大民研會公佈兩種結果,但是由於「主要身份」為多數調查所採用,所以香港傳媒側重報道「主要身份」的結果。

我們的調查及分析顯示「多元身份」是更合適的問卷設計,原因有二:第一,多元身份是香港的常態。愈來愈多的大多數市民對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份均有較高認同,要求市民從以上四種身份(或兩種身份)選擇一種容易出現偏頗。第二,我們的三輪調查中,市民對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份認同同時加強,此乃採用「主要身份」的調查未能反映的事實。

圖11顯示,45.1%市民對兩種身份的認同程度相同:要求市民二擇其一容易令結果具誤導性。再者,散佈圖顯示人數最多的三個組別,給予兩種身份同樣為5分、6分或7分的高評分。這三個組別共佔39.4%。

Besides possible bias, the 'dominant identity' questionnaire design also does not allow researchers to answer the following two important questions on identity raised in this study:

- i) What is the proportion of the public that strongly (or relatively strongly) identify themselves as both 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese'?
- ii) Are the identifications as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' correlated?

Though the HKUPOP survey also adopts the 'multiple identity' design, it has not released any analyses on the above two issues. To our knowledge, our survey is the only one that adopts the 'multiple identity' design to analyse the above two important issues.

Our survey finds that, since mid-2017, the public have identified themselves more strongly as 'Hongkonger' and also as 'Chinese'. On the other hand, surveys that adopt the 'dominant identity' design suggest that the strength of identities has gone in opposite directions: Identity as 'Hongkonger' has strengthened while identity as 'Chinese' has weakened. This is because the rise in citizens' identity as 'Hongkonger' exceeds the rise in their identity as 'Chinese'. In such a situation, when interviewees are compelled to choose one identity over the other, more will choose 'Hongkongers' over 'Chinese'. The 'dominant identity' design can thus produce highly misleading results.

5.2 Self-identity as 'Chinese' across groups by age, by educational attainment, and by political inclination in 4 rounds of surveys

Table 7 shows that, in the 4 surveys, all age groups except Young Adults (18 years to 29 years old), and also all groups by educational background (from primary level to graduate school), have a relatively strong identity as 'Chinese', with ratings above the mid-point of 5. The identity as 'Chinese' of older age groups (age 50 and over) is significantly higher than that of younger age groups (age 18 to 49).

Though the identity of Young Adults (18 to 29 years old) as 'Chinese' has strengthened slightly to 5.29 from 4.96 in the last round, it is only marginally above the mid-point of 5. Policy makers need to work hard to cultivate national identity among Young Adults.

Across political inclination, Pro-establishment supporters very strongly identify themselves as 'Chinese'. The identity as 'Chinese' of Pro-establishment supporters is significantly higher than that of Moderates. Moreover, the identity as 'Chinese' of Pro-establishment supporters has strengthened continuously over the 4 surveys, and the rise is statistically significant.

除了容易出現偏頗外,採用「主要身份」的調查 都不能回答由本研究提出,有關身份認同的兩個 重要問題:

- i) 有多少市民同時對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份擁有高度認同(或較高認同)?
- ii) 市民對「香港人」及「中國人」的身份認同是 否相關?

雖然港大民研也採用「多元身份」作調查,但從 未發佈對以上兩個問題的分析。就我們所知,本 研究為目前唯一採用「多元身份」框架去分析以 上兩個問題的調查。

我們的調查發現從2017年中起,市民對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份認同一併上升。另一方面,採用「主要身份」的調查卻發現兩者出現此消彼長的情況:市民的「香港人」身份認同上升,而「中國人」身份認同則下降。這是由於市民對「香港人」身份認同的升幅高於對「中國人」身份認同的升幅。這種情況下,如受訪者被要求作出非此即彼的選擇,更多人會選擇「香港人」,更少人會選擇「中國人」,是以採用「主要身份」的調查得出具高度誤導性的結果。

5.2 四輪調查的「中國人」身份認同(按年齡、 教育程度及政治傾向組別劃分)

表7顯示在三輪調查中,除青年(18歲至29歲)外的所有年齡組別,以及所有教育組別(小學到研究院)對「中國人」身份皆有較高認同,評分都高於中位數5分。年齡較高的組別(50歲或以上)對「中國人」身份的認同感顯著地高於青壯年(18歲至49歲)。

雖然青年(18歲至29歲)對「中國人」身份的認同感由上輪調查的4.96分微升至5.29分,但評分只略高於中位數5分,決策者須努力培養青年的國民身份認同。

在政治傾向方面,建制派對「中國人」身份有極高認同,顯著高於溫和派。經過四輪調查,建制派的認同感進一步加強,其升幅達統計上顯著水平。

Table 7 : Public's identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese'

			受訪	人數			分數	(0-10)	
			Respo	ndents			Score	(0-10)	
		2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12
所有市民	All Respondents	979	986	981	983	6.63	6.71	6.78	6.83
年齡	18 to 29	176	169	169	163	4.93	5.06	4.96	5.29
Age	30 to 39	165	166	165	164	5.92	6.26	6.30	6.32
	40 to 49	173	174	172	171	6.73	6.56	6.71	6.58
	50 to 59	204	201	201	197	7.06	7.14	7.35	7.15
	60 to 69	142	147	147	155	7.40	7.57	7.88	7.72
	≥70	120	129	127	132	8.04	7.70	7.76	8.12
教育程度	小學或以下 primary or below	125	121	112	95	7.74	8.03	8.00	8.37
Education	初中 Lower secondary	116	121	111	122	7.26	7.58	7.44	7.58
	高中 Higher secondary	294	295	301	290	6.79	6.54	6.95	6.76
	專上非學位 Non-degree tertiary	116	116	127	105	6.08	6.49	6.35	6.49
	大學學位 Bachelor's degree	270	274	275	296	5.70	5.87	6.10	6.24
	研究院 Postgraduate degree	55	53	49	67	7.08	6.64	6.17	6.42
政治傾向	建制派 Pro-establishment	98	95	101	111	8.86	9.43	9.50	9.54
Political	溫和派 Moderates	569	592	603	630	6.93	7.09	7.18	7.12
Inclination	非建制派 Non-establishment	279	263	248	214	5.16	4.63	4.50	4.40
	其中:民主派 of which: Democrats	207	198	184	163	5.74	5.16	5.16	5.05
	其中:其他非建制派 of which: Others	72	65	64	51	3.50	3.01	2.61	2.31
	其他 Others	30	34	29	26	6.33	7.61	8.55	8.45

Moderates identify themselves strongly as 'Chinese', with a rating of around 7. As for Non-establishment supporters, their identity as 'Chinese' is weak and is significantly lower than that of Moderates. Moreover, their identity has weakened continuously over the 4 surveys, and the fall is statistically significant.

Among Non-establishment supporters, the strength identification of Democrats as 'Chinese' is slightly above the mid-point of 5, but the strength of their identification has fallen. The 'Others' group (mostly Localists/Self-Determinists) has a very weak identity as 'Chinese'. Moreover, their identity has weakened further over the 4 surveys, and the fall is statistically significant. The political divide between the Pro-establishment and Non-establishment groups in national identity is deep and widening. This is a cause for concern.

溫和派對「中國人」身份有較高認同,評分大約 是7分。非建制派對「中國人」身份的認同感則較 弱,統計上顯著低於溫和派,並在第四輪調查中 進一步減弱,下跌幅度達統計上顯著水平。

非建制派當中,民主派的「中國人」身份認同雖 然稍高於中位數5分,不過其認同感亦有所減弱。 其他非建制派(主要是本土派及自決派)的「中 國人」身份認同甚弱,其認同感在第四輪調查更 持續下降,下降幅度達統計上顯著水平。建制派 和非建制派的「中國人」身份認同有相當大的政 治鴻溝,且正在加深,情況令人擔憂。

6

對第二十三條立法諮詢的取態 (題目10)

Attitudes towards initiating Article 23 public consultation (Question 10)

Figure 13 shows the percentage distribution of attitudes towards initiating public consultation for Article 23. Opinions were highly polarised. The largest two groups were those choosing the 2 extremes: 22% chose 'Very unnecessary' (rating of 7), and 14.1% chose 'Very necessary' (rating of 1), while the groups choosing less extreme ratings (2-6) were smaller (no more than 13%).

圖13顯示對第二十三條立法諮詢取態的百分比分佈。市民的取態兩極化,按1分至7分的尺度,最多市民選擇兩個極端選項:22%認為「非常無須要」(1分),14.1%認為「非常有須要」(7分),選擇非極端選項(2至6分)的人數較少(不多於13%)。

圖 13 : 對第二十三條立法諮詢的取態(百份比分佈)

Figure 13 : Percentage distribution of attitudes towards initiating public consultation for Article 23

對第二十三條立法諮詢的取態(百份比分佈) Percentage distribution of attitudes towards initiating public consultation for Article 23




表 8 : 對第二十三條立法諮詢的取態

Table 8 : Attitudes towards initiating Article 23 consultation

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12
Relatively Necessary 比較有須要	35.5%	37.1%	34.5%	34.0%
Relatively Unnecessary 比較無須要	45.5%	44.4%	45.3%	47.9%
Don't Know 唔知道	5.9%	5.2%	5.5%	5.3%
Net Value 淨值	-10.6%	-7.7%	-11.4%	-14.7%
Mean Score 平均分	4.74	4.66	4.49	4.37

Net value: Percent who chose 'Relatively Necessary' less percent who chose 'Relatively Unnecessary'

淨值:認為「比較有須要」的百分比減去認為「比較無須要」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater necessity 平均分由0至10分,愈高分代表愈有須要

Table 8 summarizes the pattern of attitudes in the 4 surveys. Respondents who chose ratings above (below) the median of 4 were combined into a group named 'Relatively necessary' ('Relatively unnecessary'). In all 4 surveys, opinions are divided without a clear majority: Slightly less than half chose 'Relatively unnecessary' while slightly more than a third chose 'Relatively necessary'.

Over time, there is a slight rise in 'Relatively unnecessary' over 'Relatively necessary'. Policy makers should exercise caution in approaching this subject in view of the deep polarisation.

The reason for such division plausibly is due to the fact that a considerable proportion of the public is strongly opposed to having Article 23 legislated at all, and hence is opposed to any consultation, whilst those in favour hold that – given the inevitability of Article 23's legislation under the Basic Law, it is marginally better to have at least some consultation, as opposed to none.

Compared with Moderates, Pro-establishment supporters are more inclined towards 'Very necessary', whilst Non-establishment supporters are more inclined towards 'Very unnecessary'. Moderates are divided: Their opinions are close to that of the community as a whole.

表 8 概括市民在四輪調查的取態。我們將給予高於(低於)中位數 4 分的市民歸類為「比較有須要」組別(「比較無須要」組別)。四輪調查中,市民的意見分歧,未有過半數的主流意見:認為「比較無須要」的市民稍低於一半 認為「比較有須要」的市民稍多於三分之一。

比較四輪調查,認為「比較無須要」諮詢的市民 較「比較需要諮詢」的稍微增長。兩極化嚴重, 決策者需要小心從事。

取態兩極化的原因,相信是部分市民十分反對第二十三條立法,是以反對任何諮詢。贊成諮詢的市民卻認為第二十三條立法是香港的憲制責任,不能避免,有諮詢總比無諮詢好。

與溫和派比較,建制派較為同意「非常有須要」 諮詢,非建制派則較為同意「非常無須要」諮詢。溫和派於兩個極端的佔比旗鼓相當,與全港市民一樣未有共識。

對《基本法》的認識(題目11) 7Knowledge of Basic Law (Question 11)

The mean score of public's self-rating of its familiarity with the Basic Law rose continuously from 4.45 in the 1^{st} survey to 4.69 in the 4^{th} survey, and the rise was statistically significant. However, the rating is still below the median of 5, indicating that the public's knowledge of Basic Law is still inadequate.

市民對《基本法》認識程度的自我評價,由第一 輪調查的 4.45 分微升至第四輪調查的 4.69 分,達 統計上顯著水平。不過評分仍然低於中位數 5 分, 反映市民對《基本法》的認識並不足夠。

表 9 : 對《基本法》的認識

Table 9 : Attitudes towards initiating Article 23 consultation

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12
Good Knowledge 認識較深	29.1%	30.2%	32.6%	34.9%
Little Knowledge 認識較淺	47.6%	44.8	43.6%	42.0%
Don't Know 唔知道	0.4%	0.8%%	1.2%	1.0%
Net Value 淨值	-18.6%	-14.7%	-11.2%	-7.1%
Mean Score 平均分	4.45	4.53	4.64	4.69

Net value: Percent who chose 'Good Knowledge' less percent who chose 'Little Knowledge'

淨值: 認為「認識較深」的百分比減去認為「認識較淺」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means better knowledge 平均分由0至10分,愈高分代表認識愈深

8 出現矛盾的責任屬內地或香港? (題目14) Whose responsibility is it when conflicts arise between Hong Kong and the Mainland? (Question 14)

Table 10 shows that when asked to allocate blame between the Mainland and Hong Kong when conflicts arise in the implementation of 1C2S, roughly half selected 'Equally Responsible' across all 4 surveys. Meanwhile, around a quarter of the public suggested that the Mainland was responsible while 1/6 assigned the responsibility to HK. Since the 2nd round, there has been a very small shift in net blame towards the Mainland (Net Value rose from 7.9% in 2nd round to 9.8% in 4th round).

表10顯示當實踐「一國兩制」出現矛盾時,應歸 咎責任於內地或香港。四輪調查中,約一半市民 選擇「一半半」;約四分之一認為責任屬於內 地,六分之一認為責任屬於香港。從第二輪調查 起,責任誰屬的淨值輕微地由指責香港轉向歸咎 於內地(淨值由第二輪的7.9%升至第四輪的 9.8%)。

Comparing the 1st survey with the latter 3 rounds, public opinion moved towards polarisation: Those who chose 'Equally responsible' fell, while the proportions of those who held that the responsibility lay either with the Mainland or with HK both rose. In other words, more people were blaming either the Mainland or Hong Kong. The trend is worrisome.

比較第一輪和其後三輪調查,民意趨向兩極化: 認為「一半半」的人減少,認為責任屬於內地和 香港皆升。換言之,更多人指責內地或香港,顯 示民意趨向兩極化,令人擔憂。

As expected, Pro-establishment supporters tend to blame HK while Non-establishment supporters tend to blame the Mainland. Among Moderates, a declining majority (declining continuously from 65.9% in the 1st round to 58.4% in the 4th round) held that both parties were equally to blame. Opinions within Moderates were also polarising.

一如預期,建制派傾向指責香港,而非建制派則傾向指責內地。在溫和派中,多數人認為雙方擁有同樣責任,不過此比例逐步遞減(從第一輪的65.9%下降至第四輪的58.4%),顯示溫和派的取態亦逐漸兩極化。

The results suggest that both the Central Government and HKSAR Government ought to reflect on its own responsibility for deadlocks and conflicts between the two.

結果反映中央政府與香港均需就雙方的僵局和矛盾反思自身責任。

表 10 : 出現矛盾時內地與香港的責任

Table 10 : Whose responsibility is it when conflicts arise between Hong Kong and the Mainland

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12
The Mainland 內地	24.1%	26.5%	26.1%	27.2%
Hong Kong 香港	15.4%	19.0%	18.1%	17.4%
Equally responsible—半半	54.5%	49.0%	50.7%	50.8%
Don't Know 唔知道	6.0%	5.5%	5.1%	4.7%
Net Value 淨值	9.3%	7.9%	8.0%	9.8%
Mean Score 平均分	5.02	4.92	4.98	5.06

Net Value: Percent who chose 'The Mainland' less percent who chose 'Hong Kong'

淨值: 認為屬「內地」的百分比減去認為屬「香港」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Scores higher (lower) than 5 means greater responsibility lies with the Mainland (Hong Kong) 平均分由0至10分,分數高於(低於)5分代表內地(香港)需負較大責任

林鄭月娥上台對社會撕裂的影響(題目15) Impact of Carrie Lam's appointment as CE on societal division (Question 15)

Those who chose 'Decreased' vastly exceeded those who chose 'Increased'. From the 2nd to the 4th round, those who chose 'Decreased' fell while those who chose 'Increased' or 'Unchanged' both rose. The gap or Net Value between 'Decreased' & 'Increased' fell, indicating that the favourable impact on societal division of Carrie Lam's appointment as CE waned. This is consistent with the decline in the CE approval ratings in other surveys in 2018.

認為「減少」的市民遠遠超於認為「增加」者。由第二輪至第四輪調查,認為「減少」的人數下降,認為「增加」或「無變」的人數上升。「減少」和「增加」之間的差距或淨值降低,顯示林鄭月娥上台對社會撕裂的有利影響有所減弱,結果與2018年特首民望於其他調查下跌相符。

11 :林鄭月娥上台對社會撕裂的影響

Table 11 : Impact of Carrie Lam's appointment as CE on societal division

	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12
Decreased 減少	49.0%	42.1%	37.5%
Increased 增加	7.6%	9.1%	12.4%
Unchanged 無變	41.0%	46.5%	47.6%
Don't Know 唔知道	2.4%	2.3%	2.4%
Net Value 淨值	42.4%	33.1%	25.1%

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Decreased' less percent who chose 'Increase'

淨值:認為「減少」的百分比減去認為「增加」的百分比

10 移民海外與「一國兩制」信心 (題目16和17) Emigration and confidence in 1C2S (Questions 16 & 17)

Table 12 shows public's emigration plans in the 4 surveys. Those who had 'No plans' to emigrate vastly exceeded those who 'Have plans'. Over time, there has been a slight fall in those who have 'No plans' to emigrate and a slight rise in those who 'Have plans'.

表12顯示市民在四輪調查的移民計劃。「無打算」移民的人數遠遠拋離「有打算」者。比較四輪調查,「無打算」的人數稍微下降,而「有打算」則微升。

表 12 :市民移民海外的計劃 Table 12 :Public's emigration plans

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12
No Plans 無打算	85.3%	86.4%	86.1%	84.0%
Have Plans有打算	13.6%	12.6%	13.0%	14.9%
Don't Know 唔知道	1.0%	0.9%	0.9%	1.2%
Net Value 淨值	71.7%	74.5%	73.1%	69.1%

Net Value: Percent who chose 'No Plans' less percent who chose 'Have Plans'

淨值:認為「無打算」的百分比減去認為「有打算」的百分比

Table 13 shows the percentages of different groups who plan to emigrate due to lack of confidence in 1C2S. Compared to the last survey, the Emigration Ratio (planning to emigrate due to lack of confidence in 1C2S) of the public rose from 9.2% to 11.2%. For Moderates and Non-establishment supporters, the Ratios increased respectively from 6.8% to 9.3%, and from 19.9% to 23.8%. The Emigration Ratios of Non-establishment supporters were much higher than those of Moderates and Pro-establishment supporters. In the latest survey, the Emigration Ratio of 'Non-establishment: Others' (30.3%) was 3 times that of Moderates (9.3%).

表13顯示不同組別因對「一國兩制」缺乏信心而計劃移民的的百分比。比較上一輪調查,移民比率(因對「一國兩制」缺乏信心而計劃移民的比例)由9.2%升至11.2%。溫和派和非建制派的移民比率分別由6.8%升至9.3%,以及由19.9%升至23.8%。非建制派的移民比率遠遠超越溫和派和建制派。最近一輪調查中, 其他非建制派的移民比率(30.3%)是溫和派(9.3%)的三倍。

表 13 : 因對「一國兩制」缺乏信心而計劃移民的比例

Table 13 : Public's emigration plans due to lack of confidence in 1C2S by political inclination

	全部受訪人數 All Respondents			移民比率 Emigration Ratio				
	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12
建制派 Pro-establishment	101	97	105	111	1.0%	0%	0%	0%
溫和派 Moderates	580	600	617	637	7.9%	5.8%	6.8%	9.3%
非建制派 Non-establishment	279	265	248	215	14.3%	16.8%	19.9%	23.8%
其中:民主派 of which: Democrats	207	200	184	164	14.0%	14.3%	14.9%	21.8%
其中:其他非建制派 of which: Others	72	65	64	51	15.3%	24.6%	34.3%	30.3%
Others 其他	33	35	30	28	3.1%	2.5%	3.2%	0.0%
Total 整體市民	996	998	1000	991	8.8%	8.0%	9.2%	11.2%

In the 4th survey, among those who plan to emigrate due to their lack of confidence in 1C2S, 59% were Moderates, and 39% were Non-establishment supporters. Past studies have suggested that surveys often inaccurately amplify the number of individuals who seek to emigrate, for only a fraction of those who express interest in emigrating eventually do so in reality – as such, caution should be exercised in interpreting the findings, though they still provide valuable reference of the degree and extent of concern. Amongst Moderates, those who confess to having plans to emigrate due to their lack of confidence in 1C2S may do so due to - on one hand their disillusionment towards the Central Government and the Pro-Establishment, but also - on the other hand - disillusionment towards perceived instability caused by the Non-establishment supporters, or 'Yellow Ribbons'; the latter may cause disaffection amongst the Moderates due to the perceived damage of radical politics on the rule of law and Hong Kong's economy. Neither of the possibilities above could be ruled out.

第四輪調查中,因對「一國兩制」缺乏信心而計劃移民者,59%屬於溫和派,39%屬於非建制派。根據過往研究,在民調中聲稱移民的人數,往往遠超真正移民的人數。民調結果雖有一定參考價值,但要小心解讀。溫和派聲稱無信心而計劃移民,一方面可能是對中央政府及建制派不滿,另一方面亦可能是擔心非建制派,或俗稱「黃絲帶」破壞社會穩定,例如覺得激進政治將會損害香港法治及經濟,兩種可能性皆不能排除。

1 1 對粵港澳大灣區和「一帶一路」的取態 Attitudes towards the Greater Bay Area (GBA) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

Table 14 shows that the public is not familiar with the GBA. Over time, there has been a slight rise in 'Familiar' and slight fall in 'Unfamiliar' (Question 19). More promotion of the GBA is needed.

表14顯示市民對大灣區認識不深。比較上輪, 「認識較深」輕微上升,「認識較淺」下降(題 目19)。粵港澳大灣區需要更多宣傳。

表 14 :對粵港澳大灣區的認識 Table 14 : Familiarity with the GBA

	2018.6	2018.12	
Familiar認識較深	24.5%	26.6%	
Unfamiliar 認識較淺	55.5%	54.9%	
Don't Know 唔知道	1.3%	1.2%	
Net Value 淨值	-31.4%	-28.6%	
Mean Score 平均分	3.85	3.94	

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Familiar' less percent who chose 'Unfamiliar' 淨值: 認為「認識較深」的百分比減去認為「認識較淺」的百分比,

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater familiarity 平均分由0至10分,愈高分代表認識愈深

Table 15 shows that the majority agreed to HK's participation in the development of the GBA in both rounds of surveys (Question 20). Pro-establishment supporters' agreement to participation was high and rising: Their mean score increased from 8.1 to 8.7, and the increase was statistically significant. Moderates were mildly positive: Their mean scores in both rounds were 6.4. However, Non-establishment supporters switched from mild agreement to mild disagreement: Their mean score fell from 5.4 to 4.6.

表15顯示大多數市民在兩輪調查均支持香港參與 大灣區發展(題目20)。建制派的支持度較高, 且正在上升,評分由8.1分升至8.7分,升幅達到統 計上顯著水平。溫和派傾向支持:兩輪評分皆是 6.4分。但非建制派由傾向支持轉為傾向反對:評 分由5.4分下跌至4.6分。

表 15 : 香港應否參與粵港澳大灣區發展?

Table 15 : Should HK participate in the development of the GBA?

	2018.6	2018.12	
Agree 支持	56.4%	54.0%	
Disagree 反對	23.6%	24.7%	
Don't Know 唔知道	7.0%	7.2%	
Net Value 淨值	35.4%	31.6%	
Mean Score 平均分	6.30	6.27	

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Agree' less percent who chose 'Disagree' 淨值: 認為「支持」的百分比減去認為「反對」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means stronger agreement 平均分由0至10分,愈高分代表愈支持

11.1 Willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA (Question 21)

Table 16 shows that, in the 4th survey, only 13.0% of the public would consider moving there; another 13.4% may consider moving, but 62.6% would not consider moving. Over time, there is a slight rise in 'Willing' and a sight fall in 'Not willing'.

11.1 前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展的 意願(題目21)

圖16顯示第四輪調查中,只有13.0%的市民會考慮前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展,13.4%或者會考慮,但62.6%不會考慮。比較兩輪調查,「會考慮」前往輕微上升,「不會考慮」輕微下降。

表 16 : 前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願

Table 16 : Willingness of living or working in other cities of the GBA

	2018.6	2018.12	
Willing 會考慮	12.2%	13.0%	
Not willing 不會考慮	63.1%	62.6%	
Maybe 或者	11.9%	13.4%	
Don't Know 唔知道	12.8%	11.0%	
Net Value 淨值	-51.0%	-49.5%	

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Willing' less Percent who chose 'Not willing'

淨值:「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比

Table 17 shows a significant change in the willingness of youths (age 18 to 29) to live or work in other cities of the GBA since mid-2018. In the 3rd survey in mid-2018, only 8.1% of youths were willing to live or work in other cities of the GBA, the lowest ratio among all age groups. The attitude of youths changed rapidly in 6 months. At the end of 2018, 14.9% of youths expressed willingness to live or work in the GBA, the highest ratio among all age groups; while 48.8% were unwilling to do so, the lowest ratio among all age groups. The fall in net unwillingness of youths was large (19%), and the change was statistically significant. This is consistent with the de-radicalisation of HK youths.

表17顯示從2018年中起,青年(18至29歲)北上 大灣區居住或發展的意願有顯著變化。在2018年 中的第三輪調查中,只有8.1%的青年會考慮前往 大灣區居住或發展,是比例最低的年齡組別。六 個月後,青年的取態急轉。至年終,14.9%的青年 會考慮前往,是比例最高的年齡組別;48.8%不會 考慮,是比例最低的年齡組別。青年的不願意度 淨值大幅下降(19%),跌幅達統計上的顯著水 平,與他們的去激進化趨勢相乎。

表 17 : 青年(18 至 29 歲)前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願

Table 17 : Willingness of youths (age 18 to 29) to live or work in other cities of the GBA

	2018.6	2018.12	
Willing 會考慮	8.1%	14.9%	
Not willing 不會考慮	61.0%	48.8%	
Maybe 或者	15.0%	23.5%	
Don't Know 唔知道	15.9%	12.7%	
Net Value 淨值	-52.9%	-33.9%	

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Willing' less percent who chose 'Not willing'

淨值:「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比

11.2 Should HK take part in the development of the BRI? (Question 22)

Table 18 shows that the majority in both the 3rd and 4th surveys supported the development of BRI. Over time, the net support fell from 37.6% to 26.2%. This may be related to the problems that the BRI encountered in a number of countries.

As expected, Pro-establishment supporters were highly positive: their mean score increased from 8.10 to 8.65. Moderates remained mildly positive although their mean score fell slightly from 6.46 to 6.22. Non-establishment supporters switched from being mildly positive to mildly negative: Their mean score fell from 5.46 to 4.01.

11.2 香港應否參與「一帶一路」發展? (題目22)

表18顯示第三和第四輪調查中,多數市民支持「一帶一路」發展。淨支持值由37.6%下跌至26.2%,可能跟推行「一帶一路」時,與部分沿線國家存在爭端有關。

建制派的支持度如預期般相當正面:評分由8.10 分升至8.65分。溫和派傾向支持,但評分由6.46分 微跌至6.22分。非建制派由傾向支持轉為傾向反 對,評分由5.46分跌至4.01分。

表 18 : 香港應否參與「一帶一路」發展

Table 15 : Hong Kong's participation in the development of the BRI

2018.6	2018.12	
56.5%	53.1%	
21.6%	28.3%	
7.1%	5.6%	
37.6%	26.2%	
6.37	6.02	
	56.5% 21.6% 7.1% 37.6%	56.5% 53.1% 21.6% 28.3% 7.1% 5.6% 37.6% 26.2%

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Support' less percent who chose 'Oppose'

淨值:「支持」的百分比減去「反對」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means stronger support 平均分由0至10分,愈高分代表愈支持



11.3 Summary of attitudes towards GBA and BRI

To summarise, Pro-establishment supporters and Moderates, who together constitute over 75% of the adult population, agreed that HK should take part in the GBA and the BRI whereas the attitude of Non-establishment supporters turned negative. The political divide between Non-establishment supporters and the majority of the public was increasing. Non-establishment supporters appeared to see the GBA and BRI as schemes that would threaten HK's autonomy.

Though participation in the GBA and BRI had widespread support, the public was not familiar with the GBA, pointing to the need for more efforts in promotion. The proportion of the public that would or may consider moving to other cities in the GBA to live, work, or retire was still small (around a quarter), but the proportion was rising. The rise in willingness among youths was especially strong. This shows that efforts to promote the integration of the GBA has bear some fruits.

12 非建制派支持者的不滿情緒 Disaffection of Non-establishment supporters

Our surveys indicate that Non-establishment supporters in HK appear to be increasingly alienated. Besides their high and rising Emigration Ratios, and their low and falling evaluations of 1C2S, their identity as 'Chinese' has also fallen, contrary to the trend of the majority. Their attitudes towards the Greater Bay Area and the Belt and Road Initiative have increasingly diverged from that of the majority.

Notwithstanding the fact that Non-establishment supporters are in the minority, they play a key role in elections. In fact, as they are more likely to vote and voice their opinions, they command around half of the votes in most elections and are influential in shaping public opinion. Their increasing disaffection is a serious social and political issue that the Central government and the HKSAR government must take careful note.

11.3 對粵港澳大灣區和「一帶一路」的 取態總結


總而言之,建制派及溫和派佔成年人口超過75%,他們認為香港應該參與粵港澳大灣區和「一帶一路」的發展。然而,非建制派支持者的態度轉趨負面。他們似乎認為粵港澳大灣區和「一帶一路」削弱香港的自主權。

雖然市民廣泛支持香港參與粵港澳大灣區和「一帶一路」發展,不過他們對粵港澳大灣區認識不深,政府在宣傳方面仍需努力。市民「會」和「或者會」考慮前往粵港澳大灣區內其他城市居住、工作或退休的比例尚小(約四分之一),不過正在增加。當中願意前往的青年,增幅特別明顯,顯示促進粵港澳大灣區融合的工作有一定成效。

非建制派支持者似乎愈來愈不滿現狀:他們的移民比率偏高且上升,對「一國兩制」的評價低落且下降,對「中國人」的身份認同也在降低,跟普羅大眾的趨勢相反。他們對粵港澳大灣區和「一帶一路」發展的取態亦與大多數人背道而馳。


雖然非建制派屬少數,不過較積極投票及發聲。 他們在大部分選舉取得約一半的選票,對民意有 較大影響力。他們的不滿持續升溫,實屬中央政 府及特區政府需要解決的嚴重社會及政治問題。





附錄 I 指數 A 的不同編制方式

Appendix I Alternative Methods of Constructing Index (A)



Index (A), the composite score of 1C2S from public's evaluation, is computed from scores of 9 dimensions. Conceptually, there are different ways to combine the 9 dimensions into a composite score. We have chosen the method of simple average, which simply gives an equal weight to each dimension. Conceptually, simple average may not be the best as different dimensions may carry different weights. Here, we compare the method of simple average to two alternatives methods that are more sophisticated, namely, Principal Component Analysis and Factor Analysis. Table 1 shows the scores of Index (A) computed by the three methods. The results of the three methods are highly similar and we adopt the simple average as it is the most common and most easily understood.

指數A是香港市民對「一國兩制」的綜合評價,由 九個範疇構成。要將九個範疇計算為綜合評分, 在概念上有不同方式。我們採用了簡單平均數, 視每個範疇權重相同。理論上,不同範疇可能有 不同比重,簡單平均數未必是最好的編制方式, 是以我們考慮兩種更複雜的方式與簡單平均數比 較,分別為「主成分分析」與「因子分析」。表1 是以三種方式計算指數A的評分,結果非常相似, 所以我們採用最常見及最容易理解的簡單平均 數。

表1:不同方式編制的民意調查評分(受訪人數:901)

Table 1 : Score constructed from public survey with different methods (sample: 901)

	Score 評分(1-7)	Score 評分 (0-10)	_
Simple Average 簡單平均數	3.90	4.84	
Principal Component Analysis 主成分分析	3.90	4.84	
Factor Analysis 因子分析	3.86	4.76	

The results of all three methods are highly similar, largely due to the clustered nature of the public's assessments of the nine dimensions (cf. the distributions of the nine dimensions are highly correlated), which causes the core components or sub-items across all three methods to be highly similar.

三種方式編制的結果十分接近,相信是由於市民 對九個範疇的評分相當近似(九個範疇的分佈高 度相關),是以其主要成分或主要因子在三種方 式都十分接近。

Simple average (of the nine dimensions)

This is the most common method employed in constructing indices – its strength lies in its parsimony and accessibility; its weakness is that it assigns equal weighting to all items (i.e. it assumes equal importance for all items).

簡單平均數(九個範疇)

這是編制指數最常用的方法,優點是簡單及容易明白,缺點是假定所有項目都同等重要(即所有項目的權重相等)。

Principal component analysis

Principal component analysis is a statistical method that processes and simplifies data; it is the standard scientific method employed in constructing indices. Through statistical analysis, it extracts the data set's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains the variations across the data; its flaw lies in the complex calculations involved, which render the method inaccessible to laypersons. After complex calculations, we have found that there is negligible difference between results arrived at by using the average approach, and the results acquired via Principal component analysis.

Factor analysis

Factor analysis extracts common factors from the data, and it shares a similar methodology with Principal component analysis. Its strength lies in its ability to identify hidden and representative factors amongst the many variables and group variables of a similar nature and converting the same into a common factor, which reduces the total number of variables. Its weakness is that its complex calculations are difficult to navigate for laypersons. After complex calculations, we have found that there is negligible difference between the results arrived at by using the average approach, and the results acquired using factor analysis.

Given the similarity of the results from all three methods, we adopted the simplest and most commonly used method – i.e. the average of the nine dimensions – in constructing the Index.


主成分分析

主成分分析是一種分析和簡化數據的統計技術, 是以科學化方式編制指數的標準方法,其方法是 通過對數據進行特徵分解,以得出數據的主要成 分與它們的權值,優點是揭露數據的內部結構, 從而更好解釋數據的變化,缺點是計算繁複,一 般人難以掌握。經過繁複計算後,我們發現主成 分分析與簡單平均數所得出的結果,只有微不足 道的差異。

因子分析


因子分析是從數據中提取公性因子的統計方法, 技術與主成分分析類似,其優點是可以在多項變量中找出隱藏及具有代表性的因子,將相同本質的變量歸入一個因子,從而減少變量的數目,缺 點是計算十分繁複,外行人亦難以明白。經過繁 複計算後,我們發現因子分析與簡單平均數所得 出的結果,只有微不足道的差異。

因為三種方式編制指數結果十分接近, 我們選取 最簡單常用的方法,即九個範疇的簡單平均數來 編制「一國兩制」指數。



附錄 II 更新「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」

Appendix II Updating the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index



Index (B) is the average of 3 indices, namely, the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser Institutes, and the Democracy Index of the EIU (Economic Intelligence Unit). There is no need to update the Democracy Index as it already reflects conditions in 2018. The Economic Freedom and Personal Freedom Indices of CATO-Fraser only reflect conditions in 2016. These two indices are updated based on 'Comparable International Indices' (henceforth Comparable Indices). The methods used are detailed below.

Economic Freedom Index

The Comparable Index used is the Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom Index, which reflects conditions up to 2018. We first calculate the percentage changes in the Comparable Index from 2016 to 2017, and from 2016 to 2018; then we apply these percentages to the 2016 Economic Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser to obtain the updated scores of 2017 and 2018.

Personal Freedom Index

The Personal Freedom Index has 7 components. The Comparable Index for each of the 7 components are listed in Table 1. For each of the 7 components, we first calculate the percentage change in the corresponding Comparable Index from 2016 to 2017; then we apply the percentage to the 2016 score of that component to obtain the updated score of 2017. Updating to 2018 is not yet possible as the latest Comparable Indices only reflect conditions in 2017.

指數B是「經濟自由指數」、「個人自由指數」及「民主指數」三項指數的平均分。首兩項指數由卡托研究所(Cato Institute)及菲沙研究所(Fraser Institute)編制,第三項指數則由經濟學人智庫編制。「民主指數」已經反映2018年的情況,所以毋須更新。卡托研究所與菲沙研究所的「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」只反映2016年的數據,此兩項指數將按相應的國際指數(簡稱相應指數)更新。更新方法如下。

「經濟自由指數」

相應指數為傳統基金會的「經濟自由指數」,反映2018年的情況。我們計算相應指數於2016年至2017年及2016至2018年的百分比變化,將之套用於卡托研究所及菲沙研究所的「經濟自由指數」,從而得出2017年及2018年的評分。

「個人自由指數」

「個人自由指數」由七個子項目組成,表1列出各個子項目的相應指數。我們計算每項相應指數於2016年至2017年的百分比變化,將之套用於該子項目於2016年的評分,從而得出2017年的評分。由於最新的相應指數只反映2017年的情況,所以未能更新至2018年。

表 1 :「個人自由指數」子項目的相應指數

Table 1 : Comparable Indices for Components of Personal Freedom Index

Components of Personal Freedom Index 「個人自由指數」子項目	Comparable Indices 相應指數
Rule of Law 法治 Security and Safety 安全	Relevant sub-indices from World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index 世界正義項目「法治指數」之相關子項目 ¹
Movement 遷徙自由 Religion 宗教自由 Association, Assembly, & Civil Society 結社、集會及公民社會自由	Relevant sub-indices from Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report 自自由之家「世界自由調查報告」之相關子項目 ²
Expression and Information 言論自由	Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index 無國界記者「全球新聞自由指數」
Identity and Relationships 性別認同及關係	Relevant sub-index from Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report 自自由之家「世界自由調查報告」之相關子項目³


We use the same indicators in the Personal Freedom Index to measure the rule of law, which consists of procedural justice, civil justice and criminal justice from World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index. Security and safety are comparable with the score on 'Order and Security'.
我們採用與「個人自由指數」相同的指標以量度「法治」,即世界正義項目「法治指數」的程序公義、民事司法及刑事司法評分;「安全」參照「秩序與治安」的評分。

² The freedom of movement is corresponding to the score on 'G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?'; religion freedom is corresponding to the score on 'D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?'; and the freedom of association, assembly, and civil society is corresponding to the score on 'E. Associational and Organizational Rights'.

[「]遷徙自由」参照「G1. 人民是否享有遷徙自由,包括改變居所、就業或教育的能力?」的評分;「宗教自由」参照「D2. 人民能否在公開或私人場合自由地實踐和表達宗教信仰或非信仰?」的評分;及「結社、集會及公民社會自由」参照「E. 結社及組織權利」的評分。


³ The freedom of identity and relationships is corresponding to the score on 'G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?'.

[「]性別認同及關係」參照「G3. 人民是否享有個人社交自由,包括選擇婚姻對象及家庭人數、免受居所暴力及自主改變外貌?」的評分。



附錄 III 「一國兩制」指數:更新前之估算值

Appendix III 1C2S Index: Estimated Scores before Updating



Scores of Index (A) shown below are the same as those in Figure 3 in Section 2. Scores of the 1C2S Index, which is the average of Indices (A) and (B), are slightly different from those in Figure 3 in Section 2 as Index (B) has not been updated.

The differences in scores of Index (B) and the 1C2S Index due to updating are negligible.


圖1顯示過去三份報告上,基於當時可得的數據而估算的指數B,與第二節內圖3顯示的更新數據有輕微差異。

下述的指數A與第二節內圖3相同。由於指數B尚未 更新,「一國兩制」指數(指數A和指數B的平均 分)與該圖有輕微差異。

指數B及「一國兩制」指數因為更新而帶來的差異 微不足道。

圖 1 : 四份報告的「一國兩制」指數 Figure 1 : 1C2S Index in 4 Reports

「一國兩制」指數 (估算) 1C2S Index (Estimates)



附錄 IV 「一國兩制」輿情指數的編制方法

Appendix IV Construction of 1C2S Mass Media Index (1C2S MMI)

Our sample consists of around 132,600 newspaper articles related to 1C2S from 21 local daily newspapers that were published between April 1998 and December 2018. The number of articles processed in each newspaper is listed in Table 1.

Each article undergoes a 'tokenisation' process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of approximately 21 years, our text corpus contains around 66 million tokens. From this massive dataset, common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as '我', '你', '的', are first removed before further analysis.

To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: 'positive', 'negative' or 'neutral' (not a sentiment word). A positive word is then given a sentiment score of 1, a negative word is assigned a score of -1, and a neutral word has a score of 0. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by Ku et al. (2009). The number of words processed each year since 1998 is given in Table 2.

The positive, or negative as the case may be, sentiment of a paragraph is quantified via a count of the number of positive (negative) words it contains, adjusted by the its total word count. The sentiment score of an article is calculated as the average difference between positive and negative proportions among constituent paragraphs. 1C2S MMI is derived as an index that captures the weighted average sentiment score among newspapers in a given month. The base month of set at July 2017 to indicate 20 years after the establishment of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Table 1 reveals substantial differences in the number of news articles published by newspapers during the sample period. Article count of a newspaper alone could be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure 1C2S MMI's reliability, the sentiment score for each newspaper is further weighted by public perceptions of its credibility based on the survey 'Public Evaluation on Media Credibility' conducted by Centre for Communication Research, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. The time series of MMI since 2015 is given in Table 3.

「一國兩制」輿情指數的資料由新聞文章組成, 包含1998年4月至2018年12月期間,來自本地21 份日報關於「一國兩制」,約132,600份報導及評 論。表1顯示每份報章所運算的文章數量。

我們就每篇文章進行「分詞」(tokenization), 通過電腦運算將文章分解成語例(token,為單詞 或短語)。我們利用約21年的資料組成語料庫, 包含大約6,600萬個語例。 在進一步分析這個龐大 的語料庫之前,我們首先剔除無助理解文章的常 見單詞(如「我」、「你」、「的」)。為了辨 別一篇文章的情緒,我們採用由古倫維、何修維 及陳信希(2009)開發的繁體中文情緒字典¹,把 語例分類為「正面」、「中立」(非情感詞)或 「負面」。「正面」的語例得1分,「中立」得0 分,「負面」得-1分。表2顯示各年所運算的文字 數量。

我們計算每段落所包含的正、負面語例數量,每篇文章的情緒評分則為各個段落經字數調整後的淨值。「一國兩制」與情指數即為當月所有文章的平均情緒評分,基數月訂為2017年7月,基數為100,以標誌回歸20周年的情況。從表1可以看到,不同報章所刊登的文章數目有明顯差別。因此,只考慮文章數目不足以呈現不同報章對讀者觀感的影響力。為確保可靠性,本指數將採用由香港中文大學傳播與民意調查中心「市民對傳媒公信力的評分」為每份報章的情緒評分加權。表3顯示自2015以來「一國兩制」與情指數的數表。

Ku, Lun-Wei, Ho, Xiu-Wei and Chen, Hsin-His (2009).
Opinion Mining and Relationship Discovery Using CopeOpi
Opinion Analysis System, Journal of American Society for
Information Science and Technology, 60(7), pp1486-1503.

表 1 :報章來源 Table 1 :Data Source

Total 總數

表 2 : 資料字數 (按年份劃分) Table 2 : Number of Words

報章	文章篇數	年份	字數
Newspaper	Number of Articles	Year 	Number of Words
A Daily A報	81	1998	669,676
am730	1,960	1999	2,498,254
Apple Daily 蘋果日報	8,459	2000	2,320,584
Headline Daily 頭條日報	931	2001	2,640,690
Hong Kong Commercial Daily		2002	2,545,546
香港商報	12,820	2003	2,713,403
Hong Kong Daily News 新報	4,476	2004	4,801,621
Hong Kong Economic Journal		2005	2,874,994
信報	9,263	2006	1,879,834
Hong Kong Economic Times		2007	2,797,512
經濟日報	3,869	2008	1,446,629
Hong Kong Globe 公正報	194	2009	1,815,839
Metro Daily都市日報	1,303	2010	1,880,198
Ming Pao Daily News 明報	10,851	2011	2,040,824
Oriental Daily News 東方日報	7,498	2012	3,441,893
Lion Rock Daily 香港仔	143	2013	3,312,415
Sharp Daily 爽報	152	2014	5,386,835
Sing Pao 成報	4,729	2015	4,411,567
Sing Tao Daily 星島日報	7,020	2016	5,590,354
Sky Post 晴報	420	2017	6,204,647
Ta Kung Pao 大公報	26,628	2018	4,932,978
The Sun 太陽報	4,828		
Tin Tin Daily News 天天日報	452	Total 總數	66,206,293
Wen Wei Po 文匯報	26,519		

132,596

		1C2S MM	1C2S MMI 「一國兩制」 與情指數 (2017.7 = 100) 1C2S MMI (2017.7 = 100)		
年份 Year	半年 Half-Year	月份 Month	月結 Monthly	半年平均數 6-Month	
2015	H1	1	75.30	84.70	
		2	77.80	82.98	
		3	94.43	84.55	
		4	87.11	85.43	
		5	84.35	85.21	
		6	69.72	81.45	
	H2	7	85.16	83.10	
		8	71.31	82.01	
		9	93.72	81.89	
		10	119.39	87.27	
		11	105.59	90.81	
		12	86.43	93.60	
2016	H1	1	65.41	90.31	
		2	62.97	88.92	
		3	84.60	87.40	
		4	67.90	78.82	
		5	90.49	76.30	
		6	67.87	73.21	
	H2	7	82.53	76.06	
		8	74.79	78.03	
		9	90.05	78.94	
		10	90.74	82.75	
		11	71.54	79.59	
		12	94.74	84.06	
2017	H1	1	100.73	87.10	
		2	86.41	89.03	
		3	96.44	90.10	
		4	107.89	92.96	
		5	104.60	98.47	
		6	103.72	99.96	
	H2	7	100	99.84	
		8	86.38	99.84	
		9	81.64	97.37	
		10	103.44	96.63	
		11	104.57	96.63	
		12	106.79	97.14	
2018	H1	1	103.41	97.71	
		2	98.56	99.74	
		3	113.21	105.00	
		4	76.76	100.55	
		5	104.08	100.47	
		6	99.28	99.22	
	H2	7	93.67	97.61	
		8	78.51	94.26	
		9	77.31	88.27	
		10	90.24	90.52	
		11	95.01	89.00	
		12	114.84	91.60	

Accuracy test

1C2S MMI is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict.

準確度覆查

「一國兩制」與情指數是建基於由詞彙組成的模型。此模型視每段落為一籃子的詞語,從而抽離整篇文章的脈絡。其中一個效果是可能無法辨認到如諷刺等寫作手法,因而不能完全理解每一個段落的真正含義。這個局限在分析小說及文學作品時可能較為明顯,但對於寫作手法較直接的新聞文章而言,相信不是一個大問題。

為證實此詞彙模型辨別情緒的準確度,我們兩位研究員從語料庫中隨機抽取了約18,000個段落,親自分類為「正面」、「負面」和「中立」,再與詞彙模型比較。各段落的出處在給予研究員之前已經被隱藏。假如兩名研究員對同一個段落的情緒判斷有異,第三名研究員將會重讀並作出判斷。

表 4 :覆查結果

Table 4 : Results of Accuracy Test

	Positive 正面	Neutral 中立	Negative 負面
No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers			
真人研究員對情緒的判斷	2,363	14,202	1,472
Net Value			
情緒淨值	21.76%	14.42%	2.92%

In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time. As shown in Table 4, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as 'positive' whereas 1,472 were classified as 'negative.'


是次覆查中,兩名研究員在大約八成的情況下均 能作出相同的判斷。如表4所顯示,2,363及1,472 個段落分別被判決為「正面」及「負面」。

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be.

我們利用與「一國兩制」與情指數相同的詞彙模型為此等段落的情緒評分。在模型中,情緒評分為正、負面詞語量的淨值,所以評分愈高代表情緒愈正面。


Table 4 also shows the average sentiment scores of these 3 groups of paragraphs. In particular, 'positive' paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as 'negative' paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these 3 groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.

表4顯示利用詞彙模型計算的情緒評分。被研究員 判斷為「正面」的段落,情緒評分為21.76%,約 為「負面」段落的7.5倍。再者,利用多變量回歸 分析,三個類別的情緒評分發現具統計學上的顯 著差異,證實詞彙模型的計算結果與我們研究員 的人手分類一致。



附錄 V 爭議事件一覽

Appendix V List of Controversial Events



The controversial events which may have affected evaluations of 1C2S that occurred between mid-2017 to mid-2018 (the first and third surveys) are listed below.

2017年中至2018年中期間(即第一輪至第三輪調查),可能影響對「一國兩制」評價的爭議事件 臚列如下。

Between the first and second rounds (from mid-2017 to end of 2017):

- Disqualification of four LegCo members by the High Court (14 July);
- Prison sentences on the '13 + 3' protesters: The Court of Appeals sentenced 13 protestors in the violent demonstrations in relation to North East New Territories Development and the three student leaders (Joshua Wong, Nathan Law and Alex Chow) in the Civic Square occupation to 6 to 13 months' imprisonment. The court also gave new tougher sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence (15 & 17 August);
- China's enactment of the national anthem law (1 September);
- Emphasis on 'overall jurisdiction over Hong Kong' in the Work Report of 19th CPC National Congress (19 October);
- LegCo's passage of the non-binding motion on the high-speed rail co-location arrangement (15 November); and
- Amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Council to restrict filibustering (15 December).

第一輪至第二輪期間(2017年中至2017年底):


- 高等法院裁定四名立法會議員宣誓無效(7月 14日);
- 「13+3」示威者被判入獄:上訴法庭判處 13 名涉及暴力的反新界東北發展示威者與強行進 入公民廣場示威的「雙學三子」(黃之鋒、羅 冠聰及周永康)6 至 13 個月監禁。上訴法庭 更提出更嚴厲的量刑準則予未來涉及暴力的大 型非法集會案件(8 月 15 及 17 日);
- 中國訂立國歌法(9月1日);
- 中共十九大工作報告強調對香港的「全面管治權」(10月19日);
- 立法會通過關於高鐵「一地兩檢」安排的無約 束力議案(11月15日);及
- 立法會透過修訂議事規則限制拉布(12月15日)。

Between the second and third rounds (from early to mid-2018):

- Agnes Chow Ting, a pro-democracy activist, was banned from running for the LegCo by-election on the grounds that her party, Demosisto, had called for 'self-determination' (27 January);
- The case of the three student leaders was brought to the Court
 of Final Appeals (CFA). The CFA overturned the prison sentences
 on the trio on a technicality but ruled that the Court of Appeals
 was entitled to give tough sentence guidelines for future
 offenders of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence
 (6 February);
- Edward Leung, leader of HK Indigenous, was given a prison sentence of 6 years for his role in the civil unrest in Mongkok (11 June); and
- LegCo's passage of the co-location bill after protracted debates (14 June).

第二輪至第三輪期間(2018年初至年底):

- 有意代表香港眾志出選立法會港島區補選的周庭,被裁定參選提名無效(1月27日);
- 「雙學三子」案件上訴至終審法院。終審法院 以技術因素推翻監禁判決,但認可上訴法院對 未來涉及暴力的大規模非法集會案件所提出的 更嚴厲判刑指引(2月6日);
- 本土民主前線領袖梁天琦參與旺角騷亂,被判 處6年監禁(6月11日);及
 - · 立法會經過漫長辯論後,通過「一地兩檢」議 案(6月14日)。



附錄 VI 香港大學民意研究計劃有關政治傾向的調查

Appendix VI HKU Public Opinion Programme (HKUPOP) Surveys on Political Inclination

Our results on political inclination are similar to those of HKUPOP, which has collected data on political inclination on a bi-weekly basis since late October 2016. The HKUPOP survey classified political inclination into 3 groups: 'Inclined towards the pro-democracy camp' (analogous to our 'Non-establishment' group), 'Inclined towards the pro-establishment camp', (analogous to our 'Pro-establishment' group), and 'Inclined towards the centrist', (analogous to our 'Moderates' group).

We use the HKUPOP data, which has 55 observations from October 2016 to December 2018, to compute the 3 linear trends that best fit the data on the proportions of the 3 camps. The analysis confirmed that the proportion of the Pro-democracy camp exhibited a decreasing trend (slope = -0.0044) that was statistically significant. The proportion of the Centrist camp exhibited an increasing trend (slope = 0.0037) that was statistically significant. The results are similar to those obtained from our surveys.² However, in the HKUPOP surveys, the proportion of the Pro-establishment camp did not exhibit a definite trend that was statistically significant.

香港大學民意研究計劃(港大民研)從2016年10 月下旬起,每兩星期統計有關政治傾向的數據, 調查結果與我們吻合。港大民研將政治傾向劃分 為以下三個派別,「傾向民主派」(對應我們的 「非建制派」)、「傾向建制派」(對應我們的 「建制派」)和「偏向中間派」¹(對應我們的 「溫和派」)。

港大民研從2016年10月至2018年12月,有關三種政治傾向的調查已累積55個觀測點。我們以此計算最匹配各個派別所佔人口比例的三組線性趨勢。統計分析證實,民主派呈下降趨勢(斜率=-0.0044),而中間派則呈上升趨勢(斜率=0.0037),兩者的升跌幅均達統計上顯著水平,與我們調查所得的趨勢相似²。不過在港大民研的調查中,建制派的變化未見達到統計上顯著水平的明顯趨勢。

¹ This group include 'Inclined towards the Centrist' and also 'No political inclination'. This is similar to our 'Moderates' which include 'Centrists' and 'No political inclination'.

此派別包括「偏向中間派」和「沒有政治取態」。我們的「溫和派」包括「中間派」和「沒有政治取態」,與之相似。


² Using the best fit linear trend, the fall in proportion of the 'Inclined towards the pro-democracy camp' from mid-2017 to the end of 2018 would be 2.4 percentage points, while the increase in proportion of the 'Inclined towards the centrist camp' in the same period would be 2.0 percentage points. The directions of changes are the same as those in our surveys, but the magnitudes of changes in their surveys are smaller. This may be due to the fact that the names of different camps in the HKUPOP surveys are not exactly the same as ours.


如採用最匹配的線性趨勢,從2017年中至2018年底,「偏向民主派」佔人口比例的跌幅為2.4個百分點,「偏向中間派」的升幅為2.0個百分點。此升跌趨勢與我們的調查相同,但我們的調查所反映的變化幅度較大,可能因為港大民研對各個派別的名稱與我們不盡相同。

圖1:香港市民的政治傾向(港大民研)

Figure 1 : Composition of population by political inclination (HKUPOP)

香港市民的政治傾向(港大民研) Composition of population by political inclination (HKUPOP)





'ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS'

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「一國兩制」指數

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