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'ONE COUNTRY  
TWO SYSTEMS'  
INDEX

「一國兩制」指數

ADVANCE  
VERSION  
預覽版

# 'One Country Two Systems' Index

2024 H1  
(Fourteenth Edition)

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## Preface

The unprecedented pursuit of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ (henceforth 1C2S) demands unyielding exploration and persistence from stakeholders. Since 1997, progress has been made in realizing 1C2S, but challenges have also emerged. To support the full implementation of 1C2S, Path of Democracy established the 1C2S Index in July 2017 and released its first report. This initiative aims to objectively evaluate the ongoing implementation of 1C2S by reviewing its accomplishments and shortfalls.

The 1C2S Index is based on both local opinion and international perception of the current state of 1C2S. Periodic public surveys measure local attitudes, and we also incorporate global assessments from international think tanks. These independent evaluations contribute to a more balanced view on how the world, including Hong Kong people, perceives the state of 1C2S. To further enhance the analysis, we have devised and introduced a 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI), employing big data analytics to measure Hong Kong and overseas media sentiment towards 1C2S. Our report also incorporate public views on current social issues related to 1C2S, such as emigration plans, national security, and economic integration.

In 2022, a comprehensive review was conducted to ensure alignment with societal and global development after five years of impartial measurement. The main Index will now adopt a more timely, objective, distinctive, and extensive construction method. We are also innovating the study of media sentiment by expanding coverage of 1C2S MMI to reflect the changing media landscape and readership. An online data portal has been launched to better inform policymakers, researchers, media, and the public with data visualizations and customized analysis through an open and transparent approach.

We are grateful to the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong for conducting the telephone polls and sentiment.ai for measuring media sentiment on our behalf. Moving forward, we will continue to conduct public surveys and update international indices every six months, and to monitor media sentiment regularly to gauge the latest perceptions of the public, the international community, and the media on 1C2S.

Ray Poon  
Co-convenor (Research)

August 2024

## Executive Summary

1. The 1C2S Index for the first half of 2024 rose from 6.04 points in the second half of 2023 to 6.17 points. Most respondents (64.8%) believe that maintaining economic prosperity and stability will be the most favourable factor for continuing to implement 1C2S after 2047.
2. The international community's assessment of Hong Kong rose slightly from 6.87 points to 6.89 points, with scores for "economic openness" and "civil rights" also showing an upward trend. Telling Hong Kong's good story to the outside world effectively is both urgent and challenging. PoD suggests the government establish a 1C2S office to maintain contact with Western media and dispel misperceptions.
3. Hong Kong's political landscape is changing, with the proportion of moderates (77.1%) increasing and continues to occupy the largest segment of Hong Kong's population. We believe this will be an opportunity for society to reduce political polarization.
4. The proportion of citizens who identify both Chinese and Hong Kong identities, indicating a dual identity, increased by 3.8 percentage points to 63.8%. Conversely, the gap between those who identify solely as Chinese or solely as Hong Kongers has narrowed over the past few years.
5. Regarding citizens' plans to emigrate overseas, the proportion of respondents "intend to emigrate" decreased from 17.9% in the previous period to 14% in July 2024. The vast majority of respondents (84.1%) have no plans to emigrate overseas. We believed that as the government implements various talent attraction programs, Hong Kong will continue to attract foreign talent, further fueling economic transformation and development.
6. With the ongoing trend of Hong Kong residents "going north" for consumption, citizens have more opportunities to experience China's development first hand. The proportion of citizens interested in studying, working and retiring in the Greater Bay Area has rebounded from 6.9% in February 2024 to 7.9% in July 2024.
7. A significant majority (63.2%) of respondents believe employers should consider job applications from individuals who have already faced legal consequences from the anti-extradition protests. This reflects an openness to providing second chances and reintegrating them into society. Leveraging this sentiment, the government could take the lead in launching initiatives that support their transition back into the workforce.

## Index At-a-Glance

1C2S Index  
「一國兩制」指數

**6.17**  
(↑ 2.2%)

2024 H1

1C2S Mass Media Index  
「一國兩制」輿情指數

**133.7**  
(↓ 21.6%)

2024 Q2

Moderates  
溫和派


**77.1%**  
(↑ 2.5%)

2024.7

Dual Identity  
雙重身分認同

**63.8%**  
(↑ 3.8%)

2024.7



### Public Opinion 民意調查

High Degree of Autonomy  
高度自治

**5.29**  
(↑ 5.4%)

Human Rights and Freedom  
人權自由

**5.46**  
(↑ 3.8%)

Hong Kong-Mainland Relations  
內港關係

**5.61**  
(↑ 5.1%)

### International Perception 國際評價

Economic Openness  
經濟開放

**9.35**  
(↑ 0.4%)

Civil Liberty  
公民權利

**6.26**  
(↑ 0.3%)

Democratic Development  
民主發展

**5.06**  
(-)

## 2024 H1 Overview

Despite the absence of soccer star Lionel Messi in a highly-anticipated exhibition match, a strong line-up of mega events and international conferences filled the first half of 2024 to attract tourists and boost economy. Another key initiative was the expansion of individual visit scheme to offer residents from more Chinese cities a more convenient travel visa. The city also felt proud with the first Hongkonger selected for China's space programme as a preparatory astronaut.

Hong Kong's court handled some most controversial protest cases. In the landmark case of 'Hong Kong 47', most pro-democracy activists were guilty of conspiracy to commit subversion. Protesters who stormed and vandalised the Legislative Council Complex were convicted of rioting. The court overturned a previous ruling to ban the protest anthem 'Glory to Hong Kong'. In the reporting period, two non-permanent overseas judges resigned.

The long-delayed domestic security law under Article 23 of the Basic Law was enacted. With powers granted by this new law, the government revoked passports of six individuals who fled to the UK on suspicion of national security offenses. The US warned of imposing visa restrictions on Hong Kong officials. The EU and UK raised concerns over Hong Kong's new security law and judicial independence. Diplomatic tensions also grew as British police arrested a Hong Kong trade office official in London and two others for allegedly breaching UK national security laws.

### International confidence regained momentum

Local discussion on government functions and market performance increased as call for economic reform strengthened. Promotional activities targeting overseas audience in the past were slowly reflecting on our scores. Four years of decline in international confidence was reversed and a rising trend established. Increase in both public opinion and international perception supported an overall growth in 1C2S Index. The latest reading rose by 2.2% from 6.04 to 6.17.

All pillars, namely 'high degree of autonomy' (+5.4%), 'Hong Kong-Mainland relations' (+5.1%) and 'human rights and freedom' (+3.8%), rose. The city's autonomy was verified by the courts' impartial handling of controversial cases and local legislation of a national security law. The selection of astronaut for space programme and the expansion of individual visit scheme demonstrated the achievement of dialogue between the mainland and Hong Kong.

Due to time lag in the compilation of international indices, results from overseas business promotion started to gather in this round as 'economic openness' (+0.4%) increased. Massive promotional campaigns to attract overseas investment earned confidence in our business environment. 'Civil liberty' (+0.3%) rose slightly and 'democratic development' remained unchanged.

### Political moderation plateaued

Mass apathy from a depoliticized society contributed to political moderation. Moderates remained the largest group with overwhelming dominance (77.1%), followed by non-establishment supporters (14.3%) and pro-establishment supporters (5.9%). The size of moderates expanded by 2.5 percentage points. Non-establishment supporters increased by 0.6 percentage points and pro-establishment supporter decreased by 2.2 percentage points.

The increase of moderates was also seen among youths (aged 18 to 29). Moderates rose by 6.5 percentage points to 72.5%. Among non-establishment supporters, democrats fell by 3.5 percentage points to 15.0% and localists dropped by 2.0 percentage points to 9.3. While the rise of moderation among 18-29 age group is a healthy development, one should remain vigilant in the near future.

## Reconvergence of citizens' identity as Hongkongers or Chinese

Citizens' self-identification as Hongkongers or Chinese started to converge after a period of divergence. The gap continued to close after a two-year convergence. In this round, both identities of 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' increased. The former rose by 2.4% from 8.23 to 8.43 and the latter rose by 1.8% from 7.03 to 7.16.

Most Hong Kong citizens are cognizant of their dual identity as both Hongkongers and Chinese. Over half of the public acknowledged dual identity in earlier surveys. This had gradually changed since 2019 and hit rock bottom in mid-2020 but had since rebounded. People who recognized their dual identity rose from last round's 60.0% by 3.8 percentage points to 63.8%. 'Hongkonger only' fell to 23.4% by 1.3%.

## Implications and recommendations

International perception has shown signs of recovery after repeated declines. Simultaneously, domestic opinion has experienced substantial growth. The disparity between how local people and the international community looked at 1C2S has been narrowing. While different social groups may hold varying expectations, there remains a shared desire for long-term prosperity and stability. Ultimately, this common ground can serve as a unifying force to bridge perspectives and foster understanding.

Many indicators returned to early-2019 level. Public discontent sparked by the crisis in 2019 appeared to have somewhat dissipated. People with emigration plans kept on declining. The proportion of moderates continued to grow while non-establishment supporters steadily declined. The proportion of population identifying themselves as 'Chinese' also saw a modest rate of increase.

Two rival camps showed extreme views over recent political events. Moderates were the only group countering this juxtaposition. A rational voice appears to exist in the society at large, but it is vulnerable to populist narratives. Policymakers must take care to ensure that moderate opinions continue to enjoy the benefit of a nourishing and safe environment in a divided environment.

It is important for the HKSAR government to capitalize on the growing confidence and build further momentum by spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of Hong Kong including the business community, the academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs to promote the image of Hong Kong under 1C2S. Such effort may include:

- Setting up an Office of 1C2S for sustained outreach effort both locally and in the APEC region to mobilize support and enhance Hong Kong's presence. This dedicated office should actively participate in foreign think tank forums directly or through the business community to promote the Hong Kong narrative in the international arena;
- Holding daily press briefings with local and international media to tackle latest policy issues in a timely, full, and proper manner to address the fear and anxiety of the foreign community in Hong Kong;
- Providing advanced training to our senior officials on how to counter the negative narrative in the western media by using positive HK stories; and
- Educating young members of the public on 1C2S basics, including importance of our constitutional order, the understanding of the rule of law, human rights, freedoms, corresponding obligations and broadening awareness of social, national, and global issues.

## 1. Introduction

This is the 14<sup>th</sup> edition of our 'One Country, Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) Index report. The 1C2S Index aims to provide an objective assessment of the implementation of 1C2S. Our first report was produced in mid-2017, marking the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China. The 1C2S Index is updated every six months, in the middle and at the end of the year.

Every six months, we update the 1C2S Index by conducting a fresh public opinion survey and incorporating the latest data from international indices. To complement our main index, we have also introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI), which employs big-data techniques to assess sentiment in Hong Kong and overseas printed, electronic, and online media.

We commissioned the Chinese University of Hong Kong's Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies to conduct a telephone poll between July and August 2024 to generate public opinion scores. We updated scores on international perception for the first half of 2024 by scoring and rating 148 countries and territories using nine comprehensive data sources and 127 indicators provided by international think tanks. Sentiment.ai measured the MMI and updated it through the end of June 2024.

Our latest survey has continued to include topical issues related to 1C2S, such as the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047, citizens' identities, attitudes towards emigration, and public opinions on the Greater Bay Area. To fully capture the city's socio-political reality, we introduced new questions to gauge the impact of recent changes, included public's satisfaction with the SAR government, and public opinion on whether employers should consider job applications from individuals who were arrested during the 2019 protests and have faced legal consequences.

It should be stressed that public opinion, international perception, and MMI are shaped by perceptions and may not reflect actual reality. However, changes in perceptions of 1C2S among the Hong Kong public, international think tanks, and the Hong Kong and overseas media are significant. We will analyse the reasons for these changes, as they are crucial for the implementation of 1C2S.

In our report, all scores are expressed on a scale of 0 -10. An asterisk (\*\*) indicates a statistically significant change in scores compared to the previous round. Scores without an asterisk indicate statistically insignificant changes.

Some scores are further analysed by age group, educational attainment, and political inclination. Previously, the non-establishment camp was divided into 'democrats' and 'others'. This division has been removed in this report due to the small size of the 'others' group, which prevented meaningful analysis. However, this data is still available for reference in our online data portal.

Readers can access our data portal for historical data on the 1C2S Index series by visiting the Path of Democracy webpage (<http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/>). An extensive report on the survey results is also available.




## 2. 1C2S Index

The 1C2S Index is the average score of three pillars on public opinion and three pillars on international perception. The three pillars on public opinion, namely ‘high degree of autonomy’, ‘human rights and freedom’ and ‘Hong Kong-Mainland relationship’ reflect Hong Kong residents’ evaluations on different aspects of 1C2S. The three pillars on international perception, namely ‘economic openness’, ‘civil liberty’ and ‘democratic development’, are based on the evaluation by international think tanks regarding various aspects of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

Figure 1 shows the 1C2S Index since 2021 H2. The latest reading in 2024 H1 is 6.17, representing a 2.2% increase from 6.04 recorded half a year ago. After a sustained period of decline, the Index has continued to rise and has returned to its mid-2019 level. This rise is attributed to improvements in scores across all public opinion pillars. The results obtained for these pillars will be detailed in the following sub-sections.

Figure 1: 1C2S Index

圖 1：「一國兩制」指數



### 2.1. Public opinion















Table 1 shows the scores for the pillars and sub-pillars of the public opinion survey. All three pillars have shown an upward trend. The scores of ‘High Degree of Autonomy’ increased by 5.4% to 5.29 points, the scores for ‘Hong Kong-Mainland Relations’ increased by 5.1% to 5.61 points, and the score for ‘Human Rights and Freedom’ increased by 3.8% to 5.46 points.

All twelve sub-pillars showed an upward trend in this round of the survey. The three sub-pillars with the largest increases were ‘Resolving via dialogue and negotiation’ (+10.0%), ‘Self-conduct of administrative affairs’ (+7.1%), and ‘Hong Kong people administrating Hong Kong’ (+6.5%). The changes in scores for ‘Hong Kong people administrating Hong Kong’, ‘Original way of life’ and ‘Resolving via dialogue and negotiation’ reached statistical significance compared to the previous survey period.

Three sub-pillars with the highest scores were ‘Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests’ (6.43), ‘Equal protection of the Law’ (6.17) and ‘Original way of life’ (6.08). The three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were ‘Freedom of speech, association and assembly’ (4.60), ‘Hong Kong people administrating Hong Kong’ (4.78), and ‘Democratic development’ (4.99).

Table 1: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on public opinion

表 1：民意調查的支柱及子支柱分數

	2022 H1	2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2	2024 H1	
<b>Overall 總分</b>	<b>4.71</b>	<b>4.98</b>	<b>5.22</b>	<b>5.21</b>	<b>5.45</b>	
<b>A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治</b>	<b>4.61</b>	<b>4.82</b>	<b>5.06</b>	<b>5.02</b>	<b>5.29</b>	
A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務	4.84	5.07	5.48	5.22	5.59	 *
A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權	4.92	4.99	5.25	5.29	5.40	
A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權	4.74	4.89	5.13	5.09	5.36	
A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」	3.96	4.31	4.38	4.49	4.78	 *
<b>B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由</b>	<b>4.61</b>	<b>4.94</b>	<b>5.11</b>	<b>5.26</b>	<b>5.46</b>	
B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式	5.13	5.52	5.77	5.77	6.08	 *
B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社及集會自由	3.89 <sup>^</sup>	4.26	4.27	4.51	4.60	
B3. Democratic development 民主政制發展	3.74	4.15	4.42	4.78	4.99	
B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護	5.65 <sup>^</sup>	5.82	6.00	5.96	6.17	
<b>C. Hong Kong-Mainland Relations 內港關係</b>	<b>4.92</b>	<b>5.19</b>	<b>5.47</b>	<b>5.34</b>	<b>5.61</b>	
C1. Resolving via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾	4.06	4.24	4.75	4.89	5.38	 *
C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益	5.81	6.24	6.39	6.31	6.43	
C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定	5.61	5.84	5.94	5.29	5.49	
C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落實「一國兩制」	4.19	4.45	4.81	4.88	5.15	

### 2.1.1. Generation gap and political divide

Figure 2 shows average scores of public opinions by age group. Except for the 70 or above age group, all others experienced an increase. Among which, the 40-49 age group experienced the greatest increase by 19.2%, while the 18-29 age group comes in second (+14.9%).

Figure 3 average scores of public opinions by political inclination. Average scores produced by all political groups increased. Pro-establishment supporters increased by 4.6% to 5.45 points, whereas non-establishment supporters experienced a drastic increase of 24.4% to 3.16 points.

Statistical tests revealed a clear and consistent divide in public opinion across political inclinations. Compared to moderates, the evaluations of pro-establishment supporters were significantly more positive. Conversely, the evaluations of non-establishment supporters were significantly more negative.

Figure 2: Public opinion (by age group)

圖 2：民意調查（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 3: Public opinion (by political inclination)

圖 3：民意調查（按政治傾向劃分）



## 2.2. International perception

Table 2 presents the scores for the pillars and sub-pillars by international evaluation. Compared to the previous round, the scores for 'economic openness' slightly increased by 0.4% to 9.35 points, 'civil liberty' rose slightly by 0.3% to 6.26 points, while 'democratic development' remained unchanged at 5.06 points.

The scores for the sub-pillars varied, with some increasing and others decreasing. The sub-pillars with the largest increase was 'democratic culture' (+10.5%), while the largest decrease was in the score for "civic participation" (-10.6%).

The three sub-pillars with the highest scores were 'market access' (9.76), 'financial stability' (9.52) and 'regulatory quality' (9.12). The three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were 'expression, association and assembly' (2.99), 'political pluralism' (3.24) and 'civic participation' (5.16).

Table 2: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on international perception

表 2：國際評價的支柱和子支柱分數

	2022 H1	2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2	2024 H1	
<b>Overall 總分</b>	<b>6.93 (39)</b>	<b>6.87 (39)</b>	<b>6.82 (42)</b>	<b>6.87 (39)</b>	<b>6.89 (40)</b>	
<b>D. Economic Openness 經濟開放</b>	<b>9.28 (2)</b>	<b>9.20 (2)</b>	<b>9.17 (2)</b>	<b>9.31 (2)</b>	<b>9.35 (2)</b>	
D1. Business environment 營商環境	8.85 (2)	8.68 (2)	8.66 (2)	8.98 (2)	8.99 (2)	
D2. Market access 市場門檻	9.73 (1)	9.72 (1)	9.70 (1)	9.71 (1)	9.76 (1)	
D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素	8.83 (2)	8.83 (3)	8.95 (2)	9.17 (2)	9.12 (2)	
D4. Financial stability 金融穩定	9.70 (1)	9.58 (1)	9.37 (4)	9.36 (4)	9.52 (3)	
<b>E. Civil Liberty 公民權利</b>	<b>6.35 (72)</b>	<b>6.28 (72)</b>	<b>6.23 (73)</b>	<b>6.24 (73)</b>	<b>6.26 (72)</b>	
E1. Rule of law 法治	6.44 (42)	6.33 (43)	6.40 (43)	6.42 (43)	6.40 (43)	
E2. Security and safety 安全	8.07 (36)	8.09 (36)	8.11 (36)	8.20 (35)	8.23 (34)	
E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會	3.25 (123)	3.15 (124)	3.08 (126)	2.95 (126)	2.99 (126)	
E4. Individual rights 個人權利	7.64 (43)	7.56 (47)	7.34 (55)	7.41 (51)	7.40 (53)	
<b>F. Democratic Development 民主發展</b>	<b>5.17 (90)</b>	<b>5.12 (91)</b>	<b>5.04 (91)</b>	<b>5.06 (90)</b>	<b>5.06 (90)</b>	
F1. Constraints on powers 權力制約	5.64 (56)	5.50 (60)	5.39 (64)	5.43 (63)	5.40 (64)	
F2. Political pluralism 政治多元	3.51 (123)	3.51 (123)	3.23 (125)	3.23 (125)	3.24 (122)	
F3. Civic participation 公民參與	5.82 (56)	5.79 (57)	5.74 (55)	5.77 (55)	5.16 (76)	
F4. Democratic culture 民主文化	5.73 (72)	5.67 (80)	5.81 (75)	5.81 (73)	6.42 (54)	

Note: World ranking in parentheses.

### 2.2.1. Comparison with selected regions

Generally, developed regions have higher scores for freedom and democracy than developing regions. As Hong Kong is a developed region, we selected neighbouring developed countries and regions, including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan for comparison to evaluate Hong Kong's performance. We also compared the scores of mainland China and the U.S. to observe Hong Kong's development relative to these two major powers under 1C2S.

Table 3 compares the scores of Hong Kong and neighbouring regions on various pillars in the international perception. Hong Kong excels in 'Economic Openness' (9.35 points), ranking second globally, ahead of Taiwan (7.92 points), Japan (7.45 points) and South Korea (7.02 points).

Compared to the previous round, Hong Kong's 'Civil Liberty' ranking rose one position to 72<sup>nd</sup>, with a score of 6.26 points. This score lags behind neighbouring Singapore (6.90 points), Taiwan (8.27 points), South Korea (8.27 points) and Japan (9.05 points).

In terms of 'Democratic Development', Hong Kong's score remains at 5.06 points, not yet on par with other nearby developed regions (Singapore 6.91 points, South Korea 7.58 points, Taiwan 8.28 points, Japan 8.62 points). However, in the past six months, except for Taiwan and the U.S., the scores of other selected countries and regions have shown a downward trend.

Table 3: Pillar scores on international perception of selected regions

表 3：選定地區之國際評價支柱分數

	D. Economic Openness 經濟開放			E. Civil Liberty 公民權利			F. Democratic Development 民主發展			Overall 總分		
	Score 分數	Rank 排名		Score 分數	Rank 排名		Score 分數	Rank 排名		Score 分數	Rank 排名	
Hong Kong 香港	9.35	↑ (2)	-	6.26	↑ (72)	↑	5.06	↓ (90)	-	6.89	↑ (40)	↓
Mainland China 中國內地	6.87	↓ (36)	↑	3.00	↓ (140)	-	2.49	↓ (137)	↑	4.12	↓ (123)	↑
Japan 日本	7.45	↓ (23)	↑	9.05	↑ (13)	↑	8.62	↓ (12)	↓	8.37	↓ (14)	↑
South Korea 南韓	7.02	↑ (31)	↑	8.27	↓ (31)	↓	7.58	↓ (33)	↑	7.62	↓ (29)	↓
Singapore 新加坡	9.68	↑ (1)	-	6.90	↑ (55)	↑	6.81	↓ (47)	↓	7.80	↑ (24)	↑
Taiwan 台灣	7.92	↓ (14)	↓	8.27	↑ (30)	-	8.28	↑ (20)	-	8.16	↓ (19)	-
United States 美國	8.15	↓ (9)	↓	8.15	↑ (33)	↑	7.66	↑ (32)	-	7.99	↓ (20)	-

Note: World ranking in parentheses.

### 2.2.2. Global trend


Figure 4 illustrates the global trend in international perception. In the first half of 2024, the global economy continued to face persistent inflationary pressures and rising interest rates, leading to slower economic growth and the risk of recession in many countries. The Russia-Ukraine war, China-U.S. trade tensions, and other geopolitical risks continue to create uncertainty for the global economy. The global average score for "Economic Openness" declined slightly to 5.74 points (-0.9%). Singapore (9.68), Hong Kong (9.35), and Denmark (8.57) continue to lead the way.

Globally, civil rights and democratic development face significant challenges. Political polarization has intensified in some countries, leading to increased social divisions and political instability. Freedom of speech and press freedom continue to be restricted in some regions, suppressing dissenting voices. The global score for "Civil Rights" remains at 6.05 points. Traditional Nordic countries, Norway (9.87 points), Denmark (9.84 points), and Sweden (9.61 points), are still considered to have the best civil rights protections.

Amidst controversies surrounding electoral fraud and crackdowns on social organizations, some regions continue to experience democratic backsliding. The global score for "Democratic Development" fell by 0.5% compared to the previous six months, reaching 5.64 points. In terms of "Democratic Development," Denmark (9.48), Norway (9.38), and Finland (9.28) continue to occupy the top three positions globally.

Figure 4: Global trend of pillar scores on international perception

圖 4：國際評價支柱分數的全球趨勢



### 2.3. Significant events

This round of index surveys has seen significant political controversies and major events both locally and internationally, which may be closely related to the changes in the 1C2S Index. Listed below are major events that occurred since the last report was published, from January 2024 to June 2024, to provide a deeper understanding of the Index's changing trends.

Table 4: Significant events

表 4：重大事件一覽

1.1	The new term of the District Councils, formed after the implementation of the principle of 'patriots administering Hong Kong', has officially begun.	落實「愛國者治港」原則後產生的新一屆區議會任期正式展開。
1.25	Chow Hang-tung, former Vice-Chairperson of the Hong Kong Alliance, was originally convicted in the "June 4th Incitement to Unlawful Assembly Case" was acquitted on appeal but the Court of Final Appeal upheld the Department of Justice's appeal, reinstating the conviction.	前支聯會副主席鄒幸彤於 2021 年涉及的「六四煽惑集結案」，終審法院裁定律政司上訴得直，恢復原審定罪。

1.25	Chief Executive John Lee announced the formation of a "rebuttal team" to defend Hong Kong policies against criticism and concerns.	行政長官李家超宣布成立一支應變反駁隊，為香港政策辯護、回應和反駁有關市民和外界對香港政策的批判及擔憂。
2.4	Inter Miami CF's exhibition match against the Hong Kong national football team sparked fan outrage after star player Lionel Messi abstained from playing.	美國職業聯賽球隊國際邁阿密與香港足球代表隊進行表演賽，但因球星美斯缺陣，引發球迷憤怒。
2.22	The Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Work Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, Mr. Xia Baolong, began a seven-day visit to Hong Kong.	中共中央港澳工作辦公室主任、國務院港澳事務辦公室主任夏寶龍展開七天訪港行程。
3.16	Twelve defendants convicted of rioting in the July 1st, 2019 attack on the Legislative Council building were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six and a half to seven years.	2019年7月1日衝擊立法會大樓案，暴動罪成的12名被告各被判囚6年半至7年不等。
3.19	The Legislative Council unanimously passed the 'Safeguarding National Security Ordinance'.	立法會全票通過《維護國家安全條例》草案。
3.25	Ma Chun-man, a national security offender, was denied early release due to amendments to prison rules enacted following the implementation of the "Safeguarding National Security Ordinance". This marked the first case of such denial under the new law.	原定可以因監獄中行為良好，而提早出獄的國家安全罪犯馬俊文，因《維護國家安全條例》生效修訂了監獄規則，而不能獲釋，為該條例生效後的首宗案例。
5.8	The High Court formally issued an injunction against the song "Glory to Hong Kong."	高等法院正式批出《願榮光歸香港》禁制令。
5.13	British police charged and prosecuted a Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office employee in London and two others for espionage activities, violating the UK's national security laws.	英國警方指香港駐倫敦經濟貿易辦事處職員及另外2人涉嫌在當地組織間諜活動，觸犯該國國安法，被檢控及起訴。
5.17	The government proposed reforms to the Social Workers Registration Board, including revoking licenses of social workers convicted of serious crimes, to enhance national security.	政府提出改革現有的社工註冊局，舉措包括確保被裁定干犯嚴重罪行人士的社工資格會被註銷，以令註冊局能更有效地維護國家安全。
5.28 & 6.3	Police arrested eight individuals for the first time under the "Safeguarding National Security Ordinance", alleging they committed "offences related to incitement."	警方首次引用《維護國家安全條例》拘捕八人，涉嫌觸犯「煽動意圖的相關罪行」。
5.30 & 6.13	In the "Hong Kong 47 case, 31 defendants pleaded guilty, 14 were found guilty of "conspiracy to subvert state power", and two were acquitted, with the Department of Justice appealing one acquittal.	「泛民47人初選案」裁決宣判，31人認罪，其餘16人不認罪。當中，14人被裁定「串謀顛覆國家政權罪」罪成，其餘2人被判無罪，律政司其後就其中一人提出上訴。
5.30	Financial Secretary Paul Chan led a government delegation to the U.S., signing three MOUs with partners in the San Francisco Bay Area.	財政司司長陳茂波率領政府代表團訪美，期間與三藩市灣區夥伴簽訂三項合作意向書及備忘錄。



6.6	Two non-permanent overseas judges of the Court of Final Appeal, Lord Robert Reed and Lord Patrick Hodge, resigned.	終身法院兩名海外非常任法官，郝廉思和岑耀信請辭
6.7	The Civil Service Bureau issued an updated "Civil Service Code", outlining the constitutional order of Hong Kong, civil servants' role in the executive branch, and their expected beliefs and ethical standards.	公務員事務局頒布更新版《公務員守則》，闡明香港特區的憲制秩序、公務員作為行政機關一員的憲制角色和責任，以及公務員應有的基本信念和操守準則。
6.11	The government announced that a Hong Kong citizen has been selected as a preparatory astronaut, specifically a payload specialist.	政府宣佈，首次有香港市民獲選為國家載人航天工程的載荷專家，並有機會成為航天員，為國家航天工程作出貢獻。
6.12	The Security Bureau revoked the Hong Kong passports of six individuals who fled to the UK on suspicion of national security offenses.	保安局撤銷六名因涉嫌干犯危害國家安全罪行而潛逃英國人士的特區護照。
6.13	The European Union published a "Hong Kong: Annual Report," which the Hong Kong government criticized for its inaccurate and biased content regarding national security and human rights.	歐洲聯盟委員會及歐洲聯盟外交與安全政策高級代表發表「香港年報」，港府對報告有關特區維護國家安全、保障人權等方面不實和偏頗內容表示強烈不滿和反對。

### 3. 1C2S Mass Media Index

Media sentiment is an important factor in shaping public opinion. We attempt to use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S and monitor how its performance is covered in the mass media. This provides a timely barometer of public sentiment. 1C2S MMI measures daily net sentiment of media reports. A quarterly average is reported in this section to align with and complement our main Index, which is compiled biannually. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

#### 3.1. Recent trend


On the 25th anniversary of the HKSAR, Western leaders criticised China for failing to uphold 1C2S, whereas President Xi Jinping reaffirmed his commitment in this system over the long term. Reassurance from the Chinese leadership boosted media optimism to a new high. However, the uplift was soon interrupted by geopolitical tensions. U.S. House Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan and China's subsequent white paper on the Taiwan issue heightened cross-strait tensions. Nonetheless, MMI regained its upward momentum and reached 150.1 in 2022 Q4 after the 20<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the CCP which proclaimed 1C2S a great innovation of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the best arrangement for national reunification.

MMI continued its rising trend with the restructuring of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. Following director Xia Baolong's visit to Hong Kong, these gestures from the central government were warmly welcomed by media reports and commentaries. While discussions of different views entered the generally positive media scene, the proposed reform plan of District Council sparked widespread debate on the new local administration measures. The all-time peak was followed by a steep fall, with a recording of 139.7 in 2023 Q2, as reports released by foreign governments levelled constant criticisms against the state of rule of law and freedoms in Hong Kong.

The previous fall sustained in the second half of 2023 until President Xi's reply letter to Hong Kong students expressed his care to the younger generation and the Chief Executive's overseas visit to ASEAN expanded business opportunities. Despite foreign concerns regarding the city's political landscape and human rights development, MMI continued to soar as a new development plan for synergistic growth of Shenzhen and Hong Kong's innovative and technology sector and the completed election and appointment of new District Council members gathered hopeful news. Consequently, MMI recovered to 155.3 in 2023 Q4.

In the first half of 2024, positive media coverage and public sentiment regarding Hong Kong significantly declined. The Asian Financial Forum 2024, held at the beginning of the year, and the visit by Xia Baolong, the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, garnered some positive media attention. However, the subsequent reintroduction of Article 23 to the legislative agenda attracted considerable international scrutiny and criticism, raising concerns about further erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy and civil liberties. By the end of Q2 2024, MMI had dropped to 133.7.

Figure 5: 1C2S MMI (quarterly average)  
圖 5：「一國兩制」輿情指數 (季度結)




### 3.2. Channel variations

Figure 6 shows MMI by media channels, namely TV and radio, newspaper and online-only media. A general pattern emerged: news reported by TV and radio tended to be relatively more positive while online-only media were more critical. This media landscape changed during the year between the second quarters of 2019 and 2020. TV stations, radios, and newspapers joined the chorus of criticism towards 1C2S and produced more negative sentiment than online-only media. After this period, TV stations and radios resumed their regular reporting style. Their sentiment score grew stronger than other channels in a generally positive news event. However, the distinction between newspapers and online-only media became less and less noticeable. The trend of sentiment generated by these two channels often intertwined.

The latest quarterly survey shows that the scores for all media are on a downward trend, and therefore the overall MMI has also declined significantly.

Figure 6: 1C2S MMI (by media channels)  
圖 6：「一國兩制」輿情指數 (按傳播媒介劃分)



## 4. Political Orientation

Figure 7 depicts the composition of Hong Kong population by political inclination. Moderates (including centrists and those without specific political inclination) remained the largest group (77.1%), followed by non-establishment supporters (14.3%) and pro-establishment supporters (5.9%).


Over the last half year, the gap between the moderates and non-establishment supporters slightly widened, with the two groups diverging by approximately 1.9 percentage from the previous survey period. Meanwhile, the size of pro-establishment supporters decreased by 2.2 percentage points. It is believed that some pro-establishment and non-establishment supporters began to identify themselves as moderates, contributing to a trend of political moderation.

A hopeful trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation continued from mid-2017 to early 2019. The proportion of moderates and pro-establishment supporters in the population increased, while that of non-establishment supporters declined. However, radicalism resurged abruptly thereafter, leading to a reversal of this trend until the political rift began to heal in early 2020. The pro-establishment camp regained supporters, while the non-establishment shrank from its peak, and the moderates rebounded from their low point.

The steadily declining population in support of political extremity indicated a narrowing political divide and polarization. It appeared that the subsiding momentum of political controversies, such as the enactment of NSL, electoral reform and the implementation of Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, began to be reflected in the political makeup of the population.

Figure 7: Political inclination of population

圖 7：香港市民政治傾向




## 4.1. De-radicalisation of youths

Figure 8 illustrates the change in the composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by political inclination. The proportion of moderates significantly increased by 6.5 percentage points to 72.5%. Non-establishment supporters were further divided into 'democrats' and 'others', with the latter representing the localist camp. Democrats decreased by 3.5 percentage points to 15%, while other non-establishment supporters also decreased by 2 percentage points to 9.3%. While the proportion of pro-establishment supporters increased slightly by 0.2 percentage points to 1.8%.

From mid-2017 to early 2019, there were encouraging signs of de-radicalization amid youths, with the proportion of moderates increasing. However, this trend reversed as the proportion of non-establishment supporters experienced a steep rise, exceeding moderates for a period. Furthermore, within the non-establishment group, localists occasionally surpassed democrats. Since mid-2020, the situation of radicalisation has clearly eased, with the proportion of localists decreasing and moderates exceeding the entire non-establishment group.

Figure 8: Political inclination of youths

圖 8：青年的政治傾向



## 5. Continuation of 1C2S

A key issue for Hong Kong's future is the continuation of 1C2S. In previous surveys, respondents were asked about whether this constitutional arrangement should be continued beyond 2047, and those who answered 'yes' were further asked about favourable conditions for such as a goal. This set of questions became irrelevant after the Central Government assured that 1C2S would be preserved over the long term. However, understanding people's needs for a preferred future could still serve the purpose of improving and upholding 1C2S. Therefore, all respondents were asked to choose what conditions would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S from the following list (they were allowed to choose more than one item):

- Maintaining a high degree of autonomy;
  - Maintaining economic prosperity and stability;
  - Political system democratises further;
  - Maintaining national security; and
- Others (please specify).

Figure 9 shows the percentages of respondents who selected each of the five conditions for the continuation of 1C2S. The data reveals a consistent preference among respondents, with "Maintaining economic prosperity and stability" (64.9%) ranking highest. "Maintaining a high degree of autonomy" (46.9%) follows closely, while "Political system democratises further" (33.3%) surpasses "Maintaining national security" (32.7%) to secure the third position. While the proportion of respondents who selected "Others/ Don't know" has significantly decreased by 8.1% to 3.2%.


Figure 10 highlights the distinct patterns of choice across different political inclinations. With the exception of 'Others' category within the non-establishment supporters, all other political groups prioritized 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' as the most favourable condition for the continuation of 1C2S. Moderates ranked 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (67.2%) and 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (46.2%) as their top two priorities. Notably, there is a discernible upward trend in the selection of the remaining two conditions: 'Political system democratises further' (32.4%), 'Maintaining national security' (34.8%).

Pro-establishment supporters also placed "Maintaining economic prosperity and stability" (65.1%) as their highest priority. However, a significant decline is observed in the selection of "Maintaining national security" (48.5%) and "Political system democratises further" (15.9%), exhibiting drops of 12.6% and 12.3% respectively.

Within the non-establishment camp, "Maintaining a high degree of autonomy" (53.5%) and "Maintaining economic prosperity and stability" (53.4%) are perceived as equally crucial conditions for the continued implementation of 1C2S. "Maintaining national security" (14.4%) has experienced a slight decrease of 1.3% compared to the previous survey period.

Figure 9: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047


圖 9：2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件



Note: Previous responses (before 2023) did not include those who opposed continuing 1C2S beyond 2047 (representing about 25% of respondents). Readers should be aware of this change and its potential impact.



Figure 10: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047 (by political inclination)  
 圖 10：有利於 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（按政治傾向劃分）



Note: Data collected prior to 2023 did not include respondents who believed 1C2S 'should not' be continued beyond 2047 (approximately a quarter of the total respondents). Readers are advised to consider this change and its interpretations when interpreting the data.

## 6. Citizens' Identity

We also surveyed how citizens identify themselves: whether as Hongkongers or Chinese. Figure 11 shows that members of the public consistently identified more strongly as Hongkongers than as Chinese. While scores for both identities began to converge in the second half of 2022, the gap between them has since widened. Despite this, the scores for dual identities remain high. This round, the scores for Hongkonger and Chinese are recorded at 8.43 points and 7.16 points, respectively, representing increases of 2.4% and 1.8% compared to the previous survey period. The increase in the rating for Hongkongers is statistically significant compared to the last survey period, namely the second half of 2023.

Figure 12, a graph mapping the mix of identities rated by respondents against time, further illustrates the trend. On a 0 to 10 scale, a median score of 5 indicates moderate identification. Scores above the median indicate relatively strong identification; while scores below the median indicate relatively weak identification. These levels of strength can be grouped into four categories: dual identity (strong in both identifications), stronger identification as Hongkongers only, stronger identification as Chinese only, and others, which include those without a dominant identity. Earlier surveys showed a clear pattern that most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both Hongkongers and Chinese. This had gradually changed since mid-2019 and rebounded after hitting rock bottom in mid-2020. Dual identity became the dominant identity again by overtaking 'Hongkonger only' since 2022. The share for dual identity continued to rise by 3.8 percentage points to 63.8% in this round.

While identification as Chinese does not equate to patriotic, identification as both Hongkongers and Chinese is a pre-requisite for 'devotion to China and Hong Kong'. The rebound in the proportion of Hong Kong people with dual identity since December 2018 suggests easing societal tension, which would likely benefit the implementation of 1C2S. We acknowledge the potential impact of ongoing international condemnation of China on how Hongkongers view themselves. The significance of this factor will hopefully become clearer over time.

Figure 11: Citizens' identity scores

圖 11：市民的身分認同評分





Figure 12: Citizens' identity mix  
圖 12：市民的混合身分認同



## 6.1. Rank correlation

Statistical analysis yields the observation that there was a positive correlation between identification as a Hongkonger and as a Chinese. The converse also held true, as the rank correlation coefficient was 0.239 and this was statistically very significant. The finding that the two identities as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' were mutually reinforcing each other provided a strong basis for the implementation of 1C2S.

Table 5: Rank correlation of citizens' identity  
表 5：市民的身分認同等級相關係數

	2022.7	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7
Correlation 相關係數	0.430	0.332	0.374	0.242	0.239
t-statistic t 檢定統計	14.25	10.32	12.21	7.77	7.68

## 7. Topical Issues

### 7.1. Emigration

Table 6 presents the public's emigration plans. The majority (84.1%) reported having "no plans" to emigrate, significantly exceeding those with "plans" (14.0%). The "no plans" group saw a 3.3 percentage point increase, while the "plans" group experienced a 3.9 percentage point decrease. Consequently, the net value dropped by 7.3 percentage points since the last round, reaching -70.3%.

Figure 13 and Figure 14 illustrate the net value of emigration plans across different age groups and political inclinations. All age groups experienced declines, with the most drastic decreases observed among those aged 18-29 and 40-49.

As expected, non-establishment supporters were more likely to have plans to emigrate than respondents with other political inclinations. Their net value fell by 19.3 percentage points to -43.4%. The pro-establishment camp also experienced a decrease in net value, dropping by 5.3 percentage points to -95.6%.

Past studies have suggested that surveys often overestimate the number of individuals intending to emigrate, as only a fraction of those who expressing interest actually follow through their plans. Therefore, caution should be exercised when interpreting these findings, though they still provide valuable insights into the degree and extent of concern. The relaxation of immigration requirements by popular countries in response to the implementation of the two pieces of national security legislations might also suggest that emigration plans are not necessarily be driven by a lack of confidence in 1C2S, or the socio-political situation in Hong Kong, but rather perceived as 'opportunities not to be missed' by those who had previously considered immigration regardless.

Table 6: Public's emigration plans

表 6 : 市民移民海外的計劃

	2022.7	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7	
Have Plans 有打算	15.8%	12.3%	14.9%	17.9%	14.0%	
No Plans 無打算	74.4%	78.1%	75.6%	80.8%	84.1%	
Don't Know 唔知道	9.8%	9.5%	9.5%	1.3%	1.9%	
Net Value 淨值	-58.6%	-65.8%	-60.8%	-62.9%	-70.2%	*

Net Value: Percent "Have Plans" minus percent "No Plans"

淨值：認為「有打算」的百分比減去認為「無打算」的百分比

Figure 13: Public's emigration plans (by age group)  
圖 13：市民移民海外的計劃（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 14: Public's emigration plans (by political inclination)  
圖 14：市民移民海外的計劃（按政治傾向劃分）



## 7.2. Willingness to live or work in other Greater Bay Area (GBA) cities

Table 7 presents the willingness of respondents to live or work in other cities within the GBA. Of those surveyed, 7.9% indicated they were 'willing' to live or work in the GBA, while 56.0% were 'unwilling'. Compared to the previous survey, the proportion of those willing increased slightly by 1%, while the proportion of those unwilling decreased by 1.7%. Notably, approximately 34% of respondents remained undecided about their willingness, a figure consistent with the previous survey period.

Figure 15 and Figure 16 further illustrate the willingness to live or work in other GBA cities, categorised by age group and political inclination, respectively. Across all age groups, net willingness values showed an increase. The most significant rise was observed among those aged 40-49, with a 9.7 percentage point increase in net willingness, reaching -37.8%.

Similarly, net willingness among supporters of all political camps has continued to increase. Non-establishment supporters experienced the most substantial increase, reaching 7.5%, followed by moderates (1.4%) and pro-establishment supporters (0.3%).

Table 7: Willingness to live or work in other cities of the GBA

表 7：前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願

	2022.7	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7
Willing 會考慮	4.5%	3.4%	5.1%	6.9%	7.9%
Not willing 不會考慮	69.6%	75.2%	61.3%	57.7%	56.0%
Maybe / Don't Know 或者 / 唔知道	25.9%	21.3%	33.6%	34.2%	36.1%
Net Value 淨值	-65.2%	-71.8%	-56.2%	-50.9%	-48.0%

Net Value: Percent "Willing" minus Percent "Not Willing"

淨值：「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比

Figure 15: Willingness to live or work in other cities of the GBA (by age group)

圖 15：前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 16: Willingness to live or work in other cities of the GBA (by political inclination)

圖 16：前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願（按政治傾向劃分）



### 7.3. Confidence in the Hong Kong education system

Table 8 presents the level of public confidence in Hong Kong's education system. Confidence in the education system has increased by 6.5%, reaching 45.6%, the highest level since the question was first posed in mid-2021. Conversely, the proportion of respondents expressing "not confident" in the local education system has decreased by 3.7% to 39.3%.

Figure 17 and Figure 18 further illustrate confidence in the education system, segmented by age group and political inclination, respectively. All age groups, except those aged 70 or above experienced an increase in net confidence values. The most significant increases were observed among those aged 18-29 (+23.6%), 40-49 (+18.9%), and 30-39 (+18.6%). The changes in net confidence values for all respondents and these three age groups are statistically significant.

In terms of political inclination, net confidence values have increased drastically among both moderates (+14.8%) and non-establishments (+16.9%), reaching statistically significant levels. However, the pro-establishment camp saw a decrease in net values by 10.0%.

Table 8: Confidence in the Hong Kong education system  
 表 8：對香港教育制度的信心

	2022.7	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7
Confident 有信心	26.7%	29.6%	41.6%	39.1%	45.6%
Not Confident 無信心	40.6%	40.8%	37.4%	43.6%	39.3%
Half-half 一半半	29.5%	24.2%	18.7%	14.8%	13.7%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	3.2%	5.5%	2.3%	2.6%	1.4%
Net Value 淨值	-13.9%	-11.2%	4.2%	-4.5%	6.3% *

Net value: Percent "Confident" minus Percent "Not Confident"  
 淨值：「有信心」的百分比減去「無信心」的百分比

Figure 17: Confidence in the Hong Kong education system (by age group)  
 圖 17：對香港教育制度的信心（按年齡組別劃分）







Figure 18: Confidence in the Hong Kong education system (by political inclination)  
 圖 18：對香港教育制度的信心（按政治傾向劃分）



## 7.4. Satisfaction with the performance of civil service

Table 9 presents the level of satisfaction respondents expressed regarding the performance of the civil service. Those satisfied with the civil service's performance saw an increase of 4.8%, reaching 45.5%. Conversely, the proportion of respondents expressing dissatisfaction with the civil service's performance decreased slightly by 3.6%, accounting for approximately one-third of the respondents. The change in the net satisfaction reached 13.3%, a statistically significant increase compared to the previous survey.

Figure 19 and Figure 20 further illustrate satisfaction with civil service's performance, segmented by age group. All age groups, except those aged 50-59, experienced an increase in net satisfaction values. The most significant increases were observed among those aged 18-29 (+17.6%), 60-69 (+15.7%), and 40-49 (+14.5%), reaching net values of -1.8%, 29.1%, and 6.3%, respectively.

Net satisfaction values varied among supporters of different political stances. Pro-establishment supporters experienced a drastic decrease in net satisfaction by 20.9 percentage points, reaching 37.1%. Meanwhile, net satisfaction values increased for moderates (19.5%) and non-establishment supporters (-32.1%).

Table 9: Level of satisfaction with civil service performance

表 9：對公務員服務水平的滿意度

	2022.7	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7
Satisfied 滿意	42.6%	40.3%	49.4%	40.7%	45.5%
Dissatisfied 不滿意	29.8%	26.9%	27.6%	35.9%	32.3%
Half-half 一半半	25.8%	29.9%	19.7%	21.5%	20.3%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	1.7%	3.0%	3.3%	1.9%	2.0%
Net Value 淨值	12.8%	13.4%	21.8%	4.8%	13.3%

Net value: Percent 'Satisfied' minus percent 'Dissatisfied'

淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比

Figure 19: Level of satisfaction with civil service performance (by age group)

圖 19：對公務員服務水平的滿意度（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 20: Level of satisfaction with civil service performance (by political inclination)

圖 20：對公務員服務水平的滿意度（按政治傾向劃分）



## 8. Recent Political Events

### 8.1. Satisfaction with HKSAR Government

Table 10 presents public satisfaction ratings with the current Hong Kong SAR Government. Nearly half of the respondents (44.4%) expressed satisfaction with the government's performance, while 39% indicated dissatisfaction.

These mixed public perceptions indicate that the Hong Kong government has opportunities to enhance its standing in the eyes of residents. One area the government could prioritize is fostering economic development and reform, drawing inspiration from the spirit of the Third Plenum. Deepening structural reforms and transitioning towards a more sustainable, innovation-driven economy could offer a constructive path forward for the Hong Kong government.

Table 10: Level of satisfaction with the current HKSAR government

表 10：對現屆政府表現的滿意度

	All Respondents 所有受訪者
Satisfied 滿意	44.4%
Dissatisfied 不滿意	39.0%
Half-half 一半半	15.4%
Don't know 唔知道	1.2%
Net Value 淨值	5.4%

Net value: Percent 'Satisfied' minus percent 'Dissatisfied'

淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比

### 8.2. Political reform

Table 11 examines public opinion on whether the government should accelerate Hong Kong's democratic development. The survey reveals that most respondents (66.6%) believe the government should accelerate democratic development. Conversely, approximately 17.6% believe the government should not accelerate development, while 15.8% remain unsure.

People share a demand for democratic political development. Nonetheless, the Hong Kong administration may need to thread a careful needle - advancing democratic reforms at a measured pace that balances the diverse views of its constituents. Engaging in open dialogue, incorporating public feedback, and ensuring transparency in the reform process could help build broader support and legitimacy.

Table 11: Attitude towards accelerating democratic political development

表 10：對加快民主政制發展的態度

	2020.9	2024.7
Should 應該	67.0%	66.6%
Should not 不應該	14.0%	17.6%
Don't know 唔知道	4.5%	15.8%
Net Value 淨值	53.0%	49.0%

Net value: Percent 'Should' minus percent 'Should not'

淨值：「應該」的百分比減去「不應該」的百分比

Note: Question asked in 2020.9 was 'The Basic Law stipulates that the selection of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council shall be executed by universal suffrage in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. Do you think the future democratization of Hong Kong will be faster or slower?'

註：2020.9 的題目為「基本法規定，要達至普選產生行政長官同立法會須根據循序漸進嘅原則，你認為未來香港達至雙普選嘅進程應該減慢定加快呢？」

### 8.3. Employment of anti-extradition protesters

Table 12 explores public opinion on whether local employers should consider job applications from individuals who have already faced legal consequences from the anti-extradition bill protests. Most respondents (63.2%) believe employers should consider these applications, while approximately one-fifth disagree.

This public sentiment suggests an openness among Hong Kong residents to providing second chances and reintegrating them back into society. Seizing on this, the government could look to spearhead initiatives that assist these individuals in transitioning back into the workforce after serving their sentences. A "forgive and forget" publicity campaign, combined with direct outreach to employers, could demonstrate the government's commitment to rehabilitation and reintegration.

Table 12: Attitude towards employing anti-extradition protesters.

表 11：對招聘反修例示威者的態度

	All Respondents 所有受訪者
Agree 同意	63.2%
Disagree 不同意	20.7%
Half-half 一半半	11.2%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	4.9%
Net Value 淨值	42.5%

Net value: Percent 'Agree' minus percent 'Disagree'

淨值：「同意」的百分比減去「不同意」的百分比

### 8.4. Generation gap and political divide

Table 13 and Table 14 summarize the net values generated from questions about selected political controversies, with the results categorized by age group and political inclination.

The data reveals clear patterns in how respondents from different age and political groups reacted to these controversial issues. Generally, the net values increased with age and decreased as political leanings moved away from the pro-establishment end of the spectrum. For instance, the 18-29 age group and non-establishment supporters were the most critical in their assessments of the political controversies.

Considering the contrasting views displayed by the different political camps, the stance of moderates serves as a valuable reference point for gauging the general public's opinions on these topical issues. In the current round, moderates' level of satisfaction with the SAR Government remained independent from the positions taken by both the pro-establishment and non-establishment camps. This suggests that rationality and pragmatism continue to be deeply rooted within the Hong Kong community.

Table 13: Generation gap over selected political events (by age group)

表 12：對選定政治事件之代溝（按年齡劃分）

	New electoral systems 新選舉制度 (2024.2)	Satisfaction with HKSAR Government 政府表現滿意度 (2024.7)	Democratic political reform 民主政制發展 (2024.7)	Employment of anti- extradition protesters 招聘返修例示威者 (2024.7)
18-29	-26.1%	-31.2%	54.6%	31.7%
30-39	-23.7%	-26.5%	55.6%	31.0%
40-49	-20.0%	-1.3%	59.6%	51.0%
50-59	-7.1%	10.0%	42.0%	41.5%
60-69	5.3%	21.3%	51.5%	52.2%
≥70	21.0%	47.6%	32.9%	41.5%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-6.9%	5.4%	49.0%	42.5%

Table 14: Political divide over selected political controversies (by political inclination)

表 13：對選定政治爭議之政治鴻溝（按政治傾向劃分）

	New electoral systems 新選舉制度 (2024.2)	Satisfaction with HKSAR Government 政府表現滿意度 (2024.7)	Democratic political reform 民主政制發展 (2024.7)	Employment of anti- extradition protesters 招聘返修例示威者 (2024.7)
Pro-establishment 建制派	46.3%	65.8%	33.1%	45.6%
Moderates 溫和派	-4.1%	11.5%	46.3%	41.1%
Non-establishment 非建制派	-57.1%	-54.5%	72.4%	53.3%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-6.9%	5.4%	49.0%	42.5%

# Appendices

## I. Methodology

### 1. Construction of 1C2S Index

We construct a conceptual framework to capture the current situation of 1C2S through six pillars, three based on public opinion and three based on international perception. The three pillars on public opinion are derived from telephone polls conducted among Hong Kong residents, evaluating the implementation of 1C2S. The three pillars on international perception are compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on the state of freedom and democracy worldwide. Each pillar is further divided into four sub-pillars. Consequently, we create a measurement system comprising six pillars and 24 sub-pillars. Each sub-pillar is assigned equal weight to generate a pillar score. The 1C2S Index is calculated as the simple average of all six pillar scores. Table 15 below outlines the six pillars and 24 sub-pillars used in our index.

Table 15: Pillars and sub-pillars of 1C2S Index

表 14：「一國兩制」指數的支柱和子支柱

Pillar 支柱	Sub-pillar 子支柱		
Public Opinion 民意調查	A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治	A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務 A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權 A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權 A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」	
	B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由	B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式	
		B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社和集會自由	
		B3. Democratic development 民主發展	
		B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護	
	C. Hong Kong-Mainland Relations 內港關係	C1. Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾	
		C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益	
		C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定	
		C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落实「一國兩制」	
	International Perception 國際評價	D. Economic Openness 經濟開放	D1. Business environment 營商環境
			D2. Market access 市場門檻
			D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素
D4. Financial stability 金融穩定			
E. Civil Liberty 公民權利		E1. Rule of law 法治	
		E2. Security and safety 安全	
		E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會	
		E4. Individual rights 個人權利	
F. Democratic Development 民主發展	F1. Constraints on power 權力制約		
	F2. Political pluralism 政治多元		
	F3. Civic participation 公民參與		
	F4. Democratic culture 民主文化		

## 1.1. Public Opinion

We obtain three pillar and twelve sub-pillar scores on the implementation of 1C2S from telephone polls conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Each sub-pillar is represented by a single survey question, with the questions listed in Table 16.

Approximately 1,000 individuals are randomly sampled in each round using the CATI (computer-assisted telephone interviewing) system. All the respondents are aged 18 or above and spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin. To ensure representativeness of the Hong Kong population, all data are weighted by the proportion of gender and age of individuals aged 18 or above (excluding foreign domestic helpers) according to the Census and Statistics Department.

Table 17 provides details on the statistical and scientific standards of each survey. Since the first half of 2021, the telephone surveys have employed a dual-frame sampling design, randomly selecting phone numbers from a combined sample of residential landline and mobile phone numbers. To address potential double-counting or other unknown factors arising from individuals owning both landline and mobile numbers, additional steps are taken in the weighting method. The specific calculations are detailed in a subsequent sub-section.

In the telephone polls, many questions employ a 1 to 7 rating scale, with 4 as the median. This scale, known as the Likert scale, is commonly used in psychological assessments. It is preferred over a 0 to 10 scale, as the latter is considered too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents. However, to better align with existing indices that typically employ a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median), we mathematically converted the results into this scale.

Table 16: Questions on public opinion

表 15：民意調查問題

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Survey Question 民調問題
A1	‘After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to practice a high degree of autonomy, and has been able to handle its own internal administrative affairs. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港實行到高度自治，自行處理特區內嘅行政事務。你有幾同意呢？」
A2	‘After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent judiciary powers. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅司法權。你有幾同意呢？」
A3	‘After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent legislative powers. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅立法權。你有幾同意呢？」
A4	‘How successful has the practice of “Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong” been?’ 「整體嚟講，你認為落實『港人治港』有幾成功呢？」
B1	‘After the handover, the original ways of life of the Hong Kong people have maintained. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港人繼續維持原有嘅生活方式。你有幾同意呢？」
B2	‘After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論、結社同集會自由。你有幾同意呢？」
B3	‘After the handover, the development of Hong Kong’s democratic system has been progressively implemented, following the provision of the Basic Law. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港嘅民主政制發展，正係按照基本法嘅規定，循序漸進地落實。你有幾同意呢？」
B4	‘After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capabilities, identities and social classes. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港人不論經濟能力、身份同社會地位都能夠得到法律保護。你有幾同意呢？」



Sub-pillar 子支柱	Survey Question 民調問題
C1	'When conflicts between mainland China and Hong Kong arise, how confident are you that the conflicts can be resolved through consultation and dialogue?' 「對於當內地同香港出現嘅矛盾時，兩地可透過對話協商得以解決，你有幾大信心呢？」
C2	'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to keep intact the sovereignty of China, national security and profits from development projects. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港可以做到維護國家主權、安全和發展利益。你有幾同意呢？」
C3	'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain long-term prosperity and stability. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港能夠維持到長期繁榮穩定。你有幾同意呢？」
C4	'How confident are you in the full implementation of "One Country, Two Systems" in Hong Kong in the future (before 2047)?' 「你有幾大信心香港喺未來（即 2047 年前）能全面落实『一國兩制』呢？」

Table 17: Survey details

表 16：調查概況

Round 輪次	Survey Period 調查日期	Number of Respondents 受訪人數			Response Rates 回應率		Confidence Level 置信水平	Sampling Error 抽樣誤差
		Landline 固網	Mobile 手機	Total 總數	Landline 固網	Mobile 手機		
2017 H1	5.23 - 6.3	1,002	-	1,002	36.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2017 H2	12.11 - 12.23	1,006	-	1,006	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018 H1	5.23 - 6.2	1,004	-	1,004	37.2%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018 H2	12.3 - 12.12	1,001	-	1,001	38.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2019 H1	5.27 - 6.6	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
*	7.24 - 8.7	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
*	10.17 - 10.31	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2019 H2	12.10 - 12.20	1,000	-	1,000	40.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2020 H1	6.9 - 6.29	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2020 H2	12.22 - 1.13	1,002	-	1,002	32.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2021 H1	6.21 - 7.9	498	503	1,001	30.9%	31.4%	95.0%	±3.10%
2021 H2	12.20 - 1.10	497	506	1,003	30.6%	30.0%	95.0%	±3.09%
2022 H1	6.23 - 7.11	481	521	1,002	26.9%	28.2%	95.0%	±3.10%
2022 H2	12.15 - 1.18	474	531	1,005	24.4%	26.7%	95.0%	±3.09%
2023 H1	6.13 - 7.18	432	578	1,010	16.6%	23.3%	95.0%	±3.08%
2023 H2	1.12 - 2.29	248	763	1,011	31.4%	38.2%	95.0%	±3.08%
2024 H1	7.11-7.31	223	790	1,013	50.7%	54.8%	95.0%	±3.08%

Note: "\*\*" denotes surveys conducted in addition to the biannual exercise.

### 1.1.1. Weighting method for dual-frame sampling

In dual-frame sampling, weighting adjustments are made for the ownership of phone numbers in addition to the distribution of the Hong Kong population. Since each individual owns a different amount of landline and mobile numbers, each has a different probability of selection as respondents. To eliminate over-representation of any individual, the first weight factor (WT1) approximates the probability of selection for each respondent. It is a ratio of the amount of landline and mobile numbers owned by a respondent to the total number of those in the territory.  $WT1_i$  is calculated by the inverse of probability of selection of individual  $i$ , i.e.  $WT1_i = \pi_i^{-1}$ .

$$\pi_i = \frac{n_L}{N_L} \times \frac{t_i^L}{e_i^L} + \frac{n_m}{N_m} \times t_i^m$$

<i>Where</i>	$i$	=	$i$ -th person selected
	$n_L$	=	amount of sample's landline numbers
	$N_L$	=	amount of population's landline numbers
	$t_i^L$	=	amount of $i$ -th person's landline numbers
	$e_i^L$	=	amount of eligible respondents in the household
	$n_m$	=	amount of sample's mobile numbers
	$N_m$	=	amount of population's mobile numbers
	$t_i^m$	=	amount of $i$ -th person's mobile numbers

Sampling in telephone surveys is randomized by phone numbers without demographic consideration. The second weight factor (WT2) adjusts the size of every sample group to match population distribution in terms of gender and age. WT2 is calculated by dividing the population estimates of a gender and age group by its sample size and the sample's probability of selection.

$$WT2 = \frac{\text{group population estimates}}{\text{group sample size} \times WT1}$$

The final weighting factor (WT\_F) is calculated by the following formula.

$$WT\_F = WT1 \times WT2 \times \frac{\text{total sample size}}{\text{total population estimates}}$$

<i>Where</i>	WT_F	=	final weighting factor
	WT1	=	weight factor adjusting for the ownership of phone numbers
	WT2	=	weight factor adjusting for the distribution of the Hong Kong population

## 1.2. International perception

We obtain 3 pillar and 12 sub-pillar scores on the state of freedom and democracy in the world from tracking indices compiled by international think tanks. Every sub-pillar is derived from multiple indicators. They offer a wide coverage of scopes and territories enabling us to compare Hong Kong's position on the global stage with an 1C2S perspective. There are two selection criteria for data sources. First, their datasets must cover Hong Kong to allow a direct comparison. Second, their indicators must capture key areas of 1C2S that draw international attention. Also, every data source has a different geographic coverage, only locations observed by at least three quarters of all data sources are included. As a result, 127 indicators from 9 data sources are adopted in our model to score and rank 148 countries and territories. Tables below show the list of indicators and their sources. Data sources include:

- Cato Institute and Fraser Institute: Human Freedom Index (HFI);
- Economist Intelligence Unit: Democracy Index (DI);
- Freedom House: Freedom in the World (FIW);
- International Institute for Management Development (IMD): World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY);
- Reporters Without Borders: World Press Freedom Index (WPFI);
- V-Dem Institute: V-Dem Dataset (V-Dem);
- World Bank: Doing Business Index (DB);
- World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Index (GCI); and
- World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index (RoLI).

Table 18: List of indicators on international perception (D. Economic Openness)

表 17：國際評價之指標列表（D. 經濟開放）

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
D1. Business Environment 營商環境	Business facilitation 方便營商	D1.1	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.10 Burden of government regulation	GCI	1-7
		D1.2	5C Business regulations	EFW	0-10
		D1.3	Paying Taxes	DB	0-100
		D1.4	Resolving Insolvency	DB	0-100
	Labour market 勞動市場	D1.5	Pillar 8: Labour market	GCI	0-100
		D1.6	Business Efficiency - 3.2 Labor Market	WCY	0-100
D2. Market Access 市場門檻	Free trade 自由貿易	D2.1	4 Freedom to trade internationally	EFW	0-10
		D2.2	Pillar 7: Product market - Trade openness	GCI	0-100
		D2.3	Trading across Borders	DB	0-100
	Market competition 市場競爭	D2.4	Starting a Business	DB	0-10
		D2.5	Government Efficiency - 2.4 Business Legislation	WCY	0-100
		D2.6	Business Efficiency - 3.5 Attitudes and Values	WCY	0-100
		D2.7	Pillar 7: Product market - Domestic competition	GCI	0-100
D3. Regulatory Quality 監管質素	Protection of property rights 保障私有產權	D3.1	2C Protection of property rights	EFW	0-10
		D3.2	Infrastructure - 4.3.21 Intellectual property rights	WCY	0-10
		D3.3	Pillar 1: Institutions - Property rights	GCI	0-100
	Enforcement of contracts 履行合約	D3.4	2F Legal enforcement of contracts	EFW	0-10
		D3.5	Government Efficiency - 2.3.09 Legal and regulatory framework	WCY	0-10
		D3.6	Enforcing Contracts	DB	0-100
		D3.7	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes	GCI	1-7
	Corporate governance 企業管治	D3.8	Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Auditing and accounting practices	WCY	0-10
		D3.9	Pillar 1: Institutions - Corporate governance	GCI	0-100
		D3.10	Protecting Minority Investors	DB	0-100
D4. Financial Stability 金融穩定	Public finance 公共財政	D4.1	3 Sound Money	EFW	0-10
		D4.2	Government Efficiency - 2.1.07 Public finance	WCY	0-10
		D4.3	Pillar 4: Macroeconomic stability	GCI	0-100
	Money market 金融市場	D4.4	5A Credit market regulations	EFW	0-10
		D4.5	Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Banking and financial services	WCY	0-10
		D4.6	Getting Credit	DB	0-100
		D4.7	Pillar 9: Financial system	GCI	0-100

Table 19: List of indicators on international perception (E. Civil Liberty)

表 18：國際評價之指標列表 (E. 公民權利)

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
E1. Rule of Law 法治	Judicial independence 司法獨立	E1.1	F. Rule of Law – F1. Is there an independent judiciary?	FiW	0-4
		E1.2	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.07 Judicial independence	GCI	0-100
	Civil and criminal justice 民事與刑事公義	E1.3	F. Rule of Law – F2. Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?	FiW	0-4
		E1.4	Government Efficiency – 2.5.01 Justice	WCY	0-10
		E1.5	Factor 7: Civil Justice	RoLI	0-1
		E1.6	Factor 8: Criminal Justice	RoLI	0-1
	Equal protection 平等保障	E1.7	F. Rule of Law – F4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?	FiW	0-4
		E1.8	Access to justice	V-Dem	0-1
	Regulatory enforcement 監管執法	E1.9	Factor 6: Regulatory Enforcement	RoLI	0-1
		E1.10	Rigorous and impartial public administration	V-Dem	0-4
		E1.11	Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	V-Dem	0-4
E2. Security and Safety 安全	Absence of crime 杜絕犯罪	E2.1	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.01 Organized crime	GCI	1-7
		E2.2	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.04 Reliability of police services	GCI	1-7
		E2.3	Factor 5: Order and Security – 5.1 Crime is effectively controlled	RoLI	0-1
	Right to life 生存權利	E2.4	B Security and Safety – Bi Homicide	PFI	0-10
		E2.5	F. Rule of Law – F3. Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?	FiW	0-4
		E2.6	Physical violence index	V-Dem	0-1
		E2.7	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.2 The right to life and security of the person is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Civil conflict and terrorism 內戰與恐怖主義	E2.8	B Security and Safety – Bii. Disappearances, conflicts, and terrorism	PFI	0-10
		E2.9	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.03 Terrorism incidence	GCI	0-100
		E2.10	Factor 5: Order and Security – 5.2 Civil conflict is effectively limited	RoLI	0-1
E3. Expression, Association and Assembly 表達、結社與集會	Expression 表達	E3.1	F Freedom of Expression – Fi Direct Attacks on Press	PFI	0-10
		E3.2	(Removed)*	-	-
		E3.3	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D1. Are there free and independent media?	FiW	0-4
		E3.4	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?	FiW	0-4
		E3.5	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D4. Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?	FiW	0-4
		E3.6	World Press Freedom Index	WPFI	0-100
		E3.7	Freedom of expression index	V-Dem	0-1
		E3.8	Alternative sources of information index	V-Dem	0-1
		E3.9	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.4 Freedom of opinion and expression is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Association and Assembly 結社和集會	E3.10	E. Associational and Organizational Rights	FiW	0-12
		E3.11	Freedom of peaceful assembly	V-Dem	0-4
		E3.12	CSO entry and exit	V-Dem	0-4
		E3.13	CSO repression	V-Dem	0-4
		E3.14	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.7 Freedom of assembly and association is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1

\* Combined with E3.1 to reflect a revision from Cato Institute.

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
E4. Individual Rights 個人權利	Religion 宗教	E4.1	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or non-belief in public and private?	FiW	0-4
		E4.2	Freedom of religion	V-Dem	0-4
		E4.3	Religious organization repression	V-Dem	0-4
		E4.4	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.5 Freedom of belief and religion is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Movement 遷徙	E4.5	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?	FiW	0-4
		E4.6	Freedom of domestic movement	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.7	Freedom of foreign movement	V-Dem	0-4
	Labour 勞動	E4.8	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G4. Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation?	FiW	0-4
		E4.9	Government Efficiency – 2.5.11 Equal opportunity	WCY	0-10
		E4.10	Freedom from forced labor	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.11	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.8 Fundamental labor rights are effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Property rights 私有產權	E4.12	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G2. Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors?	FiW	0-4
		E4.13	Property rights	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.14	Relationship Freedoms	PFI	0-10
	Relationship 關係	E4.15	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?	FiW	0-4
		E4.16	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.1 Equal treatment and absence of discrimination	RoLI	0-1
	Privacy, non-discrimination and equal treatment 私隱、非歧視和平等對待	E4.17	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.6 Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1

Table 20: List of indicators on international perception (F. Democratic Development)

表 19：國際評價之指標列表 (F. 民主發展)

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
F1. Constraints on Power 權力制約	Executive check 制約行政權	F1.1	Functioning of government	DI	0-100
		F1.2	Factor 1: Constraints on Government Powers	RoLI	0-1
		F1.3	Judicial constraints on the executive index	V-Dem	0-1
		F1.4	Legislative constraints on the executive index	V-Dem	0-1
		F1.5	C. Functioning of Government – C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?	FiW	0-4
		F1.6	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.08 Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations	GCI	0-100
	Absence of corruption 杜絕貪腐	F1.7	C. Functioning of Government – C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?	FiW	0-4
		F1.8	Government Efficiency – 2.3.13 Bribery and corruption	WCY	0-10
		F1.9	Political corruption index	V-Dem	0-1 (inverted 倒數)
		F1.10	Factor 2: Absence of Corruption	RoLI	0-1

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
F2. Political Pluralism 政治多元	Electoral process 選舉過程	F2.1	A. Electoral Process	FiW	0-12
		F2.2	Electoral process and pluralism	DI	0-100
		F2.3	Clean elections index	V-Dem	0-1
		F2.4	Share of population with suffrage	V-Dem	0-1
		F2.5	Disclosure of campaign donations	V-Dem	0-4
	Political competition 政治競爭	F2.6	B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B2. Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?	FiW	0-4
		F2.7	B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?	FiW	0-4
		F2.8	Public campaign finance	V-Dem	0-4 z score
		F2.9	Divided party control index	V-Dem	z 分數
		F2.10	Elected officials index	V-Dem	0-1
	Party development 政團發展	F2.11	B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?	FiW	0-4
		F2.12	Barriers to parties	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.13	Party ban	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.14	Opposition parties autonomy	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.15	Party institutionalization index	V-Dem	0-1
F3. Civic Participation 公民參與	Political rights and awareness 政治權利與意識	F3.1	B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B4. Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?	FiW	0-4
		F3.2	Political participation	DI	0-100
		F3.3	Mass mobilization	V-Dem	0-4
	Citizen engagement 公民參與	F3.4	Civil society participation index	V-Dem	0-1
		F3.5	Engagement in state-administered mass organizations	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.6	Engagement in independent trade unions	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.7	Engagement in independent political associations	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.8	Engagement in independent non-political associations	V-Dem	0-4
	Transparency and open government 政務公開	F3.9	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.06 Budget transparency	GCI	0-100
		F3.10	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.12 E-participation	GCI	0-100
		F3.11	C. Functioning of Government – C3. Does the government operate with openness and transparency?	FiW	0-4
		F3.12	Factor 3: Open Government	RoLI	0-1
		F3.13	Government Efficiency – 2.3.11 Transparency	WCY	0-10
F4. Democratic Culture 民主文化	Public attitude 大眾態度	F4.1	Political culture	DI	0-100
		F4.2	Deliberative component index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.3	Political Polarization	V-Dem	0-4 (inverted 倒數)
		F4.4	Political violence	V-Dem	0-4 (inverted 倒數)
		F4.5	Factor 5: Order and Security – 5.3 People do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances	RoLI	0-1
	Political equality 政治平等	F4.6	Equal protection index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.7	Equal access index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.8	Equal distribution of resources index	V-Dem	0-1

### 1.2.1. Aggregation method for composite indicators

International indices are often released with a considerable time lag due to the extensive data compilation from a large number of countries. Very few indicators are collected for release in the immediate index period. Hence, we offset the time difference by rolling data forward to the release date. In other words, indicators are assigned to the index period in which they become available. Figure 21 shows the number of indicators by years offset. An alternative approach is to backdate data to the collection period. However, this approach has three disadvantages. No change will be observed in the latest issue because new scores are applied to an earlier period. Our biannual report will always record identical values in the first and second halves because most datasets are compiled on a yearly basis. Published scores will be revised substantially in the subsequent issue because indicators are updated retrospectively. It is noteworthy that backdating or time offsetting affects only the presentation of historical scores. Both approaches produce the latest pillar scores based on the latest available data.

Countries and territories covered by insufficient data sources are omitted in our model. For remaining included locations, an imputation process is carried out to replace missing data. Countries and territories are categorized into 7 regions according to the World Bank region groups. When a missing value arises, it is substituted with the regional average of recorded values. To standardize the range of data values, the complete dataset is transformed into a common scale by min-max normalisation as the below formula. For each indicator in each index period, the frontier value will be rescaled to 10 and the bottom value to 0. Even if a country or territory has the same raw score over time, its normalized score can be changed due to a change in the minimum or maximum value of the data series.

$$\text{normalized score} = \frac{x_i - \min(x)}{\max(x) - \min(x)}$$

A sub-pillar score is generated by its indicators with weights determined by principal component analysis. It is a standard statistical method that processes and simplifies data scientifically in index construction. It extracts a dataset's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains variations across the data through the below statistical analysis. Table 21 shows the weights of every indicator in recent index periods. Measuring about 60 countries and territories only, the coverage of IMD's World Competitiveness Yearbook is significantly smaller than other data sources. As there are more missing than recorded entries, we will assign a zero weight to IMD indicators for unobserved countries and territories instead of imputing with sub-regional average. The weights of available indicators from the remaining data sources will be enlarged proportionately.

Figure 21: Number of indicators by offsetting years

圖 21：經年期調整之指標數目




Table 21: PCA weights (%)

表 20 : 主成分權重 ( % )

D. Economic Openness 經濟開放						E. Civil Liberty 公民權利						F. Democratic Development 民主發展					
	2022	2022	2023	2023	2024		2022	2022	2023	2023	2024		2022	2022	2023	2023	2024
	H1	H2	H1	H2	H1		H1	H2	H1	H2	H1		H1	H2	H1	H2	H1
D1.1	12.1	12.9	13.9	21.8	22.6	E1.1	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.2	9.4	F1.1	12.4	12.5	12.4	12.4	12.5
D1.2	20.6	19.4	19.8	21.7	22.4	E1.2	7.1	7.1	7.0	7.2	7.1	F1.2	12.6	12.8	12.5	12.5	12.5
D1.3	18.8	19.1	19.6	16.1	16.0	E1.3	10.6	10.6	10.5	10.5	10.7	F1.3	11.1	11.1	10.8	10.8	10.8
D1.4	17.3	16.9	17.0	10.4	9.9	E1.4	2.5	2.5	2.8	2.9	2.5	F1.4	9.3	9.3	9.6	9.5	10.3
D1.5	22.5	22.7	23.2	19.7	19.5	E1.5	10.5	10.5	10.6	10.7	10.7	F1.5	10.1	10.1	10.0	9.9	10.0
D1.6	8.7	9.1	6.6	10.3	9.7	E1.6	10.8	10.8	10.9	10.8	10.8	F1.6	4.9	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.8
D2.1	14.6	14.5	14.7	15.9	16.3	E1.7	8.7	8.7	8.7	8.6	8.6	F1.7	12.6	12.5	12.4	12.4	12.4
D2.2	15.2	15.1	15.3	15.3	16.1	E1.8	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.4	F1.8	3.6	3.6	4.1	4.2	3.4
D2.3	13.8	13.2	13.5	13.4	13.6	E1.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	F1.9	12.4	12.3	12.2	12.2	12.3
D2.4	11.6	11.2	11.1	11.5	12.1	E1.10	10.5	10.5	10.1	10.0	10.2	F1.10	11.0	11.1	11.0	11.1	11.0
D2.5	16.2	16.9	16.7	16.0	16.5	E1.11	9.5	9.5	9.7	9.7	9.7	F2.1	9.6	9.7	9.5	9.5	9.4
D2.6	9.6	10.1	9.6	9.0	6.0	E2.1	10.2	10.1	10.2	9.8	9.8	F2.2	9.3	9.2	9.2	9.1	9.2
D2.7	18.9	19.1	19.2	18.8	19.4	E2.2	10.6	10.5	10.6	10.2	10.2	F2.3	8.0	8.0	7.7	7.7	8.1
D3.1	13.1	13.1	13.2	12.7	12.9	E2.3	11.2	11.1	11.2	11.2	11.2	F2.4	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.4
D3.2	10.7	10.7	11.2	10.8	10.7	E2.4	5.1	4.6	4.7	5.2	5.2	F2.5	5.2	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.8
D3.3	13.5	13.5	13.8	13.8	14.0	E2.5	13.6	13.9	13.6	13.6	13.4	F2.6	9.4	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.3
D3.4	10.3	10.3	10.3	12.2	12.4	E2.6	10.8	11.0	10.8	10.7	11.1	F2.7	8.7	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.6
D3.5	6.5	6.5	5.3	4.7	3.9	E2.7	14.3	14.2	14.1	13.7	13.7	F2.8	3.8	3.8	4.1	4.1	4.4
D3.6	8.0	8.0	8.1	8.0	8.1	E2.8	12.8	13.1	13.0	13.8	13.6	F2.9	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5
D3.7	10.5	10.5	10.2	9.5	9.5	E2.9	5.1	4.8	4.9	4.4	4.3	F2.10	4.4	4.4	4.9	5.0	4.7
D3.8	9.6	9.6	10.0	9.6	9.2	E2.10	6.4	6.8	7.0	7.3	7.4	F2.11	9.9	9.9	9.8	9.8	9.6
D3.9	10.4	10.4	10.6	10.7	11.1	E3.1	0.0	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.9	F2.12	8.3	8.3	8.2	8.1	7.9
D3.10	7.3	7.3	7.4	7.8	8.1	E3.2	3.0	-	-	-	-	F2.13	6.2	6.2	6.0	6.1	5.9
D4.1	15.9	15.5	15.9	17.4	17.9	E3.3	8.4	8.4	8.3	8.3	8.3	F2.14	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.6
D4.2	7.0	8.6	7.4	6.0	4.8	E3.4	8.3	8.3	8.2	8.2	8.3	F2.15	6.5	6.6	6.7	6.7	6.6
D4.3	21.6	22.1	23.0	22.5	22.4	E3.5	8.3	8.3	8.4	8.3	8.2	F3.1	12.9	12.8	12.7	12.7	12.1
D4.4	12.6	8.8	9.0	11.1	11.3	E3.6	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.8	7.6	F3.2	13.0	13.0	12.7	12.8	12.4
D4.5	15.5	17.1	16.3	14.8	15.4	E3.7	8.9	8.9	8.7	8.8	8.8	F3.3	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.2	1.3
D4.6	6.5	6.3	6.4	7.0	7.2	E3.8	7.9	7.8	7.6	7.6	7.8	F3.4	10.8	10.8	10.3	10.2	10.7
D4.7	21.0	21.7	22.2	21.3	21.0	E3.9	7.1	7.2	7.2	7.1	7.1	F3.5	6.3	6.3	7.3	7.2	7.0
						E3.10	8.7	8.7	8.7	8.8	8.8	F3.6	4.8	4.8	5.1	4.8	5.1
						E3.11	7.7	7.7	8.1	8.1	8.0	F3.7	3.8	3.7	4.9	4.7	6.5
						E3.12	8.1	8.0	8.1	8.1	8.1	F3.8	2.8	2.8	3.3	3.1	4.5
						E3.13	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	F3.9	10.3	10.2	9.8	10.3	9.8
						E3.14	7.4	7.6	7.6	7.5	7.5	F3.10	7.5	7.4	7.0	7.4	6.8
						E4.1	6.1	6.0	6.0	5.9	6.1	F3.11	14.1	14.1	13.5	13.4	12.5
						E4.2	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.7	F3.12	12.1	12.3	11.7	11.7	11.1
						E4.3	6.0	5.9	5.9	5.8	6.0	F3.13	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.1
						E4.4	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	F4.1	13.3	13.1	13.1	12.8	13.0
						E4.5	7.9	7.9	7.8	7.8	7.9	F4.2	13.1	13.0	13.4	13.5	13.0
						E4.6	6.2	6.1	6.9	6.9	6.9	F4.3	7.2	7.1	6.3	6.4	7.3
						E4.7	5.6	5.6	5.9	6.0	6.4	F4.4	11.0	10.9	10.3	10.3	10.7
						E4.8	7.9	7.9	7.8	7.8	7.8	F4.5	8.7	9.2	9.1	9.3	9.6
						E4.9	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0	F4.6	16.3	16.4	16.7	16.6	16.3
						E4.10	5.3	5.3	5.1	5.1	4.9	F4.7	14.1	13.9	14.4	14.3	13.7
						E4.11	6.2	6.2	6.1	6.1	6.1	F4.8	16.3	16.4	16.5	16.7	16.4
						E4.12	8.0	7.9	7.9	7.8	7.8						
						E4.13	6.3	6.2	6.3	6.3	5.9						
						E4.14	4.3	4.3	4.1	4.3	4.2						
						E4.15	7.0	7.0	6.8	6.8	6.8						
						E4.16	4.3	4.6	4.4	4.5	4.4						
						E4.17	6.5	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6						



### 1.3. Revisions and refinement

After the first survey in June 2017, our questionnaire for public opinion was refined in the 2017 H2, 2020 H2 and 2022 H1 rounds to increase validity. These refinements include change of wordings and addition and removal of questions, affecting five of the twelve questions used to compute public opinion scores. Scores of the other seven questions are directly comparable as they are identical in all surveys. Table 22 and Table 23 show the history of the refinement of our questionnaire and the score differences from it respectively.

We have expanded the measurement system for international perception with more indicators and data sources since the 2022 H1 report to enhance objectivity. Figure 22 compares every country's score in the original and revised measurement systems in the same index period. The overall correlation is very strong. Despite a broader selection of indicators leads to slight score differences, both systems are consistent with the performance of a country.

Table 22: Revisions of questions on public opinion

表 21：民意調查問題之修訂


Round 輪次	Revision 修訂
2017 H2	Removed 'After the handover, the internal affairs of Hong Kong have not been interfered with by the central and local governments of China. To what extent would you agree?' 移除「回歸之後，特區內部事務並無受到中央各部門同其他內地省市嘅干預。你有幾同意呢？」
2017 H2	Revised 'After the handover, the way of life of the Hong Kong people has not been affected by mainland China. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain their original way of life. To what extent would you agree?' 修訂「回歸之後，香港人原有嘅生活方式受到內地影響。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港人繼續維持原有嘅生活方式。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?' 新增「回歸之後，香港人繼續喺法律面前一律平等。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to keep intact the sovereignty of China, national security and profits from development projects. To what extent would you agree?' 新增「回歸之後，香港可以做到維護國家主權、安全和發展利益。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain prosperity and stability in the long term. To what extent would you agree?' 新增「回歸之後，香港能夠維持到長期繁榮穩定。你有幾同意呢？」
2022 H1	Revised 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedom of speech.' to 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly.' 修訂「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論自由。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論、結社同集會自由。你有幾同意呢？」
2022 H1	Revised 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capability, identity and social status. To what extent would you agree?' 修訂「回歸之後，香港人繼續喺法律面前一律平等。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港人不論經濟能力、身份同社會地位都能夠得到法律保護。你有幾同意呢？」

Table 23: Score difference due to revisions of questions on public opinion

表 22：修訂民意調查問題之評分差距

Round 輪次	Identical 相同	Revised 修訂	Difference 差距
2017 H1	4.70	4.84	0.14
2017 H2	4.67	4.98	0.31
2018 H1	4.78	5.05	0.27
2018 H2	4.59	4.84	0.25
2019 H1	4.30	4.58	0.28
2019 H2	3.27	3.53	0.26
2020 H1	3.15	3.39	0.24
2020 H2	3.15	3.62	0.47
2021 H1	3.19	3.62	0.43
2021 H2	3.64	4.02	0.38
2022 H1	4.35	4.71	0.36
2022 H2	4.59	4.98	0.39
2023 H1	4.89	5.22	0.33
2023 H2	4.95	5.21	0.26
2024 H1	5.24	5.45	0.22

Figure 22: Score difference of revised measurement systems on international perception  
圖 22：修訂國際評價指標體系後之評分差距



## 2. Construction of 1C2S Mass Media Index

We build up a massive dataset by collecting media articles that contain the keyword ‘One Country, Two Systems’ from news database. Our sample consists of 261,332 news reports from 6 television and radio stations, 21 local daily newspapers and 10 online-only media that were published between April 1998 and December 2023. Each article undergoes a ‘tokenisation’ process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of over 20 years, our text corpus contains around 211 million tokens. The number of articles processed from each media source is listed in Table 24.

Common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as pronouns, prepositions and particles, are first removed before further analysis. To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘neutral’. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by the Natural Language Processing and Sentiment Analysis Lab, Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica.

An article is made up of paragraphs. For each paragraph, net sentiment is calculated by the difference between the number of positive and negative words divided by the total word count. At the article level, a net sentiment score is then derived by averaging the net sentiment of its constituent paragraphs with the below equation. To each news source, a daily net sentiment score is further assigned by averaging the score of all articles published in the past 30 days. This time frame of 30 days is a reporting standard of the media industry. MMI is set at 100 on the base day of 1 January 2021.

$$\text{net sentiment score} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \frac{(a_i - b_i)}{w_i}}{N}$$

*N* = total number of paragraphs

*i* = the *i*<sup>th</sup> paragraph

*a<sub>i</sub>* = number of positive words

*b<sub>i</sub>* = number of negative words

*w<sub>i</sub>* = total number of words

People often receive news from multiple sources and channels. Since there are substantial differences in the number of news articles published by various sources and in the number of viewership via various channels, the article count of a news source alone could be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure 1C2S MMI’s reliability, the sentiment score for each news source is weighted by public perceptions of its credibility based on the survey ‘Public Evaluation on Media Credibility’ conducted by the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, The Chinese University of Hong Kong and each media channel is weighted based on people’s main sources of news from the survey ‘Appraisal of the Local News Media’ conducted by Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute.

Table 24: Articles processed in 1C2S MMI

表 23 : 輿情指數之處理報道數

	2023 Q2	2023 Q3	2023 Q4	2024 Q1	2024 Q2	Database Total 數據庫總量
<b>TV &amp; Radio 電視電台</b>	<b>544</b>	<b>478</b>	<b>765</b>	<b>699</b>	<b>659</b>	<b>28,331</b>
Cable TV / Hong Kong Open TV 有線電視/香港開電視	29	22	42	45	38	1,068
Commercial Radio 商業電台	72	59	90	72	69	3,706
Metro Radio 新城電台	75	81	80	98	88	2,664
Now TV	94	119	181	171	141	6,009
RTHK 香港電台	180	150	280	203	251	9,422
TVB 無綫電視	94	47	92	110	72	5,451
<b>Newspaper 報章</b>	<b>2,884</b>	<b>2,527</b>	<b>3,185</b>	<b>3,119</b>	<b>2,324</b>	<b>214,672</b>
am730	78	73	106	104	82	5,317
Apple Daily 蘋果日報	-	-	-	-	-	13,076
Headline Daily 頭條日報	16	-	-	2	149	1,872
Hong Kong Commercial Daily 香港商報	141	160	218	169	126	19,448
Hong Kong Daily News 新報	-	-	-	-	-	4,476
Hong Kong Economic Journal 信報	122	129	141	142	136	6,411
Hong Kong Economic Times 經濟日報	71	64	60	63	66	9,524
Lion Rock Daily 香港仔	26	20	42	36	17	704
Metro Daily 都市日報	-	-	-	-	-	1,528
Ming Pao Daily News 明報	126	118	156	124	116	15,895
Oriental Daily News 東方日報	44	22	28	28	25	10,398
South China Morning Post 南華早報	21	13	18	-	-	707
Sharp Daily 爽報	-	-	-	-	-	152
Sing Pao 成報	31	32	59	41	30	5,535
Sing Tao Daily 星島日報	289	202	260	220	231	16,945
Sky Post 晴報	10	7	-	-	-	833
Ta Kung Pao 大公報	957	823	1,018	1,159	520	48,871
The Standard 英文虎報	-	5	3	-	-	107
The Sun 太陽報	-	-	-	-	-	4,828
Tin Tin Daily News 天天日報	-	-	-	-	-	452
Wen Wei Po 文匯報	952	859	1,076	1,031	826	47,593
<b>Online-Only Media 純網媒</b>	<b>629</b>	<b>513</b>	<b>776</b>	<b>717</b>	<b>645</b>	<b>26,492</b>
Bastille Post 巴士的報	389	246	388	354	357	12,133
Citizen News 眾新聞	-	-	-	-	-	1,186
HK01 香港 01	199	225	306	296	225	9,107
Hong Kong Free Press 香港自由新聞	4	5	6	1	-	45
Initium Media 端傳媒	4	3	9	10	8	195
In-Media 獨立媒體	-	4	28	27	18	555
Passion Times 熱血時報	30	29	38	26	37	722
Post 852 852 郵報	-	-	-	-	-	631
Speak Out HK 港人講地	3	1	1	3	-	58
Stand News 立場新聞	-	-	-	-	-	1,860
<b>Total 總數</b>	<b>4,057</b>	<b>3,518</b>	<b>4,726</b>	<b>4,535</b>	<b>3,628</b>	<b>269,495</b>

## 2.1. Accuracy test

1C2S MMI is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict.

In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time. As shown in Table 25, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as 'positive' whereas 1,472 were classified as 'negative.'

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be.

Table 25 also shows the average sentiment scores of these three groups of paragraphs. In particular, 'positive' paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as 'negative' paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these three groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.

Table 25: Results of accuracy test

表 24 : 覆查結果

	Positive 正面	Neutral 中立	Negative 負面
No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers 真人研究員對情緒的判斷	2,363	14,202	1,472
Net Value 情緒淨值	21.76%	14.42%	2.92%


## II. Comparable Surveys

### 1. Perception of 1C2S

Our 1C2S Index reflects local and international perceptions of areas such as Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, human rights and freedom, democratic development, economic openness, and Hong Kong-Mainland relations. We conduct telephone surveys and collect data from international think tanks every six months. Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (HKPORI, formerly Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong) also conducts telephone surveys quarterly to gauge public confidence in 1C2S. Respondents are asked, 'Generally speaking, are you confident in "One Country Two Systems"?' Figure 23 shows that these surveys display a similar trend with a decline from mid-2017 to late-2019 followed by a gradual rebound.

Figure 23: Changes of public perceptions towards 1C2S

圖 23：「一國兩制」公眾觀感的變動




### 2. Media sentiment and public opinion

We use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S covered by TV stations, radios, newspapers and online media. 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) measures daily net sentiment of media reports. It is calculated monthly and reported quarterly. As media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion, we compare it with HKPORI's Public Sentiment Index (PSI). PSI quantified Hong Kong people's sentiments towards the prevailing societal, economic and political climate. It appraises the concepts of 'good governance' and 'social harmony' by evaluating the overall government performance and social conditions. Figure 24 shows both MMI and PSI oscillated in 2017 and 2018, bottomed in 2019 and embarked on a path of recovery.

Figure 24: Changes of MMI and PSI

圖 24：輿情指數和民情指數的變動



### 3. Political orientation


We ask citizens about their political inclination in our half-yearly survey and classify them as pro-establishment supporters, non-establishment supporters (including democrats, localists, and self-determinists), and moderates (including centrists and those without specific political inclination). HKUPOP conducted telephone surveys every two weeks to collect citizens' political inclination and results from October 2016 to June 2019 were released. After spinning off from the University of Hong Kong, HKPORI launches the 'We Hong Kongers' series and invites citizens to fill out questionnaires via email almost every week. Results are rim-weighted to obtain political inclination of the online group. The Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (HKIAPS) of the Chinese University of Hong Kong conducts regular telephone surveys to assess popularity of the chief executive of the HKSAR government. Political inclination of respondents has become part of its release since 2020.

Political inclination identified by HKPORI and HKIAPS, while termed differently, aligned closely with our classification. Moderates in our survey correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the centrist camp' and 'no political inclination / politically neutral / not belong to any camp' and HKIAPS' 'no specific inclination'. Non-establishment supporters correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the pro-democracy camp' and 'inclined towards the localist camp' and HKIAPS' 'non-establishment'. Pro-establishment supporters correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the pro-establishment camp' and HKIAPS' 'pro-establishment'. Figure 25 shows that both surveys are consistent with our findings. A trend of deradicalization was witnessed from mid-2017 to late-2019, followed by a rapid formation and dissolution of non-establishment supporters in the immediate year and the rise of moderate politics since mid-2020.



Figure 25: Changes of citizens' political inclinations

圖 25：市民政治傾向的變動



#### 4. Citizens' identity

Two types of questionnaire design are commonly used to track citizens' self-identity in Hong Kong, the 'dominant identity' design and the 'multiple identity' design. A 'dominant identity' design classifies one's identity either as 'Hongkonger' or 'Chinese', and in some cases, includes certain mixed identities, e.g. 'Chinese in Hong Kong', 'Hongkonger in China' and 'both'. Respondents are compelled to select only one among two or more identities. If proportionally more people choose one category, the proportions of other categories must go down.

We adopt a 'multiple identity' design which uses separate questions to measure citizens' identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese'. This approach allows a possible scenario where a citizen identifies oneself more or less strongly as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' simultaneously. Furthermore, the source data enable us to categorize citizens into four dominant identities: strong identification as Hongkongers only, strong identification as Chinese only, dual identity with strong identifications in both and others which include those without a dominant identity.

HKPORI's identity survey employs both the 'multiple identity' and 'dominant identity' questionnaire designs. Respondents first rate their identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' separately. After that, they will choose one amongst these four categories: 'Hongkonger', 'Chinese', 'Chinese in Hong Kong and 'Hongkonger in China'. Although HKPORI releases results of both designs, media in Hong Kong focuses on the first part only as it is more popular in public surveys. The proportion of citizens that identify themselves strongly as both 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' cannot be reflected.

26 shows the ratings of citizens' identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' from HKPORI and us using a 'multiple identity' design. Both surveys suggest that the 'Hongkonger' identity maintained high in 2020 and then declined. The 'Chinese' identity recovered from its lowest level in 2019 and 2020. Figure 27 shows results from HKPORI and us using a 'dominant identity' design. HKPORI refers 'Chinese in Hong Kong' and 'Hongkongers in China' as 'mixed identities', which corresponds to our 'dual identity'. Both surveys suggest that the majority of Hong Kong society

possess a 'dual identity', while being temporarily overtaken by 'Hongkonger only' from 2019 to mid-2021, it has resurged to become the primary identity since late-2021.

Figure 26: Changes of scores with 'dominant identity' design

圖 26：「主要身分」評分的變動





Figure 27: Changes of proportions with 'multiple identity' design

圖 27：「多元身分」比例的變動



# 'One Country Two Systems' Index

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