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前言 Preface

The unprecedented pursuit of 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) demands unyielding exploration and persistence from stakeholders. Since 1997, we have made headway in the realization of 1C2S, but at the same time, have also encountered many challenges. To assist full implementation of 1C2S, in July 2017, Path of Democracy established the 1C2S Index and released its first report in relation thereto with a view to conduct an objective evaluation of the continued implementation of 1C2S by reviewing the accomplishments and shortfalls of 1C2S at the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong SAR.

「一國兩制」是前無古人的嘗試,1997年至今既取得成果,也遇到挑戰,實踐過程需要社會各界不斷探索。民主思路在香港回歸20年之際發布第一份關於「一國兩制」概況的客觀評價,希望鑑察其成就與缺失,為全面準確貫徹此方針謹盡綿力。

The 1C2S Index is based on both local opinion and international perception on the current state of 1C2S. In order to measure local sentiment, we conduct periodic public surveys in Hong Kong on aspects such as 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong', judiciary independence, the high degree of autonomy and other important issues. We also looked at global studies carried out by international think tanks and how Hong Kong is being rated on aspects like human rights, rule of law, freedom of speech and freedom of association. These independent evaluations are also incorporated into the Index to give a more balanced view on how the World including Hong Kong people look at the state of 1C2S.

「一國兩制」指數編製自關於「一國兩制」 現狀的本地民意及國際評價。我們定期進行 民意調查,就港人治港、高度自治、司法獨 立及其他重要範疇了解香港市民想法。我們 亦參考國際機構對香港在人權、法治、言論 自由和結社自由等範疇的評分,把以上獨立 意見揉合於指數之中,為香港及世界各地對 「一國兩制」現狀的觀感作出中肯評估。

We also devised and introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) by making use of big data analytics to measure the media sentiment of Hong Kong towards 1C2S since 1988 with real-time monitoring and predictive alerts. In compiling our reports, we also sought views on current issues related to 1C2S, such as the public's emigration plans, national security and economic integration.

We extend our sincere gratitude to the research team involved in the production of our sixth edition of the 1C2S Index report: Gillian Tam, Ting Hin Yan, and Ian Chan. We are also grateful to Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong for completing the telephone polls on our behalf.

Going forward, to better inform policy makers and the public, we will continue to conduct public surveys and update international indices every six months, and to monitor media sentiment regularly to gauge the latest perceptions of the public, the international community and the media on 1C2S.

Ray Poon Co-convenor (Research) 除此之外,我們借助大數據技術,推出「一國兩制」與情指數去衡量新聞情緒,追溯自 1998年迄今香港媒體的有關報導,實現即時 觀測與預警。 編製報告時,我們亦探討「一 國兩制」實踐中的熱門議題,例如移民海 外、國家安全、經濟融合等。修例風波觸發 對「一國兩制」的關注及擔憂,我們就此進 行兩輪額外的調查,了解民意變化。


報告更新至第六版,我們衷心感謝研究團隊:譚廸文、甄定軒及陳譽仁,亦謹此向執行電話調查的香港中文大學香港亞太研究所致以謝意。

展望未來,我們會繼續每半年進行民意調查 及更新國際指數,亦會定期追蹤輿情指數, 從而反映香港市民、國際社會及本地媒體對 「一國兩制」的最新觀感,供決策者及公眾 參考。


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主要結果 Key Findings



Before the ripple effect of the anti-extradition movement had the chance to settle, Hong Kong was quickly met with the COVID-19 pandemic as 2020 began. The combined impact of political and public health crises has plunged the difficult situation of Hong Kong deeper into a dark winter of never-before-seen scale since the handover. On the surface, Hong Kong recorded a negative economic growth for four consecutive quarters and the highest unemployment rate in fifteen years at 6.2% in July 2020. The city's leadership struggled throughout this challenging period with limited governance capacity as anti-epidemic measures were often met with resistance given the public's general lack of trust.

反修例運動餘波未了,今年香港又受累於新冠肺炎疫情。政治事件與公共衛生的共同打擊下,局面嚴峻的香港步入更凛冽的寒冬。經濟連續四季錄得負增長,2020年7月份的失業率以6.2%創十五年新高。民望低迷的特區政府,憑有限的管治能力面對困境,抗疫工作更是舉步維艱。

The severity of the dual crises was further intensified by a background of Sino-US international power struggle which fuelled the already unstable socio-political climate of Hong Kong. Not only is the duelling coronavirus blame narratives exacerbated the showdown between Washington and Beijing. the now-effective Hong Kong Autonomy Act also accelerates Sino-US decoupling with US applying sanctions over Hong Kong as well as Chinese and Hong Kong officials on the pretext of erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy. The passage of the Hong Kong National Security Law and the upgrading of the central leading committee which oversees Hong Kong and Macau affairs brought perceived increase of presence of Beijing over Hong Kong. The general atmosphere has been that of fear and uncertainty as some chanted a de facto abolishment of 1C2S and an approaching wave of capital and brain drains, catalysed by new international immigration arrangements designed for Hong Kong residents.

中美角力令風雨交加的香港局勢雪上加霜。先是 北京與華盛頓為新冠病毒源頭打起輿論戰,美國 《香港自治法》亦已通過,可以制裁被視為損害 香港自由的中港官員,兩國脫鉤的風險一再惡 化。《港區國安法》迅速生效與中央政府領導港 澳事務的小組升格,北京被認為將會在香港事務 上採取更主動的角色。有人高呼「一國兩制」已 死,也正值多國針對港人提供新移民政策,催生 人才與資金外流的熱議,令社會隱憂猶存。

All these incidents combine to reinforce the need for Hong Kongers to confront the future of Hong Kong and 1C2S with fortitude and determination. In our sixth edition of the 1C2S Index report, we hope to shed light on the subject with substantial quantitative data from our latest round of survey in June 2020. To fully capture the socio-political reality of the city, we also introduced new sets of questions on the development of the social movement against the backdrop of more explicit presence of the central authorities in Hong Kong.

這半年的雙重危機與國際博弈,催促市民再次思考香港的前途問題與「一國兩制」的未來。第六版「一國兩制」指數報告整合2020年6月的民意調查結果,我們希望藉著客觀數據探討香港與「一國兩制」何去何從。為更掌握香港的現實狀況,我們亦增加了新題目,以理解本地和國際社會對近半年來政治事件的關注。

Confidence in 1C2S hung low

While the radicalism magnified by the anti-extradition movement seemed to have died down a little in the beginning of 2020, the unresolved demands of the protesters were quick to resume momentum as early strategies against COVID-19 exposed the government's unpreparedness. Concerns about the state of 1C2S and the various rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Basic Law were heightened by the drafting of the Hong Kong National Security Law in late May, prompting vigorous reactions from both local citizens and the international communities. Under these circumstances, it is to be expected that the briefly recovered 1C2S Index will resume its decline. The Index fell from 5.70 at the end of 2019 to 5.58 in June 2020, just 0.01 point higher than the lowest point recorded in October 2019.

However, while all nine dimensions from Index (A): Public Opinion fell, only one of these declinations was statistically significant, namely that in 'freedom of speech'. This is hardly surprising given China's expulsion of US journalists affected their work in Hong Kong, the review of RTHK's content production procedures aroused concerns over editorial independence, and the expeditious introduction of the Hong Kong National Security Law also mounted worries of the public over the freedoms promised by 1C2S.

From our past reports, we can see it has been a consistent pattern that the Hong Kong public host higher expectations and much more critical view on the integrity of 1C2S. Changes in Index (B): International Perception tend to be more diverse and less drastic. Negative adjustments were made for rule of law, freedom of association and freedom of expression due to time lag in the compilation of international indices, further decline at the international level is anticipated given the current socio-political situation. This is so notwithstanding the historic turnout for the local district election, the rise of citizen journalism and the relative safety in the time of global terrorism which will be seen as positive factors in terms of democratic participation and personal freedom.

「一國兩制」信心困滯不前

反修例運動燃點的激進情緒看似從年初緩和,但特區政府在疫症萌芽之時猝不及防,並未消退的政治訴求隨著不滿的民眾重新復燃。《港區國安法》於五月底突如其來,引起國際社會及市民關注「一國兩制」的狀況及《基本法》保障的自由。稍事復甦的「一國兩制」指數反覆向下並不教人意外。由2019年底的5.70分跌至2020年6月的5.58分,只較2019年10月的最低位微高0.01分。

指數(A):民意調查九個範疇皆錄得跌幅,其中言論自由的降幅達統計上顯著水平。結果與2020年上半年發生的事件不無關係,包括北京驅逐美國記者,因而影響他們在港的採訪工作、檢討香港電台管治的專責小組帶來干預編輯自主的疑問,以及《港區國安法》迅速通過令大眾憂慮「一國兩制」下的自由受損。

在過去的報告中,香港市民一直比國際社會對「一國兩制」有更高期望,評分亦因而較嚴格。所以,指數(B):國際評價的變化相對多樣化和平穩。儘管區議會投票率創新高、公民新聞冒起、國際恐怖主義未算盛行,俱為促進民主參與和個人自由的良好因素,不過香港的法治、結社自由和言論自由卻被視為越趨負面。國際智庫在整合全球評分時,數據一般滯後,鑑於香港近期的社會狀況,國際社會的評價很可能進一步下降。

Overwhelming support for the continuation of 1C2S

Despite the fall of the Index, overall support for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 remains overwhelmingly high at 77.2%. Even with the social turbulence, support across all groups with different political inclinations still maintained over 75%, including the resistance camp, who is known to be highly critical of 1C2S. Support for other future options is marginal: direct administration under the central government stands at 4.9% and Hong Kong independence at 2.3%. Though the public's current evaluation of 1C2S is quite critical, the majority of them still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

For most people, 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (69.6%) remained the most favourable condition to the continuation of 1C2S. Consistent with one of the core demands of the anti-extradition movement which remain pertinent among the society at large, 'democratising further' (53.3%) continues to surpass 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (51.9%) as the second most important condition.

The conventional political divide over the issue of 'democratizing further' and 'maintaining national security' resumed. This is evidenced by the fact that the former continues to have strong support from democrats and other non-establishment groups, and the rise in support for the latter among both pro-establishment and moderates.

廣泛支持繼續實行「一國兩制 |

雖然社會氣氛緊張,市民對2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度仍然高達77.2%。所有政治派別均高企於約七成半,包括對「一國兩制」常有批評的抗爭派。其他前途選項亦缺乏支持:4.9%支持內地直轄、2.3%支持完全獨立。即使市民對當前「一國兩制」的實施狀況有一定批評,他們依然相信「一國兩制」是適合香港未來的體制。

對大部分市民而言,「維持高度自治」(69.6%) 仍然是有利於繼續實行「一國兩制」的首要選項。「經濟維持繁榮穩定」(51.9%)一度是第二 有利條件,在去年下半年被「政制進一步民主 化」(53.3%)超越,與反修例運動的訴求之一相 符。

各個政治派別認為「政制進一步民主化」及「維持國家安全」的重要性更趨分歧,前者一直獲得民主派及其他非建制派的大多數支持,後者從建制派及溫和派所得的支持開始攀升。

Resurgence of political polarization

Amidst a hopeful trend of a growing population of moderates in 2017 and 2018, the population became more polarized in 2019 and this trend unfortunately continues in 2020. While moderates remained the largest group, this group has embarked on a declining trend with a drop in proportion by 0.9 percentage points (from 50.9% to 50.0%) from December 2019 to June 2020. Non-establishment supporters rose by 4.2 percentage points (from 36.8% to 41.0%) in the same period while pro-establishment supporters also experienced a slight growth of 1.7% since the last round (from 7.3% to 9.0%). Different trajectories displayed by the above groups also signified further polarization, despite a subsiding momentum of the anti-extradition movement. The number of pro-establishment supporters regained and the growth of non-establishment supporters continued steadily, while moderates continued to decline.

Radicalism re-emerged among youths (aged 18 to 29), as their political inclination tends to be particularly sensitive to social events and fluctuates in a timely manner. Since non-establishment supporters overtook moderates to become the majority in late 2019, they continued to grow by 7.5 percentage points (from 55.3% to 62.8%) in the latest round while moderates steadily decreased by 2.4 percentage points (from 38.2% to 35.8%). Moderates do not only cease to be the majority, their size even falls behind that of other non-establishment supporters, accounting for 37.9%, which also overruns democrats who claimed only 24.9% of youths support. This is the first time yet that other non-establishment supporters, mainly the resistance camp, become the majority among youths. Such degree of radicalisation among 18-29 age group is a serious concern.

Up till the end of 2018, there had been encouraging signs of de-radicalization of youths, where population of moderates were high and rising. This trend, however, reversed abruptly from 2019 onwards as the proportion of non-establishment witnessed rise. Within the supporters а steep non-establishment cohort, the resistance subgroup surpasses democrats by a large margin. This presents a more pressing situation than 2017 when the traditional and radical wings were of almost equal share. This is an alarming observation.

政治兩極化復甦

溫和政治於2017至2018年興起,2019年開始社會 再趨撕裂,並延續至2020年。雖然溫和派仍佔大 多數,其跌勢未止,從2019年12月至2020年6月 再下降0.9個百分點(由50.9%跌至50.0%)。 2019年間已增長一倍的非建制派支持者,在同期 再上升4.2個百分點(由36.8%升至41.0%),而建 制派支持者亦微升1.7%(由7.3%升至9.0%)。社 會運動雖然有所休整,但是市民的政治傾向持續 兩極化:一方面建制派重拾部分支持者,另一方 面非建制派的增長趨平,只有溫和派繼續下跌。

青年(18-29歲)的政治傾向轉變迅速,激進主義 再次抬頭。非建制派自去年超越溫和派後,繼續 增長7.5個百分點(由55.3%升至62.8%),溫和派 則遞減2.4個百分點(由38.2%跌至35.8%)。非建 制派組別中,自稱為民主派的年輕支持者流失至 24.9%,以抗爭派為主的其他非建制派躍升至 37.9%,首次成為青年群組的主流,情況值得正 視。

截至2018年底,青年溫和派不但高企,還慢慢攀升,呈現令人鼓舞的去激進化跡象。但此趨勢由2019年起急速扭轉,令溫和派屈居於急速增長的非建制派之後。更甚者,青年抗爭派已經超越民主派,而且差距進一步拉遠。非建制派中,傳統與激進兩翼的勢力在2017年尚算均等,現在的情況更令人擔憂。

Divergence of citizens' identity as 'Hong-kongers' and 'Chinese'

Citizens' self-identification as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' started to diverge after a period of parallel increase. From October 2019 to June 2020, the public's self-identification as 'Hongkongers' rose from 8.41 to 8.55. In the same period, that as 'Chinese' dropped from 4.72 to 4.38 with statistical significance.

Most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese'. This has gradually changed since June 2019. While over half of the public acknowledged dual identity in earlier surveys, this had dropped to 32.5% and was overwhelmingly surpassed by citizens identifying themselves strongly as 'Hongkongers only' (69.7%) in June 2020.

As a result of the declining dual identity, the correlation between the two stated identities became less apparent. The two identities used to mutually reinforce each other. Now, there are only signs of polarization. The negative correlation becomes statistically significant in this round. A stronger identification as 'Hongkonger' now accompanies a weaker one as 'Chinese', and vice versa. The loss of the mutuality of the two identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' risks challenging the implementation of 1C2S in the near future.

香港人與中國人身分認同背馳

過去一段時間,市民對「香港人」和「中國人」 兩種身分認同同步增強,最近的調查則顯示兩者 開始分歧。2019年10月至2020年6月期間,大眾 對「香港人」的認同感由8.41分上升至8.55分。同 期,對「中國人」的認同感則由4.72分下跌至4.38 分,達統計上顯著水平。

香港市民普遍擁有「香港人」和「中國人」雙重身分認同,情況自2019年6月起逐步轉變。過往調查中,擁有雙重身分認同的市民由超過一半,下降至2020年6月的32.5%,跌低於對「香港人」有較強認同感的市民(69.7%)。

隨著雙重身分認同大不如前,這兩種身分的相關 性亦變得模糊,由過去的相輔相成,變為現在的 背馳傾向。最新的相關等級係數仍為負值,達統 計上顯著水平,說明「香港人」身分認同越強, 「中國人」身分認同則越弱,反之亦然。「香港 人」和「中國人」兩種身分認同的共存空間消 失,將會是短期內實踐「一國兩制」的一大挑 戰。

Implications

The decline in most indicators in our latest report suggested that the dual crises as well as the aftermath of the anti-extradition bill have taken a toll on the public's confidence in the future of 1C2S and Hong Kong. However, we also found that the majority of Hong Kong public supported the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. It is difficult to reconcile the fact that despite what appeared to be a marked decline in confidence of the 1C2S, people of Hong Kong still overwhelmingly indicated they were in favour of the continuation of the same beyond 2047. A possible explanation is that while the immediate perception is bad, the longer view of 1C2S still holds good.

The continued polarization sent an alarming sign. Non-establishment supporters became increasingly alienated from the majority. Along with their weak identification as 'Chinese', there are high and rising emigration ratios and diminishing enthusiasm for national development. Their priorities for the continuation of 1C2S also diverged from those of the majority. Particularly worrying was that non-establishment supporters appeared to be concentrated in the branch known to harbour increasingly radical views on the socio-economic-political future of Hong Kong and are deeply critical of 1C2S, the central and HKSAR governments.

While assertive responses from Beijing may introduce a stabilizing element to the 1C2S model in the long-run, the younger generation is beginning to accept radical means to achieve political goals. The 18-29 age group displayed an overall eagerness in the idea of mutual destruction ('laam chau' 「攬抄」) and embraced the LegCo gridlock brought by the delay in house chairman election. It may be unfair to say that their criticisms of 1C2S arose solely out of misunderstanding. It is rather more appropriate to view their disillusionment and re-radicalization as a result of prolonged negligence of the deep-rooted problems in the implementation of 1C2S. Both the central and HKSAR governments need to tackle and resolve these issues with patience and care.

啟示

本報告中多項指標下滑,反映新冠肺炎及《港區國安法》的雙重危機,再加上修例餘波,重創香港及「一國兩制」未來的信心。儘管對「一國兩制」信心驟降,我們同時發現香港市民更廣泛地支持於2047年後延續「一國兩制」。兩種取態看似不容易調和,可能說明市民對「一國兩制」的即時印象轉差,但是長遠評價仍然不俗。

社會再趨兩極化,為香港響起一大警號。非建制派的「中國人」身分認同轉弱,移民比例攀升, 冷待國家發展,對繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利 條件與普羅大眾日漸疏遠。更多非建制派支持者 轉投激進陣營,他們對「一國兩制」、中央政府 和特區政府深感不滿,或會對香港的未來發展造 成令人擔憂的後果。


北京用強硬措施處理香港問題,長遠可能為「一國兩制」發展注入穩定因素,不過年輕一代卻愈來愈接受運用激進手法去實現政治目標,普遍認同「攬抄」意識及立法會停擺。過去一年社會震盪並未停止,難以再相信市民的不滿情緒與再激進化乃憑空而來,或是將他們對「一國兩制」的批評完全歸咎於對政局的誤解。實踐「一國兩制」的過程中,存在長期未能解決的深層次矛盾,中央政府及特區政府必須付出耐心及與努力去解決及緩和。




「一國兩制」概覽 1C2S at a Glance



1C2S Index 「一國兩制」指數	1C2S Mass Media Index 「一國兩制」與情指數	Moderates 溫和派	Continuation of T2S 延續「一國兩制」	Dual Identity 雙重身分認同
5.58 (↓ 2.2%)	65.5 (↓ 1.7%)	50.0% (↓ 0.9%)	77.2% (↑ 3.7%)	32.5% (↓ 3.7%)
2020.6	2020.7	2020.6	2020.6	2020.6



Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務	Independent judiciary 獨立司法權	Independent legislature 獨立立法權	Economic Freedom 經濟自由
3.40	4.16	3.71	8.80
(↓2.6%)	(↓ 2.6%)	(↓1.1%)	(↓1.2%)
Original ways of life 原有生活方式	Freedom of speech 言論自由	Democratisation 民主政制發展	Personal Freedom 個人自由
4.39	4.04	3.08	8.47
(↓3.5%)	(↓7.3%)	(↓ 4.0%)	(↓ 2.4%)
'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' and 'high degree of autonomy' principles 「港人治港、高度自治」原則	Full implementation of 1C2S 全面落實 「一國兩制」	Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾	Democracy Index 民主指數
2.82	2.37	2.53	6.02
(↓ 5.7%)	(↓ 6.3%)	(↓3.8%)	(↓ 2.1%)



1 ^{簡介} Introduction

This is the sixth edition of our 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) Index report. The purpose of the 1C2S Index is to provide an objective assessment on the implementation of 1C2S. Our first Report was released in mid-2017, on the 20th anniversary of the return of Hong Kong to China. We update the 1C2S Index every six months, at mid-year and year end.

香港回歸20週年之際,民主思路於2017年中首次發布「一國兩制」指數,旨在為香港實踐「一國兩制」作客觀評價。指數於年中與年底,每半年更新,這是第六版報告。

Every half year, we update the 1C2S Index through updating Index (A): Public Opinion and Index (B): International Perception respectively with a new public survey and with the latest data from international indices. To complement our Index, we also introduced a new index: 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) that uses big-data techniques to measure the sentiment of Hong Kong newspapers since 1998.

我們每半年進行電話調查及收集國際指數的最新數據,更新指數(A):民意調查及指數(B): 國際評價,從而更新「一國兩制」指數。我們還推出嶄新的「一國兩制」與情指數,檢視從1998年起香港報章對「一國兩制」的情緒,利用大數據技術去補充指數之不足。

We commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct telephone poll between 9th to 29th June, 2020 to compile Index (A). On the other hand, some indicators of Index (B) can only be updated to 2019 because international indices are released with a considerable time lag. MMI was updated to the end of July 2020.

本報告委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查,反映2020年6月9至29日的狀況而編製指數(A)。由於各項國際指數整合數據存有時差,指數(B)的部分指標只能更新至2019年,而「一國兩制」與情指數則更新至2020年7月底。

In our surveys, we also included other topical issues related to 1C2S, such as the continuation of 1C2S after 2047, citizen's identity, attitude towards emigration and public opinions on the Greater Bay Area. In view of the introduction of the Hong Kong National Security Law, we change one of the favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S from 'completing the legislation of Article 23' to 'maintaining national security' accordingly.

電話調查也一併探討其他關乎「一國兩制」的重要議題,包括2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」、市民的身分認同、移民海外與及粵港澳大灣區發展。鑒於《港區國安法》實施,本報告把2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的其中一項有利條件,由原本的「完成第23條立法」改為「維護國家安全」。

It should be stressed that Index (A), Index (B) and MMI are determined by perception and may or may not reflect the reality. Even so, changes in perceptions of 1C2S of the Hong Kong public, of international think tanks, and of the Hong Kong press are nevertheless important. We will analyse the reasons for the changes in these perceptions as they are crucial for the implementation of 1C2S.

指數 (A) 、指數 (B) 及輿情指數的評分取決於 觀感,可能不完全反映現實。儘管如此,香港市 民、國際智庫和本地媒體的觀感變化對實施「一 國兩制」仍然至關重大,所以我們也會分析其背 後的變化原因。

In our report, all scores are in a scale of 0-10. An asterisk ('*') indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant. If there is no mentioning of statistical significance about a score, it means that the change concerned is statistically insignificant.

本報告的所有評分尺度為0至10分。如不同輪次調查之間的評分差異達統計上顯著水平,將會以星號(「*」)註明。未有註明者,則代表評分差異在統計上並不顯著。

2 「一國兩制」指數 1C2S Index

The 1C2S Index is the average of Index (A): Public Opinion, the evaluation of the Hong Kong public on different dimensions of 1C2S, and Index (B): International Perception, the evaluation of international think tanks on various aspects of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

Figure 1 shows the scores of the 1C2S Index since its inception. The latest reading is 5.58 in June 2020. Compared to last round in December 2019, the index fell by 2.2%. The 1C2S Index increased by a very moderate 0.01 from its lowest, 5.57, recorded in October 2019. Changes in Indices (A) and (B) will be detailed in the following sub-sections.

Due to the increasing scepticism towards 1C2S and time lag in data availability, the 2020 estimated score of Index (B) is likely to be upwardly biased. This implies the decline in the 1C2S Index is likely to be understated. In this respect, decision makers in Hong Kong should take careful note of the declining trend and its ramifications.

「一國兩制」指數為指數(A):民意調查及指數(B):國際評價的平均值。前者為香港市民對「一國兩制」不同範疇的評分,後者為國際智庫對香港自由民主水平的評分。編製方法詳見附件 I。

圖 1 顯示「一國兩制」指數自編製迄今的變化。 2020 年 6 月的最新讀數為 5.58 分,自 2019 年 12 月下跌 2.2%。指數較 2019 年 10 月的最低位 5.57 分稍微高 0.01 分。指數(A)及指數(B)的變化將於以下章節詳細解釋。

鑑於國際社會對「一國兩制」的疑慮未見好轉, 以及整合全球評分的數據滯後,2020 年指數 (B)的估算分數可能偏高,是以可能低估了「一 國兩制」指數的跌幅。此跌勢及其影響值得決策 者關注。



Note: Dotted line indicates a revision in indicators

註:虛線為指標經過修訂

Changes Scores 評分 變化 ■ 1C2S Index 5.58 $-0.13 (\downarrow 2.2\%)$ 「一國兩制」指數 ■ Index (A): Public Opinion 3.39 $-0.14 (\downarrow 4.1\%)$ 指數(A):民意調查 ■ Index (B): International Perception 7.76 -0.11 (| 1.4%) 指數 (B) : 國際評價

2.1. Index (A): Public Opinion

Table 1 shows that after a slight rebound from the lowest of 3.26 to 3.53 in December 2019, the trend of recovery of Index (A) reversed and the latest score recorded in June 2020 is 3.39. The decline in Index (A) was statistically significant.

While all nine dimensions also experienced decline in the past six months, only one of these drops was statistically significant, namely, the mean score given to 'freedom of speech' (-7.3%). Nonetheless, this dimension also recorded one of the biggest percentage drop since last round, together with "full implementation of 1C2S" (-6.3%) and "Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong" and "high degree of autonomy' principles" (-5.7%).

Overall, as in previous rounds since the outbreak of the anti-extradition movement, no items score higher than the median of 5. The three dimensions scoring relatively higher at over 4 are: 'independent judiciary' (4.16), 'original ways of life' (4.39) and 'freedom of speech' (4.04). Whereas those scoring the lowest include: "Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong" and "high degree of autonomy" (2.82), 'full implementation of 1C2S' (2.37) and 'resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation' (2.53).

In past surveys, item ratings typically varied within a relatively narrow band which was most plausibly due to a 'holistic rating' that the general public held on 1C2S. For instance, the range recorded in June 2020 oscillates between 2 plus and 4 plus. Normally, the narrow range implies that regardless of the specific item surveyed, their answers would be shaped by an overall impression, rendering the range in relation to their answers for each specific item relatively small.

2.1. 指數(A): 民意調查

表 1 顯示指數 (A) 自 2019 年 10 月的最低位 3.26 分回升至 2019 年 12 月的 3.53 分後,復甦跡 象並未持續,2020 年 6 月的指數 (A) 下跌至 3.39 分。下跌達統計上顯著水平。

2020 年首半年,九個範疇全數下跌,其中之一達統計上顯著水平,即「言論自由」(-7.3%)。此範疇亦錄得最大百分比跌幅,其餘跌幅較大的範疇為「全面落實『一國兩制』」(-6.3%)及「『港人治港、高度自治』原則」(-5.7%)。

反修例運動爆發後,沒有範疇得分高於中位數5分。本輪評分最高的為「獨立司法權」(4.16)、「原有生活方式」(4.39)及「言論自由」(4.04)。本輪評分最低的則為「『港人治港、高度自治』原則」(2.82),「全面落實『一國兩制』」(2.37)及「對話協商解決矛盾」(2.53)。

各範疇評分高低差別不大,相信市民心中對「一國兩制」有一個概括評分。與上輪結果相約,最新一輪評分在 2 分多至 4 分多之間。一般而言,評分差距不大代表無論詢問甚麼項目,市民的答案也受到心中的概括評分影響,因此對各細項的評分不會過於偏離整體上的概括評分。

Table 1: Index (A): Public Opinion 表 1: 指數 (A) : 民意調查

	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12	2020.6	
Average 平均分	4.58	3.98	3.26	3.53	3.39	*
Original ways of life 原有生活方式	5.79	5.34	4.28	4.55	4.39	
Independent judiciary 獨立司法權	5.13	4.52	3.93	4.27	4.16	\
Freedom of speech 言論自由	5.27	4.8	4.04	4.36	4.04	*
Independent legislature 獨立立法權	4.81	4.21	3.34	3.75	3.71	
Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務	4.59	3.98	3.31	3.49	3.40	
Democratisation 民主政制發展	4.12	3.61	2.90	3.21	3.08	
'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' and 'high degree of autonomy' principles 「港人治港、高度自治」原則	4.09	3.48	2.78	2.99	2.82	
Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾	3.72	2.9	2.46	2.63	2.53	
Full implementation of 1C2S 全面落實 「一國兩制」	3.68	2.95	2.30	2.53	2.37	

2.1.1. Generation gap and political divide

Figure 2 shows Index (A) by age in the past surveys. In June 2020, almost all age groups witnessed drops in their average scores since December 2019, after a collective rebound from their lowest in October 2019. 30-39 age group is an outlier to this trend as the only age group with mean score recovering to pre-extradition level.

The generation gap in the evaluation of 1C2S is obvious. The average scores of younger age groups were lower than those of older age groups at a statistically significant level. Though mean scores are generally low since the outbreak of the social movement in June 2019, residing below the median of 5, that produced by 18-29 age group is markedly lower at 2.45. Those aged over 70 years, which always produced the highest score, dropped further from 4.82 in December 2019 to 4.22 in June 2020.

2.1.1. 代溝及政治鴻溝

圖 2 顯示過去調查中,各個年齡組別在指數 (A) 的評分。自 2019 年 10 月一致地從最低位回升, 幾乎所有年齡組別均於過去半年錄得下降。只有 30-39 歲組別錄得升幅,並回復至反修例運動前水 平。

從這些數字可見市民對「一國兩制」評價的代溝顯而易見。年輕一代的評分普遍低於較年長的組別,差別亦達統計學上顯著水平。雖然社會運動後各年齡組別皆跌穿5分的中位數,18-29歲組別的分數比其他組別明顯地低,最新平均分為2.45分。70歲或以上的長者一如既往評分最高,儘管平均分由2019年12月的4.82分跌至2020年6月的4.22分。


Figure 3 shows Index (A) by political inclination in the past surveys. While the evaluation score of moderates was embarking on a trend of modest recovery, from 4.25 in December 2019 to 4.32 in June 2020, the pro-establishment against non-establishment political divide is big and widening. The high score of pro-establishment supporters remained significantly higher than other groups, as evident in the 2.2% rise from 7.62 in December 2019 to 7.79 in June 2020. On the other hand, the low score of non-establishment supporters fell even lower, the score 1.53 is 19% lower than that recorded in December 2019.

圖 3 顯示過去調查中,不同政治傾向在指數(A)的評分。溫和派呈現復甦跡象,評分由 2019 年 12 月的 4.25 分微升至 2020 年 6 月的 4.32 分。而建制派與非建制派之間的政治鴻溝巨大,且正在加深。建制派的高評分顯著比其他組別高,由 2019 年 12 月的 7.62 分回升至 2020 年 6 月的 7.79 分,升幅為 2.2%。非建制派的低評分下降得更快,本輪的 1.53 分比 2019 年 12 月減少 19%。

Statistical tests revealed that there was obvious and consistent discrepancy in evaluation scores across all political inclinations. In comparison with moderates, the evaluations of pro-establishment supporters were significantly higher. Evaluations of non-establishment supporters were significantly lower. From December 2018 onwards, differences between the democrats and other non-establishment supporters began to converge at below 2. The trend of polarisation is evident. This is a serious issue which the HKSAR government must take note.


經統計檢測,不同政治傾向的評價存在既明顯又一貫的差異。建制派評分比溫和派顯著較高,而非建制派評分則比溫和派顯著較低。自 2018 年 12 月,民主派與其他非建制派的評分逐漸趨同,維持低於 2 分水平。兩極化趨勢明顯,是特區政府必須有所警覺的嚴重問題。

Figure 2: Index (A): Public Opinion (by age) 圖 2:指數(A):民意調查(按年齡組別劃分)



Scores 評分	Changes 變化						
2.45	-0.29	(\ 12.0%)					
3.15	+0.39	(↑ 12.4%)					
3.50	-0.07	(↓ 2.0%)					
3.44	-0.15	(\ 4.3%)					
3.68	-0.46	(\ 12.4%)					
4.22	-0.60	(\ 14.3%)					
3.39	-0.14	(↓ 4.1%)					

Figure 3: Index (A): Public Opinion (by political inclination) 圖 3:指數(A):民意調查(按政治傾向劃分)



2.2. Index (B): International Perception

We obtain scores on Hong Kong's freedom and democracy from international think tanks to compile Index (B). These scores are derived from Cato-Fraser Institutes' Human Freedom Index, which comprises the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index, and the Economic Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index. The scores and ranks of Hong Kong since 2010 are shown in Table 2.

As international studies cover a very large number of countries, they do not always reflect the latest conditions. We will update the indices with data from comparable international indicators whenever possible. The method of updating is detailed in Appendix I.

Hong Kong has always ranked number one in Economic Freedom Index, with a score of around 9, the drop from its peak at 8.94 in 2010 to the estimated 8.91 in 2019 was only 0.3%. Although this is likely upwardly 'biased' as the credit rating of Hong Kong have been downgraded twice by two institutions (Moody's and Fitch) in the span of just four months, both indicated a 'stable' outlook for HK, suggesting certain degree of economic resilience.

Hong Kong's score in Personal Freedom Index peaked at 9.07 in 2011, dropped to an estimated score of 8.47 in 2020. Given the adverse publicity in the international media on recent political events in Hong Kong, the decline of 6.6% from its peak is not surprising. Nonetheless, Hong Kong's 2019 score of 8.47 is still relatively high.

2.2. 指數(B): 國際評價

我們從國際智庫對香港自由民主水平的評分編製指數(B)。評分取自「經濟自由指數」、「個人自由指數」及「民主指數」三項指數。首兩項指數由卡托研究所及菲沙研究所編製,第三項指數則由經濟學人智庫編製。「經濟自由指數」和「個人自由指數」的平均分被稱為「人類自由指數」。表2顯示香港由2010年起的分數和排名。

由於國際調查覆蓋大量國家,數據不一定反映最新情況,我們將按其他相應的國際指數估算香港最新的評分。更新方法詳見附錄I。

香港在「經濟自由指數」長期名列世界第一,評分約為9分。即使自2010年最高的8.94分下滑至2020年估算的8.91分,跌幅亦只有0.3%。雖然香港於短短四個月兩度被不同國際機構降低信用評級(穆迪及惠譽),他們對香港的展望仍為「平穩」,充分顯示香港經濟體系的防禦力。

香港的「個人自由指數」評分最高為2011年的 9.07分,回落至2019年估算的8.47分。鑒於國際 社會對香港近期的政治事件反應負面,由最高位 下跌6.6%並不令人意外。儘管如此,2019年的 8.47分仍然不俗。 The Democracy Index rose from 5.92 in 2010 to a peak of 6.50 in 2015, rising by 9.8%, reflecting that Hong Kong has made some progress in democratisation vis-à-vis the increase of directly elected seats in the legislature. However, Hong Kong's score fell to 6.02 in 2019, falling by 7.4% from the peak in 2015, reflecting a democratic regression originated from 'pre-existing deficiencies' in Hong Kong's political stability. It should be noted that Hong Kong's 2020 score and rank are still better than that in 2010

香港的「民主指數」由2010年的5.92分上升至2015年6.50分的頂點,升幅為9.8%,反映立法會增加直選議席令民主化取得一定進展。不過,2019年的評分由2015年的高峰下降7.4%至6.02分,反映政治穩定存在「既有缺憾」,導致民主倒退。無論如何,2019年香港所得的評分和排名仍勝過2010年。

Index (B) rose from 7.99 in 2010 to a peak of 8.14 in 2012, rising by 1.9%, largely as a result of the rise in Hong Kong's Democracy Index. Since then, it has embarked on a declining trend. The latest reading came in at 7.76, representing a drop of 4.6% from the peak.

指數 (B) 由2010年的7.99分上升至2012年8.14分的頂點,升幅為1.9%,主要緣於香港的「民主指數」上升。其後持續下跌,最新評分下降至7.76分,自高峰下跌4.6%。

Table 2: Index (B): International Perception

表 2:指數(B):國際評價

		Human Freedom Index 「人類自由指數」		Democracy Index	Aggregate
	Economic Freedom 「經濟自由」	Personal Freedom 「個人自由」	Sub-aggregate 分數	「民主指數 」	總分
2010	8.94 (1)	9.11 (12)	9.02 (1)	5.92 (80)	7.99
2011	8.90 (1)	9.14 (14)	9.02 (1)	5.92 (80)	7.99
2012	8.88 (1)	9.11 (13)	8.99 (1)	6.42 (63)	8.14
2013	8.88 (1)	8.99 (18)	8.94 (1)	6.42 (65)	8.10
2014	8.92 (1)	8.82 (27)	8.87 (2)	6.46 (66)	8.07
2015	8.88 (1)	8.75 (28)	8.82 (2)	6.50 (67)	8.04
2016	8.89 (1)	8.59 (32)	8.74 (3)	6.42 (68)	7.97
2017	8.91 (1)	8.70 (27)	8.81 (3)	6.31 (71)	7.97
2018	8.91 ^	8.68^	8.80	6.15 (73)	7.91
2019	8.80^	8.47^	8.64	6.02 (75)	7.76

Note: ' $^{\prime}$ ' denotes updates based on comparable indicators

註:「^」為更新自相應的國際指標

2.2.1. Components of Personal Freedom Index

Table 3 shows Hong Kong's scores and ranks in the seven components of the Personal Freedom Index from 2010 to 2019. During this period, the score of 'security & safety' has dropped by 0.04 as HK fell to the second place in the category while the score of 'movement' has been constant at 10. Five components have exhibited substantial decline in scores and ranks since 2013, namely, 'rule of law', 'religion', 'association & assembly', 'expression & information', and 'identity & relationships'. Since last round, 'expression & information' dropped further from 8.49 to 8.39. The declines show that the international community have relatively serious concerns on personal freedoms in Hong Kong.

2.2.1. 「個人自由指數 | 的子項目

表3顯示從2010年至2019年,香港在「個人自由指數」七個子項目上的分數和排名。期間,「安全」評分下跌0.04分,屈居世界第二,「遷徙自由」評分則保持10分。五個子項目的分數及排名自2013年起持續下跌,包括「法治」、「宗教自由」、「結社、集會及公民社會自由」、「言論自由」及「性別認同及關係」。最新一輪「言論自由」8.49分再跌至8.39分。跌幅顯示國際社會對香港的個人自由有所顧慮。

Table 3: Personal Freedom Index

表 3: 「個人自由指數」

Year 年份	Rule of Law 法治	Security & Safety 安全	Movement 遷徙自由	Religion 宗教自由	Association, Assembly & Civil Society 結社、集會及 公民社會自由	Expression& Information 言論自由	Identity & Relationships 性別認同及關係	Aggregate 總分
2010	7.50 (17)	9.93 (3)	10.00 (1)	9.02 (35)	9.42 (25)	9.05 (42)	10.00 (1)	9.11 (12)
2011	7.50 (17)	9.97 (1)	10.00 (1)	8.92 (30)	9.75 (24)	9.01 (41)	10.00 (1)	9.14 (14)
2012	7.39 (19)	9.95 (4)	10.00 (1)	9.04 (24)	9.75 (24)	8.94 (45)	10.00 (1)	9.11 (13)
2013	7.39 (19)	9.47 (39)	10.00 (1)	9.19 (19)	9.75 (24)	8.86 (48)	10.00 (1)	8.99 (18)
2014	7.80 (14)	9.53 (35)	10.00 (1)	8.13 (80)	8.00 (62)	8.74 (52)	10.00 (1)	8.82 (27)
2015	7.79 (16)	9.54 (34)	10.00 (1)	8.43 (68)	8.00 (62)	8.77 (48)	9.00 (36)	8.75 (28)
2016	7.14 (23)	9.53 (34)	10.00 (1)	8.59 (40)	8.00 (62)	8.67 (51)	9.00 (37)	8.59 (32)
2017	7.14 (23)	9.96 (2)	10.00 (1)	8.59 (40)	8.00 (62)	8.67 (50)	9.00 (30)	8.70 (27)
2018	7.08^	10.00 ^	10.00^	8.59^	8.00^	8.49^	9.00^	8.68^
2019	7.08^	10.00 ^	10.00^	8.59^	6.00^	8.39^	9.00^	8.47^

Note: Number in brackets indicates world ranking; '^' indicates updates based on comparable indicators

註:括號為國際排名;「^」為更新自相應的國際指標

2.2.2. Comparison with Hong Kong's neighbours

As Hong Kong is a highly developed region, and given that highly developed regions tend to have comparatively higher scores in freedom and democracy as compared with developing regions – we have selected certain neighbouring developed countries and territories (namely, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) as benchmarks for comparison and assessment of Hong Kong's performance. We have also compared the respective scores of the Mainland and Hong Kong under the indices, for the purpose of identifying whether Hong Kong has become increasingly 'mainlandised' under 1C2S. For brevity, we will refer to Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and the Chinese mainland as 'neighbours'.

Table 4 compares Hong Kong and its neighbours in the various indices of Index (B) in 2020. Hong Kong's score in Economic Freedom was world's number one while its score in Personal Freedom Index was at par with its developed neighbours. Due to Hong Kong's superlative performance in Economic Freedom Index, its score in Human Freedom Index was stronger than the four developed neighbours. However, Hong Kong's Democracy Index was lower than its developed neighbours, except Singapore. Consequently, Hong Kong's Index (B) score was lower than Japan's 8.24, Korea's 8.16, and Taiwan's 8.19, but above Singapore's 7.42. It was much higher than Mainland's 4.87.

Table 5 compares the 2019 Personal Freedom Index of Hong Kong with its neighbours. Hong Kong's scores were in the same league as those of our developed neighbours (Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), and were much higher than those of the Mainland. Hong Kong's aggregate score of 8.47 was much higher than that of Singapore's 7.47 but slightly lower than Japan's 8.77, Korea's 8.83, and Taiwan's 8.93.

In comparison with its four developed neighbours, Hong Kong was relatively strong in 'security & safety' and 'movement', but relatively weak in 'rule of law' and 'association, assembly & civil society'. Hong Kong was more or less at par with others in the remaining four components, namely, 'religion', 'expression & information', and 'identity & relationships'. Hong Kong's relatively low score in 'rule of law' and 'association, assembly & civil society' nevertheless warrants concern.

2.2.2. 比較鄰近地區

一般而言,發達地區的自由與民主指數,均高於發展中的地區。由於香港是高度發展的地區,所以我們選取鄰近的發達國家及地區,包括日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣作比較,藉以評價香港的表現。我們亦比較中國內地與香港的自由民主指數,以觀察在「一國兩制」之下的香港是否趨向「大陸化」。為簡便起見,我們將日本、南韓、新加坡、台灣與中國內地稱為「鄰近地區」。

表 4 比較 2019 年香港和鄰近地區的指數 (B)。香港的經濟自由名列世界第一,個人自由亦媲美鄰近發達地區。香港的經濟自由卓越,使其「人類自由指數」勝過以上四個鄰近發達地區。不過除了新加坡外,香港的「民主指數」則低於它們。整體來說,香港的指數 (B) 評分落後於日本的8.24 分、南韓的8.16 分和台灣的8.19 分,但領先新加坡的7.42 分。香港在各種指數的評分則比中國內地的4.87 分高出不少。

表 5 比較 2019 年香港和鄰近地區的「個人自由指數」。香港評分良好,接近日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣等鄰近發達地區,並大幅拋離內地。香港的總分為 8.47 分,遠遠高於新加坡的 7.47 分,但略低於日本的 8.77 分、南韓的 8.83 分及台灣的 8.93 分。

比較四個鄰近發達地區,香港在「安全」和「遷 徙自由」較優勝,「法治」及「結社、集會及公 民社會自由」則相對遜色。其餘四項,即「宗教 自由」、「言論自由」和「性別認同及關係」, 香港與鄰近發達地區不相伯仲。儘管「法治」及 「結社、集會及公民社會自由」的評分低的情況 亦令人擔憂。

Table 4: Index (B): International Perception of Hong Kong and neighbours (2019)

表 4:香港與鄰近地區之指數(B):國際評價(2019)

		Human Freedom Index 「人類自由指數」		Democracy Index	Aggregate
	Economic Freedom 「經濟自由」			「民主指數 」	總分
Hong Kong香港	8.80	8.47	8.64	6.02 (75)	7.76
Mainland China中國內地	6.61	5.75	6.18	2.26 (153)	4.87
Japan 日本	7.97	8.77	8.37	7.99 (24)	8.24
Korea 韓國	7.61	8.87	8.24	8.00 (23)	8.16
Singapore新加坡	8.77	7.47	8.12	6.02 (75)	7.42
Taiwan台灣	7.90	8.93	8.42	7.73 (31)	8.19

Note: Updates based on comparable indicators

註:更新自相應的國際指標

Table 5: Comparing Personal Freedom Index of Hong Kong and neighbours (2019)

表 5: 比較香港與鄰近地區之「個人自由指數」(2019)

	Rule of Law 法治	Security & Safety 安全	Movement 遷徙自由	Religion 宗教自由	Association, Assembly & Civil Society 結社、集會及 公民社會自由	Expression& Information 言論自由	Identity& Relationships 性別認同 及關係	Aggregate 總分
Hong Kong香港	7.08	10.00	10.00	8.59	6.00	8.39	9.00	8.47
Mainland China中國內地	4.43	9.04	5.00	3.67	1.00	5.16	9.00	5.75
Japan 日本	7.92	10.00	10.00	8.09	7.50	9.12	8.17	8.77
Korea 韓國	7.69	9.74	8.33	9.35	9.50	8.90	9.00	8.87
Singapore新加坡	7.73	9.57	8.33	6.11	3.50	6.13	7.33	7.47
Taiwan台灣	7.01	9.31	10.00	9.36	10.00	9.13	10.00	8.93

Note: Updates based on comparable indicators

註:更新自相應的國際指標

2.3. 1C2S Mass Media Index

Media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion. We attempt to use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S and monitor how 1C2S is conveyed in the mass media to provide a timely barometer of public sentiment. 1C2S MMI is a net sentiment index of newspaper articles over a given time. To dovetail with our main Index, we compile the MMI half yearly. We have mined over 153,000 news articles and around 76 million words from 21 local daily newspapers to compile the MMI (See Appendix I for details). MMI is set at 100 in the base month of July 2017, the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China.

2.3. 「一國兩制」輿情指數

媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素,故此,我們嘗試利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒,藉此透視大眾傳媒對「一國兩制」的感受及意見,編製輿論情緒對「一國兩制」的晴雨表。「一國兩制」輿情指數為一段時間內報紙文章的情緒淨值指數,以半年結為基礎,配合我們的主指數及補充其不足之處。輿情指數從21家本地報章搜集超過153,000篇報導,逾7,600萬字(詳見附錄I)。輿情指數的基數月訂為2017年7月,基數為100,以標誌回歸20周年的情況。

In the longer run, subject to resource availability, MMI opens up many opportunities of further research in public opinion formation. The MMI can be compiled at high frequency intervals (e.g. monthly) as it is not subject to the long time lags of surveys. It is also possible to investigate the effect of specific significance on media sentiment, or to compare sentiments in the local and overseas media.

Newspaper is only part of the media, and the MMI does not cover news reported by traditional electronic media such as television and radio, nor news carried by new media. Measuring the sentiments of news reported by television and radio is very difficult as there is no comprehensive text-based data base available. Measurement of sentiments of new media is also very difficult as it will be very demanding on resources. Furthermore, while widely accepted credibility ratings of different newspapers are available through regular opinion polls, comparable ratings on the credibility of different new media outlets are not available. We thus confine our study to newspaper articles on 1C2S.

It should be noted that many newspapers have also broadcasted their news through online outlets such as websites and mobile apps. In so far as the news articles of these online outlets are the same as their printed versions, the sentiments of these articles are already included in our MMI regardless of whether they are printed or broadcasted online. 1C2S MMI currently only gauges sentiment of an important subset of mass media, namely, printed newspapers, as a general representation of sentiment in mass media.

2.3.1. Recent trend

1C2S encountered one of the most severe challenges in the beginning of 2016 when 1C2S MMI plummeted to 73 points. The 'Causeway Bay Bookstore' incident aroused widespread media attention in January. The civil unrest in Mongkok evolved into a clash between civilians and the police in February. The award of the independent film 'Ten Years' as the best film in Hong Kong Film Awards in April aggravated the negative sentiment in the mass media.

MMI bottomed out and rose strongly when Carrie Lam was elected as Chief Executive. Despite the NPC Standing Committee's interpretation of the Basic Law in response to the oath-taking row in the LegCo in November 2016 and the 'democracy walls' incidents in universities in September 2017, 1C2S MMI still rose to a peak of 105.0 points in March 2018 under the new administration of Carrie Lam. However, an

長遠而言,如資源許可,輿情指數能為民意形成 開拓更多研究機會。輿情指數不受以傳統調查方 式收集民意時所產生的滯後影響,因此能以高頻 率編製(例如每月)。它亦可以調查特定重大事 件對媒體情緒的影響,或比較本地及海外媒體的 情緒。

報紙只是媒體的一部分,與情指數不包括電視、電台等傳統電子媒體報導的新聞,也不包括新媒體所報導的新聞。由於電視和電台沒有全面的文本數據庫,所以要衡量它們的新聞情緒非常困難。衡量新媒體的情緒則對資源有較高要求,所以也非常困難。此外,民意調查定期評估不同報紙的公信力,得到廣泛認可,新媒體的公信力卻沒有相應的評價。故此,我們的研究將會聚焦於與「一國兩制」有關的報紙文章。

值得注意的是,不少報紙也透過網站、手機程式 等網上媒介傳播。這些網上媒介的報導與印刷版 本大多相同,所以無論是印刷或網上版本,其情 緒已經涵括在輿情指數之中。目前,輿情指數只 衡量大眾傳媒的一個重要部分——印刷報紙,以 評估大眾傳媒整體的輿情。

2.3.1. 近期趨勢

「一國兩制」在2016年初面臨最大挑戰,輿情指數接連急跌至73點。「銅鑼灣書店」事件在1月引起傳媒廣泛關注,旺角騷亂在2月演變成警民流血衝突,再加上獨立電影《十年》在4月獲獎,讓「一國兩制」矇上陰霾。

林鄭月娥勝選為行政長官後,輿情指數從谷底反彈。儘管2016年11月全國人大常委會就立法會宣誓風波釋法,2017年9月數所大學的民主牆出現「港獨」標語,及2018年初旺角騷亂案的審訊與判刑,令輿情指數錄得跌幅,不過仍然在2018年3月達至105.0點,是自2009年以來的高峰。

alarming downward spiral started in July 2018 with the storm of controversies on the disbanding of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party and the rejection of visa renewal for Victor Mallet. MMI fell to a lower range around 90 points in the second half of 2018, a decline of about 15% from the peak in March.

Although the promulgation of the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area sparked hopes for future economic growth, Beijing's 1C2S ambition over Taiwan also drew public attention as to whether Hong Kong is a flawed example of the experiment. The anti-extradition movement emerged abruptly and caused the worst governance crisis since the Handover in June 2019 which dragged MMI from 91.6 to 84.5 points in the first half of 2019 before plummeting further to 67.2 as 2019 drew to a close.

Year 2020 began with personnel change in the central government responsible for Hong Kong affairs, involving the upgrade of the central committee on Hong Kong and Macau affairs from 'coordination group' to 'leading group', restructuring of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and new directorship of the Hong Kong Liaison Office. After this massive wave of news coverage pushed MMI upward to 73.0, it showed a minor drop as COVID-19 crisis management aroused debates over cross-border visitor control, followed by sentimental speculations about the impact of National Security Law which dwindled MMI to 66.7 in June 2020.

Based on the latest data from July 2020, MMI showed little sign of improvement and edged down further to 65.5.


2018年7月起一連串政治爭議,令輿情指數拾級而 下。鼓吹「港獨」的香港民族黨被取締及馬凱簽 證續期遭拒,觸發輿情指數跌至2018年下半年的 約90點,相當於自同年3月的頂點下滑15%。

雖然《粵港澳大灣區發展規劃綱要》為未來經濟 發展帶來希望,中央政府提出的「一國兩制」台 灣方案,令群眾思考香港是否一個可取例子。 2019年6月爆發的反修例運動蘊釀回歸後最大的管 治危機,令輿情指數在上半年由91.6點拖低至84.5 點,下半年更急瀉至67.2點的谷底。

2020年始於中央涉港部門的人事變動,包括中央 港澳工作協調小組升格為領導小組、港澳辦改 組、中聯辦任命新主任。連日的傳媒報道一度把 輿情指數推高至73.0點,但於新冠肺炎的封關爭 議中稍微回落,緊接後來對《港區國安法》的各 種揣測,令輿情指數於2020年6月跌至66.7點。

最新的數字未見好轉,輿情指數於2020年7月下跌 至65.5點。

Figure 4: 1C2S MMI (2018-2020)



	Scores 評分	Changes 變化
2018.6	99.2	(
2018.12	91.6	(↓ 7.6%)
2019.6	84.5	(↓ 7.1%)
2019.12	67.2	(↓ 17.4%)
2020.6	66.7	(↓ 0.5%)
2020.7	65.5	(↓ 1.2%)

2.4. Evaluations of 1C2S

1C2S is unprecedented in history. There have always been doubts if Hong Kong can remain a free city as part of a country ruled by a communist party. Problems and difficulties in the implementation of 1C2S are thus to be expected.

23 years after Hong Kong's return to China, despite some declines in scores in selected international indices, Hong Kong stills ranked world's number one in Economic Freedom, and ranked reasonably well in Personal Freedom. According to the 2019 Human Freedom Index, Hong Kong ranked world's number three after New Zealand and Switzerland. It is a fact that Hong Kong is still one of the freest territories in the world.

Though Hong Kong's Index (B): International Perception declined somewhat lately, Hong Kong's 2019 score at 7.76 was still relatively high. We are still in the same league as our developed neighbours: above Singapore, but slightly lower than Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The gaps between Hong Kong and the Mainland in all the above Indices on freedom and democracy remained very big, showing that allegation of 'Mainlandisation' is unfounded

The latest Index (A): Public Opinion was recorded at 3.39. The mean score of the nine items continue to be pessimistic and for the third consecutive rounds, none of the nine items received scores higher than the median of 5. 'Original ways of life', which always obtained the highest score in past surveys fell to just 4.39 and represented the highest score of all dimensions in June 2020. Some other items that usually scored less favourably in previous rounds of survey witnessed an even sharper decline, conditions such as 'the successful implementation of the "Self-Governance, High Autonomy" principles', 'full implementation of 1C2S' as well as 'resolving differences via dialogue and negotiations' continue to score below 3.

In comparison to the evaluations of international think tanks, the evaluations of the Hong Kong public are less positive. Though the moderate decline in 'expression & information' appear to align with Hongkongers and the international community's concern of the socio-political future of Hong Kong, it should be acknowledged that the public is more demanding in their assessments due to their high expectations of 1C2S. Hong Kong's people's starting point is

2.4. 「一國兩制」的評價

「一國兩制」是史無前例的嘗試,輿論不斷懷疑 香港是否能夠在共產黨領導的國家之內維持自 由,「一國兩制」的實踐出現困難與挑戰實屬意 料中事。

回歸23年,儘管部分國際指標錄得下降,香港的經濟自由排名保持世界第一,個人自由排名仍然亮麗。跟據《2019人類自由指數》,香港排名全球第三,僅次於新西蘭和瑞士。香港仍然是全球最自由的地區之一。

雖然近年香港的指數(B):國際評價下跌,2019年的7.76分仍然不俗。與鄰近香港的發達地區不相伯仲:高於新加坡,但稍低於日本,南韓和台灣。評分比中國內地高出甚多,印證香港被「大陸化」的說法缺乏根據。

最新的指數(A):民意調查錄得3.39分。自2017年中起,九個範疇全數不超過5分,其中評分一直最高的「原有生活方式」跌至4.39分,亦是2020年6月調查中的最高分數。其他評分一般較低的範疇,如「成功落實『港人治港、高度自治』」、「全面落實『一國兩制』」和「透過對話協商解決矛盾」更少於3分。

國際智庫對香港的評分相對較高,而香港市民所給予的評分相對較低,是由於兩者的評價準則有所不同。國際智庫的評分涵蓋大量發展中國家及地區,而香港已屬發達地區之列,所以得分會處於較高的區間。另外,市民心目中對「一國兩制」有較高期望,所以給予較嚴格的評分。

a system with a sophisticated legal system that enshrines both rule of law and personal freedoms, and gradual democratisation that had already been in progress prior to the return to China. These in turn induced greater expectations amongst the public with respect to the high degree of autonomy and human rights enshrined by the Basic Law.

香港在回歸前已有成熟的法治基礎和高度人身自由,政制亦逐步民主化,所以市民對基本法承諾的高度自治和保障人權及自由有更高期望。

Changes in scores in the indices are likely to be affected by significant political events and other landmark events that occurred since December 2019. Listed below are the major events that occurred since the last report from January to June 2020. The major events that occurred in previous reports from mid-2017 to late 2019 are listed in Appendix II.

2020年上半年發生不少政治爭議和重大事件,與「一國兩制」指數的變化有一定關係,上一版報告涵蓋至2019年12月,其後發生的重大事件臚列如下。早輪調查期間的重大事件詳見附錄II。

Table 6: Significant events (2020 H1) 表 6: 重大事件一覽 (2020 H1)

2 13

The State Council restructured the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and appointed Xia Baolong as the new director and the directors of Liaison Offices in Hong Kong and Macau as deputy directors.

2 1-7

In fighting the COVID-19 crisis, staff of the Hospital Authority went on a five-day strike in the attempt to push for complete closure of border with mainland. HKSAR implemented border closure to some borders and ordered all arrivals to observe fortnight-long quarantine order.

2.28 & 4.18

A group of pan-democrat leaders, including Martin Lee, Jimmy Lai, Margret Ng, Lee Cheuk-yan and Yeung Sum, were charged with participation in unauthorized assembly in relation to the anti-extradition bill movement.

3.18

US-China media row deepened after five Chinese media agents in the US were declared propaganda outlets and the opinion piece titled "China is the real sick man of Asia" was published by the Wall Street Journal in February. China expelled US journalists in retaliation and barred them from journalism in Hong Kong and Macau. Four more Chinese media entities were designated as foreign missions by the US in June.

4.9

Countering High Court's ruling last year of the unconstitutionality of anti-mask ban, the Court of Appeal ruled that the ban was constitutional at unlawful gatherings.

4.13, 4.17 & 4.21

The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the Liaison Office in Hong Kong issued statements condemning LegCo member Dennis Kwok for preventing the House Committee from electing a chairman for more than six months. The pro-democracy camp challenged that the two Offices were violating Article 22 of the Basic Law by intervening the internal operation of LegCo. In the subsequent statements, they positioned that they were bodies authorised by the central government to handle Hong Kong affairs, leading to further controversy over the applicability of the Article. The filibustering ended in May with the appointment of election host by the LegCo president after seeking external legal advice.

2 13

國務院重組港澳辦並委任夏寶龍為主任,香港及澳門中聯辦主任同列為副主任。

2.1-7

新型冠狀病毒擴散,醫管局員工發動五天罷工,要求政府 全面封關。政府宣布關閉部分口岸,並要求所有入境人士 強制隔離14天。

2.28 & 4.18

多名民主派人士,包括李柱銘、黎智英,吳靄儀、李卓人 及楊森,被控參與反修例運動的「未經批准集結」。

3.18

自2月初《華爾街日報》發表〈China is the real sick man of Asia〉文章及美國將五家中國新聞機構列為官方宣傳媒體後,中美媒體關係繼續緊張。中國驅逐數名駐華美籍記者,並禁止在港澳境內採訪。6月,美國再列四家中國媒體為外交使團。

4.9

上訴庭推翻高等法院去年的判決,裁定政府引用《緊急法》訂立《禁蒙面法》合憲,並適用於非法集會中。

4.13, 4.17 & 4.21

港澳辦及中聯辦發表聲明,譴責郭榮鏗拖延立法會內務委員會主席選舉六個月。民主派質疑兩辦干預立法會運作,違反《基本法》第22條。兩辦表示它們是中央授權專責處理香港事務的機構,引起該法的適用性爭議。尋求外間法律意見後,立法會主席指派另一名議員主持選舉,拉布於5月結束。

4.20

Fitch downed the investment grade of HK twice within the past 7 months to AA-, the HKSAR government expressed disappointment at Fitch's exaggeration of the ongoing political issues in its rating.

4.27 & 5.25

In response to the controversial district court verdict that expressing sympathy with a knifeman who was jailed over triple stabbing, Chief Justice Geoffrey Ma warned that judges should refrain from unnecessary political views to maintain the public's confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.

5.14

The People's Bank of China, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Foreign Exchange Administration of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange promulgated "Opinions on Financial Support to the Development of Guangdong-HK-Macau Greater Bay Area" promoting financial cooperation, openness and innovation in the area.

5.15-22

An HKDSE history question on Sino-Japanese relations in a period including Japnese invasion of China in World War II was criticized to have provided 'biased' sources that were overwhelmingly positive of Japan. The question was subsequently withdrew. Xinhua News Agency stated that Hong Kong should establishment a new education system in accordance to 1C2S.

5.28

The Commerce and Economic Development Bureau announced the establishment of a task force to review the governance and management of RTHK, inviting concerns over political censorship after suspected police insult in an episode of 'Headliner' and infringement of the one-China principle in 'The Pulse'.

5.28

The US State Secretary, Mike Pompeo, submitted the 2020 Hong Kong Policy Act Report to Congress, certifying that HK no longer warrants separate treatment from mainland China under US laws.

6.4

Enactment of the Anthem Law.

6.30

The Hong Kong National Security Law was introduced, passed and enacted. The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government of the HKSAR will be established. The self-determination group Demosistō announced its dissolution shortly after the enactment.

4.20

惠譽在七個月內再度調低香港評級至AA-,港府對其「過度 着眼於社會政治議題」表示失望。

4.27 & 5.25

區域法官對斬人案被告判囚表示同情後,首席法官馬道立 告戒法官應避免做不必要的整治表態,以免影響大眾對司 法獨立失去信心。

5.14

人民銀行、銀保監會、中證監及外滙局發布《關於金融支持粵港澳大灣區建設的意見》提出深化內地與港澳金融合作並發展金融開放創新,支持粵港澳大灣區建設力度,提升大灣區在國家經濟發展和對外開放中的引領作用。

5.15-22

香港中學文憑試歷史科一條中日關係題目,牽涉二戰日本 侵華時期,所提供的資料被批評具引導性,對日本偏向正 面。該題最後被考評局取消。新華社文章指出「香港必須 建立與一國兩制相適應的新教育體制」。

5.28

商務及經濟發展局宣布成立專責小組,檢討香港電台管治及管理,惹來政治審查的嫌疑。較早前,香港電台節目《The Pulse》被指違反「一中原則」及《頭條新聞》內容被指侮辱警方。

5.28

美國國務卿蓬佩奧向國會提交《2020年香港政策法報告》,宣布不再承認香港擁有高度自治,並要求取消對香港的特殊待遇。

6.4

通過《國歌法》。

6.30

《港區國安法》宣布、通過及執行。中央駐港維護國家安 全公署成立。提倡自決的香港眾志,於法案生效後馬上宣 布解散。

Though the 1C2S Index did not recover to the pre-extradition level of around 6.3 to 6.4, it was still well over the median of 5. While 1C2S has problems in implementation, as could be expected of any unprecedented system, it is clearly not unworkable. The decline in this report should be viewed in this context.

雖然「一國兩制」指數未能回復修例運動前6.3至6.4分水平,分數仍比中位數5分為高。正如任何 史無前例的制度一樣,實踐「一國兩制」時遇到 問題乃意料之內,並非代表它不可行。本輪調查 評分的下降應該由此角度解讀。

2.4.1. Impact of internal governance

Internal governance issues that are not strictly related to 1C2S appear to have important effects on evaluations of the Hong Kong public and media, but do not affect international evaluations as much. It is important to bear this in mind when reading the findings identified in this Report.

For example, in the period before mid-2018, both MMI and Index (A) performed well despite the disqualification of six LegCo members from late 2016 to mid-2017, and the sentencing of the 3 student protestors in the Civic Square occupation to prison by the Court of Appeals on August 2017. The announcement of CY Leung in late 2016 that he would not run for a second term and the subsequent election of the new CE had strong positive effects on MMI that outweighed the effect of the above controversies. The honeymoon period of the new administration from mid-2017 to mid-2018 also appeared to have an important positive effect on Index (A).

The sharp declines in Index (A) and MMI starting from late 2018 can be attributed to political controversies over the disbandment of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, the rejection of work visa for Victor Mallet and the anti-extradition movement. At the same time, the waning approval ratings of the government reflected that internal governance issues surrounding the Lantau Tomorrow Vision reclamation project and the proposed increase of age threshold for elderly welfare payments also affected Hong Kong's public and media negatively.

2.4.2. Impact of international situation

The attitude of the West towards China has been shifting from engagement to confrontation as the West increasingly fears that its supremacy would be challenged by the rise of China. Evaluations of international think tanks may not be free of western ideological biases against the rise of China, but they may also reflect genuine weaknesses in the implementation of 1C2S. Furthermore, their effects on international investors cannot be underestimated as Hong Kong is an easy target in the 'New Cold War', as evident in the passage of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 in November. The existential ambiguity of Hong Kong presents a real vulnerability.

2.4.1. 內部管治的影響

與「一國兩制」無直接關係的內部管治問題,對 香港市民和輿情的評價似乎有一定影響,但對國 際評價影響不大。在解讀此報告的結論時,應予 以考慮。

例如,即使2018年中之前發生不少政治爭議,包括六名立法會議員被褫奪議席,以及佔領公民廣場的三名學生於被上訴法院判刑入獄,指數(A)及輿情指數皆表現良好。梁振英於2016年底宣佈不角逐連任,及後新一屆行政長官選舉對輿情指數有明顯的正面作用,蓋過上述爭議的影響。新政府於2017年中至2018年中的蜜月期對指數(A)也有一定正面影響。

指數(A)及輿情指數於2018年底之後明顯下降,可以歸因於香港民族黨被取締,馬凱簽證爭議及反修例運動。同時,「明日大嶼願景」填海計劃及提高長者綜援申請年齡等內部管治事件導致特區政府民望下滑,對市民和傳媒也有一定負面影響。

2.4.2. 國際形勢的影響

西方愈來愈擔心中國崛起將會挑戰其優勢,所以 對中國的態度由合作轉向對抗。西方智庫對「一 國兩制」的評價不能完全擺脫此意識形態的轉 向,但也可能反映「一國兩制」在實踐上的真正 弱點。它們對國際投資者的影響不容小覷,因為 香港很可能在「新冷戰」下首當其衝成為戰靶, 2019年11月通過的《香港人權及民主法案》正驗 證這一點。



Much of the negative international evaluation on the rule of law in Hong Kong can be attributed to a misunderstanding of the fundamental concept of 1C2S: Hong Kong is not an independent country. It is part of a civil law country but with an independent judiciary that practices common law in relation to self-autonomy issues. The Hong Kong judiciary also has power to deal with constitutional issues but it must defer to interpretations of the national Constitution and the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. This is different in nature from courts of common law countries but not uncommon in civil law countries. This suggests the Hong Kong judiciary has a higher level of independence and judicial function than many courts at the district level of other civil law countries. This is not a weakness of the Hong Kong judicial system but rather a unique characteristic of the Hong Kong Court under 1C2S that the HKSAR Government needs to emphasize in the international arena.

Western think tanks have downgraded Hong Kong's scores on 'rule of law', citing the interpretation of the Basic Law by Beijing in 2016. However, interpretation of the Basic Law first occurred in 1999 and it is nothing new. The Hong Kong judiciary is still the same judiciary which had received high scores from western think tanks until 2015, and it is as independent as always as demonstrated by recent prosecutions and convictions of a former Chief Executive and other high-ranking officials of the HKSAR Government. It appears that western perceptions of China and Hong Kong

have changed more than Hong Kong has.

部分負面評價源於「一國兩制」的概念和實踐存在誤解:香港並非獨立國家,而是擁有獨立司法權,以普通法實行內部自治的大陸法國家一部分。司法機構有權力處理憲制問題,但必須服膺人大常委會對國家《憲法》與香港《基本法》的解釋。此安排雖然與普通法國家的法庭存在本的質上的不同,但在大陸法國家相當普遍。香港的到法機構比不少大陸法國家的地區法庭有更大的獨立性及司法權,此非香港司法制度的缺點,反倒是香港法庭在「一國兩制」下的獨特之處,值得特區政府向國際社會闡明。

近年部分西方智庫基於2016年的人大釋法降低香港法治的評分,其實人大釋法早於1999年已經發生,並非新生事物;而直到2015年,香港司法仍然得到西方好評。近年香港部分高官及某前特首被起訴及定罪的案例,說明香港司法仍然與以往一般獨立,只是西方對中國及香港的觀感有所改變。

2.5. Suggestions

Given the biases and misunderstandings identified above, it is important for the HKSAR Government to consider spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of Hong Kong including the business community, the academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs to promote the image of Hong Kong under 1C2S. Such effort may include:

- Setting up a broadly representative committee to advise the HKSAR Government on all issues relating to 1C2S;
- Setting up a dedicated office under a relevant policy bureau to explain and address the concerns of and answer any queries regarding the National Security Law from the public including the international business community;
- Establishing a semi-official high-level think tank on external relations to undertake various private initiatives such as being responsible for mounting and coordinating outreach efforts, mobilizing support from all sectors of our and international communities, and enhancing Hong Kong's presence in APEC related networks;
- Setting up an early warning system within the government to alert and manage expectation of public on all possible issues which might affect 1C2S or the perception of quality of governance;
- Setting up a system whereby international media would be timely, fully and properly briefed on issues affecting 1C2S;
- Paying more attention to the education of young members of the public in relation to issues such as understanding of the 1C2S, true meaning of rule of Law, human rights and related freedoms, moral standards, broadening of societal as well as international perspectives, and increase awareness of national issues;
- Promoting, assisting and encouraging local think tanks to conduct periodical exchanges with influential foreign think tanks interested in Hong Kong affairs, especially the Heritage Foundation and the CATO-Fraser Institutes, which are sympathetic to Hong Kong as they value economic and personal freedoms highly;

2.5. 建議

為釐清以上偏見與誤解,特區政府應領導香港各界,包括政府、商界、學界、專業團體、目標相近的智庫和民間組織,共同努力向國際社會闡釋香港在「一國兩制」下的實況,包括:

- 設立具廣泛代表性的委員會,協助政府處理所 有有關「一國兩制」的問題;
- 相關政策局內成立專責部門,解釋及回應公眾 及國際商業社會對《港區國安法》的疑問;
- 成立專注香港涉外關係的半官方高層智庫,負責推動和協調涉外工作,動員社會各界支持,加強香港在APEC網絡中的角色;
- 政府內部建立監察系統,就可能影響「一國兩制」或治理質素的所有可能衝突,管理公眾的期望;
- 建立機制使國際媒體能夠充分及恰當地知悉影響「一國兩制」的議題;
- 注重青年教育,擴闊對「一國兩制」的理解、 法治的意義、人權及自由、道德標準、社會觸 覺、國際視野及國情認識;
- 促進、協助和鼓勵本地智庫與關注香港事務的 外國重要智庫定期交流,尤其是傳統基金會和 卡托及菲沙研究所。出於對經濟和個人自由的 重視,他們對香港的情況比較理解;

- Motivating Hong Kong's business communities from western countries who are willing to defend Hong Kong in the international arena; and
- Enhancing Hong Kong's presence in APEC related networks and forums, e.g., the APEC Business Advisory Councils (ABAC), APEC Study Centres, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and other tripartite forums that involve business people, academics, and NGOs in the Asia-Pacific. As a free economy and global city, Hong Kong should find a sympathetic hearing in the vast APEC related networks in the Asia-Pacific.
- 鼓勵在香港經商的西方商人為香港發聲;及
 - 強化香港在APEC龐大網絡內的影響力,例如亞太經合組織商業諮詢理事會(ABAC),亞太經合組織研究中心,太平洋經濟合作理事會(PECC)以及其他三方論壇。作為一個自由經濟體和國際都會,亞太區內APEC龐大的網絡應該對香港有一定認同。



3 激進主義復甦 Resurgence of Radicalism

Figure 5 shows the composition of Hong Kong population by political inclination. Moderates (which include centrists and those without specific political inclination) remained the largest group (50.0%), followed by the non-establishment supporters (41.0%), and pro-establishment supporters (9.0%). Non-establishment supporters are further divided into democrats (28.0%) and 'others' (13.0%), which are mostly the resistance camp.

圖 5 顯示香港市民的政治傾向。溫和派為最大組別(50.0%),包括「中間派」和「沒有政治傾向」的市民。非建制派排列第二(41.0%),建制派佔最少(9.0%)。非建制派可以再細分為民主派(28.0%)和以抗爭派為主的其他非建制派(13.0%)。

From mid-2017 to December 2018, the proportion of moderates supporters in the population rose while that of non-establishment supporters declined. Since then, however, there was a reversal of trends which accentuated in 2019 and continued into 2020. The political rift is consolidating as moderates continued to decrease by 0.9 percentage points (from 50.9% to 50.0%) between December 2019 and June 2020.

從2017年中至2018年底,溫和派和建制派的佔比上升,而非建制派則下降。自此以後,趨勢開始逆轉,並持續至2020年。儘管2020年上半年變化未如2019年期間波動,政治撕裂愈來愈嚴重。溫和派從2019年12月至2020年6月下跌0.9個百分點(由50.9%跌至50.0%)。

The growth trends of the two juxtaposing political inclinations, pro-establishment and non-establishment, were reinforcing as they continued to expand steadily. With a modest rise of 1.7 percentage points in the first half of 2020, pro-establishment recovered to 9.0%. Non-establishment supporters grew by the largest amount, as the cohort increased by a total of 4.2 percentage points (from 36.8 % to 41.0%). Among non-establishment supporters, the proportion of democrats and others rose by 2.1 percentage points, (from 25.9% to 28.0%), and 2.1 percentage points (from 10.9% to 13.0%) respectively.


處於政治光譜兩端的建制派及非建制派佔比均平穩上升。2020年上半年,建制派回升1.7個百分點至9.0%。非建制派增幅最大,升4.2個百分點(由36.8%升至41.0%)。非建制派支持者中,民主派和其他非建制派的比例分別由25.9%上升至28.0%(增加2.1個百分點),以及由10.9%上升至13.0%(增加2.1個百分點)。

Most of these changes took place abruptly since June 2019 amidst a hopeful trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation all through 2018. The number of pro-establishment supporters regained and the growth of non-establishment supporters grow steadily, while moderates continued to decline. These trajectories signified further polarization, despite a subsiding momentum of the anti-extradition movement.

去激進化及溫和政治在2018年興起,在2019年6月 卻急速逆轉。社會運動雖然有所休整,但是市民 的政治傾向持續兩極化:一方面建制派重拾部分 支持者,另一方面非建制派的增長趨平,只有溫 和派繼續下跌。

Figure 5: Political inclination of population

圖 5:香港市民政治傾向



3.1. Re-radicalisation of youths

Figure 6 shows the change in the composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by political inclination. The proportion of moderates dropped from 38.2% in December 2019 to 35.8% in June 2020 (a decrease of 2.4 percentage points) while the proportion of the non-establishment group rose from 55.3% to 62.8% (rising by 7.5 percentage points). Within the non-establishment group, the proportions of democrats dropped from 28.5% to 24.9% (decreasing by 3.6 percentage points) while other non-establishment rose from 26.9% to 37.9% (rising by 11 percentage points). This is the first time other non-establishment supporters claiming dominance within the 18-29 age group.

Up till December 2018, there had been encouraging signs of de-radicalization of youths, where population of moderates were high and rising. This trend, however, was reversed most notably from June 2019 onwards, as the proportion of non-establishment supporters witnessed a steep rise, surpassing moderates for some time. At the same time, within the non-establishment group, other non-establishment supporters overtook democrats by a large margin. This presents a more pressing situation than 2017 when the traditional and radical wings were of almost equal share.

It must be stressed that the political inclination of youths tends to move swiftly as although the changes were unambiguously notable since the latter half of 2019, the exact relationship between the radicalization of youths and the various politicized events needs further examination.

3.1. 香港青年的再激進化


圖 6 顯示青年(18 至 29 歲)的政治傾向變化。由 2019 年 12 月至 2020 年 6 月,溫和派的比例由 38.2% 減少至 35.8%(下跌 2.4 個百分點),非建制派的比例由 55.3% 增加至 62.8%(上升 7.5 個百分點)。非建制派中,民主派的比例由 28.5%下降至 24.9%(下跌 3.6 個百分點),其他非建制派則由 26.9% 增加至 37.9%(上升 11 個百分點)。其他非建制派首次成為 18-29 歲青年的最大群組。

截至 2018 年底,青年溫和派不但高企,還慢慢攀升,呈現令人鼓舞的去激進化跡象。但此趨勢由 2019 年起急速扭轉,令溫和派屈居於急速增長的 非建制派之後。更甚者,青年抗爭派已經超越民主派,而且差距進一步拉遠。非建制派中,傳統與激進兩翼的勢力在 2017 年尚算均等,現在的情況更令人擔憂。

值得留意的是,青年的政治傾向轉變迅速,雖然 2019 年下半年起的變化顯而易見,他們的再激進 化與近期政治化事件之間的關係尚需詳細研究。

Figure 6: Political inclination of youths

圖 6:青年的政治傾向



4 2047 年後延續「一國兩制」 Continuation of 1C2S after 2047

An issue of utmost importance for the future of Hong Kong is the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. Table 7 shows that 77.2% of the public still agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. While those who chose 'should' remained steady, there had also been a decrease in 'should not' to 11.3%, leading to an increase in the net value of support by 6.4 percentage points to 65.9% from its lowest recorded in October 2019, resuming to pre-extradition level.

Figure 7 shows the net value of support produced by respondents of different political inclinations. Even after the vigorous public reaction against the imposition of the National Security Law, support across all groups with different political inclinations in Hong Kong still maintained over 75% and a net value of at least 54%, including the resistance camp, who are known to be highly critical of 1C2S. Though the public's current evaluation of 1C2S is quite critical, the majority of them still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

The net value of support generally reached over 60% across most age groups and political inclination, with the exception of the following cohorts: those ageing 18-29 years (57.7%) and other non-establishment supporters (54.2%).

2047 年後是否繼續實行「一國兩制」乃關乎香港前途的關鍵議題。表7顯示77.2%市民同意香港應該於2047年後延續「一國兩制」。認為「應該」的受訪者維持平穩,認為「反對」則減少至11.3%,導致支持度淨值從2019年10月最低位上升6.4個百分點至65.9%,回復反修例運動前水平。

圖7顯示不同政治派別的支持度淨值變化。即使民間對《港區國安法》存在疑慮,所有政治派別對延續「一國兩制」仍有超過75%人支持,淨值亦達至少54%,包括對「一國兩制」常有批評的抗爭派。縱使市民現時對「一國兩制」的評分不高,他們依然相信「一國兩制」是適合香港未來的體制。

所有年齡組別及政治傾向的受訪者支持度淨值一般達60%或以上,除了以下組別:18-29歲(57.7%)和其他非建制派(54.2%)。


Table 7: Attitudes towards the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 表 7: 2047 年後香港應否繼續實行「一國兩制」

	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2020.6
Should 應該	76.5%	75.5%	75.5%	73.5%	77.2%
Should not 不應該	8.1%	8.6%	10.1%	14.1%	11.3%
Should not: Direct administration under CPG不應該:內地直轄	-	-	-	-	4.9%
Should not: Complete independence 不應該:完全獨立	-	-	-	-	2.3%
Don't know 唔知道	15.4%	15.8%	14.4%	12.4%	11.5%
Net value 淨值	68.4%	66.9%	65.4%	59.5%	65.9% *

Net value: Percent who chose 'Should' less percent who chose 'Should Not'

淨值:認為「應該」的百分比 減去認為「不應該」的百分比

Figure 7: Net Value of support for continuation of 1C2S by political inclination 图 7:繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度淨值(按政治傾向劃分)



4.1. Alternative future arrangements for Hong Kong

In view of the re-emergence of the debate around possible futures of Hong Kong, new options were offered to respondents choosing 'should not'. We carefully limit the options to only widely debated alternatives, that is, 'direct administration under CPG' and 'complete independence'. Interesting patterns arises. Of the 11.3% voting 'should not', a majority (accounting for 4.9% overall) chose 'direct administration under CPG , followed by an overall 2.3% supporting 'complete independence', suggesting both options, but particularly 'independence', do not appear to be a viable option for many despite recurring and intensifying crisis of confidence in 1C2S.

4.1. 香港的其他前途撰項

社會偶有討論香港的其他前途選項,本輪調查把2047年後應否延續「一國兩制」的題目延伸,若受訪者選擇「不應該」,將被詢問所屬意的前途選項。設計題目時我們把選項收窄至較為人所知的方案:「內地直轄」及「完全獨立」。11.3%認為不應該延續「一國兩制」的受訪者中,最多人選擇「內地直轄」,佔整體4.9%,選擇「完全獨立」的則佔整體2.3%,說明「一國兩制」信心危機看似加劇,但是其他選項並無支持基礎。

Table 8: Support for alternative future arrangement after 2047 (by age) 表 8: 2047 年後其他前途選項的支持度(按年齡劃分)

	Direct Administration under CPG 內地直轄	Complete Independence 完全獨立	Others 其他	Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難說
18-29	3.5%	6.8%	1.2%	2.7%
30-39	3.2%	1.6%	0.0%	3.2%
40-49	4.4%	1.0%	0.0%	3.0%
50-59	3.9%	1.8%	0.9%	1.8%
60-69	8.7%	2.3%	0.0%	1.6%
≧ 70	5.7%	0.9%	0.0%	2.1%
All respondents所有受訪者	4.9%	2.3%	0.4%	2.4%

Table 9: Alternative future arrangement after 2047 (by political inclination) 表 9: 2047 年後其他前途選項的支持度 (按政治傾向劃分)

	Direct Administration under CPG 內地直轄	Complete Independence 完全獨立	Others 其他	Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難說
Pro-establishment 建制派	14.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Moderates 溫和派	5.7%	0.6%	0.2%	2.2%
Non-establishment 非建制派	2.0%	4.8%	0.7%	3.3%
Non-est.: Democrats 非建制派:民主派	1.8%	2.6%	0.3%	3.2%
Non-est.: Others 非建制派:其他	2.6%	9.3%	1.5%	3.6%
All respondents 所有受訪者	4.9%	2.3%	0.4%	2.4%

4.2. Favourable conditions to the continuation of 1C2S after 2047

If respondents agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2017, they were then asked to choose what conditions would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S from the following list (they were allowed to choose more than 1 item):

- Political system democratizng further;
- Maintaining national security (previously appeared as: Completing legislation of Article 23);
- Maintaining a high degree of autonomy;
- Maintaining economic prosperity and stability; and
- Others (please specify).

Figure 8 shows the percentages of respondents who chose each of the five conditions. For all respondents, 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (69.6%) remained the most important items, while 'political system democratizing further' (53.3%) encountered a slight drop of 2.8 percentage points since October 2019 and secured its second place for the second time. 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (51.9%), which always occupy the second place in the list, remained the third most important condition but rose by 4.3 percentage points since October 2019. 'Maintaining national security', which previously appeared as 'completing legislation of Article 23', was recorded at 10.1%. It must be noted that the change of name is to reflect the development of the matter and does not imply any direct comparability of the two conditions these names refer to.

Figure 9 shows how the pattern of choice differed by political inclination and the increasingly stark contrast among groups of different political inclinations. While non-establishment continues to be supportive of 'political system to democratize further', the democrats did not cease supporting 'maintaining high degree of autonomy' (78.6%) as being more important than 'political system democratize further' (75.9%). The other non-establishment remained the only cohort prioritizing the said condition (86.8%). Among the moderates, 'political system to democratize further' witnessed a dramatic drop of 6.1% in just 8 months' time, reaching a record low of 39.4%.

On the other hand, pro-establishment continues to demonstrate overwhelming support for 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (78.8%) while 'maintaining national security' (38.5%) and for the first time, overtaking 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy', which dropped to its record low of 35.7%.

4.2. 2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」 的有利條件

如果受訪者同意於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」,他們會進一步被邀從下列清單中選出有利於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件(可選擇多於一項):

- 政制進一步民主化;
- 維持國家安全(前為「完成23條立法」);
- 維持高度自治;
- 經濟維持繁榮穩定;及
- 其他(請註明)。

圖8顯示對所有市民而言,「維持高度自治」 (69.6%)仍然是首要選項。自2019年10月起, 「政制進一步民主化」(53.3%)微跌2.8個百分 點,保持自上輪起的次要位置。「經濟維持繁榮 穩定」(51.9%)自2019年10月稍升4.3個百分 點,未能超前,居於第三。「維護國家安全」 (前為「完成23條立法」)升至10.1%,但仍然排 列最後。為反映事態發展,此選項的名稱經過更 改,不宜與過去數字直接比較。

圖 9 按各政治傾向,顯示市民選擇各條件的比例。雖然非建制派普遍更重視「政制進一步民主化」,民主派仍然視「維持高度自治」為有利於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的首要選項(78.6%),「政制進一步民主化」則以75.9%緊隨。其他非建制派有86.8%認為「政制進一步民主化」是最重要條件。溫和派對「政制進一步民主化」的重視程度變化巨大,於短短八個月內大跌6.1個百分點至39.4%。

與過去調查一樣,建制派認為「經濟維持繁榮穩定」是延續「一國兩制」的首要條件(78.8%)。 他們對「維持國家安全」(38.5%)的重視程度第 一次超越降至35.7%的「維持高度自治」。

Figure 8 : Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 圖8:2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件





Figure 9: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 (by political inclination) 圖9: 有利於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件(按政治傾向劃分)



5 市民的身分認同 Citizens' Identity

We also surveyed how citizens identify themselves, whether as 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese'. Figure 10 shows that members of the public continue to identify themselves much more strongly as 'Hongkongers' than as 'Chinese'. The identities started to diverge after a period of parallel increase. From October 2019 to June 2020, the public's identification as 'Hongkongers' rose from 8.41 to 8.55, the highest yet recorded. In the same period, that as 'Chinese' dropped from 4.72 to 4.38 with statistical significance, also the lowest recorded since mid-2017.

我們分別詢問市民對「香港人」及「中國人」身分的認同程度。圖 10 顯示市民對「香港人」的認同強於「中國人」。2019年10月至2020年6月,「香港人」認同度由8.41分升至8.55分為歷年最高,「中國人」則由4.72分跌至4.38分,亦為編制報告以來最低,變化達統計上顯著水平。

The extent to which the public identified themselves as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' can be better demonstrated by Figure 11, a graph mapping the mix of identities rated by respondents against time. On the 0 to 10 scale, the median is 5, which indicates a moderate level of identification. Ratings that are higher than the median indicate relatively strong identification; ratings that are lower than the median indicate relatively weak identification. These levels of strength can be grouped into four categories, dual identity (strong in both identifications), stronger identification as 'Hongkongers', stronger identification as 'Chinese', and others which include those without a dominant identity.

圖 11 更清晰地呈現市民對兩種身分的認同程度。 按0分至10分的尺度,中位數為5,代表中等認 同。高於中位數代表較強認同,低於則代表較弱 認同。對兩種身分不同程度的認同可歸為四類: 雙重身分(對兩種身分均擁有較強認同),對 「香港人」身分有較強認同,對「中國人」身分 有較強認同,以及包括沒有主要身分的其他身分 認同。

It is relatively clear that most Hong Kong citizens were typically cognizant of their dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', though this has gradually changed since June 2019. While the patterns from earlier surveys were very similar, in which a majority of the public (between 55.9% to 57.3% before December 2018) had relatively strong identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', dual identity further declined to 32.5% in June 2020 and 'Hongkongers only' remained the dominant identity surpassing the 'Hongkonger/Chinese' dual identity.

大部分市民擁有「香港人」及「中國人」雙重身分認同,但比例於2019年6月後逐漸改變:大部分市民(2018年12月前介乎55.9%至57.3%)對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身分均擁有較高認同。2020年6月調查發現雙重身分認同跌至32.5%,「香港人」成為主流身份並遠遠超越雙重身份。

Identification as 'Chinese' may not be the same as patriotic, but identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' is a pre-requisite for 'devotion to China and Hong Kong'. The fact that the proportion of Hong Kong people with dual identity continues to decline within the past 8 months points to the adverse impact of the current socio-political climate has on the implementation of 1C2S. We have not overlooked a possibility that current persistent international condemnation of China also has an impact on how Hongkongers look at themselves. The importance or otherwise of this will hopefully become clearer in time.


認同「中國人」身分未必等於「愛國」,不過同時認同「中國人」及「香港人」兩種身分卻是「愛國愛港」的先決條件。市民的雙重身分認同在短短八個月持續下跌,反映社會與政治環境對落實「一國兩制」的重大挑戰。現在,國際社會對中國口誅筆伐,對塑造香港人自我認同的作用不能忽略,其影響力需時瞭解。

Figure 10: Citizens' identity scores



Scores 評分		anges 變化
8.55	0.15	(↑ 1.7%)
4.38	-0.34	(1 7.7%) *

Figure11:	Citizens'	identity	mix
	- 1L V- A	A /3 400	





5.1. Rank correlation

As a result of the declining dual identity of both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', the correlation between the two stated identifications became increasingly less apparent. The two identities used to mutually reinforce each other but currently, there are signs of polarization instead. The rank correlation coefficient decreased slightly from -0.02 in October 2019 to -0.06 in June 2020, which is statistically significant. A stronger identification as 'Hongkonger' now accompanies a weaker one as 'Chinese' (see Table 10). The converse, on the other hand, also holds. The loss of the mutuality of the two identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' risks challenging the implementation of 1C2S in the near future and one must take careful note of this.

5.1. 等級相關係數

Table 10: Rank correlation of citizens' identity 表 10:市民的身分認同等級相關係數

P1 = 1	271							
	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2020.6
Correlation 相關係數	0.13	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.12	-0.02	-0.06
t-statistic t 檢定統計	4.06	5.58	5.53	5.55	5.43	3.85	-0.69	-1.82

6 熱門議題 Topical Issues

6.1 Responsibility of conflicts

Responsibility of conflicts. Table 11 shows the allocation of blame between the Mainland and Hong Kong when conflicts arise in the implementation of 1C2S. In June 2020, 50.1% of the public suggested that the Mainland would be responsible while 8.4% assigned the responsibility to Hong Kong, both of these values were at their most extreme since mid-2017 while those who chose 'equally responsible' fell from its usual $\pm 50\%$ to a record low of 35.7% in June 2020. The sentiment implied by this swing towards blaming the Mainland is worrisome.

Net values rose across all subgroups, suggesting an overall tendency to attribute blame towards Mainland in cases of conflicts, with the exception of the 30-39 age group, although it still stands relatively high at 40.5%, almost doubled that recorded in December 2018. Furthermore, several increases in net value were atypical, including a first-ever positive net value found in the 70 or above age group and a rise of 6.6 percentage points in the pro-establishment group, where the latter was also the only negative net value across all subgroups.

The results suggest that both the central and Hong Kong governments ought to reflect on its own responsibility for deadlocks and conflicts between government and people.

6.1. 出現矛盾的責任

表 11 顯示當實踐「一國兩制」出現矛盾時,應歸咎責任於內地或香港。2020 年 6 月調查顯示,50.1% 市民認為責任屬於內地,8.4% 則認為責任屬於香港,兩個結果均為 2017 年中以來最極端的結果。此外,選擇「一半半」的人數由 ±50% 跌至 2020 年 6 月的 35.7%。換言之,更多人將矛盾責任歸咎於內地。

所有組別的淨值均錄得上升,代表更多人將矛盾責任歸咎於內地。即使30-39歲組別淨值過去八個月沒有下降,40.5%仍然頗高,是2018年12月的雙倍。除此之外,建制派及70歲或以上淨值的變化亦不常見,最新一輪顯示,前者錄得6.6個百分點升幅,後者則首次錄得正淨值,表示兩者均更傾向將矛盾責任歸咎於內地。

中央政府與香港均需就政府和市民之間的僵局和 矛盾反思自身責任。

Table 11: Responsibility for conflicts

表 11:出現矛盾時的責任

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2020.6
The Mainland內地	24.1%	26.5%	26.1%	27.2%	29.0%	34.0%	45.4%	50.1%
Hong Kong香港	15.4%	19.0%	18.1%	17.4%	16.1%	12.4%	11.5%	8.3%
Equally Responsible一半半	54.5%	49.0%	50.7%	50.8%	50.1%	47.3%	36.4%	35.7%
Don't Know 唔知道	6.0%	5.5%	5.1%	4.7%	4.8%	6.4%	6.7%	5.8%
Net Value淨值	9.3%	7.9%	8.0%	9.8%	12.9%	21.6%	33.8%	41.8%
Mean Score 平均分	5.02	4.92	4.98	5.06	5.12	5.77	6.21	6.53 *

Net Value: Percent who chose 'The Mainland' $\mathit{less}\,$ percent who chose 'Hong Kong'

淨值:認為屬「內地」的百分比減去認為屬「香港」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Scores higher (lower) than 5 means greater responsibility lies with the Mainland (Hong Kong)

平均分由0至10分,分數高於(低於)5分代表內地(香港)需負較大責任

6.2. Emigration and confidence in 1C2S

Table 12 shows public's emigration plans. Those who have 'no plans' to emigrate remained the majority (62.5%), over those who 'have plans' (34.5%). The former dropped by 6.8 percentage points while the latter rose by 5.9 percentage points. Net value changed from -40.7% in October 2019 to -28.0% in June 2020. The change in net value was statistically significant.

6.2. 移民海外與「一國兩制」信心

表 12 顯示市民的移民計劃。「無打算」移民的人數遠遠拋離「有打算」者,比例分別為 62.5% 和 34.5%。比較 2019 年 10 月,「無打算」的人數稍微下降 6.8 個百分點,而「有打算」則上升 5.9 個百分點,淨值由 -40.7% 上升至 2020 年 6 月的 -28.0%,差異達統計上顯著水平。

Table 12: Public's emigration plans 表 12: 市民移民海外的計劃

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2020.6
Have Plans 有打算	13.6%	12.6%	13.0%	14.9%	18.0%	24.1%	28.6%	34.5%
Have Plans: Because ofconfidence in 1C2S 有打算:與對一國兩制信心有關	8.8%	8.0%	9.2%	11.2%	14.4%	20.8%	25.4%	30.5%
No Plans 無打算	85.3%	86.4%	86.1%	84.0%	79.1%	73.3%	69.3%	62.5%
Don't Know 唔知道	1.0%	0.9%	0.9%	1.2%	2.9%	2.6%	2.1%	3.0%
Net Value淨值	-71.7%	-74.5%	-73.1%	-69.1%	-61.1%	-49.2%	-40.7%	-28.0% *

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Have Plans' less percent who chose 'No Plans' 淨值:認為「有打算」的百分比 減去認為「無打算」的百分比

Table 13 and Table 14 show the percentages of age groups and groups of different political inclination who plan to emigrate due to lack of confidence in 1C2S (the emigration ratio). Between October 2019 and June 2020, the emigration ratio of the public continued the trend of growth and rose by a modest 5.1%. For moderates and non-establishment supporters, the ratios also increased, from 21.2% to 25.0%, and from 36.4% to 43.6% respectively. This left pro-establishment supporters and the 30-39 age group the only exceptions to the said trend, while the former recorded 2.6% and the latter countered the upward current as the ratio dropped by 2.8% since the last round to 34.8%. More than half of other non-establishment supporters attributed their decision to confidence in 1C2S. The 18-29 age group also obtained a record high emigration ratio (42.9%).

表 13 及表 14 顯示不同年齡及政治派別因對「一國兩制」缺乏信心而計劃移民的的百分比(移民比率)。2019年10月至2020年6月期間,移民比率維持升勢,總體較上輪上升5.1個百分點。溫和派及非建制派支持者的移民比率同錄上升,分別由21.2%至25.0%及由36.4%至43.6%。只有建制派及30-39歲不升反跌,前者錄得2.6%,後者從上輪跌2.8個百分點至34.8%。超過一半其他非建制派支持者表示,他們移民決定與一國兩制信心有關。18-29歲組別亦錄得較高移民比率(42.9%)。





Table 13: Emigration ratio (by age) 表 13:移民比率(按年齡劃分)

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2020.6
18-29	8.0%	7.1%	10.9%	12.4%	16.8%	23.1%	30.1%	42.9%
30-39	11.5%	12.4%	15.8%	13.3%	24.5%	34.0%	37.6%	34.8%
40-49	11.6%	11.9%	11.6%	15.4%	13.0%	22.0%	27.7%	29.8%
50-59	11.3%	7.8%	8.9%	14.8%	15.9%	21.5%	26.9%	30.2%
60-69	6.2%	4.4%	5.8%	6.0%	9.1%	14.2%	20.3%	26.3%
≧ 70	1.6%	3.6%	2.3%	2.7%	4.8%	7.1%	7.4%	17.9%
All respondents 所有受訪者	8.8%	8.0%	9.2%	11.2%	14.4%	20.8%	25.4%	30.5%

Table 14: Emigration ratio (by political inclination) 表 14: 移民比率(按政治傾向劃分)

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2020.6
Pro-establishment 建制派	1.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.7%	7.1%	2.6%
Moderates 溫和派	7.9%	5.8%	6.8%	9.3%	13.3%	18.6%	21.2%	25.0%
Non-establishment 非建制派	14.3%	16.8%	19.9%	23.8%	25.3%	32.5%	36.4%	43.6%
Non-est.: Democrats 非建制派:民主派	14.0%	14.3%	14.9%	21.8%	22.6%	30.5%	34.0%	37.3%
Non-est.: Others 非建制派:其他	15.3%	24.6%	34.3%	30.3%	36.6%	39.2%	41.3%	57.1%
All respondents 所有受訪者	8.8%	8.0%	9.2%	11.2%	14.4%	20.8%	25.4%	30.5%



Past studies have suggested that surveys often inaccurately amplify the number of individuals who seek to emigrate, for only a fraction of those who express interest in emigrating eventually do so in reality. Caution should therefore be exercised in interpreting the above findings, though they still provide valuable reference of the degree and extent of concern. Amongst moderates, those who confess to having plans to emigrate due to their lack of confidence in 1C2S may do so due to - on one hand - their disillusionment towards the central and/or SAR governments, but also - on the other hand disillusionment towards perceived instability caused by the non-establishment supporters; the latter may cause disaffection amongst the moderates due to the perceived damage of rational politics on the rule of law and Hong Kong's economy. Neither of the possibilities above could be ruled out. Furthermore, the laxing of immigration requirements by 'popular' countries in response to the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law might also mean that plans to emigrate might not necessarily be induced by a lack of confidence in 1C2S or the socio-political situation of Hong Kong but simply seen as 'opportunities not to be missed' by those who wanted to immigrate in any event.

據過往研究,在民調中聲稱移民的人數,往往遠 超真正移民的人數。民調結果雖有一定參考價 值,但要小心解讀。溫和派聲稱無信心而計劃移 民,一方面可能是對中央政府及建制派不滿,另 一方面亦可能是擔心非建制派破壞社會穩定,例 如覺得激進政治將會損害香港法治及經濟,兩種 可能性皆不能排除。除此之外,就港區國安法的 實施,多國以放寬移民門欄向北京施壓,不能排 除有人視之為不能缺失的機會,並不一定對「一 國兩制」失去信心的表現。

6.3. Attitudes towards the Greater Bay Area (GBA)

Table 15 shows that more disagreed on Hong Kong's participation in the development of the GBA, as 33.5% supported and 47.0% opposed, leading to a negative net value of -13.5% for the first time and its record low since mid-2018. The change in net value recorded in June 2020 compared with last round's was also statistically significant.

6.3. 粤港澳大灣區

表 15 顯示較多反對市民香港參與大灣區發展,支持率跌至 33.5%,反對率升至為 47.0%,淨值為-13.5%,為 2018 年後最低。上輪至今的淨值變化達統計學上顯著水平。

Table15: Should Hong Kong participate in the development of the GBA? 表15: 香港應否參與粵港澳大灣區發展?

	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2020.6	
Agree 支持	56.4%	54.0%	47.9%	42.6%	33.5%	
Disagree 反對	23.6%	24.7%	30.4%	35.3%	47.0%	
Don't Know 唔知道	7.0%	7.2%	5.9%	5.5%	6.7%	
Net Value淨值	35.4%	31.6%	17.6%	7.3%	-13.5%	
Mean Score 平均分	6.30	6.27	5.79	5.22	4.44	*

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Agree' less percent who chose 'Disagree'

淨值:認為「支持」的百分比 減去認為「反對」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means stronger agreement

平均分由 0 至 10 分,愈高分代表愈支持

6.3.1. Willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA

Table 16 shows that those who are 'willing' to live or work in GBA resumed to pre-anti-extradition level in June 2019, reaching 11.9%, and those 'unwilling' remained high at 72.6%, leading to an increase of a net willingness to -60.7% and the change was statistically significant.

Table 17 highlights the willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA by age. For youths (age 18 to 29), those 'unwilling' reached the highest yet recorded. Their net willingness was -78.8%, which rose by 15.1 percentage points from August 2019. Nonetheless, the rise in net willingness to live or work in GBA among the 30-39, 60-69 and 70 or above age groups 8.7, 15.5 and 32.9 percentage points respectively was statistically significant.

6.3.1. 前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或 發展的意願

表 16 顯示會考慮前往大灣區的受訪者回復 2019 年 6 月社會運動前水平,達 11.9%,不會考慮的 仍然高企於 72.6%,淨值上升至 -60.7%,變化達 統計學上顯著水平。

表 17 顯示青年(18至29歲)北上大灣區居住或發展的意願。不會考慮的比率達歷年新高,意願淨值達-78.8%,比2019年8月高15.1個百分點。此外,30-39歲、60-69歲及70歲或以上三個年齡組別會考慮北上發展或居住的淨值分別上升8.7,15.5及32.9個百分點,升幅達統計學上顯著水平。

Table 16: Willingness of living or working in the GBA

表16:前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願

	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2020.6
Willing 會考慮	12.2%	13.0%	12.9%	7.8%	11.9%
Not willing 不會考慮	63.1%	62.6%	67.6%	73.9%	72.6%
Maybe / Don't Know 或者 / 唔知道	24.7%	24.4%	19.6%	18.2%	15.6%
Net Value 淨值	-51.0%	-49.5%	-54.7%	-66.1%	-60.7% *

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Willing' less Percent who chose 'Not willing'

淨值:「會考慮」的百分比 減去「不會考慮」的百分比

Table 17: Net willingness of living or working in the GBA (by age)

表17:前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願淨值(按年齡劃分)

	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2020.6	
18-29	-52.9%	-33.9%	-51.7%	-65.3%	-78.8%	
30-39	-44.9%	-48.8%	-57.6%	-71.0%	-62.3%	*
40-49	-55.1%	-52.5%	-41.7%	-58.0%	-59.8%	
50- 59	-50.5%	-45.8%	-46.7%	-60.0%	-63.1%	
60-69	-46.0%	-55.0%	-59.9%	-65.6%	-50.1%	*
≧70	-57.1%	-64.4%	-77.0%	-81.4%	-48.5%	*
All respondents 所有市民	-51.0%	-49.5%	-54.7%	-66.1%	-60.7%	*

6.4. Recent political controversies

6.4.1. Acceptance of Legislative Council standstill

Table 18 shows public's acceptance of the Legislative Council standstill for over seven months due the delay in the election of house committee chairman. Generally, 54.5% found it unacceptable while 36.7% had the opposite opinion. The net value is recorded at -17.8%, as half of the surveyed public found it unacceptable.

6.4. 近期政治爭議

6.4.1. 對立法會停止進行立法工作的接受 程度

表 18 顯示大眾對政治矛盾導致立法會停止進行立 法工作超過七個月的接受程度。大部分受訪者 (54.5%) 認為不能接受,接受的佔 36.7%,淨值 為 -17.8%。

Table 18: Acceptance of Legislative Council standstill 表 18:對立法會停止進行立法工作的接受程度

	All respondents 所有受訪者
Acceptable接受	36.7%
Unacceptable不接受	54.5%
Don't know/ Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	8.8%
Net Value 淨值	-17.8%

 $\label{thm:percent_who} \mbox{ \ensuremath{Net} value: Percent who chose 'Acceptable' less percent who chose 'Unacceptable'} \\$

淨值:「接受」的百分比 減去「不接受」的百分比

6.4.2. Acceptance of mutual destruction tactics

Similar to the rejection of the Legislative Council gridlock, public's view of the mutual destruction ('laam chau'「攬抄」) tactics to coerce the SAR government to give in to political demands is also generally negative. Over half of the public (53.9%) found the mutual destruction tactics unacceptable while only 33.4% found it acceptable. The net value is recorded at -20.5%.

Table 19: Acceptance of mutual destructiontactics

表19:對「攬炒」的接受程度

6.4.2. 對「攬炒」的接受程度

大眾普遍不認同以「攬炒」方法逼使政府接受政 治訴求。超過一半受訪者(53.9%)認為不能接受, 接受的佔 33.4%, 淨值為 -20.5%。

	All respondents 所有受訪者
Acceptable認同	33.4%
Unacceptable 不認同	53.9%
Don't know/ Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	12.6%
Net Value淨值	-20.5%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Acceptable' less percent who chose 'Unacceptable'

淨值:「接受」的百分比 減去「不接受」的百分比

6.4.3. Impact of HKMAO and LOCPG's statements

Regarding the uncommonly more out-spoken role of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the Liaison Office over Hong Kong affairs, an overwhelmingly negative impact on 1C2S is received, accounting for 59.2% overall. Less people reportedly felt that there is a positive impact on 1C2S from the two offices' behaviour than those who suggested no impact, which account for 13.7% and 17.4% respectively.

6.4.3. 港澳辦及中聯辦聲明對「一國兩 制」的影響

港澳辦及中聯辦就香港事務發聲,市民傾向認為 對「一國兩制」帶來負面影響,佔 59.2%,認為 此舉正面和沒有意見的受訪者分別有 13.7% 及 17.4% •

Table 20: Impact of HKMAO and LOCPG's statements on 1C2S

表20:港澳辦及中聯辦聲明對一國兩制的影響

	All respondents 所有受訪者
Positiveimpact 正面影響	13.7%
Negativeimpact 負面影響	59.2%
No impact 沒有影響	17.4%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	9.7%
Net Value 淨值	-45.6%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' less percent who chose 'Negative impact'

淨值:「正面影響」的百分比 減去「負面影響」的百分比

6.4.4. Impact of the National Security Law

NPC's decision to introduce the National Security Law has been unpopular as 61.5% of the public found it negative towards 1C2S and 12.3% the opposite. More people found the new law brings no impact than positive impact, as the two options record 21.1% and 12.3% respectively.

Table 21: Impact of the National Security Law on 1C2S

表 21: 訂立香港國家安全法對一國兩制的影響

6.4.4. 訂立《港區國安法》對「一國兩 制丨的影響

人大訂立《港區國安法》,大部分市民傾向認為對「一國兩制」帶來負面影響(61.5%),只有12.3%受訪者認為具正面影響。對議題沒有意見的人比認為具正面影響的多,兩個選項分別為21.1%及12.3%。

	All respondents 所有受訪者
Positiveimpact 正面影響	12.3%
Negativeimpact 負面影響	61.5%
No impact 沒有影響	21.1%
Don't know/ Difficult to say 唔知道/好難講	5.1%
Net Value淨值	-49.2%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' less percent who chose 'Negative impact'

淨值:「正面影響」的百分比 減去「負面影響」的百分比

6.4.5. Generation gap and political divide

Table 22 and Table 23 are summaries of the net value generated from different topical questions about recent political controversies, further categorized by age and political inclination.

While most age groups and groups of political inclination display a general lack of support for severely disruptive behaviour in the Legislative Council and mutual destruction tactics, the 18-29 age group and non-establishment group (democrats and others) recorded positive net values. Other non-establishment groups recorded the highest positive net value, this stands in stark contrast to the of pro-establishment supporters.

The public tends to believe HKMAO and LOCPG's statements on HK's affairs and the abrupt gazetting of the National Security Law as causing negative impact to 1C2S. Negative net values are recorded across almost all categories of classification, where the only positive net values are found in pro-establishment group. It is clear that the sense of unease with stronger Beijing presence is shared amongst the majority of the surveyed population, except the pro-establishment group, which produced the only positive net value of 49.3%. The anxiety found among the moderates should not be overlooked.

6.4.5. 代溝及政治鴻溝

表 22 及表 23 總結近期政治爭議,並按年齡及政治傾向劃分。

雖然大部分年齡及政治傾向組別均對內會風波及「攬炒」行為表示不接受或不認同,以下組別錄得正淨值:18-29歲及非建制派支持者(民主派及其他非建制派)。當中其他非建制派錄得最高淨值,與建制派支持者差異懸殊。

大眾普遍認為,港澳辦及中聯辦就香港事務發表 聲明及《港區國安法》迅速通過,對「一國兩制」 帶來負面影響。幾乎所有年齡和政治傾向均錄得 負淨值,只有建制派認為具正面影響,而在溫和 派中出現擔憂更不能忽視。

Table 22: Generation gap over recent political controversies (by age) 表 22: 對近期政治爭議之代溝(按年齡劃分)

	LegCo standstill 內會風波	Mutual destruction 「攬炒」	Statements from HKMAO and LOCPG 兩辦聲明	National Security Law 《港區國安法》
18- 29	16.2%	11.8%	-73.9%	-71.4%
30-39	-11.0%	-15.5%	-50.8%	-57.3%
40-49	-17.3%	-18.1%	-43.5%	-50.9%
50- 59	-26.3%	-28.2%	-39.4%	-42.4%
60-69	-36.0%	-35.4%	-35.1%	-37.0%
≧70	-31.3%	-37.3%	-31.0%	-36.3%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-17.8%	-20.5%	-45.6%	-49.2%

Table 23: Political divide over recent political controversies (by political inclination)

表23:對近期政治爭議之政治鴻溝(按政治傾向劃分)

	LegCo standstill 內會風波	Mutual destruction 「攬炒」	Statements from HKMAO and LOCPG 兩辦聲明	National Security Law 《港區國安法》
Pro-establishment 建制派	-89.5%	-85.1%	46.7%	49.7%
Moderates溫和派	-49.4%	-51.0%	-37.2%	-40.3%
Non-establishment 非建制派	38.1%	31.5%	-76.1%	-81.2%
Non-est.: Democrats 非建制派:民主派	26.0%	16.6%	-74.0%	-78.3%
Non-est.: Others 非建制派:其他	63.9%	63.6%	-80.6%	-87.6%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-17.8%	-20.5%	-45.6%	-49.2%





I. 編製方法

I. Methodology



1. Construction of 1C2S Index

To understand the implementation of 1C2S comprehensively, we measure how the public in HK evaluate the current situation from various dimensions. International perception of freedom and democracy in HK is also pivotal as these are core components of 1C2S. Hence, we give an equal weight to scores obtained from the following two indices:

- Index (A): Public Opinion: Hong Kong public's evaluation of 1C2S compiled from telephone polls on 9 dimensions of 1C2S; and
- Index (B): International Perception: Compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on various dimensions of freedom and democracy in HK.

1.1. Index (A): Public Opinion

Index (A) is the average of sub-scores obtained from nine dimensions on different dimensions of 1C2S in our telephone polls conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Each round, about 1,000 individuals will be randomly sampled by the CATI (computer assisted telephone interviewing) system, all aged 18 or above; all of them spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin. To better represent the distribution of the Hong Kong population, all data were weighted by the proportion of gender and age of people aged 18 or above (excluding foreign domestic helpers) according to the Census and Statistics Department. Table 24 shows the statistical and scientific standards of each survey.

In the telephone polls, many questions employed 1 to 7 as the rating scale in the survey process, with 4 as the median. This scale, which is known as the Likert scale, is commonly adopted for psychological assessments. This scale was used instead of a 0 to 10 scale as the latter is deemed too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents to choose from. However, to better conform to existing indices – which tend to be expressed on a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median) – we converted the results mathematically into the popular 0 to 10 scale.

1. 編製「一國兩制」指數

為綜合掌握香港實踐「一國兩制」的情況,我們從不同範疇衡量市民對香港現狀的評價。自由與 民主是「一國兩制」的重要元素,國際社會對香港自由民主程度的觀感亦尤其重要。因此,「一 國兩制」指數為以下兩項評分給予相同比重:

- 指數(A):民意調查—香港市民在電話調查 中對九個「一國兩制」範疇的評分;及
- 指數(B):國際評價—國際智庫對香港的自由民主水平所編製的評分。

1.1. 指數(A): 民意調查

指數(A)是香港市民對「一國兩制」的綜合評價,由九個範疇構成。我們委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查,每輪以電腦輔助電話訪問系統,隨機抽樣,訪問大約1,000人,全部皆屬18歲或以上,能操廣東話或普通話。進行分析時,數據依照香港政府統計處的18歲或以上性別及年齡分佈(扣除外籍家庭傭工)作加權處理,以更符合香港人口分佈的真實情況。表 24顯示每次調查的統計和科學標準。

電話調查中,多數題目採用1至7分的評分尺度,以4分為中位數。這是心理學常用的科學尺度,稱為李克特量尺(Likert scale)。現時編製指數常採用0至10分的尺度,其實分類過於細緻,令市民難以選擇。不過為了與現行指數匹配,是以我們利用數學方法將調查結果轉換成為常見的0至10分尺度(以5分為中位數)。

For a more extensive report on the survey results, please see Survey Results: Frequency and Percentage Distribution, which can be found on the webpage of Path of Democracy (http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/).

如欲取得電話調查的詳細結果,請參閱民主思路網頁上的「調查結果:頻數及百分比分佈」(http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/)。

Table: 24 Survey details 表24:調查概況

Round 輪次	Survey Period 調查日期	Number of Responderts 受訪人數	Response Rates 回應率	Confidence Level 置信水平	Sampling Error 抽樣誤差
2017.06	23/5-3/6	1,002	36.8%	95.0%	±3.1%
2017.12	11/12 -23/12	1,006	39.5%	95.0%	±3.09%
2018.06	23/5-2/6	1,004	37.2%	95.0%	±3.09%
2018.12	3/12-12/12	1,001	38.8%	95.0%	±3.1%
2019.06	27/5-6/6	1,002	38.0%	95.0%	±3.1%
2019.08	24/7-7/8	1,001	39.5%	95.0%	±3.1%
2019.10	17/10 -31/10	1,002	38.0%	95.0%	±3.09%
2019.12	10/12 -20/12	1,000	40.8%	95.0%	±3.1%
2020.06	9/6-29/6	1,001	39.5%	95.5%	±3.1%

1.1.1. Alternative methods of constructing Index (A)

Conceptually, there are different ways to compute the nine dimensions into a composite score as Index (A). We have chosen the method of simple average, which is the most common method employed in constructing indices. Its strength lies in its parsimony and accessibility. It may not be the best method as it assigns equal weighting to all items (i.e. assuming equal importance for all items). Here, we compare the method of simple average to two alternatives methods that are more sophisticated, namely, principal component analysis and factor analysis.

Principal component analysis is a statistical method that processes and simplifies data; it is the standard scientific method employed in constructing indices. Through statistical analysis, it extracts the data set's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains the variations across the data.

1.1.1. 指數(A)的不同編製方式

指數(A)是香港市民對「一國兩制」的綜合評價,由九個範疇構成。要將九個範疇計算為指數(A)的綜合評分,在概念上有不同方式。我們採用了編製指數時最常見的簡單平均數,優點是簡單及容易明白。理論上,不同範疇可能有不同比重,簡單平均數未必是最好的編製方式,是以我們考慮兩種更複雜的方式與簡單平均數比較,分別為主成分分析與因子分析。

主成分分析是一種分析和簡化數據的統計技術, 是以科學化方式編製指數的標準方法,其方法是 通過對數據進行特徵分解,以得出數據的主要成 分與它們的權值,優點是揭露數據的內部結構, 從而更好解釋數據的變化。



Factor analysis extracts common factors from the data, and it shares a similar methodology with Principal component analysis. Its strength lies in its ability to identify hidden and representative factors amongst the many variables and group variables of a similar nature and converting the same into a common factor, which reduces the total number of variables.

Table 25 shows the negligible difference in scores acquired by the three methods. The results of all three methods are highly similar, largely due to the clustered nature of the public's assessments of the nine dimensions (cf. the distributions of the nine dimensions are highly correlated), which causes the core components or sub-items across all three methods to be highly similar. Both alternative methods involve complex calculations, which render the methods inaccessible to laymen. Given the similarity of the results from all three methods, we adopted the simplest and most commonly used method — i.e. the average of the nine dimensions — in constructing Index (A).

因子分析是從數據中提取公性因子的統計方法, 技術與主成分分析類似,其優點是可以在多項變量中找出隱藏及具有代表性的因子,將相同本質的變量歸入一個因子,從而減少變量的數目。

表 25 顯示三種方式所得出的結果,只有微不足道的差異。三種方式的結果十分接近,相信是由於市民對九個範疇的評分相當近似(即九個範疇的分佈高度相關),是以九個範疇的主要成分或主要因子都十分接近。主成分分析及因子分析牽涉複雜計算,一般人難以明白。因為三種方式編製指數結果十分接近,我們選取最簡單常用的方法,即九個範疇的簡單平均數來編製「一國兩制」指數。



Table 25: Index (A): Public Opinion computed by different methods 表25: 指數(A):民意調查以不同方式编制

Round 輪次	Simple Average 簡單平均數	Principal Component Analysis 主成分分析	Factor Analysis 因子分析
2017.06	4.84	4.83	4.82
2017.12	4.98	4.99	4.94
2018.06	5.05	5.06	5.00
2018.12	4.84	4.84	4.76
2019.06	4.58	4.58	4.53
2019.08	3.98	3.96	3.91
2019.10	3.26	3.23	3.18
2019.12	3.53	3.51	3.47
2020.06	3.39	3.37	3.30

1.2. Index (B): International Perception

Index (B) is the average of 3 indices, namely, the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser Institutes, and the Democracy Index of the Economic Intelligence Unit. The average of the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index is known as the Human Freedom Index, which is the most comprehensive index of freedom available.

As the Human Freedom Index covers a very large number of countries, the latest Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index only reflect conditions two years ago. These two indices are updated based on the latest comparable indicators from other international think tanks. When updating is not possible, the relevant figures are assumed to be unchanged.

1.2. 指數(B):國際評價

指數(B)是「經濟自由指數」「個人自由指數」及「民主指數」三項指數的平均分。首兩項指數由卡托研究所(Cato Institute)及菲沙研究所(Fraser Institute)編製,第三項指數則由經濟學人智庫編製。「經濟自由指數」和「個人自由指數」的平均分被稱為「人類自由指數」,是目前衡量自由的指數中最全面的一種。

由於「人類自由指數」覆蓋大量國家,「經濟自由 指數」及「個人自由指數」只反映兩年前的狀況。 這兩項指數將按相應的國際指標更新,如未能更 新,我們假設相關數值不變。

1.2.1. Comparable indicators

To obtain the updated scores of Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index, we first calculate the percentage changes in the comparable indicators for the respective years; then we apply these changes to the latest Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser. The comparable indicators for the Economic Freedom Index and each of the 7 components of the Personal Freedom Index are listed in Table 26.

1.2.1. 相應指標

為更新「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」,我們計算相應指標於相關年份的百分比變化,並將之套用於卡托研究所及菲沙研究所的「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」。表 26 顯示「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」中七個項目的相應指標。

Table 26 : Comparable indicators of Index (B): International Perception

Indicators 指標	Comparable Indicators 相應指標
Economic Freedom Index 經濟自由指數	The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom 傳統基金會經濟自由指數
Rule of Law 法治	World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index – 'Procedural Justice', 'Civil Justice' and 'Criminal Justice' 世界正義項目「法治指數」-「程序公義」、「民事司法」及「刑事司法」
Security and Safety 安全	World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index – 'Order and Security' 世界正義項目「法治指數」-「秩序與治安」
Movement 遷徙自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」-「G1. 人民是否享有遷徙自由,包括改變居所、就業或教育的能力?」
Religion 宗教自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」– 「D2. 宗教信仰或非信仰?」
Association, Assembly, & Civil Society 結社、集會及公民社會自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'E. Associational and Organizational Rights' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」-「E. 結社及組織權利」
Expression and Information 言論自由	Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index 無國界記者「全球新聞自由指數」
Identity and Relationships 性別認同及關係	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」-「G3. 人民是否享有個人社交自由,包括選擇婚姻對象及家庭人數、免受居所暴力及自主改變外貌?」

1.3. Refinement and Estimation

After the first survey in June 2017, one out of the nine dimensions, namely the score on Question 4 ('original way of life remained unchanged'), is not comparable with subsequent ones due to refinements of survey questions. The refinement only affects one question in the nine questions used to compute Index (A). Scores of the other eight questions are directly comparable as they are identical in all surveys.

To adjust for the time lag of international indices, scores of Index (B) in previous reports were estimated with data available then. In every report, scores will be revised with latest updates from international think tanks.

For the convenience of comparison, Table 27 shows Index (A) computed by nine questions and by the identical eight questions, the estimated and revised scores of Index (B), and the 1C2S Index constructed by the combination of them. The results suggest that the differences in scores of Index (A), Index (B) and 1C2S Index due to question change and updating are at most 0.13 and therefore negligible.

1.3. 修訂與估算

於 2017 年 6 月第一輪調查後,電話調查中九個範疇的第四條題目(「維持原有生活方式」)經過修訂,所以此題的評分不能與其後的調查直接比較。修訂只影響指數(A)中,九個範疇的其中一條題目,另外八條問題在所有調查均相同,評分可以直接比較。

指數 (B) 的評分乃基於當時可得的數據而作出, 以修正國際指數的滯後。該估算值將於其後的報 告按最新的國際指數更新。

以便比較,表 27 顯示九個範疇及八個相同範疇計算的指數(A)、估算及修訂的指數(B),以及由它們所編製的「一國兩制」指數。結果顯示指數(A)、指數(B)及「一國兩制」指數因為題目修訂和數據更新而帶來的差異不多於 0.13,微不足道。

Tabl e 27: Refinement and estimation of 1C2S Index

表 27: 「一國兩制」指數之修訂與估算

Round 輪次	Index (A): P 指數(A)	ublic Opinion :民意調查	Index (B): Internat 指數(B):	ional Perception 國際評價	1C2S 「一國兩	Index 制」指數	Difference
Kounu ##X	8 Dimensions 八範疇	9 Dimensions 九範疇	Estimates 估算	Revised 修訂	Maximum 最大值	Minimum 最小值	差距
2017.06	4.88	-	8.04	7.97	6.46	6.43	0.03
2017.12	4.84	4.98	8.04	7.97	6.51	6.41	0.10
2018.06	4.90	5.05	8.01	7.91	6.53	6.41	0.12
2018.12	4.70	4.84	7.89	7.91	6.38	6.30	0.08
2019.06	4.43	4.58	7.87	7.76	6.23	6.10	0.13
2019.08	3.81	3.98	7.87	7.76	5.93	5.84	0.09
2019.10	3.13	3.26	7.87	7.76	5.57	5.50	0.06
2019.12	3.40	3.53	7.87	7.76	5.70	5.58	0.12

2. Construction of 1C2S Mass Media Index

Our sample consists of around 153,000 newspaper articles related to 1C2S from 21 local daily newspapers that were published between April 1998 and December 2019. The number of articles processed in each newspaper is listed in Table 28.

Each article undergoes a 'tokenisation' process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of approximately 22 years, our text corpus contains around 76 million tokens. From this massive dataset, common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as '我', '你', '的', are first removed before further analysis. To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: 'positive', 'negative' or 'neutral' (not a sentiment word). A positive word is then given a sentiment score of 1, a negative word is assigned a score of -1, and a neutral word has a score of 0. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by the Natural Language Processing and Sentiment Analysis Lab, Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica. The number of words processed each year since 1998 is given in Table 29.

The positive, or negative as the case may be, sentiment of a paragraph is quantified via a count of the number of positive (negative) words it contains, adjusted by the its total word count. The sentiment score of an article is calculated as the average difference between positive and negative proportions among constituent paragraphs. 1C2S MMI is derived as an index that captures the weighted average sentiment score among newspapers in a given month. The base month of set at July 2017 to indicate 20 years after the establishment of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Since there are substantial differences in the number of news articles published by newspapers during the sample period, the article count of a newspaper alone could be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure 1C2S MMI's reliability, the sentiment score for each newspaper is further weighted by public perceptions of its credibility based on the survey 'Public Evaluation on Media Credibility' conducted by Centre for Communication Research, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

2. 編製「一國兩制」輿情指數

「一國兩制」輿情指數的資料由新聞文章組成, 包含1998年4月至2019年12月期間,來自本地21 份日報關於「一國兩制」,約153,000份報導及評 論。表 28 顯示每份報章所運算的文章數量。

我們就每篇文章進行「分詞」(tokenization), 通過電腦運算將文章分解成語例(token,為單詞 或短語)。我們利用約22年的資料組成語料庫, 包含大約7,600萬個語例。 在進一步分析這個龐大 的語料庫之前,我們首先剔除無助理解文章的常 見單詞(如「我」、「你」、「的」)。為了辨 別一篇文章的情緒,我們採用由台灣中央研究院 資訊科學研究所自然語言處理與情感分析實驗室 開發的繁體中文情緒字典,把語例分類為「正 面」、「中立」(非情感詞)或「負面」。「正 面」的語例得1分,「中立」得0分,「負面」得 -1分。表 29顯示各年所運算的文字數量。

我們計算每段落所包含的正、負面語例數量,每篇文章的情緒評分則為各個段落經字數調整後的淨值。「一國兩制」與情指數即為當月所有文章的平均情緒評分,基數月訂為2017年7月,基數為100,以標誌回歸20周年的情況。由於不同報章所刊登的文章數目有明顯差別,因此,只考慮文章數目不足以呈現不同報章對讀者觀感的影響力。為確保可靠性,本指數將採用由香港中文大學傳播與民意調查中心「市民對傳媒公信力的評分」為每份報章的情緒評分加權。

Table 29 : Number of words processed

表29:處理資料字數

Newspaper 報章	Number of Articles 文章篇數
A Daily A 報	81
am730	2,501
Apple Daily 蘋果日報	10,451
Headline Daily 頭條日報	1,282
Hong Kong Commercial Daily 香港商報	14,876
Hong Kong Daily News 新報	4,476
Hong Kong Economic Journal 信報	10,918
Hong Kong Economic Times 經濟日報	4,375
Hong Kong Globe 公正報	194
Lion Rock Daily 香港仔	392
Metro Daily 都市日報	1,436
Ming Pao Daily News 明報	12,747
Oriental Daily News 東方日報	8,999
Sharp Daily 爽報	152
Sing Pao 成報	5,218
Sing Tao Daily 星島日報	8,450
Sky Post 晴報	582
Ta Kung Pao 大公報	30,257
The Sun 太陽報	4,828
Tin Tin Daily News 天天日報	452
Wen Wei Po文匯報	30,621
Total 總數	153,288

衣29.旋珪貝科子数	
Year 年份	Number of Words 字數
1998	669,676
1999	2,498,254
2000	2,320,584
2001	2,640,690
2002	2,545,546
2003	2,713,403
2004	4,801,621
2005	2,874,994
2006	1,879,834
2007	2,797,512
2008	1,446,629
2009	1,815,839
2010	1,880,198
2011	2,040,824
2012	3,441,893
2013	3,312,415
2014	5,386,835
2015	4,411,567
2016	5,590,354
2017	6,204,647
2018	4,932,978
2019	7,086,984
2020 H1	3,109,115
Total總數	76,307,622

2.1. Accuracy test

1C2S MMI is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict.

In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time. As shown in Table 30, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as 'positive' whereas 1,472 were classified as 'negative.'

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be.

Table 30 also shows the average sentiment scores of these 3 groups of paragraphs. In particular, 'positive' paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as 'negative' paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these 3 groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.

2.1. 準確度覆查

「一國兩制」與情指數是建基於由詞彙組成的模型。此模型視每段落為一籃子的詞語,從而抽離整篇文章的脈絡。其中一個效果是可能無法辨認到如諷刺等寫作手法,因而不能完全理解每一個段落的真正含義。這個局限在分析小說及文學作品時可能較為明顯,但對於寫作手法較直接的新聞文章而言,相信不是一個大問題。

為證實此詞彙模型辨別情緒的準確度,我們兩位研究員從語料庫中隨機抽取了約18,000個段落,親自分類為「正面」、「負面」和「中立」,再與詞彙模型比較。各段落的出處在給予研究員之前已經被隱藏。假如兩名研究員對同一個段落的情緒判斷有異,第三名研究員將會重讀並作出判斷。是次覆查中,兩名研究員在大約八成的情況下均能作出相同的判斷。

我們利用與「一國兩制」與情指數相同的詞彙模型為此等段落的情緒評分。在模型中,情緒評分為正、負面詞語量的淨值,所以評分愈高代表情緒愈正面。表30顯示利用詞彙模型計算的情緒評分。2,363及1,472個段落分別被判決為「正面」及「負面」。被研究員判斷為「正面」的段落,情緒評分為21.76%,約為「負面」段落的7.5倍。再者,利用多變量回歸分析,三個類別的情緒評分發現具統計學上的顯著差異,證實詞彙模型的計算結果與我們研究員的人手分類一致。




Table 30 : Results of accuracy test

表30:覆查結果

	Positive 正面	Neutral 中立	Negative 負面
No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers 真人研究員對情緒的判斷	2,363	14,202	1,472
Net Value 情緒淨值	21.76%	14.42%	2.92%



II 重大事件一覽 II List of Significant Events



The significant events which may have affected evaluations of 1C2S that occurred in the previous reports (mid-2017 to late-2019) are listed below.

2017年中至2019年底間,可能影響對「一國兩制」評價的重大事件臚列如下。

2017 H2

714

Disqualification of four LegCo members by the High Court

8.15 & 8.17

Prison sentences of the '13+3' protestors in relation to the demonstration against the Northeast Territories Development and the Civic Square occupation. The court also gave new tougher sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence

9.1

China's enactment of the national anthem law

10.19

Emphasis on 'overall jurisdiction over Hong Kong' in the Work Report of 19th CPC National Congress

11.15

LegCo's passage of the non-binding motion on the high-speed rail co-location arrangement

12.15

Amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Council to restrict filibustering

7.14

高等法院裁定四名立法會議員宣誓無效

8.15 & 8.17

反新界東北發展示威者與強行進入公民廣場示威的「13+3」示威者被判入獄。上訴法庭更提出更嚴厲的量刑準則予未來涉及暴力的大型非法集會 案件

9.1

中國訂立國歌法

10.19

中共十九大工作報告強調對香港的「全面管治權」

11.15

立法會通過關於高鐵「一地兩檢」安排的無約束力議案

12.15

立法會透過修訂議事規則限制拉布

1.27

Agnes Chow Ting, a pro-democracy activist, was banned from running for the LegCo by-election on the grounds that her party, Demosisto, had called for 'self-determination'

2.6

The case of the three student leaders was brought to the Court of Final Appeals (CFA). The CFA overturned the prison sentences on the trio on a technicality but ruled that the Court of Appeals was entitled to give tough sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence

6.11

Edward Leung, leader of Hong Kong Indigenous, was given a prison sentence of 6 years on June 11 for his role in the civil unrest in Mongkok

6.14

LegCo's passage of the co-location bill on June 14 after protracted debates

1.27

有意代表香港眾志出選立法會港島區補選的周 庭,被裁定參選提名無效

2.6


「雙學三子」案件上訴至終審法院。終審法院以 技術因素推翻監禁判決,但認可上訴法院對未來 涉及暴力的大規模非法集會案件所提出的更嚴厲 判刑指引

6.11

本土民主前線領袖梁天琦參與旺角騷亂,被判處6 年監禁

6.14

立法會經過漫長辯論後,通過「一地兩檢」議案



8.14

Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, delivered a speech hosted by the Foreign Correspondents' Club

9.24

The Hong Kong National Party was banned on national security grounds

10.5

Visa renewal of Victor Mallet, the Financial Times' Asia News Editor and Vice President of the Foreign Correspondents Club (FCC), was rejected. He had chaired a talk by pro-independence activist Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the Hong Kong National Party, at the FCC

10 12

Lau Siu Lai, a Democrat who had called for Hong Kong self-determination, was barred from running the LegCo by-election

10.23

Opening of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge

11.14

The United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended the US Congress to assess its export policy on technology with regard to Hong Kong's status as a separate customs area

11.19

Trial of 9 key figures of the 'Occupy Central' movement started

12.4

Public education campaigns to promote the country's Constitution and Hong Kong's Basic Law were initiated on the National Constitution Day

12.4

Corruption investigation against Leung Chun-ying, former chief executive of HKSAR, for receiving a HK\$50 million payment from an Australian engineering firm was dropped due to lack of sufficient evidence

8.14

支持「港獨」的香港民族黨召集人陳浩天受邀於香港外國記者會演講

9.24

基於維護國家安全,香港民族黨被禁止運作

10.5

《金融時報》亞洲總編輯、香港外國記者會副主席馬凱的簽證續期遭拒。他早期主持主張「港獨」的香港民族黨召集人陳浩天於香港外國記者會的演講

10 12

提倡香港「自決」的民主派候選人劉小麗於立法會補選中的被裁定提名無效

10.23

港珠澳大橋啟用

11.14

美中經濟與安全審查委員會向美國國會建議,重 新審視高科技出口政策,評估香港的獨立關稅區 地位

11.19

「佔中九子」案開審

12.4

「國家憲法日」舉辦宣傳活動,推廣國家《憲 法》與香港《基本法》

12.4

前行政長官梁振英涉嫌收取澳洲工程公司5,000萬港元,案件因證據不足不進行檢控

1.2

Xi Jinping marked the 40th anniversary of the 'Message to Compatriots' by upholding 1C2S as the best solution to cross-strait unification

1.2

習近平於《告台灣同胞書》發表40周年紀念會指 「一國兩制」為兩岸統一的最佳方式

2.18

Promulgation the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area

2.18

《粵港澳大灣區發展規劃綱要》發布

3.23

Kaohsiung mayor and Taiwan leader hopeful Han Kuo-yu's visited the central government's Liaison Office in Hong Kong

3.23

高雄市市長、台灣總統熱門候選人韓國瑜拜訪香 港中聯辦

4.9

The 'Umbrella nine' (key leaders of the Occupy Central movement) were found guilty as the District Court ruled that civil disobedience was an invalid defence

4.9

區域法院裁定「佔中九子」罪成,指出公民抗命 不屬抗辯理由

5.11 - 5.14

Attempts to start bills committee proceedings in LegCo for the controversial amendments to the extradition law erupted into chaos

5.11 - 5.14

立法會法案委員會開展審議《逃犯條例》修訂 案,發生衝突

5.17 -5.21

Han Zheng, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Wang Zhimin, Director of the central government's Liaison Office, both confirmed that the central government was supportive of the extradition law amendments

5.17 - 5.21

國務院副總理韓正及香港中聯辦主任王志民開腔 支持《逃犯條例》修訂

6.9, 6.15 & 6.16

Record-setting demonstrations against the extradition law were staged. The government eventually announced the suspension of the amendment bill

6.9, 6.15 & 6.16

反修例遊行集會連破人數紀錄,政府最終決定暫 緩修例

6 - 11

Accusations of police misconduct accentuated after major collisions, including the 6.12 LegCo protest, 7.21 Yuen Long incident, 8.31 Prince Edward station incident, 10.1 and 11.11 gunshot incidents, confrontation in the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University

6 - 11

連串衝突引起針對警察濫權失德的投訴,包括 6.12立法會示威、7.21元朗事件、8.31太子站事 件、10.1及11.11槍傷事件、香港中文大學衝突及 香港理工大學衝突

7.1 & 7.21

Protesters broke into the LegCo Chamber and vandalized the Hong Kong emblem on 1 July and laid siege to the central government's Liaison Office and defaced the Chinese emblem on 21 July

7.1 & 7.21

示威者分別於7月1日及21日闖入立法會及包圍中 聯辦大樓,途污香港特區區徽及中國國徽

8 - 9

Protesters called for a general strike and began a new campaign to paralyze the airport, inflicting citywide and international disruptions in transportation

8 - 9

示威者發動「三罷」行動及癱瘓機場,令本地及 國際交通受阳

9.4

Carrie Lam officially announced the withdrawal of the amendment bill of the extradition law

9.4

林鄭月娥正式宣布撤回《逃犯條例》修訂案

10.4 & 11.18

The government enacted the anti-mask law under the Emergency Regulations Ordinance but was ruled unconstitutional by the High Court

10.4 & 11.18

特區政府引用《緊急情況規例條例》訂立《反蒙 面法》,及後被高等法院裁定違憲

11.4 & 11.14

Carrie Lam met with Xi Jinping for the first time since the eruption of the social unrest. Xi said the most pressing task is to end violence and restore order. The message was reiterated in his speech in the BRICS summit in Brazil

11 4 & 11 14

習近平於反修例風波爆發後首次與林鄭月娥會面,指出止暴制亂為最迫切任務,並在巴西舉行的金磚國家峰會上重申

11.24

Pan-democrats scored a landslide victory in the District Council election with the highest voter turnout of 71.2%

11.24

泛民主派於區議會選舉得到壓倒性勝利,投票率達71.2%,為歷來最高

11.27

US President Donald Trump signed the 'Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act'

11.27

美國總統特朗普簽署《香港人權及民主法案》

12.19

The bank account of Spark Alliance, fundraising platform for protesters, was froze due to accusation of money laundering

12.19

反修例運動的籌款平台星火同盟的銀行戶口,涉 嫌洗黑錢被凍結

'ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS'

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