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前言 Preface

The unprecedented pursuit of 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) requires unyielding exploration and persistence of stakeholders. Since 1997, we have made headway in the realization of 1C2S, but at the same time, have also encountered many challenges. To assist full implementation of 1C2S, in July 2017, Path of Democracy established the 1C2S Index and released its first report in relation thereto with a view to conduct an objective evaluation of the continued implementation of 1C2S by reviewing the accomplishments and shortfalls of 1C2S at the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong SAR.

The 1C2S Index is based on both local opinion and international perception on the current state of 1C2S. In order to measure local sentiment, we conduct periodic public surveys in Hong Kong on aspects such as 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong', judiciary independence, the high degree of autonomy and other important issues. We also looked at global studies carried out by international think tanks and how Hong Kong is being rated on aspects like human rights, rule of law, freedom of speech and freedom of association. These independent evaluations are also incorporated into the Index to give a more balanced view on how the World including Hong Kong people look at the state of 1C2S.

We also devised and introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) by making use of big data analytics to measure the media sentiment of Hong Kong towards 1C2S since 1998 with real-time monitoring and predictive alerts.

In compiling our reports, we also sought views on current issues related to 1C2S, such as the public's emigration plans, national security and economic integration. In this report, in view of the special unprecedented circumstances caused by the anti-extradition movement, we have conducted two extra rounds of survey to reflect the change of public sentiments during the relevant period.

We extend our sincere gratitude to the research team involved in the production of our fifth edition of the 1C2S Index report: Gillian Tam, Ting Hin Yan, and Ian Chan. We are also grateful to Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong for completing the telephone polls on our behalf.

Going forward, to better inform policy makers and the public, we will continue to conduct public surveys and update international indices every six months, and to monitor media sentiment regularly to gauge the latest perceptions of the public, the international community and the media on 1C2S.

Ray Poon

Co-convenor (Research)

「一國兩制」是前無古人的嘗試,1997 年至今既取得成果,也遇到挑戰,實踐過程需要社會各界不斷探索。民主思路在香港回歸20年之際發布第一份關於「一國兩制」概況的客觀評價,希望鑑察其成就與缺失,為全面準確貫徹此方針謹盡綿力。

「一國兩制」指數編製自關於「一國兩制」 現狀的本地民意及國際評價。我們定期進行 民意調查,就港人治港、高度自治、司法獨 立及其他重要範疇了解香港市民想法。我們 亦參考國際機構對香港在人權、法治、言論 自由和結社自由等範疇的評分,把以上獨立 意見揉合於指數之中,為香港及世界各地對 「一國兩制」現狀的觀感作出中肯評估。

除此之外,我們借助大數據技術,推出「一國兩制」與情指數去衡量新聞情緒,追溯自 1998年迄今香港媒體的有關報導,實現即時 觀測與預警。

編製報告時,我們亦探討「一國兩制」實踐中的熱門議題,例如移民海外、國家安全、經濟融合等。修例風波觸發對「一國兩制」的關注及擔憂,我們就此進行兩輪額外的調查,了解民意變化。


報告更新至第五版,我們衷心感謝研究團隊:譚廸文、甄定軒及陳譽仁,亦謹此向執行電話調查的香港中文大學香港亞太研究所致以謝意。

展望未來,我們會繼續每半年進行民意調查及更新國際指數,亦會定期追蹤輿情指數,從而反映香港市民、國際社會及本地媒體對「一國兩制」的最新觀感,供決策者及公眾參考。


潘學智

聯席召集人(研究)





摘要 Key Findings



While some applauded the promulgation of the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in early 2019, the outbreak of public fear over 'submission to the Mainland' was epitomized by both the persistence and magnitude of the anti-extradition movement which also highlighted the inadequacies or insensitivity of local governance and deeprooted social problems. Many feared heightened tensions provoked by increased violence would bring about intervention from Beijing. Hong Kong also became a battle ground of international power struggle, featuring in the Sino-US trade talks, Beijing's 1C2S plan for Taiwan, the passage of the 'Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act', and some even attempted to portray the anti-extradition movement as an inspiration for pro-democratic uprisings around the world. What is certain is there can be no foregone conclusions other than that the final verdict is yet to come.

Everyone is now compelled to confront with the future of Hong Kong and 1C2S. In our fifth edition of the 1C2S Index report, we hope to shed light on the subject with substantial quantitative data from four rounds of surveys. To fully capture the socio-political reality of the city, we also introduced new sets of questions on the social movement that gripped Hong Kong and the international community in the latter half of 2019.

雖然 2019 年初發布的《粵港澳大灣區發展規劃綱要》引起不少迴響,香港積壓甚多又懸而未決的管治問題與深層次矛盾,終於在曠日持久的反修例運動下,伴隨「送中」帶來的公眾恐慌爆發。示威期間暴力升級,緊張局面令更多人憂慮中央政府介入。香港亦成為國際政治角力的戰場,周旋於中美貿易談判、北京的「一國兩制」台灣方案、美國的《香港人權及民主法案》,反修例運動甚至被描繪為啟迪世界各地民主運動的案例。社會對事態的理解眾說紛紜,唯一肯定的是現在難以蓋棺定論。

動盪的一年,催促市民再次思考香港的前途問題與「一國兩制」的未來。第五版「一國兩制」指數報告整合 2019 年四輪民意調查的統計結果,我們希望藉著客觀數據探討香港與「一國兩制」何去何從。為更掌握香港的現實狀況,我們亦增加了新題目,以理解本地和國際社會對近半年來社會運動的關注。

「一國兩制」信心岌岌可危 Confidence in 1C2S at risk

Concerns built up around the nature of the amendment bill and inexplicably turned what was to be an innocuous attempt to fill up a loophole in the criminal justice system into an acute frenzy questioning the continuation of judicial independence and even the erosion of legislative power. The injunction against violent online messages and the anti-mask law further escalated the matter as the bans were read as examples of encroachment on the freedom of expression. In these circumstances, a substantial drop in the IC2S Index is to be expected. The Index fell from 6.38 at the end of 2018, to its record low since its inception at 5.57 in October and slightly recovered to 5.70 in December 2019.

While all nine dimensions from Index (A): Public Opinion fell, five of them rebounded with statistical significance from October to December, namely, independent judiciary, independent legislature, original ways of life, freedom of speech and democratisation. The upturn coincided with the ruling by the High Court that the anti-mask law was unconstitutional, the landslide victory of the non-establishment camp in the District Council election and the government's proposal to create an independent panel to review the causes of the social unrest in November and December which no doubt contributed to the slight recovery of the Index.

From our past reports, we can see it has been a consistent pattern that the Hong Kong public host higher expectations and much more critical view on the integrity of 1C2S. Changes in Index (B): International Perception tends to be more diverse and less drastic. In line with the improved reliability rating of police services from the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report, Cato- Fraser Institutes raised Hong Kong's rating for security. Negative adjustments were made for rule of law and freedom of expression in other international studies but due to time lag in the compilation of international indices, further decline at the international level is anticipated given the current socio- political situation, notwithstanding the historic turnout for the local district election and the rise of citizen journalism will be seen as positive factors in term of democratic participation.

修訂《逃犯條例》本來試圖堵塞現時刑事司法的漏洞,但公眾關注升溫,成為質疑司法獨立和立法權被損害的怒號。頒布針對網上煽動暴力言行的禁制令和實施禁蒙面法,更被視為侵犯言論自由。由此觀之,「一國兩制」指數持續下降並不教人意外。2018年底的6.38分跌至2019年10月的5.57分,為指數自編製以來的最低位,其後稍微回升至12月的5.70分。

雖然指數(A):民意調查九個範疇皆錄得跌幅,但是其中五項於10月至12月期間回暖,達統計上顯著水平,分別為獨立司法權、獨立立法權、維持原有生活方式、言論自由和民主政制發展。此等範疇的漲幅與以下在11至12月間發生的事件不無關係:高院裁定禁蒙面法違憲,非建制派於區議會選舉壓倒性勝利和政府倡設獨立檢討委員會檢討社會動盪原因。

在過去的報告中,香港市民一直比國際社會對「一國兩制」有更高期望,評分亦因而較嚴格。所以,指數(B):國際評價的變化相對多樣化和平穩。卡托一菲沙研究所增加香港在安全方面的評分,符合世界經濟論壇「全球競爭力報告」提高警察服務可靠程度。儘管地區議會選舉的投票率達歷史新高,再加上公民新聞冒起,俱為促進民主參與的良好因素,不過香港的法治和言論自由卻被視為越趨負面。國際智庫在整合全球評分時,數據一般滯後,鑑於香港近期的社會狀況,香港在國際社會的評價很可能進一步下降。

反修例運動的青年參與

Youth involvement in the anti-extradition movement

Chaos erupted as the bills committee proceedings in LegCo for the controversial extradition law amendment attempted to start. Accusations of police brutality surfaced after major collisions between police and demonstrators, such as the 7.21 Yuen Long incident, 8.31 Prince Edward station incident, 10.1 and 11.11 gunshot incidents and campus clashes in universities. Protests turned more ferocious as general acceptance of violence in most age groups increased between August and October, especially in the 18-29 age group.

Our data also reveal that young people's involvement in the movement produced some distinctive patterns among their sub-groups. In the 18-29 age group, students' participation (50.7%) had been much less prominent than employed youths (73.8%). Students generally embraced the concept of violent resistance as their net acceptance ratio grew sharply from 6.5% in August to 29.1% in October. The rise in this group was much quicker than their employed counterparts.

As the discontent boiled, more vigorous 'retaliation' strategies were deployed by both camps. People from both camps began to use online doxing to put pressure on protesters and journalists on the one hand and on police officers and their families on the other. Acceptance of such behaviours was low, although acceptance of doxing against police officers and their families was generally higher. The difference in level of acceptance of online doxing against the two groups was starkest among the age group 30-39 years, of which difference was statistically significant.

立法會修訂《逃犯條例》的法案委員會「鬧雙胞」,爭議不斷。多宗警民衝突令「警暴」指控浮現,包括 7.21 元朗事件,8.31 太子站事件,10.1 及 11.11 槍傷事件及大學校園對峙。示威越演越烈,從 8 月至 10 月,大部分年齡組別越來越接受激進示威行為,在 18-29 歲尤其明顯。

從我們的數據可以看到,不同背景的年輕人用不同方式參與這場運動,差異鮮明。18-29 歲青年中,學生的參與度(50.7%)不及在職青年(73.8%)。然而,暴力抗爭這個概念在學生群體有所滋長,他們對激進示威行為的接受淨值由8月的6.5%急速上升至10月的29.1%,升幅比在職青年環要強。

隨著不滿情緒白熱化,雙方陣營開始採取更激進的報復行為。網絡「起底」成風,既向示威者及記者,亦向警察及其家人製造壓力。雖然受訪者較為接受針對警察及其家人「起底」,而且在30-39歲中最為突出,差距達統計上顯著水平,不過市民普遍也不接受對雙方陣營的網絡欺凌。

廣泛支持繼續實行「一國兩制」 Overwhelming support for the continuation of 1C2S

The overall support for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 was, however, overwhelmingly high at 73.5%. Despite the social turbulence, support across all groups with different political inclinations still maintained at around and often over 70%, including the localists and self-determinists, who are known to be highly critical of 1C2S. Though the public's current evaluation of 1C2S is quite critical, the majority of them still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

For most people, 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (65.4%) remained the most favourable condition to the continuation of 1C2S. Consistent with one of the core demands of the anti-extradition movement, 'democratising further' (56.0%) surpassed 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (47.6%) as the second most important condition for the first time since 2018.

Albeit to different degree, the rapid growth in the share of 'democratising further' happening from June 2019 onwards was common to all political inclination, with the exception of pro-establishment supporters. Nonetheless, the pro-establishment group's regard of 'completing legislation of Article 23' had lowered continuously since December 2018, giving way to 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability'.

雖然社會氣氛緊張,市民對 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度仍然高達 73.5%。所有政治派別均高企於約七成,包括對「一國兩制」常有批評的本土派和自決派。即使市民對當前「一國兩制」的實施狀況有一定批評,他們依然相信「一國兩制」是適合香港未來的體制。

對大部分市民而言,「維持高度自治」(65.4%) 仍然是有利於繼續實行「一國兩制」的首要選項。 「經濟維持繁榮穩定」(47.6%)一度是第二有利 條件,自 2018 年開始調查後,首次被「政制進一 步民主化」(56.0%)超越,與反修例運動的訴求 之一相符。

除建制派支持者外,自 2019 年 6 月起,各個政治派別對「政制進一步民主化」均有不同程度的升幅。此外,自 2018 年 12 月起,「經濟維持繁榮穩定」在建制派中持續攀升,令「完成23條立法」的重要性相對減低。



政治兩極化復甦 Resurgence of political polarization

The population became more polarized from December 2018 to December 2019 amidst a hopeful trend of the rise of moderation in 2017 and 2018. While moderates remained the largest group, they had decreased by 13.3 percentage points (from 64.2% to 50.9%) in 2019. Non-establishment supporters rose by 15.1 percentage points (from 21.7% to 36.8%) in the same period while pro-establishment supporters decreased by 4 percentage points (from 11.3% to 7.3%). Different trajectories displayed by the above groups also signified further polarization, as evident in the changes between October and December 2019. While the number of pro-establishment supporters regained and the growth of non-establishment supporters stabilized, moderates continued to decline.

Radicalism re-emerged among youths (aged 18 to 29). The proportion of moderates in this age group dropped from 66.4% in December 2018 to 38.2% in December 2019 (decreasing by 28.2 percentage points) while the proportion of the non-establishment group rose from 29.7% to 55.3% (rising by 25.6 percentage points). Within the non-establishment group, the proportions of democrats and 'others' rose from 19.6% to 28.5% and from 10.1% to 26.9% respectively (rising by 8.9% and 16.8% percentage points).

Up till December 2018, there had been encouraging signs of de-radicalization of youth, where population of moderates were high and rising. This trend, however, was reversed abruptly from June 2019 onwards, as the proportion of non-establishment supporters witnessed steep rise, surpassing moderates. At the same time, within the non-establishment group, 'others' overtook and dropped just below democrats in December 2019, which reminisced 2017 when the traditional and radical wings were of almost equal share. This is an alarming observation.

溫和政治於 2017 至 2018 年興起,從 2018 年 12 月至 2019 年 12 月社會卻再趨撕裂。雖然溫和派仍佔大多數,其比例卻在 2019 年下降 13.3 個百分點(由 64.2% 跌至 50.9%)。同期,非建制派支持者上升 15.1 個百分點(由 21.7% 升至 36.8%),建制派支持者則下降 4 個百分點(由 11.3% 跌至 7.3%)。2019 年 10 月至 12 月的政治傾向轉變,進一步説明市民的兩極化趨勢。一方面建制派重拾部分支持者,另一方面非建制派的增長趨平,只有溫和派繼續下跌。

激進主義在青年(18-29 歲)當中再次抬頭。 溫和派的比例由 2018 年 12 月的 66.4%下降 至2019 年 12 月的 38.2%(跌幅為 28.2 個 百分點),而非建制派的比例由 29.7% 上升 至 55.3%(升幅為 25.6 個百分點)。非建制 派組別中,民主派和其他非建制派分別由 19.6%升至 28.5%及由 10.1%升至 26.9% (升幅為 8.9 及 16.8 個百分點)。

截至 2018 年 12 月,青年溫和派不但高企,還慢慢攀升,呈現令人鼓舞的去激進化跡象。但此趨勢由 2019 年 6 月起急速扭轉,令溫和派屈居於急速增長的非建制派之後。更甚者,其他非建制派的比例曾一度多於民主派,至 2019 年 12 月始回落稍低水平,近似 2017 年非建制派中傳統與激進兩翼勢力均等的情況,令人擔憂。

香港人與中國人身分認同背馳

Divergence of citizens' identity as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese'

Citizens' self-identification as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' started to diverge after a period of parallel increase. From December 2018 to October 2019, the public's self-identification as 'Hongkongers' rose from 8.06 to 8.41. In the same period, that as 'Chinese' dropped from 6.83 to 4.72. Both changes were statistically significant.

Most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese'. This has gradually changed since June 2019. While over half of the public acknowledged dual identity in earlier surveys, this had dropped to 36.2% and was surpassed by citizens identifying themselves strongly as 'Hongkongers only' (53.5%) in October 2019.

As a result of the declining dual identity, the correlation between the two stated identities became less apparent. The two identities used to mutually reinforce each other. Now, there are signs of polarization between them instead. The rank correlation coefficient changed from 0.74 in December 2018 to -0.22 in October 2019, though the correlation was not statistically significant. A stronger identification as 'Hongkonger' now accompanies a weaker one as 'Chinese', and vice versa. The loss of the mutuality of the two identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' risks challenging the implementation of 1C2S in the near future.

過去一段時間,市民對「香港人」和「中國人」兩種身分認同同步增強,最近的調查則顯示兩者開始分歧。2018 年 12 月至 2019 年 10 月期間,大眾對「香港人」的認同感由 8.06 分上升至 8.41 分。同期,對「中國人」的認同感則由 6.83 分下跌至 4.72 分。兩項變化均達統計上顯著水平。

香港市民普遍擁有「香港人」和「中國人」雙重身分認同,情況自 2019 年 6 月起逐步轉變。過往調查中,擁有雙重身分認同的市民由超過一半,下降至 2019 年 10 月的 36.2%,跌低於對「香港人」有較強認同感的市民(53.5%)。

隨著雙重身分認同大不如前,這兩種身分的相關性亦變得模糊,由過去的相輔相成,變為現在的背馳傾向。雖然最新的相關等級係數未達統計上顯著水平,但數字由 2018 年 12 月的 0.74 跌至 2019 年 10 月的 -0.22,説明「香港人」身分認同越強,「中國人」身分認同則越弱,反之亦然。「香港人」和「中國人」兩種身分認同的共存空間消失,將會是短期內實踐「一國兩制」的一大挑戰。





啟示 Implications

The decline in most indicators in our latest report suggested that the anti-extradition movement reached a never-before-seen scale and magnitude of a crisis of confidence in the future of 1C2S and Hong Kong. Disaffection of the younger age groups is most alarming. However, we also found that the Hong Kong public overwhelmingly supported the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. For instance, the post-80s who produced one of the lowest evaluations of the current 1C2S and the strongest hostility in the anti-government protests, were also the most supportive towards the continuation of 1C2S. It is difficult to reconcile the fact that despite what appeared to be a marked decline in confidence of the 1C2S, people of Hong Kong still overwhelmingly indicated they were in favour of the continuation of the same beyond 2047.

The continued polarization sent an even more alarming sign. Non-establishment supporters became increasingly alienated. Along with their weak identification as 'Chinese', there are high and rising emigration ratios and diminishing enthusiasm for national development. Their priorities for the continuation of 1C2S also diverged from those of the majority. Particularly worrying was that non-establishment supporters appeared to be concentrated in the branch known to harbour increasingly radical views on the socio-economic-political future of Hong Kong and are deeply critical of 1C2S, the central and HKSAR governments.


Mapping the eruption of the anti-extradition movement, it is hard to describe the disillusionment and re-radicalization of the population as coming out of the blue; nor is it fair to say that their criticisms of 1C2S arose solely out of misunderstanding. It is rather more appropriate to view this as the result of prolonged negligence of the deep-rooted problems in the implementation of 1C2S. Both the central and HKSAR governments need to tackle and resolve these issues with patience and care.

本報告中多項指標下滑,顯示修例風波對香港及「一國兩制」的未來造成前所未見的信心危機。來自年輕組別的不滿情緒,為社會響起一大警號。與此同時,我們亦發現香港市民廣泛支持於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」。例如,「八十後」是對「一國兩制」評價最低,亦是在反修例示威中最敵視政府的一群,不過他們也是最支持延續「一國兩制」的一群。儘管對「一國兩制」信心驟降,市民仍然廣泛認同此制度應該於2047年後延續,兩種取態不容易調和。


更大的警號是社會再趨兩極化。非建制派的「中國人」身分認同轉弱,移民比例攀升,對國家發展的關心退減,對繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件與普羅大眾日漸疏遠。更多非建制派支持者轉投激進陣營,他們對「一國兩制」、中央政府和特區政府深感不滿,或會對香港的未來發展造成令人擔憂的後果。

修例風波爆發後,難以再相信市民的不滿情緒與 再激進化乃憑空而來,或是將他們對「一國兩 制」的批評完全歸咎於對政局的誤解。實踐「一 國兩制」的過程中,存在長期未能解決的深層次 矛盾,中央政府及特區政府必須付出耐心及與努 力去解決及緩和。





第五版報告 Fifth Edition



1 簡介 Introduction

This is the fifth edition of our 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) Index report. The purpose of the 1C2S Index is to provide an objective assessment on the implementation of 1C2S. Our first Report was released in mid-2017, on the 20th anniversary of the return of Hong Kong to China. We update the 1C2S Index every six months, at mid-year and year end.

Every half year, we update the 1C2S Index through updating Index (A): Public Opinion and Index (B): International Perception respectively with a new public survey and with the latest data from international indices. To complement our Index, we also introduced a new index: 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) that uses big-data techniques to measure the sentiment of Hong Kong newspapers since 1998.

Starting from mid-2019, anti-extradition protests dominated the headlines, marking the most severe crisis of 1C2S since 1997. Our mid-2019 survey was conducted a few days before the eruption of the very large demonstrations of June 9 and June 16. Though the survey already reflected part of the increasing scepticism of the public towards 1C2S, it did not capture the explosion of public anger that came soon after. To get a more representative picture of public sentiments, we conducted two extra rounds of survey in addition to our regular half-year investigation.

香港回歸 20 週年之際,民主思路於 2017 年中首次發布「一國兩制」指數,旨在為香港實踐「一國兩制」作客觀評價。指數於年中與年底,每半年更新,這是第五版報告。

我們每半年進行電話調查及收集國際指數的最新數據,更新指數(A):民意調查及指數(B): 國際評價,從而更新「一國兩制」指數。我們還推出嶄新的「一國兩制」與情指數,檢視從 1998 年起香港報章對「一國兩制」的情緒,利用大數據技術去補充指數之不足。

自 2019 年 6 月起,《逃犯條例》修訂風波引發回歸以來「一國兩制」最嚴峻的危機。我們2019年年中的調查在 6 月 9 日及 6 月 16 日兩場大規模遊行之前進行,雖然該輪結果已呈現大眾對「一國兩制」的疑慮加劇,但未能全面反映示威爆發後累積的民憤。為更掌握民意,我們在定期的半年調查之外額外進行了兩輪調查。



We commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct four telephone polls in June, August, October and December 2019 to compile Index (A). On the other hand, some indicators of Index (B) can only be updated to 2018 because international indices are released with a considerable time lag. MMI was updated to the end of December 2019.

本報告委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查,反映 2019 年 6 月、8 月、10 月 及12 月的狀況而編製指數(A)。由於各項國際指數整合數據存有時差,指數(B)的部分指標只能更新至 2018 年,而「一國兩制」與情指數則更新至 2019 年 12 月。

In our surveys, we also included other topical issues related to 1C2S, such as the continuation of 1C2S after 2047, citizen's identity, attitude towards emigration and public opinions on the Greater Bay Area. In the August and October surveys, we have added new questions in relation to the anti-extradition movement.

電話調查也一併探討其他關乎「一國兩制」的重要 議題,包括 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」、 市民的身分認同、移民海外與及粵港澳大灣區發 展。本報告亦於 2019 年 8 月和 10 月 兩輪調查 中,增加了關於反修例運動的新問題。

It should be stressed that Index (A), Index (B) and MMI are determined by perception and may or may not reflect the reality. Even so, changes in perceptions of 1C2S of the Hong Kong public, of international think tanks, and of the Hong Kong press are nevertheless important. We will analyse the reasons for the changes in these perceptions as they are crucial for the implementation of 1C2S.

指數(A)、指數(B)及輿情指數的評分取決於 觀感,可能不完全反映現實。儘管如此,香港市 民、國際智庫和本地媒體的觀感變化對實施「一 國兩制」仍然至關重大,所以我們也會分析其背 後的變化原因。

In our report, all scores are in a scale of 0-10. Differences in scores at a particular point in time, or changes in scores over time that are big enough to be statistically significant will be noted explicitly. If there is no mentioning of statistical significance about a score, it means that the difference or change concerned is statistically insignificant.

本報告的所有評分尺度為0至10分。如同一輪調查的不同組別或不同輪次調查之間的評分差異達統計上顯著水平,報告將會特別註明。未有註明者,則代表評分差異在統計上並不顯著。



2 「一國兩制」指數 1C2S Index

The 1C2S Index is the average of Index (A): Public Opinion, the evaluation of the Hong Kong public on different dimensions of 1C2S, and Index (B): International Perception, the evaluation of international think tanks on various aspects of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.


Figure 1 shows the scores of the 1C2S Index since its inception. The 1C2S Index declined from 6.38 in December 2018 to 5.70 in the December 2019 after rebounding from its lowest at 5.57 in October, falling by 10.7% in total. Changes in Indices (A) and (B) will be detailed in the following sub-sections.

Due to the increasing scepticism towards 1C2S and time lag in data availability, the 2019 estimated score of Index (B) is likely to be upwardly biased. This implies the decline in the 1C2S Index is likely to be understated. In this respect, decision makers in Hong Kong should take careful note of the declining trend and its ramifications.

「一國兩制」指數為指數(A):民意調查及 指數(B):國際評價的平均值。前者為香港 市民對「一國兩制」不同範疇的評分,後者為 國際智庫對香港自由民主水平的評分。編製方 法詳見附件 |。

圖 1 顯示「一國兩制」指數自編製迄今的變化。指數由 2018 年 12 月的 6.38 分跌至 2019 年10 月的 5.57 分,為指數自編製以來的最低位,其後稍微回升至12 月的 5.70 分,期內總跌幅為 10.7%。指數(A)及指數(B)的變化將於以下章節詳細解釋。

鑑於國際社會對「一國兩制」的疑慮未見好轉,以及整合全球評分的數據滯後,2019年指數(B)的估算分數可能偏高,是以可能低估了「一國兩制」指數的跌幅。此跌勢及其影響值得決策者關注。



9 7.97 7.97 7.91 7.91 1C2S Index 7.87 7.87 「一國兩制」指數 Index (A): Public Opinion ⁷ 6.43 6.48 6.48 6.38 6.23 指數(A):民意調查 5**.**93 5.57 5.70 6 Index (B): International Perception 5.05 4.98 指數(B):國際評價 4.88 4.84 4.58 3,98 3.53 3.26

2019.6

2019.12

1C2S Index「一國兩制」指數

Note: Dotted line indicates a revision in indicators

2017.12

註 :虛線為指標經過修訂

2017.6

2.1. Index (A): Public Opinion

Table 1 shows that, after falling to its lowest at 3.26 in October 2019, Index (A) recovered to 3.53 in December 2019 from 4.84 in December 2018, falling by 27.1% in total. The decline in Index (A) was statistically significant, sending a worrisome signal. Moreover, all nine dimensions have declined in the past year with statistical significance which is again a point of concern.

2018.6

2018.12

2.1. 指數(A): 民意調查

表1顯示指數(A)由2018年12月的4.84分下降至2019年10月的最低位3.26分,再回升至2019年12月的3.53分,期內總跌幅為27.1%。指數(A)的下跌達統計上顯著水平,情況令人擔憂。這一年間,九個範疇全數下跌,均達統計上顯著水平,同樣值得關注。

Between October and December 2019, the statistically significant rebound in mean scores given to several dimensions, namely, independent judiciary, independent legislature, original ways of life, freedom of speech and democratisation largely matches with the general public sentiment and the development of the anti-extradition movement. For instance, the enactment of the anti-mask ban in October, which escalated the incubating societal division to a whole new level as it was badly received as facilitating the becoming of a 'police state'. However, the ruling of anti-mask ban by the High Court as 'unconstitutional' in mid-November seemed to ease the anxiety as the ruling probably worked to assure the public of the judicial independence of HKSAR. The rebound also coincides with the District Council election where the non-establishment camp won a landslide victory and where a record number of opposition candidates won in districts known for their conservatism.

In past surveys, item ratings typically varied within a relatively narrow band which was most plausibly due to a 'holistic rating' that the general public held on 1C2S. For instance, the range recorded in December 2019 oscillates just between 2 plus and 4 plus. Normally, the narrow range implies that regardless of the specific item surveyed, their answers would be shaped by an overall impression, rendering the range in relation to their answers for each specific

各範疇評分高低差別不大,相信市民心中對「一國 兩制」有一個概括評分。例如 2019 年 12 月的評 分在2分多至4分多之間。一般而言,評分差距不 大代表無論詢問甚麼項目,市民的答案也受到心中 的概括評分影響,因此對各細項的評分不會過於偏 離整體上的概括評分。

2019年10月至12月期間,其中五個範疇的平均

分反彈,達統計上顯著水平,分別為獨立司法權、

獨立立法權、原有生活方式、言論自由和民主政制

發展。此等範疇回暖與大眾情緒和修例風波的發展

大致相符。例如,十月實施禁蒙面法後,社會撕裂

升級,有人視之令香港變為「警察城市」。當高等 法院在 11 月中裁定禁蒙面法違憲時,也有人視之

為司法獨立的表現,不安情緒似乎有所舒緩。非建

制派於區議會選舉取得壓倒性勝利,候選人攻陷不

少傳統建制 選區,亦與分數回升不無關係。

Table 1: Index (A): Public Opinion 表 1 :指數 (A): 民意調查

item relatively small.

	11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12		
	Average 平均分	4.84	4.58	3.98	3.26	3.53	*	
4	Original ways of life 原有生活方式	5.96	5.79	5.34	4.28	4. 55	*	
5	Freedom of speech 言論自由	5.41	5.27	4.8	4.04	4.36	*	
2	Independent judiciary獨立司法權	5.39	5.13	4. 52	3.93	4.27	*	
3	Independent legislature 獨立立法權	5.08	4.81	4.21	3.34	3.75	*	
1	Self-conductof administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務	4.82	4. 59	3.98	3.31	3.49	*	
6	Democratisation 民主政制發展	4.34	4.12	3.61	2.90	3.21	*	
7	'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' and 'high degree of autonomy' principles 「港人治港、高度自治」原則	4.38	4.09	3.48	2.78	2.99	*	
9	Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾	4.05	3.72	2.9	2.46	2.63	*	
8	Full implementation of 1C2S 全面落實「一國兩制」	4.09	3.68	2.95	2.30	2.53	*	

Note: '*' denotes changes that are statistically significant compared with the previous report (results from 2018.12)

註 :「*」為與上一次報告(2018年12月)相比達統計上顯著水平之變化

2.1.1. Generation gap and political divide

Figure 2 shows Index (A) by age in the past surveys. All age groups have witnessed clear drops in their average scores since December 2018, as well as a collective rebound from their lowest in October2019. However, only the rebound among 30-39 years was statistically significant. Nonetheless, changes in mean score since December 2018 happening across all age groups were statistically significant.

The generation gap in the evaluation of 1C2S is obvious. The average scores of younger age groups were lower than those of older age groups at a statistically significant level. The scores of the two youngest groups, the 18-29 and the 30-39 age groups, converged at around 2.75 in December 2019. Those aging over 70 years, which always produced the highest score, dropped to below the median of 5 at 4.82.

Figure 3 shows Index (A) by political inclination in the past surveys. There was a collective drop across all political inclinations. The evaluation scores of moderates and of democrats declined from 4.87 in December 2018 to 4.25 in the December 2019 and from 2.97 to 1.94 respectively. Only the declines recorded in these two groups were statistically significant overtime.

Statistical tests revealed that there was obvious and consistent discrepancy in evaluation scores across all political inclinations. In comparison with moderates, the evaluations of pro-establishment supporters were significantly higher. Evaluations of non-establishment supporters were significantly lower. Since December 2018, differences between the democrats and other non-establishment supporters began to converge at below 2 in December 2019.

The pro-establishment against non-establishment political divide is big and widening. The high score of pro-establishment supporters remained significantly higher than other groups, though the gradual rise was halted by the social unrest, as evident in the 5.1% drop in their evaluation score since December 2018. On the other hand, the low score of non-establishment supporters fell even lower, by around 28.1% since December 2018. The trend of polarisation is evident. This is a serious issue which the HKSAR government must take note.

2.1.1. 代溝及政治鴻溝

圖 2 顯示過去調查中,各個年齡組別在指數 (A)的評分。自 2018 年 12 月,所有年齡組 別的評分均錄得下降,而且均達統計上顯著水 平。它們一致地在 2019 年 10 月從各自的最低 位回升,不過只有 30-39 歲組別的反彈達統計 上顯著水平。

從這些數字可見市民對「一國兩制」評價的代 溝顯而易見。年輕一代的評分普遍低於較年長 的組別。18-29 和 30-39 歲兩個青年組別的評 分趨同,在 2019 年 12 月錄得大約 2.75 分。 70 歲或以上的長者一如既往評分最高,錄得 4.82 分,但仍然低於中位數 5 分。

圖 3 顯示過去調查中,不同政治傾向在指數 (A)的評分。所有政治派別集體下跌。溫和派和民主派的評分分別由 2018 年 12 月的 4.87 分和 2.97 分下跌至 2019 年 12 月的 4.25 分和 1.94 分,跌幅達統計上顯著水平。

經統計檢測,不同政治傾向的評價存在既明顯 又一貫的差異。建制派評分比溫和派顯著較 高,而非建制派評分則比溫和派顯著較低。自 2018 年 12 月,民主派與其他非建制派之間的 差異逐漸拉近,兩個組別的評分於 2019 年 12 月跌至低於 2 分。

建制派與非建制派之間的政治鴻溝巨大,且正在加深。建制派的高評分顯著比其他組別高,雖然增長因社會運動受挫,較 2018 年 12 月下跌 5.1%。另一方面,非建制派的低評分下降得更快,比 2018 年 12 月減少 28.1%。兩極化趨勢明顯,是特區政府必須有所警覺的嚴重問題。

Figure 2: Index (A): Public Opinion (by age) 圖 2 : 指數 (A): 民意調查 (按年齡組別劃分)

Index (A): Public Opinion (by Age) 指數(A): 民意調查(按年齡劃分)





Figure 3: Index (A): Public Opinion (by political inclination) 圖 3 :指數 (A): 民意調查 (按政治傾向劃分)

Index (A): Public Opinion (by Political Inclination) 指數(A): 民意調查(按政治傾向劃分)



2.2. Index (B): International Perception

We obtain scores on Hong Kong's freedom and democracy from international think tanks to compile Index (B). These scores are derived from Cato-Fraser Institutes' Human Freedom Index, which comprises the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index, and the Economic Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index. The scores and ranks of Hong Kong since 2010 are shown in Table 2.

As international studies cover a very large number of countries, they do not always reflect the latest conditions. We will update the indices with data from comparable international indicators whenever possible. The method of updating is detailed in Appendix I.

Hong Kong has always ranked number one in Economic Freedom Index, with a score of around 9, the drop from its peak at 8.94 in 2010 to 8.91 in 2019 was only 0.3%.

Hong Kong's score in Personal Freedom Index peaked at 9.07 in 2011, dropped to 8.58 in 2016, and rose to an estimated score of 8.68 in 2019. Given the adverse publicity in the international media on recent political events in Hong Kong, the decline of 4.3% from its peak is not surprising. Nonetheless, Hong Kong's 2019 score of 8.68 is still relatively high.

The Democracy Index rose from 5.92 in 2010 to a peak of 6.50 in 2015, rising by 9.8%, reflecting that Hong Kong has made some progress in democratisation vis-à-vis the increase of directly elected seats in the legislature. However, Hong Kong's score fell to 6.02 in 2019, falling by 7.4% from the peak in 2015, reflecting a democratic regression originated from pre-existing deficiencies in Hong Kong's political stability. It should be noted that Hong Kong's 2019 score and rank are still better than those in 2010.

Index (B) rose from 7.99 in 2010 to a peak of 8.14 in 2012, rising by 1.9%, largely as a result of the rise in Hong Kong's Democracy Index. Since then, it has embarked on a declining trend. The latest reading came in at 7.87, representing a drop of 3.3% from the peak.

2.2. 指數(B):國際評價

我們從國際智庫對香港自由民主水平的評分編製指數(B)。評分取自「經濟自由指數」、「個人自由指數」及「民主指數」三項指數。首兩項指數由卡托研究所及菲沙研究所編製,第三項指數則由經濟學人智庫編製。「經濟自由指數」和「個人自由指數」的平均分被稱為「人類自由指數」。表2顯示香港由2010年起的分數和排名。

由於國際調查覆蓋大量國家,數據不一定反映 最新情況,我們將按其他相應的國際指數估算 香港最新的評分。更新方法詳見附錄1。

香港在「經濟自由指數」長期名列世界第一, 評分約為9分。即使自2010年最高的8.94分 下滑至2019年估算的8.91分,跌幅亦只有0.3%。

香港的「個人自由指數」評分最高為 2011 年的 9.07 分,回落至 2016 年的 8.58 分,再下跌至 2019 年估算的 8.68 分。國際社會對香港近期 的政治事件反應負面,由最高位下跌 4.3% 並不令人意外。儘管如此,2019 年的 8.68 分仍然不俗。

香港的「民主指數」由 2010 年的 5.92 分上升至 2015 年 6.50 分的頂點,升幅為 9.8%,反映立法會增加直選議席令民主化取得一定進展。不過,2019 年的評分由 2015 年的高峰下降7.4% 至 6.02 分,反映政治穩定存在既有缺憾,導致民主倒退。無論如何,2019 年香港所得的 評分和排名仍勝過 2010 年。

指數(B)由 2010年的7.99分上升至2012年8.14分的頂點,升幅為1.9%,主要緣於香港的「民主指數」上升。其後持續下跌,最新評分下降至7.87分,自高峰下跌3.3%。

Table 2: Index (B): International Perception 表 2 :指數 (B): 國際評價

Index (B):International Perception 指數(B):國際評價

		Human Freedom Index 「人類自由指數」		Democracy Index Aggr		
	Economic Freedom 「經濟自由」	Personal Freedom 「個人自由」	Sub-aggregate 分數	「民主指數 」	總分	
2010	8.94 (1)	9.11 (12)	9.02 (1)	5.92 (80)	7 . 99	
2011	8.90 (1)	9.14 (14)	9.02 (1)	5.92 (80)	7.99	
2012	8.88 (1)	9.11 (13)	8.99 (1)	6.42 (63)	8.14	
2013	8.88 (1)	8.99 (18)	8.94 (1)	6.42 (65)	8.10	
2014	8.92 (1)	8.82 (27)	8.87 (2)	6.46 (66)	8 . 07	
2015	8.88 (1)	8.75 (28)	8.82 (2)	6. 50 (67)	8.04	
2016	8.89 (1)	8.59 (32)	8.74 (3)	6.42 (68)	7 . 97	
2017	8.91 (1)	8.70 (27)	8.81 (3)	6.31 (71)	7.97	
2018	8.91*	8.68*	8.80	6. 15 (73)	7.91	
2019	8.91*	8.68*	8.80	6. 02 (75)	7.87	

Note: '*' denotes updates based on comparable indicators 註 : 「*」 為更新自相應的國際指標

2.2.1. Components of Personal Freedom Index

Table 3 shows Hong Kong's scores and ranks in the seven components of the Personal Freedom Index from 2010 to 2019. During this period, the score of 'security & safety' has risen while the score of 'movement' has been constant at 10. Five components have exhibited substantial decline in scores and ranks since 2013, namely, 'rule of law', 'religion', 'association & assembly', 'expression & information', and 'identity & relationships'. The declines show that the international community have relatively serious concerns on personal freedoms in Hong Kong.

2.2.1.「個人自由指數」的子項目

表 3 顯示從 2010 年至 2019 年,香港在「個人自由指數」七個子項目上的分數和排名。期間,「安全」評分上升,「遷徙自由」評分保持 10 分。五個子項目的分數及排名自 2013 年起持續下跌,包括「法治」、「宗教自由」、「結社、集會及公民社會自由」、「言論自由」及「性別認同及關係」。跌幅顯示國際社會對香港的個人自由有所顧慮。

Table 3: Hong Kong's scores and ranks in Personal Freedom Index 表 3 :香港於「個人自由指數」的分數及排名

Personal Freedom Index 「個人自由指數」

					· — — , — ×	~ =		
Year 年份	Rule of Law 法治	Security & Safety 安全	Movement 遷徙自由	Religion 宗教自由	Association, Assembly,& Civil Society 結社、集會及 公民社會自由	Expression & Information 言論自由	ldentity & Relationships 性別認同及關係	Aggregate 總分
2010	7.50 (17)	9.93 (3)	10.00 (1)	9.02 (35)	9.42 (25)	9.05 (42)	10.00 (1)	9.11 (12)
2011	7.50 (17)	9.97 (1)	10.00 (1)	8.92 (30)	9.75 (24)	9.01 (41)	10.00 (1)	9.14 (14)
2012	7.39 (19)	9.95 (4)	10.00 (1)	9.04 (24)	9.75 (24)	8.94 (45)	10.00 (1)	9.11 (13)
2013	7.39 (19)	9.47 (39)	10.00 (1)	9.19 (19)	9.75 (24)	8.86 (48)	10.00 (1)	8.99 (18)
2014	7.80 (14)	9.53 (35)	10.00 (1)	8.13 (80)	8.00 (62)	8.74 (52)	10.00 (1)	8.82 (27)
2015	7.79 (16)	9.54 (34)	10.00 (1)	8.43 (68)	8.00 (62)	8.77 (48)	9.00 (36)	8.75 (28)
2016	7.14 (23)	9.53 (34)	10.00 (1)	8.59 (40)	8.00 (62)	8.67 (51)	9.00 (37)	8.59 (32)
2017	7.14 (23)	9.96 (2)	10.00 (1)	8.59 (40)	8.00 (62)	8.67 (50)	9.00 (30)	8.70 (27)
2018	7.08*	10.00*	10.00*	8.59*	8.00*	8.49*	9.00*	8.68*
2019	7.08*	10.00*	10.00*	8.59*	8.00*	8.49*	9.00*	8.68*

Note: '*' denotes updates based on comparable indicators

註 : 「*」為更新自相應的國際指標

2.2.2. Comparison with Hong Kong's neighbours

As Hong Kong is a highly developed region, and given that highly developed regions tend to have comparatively higher scores in freedom and democracy as compared with developing regions – we have selected certain neighbouring developed countries and territories (namely, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) as benchmarks for comparison and assessment of Hong Kong's performance. We have also compared the respective scores of the Mainland and Hong Kong under the indices, for the purpose of identifying whether Hong Kong has become increasingly 'Mainlandised' under 1C2S. For brevity, we will refer to Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and the Chinese mainland as 'neighbours'.

Table 4 compares Hong Kong and its neighbours in the various indices of Index (B) in 2019. Hong Kong's score in Economic Freedom was world's number one while its score in Personal Freedom Index was at par with its developed neighbours. Due to Hong Kong's superlative performance in Economic Freedom Index, its score in Human Freedom Index was stronger than the four developed neighbours. However, Hong Kong's Democracy Index was lower than its developed neighbours, except Singapore. Consequently, Hong Kong's Index (B) score was lower than Japan's 8.19, Korea's 8.09, and Taiwan's 8.18, but above Singapore's 7.44. It was much higher than Mainland's 4.87

Table 5 compares the 2019 Personal Freedom Index of Hong Kong with its neighbours. Hong Kong's scores were in the same league as those of our developed neighbours (Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), and were much higher than those of the Mainland. Hong Kong's aggregate score of 8.68 was much higher than that of Singapore's 7.52 but slightly lower than Japan's 8.74, Korea's 8.83, and Taiwan's 8.88.

In comparison with its four developed neighbours, Hong Kong was relatively strong in 'security & safety' and 'movement', but relatively weak in 'rule of law'. Hong Kong was more or less at par with others in the remaining four components, namely, 'religion', 'association & assembly', 'expression & information', and 'identity & relationships'. Hong Kong's relatively low score in 'rule of law' may be unfair but nevertheless warrants concern.

2.2.2. 比較鄰近地區

一般而言,發達地區的自由與民主指數,均 高於發展中的地區。由於香港是高度發展的 地區,所以我們選取鄰近的發達國家及地 區,包括日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣作比 較,藉以評價香港的表現。我們亦比較中國 內地與香港的自由民主指數,以觀察在「一 國兩制」之下的香港是否趨向「大陸化」。 為簡便起見,我們將日本、南韓、新加坡、 台灣與中國內地稱為「鄰近地區」。

表 4 比較 2019 年香港和鄰近地區的指數 (B)。香港的經濟自由名列世界第一,個人自由亦媲美鄰近發達地區。香港的經濟自由卓越,使其「人類自由指數」勝過以上四個鄰近發達地區。不過除了新加坡外,香港的「民主指數」則低於它們。整體來說,香港的指數(B)評分落後於日本的 8.19 分、南韓的 8.09 分和台灣的 8.18分,但領先新加坡的 7.44 分。香港在各種指數的評分則比中國內地的 4.87 分高出不少。

表 5 比較 2019 年香港和鄰近地區的「個人自由指數」。香港評分良好,接近日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣等鄰近發達地區,並大幅拋離內地。香港的總分為 8.68 分,遠遠高於新加坡的 7.52 分,但略低於日本的 8.74 分、南韓的 8.83 分及台灣的 8.88 分。

比較四個鄰近發達地區,香港在「安全」和「遷徙自由」較優勝,「法治」則相對遜色。 其餘四項,即「宗教自由」、「結社、集會及公民社會自由」、「言論自由」和「性別認同 及關係」,香港與鄰近發達地區不相伯仲。 儘管「法治」的評分未必公允,但情況亦令 人擔憂。

Table 4: Comparing Index (B): International Perception of Hong Kong and neighbours (2019)

表 4 :比較香港與鄰近地區之指數(B):國際評價(2019)

Index (B): International Perception (2019)

指數(B):國際評價(2019)

		man Freedom Index 人類自由指數」*	Democracy Index	Aggregate	
	Economic Freedom 「經濟自由」	Personal Freedom 「個人自由 」	Sub-aggregate 分數	「民主指數 」	總分
Hong Kong 香港	8.91	8.68	8.80	6.02 (75)	7.87
Mainland China 中國內地	6.49	5.86	6. 18	2.26 (153)	4.87
Japan 日本	7.84	8.74	8.29	7.99 (24)	8.19
Korea 韓國	7.44	8.83	8.14	8.00 (23)	8.09
Singapore 新加坡	8.77	7.52	8 . 15	6. 02 (75)	7.44
Taiwan 台灣	7.92	8.88	8.40	7.73 (31)	8.18

Note: '*' denotes updates based on comparable indicators

註 : 「*」為更新自相應的國際指標

Table 5: Comparing Personal Freedom Index of Hong Kong and neighbours (2019)

表 5 :比較香港與鄰近地區之「個人自由指數」(2019)

Personal Freedom Index (2019) 「個人自由指數」(2019)

						_ - · · · /		
	Rule of Law 法治	Security&Safety 安全	Movement 遷徙自由	宗教自由	Association, Assembly,& Civil Society 結社、集會及 公民社會自由	古神日出	ldentity & Relationships 性別認同及關係	Aggregate 總分
Hong Kong 香港	7.08	10.00	10.00	8 . 59	8.00	8.49	9.00	8 . 68
Mainland China 中國內地	4.77	9.16	5.00	3 . 67	1.00	5.13	9.00	5 . 86
Japan 日本	7 . 88	10.00	10.00	8.09	7 . 50	8.97	8.17	8.74
Korea 韓國	7.74	9.74	8 . 33	9 . 35	9.50	8.46	9.00	8 . 83
Singapore 新加坡	7.77	9.57	8.33	6.11	3 . 50	6.58	7.33	7 . 52
Taiwan 台灣	7.01	9.31	10.00	9 . 36	10.00	8.68	10.00	8.88

Note: '*' denotes updates based on comparable indicators 註 :「*」為更新自相應的國際指標

2.3. 1C2S Mass Media Index

Media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion. We attempt to use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S and monitor how 1C2S is conveyed in the mass media to provide a timely barometer of public sentiment. 1C2S MMI is a net sentiment index of newspaper articles over a given time. To dovetail with our main Index, we compile the MMI half yearly. We have mined close to 146,000 news articles and around 73 million words from 21 local daily newspapers to compile the MMI (See Appendix I for details). MMI is set at 100 in the base month of July 2017, the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China.

In the longer run, subject to resource availability, MMI opens up many opportunities of further research in public opinion formation. The MMI can be compiled at high frequency intervals (e.g. monthly) as it is not subject to the long time lags of surveys. It is also possible to investigate the effect of specific significant on media sentiment, or to compare sentiments in the local and overseas media.

Newspaper is only part of the media, and the MMI does not cover news reported by traditional media such as television and radio, nor news carried by new media. Measuring the sentiments of news reported by television and radio is very difficult as there is no comprehensive text-based data base available. Measurement of sentiments of new media is also very difficult as it will be very demanding on resources. Furthermore, while widely accepted credibility ratings of different newspapers are available through regular opinion polls, comparable ratings on the credibility of different new media outlets are not available. We thus confine our study to newspaper articles on 1C2S.

It should be noted that many newspapers have also broadcasted their news through online outlets such as websites and mobile apps. In so far as the news articles of these online outlets are the same as their printed versions, the sentiments of these articles are already included in our MMI regardless of whether they are printed or broadcasted online. 1C2S MMI currently only gauges sentiment of an important subset of mass media, namely, printed newspapers, as a general representation of sentiment in mass media.

2.3. 「一國兩制」 輿情指數

媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素,故此,我們嘗試利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒,藉此透視大眾傳媒對「一國兩制」的感受及意見,編製輿論情緒對「一國兩制」的晴雨表。「一國兩制」與情指數為一段時間內報紙文章的情緒淨值指數,以半年結為基礎,配合我們的主指數及補充其不足之處。輿情指數從21家本地報章搜集接近146,000篇報導,逾7,300萬字(詳見附錄1)。輿情指數的基數月訂為2017年7月,基數為100,以標誌回歸20周年的情況。

長遠而言,如資源許可,輿情指數能為民意形成 開拓更多研究機會。輿情指數不受以傳統調查方 式收集民意時所產生的滯後影響,因此能以高頻 率編製(例如每月)。它亦可以調查特定重大事 件對媒體情緒的影響,或比較本地及海外媒體的 情緒。

報紙只是媒體的一部分,輿情指數不包括電視、電台等傳統電子媒體報導的新聞,也不包括新媒體所報導的新聞。由於電視和電台沒有全面的文本數據庫,所以要衡量它們的新聞情緒非常困難。衡量新媒體的情緒則對資源有較高要求,所以也非常困難。此外,民意調查定期 評估不同報紙的公信力,得到廣泛認可,新媒體的公信力卻沒有相應的評價。故此,我們的研究將會聚焦於與「一國兩制」有關的報紙文章。

值得注意的是,不少報紙也透過網站、手機程式等網上媒介傳播。這些網上媒介的報導與印刷版本大多相同,所以無論是印刷或網上版本,其情緒已經涵括在輿情指數之中。目前,輿情指數只衡量大眾傳媒的一個重要部分—— 印刷報紙,以評估大眾傳媒整體的輿情。

2.3.1. Recent Trend

1C2S encountered one of the most severe challenges in the beginning of 2016 when 1C2S MMI plummeted to 73 points. The 'Causeway Bay Bookstore' incident aroused widespread media attention in January. The civil unrest in Mongkok evolved into a clash between civilians and the police in February. The award of the independent film 'Ten Years' as the best film in Hong Kong Film Awards in April aggravated the negative sentiment in the mass media.

MMI bottomed out and rose strongly when Carrie Lam was elected as Chief Executive. Despite the NPC Standing Committee's interpretation of the Basic Law in response to the oath-taking row in the LegCo in November 2016 and the 'democracy walls' incidents in universities in September 2017, 1C2S MMI still rose to a peak of 105 points in March 2018 under the new administration of Carrie Lam. However, an alarming downward spiral started in July 2018 with the storm of controversies on the disbanding of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party and the rejection of visa renewal for Victor Mallet. MMI fell to a lower range around 90 points in the second half of 2018, a decline of about 15% from the peak in March.

Although the promulgation of the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area sparked hopes for future economic growth, Beijing's 1C2S ambition over Taiwan also drew public attention as to whether Hong Kong is a flawed example of the experiment. The anti-extradition movement emerged abruptly and caused the worst governance crisis since the Handover in June 2019 which dragged MMI from 91.6 to 84.5 points in the first half of 2019 before plummeting further to 67.2 as 2019 drew to a close, representing a drop of 24.4% on a year-on-year basis.

23.1. 近期趨勢


「一國兩制」在 2016 年初面臨最大挑戰, 輿情指數接連急跌至 73 點。「銅鑼灣書 店」事件在 1 月引起傳媒廣泛關注,旺角騷 亂在 2 月演變成警民流血衝突,再加上獨立 電影《十年》在 4 月獲獎,讓「一國兩制」 矇上陰霾。

林鄭月娥勝選為行政長官後,輿情指數從谷底反彈。儘管 2016 年 11 月全國人大常委會就立法會宣誓風波釋法,2017 年 9 月數所大學的民主牆出現「港獨」標語,及2018 年初旺角騷亂 案的審訊與判刑,令輿情指數錄得跌幅,不過仍然在 2018 年 3 月達至 105 點,是自 2009 年以來的高峰。2018 年 7 月起一連串政治爭議,令輿情指數拾級而下。鼓吹「港獨」的香港民族黨被取締及馬凱簽證續期遭拒,觸發輿情指數跌至 2018 年下半年的約 90 點,相當於自同年 3 月的頂點下滑 15%。

雖然《粵港澳大灣區發展規劃綱要》為未來經濟發展帶來希望,中央政府提出的「一國兩制」台灣方案,令群眾思考香港是否一個可取例子。2019 年 6 月爆發的反修例運動蘊釀回歸後最大的管治危機,令輿情指數在上半年由 91.6 點拖低至 84.5 點,下半年更急瀉至 67.2 的谷底,全年錄得 24.4%的降幅。



Figure 4: 1C2S MMI (2018 — 2020) 圖 4 : 「一國兩制」與情指數(2018-2020)





2.4. Evaluations of 1C2S

1C2S is unprecedented in history. There have always been doubts if Hong Kong can remain a free city as part of a country ruled by a Communist Party. Problems and difficulties in the implementation of 1C2S are thus to be expected.

22 years after Hong Kong's return to China, despite some declines in scores in selected international indices, Hong Kong stills ranked world's number one in Economic Freedom, and ranked very well in Personal Freedom. According to the 2019 Human Freedom Index, Hong Kong ranked world's number three after New Zealand and Switzerland. It is a fact that Hong Kong is still one of the freest territories in the world.

Though Hong Kong's Index (B): International Perception declined somewhat lately, Hong Kong's 2019 score at 7.87 was still relatively high. We are still in the same league as our developed neighbours: above Singapore, but slightly lower than Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The gaps between Hong Kong and the Mainland in all the above Indices on freedom and democracy remained very big, showing that the allegation of 'Mainlandisation' is unfounded.

The latest Index (A): Public Opinion was just over 3.5. For the first time since mid-2017, none of the nine items received scores higher than 5, 'original ways of life', which always obtained the highest score in past surveys fell to just 4.55 and represented the highest score of all categories in December 2019. Some other items that usually scored less favourably in previous rounds of survey witnessed an even sharper decline, items such as "Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong" and "high degree of autonomy" principles', 'full implementation of 1C2S' as well as 'resolving differences via dialogue and negotiations' which even fell to below 3, all accounting for more than 30% drop since December 2018. This again presents a never-before-seen decline since mid-2017.

In comparison to the evaluations of international think tanks, the evaluations of the Hong Kong public are less positive, suggesting that the public is more demanding in their assessments due to their high expectations of 1C2S. Hong Kong's people's starting point is a system with a sophisticated legal system that enshrines both rule of law and personal freedoms, and gradual democratisation that had already been in progress prior to the return to China. These in turn induced greater expectations amongst the public with respect to the high degree of autonomy and human rights enshrined by the Basic Law.

Changes in scores in the indices are likely to be affected by significant political events and other landmark events that occurred throughout 2019 and June, in particular, presents itself as a tipping point after which most of the indicator scores plummeted. We list below the major events that occurred since the last report in December 2018. The major events that occurred in previous reports from mid-2017 to late 2018 are listed in Appendix II.

2.4. 「一國兩制」的評價

「一國兩制」是史無前例的嘗試,輿論不斷 懷疑香港是否能夠在共產黨領導的國家之內 維持自由,「一國兩制」的實踐出現困難與 挑戰實屬意料中事。

回歸 22 年,儘管部分國際指標錄得下降,香港的經濟自由排名保持世界第一,個人自由排名仍然亮麗。跟據《 2019 人類自由指數 》,香港排名全球第三,僅次於新西蘭和瑞士。香港仍然是全球最自由的地區之一。

雖然近年香港的指數(B):國際評價下跌,2019年的7.87分仍然不俗。與鄰近香港的發達地區不相伯仲:高於新加坡,但稍低於日本,南韓和台灣。評分比中國內地高出甚多,印證香港被「大陸化」的説法缺乏根據。

最新的指數(A):民意調查只稍微高於3.5分。自2017年中起,九個範疇首次全數不超過5分,其中評分一直最高的「原有生活方式」跌至4.55分,亦是2019年12月調查中的最高分數。其他評分一般較低的範疇,如「成功落實『港人治港、高度自治』」、「全面落實『一國兩制』」和「透過對話協商解決矛盾」更少於3分,與2018年12月相比下降超過30%。跌幅為2017年中後首見。

國際智庫對香港的評分相對較高,而香港市民所給予的評分相對較低,是由於兩者的評價準則有所不同。國際智庫的評分涵蓋大量發展中國家及地區,而香港已屬發達地區之列,所以得分會處於較高的區間。另外,市民心目中對「一國兩制」有較高期望,所以給予較嚴格的評分。香港在回歸前已有成熟的法治基礎和高度人身自由,政制亦逐步民主化,所以市民對基本法承諾的高度自治和保障人權及自由有更高期望。

2019年發生不少政治爭議和重大事件,與「一國兩制」指數的變化有一定關係,六月反修例運動的爆發更是急瀉的開始。上一版報告於2018年12月發布,其後發生的重大事件臚列如下。早輪調查期間的重大事件詳見附錄 II。

- Xi Jinping marked the 40th anniversary of the 'Message to Compatriots' by upholding 1C2S as the best solution to cross-strait unification (2 January);
- Promulgation the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (18 February);
- Kaohsiung mayor and Taiwan leader hopeful Han Kuo-yu's visited the central government's Liaison Office in Hong Kong (23 March);
- The 'Umbrella nine' (key leaders of the Occupy Central movement) were found guilty as the District Court ruled that civil disobedience was an invalid defence (9 April);
- Attempts to start bills committee proceedings in LegCo for the controversial amendments to the extradition law erupted into chaos (11-14 May);
- Han Zheng, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Wang Zhimin,
 Director of the central government's Liaison Office, both confirmed that
 the central government was supportive of the extradition law
 amendments (17 and 21 May);
- Record-setting demonstrations against the extradition law were staged. The government eventually announced the suspension of the amendment bill (9, 15 and 16 June);
- Accusations of police misconduct accentuated after major collisions, including the 6.12 LegCo protest, 7.21 Yuen Long incident, 8.31 Prince Edward station incident, 10.1 and 11.11 gunshot incidents, confrontation in the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University (June-November);
- Protesters broke into the LegCo Chamber and vandalized the Hong Kong emblem on 1 July and laid siege to the central government's Liaison Office and defaced the Chinese emblem on 21 July (July);
- Protesters called for a general strike and began a new campaign to paralyze the airport, inflicting citywide and international disruptions in transportation (August and September);
- Carrie Lam officially announced the withdrawal of the amendment bill of the extradition law (4 September);

- 習近平於《告台灣同胞書》發表 40 周年紀 念會指「一國兩制」為兩岸統一的最佳方式 (1月2日);
- 《粤港澳大灣區發展規劃綱要》發布(2月 18日);
- 高雄市市長、台灣總統熱門候選人韓國瑜拜 訪香港中聯辦(3月23日);
- 區域法院裁定「佔中九子」罪成,指出公民 抗命不屬抗辯理由(4月9日);
- 立法會法案委員會開展審議《逃犯條例》修 訂案,發生衝突。(5月11-14日);
- 國務院副總理韓正及香港中聯辦主任王志民 開腔支持《逃犯條例》修訂。(5月17及21 日);
- 反修例遊行集會連破人數紀錄,政府最終決 定暫緩修例(6月9、15及16日);
- 連串衝突引起針對警察濫權失德的投訴,包括6.12立法會示威、7.21元朗事件、8.31太子站事件、10.1及11.11槍傷事件、香港中文大學衝突及香港理工大學衝突(6至11月);
- 示威者分別於7月1日及21日闖入立法會及 包圍中聯辦大樓,塗污香港特區區徽及中國 國徽(7月);
- 示威者發動「三罷」行動及癱瘓機場,令本 地及國際交通受阻。(8及9月);
- 林鄭月娥正式宣布撤回《逃犯條例》修訂 案。(9月4日);

- The government enacted the anti-mask law under the Emergency Regulations Ordinance but was ruled unconstitutional by the High Court (4 October and 18 November);
- Carrie Lam met with Xi Jinping for the first time since the eruption of the social unrest. Xi said the most pressing task is to end violence and restore order. The message was reiterated in his speech in the BRICS summit in Brazil (4 and 14 November);
- Pan-democrats scored a landslide victory in the District Council election with the highest voter turnout of 71.2% (24 November);
- US President Donald Trump signed the 'Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act' (27 November); and
- The bank account of Spark Alliance, fundraising platform for protesters, was froze due to accusation of money laundering (19 December).

Though the 1C2S Index declined from 6.38 in December 2018 to an alarming level of 5.72 in December 2019, it was still well over the median of 5. While 1C2S has problems in implementation, as could be expected of any unprecedented system, it is clearly not unworkable. The decline in this report should be viewed in this context.

- 特區政府引用《緊急情況規例條例》訂立《反蒙面法》,及後被高等法院裁定違憲。(10月4日及11月18日);
- 習近平於反修例風波爆發後首次與林鄭 月娥會面,指出止暴制亂為最迫切任 務,並在巴西舉行的金磚國家峰會上重 申。(11月4及14日);
- 泛民主派於區議會選舉得到壓倒性勝利,投票率達71.2%,為歷來最高。 (11月24日)
- 美國總統特朗普簽署《香港人權及民主 法案》(11月27日);及
- 反修例運動的籌款平台星火同盟的銀行 戶口,涉嫌洗黑錢被凍結(12月19日)。

雖然「一國兩制」指數由 2018 年 12 月的 6.38 分下降至 2019 年 12 月的 5.72 分,分數 仍比中位數 5 分為高。正如任何史無前例的 制度一樣,實踐「一國兩制」時遇到問題乃意 料之內,並非代表它不可行。2019 年 12 月 調查評分的下降應該由此角度解讀。



2.4.1. Impact of internal governance

Internal governance issues that are not strictly related to 1C2S appear to have important effects on evaluations of the Hong Kong public and media, but do not affect international evaluations as much. It is important to bear this in mind when reading the findings identified in this Report.

For example, in the period before mid-2018, both MMI and Index (A) performed well despite the disqualification of six LegCo members from late 2016 to mid-2017, and the sentencing of the 3 student protestors in the Civic Square occupation to prison by the Court of Appeals on August 2017. The announcement of CY Leung in late 2016 that he would not run for a second term and the subsequent election of the new CE had strong positive effects on MMI that outweighed the effect of the above controversies. The honeymoon period of the new administration from mid-2017 to mid-2018 also appeared to have an important positive effect on Index (A).

The sharp declines in Index (A) and MMI starting from late 2018 can be attributed to political controversies over the disbandment of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, the rejection of work visa for Victor Mallet and the anti-extradition movement. At the same time, the waning approval ratings of the government reflected that internal governance issues surrounding the Lantau Tomorrow Vision reclamation project and the proposed increase of age threshold for elderly welfare payments also affected Hong Kong's public and media negatively.

2.4.1. 內部管治的影響

與「一國兩制」無直接關係的內部管治問題, 對香港市民和輿情的評價似乎有一定影響,但 對國際評價影響不大。在解讀此報告的結論 時,應予以考慮。

例如,即使 2018 年中之前發生不少政治爭議,包括六名立法會議員被褫奪議席,以及佔領公民廣場的三名學生於被上訴法院判刑入獄,指數 (A) 及輿情指數皆表現良好。梁振英於 2016 年底宣佈不角逐連任,及後新一屆行政長官選舉對輿情指數有明顯的正面作用,蓋過上述爭議的影響。新政府於 2017 年中至2018 年中的蜜月期對指數 (A) 也有一定正面影響。

指數(A)及輿情指數於 2018 年底之後明顯下降,可以歸因於香港民族黨被取締,馬凱簽證爭議及反修例運動。同時,「明日大嶼願景」填海計劃及提高長者綜援申請年齡等內部管治事件導致特區政府民望下滑,對市民和傳媒也有一定負面影響。



2.4.2. Impact of international situation

The attitude of the West towards China has been shifting from engagement to confrontation as the West increasingly fears that its supremacy would be challenged by the rise of China. Evaluations of international think tanks may not be free of western ideological biases against the rise of China, but they may also reflect genuine weaknesses in the implementation of 1C2S. Furthermore, their effects on international investors cannot be underestimated as Hong Kong is an easy target in the 'New Cold War', as evident in the passage of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 in November. The existential ambiguity of Hong Kong presents a real vulnerability.

Much of the negative international evaluation on the rule of law in Hong Kong can be attributed to a misunderstanding of the fundamental concept of 1C2S: Hong Kong is not an independent country. It is part of a civil law country but with an independent judiciary that practices common law in relation to self-autonomy issues. The Hong Kong judiciary also has power to deal with constitutional issues but it must defer to interpretations of the national Constitution and the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. This is different in nature from courts of common law countries but not uncommon in civil law countries. This suggests the Hong Kong judiciary has a higher level of independence and judicial function than many courts at the district level of other civil law countries. This is not a weakness of the Hong Kong judicial system but rather a unique characteristic of the Hong Kong Court under 1C2S that the HKSAR Government needs to emphasize in the international arena.

Western think tanks have downgraded Hong Kong's scores on 'rule of law', citing the interpretation of the Basic Law by Beijing in 2016. However, interpretation of the Basic Law first occurred in 1999 and it is nothing new. The Hong Kong judiciary is still the same judiciary which had received high scores from western think tanks just a few years back, and it is as independent as always as demonstrated by recent prosecutions and convictions of a former Chief Executive and other high-ranking officials of the HKSAR Government. It appears that western perceptions of China and Hong Kong have changed.

2.4.2. 國際形勢的影響

西方愈來愈擔心中國崛起將會挑戰其優勢, 所以對中國的態度由合作轉向對抗。西方智 庫對「一國兩制」的評價不能完全擺脱此意 識形態的轉向,但也可能反映「一國兩制」 在實踐上的真正弱點。它們對國際投資者的 影響不容小覷,因為香港很可能在「新冷 戰」下首當其衝成為戰靶。

部分負面評價源於「一國兩制」的概念和實踐存在誤解:香港並非獨立國家,而是擁有獨立司法權,以普通法實行內部自治的大陸法國家一部分。司法機構有權力處理憲制問題,但必須服膺人大常委會對國家《憲法》與香港《基本法》的解釋。此安排雖然與普通法國家的法庭存在本質上的不同,但在大陸法國家相當普遍。香港的司法機構比不少大陸法國家的地區法庭有更大的獨立性及司法權,此非香港司法制度的缺點,反倒是香港法庭在「一國兩制」下的獨特之處,值得特區政府向國際社會闡明。

近年部分西方智庫基於 2016 年的人大釋法 降低香港法治的評分,其實人大釋法早於 1999 年已經發生,並非新生事物;而直到 2015 年,香港司法仍然得到西方好評。近年 香港部分高官及某前特首被起訴及定罪的案 例,説明香港司法仍然與以往一般獨立,只 是西方對中國及香港的觀感有所改變。

2.5. Suggestions

Given the biases and misunderstandings identified above, it is important for the HKSAR Government to consider spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of Hong Kong including the business community, the academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs to promote the image of Hong Kong under 1C2S. Such effort may include:

- Setting up a broadly representative committee to advise the HKSAR Government on all issues relating to 1C2S;
- Establishing a semi-official high-level think tank on external relations to undertake various private initiatives such as being responsible for mounting and coordinating outreach efforts, mobilizing support from all sectors of our and international communities, and enhancing Hong Kong's presence in APEC related networks;
- Setting up an early warning system within the government to alert and manage expectation of public on all possible issues which might affect 1C2S or the perception of quality of governance;
- Setting up a system whereby international media would be timely, fully and properly briefed on issues affecting 1C2S;
- Promoting, assisting and encouraging local think tanks to conduct periodical exchanges with influential foreign think tanks interested in Hong Kong affairs, especially the Heritage Foundation and the CATO-Fraser Institutes, which are sympathetic to Hong Kong as they value economic and personal freedoms highly;
- Motivating Hong Kong's business communities from western countries who are willing to defend Hong Kong in the international arena; and
- Enhancing Hong Kong's presence in APEC related networks and forums, e.g., the APEC Business Advisory Councils (ABAC), APEC Study Centres, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and other tripartite forums that involve business people, academics, and NGOs in the Asia-Pacific. As a free economy and global city, Hong Kong should find a sympathetic hearing in the vast APEC related networks in the Asia-Pacific.

2.5. 建議

為釐清以上偏見與誤解,特區政府應領導香港各界,包括政府、商界、學界、專業團體、目標相近的智庫和民間組織,共同努力向國際社會闡釋香港在「一國兩制」下的實況,包括:

- 設立具廣泛代表性的委員會,協助政府 處理所有有關「一國兩制」的問題;
- 成立專注香港涉外關係的半官方高層智庫,負責推動和協調涉外工作,動員社會各界支持,加強香港在 APEC 網絡中的角色;
- 政府內部建立監察系統,就可能影響 「一國兩制」或治理質素的所有可能衝 突,管理公眾的期望;
- 建立機制使國際媒體能夠充分及恰當地 知悉影響「一國兩制」的議題;
- 促進、協助和鼓勵本地智庫與關注香港 事務的外國重要智庫定期交流,尤其是 傳統基金會和卡托及菲沙研究所。出於 對經濟和個人自由的重視,他們對香港 的情況比較理解;
- 鼓勵在香港經商的西方商人為香港發聲;及
- 強化香港在 APEC 龐大網絡內的影響力,例如亞太經合組織商業諮詢理事會(ABAC),亞太經合組織研究中心,太平洋經濟合作理事會(PECC)以及其他三方論壇。作為一個自由經濟體和國際都會,亞太區內 APEC 龐大的網絡應該對香港有一定認同。

3 修例風波 Anti-extradition movement

In view of the escalating and deepening public discontent, we conducted two special rounds of survey in August and October, aiming to better understand the relationship between the anti- extradition bill movement and its impact as well as implication on the implementation of 1C2S.

隨著《逃犯條例》事態發展,公眾不滿情緒日漸升溫,我們於2019年8及10月額外進行兩輪調查,以了解反修例運動對「一國兩制」的影響和啟示。

3.1. Participation in the movement

Table 6 shows the percentages of interviewees who have participated in anti-extradition bill marches. A total of 40.5% of interviewees have participated in the movement in the second survey in October. As expected, the rate of participation of young adults (age 18 to 29) was high (63.2%). The rate of participation of older age groups were also substantial: 35.0% for the 60 to 69 age group, and 24.7% for the 70 years or above age group respectively.

3.1. 運動參與度

表 6 顯示參與反修例遊行的受訪者百分比。 8 月份,35.7% 受訪者表示曾經參與反修例遊行,10 月份升至 40.5%。青年(18-29歲)的參與度如預期般高(63.2%)。較年長組別參與度亦相當高,60-69歲和70歲或以上群組分別達到35.0%和24.7%。

Table 6: Participation in the anti-extradition movement

表 6 :反修例運動參與度

	2019.08	2019.10
Participated 有參加	35.7%	40.5%
Didn't Participate無參加	63.5%	59.0%
Don't Know 唔知道	0.9%	0.5%

3.2. Acceptance of violent means of protesting

Table 7 shows the public acceptance of two indicative events where violence was observed. We asked in August whether respondents accepted the storming of the Legislative Council by some of the demonstrators on July 1 and in October the attacks targeting MTR stations, police stations and Chinese banks and shops after the enactment of anti-mask law. Though the two incidents are not strictly comparable, changes across different groups may reveal their acceptance of violent means of protesting.

It can be seen that there recorded a slight increase between August and October in the number of people accepting the use of violence in the protest. Those who voted 'accept' generally account for about half of those interviewed.

From Figure 5, with the exception of the cohort ages 70 or above, mean score of acceptance of all age groups increased, though only that of 18-29 age group was statistically significant.

From Figure 6, it can be seen that as with the political inclinations of those 'accepting' violent means of protesting, only non-establishment supporters recorded a rise in mean score, while scores given by moderates and pro-establishment supporters were both low, suggesting more polarization.

3.2. 激進示威行為的接受程度

表 7 顯示公眾對兩件激進示威行為示例的接受程度,分別是 7月 1日衝擊立法會和 10份 反蒙面法實施後衝擊港鐵站、警署、中資銀行和商戶的行動。雖然兩件事件性質不相同,不能相提並論,但是不同組別之間的差異仍能反映示威活動中,對激進行為的接受程度。

8 至 10 月期間激進行為的接受程度錄得輕微 上升,表示「接受」的約過半數。

從圖 5 可見,除了 70 歲或以上組別外,其他 所有年齡組別對激進行為的接受程度平均分 均有上升,不過只有 18-29 歲組別的升幅達 統計上顯著水平。

從圖 6 可見,按政治傾向劃分,只有非建制 派的平均分錄得上升,而建制派和溫和派平 均分則在較低水平,顯示兩極化越趨嚴重。

Table 7: Acceptance of violent means of protesting

表 7 :激進示威行為的接受程度

	2019.08	2019.10
Accept 接受	44.4%	52.6%
Reject不接受	33.5%	22.0%
Don't Know 不知道	0.8%	0.8%
Net Value 淨值	10.9%	30.6%
Mean Score平均分	5.16	5.81

Net value: Percent who chose 'Accept' less percent who chose 'Reject'

淨值 : 認為「接受」的百分比減去認為「不接受」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater acceptance

平均分由0至10分,愈高分代表愈接受

Figure 5: Acceptance of violent means of protesting (by age)

圖 5 : 激進示威行為的接受程度(按年齡劃分)

Acceptance of Violent Means of Protesting (by Age) 激進示威行為的接受程度(按年齡劃分)




Figure 6: Acceptance of violent means of protesting (by political inclination) 圖 6 : 激進示威行為的接受程度(按政治傾向劃分)

Acceptance of Violent Means of Protesting (by Political Inclination) 激進示威行為的接受程度(按政治傾向劃分)



3.3. Acceptance of online doxing

As the discontent boiled, people began to use online doxing to create pressure against protesters and journalists on the one hand and against police officers and their families on the other. Table 8 shows that there was a very low acceptance of online doxing in October. The net value of acceptance against protesters and journalists and against police officers and their families were -64.2% and -52.6% respectively and the mean score against them were 2.06 and 2.40 respectively.

By age, Figure 7 shows that the acceptance of online doxing against police officers and their families was generally higher, except of those aging 70 or above. Young people (18-29 years) gave the highest mean score of 2.88 on the acceptance of online doxing against police officers and their families. Furthermore, the difference in level of acceptance of online doxing against police officers and their families and against protesters and journalists was starkest among the age group 30-39 years, of which difference was statistically significant.

Acceptance of online doxing against the two rival groups was significantly different for each of the political inclinations. Figure 8 shows that pro-establishment supporters accepted online doxing against protesters and journalists more than against police officers and their families, and vice versa for non-establishment supporters. Moderates did not display targeted hatred towards any of the two rival groups, with mean scores between 1.62 and 1.71. Mean score given by pro-establishment supporters on the level of acceptance of doxing against protesters and journalists was highest at 2.18 while the mean score given by other non-establishment supporters on the level of acceptance of doxing against police and families was also highest at 4.59.

3.3. 網上「起底」的接受程度

隨著不滿情緒白熱化,網絡「起底」出現, 既向示威者及記者,亦向警察及其家人製造 壓力。表 8 顯示,市民在十月份一般對網上 「起底」的接受程度非常低。針對示威者和 記者以及對警察和其家人「起底」的接受淨 值分別為-64.2%和-52.6%,平均分為 2.06 分和 2.40 分。

按年齡劃分,圖 7 顯示受訪者一般較為接受針對警察及其家人的「起底」,70 歲或以上組別除外。青年(18-29歲)最針對警察及其家人,平均分達 2.88 分,為所有年齡組別中最高。另外,比較兩個群體的「起底」接受程度,差距在 30-39 歲組別最為突出,達統計上顯著水平。

不同政治傾向的受訪者對兩個群體「起底」的接受程度均存在顯著差異。圖 8 顯示建制派對針對示威者和記者的「起底」接受程度比針對警察及其家人為高,非建制派則相反。溫和派沒有針對任何群體的明顯傾向,對兩個群體的平均分介乎 1.62 分至 1.71分。建制派針對示威者和記者「起底」的接受程度最高,平均分為 2.18 分,而其他非建制派針對警察和其家人「起底」的接受程度亦為最高,平均分為 4.59 分。

Table 8: Acceptance of online doxing (2019.10) 表 8 :網上「起底」的接受程度 (2019.10)

	Against police officers and their families 針對警察及其家人	Against protesters and journalists 針對示威者及記者
Accept 接受	19.0%	11.4%
Reject 不接受	71.7%	75 . 7%
Don't Know 不知道	1.9%	1.9%
Net Value淨值	-52.6%	-64.2%
Mean Score 平均分	2.40	2.06

Net value: Percent who chose 'Accept' less percent who chose 'Reject'

淨值 : 認為「接受」的百分比減去認為「不接受」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater acceptance

平均分由0至10分,愈高分代表愈接受

Figure 7: Acceptance of online doxing (by age) 圖 7 :網上「起底」的接受程度(按年齡劃分)

Acceptance of Online Doxing (By Age) 網上「起底」的接受程度(按年齡劃分)




Figure 8: Acceptance of online doxing (by political inclinations)

圖 8 :網上「起底」的接受程度(按政治傾向劃分)

Acceptance of Online Doxing (by Political Inclination) 網上「起底」的接受程度(按政治傾向劃分)



3.4. Perceived efficacy of community dialogues

The Hong Kong government proposed to meet the public in community dialogue sessions. In October, we asked the public about their perceived efficacy of such dialogue after the first of such sessions. Table 9 suggests that the mean score for the efficacy of community dialogues in easing societal tension was 4.26, slightly below the median of 5. All age groups, with the exception of those of 70 years or above, tended to hold a negative view on its efficacy.

Nonetheless, there exists a clear divide in the outlook on the community dialogues among those with different political inclinations, while pro-establishment and moderates both gave a higher mean score of 5.92 and 5.13 respectively, there was also a difference between democrats and other non-establishment supporters, with the former giving a score of 3.93 and the latter only 2.98.

3.4. 社區對話的效用

特區政府提議舉行社區對話,邀請市民表達意見。第一場社區對話後,我們在十月份詢問受訪者認為能否舒緩社會情緒,表 9 顯示平均分為 4.26 分,比中位數 5 分為低。 所有年齡組別,除 70 歲或以上,均認為社區對話的效用未如理想。

另外,不同政治傾向的受訪者對社會對話的效用存在明顯的分歧,建制派和溫和派的平均分分別為 5.92 分和 5.13 分。非建制派中,民主派和其他非建制派也有不同,前者的平均分為 3.93 分,而後者只有 2.98 分。

Table 9: Can community dialogues ease emotions? (2019.10)

	表 9	: 計區對話的效用	(2019.10)
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	2019.10
Can 能夠	30.7%
Cannot 不能夠	46.4%
Don't Know 不知道	0.8%
Net Value 淨值	-15.7%
Mean Score 平均分	4.26

Net value: Percent who chose 'Can'less percent who chose 'Cannot' 淨值: 認為「能夠」的百分比減去認為「不能夠」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater acceptance

平均分由0至10分,愈高分代表愈能夠

3.5. Enactment of Anti-Mask Law

As seen in Table 10, overall, 64.1% opposed to the enactment of the anti-mask law. The oppose rates across all age groups all recorded at past 58%. Only among the pro-establishment, 'support' was higher than 'oppose' with an overwhelming 82.0% supporting the law.

3.5. 訂立《禁止蒙面規例》

表 10 顯示 64.1% 受訪者反對實施禁蒙面法。 所有年齡組別均達 58% 或以上反對,建制派 是唯一「支持」多於「反對」的組別,支持度 為 82.0%。

Table 10: Acceptance of online doxing (2019.10) 表 10 :網上「起底」的接受程度 (2019.10)

	2019.10
Support 贊成	27.2%
Oppose 反對	64.1%
Don't Know 不知道	8.8%



3.6. Youth involvement

Younger people tended to produce responses quite distinctively from other age groups, reflecting the unique nature of their participation in the movement. As shown below, there appears clear differences among sub-groups of young people within the age group of 18-29. This contradicts the common references made with the label of 'young people' which tend to flatten the heterogeneity among them. We will discuss the responses from three survey questions which displayed most notable differences amongst this group below.

Employed youths were the most active in the movement, as their rate of participation remained around 70%. In comparison, students' participation had been much less prominent though much steadier, where rate of participation oscillated between just below and above 50% in August and October respectively.

Compared with other age groups, only the 18-29 age group experienced a significant increase in the acceptance of violent means of protesting. Although the score for employed youth and students increased at a similar rate, the net value for students grew sharply from 6.5% to 29.1%. This suggests more students accepted the concept of violent protesting between August and October, only milder than their employed counterparts.

Students between 18 and 29 years held a more balanced attitude towards online doxing against different groups, with a mean score ranging between 2.59 and 2.88. Those who are working in the same age group found online doxing against police officers and their families much more acceptable than against protesters and journalists.

3.6. 青年參與

從不少調查題目的分布中,可見青年參與運動的模式與其他年齡組別截然不同。而 18-29 歲組別中,不同背景的年輕人亦運用不同方式參與這場運動,純粹用「青年」這個標籤來了解他們未免過於單一。以下部分選取其中三條差異最鮮明的題目,突顯青年對不同事件的意見。

就職青年為最活躍的參與者,8月至10月的參與度約70%。相比之下,學生的參與程度較低但亦較平穩,維持在50%上下。

相比其他年齡組別,只有 18-29 歲對激進示威 行為的接受程度顯著上升。雖然就職和在學青 年的平均分上升幅度相約,但是學生的淨值由 6.5% 大幅上升至 29.1%。此現象代表 8 月至 10 月期間,更多學生接受激進示威行為,只是 評分未及就職青年極端。

18-29 歲學生對網上「起底」所針對的群體較為 持平,平均分徘徊在 2.59 分至 2.88 分,但在 職青年接受針對警察及其的家人的「起底」比 針對示威者和記者高出不少。

Table 11: Participation in the movement (18-29 years)

表 11 :反修例運動參與度(18-29歲)

		2019.8		2019.10			
	Employed 在職人士	Students 學生	18-29	Employed 在職人士	Students 學生	18-29	
Didn't Participate 無參加	30.3%	51.8%	42.3%	24.9%	49.3%	36.1%	
Participated 有參加	66.5%	48.2%	56.2%	73.8%	50.7%	63.2%	
Don't Know 唔知道	3.3%	0.0%	1.5%	1.3%	0.0%	0.7%	

^{*} Jobseekers aged 18-29 are too few to be shown, the same for below

Table 12: Acceptance of violent means of protesting (18-29 years)

表 12 :激進示威行為的接受程度(18-29歲)

		2019.08		2019.10			
	Employed 在職人士	Students 學生	18-29	Employed 在職人士	Students 學生	18-29	
Accepted 接受	46.5%	43.3%	44.4%	51.0%	54.6% 5	52.6%	
Rejected 不接受	30.2%	36.8%	33 . 5%	19.1%	25.5% 2	22.0%	
Don't Know 唔知道	1.7%	0.0%	0.8%	1.5%	0.0%	0.8%	
Net Value 淨值	16.3%	6.5%	10.9%	31.8%	29.1% 3	30.6%	
Mean Score平均分	5.47	4.92	5.16	6.13	5 . 46	5.81	

Table 13: Acceptance of online doxing (18-29 years)

表 13 :網上「起底」的接受程度(18-29 歲)

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		e officers and 對警察及其家		Against protesters and journalists 針對示威者及記者			
	Employed 在職人士	Students 學生	18-29	Employed 在職人士	Students 學生	18-29	
Accepted 接受	25.7%	23.3%	24.7%	11.5%	18.2%	14.0%	
Rejected 不接受	64.0%	68.2%	66.1%	79.9%	65 . 8%	73.7%	
Don't Know 唔知道	1.5%	0.0%	0.8%	1.5%	0.0%	1.7%	
Net Value 淨值	-38.3%	-44.9%	-41.4%	-68.4%	-47.6%	-59.6%	
Mean Score平均分	3.08	2.59	2.88	2.03	2.88	2.38	

Net value : Percent who chose 'Accept'less percent who chose 'Reject' 淨值 :認為「接受」的百分比減去認為「不接受」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater acceptance

平均分由0至10分,愈高分代表愈接受

^{*18-29} 歲待業者過少,故不列出 ,下同

4 激進主義復甦 Resurgence of radicalism

Figure 9 shows the composition of Hong Kong population by political inclination. Moderates (which include centrists and those without specific political inclination) remained the largest group (50.9%), followed by the non-establishment supporters (36.8%), and pro-establishment supporters (7.3%). Non-establishment supporters are further divided into democrats (25.9%) and 'others' (10.9%), which are mostly localists and self-determinists.

From mid-2017 to December 2018, the proportion of moderates and pro-establishment supporters in the population have risen while that of non-establishment supporters has declined. Since then, however, there was a reversal of trends which accentuated in 2019.

Throughout 2019, moderates decreased by 13.3 percentage points (from 64.2% to 50.9%); pro-establishment supporters also decreased by 4 percentage points (from 11.3% to 7.3%); but non-establishment supporters increased by 15.1% (from 21.7% to 36.8%). Among non-establishment supporters, the proportion of democrats and 'others' rose by 9.3 percentage points (from 16.6% to 25.9%), and 5.8 percentage points (from 5.1% to 10.9%) respectively.

Most of these changes took place abruptly since June 2019 amidst a hopeful trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation all through 2018. Different trajectories displayed by groups of different political inclinations also signify further polarization, as evident in the changes between October and December 2019, a time when the momentum of the movement started to slow, while number of pro-establishment supporters regained and the growth of non-establishment supporters stabilized, moderates continued to decline, though its size still accounted for the majority of the respondents.


圖 9 顯示香港市民的政治傾向。溫和派為最大組別(50.9%),包括「中間派」和「沒有政治傾向」的市民。非建制派排列第二(36.8%),建制派佔最少(7.3%)。非建制派可以再細分為民主派(25.9%)和以本土派和自決派為主的其他非建制派(10.9%)。

從 2017 年中至 2018 年底,溫和派和建制派的 人口比例上升,而非建制派則下降。自此以後, 趨勢開始逆轉。

2019年,溫和派下跌 13.3 個百分點(由 64.2%跌至 50.9%),建制派下跌 4個百分點(由 11.3%跌至 7.3%),而非建制派則增加 15.1 個百分點(由 21.7%升至 36.8%)。 非建制派支持者中,民主派和其他非建制派的比例分別由 16.6%上升至 25.9%(增加 9.3 個百分點),以及由 5.1%上升至 10.9%(增加 5.8 個百分點)。

去激進化及溫和政治在 2018 年興起,在 2019 年 6 月卻急速逆轉。2019 年 10 月至 12 月的政治傾向轉變,進一步説明市民的兩極化趨勢。一方面建制派重拾部分支持者,另一方面非建制派的增長趨平,溫和派儘管仍佔大多數,但是跌勢繼續保持。

Figure 9: Political inclination of population 圖 9 :香港市民的政治傾向



4.1. Re-radicalisation of youths

Figure 10 shows the change in the composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by political inclination. The proportion of moderates dropped from 66.4% in December 2018 to 38.2% in December 2019 (decreasing by 28.2 percentage points) while the proportion of the non-establishment group rose from 29.7% to 55.3% (rising by 25.6 percentage points). Within the non-establishment group, the proportions of democrats and 'others' rose from 19.6% to 28.5% and from 10.1% to 26.9% (rising by 8.9% and 16.8% percentage points) respectively.

Up till December 2018, there had been encouraging signs of de-radicalization of youth, where population of moderates were high and rising. This trend, however, was reversed most notably from June 2019 onwards, as the proportion of non-establishment supporters witnessed a steep rise, surpassing moderates for some time. At the same time, within the non-establishment group, after overtaking democrats, other non-establishment supporters dropped below democrats in December 2019. Worryingly, over a quarter of youths identified themselves as localists or self-determinists, which reminisced 2017 when the traditional and radical wings were of almost equal share.

It must be stressed that the political inclination of youths tends to move swiftly as although the changes were unambiguously notable in the latter half of 2019, the exact relationship between the radicalization of youth and the social unrest since June 2019 needs further examination.

Figure 10: Political inclination of youths

圖 10 :青年的政治傾向

Political Inclination of Youths 青年的政治傾向



4.1. 香港青年的再激進化

圖 10 顯示青年(18 至 29 歲)的政治傾向變化。由 2018 年 12 月至 2019 年 12 月,溫 和派的比例由 66.4%減少至 38.2%(下跌 28.2個百分點),非建制派的比例由 29.7%增加至55.3%(上升 25.6個百分點)。非建制派中,民主派的比例由 19.6%增加至 28.5%(上升8.9個百分點),其他非建制派則由10.1%增加至 26.9%(上升16.8個百分點)。

截至 2018 年 12 月,青年溫和派不但高企,還慢慢攀升,呈現令人鼓舞的去激進化跡象。但此趨勢由 2019 年 6 月起急速扭轉,令溫和派屈居於急速增長的非建制派之後。更甚者,其他非建制派的比例曾一度多於民主派,至 2019 年 12 月始回落稍低水平。超過四分一的青年自認為本土派和自決派,近似 2017 年非建制派中傳統與激進兩翼勢力均等的情況,令人擔憂。

值得留意的是,雖然 2019 年下半年的變化 顯而易見,青年的政治傾向轉變迅速,他們 的再激進化與 2019 年 6 月起的社會運動之 間的關係尚需詳細研究。

5 2047 年後延續「一國兩制」 Continuation of 1C2S after 2047

An issue of utmost importance for the future of Hong Kong is the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. Table 14 shows that 73.5% of the public still agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. Even after the anti-extradition movement erupted in June, support across all groups with different political inclinations in Hong Kong still maintained at around and often over 70%, including the localists and self-determinists, who are known to be highly critical of 1C2S. Though the public's current evaluation of 1C2S is quite critical, the majority of them still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

While those who chose 'should' remained steady, there was an increase in 'should not', leading to a statistically significant drop in the net value of support by 8.9 percentage points, reaching its lowest score since December 2018 at 59.5%. The net value of support generally reached over 50% across most age groups, educational attainment, and political inclination, with the exception of the following cohorts: those ageing 70 years or above (44.0%), those with primary school enrolment or below (46.7%) and other non-establishment supporters (44.7%).

Figure 11 shows the volatility of net value of support produced by respondents of different political inclinations. Most notable of these changes was the steep increase in net value by other non-establishment supporters in the first half of 2019, catching up with both moderates and democrats at over 70%, which was immediately followed by a statistically significant steep decrease since June 2019. Net value by pro-establishment supporters also fluctuated with a sudden rebound after an initial decline.

Overall, since December 2018, in addition to the collective decline in net value of support for the continuation of 1C2S, differences among those with different political inclinations are surfacing. Given the decrease in net support from all political inclinations, one may find it difficult to conclude what alternatives are on the rise.

2047 年後是否繼續實行「一國兩制」乃關乎香港前途的關鍵議題。表 14 顯示 73.5% 市民同意香港應該於 2047 年後延續「一國兩制」。即使 6 月起發生反修例運動,所有政治派別仍對延續「一國兩制」存在相當甚至超過有 70% 人支持,包括對「一國兩制」常有批評的本土派和自決派。縱使市民現時對「一國兩制」的評分不高,他們依然相信「一國兩制」是適合香港未來的體制。

選擇「應該」的受訪者維持平穩,選擇「反對」則有所增加,導致支持度淨值下跌 8.9 個百分點至 59.5%,達統計上顯著水平,亦為2018 年 12 月後最低點。任何年齡組別、教育程度或政治傾向的受訪者支持度淨值一般達50% 或以上,除了以下三個組別:70 歲或以上(44.0%)、小學或以下(46.7%)和其他非建制派(44.7%)。

圖 11 顯示不同政治派別的支持度淨值變化, 其他非建制派於 2019 年的變化最為明顯, 年中一度與溫和派和民主派看齊,超過 70%,但 自 6 月起跌幅達統計上顯著水平。建制派首六個月亦錄得降幅,但於下半年回升。

總括而言,自 2018 年 12 月起,市民對 2047 年後是否繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持淨值集 體下降,不同政治派別之間的差異更加明顯。 而所有政治派別的支持淨值均錄得下降,現時 難以斷定受訪者正在考慮甚麼替代方案。

Table 14: Attitude towards the continuation of 1C2S after 2047

表 14 :2047 年後香港應否繼續實行「一國兩制」

	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Should 應該	76 . 5%	75 . 5%	75 . 5%	73 . 5%	-
Should Not 不應該	8.1%	8.6%	10.1%	14.1%	-
Don't Know 唔知道	15.4%	15 . 8%	14.4%	12.4%	-
Net Value 淨值	68.4%	66.9%	65.4%	59 . 5%	-


Net value: Percent who chose 'Should' less percent who chose 'Should Not'

淨值 : 認為「應該」的百分比減去認為「不應該」的百分比

Figure 11: Net value of support for continuation of 1C2S (by political inclination)

圖 11 :繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度淨值(按政治傾向劃分)





5.1. Favourable conditions to the continuation of 1C2S after 2047

If respondents agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2017, they were then asked to choose what conditions would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S from the following list (they were allowed to choose more than 1 item):

- Hong Kong's political system democratises further;
- Hong Kong completing legislation of Article 23;
- Hong Kong maintaining a high degree of autonomy;
- Hong Kong maintaining economic prosperity and stability; and
- Others (please specify).

Figure 12 shows the percentages of respondents who chose each of the five conditions. For all respondents, 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (65.4%) remained the most important items, while 'democratising further' (56.0%) rose by over 22.7 percentage points since December 2018, of which steep rise happened from June 2019 onwards. 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (47.6%), which used to occupy the second place in the list dropped by 6.8 percentage points and became only the third most important condition. 'Completing legislation of Article 23' (4.5%) came in the last and witnessed a drop by almost 7 percentage points since December 2018.

Figure 13 shows the pattern of choice differed by political inclination. Most groups, with the exception of pro-establishment supporters, started to attach more importance to the option'political system democratising further' in the implementation of 1C2S, albeit to different degree.

5.1. 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件

如果受訪者同意於 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」,他們會進一步被邀從下列清單中選出有利於 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件(可選擇多於一項):

- 政制進一步民主化;
- 完成 23 條立法;
- 維持高度自治;
- 經濟維持繁榮穩定;及
- 其他(請註明)。

圖 12 顯示對所有市民而言,「維持高度自治」 (65.4%)仍然是首要選項。自2018 年 12 月 起,「政制進一步民主化」(56.0%)升幅達 22.7 個百分點,在 2019 年 6 月後尤其迅速。 以往保持第二位的「經濟維持繁榮穩定」 (47.6%)下跌 6.8 個百分點,成為第三選 項。「完成 23 條立法」(4.5%)仍然排列最 後,2018 年 12 月起下跌近 7 個百分點。

圖 13 按各政治傾向,顯示市民選擇各條件的 比例。除建制派外,所有政治派別不同程度地 更重視「政制進一步民主化」。 As in previous rounds of survey, pro-establishment supporters perceived 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' as an unambiguous priority for the implementation of 1C2S (78.3%). This group also displayed the highest percentage of support in the option, 'completing legislation of Article 23', amongst all other groups, though the percentage also witnessed a sharp drop of 27.3 percentage points since December 2018.

與過去調查一樣,建制派認為「經濟維持繁榮穩定」是延續「一國兩制」的首要條件 (78.3%)。他們對「完成 23 條立法」的 重要程度仍然是所有政治派別中最高,但自 2018 年 12 月起下跌 27.3 個百分點。

Moderates displayed more balanced ratings on the different categories and less fluctuations to their ratings. There was notable increase to the scores of 'democratising further' since December 2018, from whence an increase of 15.4 percentage points was recorded in October 2019.

溫和派對各項條件的評分較為穩定,變化較少。2018 年 12 月至 2019 年 10 月,「政制進一步民主化」上升不少,升幅為15.4個百分點。

Among non-establishment supporters, those of 'others' produced the strongest priority given to a condition in this survey, as they gave 88.6% to 'democratising further'. Democrats, on the other hand, still rated 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (79.0%) as the top priority for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047, although 'democratising further' came close at 75.2%.

非建制派中,其他非建制派有 88.6% 認為「政制進一步民主化」是必要條件,亦是次調查中最鮮明的取態。另外,民主派仍然視「維持高度自治」為有利於 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的首要選項(79.0%),「政制進一步民主化」則以 75.2% 緊隨。

Figure 12: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 圖 12 : 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件

Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 有利於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件





Figure 13: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 (by political inclination) 圖 13 : 有利於 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件(按政治傾向劃分)

Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 (by political inclination) 2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件(按政治傾向劃分)





6 市民的身分認同 Citizens' identity

We also surveyed how citizens identify themselves, whether as 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese'. Figure 14 shows that members of the public identify themselves much more strongly as 'Hongkongers' than as 'Chinese'. The identities started to diverge after a period of parallel increase. From December 2018 to October 2019, the public's identification as 'Hongkongers' rose from 8.06 to 8.41. In the same period, that as 'Chinese' dropped from 6.83 to 4.72. Both changes were statistically significant.

The extent to which the public identified themselves as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' can be better demonstrated by Figure 15, a graph mapping the mix of identities rated by respondents against time. On the 0 to 10 scale, the median is 5, which indicates a moderate level of identification. Ratings that are higher than the median indicate relatively strong identification; ratings that are lower than the median indicate relatively weak identification. These levels of strength can be grouped into four categories, dual identity (strong in both identifications), stronger identification as 'Hongkongers', stronger identification as 'Chinese', and others which include those without a dominant identity.

It is clearly depicted that most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', though this has gradually changed since the June 2019. While the patterns from earlier surveys were very similar, where a majority of the public (between 55.9% to 57.3% before December 2018) had relatively strong identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese'. In the October 2019, this has steadily dropped to only 36.2%.

In the October 2019, citizens identifying themselves strongly as 'Hongkongers only' surpassed those with dual identity at 53.5% for the first time since the inception of our survey in mid-2017.

Identification as 'Chinese' may not be the same as patriotic, but identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' is a pre-requisite for 'devotion to China and Hong Kong'. The fact that the proportion of Hong Kong people with dual identity is declining throughout 2019 suggests the adverse impact the anti-extradition movement has on the implementation of 1C2S.

我們分別詢問市民對「香港人」及「中國人」 身分的認同程度。圖 14 顯示市民對「香港人」 的認同強於「中國人」。自 2018 年 12 月起, 「香港人」認同度由 8.06 分升至 8.41 分,「中 國人」則由 6.83 分跌至 4.72 分,兩項分數變化 均達統計上顯著水平。

圖 15 更清晰地呈現市民對兩種身分的認同程度。按 1 分至 10 分的尺度,中位數為 5,代表中等認同。高於中位數代表較強認同,低於則代表較弱認同。對兩種身分不同程度的認同可歸為四類:雙重身分(對兩種身分均擁有較強認同),對「香港人」身分有較強認同,對「中國人」身分有較強認同,以及包括沒有主要身分的其他身分認同。

大部分市民擁有「香港人」及「中國人」雙重身分認同,但比例於 2019 年 6 月後逐漸改變:大部分市民(2018年12月前介乎55.9%至57.3%)對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身分均擁有較高認同。2019年10月,此比例跌至只有36.2%。

2019 年 10 月,對「香港人」身分有較強認同的 受訪者達 53.5%,超越雙重身分認同,為 2017 年中開展調查後的第一次。

認同「中國人」身分未必等於「愛國」,不過 同時認同「中國人」及「香港人」兩種身分卻 是「愛國愛港」的先決條件。市民的雙重身分 認同在 2019 年持續下跌,反映反修例運動對落 實「一國兩制」的重大挑戰。

Figure 14: Citizens' identity scores 圖 14: 市民的身分認同評分







Figure 15: Citizens' identity mix 圖 15: 市民的混合身分認同

Citizens' Identity Mix 市民的混合身分認同





6.1. Rank correlation

As a result of the declining dual identity of both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', the correlation between the two stated identifications became less apparent. The two identities used to mutually reinforce each other but today, there are signs of polarization between them instead. The rank correlation coefficient changed from 0.17 in December 2018 to -0.02 in October 2019, though the correlation was not statistically significant. A stronger identification as'Hongkonger' now accompanies a weaker one as 'Chinese' (see Table 15). The converse, on the other hand, also holds. The loss of the mutuality of the two identities as 'Hongkonger' and'Chinese' risks challenging the implementation of 1C2S in the near future.

6.1. 等級相關係數

隨著雙重身分認同大不如前,這兩種身分的相關性亦變得模糊,由過去的相輔相成,變為現在的背馳傾向。雖然最新的相關等級係數未達統計上顯著水平,但數字由2018年12月的0.17跌至2019年10月的-0.02,說明「香港人」身分認同越強,「中國人」身分認同則越弱,反之亦然(見表15)。「香港人」和「中國人」兩種身分認同的共存空間消失,將會是短期內實踐「一國兩制」的一大挑戰。

Table 15: Rank correlation of citizens' identity 表 15 :市民的身分認同等級相關係數

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Correlation 相關係數	0.13	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.12	-0.02	-
t-statistic t 檢定統計	4.06	5.58	5 . 53	5.55	5 . 43	3.85	-0.69	-

7 熱門議題 Topical Issues

7.1. Public consultation of Article 23

Table 16 summarizes the pattern of attitudes towards initiating public consultation for Article 23. In previous surveys, opinions were divided without a clear majority: Slightly less than half chose 'relatively unnecessary' while slightly more than a third chose 'relatively necessary'. Over time, there has been a slight rise in 'relatively unnecessary' over 'relatively necessary'. Since December 2018, opinions seemed to have converged to produce a negative skew. Clear tendency can be seen in the latest round of survey in December 2019, where an unambiguous majority of over 60% deemed initiating Article 23 'relatively unnecessary'. Policy makers should exercise the highest degree of caution in approaching this subject in view of the widespread disagreement on the issue.

The result may be read within the following context: it is plausible that a considerable proportion of the public is strongly opposed to having Article 23 legislation at all, and hence is opposed to any consultation. It is also possible that, some chose 'relatively unnecessary' as an answer as a consequence of careful consideration of the political reality of the society, namely, the efficacy of initiating Article 23 consultation amidst the escalating public discontentment. As with those still in favour, they might hold that – given the inevitability of Article 23's legislation under the Basic Law, it is marginally better to have at least some consultation, as opposed to none.

Compared with moderates, pro-establishment supporters were more inclined towards 'very necessary', whilst non-establishment supporters were more inclined towards 'very unnecessary'. Moderates were divided: Their opinions were close to that of the community as a whole.

7.1. 第二十三條立法諮詢

表 16 顯示對第二十三條立法諮詢的取態。以往市民的取態分歧但未算不鮮明:稍為少於半數認為「比較無需要」諮詢,多於三分一認為「比較有需要」。比較歷輪調查,認為「比較無需要」的人數漸多於「比較有需要」,2018 年 12 月後民意更偏向負面。 截至 2019 年 12 月,超過60%的大多數市民認為「比較無需要」為第二十三條立法諮詢。決策者需要小心處理大眾對政策的憂慮。

取態兩極化的原因,相信是部分市民十分反對 第二十三條立法,是以反對任何諮詢。不過, 反對任何諮詢也有可能因為受訪者考慮到近期 的政治現實,特別是在社會事件未完結下諮詢 的成效。贊成諮詢的市民也有可能認為第二十 三條立法是香港的憲制責任,不能避免,有諮 詢總比無諮詢好。

與溫和派比較,建制派認為「比較無需要」諮詢,非建制派則認為「比較無需要」諮詢。溫 和派於兩個極端的佔比旗鼓相當,與全港市民 一樣未有明確的共識。

Table 16: Attitudes towards initiating Article 23 consultation

表 16 :對第二十三條立法諮詢的取態

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Relatively Necessary 比較有需要	35 . 5%	37.1%	34.5%	34.0%	28.2%	18.5%	-	-
Relatively Unnecessary 比較無需要	45 . 5%	44.4%	45 . 3%	47.9%	53.7%	63.2%	-	-
Don't Know 唔知道	5.9%	5.2%	5.5%	5.3%	5.6%	5.5%	-	-
Net Value 淨值	-10.6%	-7.7%	-11.4%	-14.7%	-25.5%	-44.7%	-	-
Mean Score 平均分	4.74	4.66	4.49	4.37	4.79	2.82	-	-

Net value: Percent who chose 'Relatively Necessary' less percent who chose 'Relatively Unnecessary'

淨值 : 認為「比較有須要」的百分比減去認為「比較無須要」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater necessity

平均分由 0 至 10 分,愈高分代表愈有須要

7.2. Knowledge of Basic Law

Table 17 shows that the mean score of public's self-rating of its knowledge of the Basic Law experienced a slight drop from 4.69 in December 2018 to 4.63 in August 2019. The rating was still below the median of 5, indicating that the public's knowledge of Basic Law is still inadequate.

Table 17: Knowledge of Basic Law 表 17 :對《基本法》的認識

7.2. 對《基本法》的認識

市民對《基本法》認識程度的自我評價,由 2018年12月調查的4.69分微跌至2019年8 月的4.63分,評分仍然低於中位數5分,反映 市民對《基本法》的認識並不足夠。

	2017.6	2017.12	2018 . 6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Good Knowledge 認識較深	29.1%	30.2%	32.6%	34.9%	36.4%	34.7%	-	-
Little Knowledge 認識較淺	47.6%	44.8	43.6%	42.0%	40.1%	43.0%	-	-
Don't Know 唔知道	0.4%	0.8%%	1.2%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%	-	-
Net Value淨值	-18.6%	-14.7%	-11.2%	-7.1%	-3.7%	-8.3%	-	-
Mean Score 平均分	4.45	4 . 53	4.64	4.69	4.79	4.63	-	-

Net value: Percent who chose 'Good Knowledge' less percent who chose 'Little Knowledge'

淨值 : 認為「認識較深」的百分比減去認為「認識較淺」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means better knowledge

平均分由0至10分,愈高分代表認識愈深

7.3. Responsibility of conflicts

Table 18 shows the allocation of blame between the Mainland and Hong Kong when conflicts arise in the implementation of 1C2S. In October 2019, 45.4% of the public suggested that the Mainland would be responsible while 11.5% assigned the responsibility to Hong Kong, both of these values are at their most extreme since mid-2017. Nonetheless, those who chose'equally responsible' fell from its usual $\pm 50\%$ to only 36.4% in October 2019. The sentimentimplied by this swing toward blaming the Mainland is worrisome.

The results suggest that both the Central Government and HKSAR Government ought to reflect on its own responsibility for deadlocks and conflicts between government and people.

7.3. 出現矛盾的責任

表 18 顯示當實踐「一國兩制」出現矛盾時,應歸咎責任於內地或香港。2019 年 10 月調查顯示,45.4% 市民認為責任屬於內地,11.5% 則認為責任屬於香港,兩個結果均為 2017 年中以來最一面倒的結果。此外,選擇「一半半」的人數由約50% 跌至2019 年 10 月的36.4%。換言之,更多人將矛盾責任歸咎於內地,中央政府與香港均需就政府和市民之間的僵局和矛盾反思自身責任。

Table 18: Responsibility for conflicts

表 18 :出現矛盾時的責任

	2017 . 6	2017.12	2018 . 6	2018.12	2019 . 6	2019 . 8	2019.10	2019.12
The Mainland 內地	24.1%	26.5%	26.1%	27.2%	29.0%	34.0%	45.4%	-
Hong Kong香港	15.4%	19.0%	18.1%	17.4%	16.1%	12.4%	11.5%	-
Equally responsible 一半半	54.5%	49.0%	50.7%	50.8%	50.1%	47.3%	36.4%	-
Don't Know 唔知道	6.0%	5.5%	5.1%	4.7%	4.8%	6.4%	6.7%	-
Net Value淨值	9.3%	7.9%	8.0%	9.8%	12.9%	21.6%	33.8%	-
Mean Score 平均分	5.02	4.92	4.98	5.06	5.12	5.77	6.21	-

Net value: Percent who chose 'The Mainland' less percent who chose 'Hong Kong'

淨值 : 認為屬「內地」的百分比減去認為屬「香港」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Scores higher (lower) than 5 means greater responsibility lies with the Mainland (Hong Kong) 平均分由 0 至 10 分,分數高於(低於)5 分代表內地(香港)需負較大責任

7.4. Impact of Carrie Lam on societal division

Unlike previous rounds of survey, Table 19 shows that those who chose 'increased' vastly exceeded those who chose 'Decreased'. Since December 2018, those who chose 'increased' rose by 48 percentage points while those who chose 'decreased' fell by 27.6 percentage points. The net value fell from 25.1% in December 2018 to a shocking -50.5%, indicating that the favourable impact on societal division of Carrie Lam's appointment as CE dramatically evaporated since June 2019. This is consistent with the decline in the CE approval ratings in other surveys in 2019.

7.4. 林鄭月娥對社會撕裂的影響

異於過去調查結果,表 19 顯示認為「增加」的市民遠遠超於認為「減少」者。自2018年12月起,認為「增加」的人數升達48個百分點,認為「減少」的則下降27.6個百分點。「減少」和「增加」之間的差距或淨值由2018年12月的25.1%下降至2019年10月的-50.5%,林鄭月娥上台對社會撕裂的有利影響在2019年6月後徹底消失,結果與同年特首民室下跌相符。

Table 19: Impact of Carrie Lam on societal division 表 19 :林鄭月娥上台對社會撕裂的影響

	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019 . 8	2019.10	2019.12
Decreased減少	49.0%	42.1%	37 . 5%	29.0%	17.1%	9.9%	-
Increased 增加	7.6%	9.1%	12.4%	23.1%	44.8%	60.4%	-
Unchanged無變	41.0%	46.5%	47.6%	45.3%	34.8%	26.7%	-
Don't Know 唔知道	2.4%	2.3%	2.4%	2.6%	3.2%	2.9%	-
Net Value淨值	42.4%	33.1%	25.1%	6.1%	-27.7%	-50.5%	-

Net value: Percent who chose 'Decreased' less percent who chose 'Increased'

淨值 : 認為「減少」的百分比減去認為「增加」的百分比



7.5. Emigration and confidence in 1C2S

Table 20 shows public's emigration plans. Those who had 'no plans' to emigrate remain the majority (69.3%), majorly exceeded those who 'have plans' (28.6%). Over time, there has been a clear fall in those who have 'no plans' to emigrate and rise in those who 'have plans', respectively from 84.0% in December 2018 to 69.3% in October 2019 and from 14.9% to 28.6%. These changes were statistically significant.

Table 21 shows the percentages of different groups who plan to emigrate due to lack of confidence in 1C2S (the emigration ratio). Between December 2018 and October 2019, the emigration ratio of the public rose with statistical significance from 11.2% to 25.4%. For moderates and non-establishment supporters, the ratios also increased, at a statistically significant level, respectively from 9.3% to 21.2%, and from 23.8% to 36.4% respectively. Pro-establishment supporters, on the other hand, recorded the lowest emigration ratio of 7.1%.

Past studies have suggested that surveys often inaccurately amplify the number of individuals who seek to emigrate, for only a fraction of those who express interest in emigrating eventually do so in reality. Caution should therefore be exercised in interpreting the findings, though they still provide valuable reference of the degree and extent of concern. Amongst moderates, those who confess to having plans to emigrate due to their lack of confidence in 1C2S may do so due to, on one hand, their disillusionment towards the central government and the pro- establishment, but also, on the other hand, disillusionment towards perceived instability caused by the non-establishment supporters; the latter may cause disaffection amongst the moderates due to the perceived damage of radical politics on the rule of law and Hong Kong's economy. Neither of the possibilities above could be ruled out.

7.5. 移民海外與「一國兩制」信心

表 20 顯示市民的移民計劃。「無打算」移民的人數遠遠拋離「有打算」者,比例分別為69.3% 和 28.6%。比較過去調查,「無打算」的人數稍微下降,而「有打算」則上升,當中「無打算」的人數比例由 2018 年 12 月的84.0% 跌至2019 年 10 月的69.3%,「有打算」則由14.9%升至28.6%,差異達統計上顯著水平。

表 21 顯示不同政治派別因對「一國兩制」 缺乏信心而計劃移民的的百分比(移民比率)。2018 年 12 月至 2019 年 10 月期 間,移民比率由 11.2% 升至 25.4%,升 幅達統計上顯著水平。溫和派和非建制派的 移民比率分別由 9.3% 升至 21.2%,以及 由 23.8% 升至 36.4%,均達統計上顯著水 平。建制派錄得 7.1%,為最低的移民比 率。

根據過往研究,在民調中聲稱移民的人數,往往遠超真正移民的人數。民調結果雖有一定參考價值,但要小心解讀。溫和派聲稱無信心而計劃移民,一方面可能是對中央政府及建制派不滿,另一方面亦可能是擔心非建制派破壞社會穩定,例如覺得激進政治將會損害香港法治及經濟,兩種可能性皆不能排除。

Table 20: Public's emigration plans 表 20 :市民移民海外的計劃

	2017 . 6	2017.12	2018 . 6	2018.12	2019 . 6	2019 . 8	2019.10	2019.12
Have Plans有打算	13.6%	12.6%	13.0%	14.9%	18.0%	24.1%	28.6%	-
No Plans無打算	85.3%	86.4%	86.1%	84.0%	79.1%	73.3%	69.3%	-
Don't Know 唔知道	1.0%	0.9%	0.9%	1.2%	2.9%	2.6%	2.1%	-
Net Value 淨值	-71.7%	-74.5%	-73.1%	-69.1%	-61.1%	-49.2%	-40.7%	-

Net value: Percent who chose 'Have Plans' less percent who chose 'No Plans'

淨值 : 認為「無打算」的百分比減去認為「有打算」的百分比

表 21 :移民比率(按政治傾向劃分)

	Emigration Ratio 移民比率							
	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Pro-establishment建制派	1.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.7%	7.1%	-
Moderates溫和派	7.9%	5.8%	6.8%	9.3%	13.3%	18.6%	21.2%	-
Non-establishment非建制派	14.3%	16.8%	19.9%	23.8%	25.3%	32.5%	36.4%	-
Of which: Democrats 其中:民主派	14.0%	14.3%	14.9%	21.8%	22 . 6%	30.5%	34.0%	-
Of which: Others 其中:其他非建制派	15.3%	24.6%	34.3%	30.3%	36.6%	39.2%	41.3%	-
Others其他	3.1%	2.5%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	11.7%	-
All Respondents整體市民	8.8%	8.0%	9.2%	11.2%	14.4%	20.8%	25.4%	-

7.6. Attitudes towards the Greater Bay Area (GBA) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

Table 22 shows that more agreed to Hong Kong's participation in the development of the GBA, though the rate of support was closely followed by those who 'disagree', with a narrowing mean score from 6.27 in December 2018 to 5.22 in August 2019. The decline was statistically significant.

All age groups and political inclination groups experienced statistically significant drop. The 30-39 age group had been the most critical group towards the development, and they switched from mild agreement to mild disagreement: Their mean score fell from 5.67 to 4.46.

7.6. 粤港澳大灣區和「一帶一路」

表 22 顯示較多市民支持香港參與大灣區發展,雖然支持者與反對者數目逐漸逼近,平均分亦由 2018 年 12 月的 627 分跌至 2019 年 8 月的 522 分,跌幅達統計上顯著水平。

所有年齡組別及政治傾向的受訪者均錄得統計上顯著跌幅。30-39 歲組別對大灣區發展最無好感,由輕微同意轉為輕微不同意,平均分由 5.67 分跌至 4.46 分。

Table 22: Should Hong Kong participate in the development of the GBA 表 22 :香港應否參與粵港澳大灣區發展?

	2018 . 6	2018.12	2019.6	2019 . 8	2019.10	2019.12
Agree 支持	56.4%	54.0%	47.9%	42.6%	-	-
Disagree 反對	23.6%	24.7%	30.4%	35.3%	-	-
Don't Know 唔知道	7.0%	7.2%	5.9%	5.5%	-	-
Net Value 淨值	35.4%	31.6%	17.6%	7.3%	-	-
Mean Score平均分	6.30	6 . 27	5 . 79	5 . 22	-	-

Net value: Percent who chose 'Agree' less percent who chose 'Disagree'

淨值 : 認為「支持」的百分比減去認為「反對」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means stronger agreement

平均分由 0至 10分,愈高分代表愈支持

7.6.1. Willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA

Table 23 shows that, in August 2019, only 7.8% of the public would consider moving there; another 10.4% may consider moving, but 73.9% would not consider moving. Over time, there was a slight fall in 'willing' and a rise of over 10 percentage points in 'not willing' since the December 2018 of survey. The change was statistically significant.

Table 24 shows the change in the willingness of youths (age 18 to 29) to live or work in other cities of the GBA. In August 2018, only 8.1% of youths were willing to live or work in other cities of the GBA, and this has almost halved by August 2019, after experiencing a rise of 6.8 percentage points in the latter part of 2018. Those who were unwilling to do so rose from 61.0% in mid-2018 to 70.1% in August 2019, after a drop of 12.2 percentage points at the end of 2018. The rise in net unwillingness of youths was large (12.4%), and the change was statistically significant.

7.6.1. 前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住 或發展的意願

表 23 顯示 2019 年 8 月調查中,只有 7.8%的市民會考慮前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展,10.4%或者會考慮,但 73.9%不會考慮。與 2018 年 12 月比較,「會考慮」前往輕微下跌,「不會考慮」則上升超過 10 個百分點,升幅達統計上顯著水平。

表 24 顯示青年(18至29歲)北上大灣區居住或發展的意願。在2018年6月,只有8.1%的青年會考慮前往大灣區居住或發展,雖然2018年底錄得6.8個百分點的升幅,2019年8月會考慮前往的青年比例減半。不會考慮的比例由2018年6月的61.0%,先下降12.2個百分比,再升至2019年8月的70.1%。青年的不願意度淨值大幅上升(12.4%),達統計上顯著水平。

Table 23: Willingness of living or working in other cities of the GBA

表 23 : 前往粤港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願

	2018 . 6	2018.12	2019 . 6	2019 . 8	2019.10	2019.12
Willing 會考慮	12.2%	13.0%	12.9%	7.8%	-	-
Not willing不會考慮	63.1%	62.6%	67.6%	73.9%	-	-
Maybe 或者	11.9%	13.4%	11.8%	10.4%	-	-
Don't Know 唔知道	12.8%	11.0%	7.8%	7.8%	-	-
Net Value淨值	-51.0%	-49.5%	-54.7%	-66.1%	-	-

Net value: Percent who chose Willing less Percent who chose Not willing

淨值 :「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比

Table 24: Willingness of youths (age 18 to 29) to live or work in other cities of the GBA

表 24 :青年(18 至 29 歲)前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願

	2018 . 6	2018.12	2019 . 6	2019 . 8	2019.10	2019.12
	8.1%	14.9%	8.9%	4.8%	-	-
Not willing不會考慮	61.0%	48.8%	60.6%	70.1%	-	-
Maybe 或者	15 . 0%	23.5%	20.8%	15.4%	-	-
Don't Know 唔知道	15.9%	12.7%	9.8%	9.6%	-	-
Net Value淨值	-52.9%	-33.9%	-51.7%	-65.3%	-	-

Net value: Percent who chose Willing'less Percent who chose Not willing'

淨值 :「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比



7.6.2. Should Hong Kong take part in the development of BRI?

Table 25 shows that the majority of the respondents interviewed supported the development of BRI. Over time, the net support fell from 26.2% in December 2018 to 17.6% in June 2019. This may be related to the problems that the BRI encountered in a number of countries.

As expected, pro-establishment supporters were highly positive of the BRI: their mean score increased from 8.65 to 8.75. Moderates remained mildly positive although their mean score fell slightly from 6.46 to 6.22. Mean score of non-establishment supporters had a statistically significant fall from 4.01 to 3.50.

7.6.2. 香港應否參與「一帶一路」發展?

表 25 顯示多數市民支持「一帶一路」發展。 不過,支持淨值由 2018 年 12 月的 26.2% 下跌至 2019 年 6 月的 17.6%,可能跟推行 「一帶一路」時,與部分沿線國家存在爭端 有關。

建制派的支持度如預期般相當正面:評分由 8.65分升至8.75分。溫和派傾向支持,但評分由6.46分微跌至6.22分。非建制派的評分由4.01分跌至3.50分,達統計上顯著水平。

Table 25: Hong Kong's participation in the development of the BRI 表 25 :香港應否參與「一帶一路」發展

	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Support支持	56 . 5%	53.1%	48.9%	-	-	-
Oppose反對	21.6%	28.3%	31.9%	-	-	-
Don't Know 唔知道	7.1%	5.6%	5.9%	-	-	-
Net Value 淨值	37.6%	26.2%	17.6%	-	-	-
Mean Score平均分	6 . 37	6 . 02	5 . 74	-	-	-


Net value: Percent who chose 'Support' less percent who chose 'Oppose'

淨值 : 「支持」的百分比減去「反對」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means stronger support


平均分由 0 至 10 分,愈高分代表愈支持





附錄

Appendices



編製方法 ■ Methodology

1. Construction of 1C2S Index

To understand the implementation of 1C2S comprehensively, we measure how the public in HK evaluate the current situation from various dimensions. International perception of freedom and democracy in HK is also pivotal as these are core components of 1C2S. Hence, we give an equal weight to scores obtained from the following two indices:

- Index (A): Public Opinion: Hong Kong public's evaluation of 1C2S compiled from telephone polls on 9 dimensions of 1C2S; and
- Index (B): International Perception: Compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on various dimensions of freedom and democracy in HK.

1. 編製「一國兩制」指數

為綜合掌握香港實踐「一國兩制」的情況,我們從不同範疇衡量市民對香港現狀的評價。自由與 民主是「一國兩制」的重要元素,國際社會對香港自由民主程度的觀感亦尤其重要。因此,「一 國兩制」指數為以下兩項評分給予相同比重:

- 指數(A):民意調查—香港市民在電話調查 中對九個「一國兩制」範疇的評分;及
- 指數(B):國際評價—國際智庫對香港的 自由民主水平所編製的評分。



1.1. Index (A): Public Opinion

Index (A) is the average of sub-scores obtained from nine dimensions on different dimensions of 1C2S in our telephone polls conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Each round, about 1,000 individuals will be randomly sampled by the CATI (computer assisted telephone interviewing) system, all aged 18 or above; all of them spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin. Table 26 shows the statistical and scientific standards of each survey.

In the telephone polls, many questions employed 1 to 7 as the rating scale in the survey process, with 4 as the median. This scale, which is known as the Likert scale, is commonly adopted for psychological assessments. This scale was used instead of a 0 to 10 scale as the latter is deemed too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents to choose from. However, to better conform to existing indices – which tend to be expressed on a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median) – we converted the results mathematically into the popular 0 to 10 scale.

For a more extensive report on the survey results, please see Survey Results: Frequency and Percentage Distribution, which can be found on the webpage of Path of Democracy (http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/).

1.1. 指數(A): 民意調查

指數(A)是香港市民對「一國兩制」的綜合評價,由九個範疇構成。我們委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查,每輪以電腦輔助電話訪問系統,隨機抽樣,訪問大約1,000人,全部皆屬18歲或以上,能操廣東話或普通話。表26顯示每次調查的統計和科學標準。

電話調查中,多數題目採用 1 至 7 分的評分尺度,以 4 分為中位數。這是心理學常用的科學尺度,稱為李克特量尺(Likert scale)。現時編製指數常採用 0 至 10 分的尺度,其實分類過於細緻,令市民難以選擇。不過為了與現行指數匹配,是以我們利用數學方法將調查結果轉換成為常見的 0 至 10 分尺度(以 5 分為中位數)。

如欲取得電話調查的詳細結果,請參閱民主思路網頁上的「調查結果:頻數及百分比分佈」 (http://www.pathofolemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/)。

Table 26: Survey details 表 26 : 調査概況

Round輪次	Survey Period 調查日期	Number of Respondents 受訪人數	Response Rates 回應率	Confidence Level 置信水平	Sampling Error 抽樣誤差
2017.06	23/5 - 3/6	1,002	36.8%	95.0%	±3.1%
2017.12	11/12 - 23/12	1,006	39 . 5%	95.0%	$\pm 3.09\%$
2018.06	23/5 - 2/6	1,004	37.2%	95.0%	$\pm 3.09\%$
2018.12	3/12 - 12/12	1,001	38.8%	95.0%	±3.1%
2019.06	27/5 - 6/6	1,002	38.0%	95.0%	±3.1%
2019 . 08	24/7 - 7/8	1,001	39.5%	95.0%	±3.1%
2019.10	17/10 - 31/10	1,002	38.0%	95.0%	$\pm 3.09\%$
2019.12	10/12 - 20/12	1,000	39.8%	95.0%	±3.1%

1.1.1. Alternative methods of constructing Index (A)

Conceptually, there are different ways to compute the nine dimensions into a composite score as Index (A). We have chosen the method of simple average, which is the most common method employed in constructing indices. Its strength lies in its parsimony and accessibility. It may not be the best method as it assigns equal weighting to all items (i.e. assuming equal importance for all items). Here, we compare the method of simple average to two alternatives methods that are more sophisticated, namely, principal component analysis and factor analysis.

Principal component analysis is a statistical method that processes and simplifies data; it is the standard scientific method employed in constructing indices. Through statistical analysis, it extracts the data set's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains the variations across the data.

Factor analysis extracts common factors from the data, and it shares a similar methodology with Principal component analysis. Its strength lies in its ability to identify hidden and representative factors amongst the many variables and group variables of a similar nature and converting the same into a common factor, which reduces the total number of variables.

Table 27 shows the negligible difference in scores acquired by the three methods. The results of all three methods are highly similar, largely due to the clustered nature of the public's assessments of the nine dimensions (cf. the distributions of the nine dimensions are highly correlated), which causes the core components or sub-items across all three methods to be highly similar. Both alternative methods involve complex calculations, which render the methods inaccessible to laymen. Given the similarity of the results from all three methods, we adopted the simplest and most commonly used method, i.e. the average of the nine dimensions, in constructing Index (A).

Table 27: Index (A): Public Opinion computed by different methods

表 27 :指數 (A): 民意調查以不同方式編制

Principal Component Analysis Factor Analysis Simple Average Round輪次 簡單平均數 主成分分析 因子分析 2017.06 4.84 4.83 4.82 4.98 4.99 4.94 2017.12 2018.06 5.05 5.06 5.00 2018.12 4.84 4.84 4.76 2019.06 4.58 4.58 4.53 2019.08 3.98 3.96 3.91 2019.10 3.26 3.23 3.18 3.53 2019.12 3.51 3.47

1.1.1. 指數(A)的不同編製方式

指數(A)是香港市民對「一國兩制」的綜合評價,由九個範疇構成。要將九個範疇計算為指數(A)的綜合評分,在概念上有不同方式。我們採用了編製指數時最常見的簡單平均數,優點是簡單及容易明白。理論上,不同範疇可能有不同比重,簡單平均數未必是最好的編製方式,是以我們考慮兩種更複雜的方式與簡單平均數比較,分別為主成分分析與因子分析。

主成分分析是一種分析和簡化數據的統計技術,是以科學化方式編製指數的標準方法,其方法是通過對數據進行特徵分解,以得出數據的主要成分與它們的權值,優點是揭露數據的內部結構,從而更好解釋數據的變化。

因子分析是從數據中提取公性因子的統計方法,技術與主成分分析類似,其優點是可以在多項變量中找出隱藏及具有代表性的因子,將相同本質的變量歸入一個因子,從而減少變量的數目。

表 27 顯示三種方式所得出的結果,只有微不足道的差異。三種方式的結果十分接近,相信是由於市民對九個範疇的評分相當近似(即九個範疇的分佈高度相關),是以九個範疇的主要成分或主要因子都十分接近。主成分分析及因子分析牽涉複雜計算,一般人難以明白。因為三種方式編製指數結果十分接近,我們選取最簡單常用的方法,即九個範疇的簡單平均數來編製「一國兩制」指數。

1.2. Index (B): International Perception

Index (B) is the average of 3 indices, namely, the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser Institutes, and the Democracy Index of the Economic Intelligence Unit. The average of the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index is known as the Human Freedom Index, which is the most comprehensive index of freedom available.

As the Human Freedom Index covers a very large number of countries, the latest Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index only reflect conditions two years ago. These two indices are updated based on the latest comparable indicators from other international think tanks. When updating is not possible, the relevant figures are assumed to be unchanged.

1.2.1. Comparable indicators

To obtain the updated scores of Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index, we first calculate the percentage changes in the comparable indicators for the respective years; then we apply these changes to the latest Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser. The comparable indicators for the Economic Freedom Index and each of the 7 components of the Personal Freedom Index are listed in Table 28.

1.2. 指數(B):國際評價

指數(B)是「經濟自由指數」、「個人自由指數」及「民主指數」三項指數的平均分。首兩項指數由卡托研究所(Cato Institute)及菲沙研究所(Fraser Institute)編製,第三項指數則由經濟學人智庫編製。「經濟自由指數」和「個人自由指數」的平均分被稱為「人類自由指數」,是目前衡量自由的指數中最全面的一種。

由於「人類自由指數」覆蓋大量國家,「經濟 自由指數」及「個人自由指數」只反映兩年前 的狀況。這兩項指數將按相應的國際指標更 新,如未能更新,我們假設相關數值不變。

1.2.1. 相應指標

為更新「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」,我們計算相應指標於相關年份的百分比變化,並將之套用於卡托研究所及菲沙研究所的「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」。表28顯示「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」中七個項目的相應指標。

Table 28: Comparable indicators of Index (B): International Perception 表 28 : 指數 (B): 國際評價之相應指標

表 28 · 指數 (B) · 國際評價之相應	
Indicators 指標	Comparable Indicators 相應指標
Economic Freedom Index 經濟自由指數	The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom 傳統基金會經濟自由指數
Rule of Law法治	World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index — 'Procedural Justice', 'Civil Justice' and 'Criminal Justice' 世界正義項目「法治指數」— 「程序公義」、「民事司法」及「刑事司法」
Security and Safety安全	World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index — 'Order and Security' 世界正義項目「法治指數」—「秩序與治安」
Movement遷徙自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report—'G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence employment, or education?'自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「G1. 人民是否享有遷徙自由,包括改變居所、就業或教育的能力?」
Religion 宗教自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report—'D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?'自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「D2. 人民能否在公開或私人場合自由地實踐和表達宗教信仰或非信仰?」
Association, Assembly, & Civil Society 結社、集會及公民社會自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report—'E. Associational and Organizational Rights' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「E. 結社及組織權利」
Expression and Information 言論自由	Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index 無國界記者「全球新聞自由指數」
Identity and Relationships 性別認同及關係	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report—'G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?'自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「G3. 人民是否享有個人社交自由,包括選擇婚姻對象及家庭人數、免受居所暴力及自主改變外貌?」

1.3. Refinement and Estimation

After the first survey in June 2017, one out of the nine dimensions, namely the score on Question 4 ('original way of life remained unchanged'), is not comparable with subsequent ones due to refinements of survey questions. The refinement only affects one question in the nine questions used to compute Index (A). Scores of the other eight questions are directly comparable as they are identical in all surveys.

To adjust for the time lag of international indices, scores of Index (B) in previous reports were estimated with data available then. In every report, scores will be revised with latest updates from international think tanks.

For the convenience of comparison, Figure 16 shows Index (A) computed by nine questions and by the identical eight questions, the estimated and revised scores of Index (B), and the 1C2S Index constructed by the combination of them. The results suggest that the differences in scores of Index (A), Index (B) and 1C2S Index due to question change and updating are at most 0.12 and therefore negligible.

1.3. 修訂與估算


於2017年6月第一輪調查後,電話調查中九個範疇的第四條題目(「維持原有生活方式」)經過修訂,所以此題的評分不能與其後的調查直接比較。修訂只影響指數(A)中,九個範疇的其中一條題目,另外八條問題在所有調查均相同,評分可以直接比較。

指數(B)的評分乃基於當時可得的數據而作出,以修正國際指數的滯後。該估算值將於其後的報告按最新的國際指數更新。

以便比較,圖 16 顯示九個範疇及八個相同範疇計算的指數(A)、估算及修訂的指數(B),以及由它們所編製的「一國兩制」指數。結果顯示指數(A)、指數(B)及「一國兩制」指數因為題目修訂和數據更新而帶來的差異不多於 0.12,微不足道。

Figure 16: Refinement and estimation of 1C2S Index 圖 16 : 「一國兩制」指數之修訂與估算

Refinement and Estimation of1C2S Index 「一國兩制」指數之修訂與估算



- → 1C2S Index 「一國兩制」指數
 - → Index (A): Public Opinion (8 Dimensions) 指數 (A): 民意調查 (八範疇)
- Index (A): Public Opinion (9 Dimensions)
- 指數(A):民意調查(九範疇)
- Index (B): International Perception (Estimates)
 指數(B): 國際評價(估算)
- Index (B): International Perception (Revised)
 - 指數(B):國際評價(修訂)

2. Construction of 1C2S Index

Our sample consists of around 146,000 newspaper articles related to 1C2S from 21 local daily newspapers that were published between April 1998 and December 2019. The number of articles processed in each newspaper is listed in Table 29.

Each article undergoes a 'tokenisation' process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of approximately 22 years, our text corpus contains around 73 million tokens. From this massive dataset, common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as '我', '你', '的', are first removed before further analysis.

To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: 'positive', 'negative' or'neutral' (not a sentiment word). A positive word is then given a sentiment score of 1, a negative word is assigned a score of -1, and a neutral word has a score of 0. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by the Natural Language Processing and Sentiment Analysis Lab, Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica. The number of words processed each year since 1998 is given in Table 30.

The positive, or negative as the case may be, sentiment of a paragraph is quantified via a count of the number of positive (negative) words it contains, adjusted by the its total word count. The sentiment score of an article is calculated as the average difference between positive and negative proportions among constituent paragraphs. 1C2S MMI is derived as an index that captures the weighted average sentiment score among newspapers in a given month. The base month of set at July 2017 to indicate 20 years after the establishment of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Since there are substantial differences in the number of news articles published by newspapers during the sample period, the article count of a newspaper alone could be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure 1C2S MMI's reliability, the sentiment score for each newspaper is further weighted by public perceptions of its credibility based on the survey 'Public Evaluation on Media Credibility' conducted by Centre for Communication Research, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

2. 編製「一國兩制」輿情指數

「一國兩制」與情指數的資料由新聞文章 組成,包含 1998 年 4 月至 2019 年 12 月 期間,來自本地21份日報關於「一國兩制」, 約 146,000 份報導及評論。表 29 顯示每份報 章所運算的文章數量。

我們就每篇文章進行「分詞」(tokenization),通過電腦運算將文章分解成語例(token,為單詞或短語)。 我們利用約22年的資料組成語料庫,包含大約7,000萬個語例。在進一步分析這個龐大的語料庫之前,我們首先剔除無助理解文章的常見單詞(如「我」、「你」、「的」)。

為了辨別一篇文章的情緒, 我們採用由台灣中央研究院資訊科學研究所自然語言處理與情感分析實驗室開發的繁體中文情緒字典, 把語例分類為「正面」、「中立」(非情感詞)或「負面」。「正面」的語例得1分,「中立」得0分,「負面」得-1分。表30顯示各年所運算的文字數量。

我們計算每段落所包含的正、負面語例數量,每篇文章的情緒評分則為各個段落經字數調整後的淨值。「一國兩制」與情指數即為當月所有文章的平均情緒評分,基數月 訂為 2017 年 7 月,基數為100,以標誌回歸 20 周年的情況。由於不同報章所刊登的文章數目不足以呈現不同報章對讀者觀感的影響力。為確保可靠性,本指數將採用由香港中文大學傳播與民意調查中心「市民對傳媒公信力的評分」為每份報章的情緒評分加權。

Table 29: News sources of 1C2S MMI 表 29 :「一國兩制」與情指數之報章來源

Newspaper 報章	Number of Articles 文章篇數
A Daily A 報	81
am730	2,316
Apple Daily 蘋果日報	9,760
Headline Daily 頭條日報	1,162
Hong Kong Commercial Daily 香港商報	14,157
Hong Kong Daily News 新報	4,476
Hong Kong Economic Journal 信報	10,391
Hong Kong Economic Times 經濟日報	4,232
Hong Kong Globe 公正報	194
Lion Rock Daily 香港仔	392
Metro Daily 都市日報	1,436
Ming Pao Daily News 明報	12,017
Oriental Daily News 東方日報	8,485
Sharp Daily 爽報	152
Sing Pao 成報	5,030
Sing Tao Daily 星島日報	7,933
Sky Post 晴報	524
Ta Kung Pao 大公報	29,033
The Sun 太陽報	4,828
Tin Tin Daily News 天天日報	452
Wen Wei Po 文匯報	29,164
Total 總數	146,215

Table 30: Number of words processed 表 30 :處理資料字數

表 30	· 處理負料子數	
Year		Number of Words
1998	}	669,676
1999)	2,498,254
2000		2,320,584
2001		2,640,690
2002		2,545,546
2003		2,713,403
2004	-	4,801,621
2005		2,874,994
2006	j	1,879,834
2007	,	2,797,512
2008	}	1,446,629
2009	1	1,815,839
2010		1,880,198
2011		2,040,824
2012		3,441,893
2013	}	3,312,415
2014	-	5,386,835
2015		4,411,567
2016		5,590,354
2017	,	6,204,647
2018	}	4,932,978
2019		7,086,984
Total		73,198,507

2.1. Accuracy test

1C2S MMI is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict

In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time. As shown in Table 31, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as 'positive' whereas 1,472 were classified as 'negative.'

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be.

Table 31 also shows the average sentiment scores of these 3 groups of paragraphs. In particular, positive paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as 'negative' paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these 3 groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.

2.1. 準確度覆查

「一國兩制」與情指數是建基於由詞彙組成的模型。此模型視每段落為一籃子的詞語,從而抽離整篇文章的脈絡。其中一個效果是可能無法辨認到如諷刺等寫作手法,因而不能完全理解每一個段落的真正含義。這個局限在分析小説及文學作品時可能較為明顯,但對於寫作手法較直接的新聞文章而言,相信不是一個大問題。

為證實此詞彙模型辨別情緒的準確度,我們兩位研究員從語料庫中隨機抽取了約 18,000 個段落,親自分類為「正面」、「負面」和「中立」,再與詞彙模型比較。各段落的出處在給予研究員之前已經被隱藏。假如兩名研究員對同一個段落的情緒判斷有異,第三名研究員將會重讀並作出判斷。

是次覆查中,兩名研究員在大約八成的情況下 均能作出相同的判斷。如表 31 所顯示,2,363 及 1,472 個段落分別被判決為「正面」及「負 面」。

我們利用與「一國兩制」與情指數相同的詞彙 模型為此等段落的情緒評分。在模型中,情緒 評分為正、負面詞語量的淨值,所以評分愈高 代表情緒愈正面。

表 31 顯示利用詞彙模型計算的情緒評分。被研究員判斷為「正面」的段落,情緒評分為 21.76%,約為「負面」段落的 7.5 倍。再者, 利用多變量回歸分析,三個類別的情緒評分發 現具統計學上的顯著差異,證實詞彙模型的計 算結果與我們研究員的人手分類一致。

Table 31: Results of accuracy test

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耒	.3 1	 /恒官 	5結果

	Positive 正面	Neutral 中立	Negative 負面
No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers 真人研究員對情緒的判斷	2,363	14,202	1,472
Net Value 情緒淨值	21.76%	14.42%	2.92%

| ■ 重大事件一覽

List of significant events

The significant events which may have affected evaluations of 1C2S that occurred in the previous reports (mid-2017 to late-2018) are listed below.

2017 年中至 2018 年底間,可能影響對「一國兩制」評價的重大事件爐列如下。

2017 H2 下半年

- Disqualification of four LegCo members by the High Court (14 July);
- Prison sentences on the (13 + 3) protesters: The violent demonstrations of 13 protestors in relation to East North Territories Development, and the three student leaders (Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, and Alex Chow) in the Civic Square occupation. In August 2017, the Court of Appeals sentenced them to 6 to 13 months imprisonment. The court also gave new tougher sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence (15 and 17 August);
- China's enactment of the national anthem law (1 September);
- Emphasis on 'overall jurisdiction over Hong Kong' in the Work Report of 19th CPC National Congress (19 October);
- LegCo's passage of the non-binding motion on the high-speed rail co-location arrangement (15 November); and
- Amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Council to restrict filibustering (15 December).

- 高等法院裁定四名立法會議員宣誓無效(7 月 14 日);
- 「13+3」示威者被判入獄:上訴法庭判處 13 名涉及暴力的反新界東北發展示威者與 強行進入公民廣場示威的「雙學三子」 (黃之鋒、羅冠聰及周永康)6至13個月 監禁。上訴法庭更提出更嚴厲的量刑準則 予未來涉及暴力的大型非法集會案件(8 月 15 及 17 日);
- 中國訂立國歌法(9月1日);
- 中共十九大工作報告強調對香港的「全面 管治權」(10月19日);
- 立法會通過關於高鐵「一地兩檢」安排的 無約束力議案(11月15日);及
- 立法會透過修訂議事規則限制拉布(12月 15日)。

2018 H1 上半年

- Agnes Chow Ting, a pro-democracy activist, was banned from running for the LegCo by-election on the grounds that her party, Demosisto, had called for 'self-determination' (27 January);
- The case of the three student leaders was brought to the Court of Final Appeals (CFA). The CFA overturned the prison sentences on the trio on a technicality but ruled that the Court of Appeals was entitled to give tough sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence (6 February);
- Edward Leung, leader of Hong Kong Indigenous, was given a prison sentence of 6 years on June 11 for his role in the civil unrest in Mongkok (11 June); and
- LegCo's passage of the co-location bill on June 14 after protracted debates (14 June).

- 有意代表香港眾志出選立法會港島區補選的 周庭,被裁定參選提名無效(1月27日);
- 「雙學三子」案件上訴至終審法院。終審法院以技術因素推翻監禁判決,但認可上訴法院對未來涉及暴力的大規模非法集會案件所提出的更嚴厲判刑指引(2月6日);
- 本土民主前線領袖梁天琦參與旺角騷亂,被 判處6年監禁(6月11日);及
- 立法會經過漫長辯論後,通過「一地兩檢」 議案(6月14日)。

2018 H2 下半年

- Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, delivered a speech hosted by the Foreign Correspondents' Club (14 August);
- The Hong Kong National Party was banned on national security grounds (24 September);
- Visa renewal of Victor Mallet, the Financial Times' Asia News Editor and Vice President of the Foreign Correspondents Club (FCC), was rejected. He had chaired a talk by pro-independence activist Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the Hong Kong National Party, at the FCC (5 October);
- Lau Siu Lai, a Democrat who had called for Hong Kong self-determination, was barred from running the LegCo by-election (12 October);
- Opening of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge (23 October);
- The United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended the US Congress to assess its export policy on technology with regard to Hong Kong's status as a separate customs area (14 November);
- Trial of 9 key figures of the 'Occupy Central' movement started (19 November);
- A series of celebrations of the 40th anniversary of China's reform and opening up (December);
- Public education campaigns to promote the country's Constitution and Hong Kong's Basic Law were initiated on the National Constitution Day (4 December); and
- Corruption investigation against Leung Chun-ying, former chief executive of HKSAR, for receiving a HK\$50 million payment from an Australian engineering firm was dropped due to lack of sufficient evidence (12 December).

- 支持「港獨」的香港民族黨召集人陳浩天 受邀於香港外國記者會演講(8月14日);
- 基於維護國家安全,香港民族黨被禁止運作 (9月24日);
- 《金融時報》亞洲總編輯、香港外國記者會 副主席馬凱的簽證續期遭拒。他早期主持主 張「港獨」的香港民族黨召集人陳浩天於香 港外國記者會的演講。(10月5月);
- 提倡香港「自決」的民主派候選人劉小 麗於立法會補選中的被裁定提名無效 (10月12日);
- 港珠澳大橋啟用(10月23日);
- 美中經濟與安全審查委員會向美國國會建 議,重新審視高科技出口政策,評估香港的 獨立關稅區地位(11月14日);
- 「佔中九子」案開審(11月19日);
- 一系列改革開放 40 周年慶祝活動(12月);
- 「國家憲法日」舉辦宣傳活動,推廣國家 《憲法》與香港《基本法》(12月4日);及
- 前行政長官梁振英涉嫌收取澳洲工程公司 5,000 萬港元,案件因證據不足不進行檢控 (12月12日)。



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February 2月 | 2020

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