



'ONE COUNTRY
TWO SYSTEMS'
INDEX

「一國兩制」
指數

2024 | H1 上半年
(Fourteenth Edition 第十四版)

2024 上半年 (第十四版)
2024 H1 (Fourteenth Edition)

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前言 Preface

The unprecedented pursuit of 'One Country, Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) demands unyielding exploration and persistence from stakeholders. Since 1997, progress has been made in realizing 1C2S, but challenges have also emerged. To support the full implementation of 1C2S, Path of Democracy established the 1C2S Index in July 2017 and released its first report. This initiative aims to objectively evaluate the ongoing implementation of 1C2S by reviewing its accomplishments and shortfalls.

The 1C2S Index is based on both local opinion and international perception of the current state of 1C2S. Periodic public surveys measure local attitudes, and we also incorporate global assessments from international think tanks. These independent evaluations contribute to a more balanced view of how the world, including Hong Kong people, perceives the state of 1C2S. To further enhance the analysis, we have devised and introduced a 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI), employing big data analytics to measure Hong Kong and overseas media sentiment towards 1C2S. Our report also incorporates public views on current social issues related to 1C2S, such as emigration plans, national security, and economic integration.

In 2022, a comprehensive review was conducted to ensure alignment with societal and global development after five years of impartial measurement. The main Index will now adopt a more timely, objective, distinctive, and extensive construction method. We are also innovating the study of media sentiment by expanding coverage of 1C2S MMI to reflect the changing media landscape and readership. An online data portal has been launched to better inform policymakers, researchers, media, and the public with data visualizations and customized analysis through an open and transparent approach.

We are grateful to the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong for conducting the telephone polls and sentiment.ai for measuring media sentiment on our behalf. Moving forward, we will continue to conduct public surveys and update international indices every six months, and to monitor media sentiment regularly to gauge the latest perceptions of the public, the international community, and the media on 1C2S.

Ray Poon
Co-convenor (Research)

August 2024

「一國兩制」是前無古人的嘗試，1997年實踐至今，有成果亦有挑戰，過程需要社會各界不斷參與及探索。民主思路在2017年7月首次發布關於「一國兩制」概況的客觀評價，希望探討其成就與缺失，為全面及準確貫徹此方針略盡綿力。

我們定期向香港市民進行民意調查，亦參考國際機構對香港的評分，揉合以上獨立意見編製成「一國兩制」指數，持平反映香港及世界各地對「一國兩制」現狀的觀感。我們借助大數據技術，編製「一國兩制」輿情指數去衡量新聞情緒，追蹤香港和海外媒體相關報道。編製報告時，我們亦探討「一國兩制」實踐中的熱門議題，例如移民海外、國家安全、經濟融合等。

經過五年的中肯評估，我們在2022年進行全面檢討，確保指數能夠與香港社會和全球發展保持一致。調整後的編製方法令「一國兩制」指數的更新更及時、來源更客觀、指標更鮮明和層面更廣闊。因應傳媒生態和閱讀習慣改變，我們亦擴大輿情指數的數據範圍，為輿情研究帶來突破。另外，我們推出網上數據平台，遵循公開透明的原則，提供數據視覺化和專屬定制分析，讓決策者、研究員、媒體和公眾參考。

我們謹此向執行電話調查的香港中文大學香港亞太研究所及衡量新聞情緒的聲聞科技致以謝意。展望未來，我們會繼續每半年進行民意調查及更新國際指數，亦會定期追蹤新聞輿情，從而反映香港市民、國際社會及各地媒體對「一國兩制」的最新觀感。

潘學智
聯席召集人(研究)

2024年8月

主要發現

Key Findings



行政摘要 Executive Summary

1. The 1C2S Index for the first half of 2024 rose from 6.04 points in the second half of 2023 to 6.17 points. Most respondents (64.8%) believe that maintaining economic prosperity and stability will be the most favourable factor for continuing to implement 1C2S after 2047.
2. The international community's assessment of Hong Kong rose slightly from 6.87 points to 6.89 points, with scores for 'economic openness' and 'civil rights' also showing an upward trend. Telling Hong Kong's good story to the outside world effectively is both urgent and challenging. PoD suggests the government establish a 1C2S office to maintain contact with Western media and dispel misperceptions.
3. Hong Kong's political landscape is changing, with the proportion of moderates (77.1%) increasing and continues to occupy the largest segment of Hong Kong's population. We believe this will be an opportunity for society to reduce political polarization.
4. The proportion of citizens who identify both 'Chinese' and 'Hongkongers' identities, indicating a dual identity, increased by 3.8 percentage points to 63.8%. Conversely, the gap between those who identify solely as 'Chinese' and solely as 'Hongkongers' has narrowed over the past few years.
5. Regarding citizens' plans to emigrate overseas, the proportion of respondents 'intend to emigrate' decreased from 17.9% in the previous period to 14% in July 2024. The vast majority of respondents (84.1%) have no plans to emigrate overseas. We believed that as the government implements various talent attraction programs, Hong Kong will continue to attract foreign talent, further fueling economic transformation and development.
6. With the ongoing trend of Hong Kong residents 'going north' for consumption, citizens have more opportunities to experience China's development first hand. The proportion of citizens interested in studying, working and retiring in the Greater Bay Area has rebounded from 6.9% in February 2024 to 7.9% in July 2024.
7. A significant majority (63.2%) of respondents believe employers should consider job applications from individuals who have already faced legal consequences from the anti-extradition protests. This reflects an openness to providing second chances and reintegrating them into society. Leveraging this sentiment, the government could take the lead in launching initiatives that support their transition back into the workforce.
1. 2024上半年的「一國兩制」指數，由2023年下半年的6.04分升至6.17分。大部分受訪者(64.8%)認為經濟維持繁榮穩定，將會是2047年後繼續落實「一國兩制」的最有利因素。
2. 國際社會對香港的評價由6.87分微升至6.89分，其中，經濟開放及公民權利的評分亦呈上升趨勢。講好香港故事既是燃眉之急，亦具挑戰性。民主思路建議政府成立「一國兩制」辦公室，與西方媒體保持聯繫，消弭誤解。
3. 香港的政治版圖正在改變，溫和派(77.1%)的佔比上漲並繼續佔據全港人口的最大部分。我們相信，這將會是社會減少政治兩極化的契機。
4. 有關擁有「雙重認同」的市民，即同時認同「中國人」與「香港人」身份的比例上升了3.8個百分點，達到63.8%。相反，僅認為自己是「中國人」或「香港人」的比例差距在過去幾年間不斷縮小。
5. 有關市民移民往海外的計劃，「有打算」移民的受訪市民由上一期的17.9%下跌至2024年7月的14%，絕大部分的受訪市民(84.1%)並沒有移民海外的打算。我們相信，隨著政府各項引進人才計劃的落實，香港也會繼續吸引外來人才，繼續推動經濟轉型發展。
6. 隨著港人「北上消費」熱潮持續，市民多了機會親身到內地了解國家的發展，有興趣前往大灣區發展的市民由2024年2月的6.9%回升至2024年7月的7.9%。我們相信，這股熱潮將帶動更多港人前往大灣區就業、居住以至退休。
7. 不少反修例運動的參與者已經承擔法律責任，大多數(63.2%)受訪者認為僱主應該考慮他們的工作申請。市民對給予他們第二次機會重新融入社會抱有包容態度，政府可以帶頭推出支持他們重返勞動市場的措施。

「一國兩制」概覽 Index At-a-Glance

1C2S Index
「一國兩制」指數

6.17

(↑ 2.2%)

2024 H1

1C2S Mass Media Index
「一國兩制」輿情指數

133.7

(↓ 21.6%)

2024 Q2

Moderates
溫和派

77.1%

(↑ 2.5%)

2024.7

Dual Identity
雙重身份認同

63.8%

(↑ 3.8%)

2024.7



Public
Opinion
民意調查

High Degree of
Autonomy
高度自治

5.29

(↑ 5.4%)

Human Rights and
Freedom
人權自由

5.46

(↑ 3.8%)

Hong Kong-Mainland
Relations
內港關係

5.61

(↑ 5.1%)

International
Perception
國際評價

Economic
Openness
經濟開放

9.35

(↑ 0.4%)

Civil
Liberty
公民權利

6.26

(↑ 0.3%)

Democratic
Development
民主發展

5.06

(-)

2024上半年回顧 2024 H1 Overview

Despite the absence of soccer star Lionel Messi in a highly-anticipated exhibition match, a strong line-up of mega events and international conferences filled the first half of 2024 to attract tourists and boost economy. Another key initiative was the expansion of individual visit scheme to offer residents from more Chinese cities a more convenient travel visa. The city also felt proud with the first Hongkonger selected for China's space programme as a preparatory astronaut.

Hong Kong's court handled some of the most controversial protest cases. In the landmark case of 'Hong Kong 47', most pro-democracy activists were guilty of conspiracy to commit subversion. Protesters who stormed and vandalised the Legislative Council Complex were convicted of rioting. The court overturned a previous ruling to ban the protest anthem 'Glory to Hong Kong'. In the reporting period, two non-permanent overseas judges resigned.

The long-delayed domestic security law under Article 23 of the Basic Law was enacted. With powers granted by this new law, the government revoked passports of six individuals who fled to the UK on suspicion of national security offenses. The US warned of imposing visa restrictions on Hong Kong officials. The EU and UK raised concerns over Hong Kong's new security law and judicial independence. Diplomatic tensions also grew as British police arrested a Hong Kong trade office official in London and two others for allegedly breaching UK national security laws.

儘管年初足球巨星美斯在表演賽中沒有出場作賽，2024年上半年特區政府主辦了多項大型活動及國際會議，吸引了大量遊客訪港，促進經濟發展。中央政府進一步擴大「個人遊」計劃，為來自中國更多城市的居民提供更便利的旅遊簽證，對提振香港旅遊業以至整體經濟發展起到關鍵作用。首次有港人獲選為國家預備航天員也讓香港市民感到自豪。

近半年來，香港法院審理多宗具爭議性的案件。在「初選47人」案中，大部分民主派人士被判串謀顛覆罪罪成。衝擊和破壞立法會大樓的抗議人士亦被判暴動罪成。年中，高等法院上訴庭亦推翻了高等法院拒絕就歌曲《願榮光歸香港》批出禁制令的決定，終頒佈臨時禁制令。在本報告撰寫期間，兩名海外非常任法官請辭。

拖延已久的《基本法》第二十三條立法刊憲在年初通過。根據該條法例賦予的權力，政府吊銷了六名因涉嫌違反國家安全罪而潛逃英國人士的特區護照。在國際方面，美國宣佈將對香港官員實施簽證限制；歐盟和英國紛紛對新出台的《維護國家安全條例》和本港司法獨立性表示關注。鑒於英國警方在倫敦逮捕了一名香港貿易辦事處官員和另外兩名涉及從事間諜活動的人士，外交關係變得緊張。



International confidence regained momentum

Local discussion on government functions and market performance increased as call for economic reform strengthened. Promotional activities targeting overseas audience in the past were slowly reflecting on our scores. Four years of decline in international confidence was reversed and a rising trend established. Increase in both public opinion and international perception supported an overall growth in 1C2S Index. The latest reading rose by 2.2% from 6.04 to 6.17.

All pillars, namely 'high degree of autonomy' (+5.4%), 'Hong Kong-Mainland relations' (+5.1%) and 'human rights and freedom' (+3.8%), rose. The city's autonomy was verified by the courts' impartial handling of controversial cases and local legislation of a national security law. The selection of astronaut for space programme and the expansion of individual visit scheme demonstrated the achievement of dialogue between the mainland and Hong Kong.

Due to time lag in the compilation of international indices, results from overseas business promotion started to gather in this round as 'economic openness' (+0.4%) increased. Massive promotional campaigns to attract overseas investment earned confidence in our business environment. 'civil liberty' (+0.3%) rose slightly and 'democratic development' remained unchanged.

Political moderation plateaued

Mass apathy from a depoliticized society contributed to political moderation. Moderates remained the largest group, with overwhelming dominance at 77.1%, followed by non-establishment supporters at 14.3% and pro-establishment supporters at 5.9%. The size of moderate group expanded by 2.5 percentage points. Non-establishment supporters increased by 0.6 percentage points, while pro-establishment supporters decreased by 2.2 percentage points.

The increase in moderates was also observed among youths aged 18 to 29, where moderates rose by 6.5 percentage points to 72.5%. Among non-establishment supporters, democrats fell by 3.5 percentage points to 15.0%, and localists dropped by 2.0 percentage points to 9.3%. While the rise of moderation among the 18-29 age group is a positive development, one should remain vigilant in the near future.

國際信心重拾升勢

經濟改革的呼聲漸強，社會專注於討論政府職能及市場表現。是輪「一國兩制」指數展現了過去半年政府向海外市場推廣的成果，連續四年國際信心下降的趨勢已成功扭轉，上輪開始的上升趨勢亦得到鞏固。「民意調查」和「國際評價」雙重提升，支撐「一國兩制」指數整體增長，最新讀數從 6.04 上升至 6.17，增幅達 2.2%。

指數的所有支柱，包括「高度自治」(+5.4%)、「內港關係」(+5.1%)和「人權自由」(+3.8%)均有所上升。法庭能公正地處理爭議案件，和維護國家安全的本地立法也順利通過，成為本港自治水平的良好佐證。國家載人航天工程在港選拔載荷專家和中央擴展「個人遊」計劃，亦展示內地與香港協商溝通的傑出成果。

由於國際指數編製的時間滯後，「經濟開放」(+0.4%)的提升意味著海外業務推廣的成果逐漸出現。大規模的招商引資推廣活動也贏得了海外投資者對本地商業環境的信心。「公民自由」(+0.3%)略有上升，而「民主發展」的得分則保持不變。

溫和政治力量趨於穩定

在去政治化的社會中，群眾的政治冷漠或許助長了政治溫和。溫和派繼續以壓倒性的優勢，成為普遍本地市民的政治取向(77.1%)。非建制派支持者和建制派支持者則分別佔據 14.3% 和 5.9%。具體來說，溫和派的佔比擴大了 2.5 個百分點；非建制派支持者的佔比亦略升 0.6 個百分點；相反，建制派的佔比下跌了 2.2 個百分點。

取態為溫和派的年輕人(18-29歲)也有所增加，上升 6.5 個百分點至 72.5%。在非建制派支持者中，民主派的佔比下降了 3.5 個百分點至 15.0%，本土派的佔比亦下降 2.0 個百分點至 9.3%。我們認為，18-29 歲群體中平穩上升的溫和趨勢對社會發展釋出了一個正面的信號，但在未來仍要警惕不同的趨向。

Reconvergence of citizens' identity as Hongkongers or Chinese

Citizens' self-identification as 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese' started to converge after a period of divergence. The gap continued to close following a two-year convergence. In this round, both identities -- 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' increased. The former rose by 2.4% from 8.23 to 8.43 while the latter increased by 1.8% from 7.03 to 7.16.

Most Hong Kong citizens are aware of their dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese'. Over half of the public acknowledged dual identity in earlier surveys. This recognition gradually changed since 2019, hitting rock bottom in mid-2020 but rebounding since then. The percentage of people who recognized their dual identity rose from last round's 60.0% by 3.8 percentage points to 63.8%. Meanwhile, those identifying as 'Hongkonger only' fell to 23.4%, a decrease of 1.3%.

Implications and recommendations

International perception has shown signs of recovery after repeated declines. Simultaneously, domestic opinion has experienced substantial growth. The disparity between how local people and the international community looked at 1C2S has been narrowing. While different social groups may hold varying expectations, there remains a shared desire for long-term prosperity and stability. Ultimately, this common ground can serve as a unifying force to bridge perspectives and foster understanding.

Many indicators have returned to early 2019 levels. Public discontent sparked by the crisis in 2019 seems to have somewhat dissipated. The number of people with emigration plans continues to decline. The proportion of moderates has continued to grow, while non-establishment supporters have steadily declined. Additionally, the percentage of the population identifying as 'Chinese' has also seen a modest increase.

Two rival camps have expressed extreme views over recent political events, with moderates being the only group countering this juxtaposition. A rational voice appears to exist in society at large, but it is vulnerable to populist narratives. Policymakers must ensure that moderate opinions continue to thrive in a nurturing and safe environment, despite the prevailing divisions.

「香港人」與「中國人」身份認同分歧收窄

香港市民認同自己為「香港人」或「中國人」的趨勢在經過一段時間分歧後開始收窄。在這一輪調查中，「香港人」和「中國人」的身份認同都有所增加。前者從 8.23 分上升 2.4% 至 8.43 分，後者則從 7.03 分上升 1.8% 至 7.16 分。

普遍香港市民都意識到自己具有「香港人」和「中國人」雙重身份。在早期的調查中，超過半數的公眾認同自己有雙重身份。這種情況從 2019 年開始逐漸發生變化，在 2020 年年中達到低谷，隨後反彈。認同雙重身份的人從上一輪的 60.0% 上升 3.8 個百分點至 63.8%。僅認同「香港人」的比例下降 1.3 個百分點至 23.4%。

啟示及建議

「國際評價」在經歷反覆下跌後開始復常；與此同時，本地民意也呈現正向發展的趨勢，可見本地居民與國際社會對「一國兩制」的看法差距正在逐漸縮小。雖然社會上不同團體對未來發展的期望各異，但他們對於香港長期繁榮穩定發展的信念是一致的。我們相信這共同基礎可以成為社會團結的力量，促進不同觀點之間的理解與交流。

鑒於許多指標已回復至修例風波前的水平，反映這場管治危機所引發的不滿情緒似已舒緩。有計劃移民的市民持續減少。溫和派的佔比繼續佔據全港人口的最大部分。當「一國兩制」在實踐上出現矛盾時，更多人認為內地和香港有共同責任。對中國人身份認同感亦有穩健增長。

兩大政治陣營對近期政治事件的反應極端，溫和派則少受政治立場網綁。社會存在理性聲音，但極容易受到民粹摧毀。決策者應確保溫和意見能夠在撕裂的社會上有一隅之地。

It is important for the HKSAR government to capitalize on this growing confidence and build further momentum by spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of Hong Kong, including the business community, academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs, to promote Hong Kong's image under 1C2S. Such efforts may include:

- Establishing an Office of 1C2S for sustained outreach both locally and in the APEC region to mobilize support and enhance Hong Kong's presence. This dedicated office should actively participate in foreign think tank forums, either directly or through the business community to promote the Hong Kong narrative in the international arena.
- Holding daily press briefings with local and international media to address the latest policy issues in a timely, comprehensive, and appropriate manner, alleviating the fears and anxieties of the foreign community in Hong Kong.
- Providing advanced training for our senior officials on how to counter the negative narrative in Western media by using positive stories from Hong Kong.
- Educating young members of the public on the basics of 1C2S, including the importance of our constitutional order, an understanding of the rule of law, human rights, freedoms, corresponding obligations, and broadening awareness of social, national, and global issues.

政府應乘勢領導香港各界，如商界、學術界、專業團體、理念相近的智庫和民間組織，共同努力闡釋「一國兩制」的實況，提升香港形象。措施包括：

- 設立「一國兩制」辦公室，專門進行本地及亞太區的推廣及聯絡工作，動員社會各界支持及強化香港的影響力。此專責辦公室將會直接或通過商界積極參與外國智庫論壇，就香港事務在國際舞台發聲；
- 政府每天舉行例行記者會，面向本地及國際傳媒，適時、充分及恰當地解釋及回應政策議題，包括外國社群的疑慮；
- 提供進階培訓予高級官員，運用正面的香港故事，以回應西方媒體的負面論述；及
- 著重青年教育，擴闊他們對「一國兩制」的基本認識，豐富對我們的憲制秩序、法治、人權和自由、相應義務的理解，增強社會觸覺、國際視野及國情認識。



第十四版報告 Fourteenth Edition



1. 簡介

1. Introduction

This is the 14th edition of our 'One Country, Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) Index report. The 1C2S Index aims to provide an objective assessment of the implementation of 1C2S. Our first report was produced in mid-2017, marking the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China. The 1C2S Index is updated every six months, in the middle and at the end of the year.

Every six months, we update the 1C2S Index by conducting a fresh public opinion survey and incorporating the latest data from international indices. To complement our main index, we have also introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI), which employs big-data techniques to assess sentiment in Hong Kong and overseas printed, electronic, and online media.

We commissioned the Chinese University of Hong Kong's Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies to conduct a telephone poll between July and August 2024 to generate public opinion scores. We updated scores on international perception for the first half of 2024 by scoring and rating 148 countries and territories using nine comprehensive data sources and 127 indicators provided by international think tanks. Sentiment.ai measured the MMI and updated it through the end of June 2024.

Our latest survey has continued to include topical issues related to 1C2S, such as the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047, citizens' identities, attitudes towards emigration, and public opinions on the Greater Bay Area. To fully capture the city's socio-political reality, we introduced new questions to gauge the impact of recent changes, included public's satisfaction with the SAR government, and public opinion on whether employers should consider job applications from individuals who were arrested during the 2019 protests and have faced legal consequences.

It should be stressed that public opinion, international perception, and MMI are shaped by perceptions and may not reflect actual reality. However, changes in perceptions of 1C2S among the Hong Kong public, international think tanks, and the Hong Kong and overseas media are significant. We will analyse the reasons for these changes, as they are crucial for the implementation of 1C2S.

香港回歸20週年之際，民主思路於2017年中首次發布「一國兩制」指數，旨在為香港實踐「一國兩制」作客觀評價。指數於年中與年底，每半年更新，這是第十四版報告。

每隔半年，我們通過進行電話民意調查及收集國際指數的最新數據，從而更新「一國兩制」指數。為補充主要指數，我們還推出了嶄新的「一國兩制」輿情指數，利用大數據技術，檢視香港和海外報章、電子傳媒和網絡媒體對「一國兩制」的情緒。

本報告委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所，在2024年7月至2024年8月進行電話調查，從而獲取民意評分。另外，我們運用國際智庫編製的9個綜合數據庫和127個指標，為148個國家和地區評分和排名，從而計算國際評價，資料已更新至2024年上半年。由輿情科技量度的「一國兩制」輿情指數則更新至2024年6月底。

另外，電話調查也納入了其他有關「一國兩制」的重要議題，包括2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件、市民的身份認同、市民對移民海外與及往大灣區發展的看法等。為更準確拿捏近期的社會及政治變化所帶來的影響，本輪新增公眾對特區政府的滿意度評價、公眾對僱主聘用涉及2019年社會事件人士的觀感及市民對於加快民主發展的看法。

需要注意的是，民意調查、國際評價及輿情指數的評分受觀感影響，可能不完全反映現實。儘管如此，香港市民、國際智庫和本地媒體的觀感變化對繼續實施「一國兩制」至關重大，我們亦會分析其變化背後的原因。

In our report, all scores are expressed on a scale of 0-10. An asterisk (*) indicates a statistically significant change in scores compared to the previous round. Scores without an asterisk indicate statistically insignificant changes.

Some scores are further analysed by age group, educational attainment, and political inclination. Previously, the non-establishment camp was divided into 'democrats' and 'others'. This division has been removed in this report due to the small size of the 'others' group, which prevented meaningful analysis. However, this data is still available for reference in our online data portal.

Readers can access our data portal for historical data on the 1C2S Index series by visiting the Path of Democracy webpage (<https://pathofdemocracy.hk/en-us/1c2s-index>). An extensive report on the survey results is also available.

本報告的所有評分尺度均以0至10分表示。帶有星號(*)的評分表示其與上一輪得分相比達到統計學上的顯著變化，沒有星號的得分則表示變化在統計學上不顯著。

部分評分將按年齡組別、教育程度和政治傾向劃分，並進一步分析。以往，政治傾向中「非建制派」會再分為「民主派」和「其他」。由於後者群體規模過少，難以進行出有意義的分析，因此本報告中不會使用有關區分。然而，有關數據仍保留在我們的網上數據平台，供讀者參考。

「一國兩制」指數的歷年數據已上載至我們的數據平台，電話調查的詳細報告亦已刊於「調查結果：頻數及百分比分佈」，歡迎讀者參閱民主思路網頁 (<https://pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index>)。



2. 「一國兩制」指數 2. 1C2S Index


The 1C2S Index is the average score of three pillars on public opinion and three pillars on international perception. The three pillars on public opinion, namely 'high degree of autonomy', 'human rights and freedom' and 'Hong Kong-Mainland relationship' reflect Hong Kong residents' evaluations on different aspects of 1C2S. The three pillars on international perception, namely 'economic openness', 'civil liberty' and 'democratic development', are based on the evaluation by international think tanks regarding various aspects of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

「一國兩制」指數為民意調查3項支柱及國際評價3項支柱的平均值。民意調查的3項支柱為「高度自治」、「人權自由」及「內港關係」，用以量度公眾對「一國兩制」的評價；國際評價的3項支柱為「經濟開放」、「公民權利」及「民主發展」，是國際智庫對香港自由和民主程度的評估。指數的編製方法詳見附件I。

Figure 1 shows the 1C2S Index since 2022 H1. The latest reading in 2024 H1 is 6.17, representing a 2.2% increase from 6.04 recorded half a year ago. After a sustained period of decline, the Index has continued to rise and has returned to its mid-2019 level. This rise is attributed to improvements in scores across all public opinion pillars. The results obtained for these pillars will be detailed in the following sub-sections.

圖1顯示「一國兩制」指數2022上半年至今的變化。2024上半年的最新讀數為6.17分，較半年前的6.04分上升2.2%。經過一段低潮，「一國兩制」指數繼續上升，回復至2019年中的水平。本輪指數的上升主要得益於「民意調查」方面的評分上漲。有關各項支柱評分的變化將於以下章節詳細解釋。

Figure 1: 1C2S Index
圖1：「一國兩制」指數



2.1 Public Opinion 民意調查

Table 1 shows the scores for the pillars and sub-pillars of the public opinion survey. All three pillars have shown an upward trend. The scores of 'high degree of autonomy' increased by 5.4% to 5.29 points, the scores for 'Hong Kong-Mainland Relations' increased by 5.1% to 5.61 points, and the score for 'human rights and freedom' increased by 3.8% to 5.46 points.

All twelve sub-pillars showed an upward trend in this round of the survey. The three sub-pillars with the largest increases were 'resolving via dialogue and negotiation' (+10.0%), 'self-conduct of administrative affairs' (+7.1%), and 'Hong Kong people administrating Hong Kong' (+6.5%). The changes in scores for 'Hong Kong people administrating Hong Kong', 'original way of life' and 'resolving via dialogue and negotiation' reached statistical significance compared to the previous survey period.

Three sub-pillars with the highest scores were 'safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests' (6.43), 'equal protection of the Law' (6.17) and 'original way of life' (6.08). The three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were 'freedom of speech, association and assembly' (4.60), 'Hong Kong people administrating Hong Kong' (4.78), and 'democratic development' (4.99).

表 1 顯示民意調查的支柱和子支柱評分，三項支柱評分均呈上升趨勢。「高度自治」的評分增加 5.4% 至 5.29 分，「內港關係」的評分增加 5.1% 至 5.61 分，「人權自由」的評分則增加 3.8% 至 5.46 分。

本輪調查中，十二項子支柱均呈上升趨勢，其中三項升幅最大的子支柱分別為「透過對話協商解決矛盾」(+10.0%)、「自行處理行政事務」(+7.1%) 和「港人治港」(6.5%)。其中，「自行處理行政事務」、「港人治港」、「維持原有生活方式」和「透過對話協商解決矛盾」較上期分數的變化達到統計學上的顯著水平。

三項分數最高的子支柱為「維護國家主權、安全和發展利益」(6.43)、「法律平等保護」(6.17) 及「原有生活方式」(6.08)。三項分數最低的子支柱為「言論、結社及集會自由」(4.60)、「港人治港」(4.78) 及「民主政制發展」(4.99)。



Table 1: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on public opinion

表 1：民意調查的支柱及子支柱分數

| | 2022 H1 | 2022 H2 | 2023 H1 | 2023 H2 | 2024 H1 | |
|--|-------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---|
| Overall 總分 | 4.71 | 4.98 | 5.22 | 5.21 | 5.45 | |
| A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治 | 4.61 | 4.82 | 5.06 | 5.02 | 5.29 | |
| A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務 | 4.84 | 5.07 | 5.48 | 5.22 | 5.59 | * |
| A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權 | 4.92 | 4.99 | 5.25 | 5.29 | 5.40 | |
| A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權 | 4.74 | 4.89 | 5.13 | 5.09 | 5.36 | |
| A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」 | 3.96 | 4.31 | 4.38 | 4.49 | 4.78 | * |
| B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由 | 4.61 | 4.94 | 5.11 | 5.26 | 5.46 | |
| B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式 | 5.13 | 5.52 | 5.77 | 5.77 | 6.08 | * |
| B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社及集會自由 | 3.89 [^] | 4.26 | 4.27 | 4.51 | 4.60 | |
| B3. Democratic development 民主政制發展 | 3.74 | 4.15 | 4.42 | 4.78 | 4.99 | |
| B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護 | 5.65 [^] | 5.82 | 6.00 | 5.96 | 6.17 | |
| C. Hong Kong-Mainland Relations 內港關係 | 4.92 | 5.19 | 5.47 | 5.34 | 5.61 | |
| C1. Resolving via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾 | 4.06 | 4.24 | 4.75 | 4.89 | 5.38 | * |
| C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益 | 5.81 | 6.24 | 6.39 | 6.31 | 6.43 | |
| C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定 | 5.61 | 5.84 | 5.94 | 5.29 | 5.49 | |
| C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落实「一國兩制」 | 4.19 | 4.45 | 4.81 | 4.88 | 5.15 | |

2.1.1. Generation gap and political divide

Figure 2 shows average scores of public opinions by age group. Except for the 70 or above age group, all others experienced an increase. Among which, the 40-49 age group experienced the greatest increase by 19.2%, while the 18-29 age group comes in second (+14.9%).

Figure 3 average scores of public opinions by political inclination. Average scores produced by all political groups increased. Pro-establishment supporters increased by 4.6% to 5.45 points, whereas non-establishment supporters experienced a drastic increase of 24.4% to 3.16 points.

Statistical tests revealed a clear and consistent divide in public opinion across political inclinations. Compared to moderates, the evaluations of pro-establishment supporters were significantly more positive. Conversely, the evaluations of non-establishment supporters were significantly more negative.

2.1.1. 代溝及政治鴻溝

圖 2 顯示了各個年齡組別在民意調查的平均得分。在是次調查結果中，除 70 歲或以上組別外，其餘年齡組別得分均呈上升趨勢。其中，40-49 歲組別的增長最為強勁，增長了 19.2% 至 5.10 分，達到統計學的顯著程度；而 70 歲或以上組別則下跌了 4.1% 至 6.95 分。

圖 3 顯示過去調查中，不同政治傾向在民意調查的總分。所有政治傾向組別的分數有所上升建制派支持者的得分增長了 4.6%，達到 5.45 分，而非建制派支持者的得分則大幅上升 24.4%，達到 3.16 分。

經統計檢測，公眾意見在政治傾向上存在明顯且一致的分歧。與持中立立場的人相比，建制派支持者的評價顯著更為正面；相反，非建制派支持者的評價則顯著地較為負面。

Figure 2: Public opinion (by age group)
圖 2：民意調查 (按年齡組別劃分)





Figure 3: Public opinion (by political inclination)
圖 3：民意調查（按政治傾向劃分）



2.2 International perception 國際評價

Table 2 presents the scores for the pillars and sub-pillars by international evaluation. Compared to the previous round, the scores for 'economic openness' slightly increased by 0.4% to 9.35 points, 'civil liberty' rose slightly by 0.3% to 6.26 points, while 'democratic development' remained unchanged at 5.06 points.

The scores for the sub-pillars varied, with some increasing and others decreasing. The sub-pillar with the largest increase was 'democratic culture' (+10.5%), while the largest decrease was in the score for 'civic participation' (-10.6%).

The three sub-pillars with the highest scores were 'market access' (9.76), 'financial stability' (9.52) and 'regulatory quality' (9.12). The three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were 'expression, association and assembly' (2.99), 'political pluralism' (3.24) and 'civic participation' (5.16).

表 2 顯示香港在國際評價的支柱和子支柱分數。與上一輪比較，「經濟開放」評分微升 0.4% 至 9.35 分，「公民權利」上升 0.3% 至 6.26 分，而「民主發展」評分則保持不變，維持在 5.06 分。

各項子支柱的評分則各有升跌。升幅度最大的子支柱是「民主文化」(+10.5%)；而「公民參與」評分的跌幅則最大 (-10.6%)。

三項評分最高的子支柱為「市場門檻」(9.76)、
「金融穩定」(9.52) 和「監管質素」(9.12)。三項分數最低的子支柱為「表達、結社和集會」(2.99)、
「政治多元」(3.24) 和「公民參與」(5.16)。

Table 2: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on international perception

表 2：國際評價的支柱和子支柱分數

| | 2022 H1 | 2022 H2 | 2023 H1 | 2023 H2 | 2024 H1 | |
|--|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|--|
| Overall 總分 | 6.93 (39) | 6.87 (39) | 6.82 (42) | 6.87 (39) | 6.89 (40) | |
| D. Economic Openness 經濟開放 | 9.28 (2) | 9.20 (2) | 9.17 (2) | 9.31 (2) | 9.35 (2) | |
| D1. Business environment 營商環境 | 8.85 (2) | 8.68 (2) | 8.66 (2) | 8.98 (2) | 8.99 (2) | |
| D2. Market access 市場門檻 | 9.73 (1) | 9.72 (1) | 9.70 (1) | 9.71 (1) | 9.76 (1) | |
| D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素 | 8.83 (2) | 8.83 (3) | 8.95 (2) | 9.17 (2) | 9.12 (2) | |
| D4. Financial stability 金融穩定 | 9.70 (1) | 9.58 (1) | 9.37 (4) | 9.36 (4) | 9.52 (3) | |
| E. Civil Liberty 公民權利 | 6.35 (72) | 6.28 (72) | 6.23 (73) | 6.24 (73) | 6.26 (72) | |
| E1. Rule of law 法治 | 6.44 (42) | 6.33 (43) | 6.40 (43) | 6.42 (43) | 6.40 (43) | |
| E2. Security and safety 安全 | 8.07 (36) | 8.09 (36) | 8.11 (36) | 8.20 (35) | 8.23 (34) | |
| E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會 | 3.25 (123) | 3.15 (124) | 3.08 (126) | 2.95 (126) | 2.99 (126) | |
| E4. Individual rights 個人權利 | 7.64 (43) | 7.56 (47) | 7.34 (55) | 7.41 (51) | 7.40 (53) | |
| F. Democratic Development 民主發展 | 5.17 (90) | 5.12 (91) | 5.04 (91) | 5.06 (90) | 5.06 (90) | |
| F1. Constraints on powers 權力制約 | 5.64 (56) | 5.50 (60) | 5.39 (64) | 5.43 (63) | 5.40 (64) | |
| F2. Political pluralism 政治多元 | 3.51 (123) | 3.51 (123) | 3.23 (125) | 3.23 (125) | 3.24 (122) | |
| F3. Civic participation 公民參與 | 5.82 (56) | 5.79 (57) | 5.74 (55) | 5.77 (55) | 5.16 (76) | |
| F4. Democratic culture 民主文化 | 5.73 (72) | 5.67 (80) | 5.81 (75) | 5.81 (73) | 6.42 (54) | |

Note: The number in parentheses indicate the world ranking.

註：括號內的數字為世界排名。

2.2.1. Comparison with selected regions

Generally, developed regions have higher scores for freedom and democracy than developing regions. As Hong Kong is a developed region, we selected neighbouring developed countries and regions, including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan for comparison to evaluate Hong Kong's performance. We also compared the scores of mainland China and the US to observe Hong Kong's development relative to these two major powers under 1C2S.

Table 3 compares the scores of Hong Kong and neighbouring regions on various pillars in the international perception. Hong Kong excels in 'economic openness' (9.35), ranking second globally, ahead of Taiwan (7.92), Japan (7.45) and South Korea (7.02).

Compared to the previous round, Hong Kong's 'civil liberty' ranking rose one position to 72nd, with a score of 6.26 points. This score lags neighbouring Singapore (6.90), Taiwan (8.27), South Korea (8.27) and Japan (9.05).

In terms of 'democratic development', Hong Kong's score remains at 5.06 points, not yet on par with other nearby developed regions (Singapore 6.91, South Korea 7.58, Taiwan 8.28, Japan 8.62). However, in the past six months, except for Taiwan and the US, the scores of other selected countries and regions have shown a downward trend.

Table 3: Pillar scores on international perception of selected regions
表 3：選定地區之國際評價支柱分數

| | D. Economic Openness 經濟開放 | | E. Civil Liberty 公民權利 | | F. Democratic Development 民主發展 | | Overall 總分 | |
|---------------------|------------------------------|------------|--------------------------|------------|-----------------------------------|------------|---------------|------------|
| | Score 分數 | Rank 排名 | Score 分數 | Rank 排名 | Score 分數 | Rank 排名 | Score 分數 | Rank 排名 |
| Hong Kong 香港 | 9.35 ↑ | (2) - | 6.26 ↑ | (72) ↑ | 5.06 ↓ | (90) - | 6.89 ↑ | (40) ↓ |
| Mainland China 中國內地 | 6.87 ↓ | (36) ↑ | 3.00 ↓ | (140) - | 2.49 ↓ | (137) ↑ | 4.12 ↓ | (123) ↑ |
| Japan 日本 | 7.45 ↓ | (23) ↑ | 9.05 ↑ | (13) ↑ | 8.62 ↓ | (12) ↓ | 8.37 ↓ | (14) ↑ |
| South Korea 南韓 | 7.02 ↑ | (31) ↑ | 8.27 ↓ | (31) ↓ | 7.58 ↓ | (33) ↑ | 7.62 ↓ | (29) ↓ |
| Singapore 新加坡 | 9.68 ↑ | (1) - | 6.90 ↑ | (55) ↑ | 6.81 ↓ | (47) ↓ | 7.80 ↑ | (24) ↑ |
| Taiwan 台灣 | 7.92 ↓ | (14) ↓ | 8.27 ↑ | (30) - | 8.28 ↑ | (20) - | 8.16 ↓ | (19) - |
| United States 美國 | 8.15 ↓ | (9) ↓ | 8.15 ↑ | (33) ↑ | 7.66 ↑ | (32) - | 7.99 ↓ | (20) - |

Note: The number in parentheses indicate the world ranking.
註：括號內的數字為世界排名。

2.2.1. 選定地區比較

一般而言，發達地區的自由與民主評價均高於發展中地區。由於香港是高度發展的地區，所以我們選取鄰近的發達國家及地區，包括日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣作比較，藉以評價香港的表現。我們亦比較中國內地與美國的評分，以觀察在「一國兩制」之下的香港相對於兩個大國的發展。

表 3 比較香港和鄰近地區在國際評價中各項支柱的分數。香港在「經濟開放」（9.35）表現尤為突出，緊接新加坡排名全球第二，大幅領先台灣（7.92）、日本（7.45）和南韓（7.02）。

與上輪評分作比較，香港的「公民權利」排名上升一位至第 72 名，評分為 6.26 分。評分落後於鄰近的新加坡（6.90）、台灣（8.27）、韓國（8.27）及日本（9.05）。

在「民主發展」方面，香港的評分維持 5.06 分，尚未能與其他鄰近發達地區看齊（新加坡 6.81、南韓 7.58、台灣 8.28、日本 8.62）。然而，在過去半年，除台灣地區及美國的評分上升外，其餘選定國家及地區的評分均呈下跌趨勢。

2.2.2. Global trend

Figure 4 illustrates the global trend in international perception. In the first half of 2024, the global economy continued to face persistent inflationary pressures and rising interest rates, leading to slower economic growth and the risk of recession in many countries. The Russia-Ukraine war, China-US trade tensions, and other geopolitical risks continue to create uncertainty for the global economy. The global average score for 'economic openness' declined slightly to 5.74 points (-0.9%). Singapore (9.68), Hong Kong (9.35), and Denmark (8.57) continue to lead the way.

Globally, civil rights and democratic development face significant challenges. Political polarization has intensified in some countries, leading to increased social divisions and political instability. Freedom of speech and press freedom continue to be restricted in some regions, suppressing dissenting voices. The global score for 'civil rights' remains at 6.05 points. Traditional Nordic countries, Norway (9.87), Denmark (9.84), and Sweden (9.61), are still considered to have the best civil rights protections.

Amidst controversies surrounding electoral fraud and crackdowns on social organizations, some regions continue to experience democratic backsliding. The global score for 'democratic development' fell by 0.5% compared to the previous six months, reaching 5.64 points. In terms of 'democratic development', Denmark (9.48), Norway (9.38), and Finland (9.28) continue to occupy the top three positions globally.


2.2.2. 全球趨勢

圖 4 顯示國際評價的全球趨勢。2024 年上半年，全球經濟繼續面臨持續的通脹壓力及加息問題，經濟增長放緩，許多國家面臨經濟衰退的風險。俄烏戰事、中美貿易緊張局勢以及其他地緣政治風險為全球經濟繼續帶來不確定性。「經濟開放」的全球平均得分略有下降，達 5.74 分 (-0.9%)。新加坡 (9.68)、香港 (9.35) 和丹麥 (8.57) 繼續保持領先地位。

全球範圍內，公民權利及民主發展均面臨著嚴峻的挑戰。部分國家政治極化加劇，導致社會越趨分化，政治局勢不穩。言論自由及新聞自由繼續在部分地區受到限制，異議聲音被受壓制。「公民權利」的全球評分繼續維持在 6.05 分。傳統北歐國家，挪威 (9.87)、丹麥 (9.84) 和瑞典 (9.61) 仍被評為公民權利保障最好的國家。

面臨選舉舞弊及對社會組織打壓等爭議，部分地區持續出現民主倒退情況。「民主發展」的全球評分較前半年下跌 0.5%，至 5.64 分。在「民主發展」方面，丹麥 (9.48)、挪威 (9.38) 和芬蘭 (9.28) 繼續佔據全球三甲。

Figure 4: Global trend of pillar scores on international perception
圖 4：國際評價支柱分數的全球趨勢



2.3 Significant events 重大事件

This round of index surveys has seen significant political controversies and major events both locally and internationally, which may be closely related to the changes in the 1C2S Index. Listed below are major events that occurred since the last report was published, from January 2024 to June 2024, to provide a deeper understanding of the Index's changing trends.

本輪指數調查期間，本地和國際發生的政治爭議和重大事件，與「一國兩制」指數的變動可能存在著密切的關聯。以下列舉了自上一期報告發佈以來，即2024年1月至6月發生的重大事件，以便更深入地理解指數的變化趨勢。

Table 4: Significant events
表 4：重大事件一覽

| | | |
|------|---|---|
| 1.1 | The new term of the District Councils, formed after the implementation of the principle of 'patriots administering Hong Kong', has officially begun. | 落實「愛國者治港」原則後產生的新一屆區議會任期正式展開。 |
| 1.25 | Chow Hang-tung, former Vice-Chairperson of the Hong Kong Alliance, was originally convicted in the 'June 4th Incitement to Unlawful Assembly Case' was acquitted on appeal but the Court of Final Appeal upheld the Department of Justice's appeal, reinstating the conviction. | 前支聯會副主席鄒幸彤於2021年涉及的「六四煽惑集結案」，終審法院裁定律政司上訴得直，恢復原審定罪。 |
| 1.25 | Chief Executive John Lee announced the formation of a 'rebuttal team' to defend Hong Kong policies against criticism and concerns. | 行政長官李家超宣布成立一支應變反駁隊，為香港政策辯護、回應和反駁有關市民和外界對香港政策的批判及擔憂。 |
| 2.4 | Inter Miami CF's exhibition match against the Hong Kong national football team sparked fan outrage after star player Lionel Messi abstained from playing. | 美國職業聯賽球隊國際邁阿密與香港足球代表隊進行表演賽，但因球星美斯缺陣，引發球迷憤怒。 |
| 2.22 | The Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Work Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, Mr. Xia Baolong, began a seven-day visit to Hong Kong. | 中共中央港澳工作辦公室主任、國務院港澳事務辦公室主任夏寶龍展開七天訪港行程。 |
| 3.16 | Twelve defendants convicted of rioting in the July 1st, 2019 attack on the Legislative Council building were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six and a half to seven years. | 2019年7月1日衝擊立法會大樓案，暴動罪成的12名被告各被判囚6年半至7年不等。 |
| 3.19 | The Legislative Council unanimously passed the 'Safeguarding National Security Ordinance'. | 立法會全票通過《維護國家安全條例》草案。 |

- 3.25 Ma Chun-man, a national security offender, was denied early release due to amendments to prison rules enacted following the implementation of the 'Safeguarding National Security Ordinance'. This marked the first case of such denial under the new law.
- 5.8 The High Court formally issued an injunction against the song 'Glory to Hong Kong'.
- 5.13 British police charged and prosecuted a Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office employee in London and two others for espionage activities, violating the UK's national security laws.
- 5.17 The government proposed reforms to the Social Workers Registration Board, including revoking licenses of social workers convicted of serious crimes, to enhance national security.
- 5.28 Police arrested eight individuals for the first time under & the 'Safeguarding National Security Ordinance', alleging 6.3 they committed 'offences related to incitement'.
- 5.30 In the 'Hong Kong 47 case', 31 defendants pleaded & guilty, 14 were found guilty of 'conspiracy to subvert 6.13 state power', and two were acquitted, with the Department of Justice appealing one acquittal.
- 5.30 Financial Secretary Paul Chan led a government delegation to the US, signing three MOUs with partners in the San Francisco Bay Area.
- 6.6 Two Non-permanent overseas judges of the Court of Final Appeal, Lord Robert Reed and Lord Patrick Hodge, resigned.
- 6.7 The Civil Service Bureau issued an updated 'Civil Service Code', outlining the constitutional order of Hong Kong, civil servants' role in the executive branch, and their expected beliefs and ethical standards.
- 6.11 The government announced that a Hong Kong citizen has been selected as a preparatory astronaut, specifically a payload specialist.
- 6.12 The Security Bureau revoked the Hong Kong passports of six individuals who fled to the UK on suspicion of national security offenses.
- 6.13 The European Union published a 'Hong Kong: Annual Report', which the Hong Kong government criticized for its inaccurate and biased content regarding national security and human rights.
- 原定可以因監獄中行為良好，而提早出獄的國家安全罪犯馬俊文，因《維護國家安全條例》生效修訂了監獄規則，而不能獲釋，為該條例生效後的首宗案例。
- 高等法院正式批出《願榮光歸香港》禁制令。
- 英國警方指香港駐倫敦經濟貿易辦事處職員及另外 2 人涉嫌在當地組織間諜活動，觸犯該國國安法，被檢控及起訴。
- 政府提出改革現有的社工註冊局，舉措包括確保候被裁定干犯嚴重罪行人士的社工資格會被註銷，以令註冊局能更有效地維護國家安全。
- 警方首次引用《維護國家安全條例》拘捕八人，涉嫌觸犯「煽動意圖的相關罪行」。
- 「泛民 47 人初選案」裁決宣判，31 人認罪，其餘 16 人不認罪。當中，14 人被裁定「串謀顛覆國家政權罪」罪成，其餘 2 人被判無罪，律政司其後就其中一人提出上訴。
- 財政司司長陳茂波率領政府代表團訪美，期間與三藩市灣區夥伴簽訂三項合作意向書及備忘錄。
- 終身法院兩名海外非常任法官，郝廉思和岑耀信請辭。
- 公務員事務局頒布更新版《公務員守則》，闡明香港特區的憲制秩序、公務員作為行政機關一員的憲制角色和責任，以及公務員應有的基本信念和操守準則。
- 政府宣佈，首次有香港市民獲選為國家載人航天工程的載荷專家，並有機會成為航天員，為國家航天工程作出貢獻。
- 保安局撤銷六名因涉嫌干犯危害國家安全罪行而潛逃英國人士的特區護照。
- 歐洲聯盟委員會及歐洲聯盟外交與安全政策高級代表發表「香港年報」，港府對報告有關特區維護國家安全、保障人權等方面不實和偏頗內容表示強烈不滿和反對。

3. 「一國兩制」輿情指數

3. 1C2S Mass Media Index

Media sentiment is an important factor in shaping public opinion. We attempt to use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S and monitor how its performance is covered in the mass media. This provides a timely barometer of public sentiment. 1C2S MMI measures daily net sentiment of media reports. A quarterly average is reported in this section to align with and complement our main Index, which is compiled biannually. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

3.1 Recent trend 近期趨勢

On the 25th anniversary of the HKSAR, Western leaders criticised China for failing to uphold 1C2S, whereas President Xi Jinping reaffirmed his commitment in this system over the long term. Reassurance from the Chinese leadership boosted media optimism to a new high. However, the uplift was soon interrupted by geopolitical tensions. US House Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan and China's subsequent white paper on the Taiwan issue heightened cross-strait tensions. Nonetheless, MMI regained its upward momentum and reached 150.1 in 2022 Q4 after the 20th National Congress of the CCP which proclaimed 1C2S a great innovation of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the best arrangement for national reunification.

MMI continued its rising trend with the restructuring of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. Following director Xia Baolong's visit to Hong Kong, these gestures from the central government were warmly welcomed by media reports and commentaries. While discussions of different views entered the generally positive media scene, the proposed reform plan of District Council sparked widespread debate on the new local administration measures. The all-time peak was followed by a steep fall, with a recording of 139.7 in 2023 Q2, as reports released by foreign governments levelled constant criticisms against the state of rule of law and freedoms in Hong Kong.

媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素，故此，我們嘗試利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒，藉此透視大眾傳媒對「一國兩制」的感受及意見，編製輿論情緒對「一國兩制」的晴雨表。「一國兩制」輿情指數為每天媒體文章的情緒淨值，此章節顯示季度平均值，以配合和補充我們每半年出版的主指數。編製方法詳見附錄 I。

在香港慶祝回歸 25 周年之際，西方領袖批評中國未能尊重「一國兩制」，而國家主席習近平則保證這樣的好制度必須長期堅持。中國領導人的承諾使樂觀情緒充斥媒體，推至新高，惟升勢不久被地緣政治矛盾暫緩。美國眾議院議長佩洛西訪問台灣，以及中國發布台灣問題白皮書，加劇兩岸緊張局勢。中共二十大高舉「一國兩制」為中國特色社會主義的偉大創舉和祖國統一的最佳安排，輿情指數恢復上升勢頭，並在 2022 年第 4 季達到 150.1 點。

輿情指數隨著港澳辦重組繼續上升趨勢，夏寶龍主任訪港亦受到媒體報道和評論熱烈歡迎。後來的區議會改革方案引起廣泛辯論，對地區治理新措施有不同觀點，為整體正面的輿情帶來改變。外國政府不斷發表報告批評香港的法治和自由狀況，使輿情指數從歷史高峰急劇下跌，並在 2023 年第 2 季度記錄為 139.7 點。

The previous fall sustained in the second half of 2023 until President Xi's reply letter to Hong Kong students expressed his care to the younger generation and the Chief Executive's overseas visit to ASEAN expanded business opportunities. Despite foreign concerns regarding the city's political landscape and human rights development, MMI continued to soar as a new development plan for synergistic growth of Shenzhen and Hong Kong's innovative and technology sector and the completed election and appointment of new District Council members gathered hopeful news. Consequently, MMI recovered to 155.3 in 2023 Q4.


In the first half of 2024, positive media coverage and public sentiment regarding Hong Kong significantly declined. The Asian Financial Forum 2024, held at the beginning of the year, and the visit by Xia Baolong, the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, garnered some positive media attention. However, the subsequent reintroduction of Article 23 to the legislative agenda attracted considerable international scrutiny and criticism, raising concerns about further erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy and civil liberties. By the end of Q2 2024, MMI had dropped to 133.7.

習近平主席向本港學生回信，表達他對年輕一代的殷切期盼，加上特首到東盟外訪拓展商機，令輿情指數早前的跌勢停止。雖然外國持續關注政治發展及人權問題，但是隨著深港河套的創新發展規劃出台及新一屆區議會選舉和委任工作圓滿完成，輿情指數繼續飆升，並在2023年第4季度達到155.3點。

有關香港的正面媒體報導和輿論在2024年上半年顯著下降。年初舉行的2024年亞洲金融論壇以及國務院港澳事務辦公室主任夏寶龍的訪港調研引起了媒體的正面關注。然而，隨著第23條立法重新提上議程，國際上出現廣泛關注和批評，引發對香港自治和公民自由進一步受侵蝕的擔憂。到2024年第二季度末，輿情指數降至133.7點。

Figure 5: 1C2S MMI (quarterly average)

圖5：「一國兩制」輿情指數（季度結）



3.2 Channel variations 傳播媒介變化


Figure 6 shows MMI by media channels, namely TV and radio, newspaper and online-only media. A general pattern emerged: news reported by TV and radio tended to be relatively more positive while online-only media were more critical. This media landscape changed during the year between the second quarters of 2019 and 2020. TV stations, radios, and newspapers joined the chorus of criticism towards 1C2S and produced more negative sentiment than online-only media. After this period, TV stations and radios resumed their regular reporting style. Their sentiment score grew stronger than other channels in a generally positive news event. However, the distinction between newspapers and online-only media became less and less noticeable. The trend of sentiment generated by these two channels often intertwined.

The latest quarterly survey shows that the scores for all media are on a downward trend, and therefore the overall MMI has also declined significantly.

圖 6 顯示按傳播媒介劃分的輿情指數，即電視電台、報紙和純網媒。普遍現象是電視電台所報道的新聞長期更正面，而純網媒則較嚴厲。這種傳媒生態於 2019 年第 2 季至 2020 年第 2 季的一年間有所改變。電視台和電台加入對「一國兩制」的集體批評，而且新聞情緒比純網媒更負面。自此之後，電視台和電台回復原先的報道風格，在較為正面的新聞事件中，情緒分數的增幅比其他媒介更強。但是，報紙和純網媒之間的差異則越來越少，這兩種媒介的情緒比過往交疊得更多。

最新季度調查顯示，所有媒介的評分均呈下降趨勢，整體輿情指數也大幅度下滑。

Figure 6: 1C2S MMI (by media channels)
圖 6：「一國兩制」輿情指數（按傳播媒介劃分）



4. 政治傾向

4. Political Orientation

Figure 7 depicts the composition of Hong Kong population by political inclination. Moderates (including centrists and those without specific political inclination) remained the largest group (77.1%), followed by non-establishment supporters (14.3%) and pro-establishment supporters (5.9%).

Over the last half year, the gap between the moderates and non-establishment supporters slightly widened, with the two groups diverging by approximately 1.9 percentage from the previous survey period. Meanwhile, the size of pro-establishment supporters decreased by 2.2 percentage points. It is believed that some pro-establishment and non-establishment supporters began to identify themselves as moderates, contributing to a trend of political moderation.

A hopeful trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation continued from mid-2017 to early 2019. The proportion of moderates and pro-establishment supporters in the population increased, while that of non-establishment supporters declined. However, radicalism resurged abruptly thereafter, leading to a reversal of this trend until the political rift began to heal in early 2020. The pro-establishment camp regained supporters, while the non-establishment shrank from its peak, and the moderates rebounded from their low point.

The steadily declining population in support of political extremity indicated a narrowing political divide and polarization. It appeared that the subsiding momentum of political controversies, such as the enactment of NSL, electoral reform and the implementation of Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, began to be reflected in the political makeup of the population.

圖7顯示香港市民的政治傾向。溫和派，包括「中間派」和「沒有政治傾向」的市民，繼續佔據全港人口的最大部分(77.1%)。非建制派排列第二(14.3%)，建制派則佔最少(5.9%)。

在過去半年，溫和派與非建制派間的差距略有擴大，兩個群體相比上一輪調查期間的差距擴大3.12百分點。與此同時，建制派支持者的規模佔比減少了2.2個百分點。我們推斷，部分建制派和非建制派支持者開始將自己視為溫和派，有助營造政治溫和化的趨勢。


從2017年中到2019年初，去激進化和溫和化趨勢持續，溫和派和建制派的人口佔比上升，非建制派支持者則下降。然而，激進主義隨後突然捲土重來，導致趨勢逆轉，直到2020年初政治分裂才開始緩和。建制陣營重新獲得支持者，而非建制陣營從高峰下降，溫和派也從低谷反彈回升。

對政治極端主義持續支持的人口比例穩步下降，意味著政治分歧和極化正在縮小。這或許反映了國安法立法、選舉改革和《維護國家安全法》實施等政治爭議的勢頭正逐步消退。



Figure 7: Political inclination of population

圖 7：香港市民政治傾向



4.1 De-radicalisation of youths 香港青年的去激進化


Figure 8 illustrates the change in the composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by political inclination. The proportion of moderates significantly increased by 6.5 percentage points to 72.5%. Non-establishment supporters were further divided into 'democrats' and 'others', with the latter representing the localist camp. Democrats decreased by 3.5 percentage points to 15%, while other non-establishment supporters also decreased by 2 percentage points to 9.3%. While the proportion of pro-establishment supporters increased slightly by 0.2 percentage points to 1.8%.

From mid-2017 to early 2019, there were encouraging signs of de-radicalization among youths, with the proportion of moderates increasing. However, this trend reversed as the proportion of non-establishment supporters experienced a steep rise, exceeding moderates for a period. Furthermore, within the non-establishment group, localists occasionally surpassed democrats. Since mid-2020, the situation of radicalisation has clearly eased, with the proportion of localists decreasing and moderates exceeding the entire non-establishment group.

圖 8 顯示青年群體 (18 至 29 歲) 的政治傾向變化。溫和派的比例上升了 6.5 個百分點到 72.5%。非建制派可再劃分為「民主派」和「其他」，後者絕大部分為本土派，兩個群組均呈下降趨勢。民主派的佔比下降 3.5 個百分點至 15%，而本土派亦下降了 2 個百分點至 9.3%。建制派則輕微上升 0.2 個百分點至 1.8%。

從 2017 年中到 2019 年初，青年群體中出現了去激進化的跡象，令人鼓舞。溫和派的比例有所上升。但這一趨勢後來出現逆轉，非建制派支持者的佔比急劇上升，更一度超越溫和派。而在非建制派內部，「本土派」偶爾還超越了「民主派」。自 2020 年中以來，激進化的情況明顯緩解，「本土派」的比例下降，而溫和派更超越整個非建制派群體。

Figure 8: Political inclination of youths
圖 8：青年的政治傾向



5. 延續「一國兩制」

5. Continuation of 1C2S

A key issue for Hong Kong's future is the continuation of 1C2S. In previous surveys, respondents were asked about whether this constitutional arrangement should be continued beyond 2047, and those who answered 'yes' were further asked about favourable conditions for such as a goal. This set of questions became irrelevant after the Central Government assured that 1C2S would be preserved over the long term. However, understanding people's needs for a preferred future could still serve the purpose of improving and upholding 1C2S. Therefore, all respondents were asked to choose what conditions would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S from the following list (they were allowed to choose more than one item):

- Maintaining a high degree of autonomy;
- Maintaining economic prosperity and stability;
- Political system democratises further;
- Maintaining national security; and
- Others (please specify).

Figure 9 shows the percentages of respondents who selected each of the five conditions for the continuation of 1C2S. The data reveals a consistent preference among respondents, with 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (64.8%) ranking highest. 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (46.8%) follows closely, while 'political system democratises further' (33.3%) surpasses 'maintaining national security' (32.7%) to secure the third position. While the proportion of respondents who selected 'others/ don't know' has significantly decreased by 8.1% to 3.2%.

Figure 10 highlights the distinct patterns of choice across different political inclinations. With the exception of 'others' category within the non-establishment supporters, all other political groups prioritized 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' as the most favourable condition for the continuation of 1C2S. Moderates ranked 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (67.2%) and 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (46.2%) as their top two priorities. Notably, there is a discernible upward trend in the selection of the remaining two conditions: 'political system democratises further' (32.4%), 'maintaining national security' (34.8%).

「一國兩制」長期延續乃關乎香港前途的關鍵議題。過去的問卷調查中，受訪者被問及這個制度安排應否延續至 2047 年後，而回答「應該」的受訪者，會再被邀請選擇對此目標的有利條件。在中央政府保證必須長期堅持「一國兩制」後，這些題目已經完成歷史作用。然而，明白市民關注的議題和對未來的期盼，或有助於維護和改善「一國兩制」。因此，所有受訪者會被邀從下列清單中選出有利於繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（可選擇多於一項）：

- 維持高度自治；
- 經濟維持繁榮穩定；
- 政制進一步民主化；
- 維持國家安全；及
- 其他（請註明）。

圖 9 顯示市民選擇各條件的比例，受訪者的偏好維持不變。「經濟維持繁榮穩定」排行第一（64.8%），緊接的是「維持高度自治」（46.8%）。在這一輪調查，「政制進一步民主化」（33.3%）超越「維護國家安全」（32.7%），排行第三。然而，選擇「其他 / 唔知道」的受訪市民百分比下跌 8.1% 至 3.2%。

圖 10 顯示不同政治傾向群體的選擇差異。除了非建制派中的「其他」類別外，其他所有政治群體都將「經濟維持繁榮穩定」列為延續「一國兩制」的最優先條件。其中，溫和派將「經濟維持繁榮穩定」（67.2%）和「維持高度自治」（46.2%）列為首要優先事項。值得注意的是，其他兩個條件的選擇呈現明顯上升趨勢：「政治體制進一步民主化」（32.4%）、「維護國家安全」（34.8%）。


Pro-establishment supporters also placed 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (65.1%) as their highest priority. However, a significant decline is observed in the selection of 'maintaining national security' (48.5%) and 'political system democratises further' (15.9%), exhibiting drops of 12.6% and 12.3% respectively.

建制派支持者亦將「經濟維持繁榮穩定」(65.1%) 列為最有利條件。但選擇「維護國家安全」(48.5%) 和「政治體制進一步民主化」(15.9%) 的百分比則分別下降 12.6% 和 12.3%。

Within the non-establishment camp, 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (53.5%) and 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (53.4%) are perceived as equally crucial conditions for the continued implementation of 1C2S. 'Maintaining national security' (14.4%) has experienced a slight decrease of 1.3% compared to the previous survey period.

在非建制派陣營中，「維持高度自治」(53.5%) 和「經濟維持繁榮穩定」(53.4%) 被視為延續「一國兩制」的同等關鍵條件。相比上一輪調查，「維護國家安全」(14.4%) 則輕微下跌了 1.3%。


Figure 9: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047
圖 9：2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件



Note: Responses prior to 2023 do not include those who believe that 'One Country, Two Systems' 'should not' continue after 2047 (about a quarter of respondents chose this answer). Readers should be careful to note these changes and their interpretations.

註：2023 年前的回應並不包括認為「一國兩制」「不應該」在 2047 年後延續者（大約四分之一的受訪者選擇此答案）。讀者需小心留意這些改變和其解釋。

Figure 10: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047 (by political inclination)
 圖 10：有利於 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（按政治傾向劃分）



Note: Responses prior to 2023 do not include those who believe that 'One Country, Two Systems' 'should not' continue after 2047 (about a quarter of respondents chose this answer). Readers should be careful to note these changes and their interpretations.

註：2023 年前的回應並不包括認為「一國兩制『不應該』」在 2047 年後延續者（大約四份之一的受訪者選擇此答案）。讀者需小心留意這些改變和其解釋。



6. 市民的身份認同

6. Citizens' Identity

We also surveyed how citizens identify themselves: whether as 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese'. Figure 11 shows that members of the public consistently identified more strongly as 'Hongkongers' than as 'Chinese'. While scores for both identities began to converge in the second half of 2022, the gap between them has since widened. Despite this, the scores for dual identities remain high. This round, the scores for 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' are recorded at 8.43 points and 7.16 points, respectively, representing increases of 2.4% and 1.8% compared to the previous survey period. The increase in the rating for 'Hongkongers' is statistically significant compared to the last survey period, namely the second half of 2023.

Figure 12, a graph mapping the mix of identities rated by respondents against time, further illustrates the trend. On a 0 to 10 scale, a median score of 5 indicates moderate identification. Scores above the median indicate relatively strong identification, while scores below the median indicate relatively weak identification. These levels of strength can be grouped into four categories: dual identity (strong in both identifications), stronger identification as 'Hongkongers only', stronger identification as 'Chinese' only, and others, which include those without a dominant identity.

Earlier surveys showed a clear pattern that most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese'. This had gradually changed since mid-2019 and rebounded after hitting rock bottom in mid-2020. Dual identity became the dominant identity again by overtaking 'Hongkonger only' since 2022. The share for dual identity continued to rise by 3.8 percentage points to 63.8% in this round.

While identification as Chinese does not equate to patriotic, identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' is a prerequisite for 'devotion to China and Hong Kong'. The rebound in the proportion of Hong Kong people with dual identity since December 2018 suggests easing societal tension, which would likely benefit the implementation of 1C2S. We acknowledge the potential impact of ongoing international condemnation of 'China on how Hongkongers view themselves. The significance of this factor will hopefully become clearer over time.

我們分別詢問市民對「香港人」及「中國人」身份認同程度。圖 11 顯示，香港市民對「香港人」的認同感持續強於「中國人」。儘管兩種身份認同在 2022 年下半年開始趨於收斂，但差距卻隨後有所擴大。不過，兩種身份認同的得分均保持較高水平。在本輪調查中，「香港人」和「中國人」的得分分別為 8.43 分和 7.16 分，分別較上一輪調查期間上升了 2.4% 和 1.8%。「香港人」身份認同得分，較上一輪的增幅達到統計學上的顯著程度。


圖 12 更清晰地呈現市民對兩種身份的認同程度。按 0 分至 10 分的尺度，5 分代表中等認同度。高於中位數代表較強認同，低於則代表較弱認同。對兩種身份不同程度的認同可歸為四類：雙重身份（對兩種身份均擁有較強認同）、只對「香港人」身份有較強認同、只對「中國人」身份有較強認同，以及包括沒有主要身份的其他身份認同。

香港市民普遍擁有「香港人」和「中國人」雙重身份認同，情況自 2019 年起逐步轉變，從 2020 年中起重新反彈。自 2022 年起，雙重身份超過「只有香港人」，重新變成香港市民的主流身份。是次調查中，雙重身份的比例上升 3.8 個百分點至 63.8%。

儘管認同「中國人」身份並不同於愛國，但同時認同「中國人」及「香港人」的雙重身份認同是「愛國愛港」的先決條件。自 2018 年 12 月以來，擁有雙重身份認同的香港人比例反彈，表明社會緊張局勢有所緩解，可能利於「一國兩制」的實施。現在，國際社會對中國口誅筆伐，對塑造香港人自我認同的作用不能忽略，其影響力需時瞭解。

Figure 11: Citizens' identity scores


圖 11：市民的身分認同評分



| | Share 佔比 | Changes 變化 |
|----------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Hongkonger 香港人 | 8.43 | +0.20 (↑ 2.4%)* |
| Chinese 中國人 | 7.16 | +0.13 (↑ 1.8%) |

Figure 12: Citizens' identity mix

圖 12：市民的混合身份認同



| | Share 佔比 | Changes 變化 |
|-------------------------|-------------|---------------|
| Dual identity 雙重認同 | 63.8% | (↑ 3.8%) |
| Hongkonger only 只有香港人身份 | 23.4% | (↓ 1.3%) |
| Chinese only 只有中國人身份 | 6.0% | (↓ 0.8%) |
| Others 其他 | 6.7% | (↓ 1.8%) |

6.1 Rank correlation 等級相關係數

Statistical analysis yields the observation that there was a positive correlation between identification as a 'Hongkonger' and as a 'Chinese'. The converse also held true, as the rank correlation coefficient was 0.239 and this was statistically very significant. The finding that the two identities as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' were mutually reinforcing each other provided a strong basis for the implementation of 1C2S.

統計分析發現市民對「香港人」及「中國人」身份認同呈現正相關，即越認同「香港人」身份的市民亦越認同「中國人」身份，反之亦然。等級相關係數為 0.239，這在統計學上是非常顯著的。這也證實「香港人」和「中國人」兩種身份認同是相輔相成的，這也為「一國兩制」的實施提供了堅實的基礎。

Table 5: Rank correlation of citizens' identity

表 5：市民的身分認同等級相關係數

| | 2022.7 | 2023.1 | 2023.7 | 2024.2 | 2024.7 |
|--------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Correlation 相關係數 | 0.430 | 0.332 | 0.374 | 0.242 | 0.239 |
| t-statistic t 檢定統計 | 14.25 | 10.32 | 12.21 | 7.77 | 7.68 |

7. 熱門議題 7. Topical Issues

7.1 Emigration 移民海外

Table 6 presents the public's emigration plans. The majority (84.1%) reported having 'no plans' to emigrate, significantly exceeding those with 'plans' (14.0%). The 'no plans' group saw a 3.3 percentage point increase, while the 'plans' group experienced a 3.9 percentage point decrease. Consequently, the net value dropped by 7.3 percentage points since the last round, reaching -70.2%.

Figure 13 and Figure 14 illustrate the net value of emigration plans across different age groups and political inclinations. All age groups experienced declines, with the most drastic decreases observed among those aged 18-29 and 40-49.

As expected, non-establishment supporters were more likely to have plans to emigrate than respondents with other political inclinations. Their net value fell by 19.3 percentage points to -43.4%. The pro-establishment camp also experienced a decrease in net value, dropping by 5.3 percentage points to -95.6%.

Past studies have suggested that surveys often overestimate the number of individuals intending to emigrate, as only a fraction of those who expressing interest actually follow through their plans. Therefore, caution should be exercised when interpreting these findings, though they still provide valuable insights into the degree and extent of concern. The relaxation of immigration requirements by popular countries in response to the implementation of the two pieces of national security legislations might also suggest that emigration plans are not necessarily be driven by a lack of confidence in 1C2S, or the socio-political situation in Hong Kong, but rather perceived as 'opportunities not to be missed' by those who had previously considered immigration regardless.

Table 6: Public's emigration plans
表 6：市民移民海外的計劃

| | 2022.7 | 2023.1 | 2023.7 | 2024.2 | 2024.7 |
|----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
| Have Plans 有打算 | 15.8% | 12.3% | 14.9% | 17.9% | 14.0% |
| No Plans 無打算 | 74.4% | 78.1% | 75.6% | 80.8% | 84.1% |
| Don't Know 唔知道 | 9.8% | 9.5% | 9.5% | 1.3% | 1.9% |
| Net Value 淨值 | -58.6% | -65.8% | -60.8% | -62.9% | -70.2%* |

Net Value: Percent "Have Plans" minus percent "No Plans"
淨值：認為「有打算」的百分比減去認為「無打算」的百分比

表 6 顯示市民的移民海外的計劃。本輪調查結果顯示，大多數香港市民 (84.1%) 表示「無打算」移民，遠高於有「打算」移民的人 (14.0%)。比起上輪調查，「無打算」移民群體的比例增加了 3.3 個百分點，而「打算」的群體則下降了 3.9 個百分點。因此，淨值較上一輪調查下降了 7.3 個百分點至 -70.2%。

圖 13 和圖 14 按年齡組別及政治派別呈現市民移民海外的淨值。本輪調查中，所有年齡組別的淨值都有所下降，其中 18-29 歲和 40-49 歲組別的下陷最為明顯。

一如預期，非建制派支持者較其他政治傾向人群更有「打算」移民，有關淨值下降了 19.3 個百分點，至 -43.4%。而建制陣營的淨值也有所下降，降至 -95.6% (-5.3%)。

根據過往研究，在民調中聲稱「打算」移民的人數，只有一小部分人最終付諸行動，因此需謹慎解讀有關調查結果。隨著一些移民熱門國家降低移民門檻，意味著表明「打算」移民者或非完全源於對「一國兩制」或香港社會政治局勢缺乏信心，他們或為了外出探索更多機遇，而作出決定。

Figure 13: Public's emigration plans (by age group)
圖 13：市民移民海外的計劃（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 14: Public's emigration plans (by political inclination)
圖 14：市民移民海外的計劃（按政治傾向劃分）



7.2 Willingness to live or work in other Greater Bay Area (GBA) cities 前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願

Table 7 presents the willingness of respondents to live or work in other cities within the GBA. Of those surveyed, 7.9% indicated they were 'willing' to live or work in the GBA, while 56.0% were 'unwilling'. Compared to the previous survey, the proportion of those willing increased slightly by 1%, while the proportion of those unwilling decreased by 1.7%. Notably, approximately 34% of respondents remained undecided about their willingness, a figure consistent with the previous survey period.

Figure 15 and Figure 16 further illustrate the willingness to live or work in other GBA cities, categorised by age group and political inclination, respectively. Across all age groups, net willingness values showed an increase. The most significant rise was observed among those aged 40-49, with a 9.7 percentage point increase in net willingness, reaching -37.8%.

Similarly, net willingness among supporters of all political camps has continued to increase. Non-establishment supporters experienced the most substantial increase, reaching 7.5%, followed by moderates (1.4%) and pro-establishment supporters (0.3%).

表 7 顯示受訪者前往大灣區居住或工作的意願，當中有 7.9% 的受訪者表示「會考慮」在大灣區其他城市工作或生活，然而，大部分受訪者 (56.0%) 表示「不會考慮」。相比上一次調查，「會考慮」的受訪者比例微增 1 個百分點，「不會考慮」的則下降 1.7 個百分點。值得注意的是，約 34% 的受訪者未確定是否願意前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展，這與上一輪調查的結果大概一致。

按年齡群組 (圖 15) 看，所有年齡群組的淨意願值都有所上升，其中 40-49 歲群體的上升幅度最大，增加 9.7 個百分點至 -37.8%。

從政治傾向 (圖 16) 看，各陣營的淨意願均呈現持續上升趨勢，當中以非建制派的增幅為最大 (7.5%)，溫和派和建制派的淨意願值則分別上漲 1.4% 和 0.3%。

Table 7: Willingness to live or work in other GBA cities
表 7：前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願

| | 2022.7 | 2023.1 | 2023.7 | 2024.2 | 2024.7 |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Willing 會考慮 | 4.5% | 3.4% | 5.1% | 6.9% | 7.9% |
| Not willing 不會考慮 | 69.6% | 75.2% | 61.3% | 57.7% | 56.0% |
| Maybe / Don't Know 或者 / 唔知道 | 25.9% | 21.3% | 33.6% | 34.2% | 36.1% |
| Net Value 淨值 | -65.2% | -71.8% | -56.2% | -50.9% | -48.0% |

Net Value: Percent "Willing" minus percent "Not Willing"
淨值：「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比

Figure 15: Willingness to live or work in other GBA cities (by age group)
圖 15：前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 16: Willingness to live or work in other GBA cities (by political inclination)
圖 16：前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願（按政治傾向劃分）



7.3 Confidence in the Hong Kong education system 對香港教育制度的信心

Table 8 presents the level of public confidence in Hong Kong's education system. Confidence in the education system has increased by 6.5%, reaching 45.6%, the highest level since the question was first posed in mid-2021. Conversely, the proportion of respondents expressing 'not confident' in the local education system has decreased by 3.7% to 39.3%.

Figure 17 and Figure 18 further illustrate confidence in the education system, segmented by age group and political inclination, respectively. All age groups, except those aged 70 or above experienced an increase in net confidence values. The most significant increases were observed among those aged 18-29 (+23.6%), 40-49 (+18.9%), and 30-39 (+18.6%). The changes in net confidence values for all respondents and these three age groups are statistically significant.

In terms of political inclination, net confidence values have increased drastically among both moderates (+14.8%) and non-establishments (+16.9%), reaching statistically significant levels. However, the pro-establishment camp saw a decrease in net values by 10.0%.

表 8 顯示過去五輪調查，市民對香港教育制度的信心趨勢。本輪調查顯示，市民對本港教育制度的信心有所增加，受訪者對教育制度「有信心」的佔比上升 6.5 個百分點至 45.6%，創下自 2021 年中以來的最高水平。對教育制度「無信心」的受訪者比例則下降 3.7 個百分點至 39.3%。

從年齡分佈來看（圖 17），除 70 歲或以上群組，所有年齡組別的淨信心值都有所上升。18-29 歲（+23.6%）、40-49 歲（+18.9%）和 30-39 歲（+18.6%）群體的增幅尤為顯著，與上輪比較的變化達到統計學上的顯著水平。

在政治傾向上看（圖 18），溫和派（+14.8%）和非建制派（+16.9%）的淨信心值急劇上升，達到統計學上的顯著水平。相反，建制派的淨值則下降 10.0%。

Table 8: Confidence in the Hong Kong Education System
表 8：對香港教育制度的信心

| | 2022.7 | 2023.1 | 2023.7 | 2024.2 | 2024.7 |
|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Confident 有信心 | 26.7% | 29.6% | 41.6% | 39.1% | 45.6% |
| Not Confident 無信心 | 40.6% | 40.8% | 37.4% | 43.6% | 39.3% |
| Half-half 一半半 | 29.5% | 24.2% | 18.7% | 14.8% | 13.7% |
| Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講 | 3.2% | 5.5% | 2.3% | 2.6% | 1.4% |
| Net Value 淨值 | -13.9% | -11.2% | 4.2% | -4.5% | 6.3%* |

Net value: Percent "Confident" minus percent "Not Confident"
淨值：「有信心」的百分比減去「無信心」的百分比

Figure 17: Confidence in the Hong Kong Education System (by age group)
圖 17：對香港教育制度的信心（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 18: Confidence in the Hong Kong Education System (by political inclination)
圖 18：對香港教育制度的信心（按政治傾向劃分）



7.4 Satisfaction with the performance of civil service 對公務員表現的滿意度

Table 9 presents the level of satisfaction respondents expressed regarding the performance of the civil service. Those satisfied with the civil service's performance saw an increase of 4.8%, reaching 45.5%. Conversely, the proportion of respondents expressing dissatisfaction with the civil service's performance decreased slightly by 3.6%, accounting for approximately one-third of the respondents. The change in the net satisfaction reached 13.3%, a statistically significant increase compared to the previous survey.

Figure 19 and Figure 20 further illustrate satisfaction with civil service's performance, segmented by age group. All age groups, except those aged 50-59, experienced an increase in net satisfaction values. The most significant increases were observed among those aged 18-29 (+17.6%), 60-69 (+15.7%), and 40-49 (+14.5%), reaching net values of -1.8%, 29.1%, and -6.4%, respectively.

Net satisfaction values varied among supporters of different political stances. Pro-establishment supporters experienced a drastic decrease in net satisfaction by 20.9 percentage points, reaching 37.1%. Meanwhile, net satisfaction values increased for moderates (19.5%) and non-establishment supporters (-32.1%).

表 9 顯示，受訪公眾對公務員表現的滿意度有所上升。表示「滿意」的受訪者比例增加 4.8 個百分點至 45.5%；表示「不滿意」的比例則下跌 3.6 個百分點，大致佔總體受訪者的三分之一。淨滿意度的變化則達 13.3 個百分點，較上次調查顯著上升。

從年齡組別上看（圖 19），除 50-59 歲組別外，其他組別的淨滿意度均有上漲。其中，以 18-29 歲（+17.6%）、60-69 歲（+15.7%）和 40-49 歲（+14.5%）的增幅最為顯著，淨值分別達到 -1.8%、29.1% 和 -6.4%。

在政治取向上（圖 20），淨滿意度呈現不同趨勢。建制派陣營的淨滿意度大幅下降 20.9 個百分點至 37.1%。而溫和派（+19.5%）和非建制派（-32.1%）的淨滿意度則有所上升。

Table 9: Level of Satisfaction with Civil Service Performance
表 9：對公務員表現的滿意度

| | 2022.7 | 2023.1 | 2023.7 | 2024.2 | 2024.7 |
|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Satisfied 滿意 | 42.6% | 40.3% | 49.4% | 40.7% | 45.5% |
| Dissatisfied 不滿意 | 29.8% | 26.9% | 27.6% | 35.9% | 32.3% |
| Half-half 一半半 | 25.8% | 29.9% | 19.7% | 21.5% | 20.3% |
| Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講 | 1.7% | 3.0% | 3.3% | 1.9% | 2.0% |
| Net Value 淨值 | 12.8% | 13.4% | 21.8% | 4.8% | 13.3%* |

Net value: Percent 'Satisfied' minus percent 'Dissatisfied'
淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比

Figure 19: Level of satisfaction with civil service performance (by age group)

圖 19：對公務員服務水平的滿意度（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 20: Level of satisfaction with civil service performance (by political inclination)

圖 20：對公務員服務水平的滿意度（按政治傾向劃分）



8. 市民對選定政治議題的觀感 8. Public Perception of Selected Political Issues

8.1 Satisfaction with HKSAR Government 對現屆政府表現的滿意度

Table 10 presents public satisfaction ratings with the current Hong Kong SAR Government. Nearly half of the respondents (44.4%) expressed satisfaction with the government's performance, while 39% indicated dissatisfaction.

These mixed public perceptions indicate that the Hong Kong government has opportunities to enhance its standing in the eyes of residents. One area the government could prioritize is fostering economic development and reform, drawing inspiration from the spirit of the Third Plenum. Deepening structural reforms and transitioning towards a more sustainable, innovation-driven economy could offer a constructive path forward for the Hong Kong government.

表 10 顯示市民對現屆政府表現的滿意度評分，近半受訪者（44.4%）表示對政府的表現感到「滿意」，而 39% 的人則表示「不滿意」。

公眾觀感不一致表明，香港政府在提升形象方面仍有進步空間。政府的首要任務應該是借鑒三中全會的精神，推動經濟發展和改革。我們相信，深化結構性改革，促進本地經濟向更可持續和創新驅動的體制轉型，將為香港政府提供一條建設性的前進道路。

Table 10: Level of satisfaction with the current HKSAR government
表 10：對現屆政府表現的滿意度

| | All Respondents 所有受訪者 |
|------------------|-----------------------|
| Satisfied 滿意 | 44.4% |
| Dissatisfied 不滿意 | 39.0% |
| Half-half 一半半 | 15.4% |
| Don't know 唔知道 | 1.2% |
| Net Value 淨值 | 5.4% |

Net value: Percent 'Satisfied' minus percent 'Dissatisfied'
淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比



8.2 Attitudes toward democratic progress 對加快民主政制發展的態度

Table 11 examines public opinion on whether the government should accelerate Hong Kong's democratic development. The survey reveals that most respondents (66.6%) believe the government should accelerate democratic development. Conversely, approximately 17.6% believe the government should not accelerate development, while 15.8% remain unsure.

People share a demand for democratic political development. Nonetheless, the Hong Kong administration may need to thread a careful needle - advancing democratic reforms at a measured pace that balances the diverse views of its constituents. Engaging in open dialogue, incorporating public feedback, and ensuring transparency in the reform process could help build broader support and legitimacy.

表 11 顯示市民對政府應否加快香港民主發展的看法。調查結果顯示，大多數受訪者 (66.6%) 認為政府「應該」加快民主發展，約 17.6% 的受訪者認為政府「不應該」加快發展，而 15.8% 的人則表示「不知道」。

調查結果揭示市民對加快民主政治發展有著一致的目標。為達到此，特區政府需要謹慎行事，平衡各方觀點，以適度的步伐推進民主改革。開展公開對話、納入公眾意見並確保改革過程的透明度也有利於得到更廣泛的支持和合法性。

Table 11: Attitude towards accelerating democratic political development

表 11：對加快民主政制發展的態度

| | 2020.9 | 2024.7 |
|----------------|--------|--------|
| Should 應該 | 67.0% | 66.6% |
| Should not 不應該 | 14.0% | 17.6% |
| Don't know 唔知道 | 4.5% | 15.8% |
| Net Value 淨值 | 53.0% | 49.0% |

Net value: Percent 'Should' minus percent 'Should not'
淨值：「應該」的百分比減去「不應該」的百分比

Note: Question asked in 2020.9 was 'The Basic Law stipulates that the selection of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council shall be executed by universal suffrage in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. Do you think the future democratization of Hong Kong will be faster or slower?'

註：2020.9 的題目為「基本法規定，要達至普選產生行政長官同立法會須根據循序漸進嘅原則，你認為未來香港達至雙普選嘅進程應該減慢定加快呢？」

8.3 Employment of anti-extradition protesters 對招聘反修例示威者的態度

Table 12 explores public opinion on whether local employers should consider job applications from individuals who have already faced legal consequences from the anti-extradition bill protests. Most respondents (63.2%) believe employers should consider these applications, while approximately one-fifth disagree.

表 12 顯示，市民對於本地僱主應該否考慮接納在 2019 事件被捕且已承擔法律責任者求職申請的看法。大多數受訪者 (63.2%) 認為僱主應該考慮這些申請，然而約五分之一的受訪者持反對態度。

This public sentiment suggests an openness among Hong Kong residents to providing second chances and reintegrating them back into society. Seizing on this, the government could look to spearhead initiatives that assist these individuals in transitioning back into the workforce after serving their sentences. A 'forgive and forget' publicity campaign, combined with direct outreach to employers, could demonstrate the government's commitment to rehabilitation and reintegration.

公眾態度表明，香港市民對於幫助這些人重新融入社會，並給予他們第二次機會持開放態度。政府可以利用這一點，推動以「寬恕與和解」為主題的倡議活動，與僱主攜手，幫助他們在服刑後重投入社會崗位。

Table 12: Attitude towards employing anti-extradition protesters.

表 12：對招聘反修例示威者的態度

| | All Respondents 所有受訪者 |
|---|-----------------------|
| Agree 同意 | 63.2% |
| Disagree 不同意 | 20.7% |
| Half-half 一半半 | 11.2% |
| Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講 | 4.9% |
| Net Value 淨值 | 42.5% |

Net value: Percent 'Agree' minus percent 'Disagree'
淨值：「同意」的百分比減去「不同意」的百分比

8.4 Generation gap and political divide 代溝與政治鴻溝

Table 13 and Table 14 summarize the net values generated from questions about selected political controversies, with the results categorized by age group and political inclination.

表 13 及表 14 按年齡及政治傾向劃分，總結公眾對近期政治爭議的淨值。

The data reveals clear patterns in how respondents from different age and political groups reacted to these controversial issues. Generally, the net values increased with age and decreased as political leanings moved away from the pro-establishment end of the spectrum. For instance, the 18-29 age group and non-establishment supporters were the most critical in their assessments of the political controversies.

數據顯示，受訪者的年齡及政治傾向對於爭議事件的取態有明確關係。一般而言，淨值隨年齡增長而上升，並隨政治傾向偏離建制派而下降。例如，18-29 歲組別及非建制派對政治爭議評價尤其負面。建制派通常給予最高淨值，有時更是所有組別中唯一的正值。

Considering the contrasting views displayed by the different political camps, the stance of moderates serves as a valuable reference point for gauging the general public's opinions on these topical issues. In the current round, moderates' level of satisfaction with the SAR government remained independent from the positions taken by both the pro-establishment and non-establishment camps. This suggests that rationality and pragmatism continue to be deeply rooted within the Hong Kong community.

有別於其他政治派別的極端觀點，溫和派在這些熱點問題上的立場甚具參考價值，表明公眾的看法。在本輪調查中，溫和派對特區政府表現的滿意度評分獨立於建制派和非建制派陣營的評分，這表明香港社會中依然存在理性和務實的態度。

Table 13: Generation gap over selected political events (by age group)

表 13：對選定政治事件之代溝（按年齡劃分）

| | New electoral systems 新選舉制度 (2024.2) | Satisfaction with HKSAR government 政府表現滿意度 (2024.7) | Democratic progress 民主政制發展 (2024.7) | Employment of anti-extradition protesters 招聘反修例示威者 (2024.7) |
|-----------------------|--|---|---|---|
| 18-29 | -26.1% | -31.2% | 54.6% | 31.7% |
| 30-39 | -23.7% | -26.5% | 55.6% | 31.0% |
| 40-49 | -20.0% | -1.3% | 59.6% | 51.0% |
| 50-59 | -7.1% | 10.0% | 42.0% | 41.5% |
| 60-69 | 5.3% | 21.3% | 51.5% | 52.2% |
| ≥ 70 | 21.0% | 47.6% | 32.9% | 41.5% |
| All respondents 所有受訪者 | -6.9% | 5.4% | 49.0% | 42.5% |

Table 14: Political divide over selected political controversies (by political inclination)

表 14：對選定政治爭議之政治鴻溝（按政治傾向劃分）

| | New electoral systems 新選舉制度 (2024.2) | Satisfaction with HKSAR government 政府表現滿意度 (2024.7) | Democratic progress 民主政制發展 (2024.7) | Employment of anti-extradition protesters 招聘反修例示威者 (2024.7) |
|------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| Pro-establishment 建制派 | 46.3% | 65.8% | 33.1% | 45.6% |
| Moderates 溫和派 | -4.1% | 11.5% | 46.3% | 41.1% |
| Non-establishment 非建制派 | -57.1% | -54.5% | 72.4% | 53.3% |
| All respondents 所有受訪者 | -6.9% | 5.4% | 49.0% | 42.5% |



附錄 Appendices



I. 編製方法 I. Methodology

1 Construction of 1C2S Index 編製「一國兩制」指數

We construct a conceptual framework to capture the current situation of 1C2S through six pillars, three based on public opinion and three based on international perception. The three pillars on public opinion are derived from telephone polls conducted among Hong Kong residents, evaluating the implementation of 1C2S. The three pillars on international perception are compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on the state of freedom and democracy worldwide. Each pillar is further divided into four sub-pillars. Consequently, we create a measurement system comprising six pillars and 24 sub-pillars. Each sub-pillar is assigned equal weight to generate a pillar score. The 1C2S Index is calculated as the simple average of all six pillar scores. Table 15 below outlines the six pillars and 24 sub-pillars used in our index.

我們建構一個觀念框架以量度香港實踐「一國兩制」的情況，基於民意調查的3項支柱及國際評價的3項支柱。民意調查的3項支柱是取自香港市民在電話調查中對落實「一國兩制」的評分。國際評價的3項支柱取自國際智庫就全球自由和民主狀況而製作的相關指數。每項支柱各設4項子支柱，使此指標體系共6項支柱和24項子支柱。每項子支柱賦予均等權重，以計算支柱的分數。「一國兩制」指數是6項支柱的簡單平均分數。表15列出指數所使用的6項支柱和24項子支柱。



Table 15: Pillars and sub-pillars of 1C2S Index
 表 15：「一國兩制」指數的支柱和子支柱

| Pillar 支柱 | Sub-pillar 子支柱 | |
|-------------------------------|---|---|
| Public Opinion 民意調查 | A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治 | A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務 A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權 A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權 A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」 |
| | B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由 | B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式 B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社和集會自由 B3. Democratic development 民主發展 B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護 |
| | C. Hong Kong-Mainland Relations 內港關係 | C1. Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾 C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益 C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定 C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落实「一國兩制」 |
| International Perception 國際評價 | D. Economic Openness 經濟開放 | D1. Business environment 營商環境 D2. Market access 市場門檻 D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素 D4. Financial stability 金融穩定 |
| | E. Civil Liberty 公民權利 | E1. Rule of law 法治 E2. Security and safety 安全 E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會 E4. Individual rights 個人權利 |
| | F. Democratic Development 民主發展 | F1. Constraints on power 權力制約 F2. Political pluralism 政治多元 F3. Civic participation 公民參與 F4. Democratic culture 民主文化 |

1.1. Public Opinion

We obtain three pillar and twelve sub-pillar scores on the implementation of 1C2S from telephone polls conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Each sub-pillar is represented by a single survey question, with the questions listed in Table 16.

Approximately 1,000 individuals are randomly sampled in each round using the CATI (computer-assisted telephone interviewing) system. All the respondents are aged 18 or above and spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin. To ensure representativeness of the Hong Kong population, all data are weighted by the proportion of gender and age of individuals aged 18 or above (excluding foreign domestic helpers) according to the Census and Statistics Department.

Table 17 provides details on the statistical and scientific standards of each survey. Since the first half of 2021, the telephone surveys have employed a dual-frame sampling design, randomly selecting phone numbers from a combined sample of residential landline and mobile phone numbers. To address potential double-counting or other unknown factors arising from individuals owning both landline and mobile numbers, additional steps are taken in the weighting method. The specific calculations are detailed in a subsequent subsection.

In the telephone polls, many questions employ a 1 to 7 rating scale, with 4 as the median. This scale, known as the Likert scale, is commonly used in psychological assessments. It is preferred over a 0 to 10 scale, as the latter is considered too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents. However, to better align with existing indices that typically employ a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median), we mathematically converted the results into this scale.

1.1. 民意調查

我們委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查，以整合市民對落實「一國兩制」的3項支柱和12項子支柱評分。每一條問卷問題代表一項子支柱。表16顯示每項子支柱相應的問卷問題。

每輪的電話調查會以電腦輔助電話訪問系統，隨機抽樣，訪問大約1,000人，全部皆屬18歲或以上，能操廣東話或普通話。進行分析時，數據依照香港政府統計處的18歲或以上性別及年齡分佈（扣除外籍家庭傭工）作加權處理，以更符合香港人口分佈的真實情況。

表17每輪電話調查的統計和科學標準。電話調查部分於2021上半年起採用雙框抽樣設計，從家居固網電話號碼及流動電話號碼的結合樣本群中隨機抽取號碼。由於大部分人同時擁有家居固網電話號碼及流動電話號碼，為免重複計算或其他不明原因帶來的估算偏差，加權的計算方法將於下一個章節詳細解釋。

電話調查中，多數題目採用1至7分的評分尺度，以4分為中位數。這是心理學常用的科學尺度，稱為李克特量尺。現時編製指數常採用0至10分的尺度，其實分類過於細緻，令市民難以選擇。不過為了與現行指數匹配，是以我們利用數學方法將調查結果轉換成為常見的0至10分尺度（以5分為中位數）。

Table 16: Questions on public opinion

表 16：民意調查問題

| Sub-pillar 子支柱 | Survey Question 民調問題 |
|-------------------|--|
| A1 | 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to practice a high degree of autonomy, and has been able to handle its own internal administrative affairs. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港實行到高度自治，自行處理特區內嘅行政事務。你有幾同意呢？」 |
| A2 | 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent judiciary powers. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅司法權。你有幾同意呢？」 |
| A3 | 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent legislative powers. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅立法權。你有幾同意呢？」 |
| A4 | 'How successful has the practice of "Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong" been?' 「整體嚟講，你認為落實『港人治港』有幾成功呢？」 |
| B1 | 'After the handover, the original ways of life of the Hong Kong people have maintained. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港人繼續維持原有嘅生活方式。你有幾同意呢？」 |
| B2 | 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論、結社同集會自由。你有幾同意呢？」 |
| B3 | 'After the handover, the development of Hong Kong's democratic system has been progressively implemented, following the provision of the Basic Law. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港嘅民主政制發展，正係按照基本法嘅規定，循序漸進地落實。你有幾同意呢？」 |
| B4 | 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capabilities, identities and social classes. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港人不論經濟能力、身份同社會地位都能夠得到法律保護。你有幾同意呢？」 |
| C1 | 'When conflicts between mainland China and Hong Kong arise, how confident are you that the conflicts can be resolved through consultation and dialogue?' 「對於當內地同香港出現嘅矛盾時，兩地可透過對話協商得以解決，你有幾大信心呢？」 |
| C2 | 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to keep intact the sovereignty of China, national security and profits from development projects. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港可以做到維護國家主權、安全和發展利益。你有幾同意呢？」 |
| C3 | 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain long-term prosperity and stability. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港能夠維持到長期繁榮穩定。你有幾同意呢？」 |
| C4 | 'How confident are you in the full implementation of "One Country, Two Systems" in Hong Kong in the future (before 2047)?' 「你有幾大信心香港喺未來（即 2047 年前）能全面落實『一國兩制』呢？」 |

Table 17: Survey details

表 17：調查概況

| Round 輪次 | Survey Period 調查日期 | Number of Respondents 受訪人數 | | | Response Rates 回應率 | | Confidence Level 置信水平 | Sampling Error 抽樣誤差 |
|-------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-----------------------|--------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | Landline 固網 | Mobile 手機 | Total 總數 | Landline 固網 | Mobile 手機 | | |
| 2017 H1 | 5.23 - 6.3 | 1,002 | - | 1,002 | 36.8% | - | 95.0% | ±3.10% |
| 2017 H2 | 12.11 - 12.23 | 1,006 | - | 1,006 | 39.5% | - | 95.0% | ±3.09% |
| 2018 H1 | 5.23 - 6.2 | 1,004 | - | 1,004 | 37.2% | - | 95.0% | ±3.09% |
| 2018 H2 | 12.3 - 12.12 | 1,001 | - | 1,001 | 38.8% | - | 95.0% | ±3.10% |
| 2019 H1 | 5.27 - 6.6 | 1,002 | - | 1,002 | 38.0% | - | 95.0% | ±3.10% |
| * | 7.24 - 8.7 | 1,001 | - | 1,001 | 39.5% | - | 95.0% | ±3.10% |
| * | 10.17 - 10.31 | 1,002 | - | 1,002 | 38.0% | - | 95.0% | ±3.09% |
| 2019 H2 | 12.10 - 12.20 | 1,000 | - | 1,000 | 40.8% | - | 95.0% | ±3.10% |
| 2020 H1 | 6.9 - 6.29 | 1,001 | - | 1,001 | 39.5% | - | 95.0% | ±3.10% |
| 2020 H2 | 12.22 - 1.13 | 1,002 | - | 1,002 | 32.5% | - | 95.0% | ±3.10% |
| 2021 H1 | 6.21 - 7.9 | 498 | 503 | 1,001 | 30.9% | 31.4% | 95.0% | ±3.10% |
| 2021 H2 | 12.20 - 1.10 | 497 | 506 | 1,003 | 30.6% | 30.0% | 95.0% | ±3.09% |
| 2022 H1 | 6.23 - 7.11 | 481 | 521 | 1,002 | 26.9% | 28.2% | 95.0% | ±3.10% |
| 2022 H2 | 12.15 - 1.18 | 474 | 531 | 1,005 | 24.4% | 26.7% | 95.0% | ±3.09% |
| 2023 H1 | 6.13 - 7.18 | 432 | 578 | 1,010 | 16.6% | 23.3% | 95.0% | ±3.08% |
| 2023 H2 | 1.12 - 2.29 | 248 | 763 | 1,011 | 31.4% | 38.2% | 95.0% | ±3.08% |
| 2024 H1 | 7.11-7.31 | 223 | 790 | 1,013 | 50.7% | 54.8% | 95.0% | ±3.08% |

Note: ‘*’ denotes surveys conducted in addition to the biannual exercise.

註：「*」為半年調查的額外輪次。

1.1.1. Weighting method for dual-frame sampling

In dual-frame sampling, weighting adjustments are made for the ownership of phone numbers in addition to the distribution of the Hong Kong population. Since everyone owns a different amount of landline and mobile numbers, each has a different probability of selection as respondents. To eliminate over-representation of any individual, the first weight factor (WT1) approximates the probability of selection for each respondent. It is a ratio of the amount of landline and mobile numbers owned by a respondent to the total number of those in the territory. WT1_i is calculated by the inverse of probability of selection of individual *i*, i.e. $WT1_i = \pi_i^{-1}$.

$$\pi_i = \frac{n_l}{N_l} \times \frac{t_i^l}{e_i^l} + \frac{n_m}{N_m} \times \frac{t_i^m}{e_i^m}$$

1.1.1. 雙框電話號碼取樣的加權方法

在雙框電話號碼取樣中，除了以香港人口的分布作調整外，亦需要為擁有手提電話這個因素作出調整。由於每人擁有不同數目的固網及流動電話號碼，他們被抽中的機率也有不同。為剔除任何一人被超額代表的機會，第一步驟是估算每名受訪者被隨機抽中的機會率，即以每位受訪者擁有家居固網電話號碼和手機號碼數目，對比全港家居固網電話及手機號碼總數。加權因子 1 (WT1_i) 之計算方式為受訪者 *i* 被抽中訪問的逆向機會率，即 $WT1_i = \pi_i^{-1}$ 。

| | | | |
|----------|---------|---|--|
| Where 當中 | i | = | i -th person selected 第 i 名被抽中的人士 |
| | n_L | = | amount of sample's landline numbers 家居固網電話號碼樣本數目 |
| | N_L | = | amount of population's landline numbers 全部家居固網電話號碼總數 |
| | t_i^L | = | amount of i -th person's landline numbers 第 i 名人士家中擁有的固網電話號碼數目 |
| | e_i^L | = | amount of eligible respondents in the household 住戶中合資格受訪人數 |
| | n_m | = | amount of sample's mobile numbers 手機號碼樣本數目 |
| | N_m | = | amount of population's mobile numbers 全部手機號碼總數 |
| | t_i^m | = | amount of i -th person's mobile numbers 第 i 名人士個人擁有的手機號碼數目 |

Sampling in telephone surveys is randomized by phone numbers without demographic consideration. The second weight factor (WT2) adjusts the size of every sample group to match population distribution in terms of gender and age. WT2 is calculated by dividing the population estimates of a gender and age group by its sample size and the sample's probability of selection.

電話調查的隨機抽樣是電話號碼，沒有考慮人口特徵。加權因子 2 (WT2) 按性別和年齡，調整每一個抽樣群組以配合人口分布。加權因子 2 是將性別和年齡分布的人口估算中除以樣本大小和樣本的選擇概率。

$$WT2 = \frac{\text{group population estimates 每組人口估算}}{\text{group sample size 每組樣本大小} \times WT1}$$

The final weighting factor (WT_F) is calculated by the following formula.

最後加權因子計算如下。

$$WT_F = WT1 \times WT2 \times \frac{\text{total sample size 總樣本大小}}{\text{total population estimates 總人口估算}}$$

| | | | |
|----------|-------------|---|--|
| Where 當中 | WT_F | = | final weighting factor 最後加權因子 |
| | WT1 | = | weight factor adjusting for the ownership of phone numbers 調整電話號碼的加權因子 |
| | WT2 | = | weight factor adjusting for the distribution of the Hong Kong population 調整香港人口分布的加權因子 |

1.2. International perception

We obtain 3 pillar and 12 sub-pillar scores on the state of freedom and democracy in the world from tracking indices compiled by international think tanks. Every sub-pillar is derived from multiple indicators. They offer a wide coverage of scopes and territories enabling us to compare Hong Kong's position on the global stage with an 1C2S perspective. There are two selection criteria for data sources. First, their datasets must cover Hong Kong to allow a direct comparison. Second, their indicators must capture key areas of 1C2S that draw international attention. Also, every data source has a different geographic coverage, only locations observed by at least three quarters of all data sources are included. As a result, 127 indicators from 9 data sources are adopted in our model to score and rank 148 countries and territories. Tables below show the list of indicators and their sources. Data sources include:

1.2. 國際評價

我們收集國際智庫編製的長期追蹤指數，以整合國際社會對世界自由民主狀況的 3 項支柱和 12 項子支柱評分。每項子支柱均由多個指標組成，這些指標涵蓋廣泛的範疇和地區，使我們能夠用「一國兩制」視角，在全球舞台上比較香港的地位。我們按兩個原則選擇數據來源：一、它們的數據集必須涵蓋香港，以便進行直接比較；二、它們的指標必須涵蓋國際社會所關心的「一國兩制」關鍵領域。此外，每個數據來源也有不同的地理覆蓋範圍，我們只採納所有數據來源中，最少獲四分之三涵蓋的地區。因此，我們的模型採用來自 9 個數據來源的 127 個指標對 148 個國家和地區進行評分和排名。以下列表顯示指標清單及其來源。數據來源包括：

- Cato Institute and Fraser Institute: Human Freedom Index (HFI);
- Economist Intelligence Unit: Democracy Index (DI);
- Freedom House: Freedom in the World (FiW);
- International Institute for Management Development (IMD): World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY);
- Reporters Without Borders: World Press Freedom Index (WPFI);
- V-Dem Institute: V-Dem Dataset (V-Dem);
- World Bank: Doing Business Index (DB);
- World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Index (GCI); and
- World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index (RoLI).

Table 18: List of indicators on international perception (D. Economic Openness)

表 18：國際評價之指標列表 (D. 經濟開放)

| Sub-pillar 子支柱 | Area 範疇 | Indicator 指標 | Description 描述 | Source 來源 | Scale 尺度 |
|----------------------------------|---|-----------------|--|--------------|-------------|
| D1. Business Environment 營商環境 | Business facilitation 方便營商 | D1.1 | Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.10 Burden of government regulation | GCI | 1-7 |
| | | D1.2 | 5C Business regulations | EFW | 0-10 |
| | | D1.3 | Paying Taxes | DB | 0-100 |
| | | D1.4 | Resolving Insolvency | DB | 0-100 |
| | Labour market 勞動市場 | D1.5 | Pillar 8: Labour market | GCI | 0-100 |
| | | D1.6 | Business Efficiency - 3.2 Labor Market | WCY | 0-100 |
| D2. Market Access 市場門檻 | Free trade 自由貿易 | D2.1 | 4 Freedom to trade internationally | EFW | 0-10 |
| | | D2.2 | Pillar 7: Product market - Trade openness | GCI | 0-100 |
| | | D2.3 | Trading across Borders | DB | 0-100 |
| | Market competition 市場競爭 | D2.4 | Starting a Business | DB | 0-10 |
| | | D2.5 | Government Efficiency - 2.4 Business Legislation | WCY | 0-100 |
| | | D2.6 | Business Efficiency - 3.5 Attitudes and Values | WCY | 0-100 |
| | | D2.7 | Pillar 7: Product market - Domestic competition | GCI | 0-100 |
| D3. Regulatory Quality 監管質素 | Protection of property rights 保障私有產權 | D3.1 | 2C Protection of property rights | EFW | 0-10 |
| | | D3.2 | Infrastructure - 4.3.21 Intellectual property rights | WCY | 0-10 |
| | | D3.3 | Pillar 1: Institutions - Property rights | GCI | 0-100 |
| | Enforcement of contracts 履行合約 | D3.4 | 2F Legal enforcement of contracts | EFW | 0-10 |
| | | D3.5 | Government Efficiency - 2.3.09 Legal and regulatory framework | WCY | 0-10 |
| | | D3.6 | Enforcing Contracts | DB | 0-100 |
| | | D3.7 | Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes | GCI | 1-7 |
| | Corporate governance 企業管治 | D3.8 | Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Auditing and accounting practices | WCY | 0-10 |
| | | D3.9 | Pillar 1: Institutions - Corporate governance | GCI | 0-100 |
| | | D3.10 | Protecting Minority Investors | DB | 0-100 |
| D4. Financial Stability 金融穩定 | Public finance 公共財政 | D4.1 | 3 Sound Money | EFW | 0-10 |
| | | D4.2 | Government Efficiency - 2.1.07 Public finance | WCY | 0-10 |
| | | D4.3 | Pillar 4: Macroeconomic stability | GCI | 0-100 |
| | Money market 金融市場 | D4.4 | 5A Credit market regulations | EFW | 0-10 |
| | | D4.5 | Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Banking and financial services | WCY | 0-10 |
| | | D4.6 | Getting Credit | DB | 0-100 |
| | | D4.7 | Pillar 9: Financial system | GCI | 0-100 |

Table 19: List of indicators on international perception (E. Civil Liberty)

表 19：國際評價之指標列表 (E. 公民權利)

| Sub-pillar 子支柱 | Area 範疇 | Indicator 指標 | Description 描述 | Source 來源 | Scale 尺度 | |
|--|---|-----------------------------------|--|--|-------------|-----|
| E1. Rule of Law 法治 | Judicial independence 司法獨立 | E1.1 | F. Rule of Law – F1. Is there an independent judiciary? | FiW | 0-4 | |
| | | E1.2 | Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.07 Judicial independence | GCI | 0-100 | |
| | Civil and criminal justice 民事與刑事公義 | E1.3 | F. Rule of Law – F2. Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters? | FiW | 0-4 | |
| | | E1.4 | Government Efficiency – 2.5.01 Justice | WCY | 0-10 | |
| | | E1.5 | Factor 7: Civil Justice | RoLI | 0-1 | |
| | | E1.6 | Factor 8: Criminal Justice | RoLI | 0-1 | |
| | Equal protection 平等保障 | E1.7 | F. Rule of Law – F4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population? | FiW | 0-4 | |
| | | E1.8 | Access to justice | V-Dem | 0-1 | |
| | Regulatory enforcement 監管執法 | E1.9 | Factor 6: Regulatory Enforcement | RoLI | 0-1 | |
| | | E1.10 | Rigorous and impartial public administration | V-Dem | 0-4 | |
| | | E1.11 | Transparent laws with predictable enforcement | V-Dem | 0-4 | |
| E2. Security and Safety 安全 | Absence of crime 杜絕犯罪 | E2.1 | Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.01 Organized crime | GCI | 1-7 | |
| | | E2.2 | Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.04 Reliability of police services | GCI | 1-7 | |
| | | E2.3 | Factor 5: Order and Security – 5.1 Crime is effectively controlled | RoLI | 0-1 | |
| | Right to life 生存權利 | E2.4 | B Security and Safety – Bi Homicide | PFI | 0-10 | |
| | | E2.5 | F. Rule of Law – F3. Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies? | FiW | 0-4 | |
| | | E2.6 | Physical violence index | V-Dem | 0-1 | |
| | | E2.7 | Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.2 The right to life and security of the person is effectively guaranteed | RoLI | 0-1 | |
| | Civil conflict and terrorism 內戰與恐怖主義 | E2.8 | B Security and Safety – Bii. Disappearances, conflicts, and terrorism | PFI | 0-10 | |
| | | E2.9 | Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.03 Terrorism incidence | GCI | 0-100 | |
| | | E2.10 | Factor 5: Order and Security – 5.2 Civil conflict is effectively limited | RoLI | 0-1 | |
| E3. Expression, Association and Assembly 表達、結社與集會 | Expression 表達 | E3.1 | F Freedom of Expression – Fi Direct Attacks on Press | PFI | 0-10 | |
| | | E3.2 | (Removed)* | - | - | |
| | | E3.3 | D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D1. Are there free and independent media? | FiW | 0-4 | |
| | | E3.4 | D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination? | FiW | 0-4 | |
| | | E3.5 | D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D4. Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution? | FiW | 0-4 | |
| | | E3.6 | World Press Freedom Index | WPFI | 0-100 | |
| | | E3.7 | Freedom of expression index | V-Dem | 0-1 | |
| | | E3.8 | Alternative sources of information index | V-Dem | 0-1 | |
| | | E3.9 | Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.4 Freedom of opinion and expression is effectively guaranteed | RoLI | 0-1 | |
| | | E3.10 | E. Associational and Organizational Rights | FiW | 0-12 | |
| | | Association and Assembly 結社和集會 | E3.11 | Freedom of peaceful assembly | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | | | E3.12 | CSO entry and exit | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | | | E3.13 | CSO repression | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | | | E3.14 | Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.7 Freedom of assembly and association is effectively guaranteed | RoLI | 0-1 |

* Combined with E3.1 to reflect a revision from Cato Institute.
因應卡托研究所之修訂，與 E3.1 合併。

| Sub-pillar 子支柱 | Area 範疇 | Indicator 指標 | Description 描述 | Source 來源 | Scale 尺度 |
|-------------------------------|--|-----------------|--|--------------|-------------|
| E4. Individual Rights 個人權利 | Religion 宗教 | E4.1 | D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or non-belief in public and private? | FiW | 0-4 |
| | | E4.2 | Freedom of religion | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | | E4.3 | Religious organization repression | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | | E4.4 | Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.5 Freedom of belief and religion is effectively guaranteed | RoLI | 0-1 |
| | Movement 遷徙 | E4.5 | G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education? | FiW | 0-4 |
| | | E4.6 | Freedom of domestic movement | V-Dem | 0-1 |
| | | E4.7 | Freedom of foreign movement | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | Labour 勞動 | E4.8 | G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G4. Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation? | FiW | 0-4 |
| | | E4.9 | Government Efficiency – 2.5.11 Equal opportunity | WCY | 0-10 |
| | | E4.10 | Freedom from forced labor | V-Dem | 0-1 |
| | Property rights 私有產權 | E4.11 | Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.8 Fundamental labor rights are effectively guaranteed | RoLI | 0-1 |
| | | E4.12 | G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G2. Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors? | FiW | 0-4 |
| | Relationship 關係 | E4.13 | Property rights | V-Dem | 0-1 |
| | | E4.14 | Relationship Freedoms | PFI | 0-10 |
| | | E4.15 | G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance? | FiW | 0-4 |
| | Privacy, non-discrimination and equal treatment 私隱、非歧視和平等對待 | E4.16 | Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.1 Equal treatment and absence of discrimination | RoLI | 0-1 |
| | | E4.17 | Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.6 Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy is effectively guaranteed | RoLI | 0-1 |

Table 20: List of indicators on international perception (F. Democratic Development)

表 20：國際評價之指標列表 (F. 民主發展)

| Sub-pillar 子支柱 | Area 範疇 | Indicator 指標 | Description 描述 | Source 來源 | Scale 尺度 |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|--|--------------|----------------------|
| F1. Constraints on Power 權利制約 | Executive check 制約行政權 | F1.1 | Functioning of government | DI | 0-100 |
| | | F1.2 | Factor 1: Constraints on Government Powers | RoLI | 0-1 |
| | | F1.3 | Judicial constraints on the executive index | V-Dem | 0-1 |
| | | F1.4 | Legislative constraints on the executive index | V-Dem | 0-1 |
| | | F1.5 | C. Functioning of Government – C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government? | FiW | 0-4 |
| | | F1.6 | Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.08 Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations | GCI | 0-100 |
| | Absence of corruption 杜絕貪腐 | F1.7 | C. Functioning of Government – C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective? | FiW | 0-4 |
| | | F1.8 | Government Efficiency – 2.3.13 Bribery and corruption | WCY | 0-10 |
| | | F1.9 | Political corruption index | V-Dem | 0-1 (inverted 倒數) |
| | | F1.10 | Factor 2: Absence of Corruption | RoLI | 0-1 |

| Sub-pillar 子支柱 | Area 範疇 | Indicator 指標 | Description 描述 | Source 來源 | Scale 尺度 |
|---------------------------------|---|--|--|--------------|----------------------|
| F2. Political Pluralism 政治多元 | Electoral process 選舉過程 | F2.1 | A. Electoral Process | FiW | 0-12 |
| | | F2.2 | Electoral process and pluralism | DI | 0-100 |
| | | F2.3 | Clean elections index | V-Dem | 0-1 |
| | | F2.4 | Share of population with suffrage | V-Dem | 0-1 |
| | | F2.5 | Disclosure of campaign donations | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | Political competition 政治競爭 | F2.6 | B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B2. Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? | FiW | 0-4 |
| | | F2.7 | B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B3. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means? | FiW | 0-4 |
| | | F2.8 | Public campaign finance | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | | F2.9 | Divided party control index | V-Dem | z score z 分數 |
| | | F2.10 | Elected officials index | V-Dem | 0-1 |
| | Party development 政團發展 | F2.11 | B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings? | FiW | 0-4 |
| | | F2.12 | Barriers to parties | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | | F2.13 | Party ban | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | | F2.14 | Opposition parties autonomy | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | | F2.15 | Party institutionalization index | V-Dem | 0-1 |
| F3. Civic Participation 公民參與 | Political rights and awareness 政治權利與意識 | F3.1 | B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B4. Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities? | FiW | 0-4 |
| | | F3.2 | Political participation | DI | 0-100 |
| | | F3.3 | Mass mobilization | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | Citizen engagement 公民參與 | F3.4 | Civil society participation index | V-Dem | 0-1 |
| | | F3.5 | Engagement in state-administered mass organizations | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | | F3.6 | Engagement in independent trade unions | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | | F3.7 | Engagement in independent political associations | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | | F3.8 | Engagement in independent non-political associations | V-Dem | 0-4 |
| | Transparency and open government 政務公開 | F3.9 | Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.06 Budget transparency | GCI | 0-100 |
| F3.10 | | Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.12 E-participation | GCI | 0-100 | |
| F3.11 | | C. Functioning of Government – C3. Does the government operate with openness and transparency? | FiW | 0-4 | |
| F3.12 | | Factor 3: Open Government | RoLI | 0-1 | |
| F3.13 | | Government Efficiency – 2.3.11 Transparency | WCY | 0-10 | |
| F4. Democratic Culture 民主文化 | Public attitude 大眾態度 | F4.1 | Political culture | DI | 0-100 |
| | | F4.2 | Deliberative component index | V-Dem | 0-1 |
| | | F4.3 | Political Polarization | V-Dem | 0-4 (inverted 倒數) |
| | | F4.4 | Political violence | V-Dem | 0-4 (inverted 倒數) |
| | | F4.5 | Factor 5: Order and Security – 5.3 People do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances | RoLI | 0-1 |
| | Political equality 政治平等 | F4.6 | Equal protection index | V-Dem | 0-1 |
| | | F4.7 | Equal access index | V-Dem | 0-1 |
| | | F4.8 | Equal distribution of resources index | V-Dem | 0-1 |

1.2.1. Aggregation method for composite indicators

International indices are often released with a considerable time lag due to the extensive data compilation from a large number of countries. Very few indicators are collected for release in the immediate index period. Hence, we offset the time difference by rolling data forward to the release date. In other words, indicators are assigned to the index period in which they become available. Figure 21 shows the number of indicators by years offset. An alternative approach is to backdate data to the collection period. However, this approach has three disadvantages. No change will be observed in the latest issue because new scores are applied to an earlier period. Our biannual report will always record identical values in the first and second halves because most datasets are compiled on a yearly basis. Published scores will be revised substantially in the subsequent issue because indicators are updated retrospectively. It is noteworthy that backdating or time offsetting affects only the presentation of historical scores. Both approaches produce the latest pillar scores based on the latest available data.

Countries and territories covered by insufficient data sources are omitted in our model. For remaining included locations, an imputation process is carried out to replace missing data. Countries and territories are categorized into 7 regions according to the World Bank region groups. When a missing value arises, it is substituted with the regional average of recorded values. To standardize the range of data values, the complete dataset is transformed into a common scale by min-max normalisation as the below formula. For each indicator in each index period, the frontier value will be rescaled to 10 and the bottom value to 0. Even if a country or territory has the same raw score over time, its normalized score can be changed due to a change in the minimum or maximum value of the data series.

1.2.1. 綜合指數的整合方法

搜集大量國家數據需時，因此國際指數出版的時 候一般會滯後，只有少數指標能夠即期發布。因此，我們會將數據向前滾動至出版日期，以補上時間落差。換言之，當國際智庫一發布最新指標，我們便會馬上更新至即期指數。圖 21 顯示經年期調整之指標數目。另外值得考慮的方法，是將數據回溯至它們的收集時期，但是有三個缺點。第一，我們的評分在每次發布時不會有改變，因為新分數只會被更新至較早的收集時期。第二，我們在上半年和下半年公布的數字往往會相同，因為大部分國際指數只會每年更新一次。第三，已發布的數字會在期後報告大幅修訂，因為指標只會往後更新。值得注意的是，向前滾動或向後回溯只會影響歷史分數如何呈現。發布時，它們的最新評分將會相同，因為兩者皆以最新數據去計算最新分數。

數據來源不足的國家或地區將會被省略，如尚有缺失的數據，我們將會以插補方式填補。我們根據世界銀行的標準將所有地區歸類為 7 個地理組別，並以該地理組別中有紀錄的平均值去填補缺失的數據。為將各個指標的高低範圍標準化，整個數據庫會以最小—最大標準化方式轉換至一個共同尺度，公式如下。每個時期的每個指標中，最高的數值將會被縮放為 10，最低的數值則會是 0。隨著一項指標的最低或最高值改變，即使一個國家或地區在不同時期擁有相同的原始分數，經標準化後的分數亦有機會改變。




$$\text{normalized score 標準化分數} = \frac{x_i - \min(x)}{\max(x) - \min(x)}$$

A sub-pillar score is generated by its indicators with weights determined by principal component analysis. It is a standard statistical method that processes and simplifies data scientifically in index construction. It extracts a dataset's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains variations across the data through the below statistical analysis. Table 21 shows the weights of every indicator in recent index periods. Measuring about 60 countries and territories only, the coverage of IMD's World Competitiveness Yearbook is significantly smaller than other data sources. As there are more missing than recorded entries, we will assign a zero weight to IMD indicators for unobserved countries and territories instead of imputing with sub-regional average. The weights of available indicators from the remaining data sources will be enlarged proportionately.

子支柱分數整合自多個指標，而各個指標的權重由主成分分析產生。這是一種分析和簡化數據的統計技術，是以科學化方式編製指數的標準方法。此方法通過對數據進行特徵分解，以得出數據的主要成分與它們的權值，優點是揭露數據的內部結構，從而更好解釋數據的變化。表 21 顯示近期指數的各個指標權重。IMD 世界競爭力年報只覆蓋約 60 個國家和地區，比其他數據來源的覆蓋量顯然較少，缺失的數值比有紀錄的更多。所以，未被收錄的國家或地區，我們會將相關指標的權重調整為零，而非以地理組別的平均值填補，其他數據來源的權重則會按比例地增大。

Figure 21: Number of indicators by offsetting years

圖 21：經年期調整之指標數目



| | Offsetting Years 年期調整 | Changes 變化 |
|---------|--------------------------|---------------|
| 2022 H1 | 1.09 | -0.11 |
| 2022 H2 | 1.35 | +0.26 |
| 2023 H1 | 1.27 | +0.18 |
| 2023 H2 | 1.53 | +0.18 |
| 2024 H1 | 1.45 | -0.10 |



Table 21: PCA weights (%)
表 21：主成分權重 (%)

| D. Economic Openness 經濟開放 | | | | | | E. Civil Liberty 公民權利 | | | | | F. Democratic Development 民主發展 | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------------------------|-------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | 2022 H1 | 2022 H2 | 2023 H1 | 2023 H2 | 2024 H1 | | 2022 H1 | 2022 H2 | 2023 H1 | 2023 H2 | 2024 H1 | | 2022 H1 | 2022 H2 | 2023 H1 | 2023 H2 | 2024 H1 |
| D1.1 | 12.1 | 12.9 | 13.9 | 21.8 | 22.6 | E1.1 | 9.4 | 9.4 | 9.3 | 9.2 | 9.4 | F1.1 | 12.4 | 12.5 | 12.4 | 12.4 | 12.5 |
| D1.2 | 20.6 | 19.4 | 19.8 | 21.7 | 22.4 | E1.2 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 7.0 | 7.2 | 7.1 | F1.2 | 12.6 | 12.8 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| D1.3 | 18.8 | 19.1 | 19.6 | 16.1 | 16.0 | E1.3 | 10.6 | 10.6 | 10.5 | 10.5 | 10.7 | F1.3 | 11.1 | 11.1 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 10.8 |
| D1.4 | 17.3 | 16.9 | 17.0 | 10.4 | 9.9 | E1.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.5 | F1.4 | 9.3 | 9.3 | 9.6 | 9.5 | 10.3 |
| D1.5 | 22.5 | 22.7 | 23.2 | 19.7 | 19.5 | E1.5 | 10.5 | 10.5 | 10.6 | 10.7 | 10.7 | F1.5 | 10.1 | 10.1 | 10.0 | 9.9 | 10.0 |
| D1.6 | 8.7 | 9.1 | 6.6 | 10.3 | 9.7 | E1.6 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 10.9 | 10.8 | 10.8 | F1.6 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 4.8 |
| D2.1 | 14.6 | 14.5 | 14.7 | 15.9 | 16.3 | E1.7 | 8.7 | 8.7 | 8.7 | 8.6 | 8.6 | F1.7 | 12.6 | 12.5 | 12.4 | 12.4 | 12.4 |
| D2.2 | 15.2 | 15.1 | 15.3 | 15.3 | 16.1 | E1.8 | 9.5 | 9.5 | 9.5 | 9.5 | 9.4 | F1.8 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 3.4 |
| D2.3 | 13.8 | 13.2 | 13.5 | 13.4 | 13.6 | E1.9 | 10.9 | 10.9 | 10.9 | 10.9 | 10.9 | F1.9 | 12.4 | 12.3 | 12.2 | 12.2 | 12.3 |
| D2.4 | 11.6 | 11.2 | 11.1 | 11.5 | 12.1 | E1.10 | 10.5 | 10.5 | 10.1 | 10.0 | 10.2 | F1.10 | 11.0 | 11.1 | 11.0 | 11.1 | 11.0 |
| D2.5 | 16.2 | 16.9 | 16.7 | 16.0 | 16.5 | E1.11 | 9.5 | 9.5 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 9.7 | F2.1 | 9.6 | 9.7 | 9.5 | 9.5 | 9.4 |
| D2.6 | 9.6 | 10.1 | 9.6 | 9.0 | 6.0 | E2.1 | 10.2 | 10.1 | 10.2 | 9.8 | 9.8 | F2.2 | 9.3 | 9.2 | 9.2 | 9.1 | 9.2 |
| D2.7 | 18.9 | 19.1 | 19.2 | 18.8 | 19.4 | E2.2 | 10.6 | 10.5 | 10.6 | 10.2 | 10.2 | F2.3 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 8.1 |
| D3.1 | 13.1 | 13.1 | 13.2 | 12.7 | 12.9 | E2.3 | 11.2 | 11.1 | 11.2 | 11.2 | 11.2 | F2.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.4 |
| D3.2 | 10.7 | 10.7 | 11.2 | 10.8 | 10.7 | E2.4 | 5.1 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 5.2 | 5.2 | F2.5 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.8 |
| D3.3 | 13.5 | 13.5 | 13.8 | 13.8 | 14.0 | E2.5 | 13.6 | 13.9 | 13.6 | 13.6 | 13.4 | F2.6 | 9.4 | 9.4 | 9.4 | 9.3 | 9.3 |
| D3.4 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 12.2 | 12.4 | E2.6 | 10.8 | 11.0 | 10.8 | 10.7 | 11.1 | F2.7 | 8.7 | 8.7 | 8.6 | 8.6 | 8.6 |
| D3.5 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 5.3 | 4.7 | 3.9 | E2.7 | 14.3 | 14.2 | 14.1 | 13.7 | 13.7 | F2.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.4 |
| D3.6 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 8.1 | 8.0 | 8.1 | E2.8 | 12.8 | 13.1 | 13.0 | 13.8 | 13.6 | F2.9 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 |
| D3.7 | 10.5 | 10.5 | 10.2 | 9.5 | 9.5 | E2.9 | 5.1 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 4.4 | 4.3 | F2.10 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 4.7 |
| D3.8 | 9.6 | 9.6 | 10.0 | 9.6 | 9.2 | E2.10 | 6.4 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 7.3 | 7.4 | F2.11 | 9.9 | 9.9 | 9.8 | 9.8 | 9.6 |
| D3.9 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 10.6 | 10.7 | 11.1 | E3.1 | 0.0 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.9 | F2.12 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 8.1 | 7.9 |
| D3.10 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 7.4 | 7.8 | 8.1 | E3.2 | 3.0 | - | - | - | - | F2.13 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 5.9 |
| D4.1 | 15.9 | 15.5 | 15.9 | 17.4 | 17.9 | E3.3 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.3 | F2.14 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 8.6 |
| D4.2 | 7.0 | 8.6 | 7.4 | 6.0 | 4.8 | E3.4 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 8.3 | F2.15 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.6 |
| D4.3 | 21.6 | 22.1 | 23.0 | 22.5 | 22.4 | E3.5 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.4 | 8.3 | 8.2 | F3.1 | 12.9 | 12.8 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 12.1 |
| D4.4 | 12.6 | 8.8 | 9.0 | 11.1 | 11.3 | E3.6 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 7.8 | 7.6 | F3.2 | 13.0 | 13.0 | 12.7 | 12.8 | 12.4 |
| D4.5 | 15.5 | 17.1 | 16.3 | 14.8 | 15.4 | E3.7 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 8.7 | 8.8 | 8.8 | F3.3 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| D4.6 | 6.5 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 7.0 | 7.2 | E3.8 | 7.9 | 7.8 | 7.6 | 7.6 | 7.8 | F3.4 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 10.3 | 10.2 | 10.7 |
| D4.7 | 21.0 | 21.7 | 22.2 | 21.3 | 21.0 | E3.9 | 7.1 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 7.1 | 7.1 | F3.5 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 7.3 | 7.2 | 7.0 |
| | | | | | | E3.10 | 8.7 | 8.7 | 8.7 | 8.8 | 8.8 | F3.6 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 5.1 | 4.8 | 5.1 |
| | | | | | | E3.11 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 8.0 | F3.7 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 4.9 | 4.7 | 6.5 |
| | | | | | | E3.12 | 8.1 | 8.0 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 8.1 | F3.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 4.5 |
| | | | | | | E3.13 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 8.5 | F3.9 | 10.3 | 10.2 | 9.8 | 10.3 | 9.8 |
| | | | | | | E3.14 | 7.4 | 7.6 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 7.5 | F3.10 | 7.5 | 7.4 | 7.0 | 7.4 | 6.8 |
| | | | | | | E4.1 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 6.1 | F3.11 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 13.5 | 13.4 | 12.5 |
| | | | | | | E4.2 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.7 | F3.12 | 12.1 | 12.3 | 11.7 | 11.7 | 11.1 |
| | | | | | | E4.3 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 6.0 | F3.13 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.1 |
| | | | | | | E4.4 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | F4.1 | 13.3 | 13.1 | 13.1 | 12.8 | 13.0 |
| | | | | | | E4.5 | 7.9 | 7.9 | 7.8 | 7.8 | 7.9 | F4.2 | 13.1 | 13.0 | 13.4 | 13.5 | 13.0 |
| | | | | | | E4.6 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 6.9 | F4.3 | 7.2 | 7.1 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 7.3 |
| | | | | | | E4.7 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.9 | 6.0 | 6.4 | F4.4 | 11.0 | 10.9 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.7 |
| | | | | | | E4.8 | 7.9 | 7.9 | 7.8 | 7.8 | 7.8 | F4.5 | 8.7 | 9.2 | 9.1 | 9.3 | 9.6 |
| | | | | | | E4.9 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 | F4.6 | 16.3 | 16.4 | 16.7 | 16.6 | 16.3 |
| | | | | | | E4.10 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 4.9 | F4.7 | 14.1 | 13.9 | 14.4 | 14.3 | 13.7 |
| | | | | | | E4.11 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.1 | F4.8 | 16.3 | 16.4 | 16.5 | 16.7 | 16.4 |
| | | | | | | E4.12 | 8.0 | 7.9 | 7.9 | 7.8 | 7.8 | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | E4.13 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 5.9 | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | E4.14 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 4.2 | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | E4.15 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.8 | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | E4.16 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.4 | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | E4.17 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | | | | | | |

1.3. Revisions and refinement

After the first survey in June 2017, our questionnaire for public opinion was refined in the 2017 H2, 2020 H2 and 2022 H1 rounds to increase validity. These refinements include change of wordings and addition and removal of questions, affecting five of the twelve questions used to compute public opinion scores. Scores of the other seven questions are directly comparable as they are identical in all surveys. Table 4 and Table 5 show the history of the refinement of our questionnaire and the score differences from it respectively.

We have expanded the measurement system for international perception with more indicators and data sources since the 2022 H1 report to enhance objectivity. Figure 2 compares every country's score in the original and revised measurement systems in the same index period. The overall correlation is very strong. Despite a broader selection of indicators leads to slight score differences, both systems are consistent with the performance of a country.

Table 22: Revisions of questions on public opinion
表 22：民意調查問題之修訂

| Round 輪次 | Revision 修訂 |
|----------|--|
| 2017 H2 | Removed 'After the handover, the internal affairs of Hong Kong have not been interfered with by the central and local governments of China. To what extent would you agree?' |
| 2017 H2 | Revised 'After the handover, the way of life of the Hong Kong people has not been affected by mainland China. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover' Hong Kong has been able to maintain their original way of life. To what extent would you agree?' |
| 2020 H2 | Added 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?' |
| 2020 H2 | Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to keep intact the sovereignty of China, national security and profits from development projects. To what extent would you agree?' |
| 2020 H2 | Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain prosperity and stability in the long term. To what extent would you agree?' |
| 2022 H1 | Revised 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedom of speech.' to 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly.' |
| 2022 H1 | Revised 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capability, identity and social status. To what extent would you agree?' |

1.3. 修訂與調整

在 2017 年 6 月進行第一次調查之後，我們的民意調查問卷在 2017 下半年、2021 上半年和 2022 上半年的輪次中經歷三次修訂，以提高調查的應用性。修訂包括更改調查問題的用字，增加或移除問題，過程影響到民意調查評分中的 5 條問題，另外 7 條問題在所有調查均相同，評分可以直接比較。表 22 和表 23 分別顯示調查問題的修訂歷史和得分差異。

為加強國際評價的客觀性，我們在 2022 上半年擴展了國際評價的指標體系，採納更多的指標和數據來源。圖 22 比較每個國家在原有和修訂後的指標體系中，同一指數時期的得分，顯示整體相關性非常強。儘管指標數量增加導致分數略有差異，但每個地區的得分在兩個指標體系之中表現一致。


Table 23: Score difference due to revisions of questions on public opinion

表 23：修訂民意調查問題之評分差距

| Round 輪次 | Identical 相同 | Revised 修訂 | Difference 差距 |
|----------|--------------|------------|---------------|
| 2017 H1 | 4.70 | 4.84 | 0.14 |
| 2017 H2 | 4.67 | 4.98 | 0.31 |
| 2018 H1 | 4.78 | 5.05 | 0.27 |
| 2018 H2 | 4.59 | 4.84 | 0.25 |
| 2019 H1 | 4.30 | 4.58 | 0.28 |
| 2019 H2 | 3.27 | 3.53 | 0.26 |
| 2020 H1 | 3.15 | 3.39 | 0.24 |
| 2020 H2 | 3.15 | 3.62 | 0.47 |
| 2021 H1 | 3.19 | 3.62 | 0.43 |
| 2021 H2 | 3.64 | 4.02 | 0.38 |
| 2022 H1 | 4.35 | 4.71 | 0.36 |
| 2022 H2 | 4.59 | 4.98 | 0.39 |
| 2023 H1 | 4.89 | 5.22 | 0.33 |
| 2023 H2 | 4.95 | 5.21 | 0.26 |
| 2024 H1 | 5.24 | 5.45 | 0.22 |

Figure 22: Score difference of revised measurement systems on international perception

圖 22：修訂國際評價指標體系後之評分差距



2 Construction of 1C2S Mass Media Index 編製「一國兩制」輿情指數

We build up a massive dataset by collecting media articles that contain the keyword 'One Country, Two Systems' from news database. Our sample consists of 261,332 news reports from 6 television and radio stations, 21 local daily newspapers and 10 online-only media that were published between April 1998 and December 2023. Each article undergoes a 'tokenisation' process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of over 20 years, our text corpus contains around 211 million tokens. The number of articles processed from each media source is listed in Table 6.

我們以關鍵字「一國兩制」搜集新聞文章，組成累計 261,332 篇報道的龐大數據庫，包含 1998 年 4 月至 2023 年 12 月期間，來自本地 6 間電視電台、21 份日報和 10 間純網媒。我們就每篇文章進行「分詞」，通過電腦運算將文章分解成語例（單詞或短語）。我們利用超過 20 年的資料組成語料庫，包含大約 2 億 110 萬個語例。表 24 顯示每份報章所運算的文章數量。

Common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as pronouns, prepositions and particles, are first removed before further analysis. To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: 'positive', 'negative' or 'neutral'. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by the Natural Language Processing and Sentiment Analysis Lab, Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica.

An article is made up of paragraphs. For each paragraph, net sentiment is calculated by the difference between the number of positive and negative words divided by the total word count. At the article level, a net sentiment score is then derived by averaging the net sentiment of its constituent paragraphs with the below equation. To each news source, a daily net sentiment score is further assigned by averaging the score of all articles published in the past 30 days. This time frame of 30 days is a reporting standard of the media industry. MMI is set at 100 on the base day of 1 January 2021.

$$\text{net sentiment score 情緒評分} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \frac{(a_i - b_i)}{w_i}}{N}$$

N = total number of paragraphs 段落總數

i = the i^{th} paragraph 第 i 個段落

a_i = number of positive words 正面語例數目

b_i = number of negative words 負面語例數目

w_i = total number of words 正面語例數目

People often receive news from multiple sources and channels. Since there are substantial differences in the number of news articles published by various sources and in the number of viewership via various channels, the article count of a news source alone could be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure 1C2S MMI's reliability, the sentiment score for each news source is weighted by public perceptions of its credibility based on the survey 'Public Evaluation on Media Credibility' conducted by the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, The Chinese University of Hong Kong and each media channel is weighted based on people's main sources of news from the survey 'Appraisal of the Local News Media' conducted by Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute.

在進一步分析這個龐大的語料庫之前，我們首先剔除無助理解文章的常見單詞，如代詞、介詞和助詞。為了辨別一篇文章的情緒，我們採用由台灣中央研究院資訊科學研究所自然語言處理與情感分析實驗室開發的繁體中文情緒字典，把語例分類為「正面」、「中立」或「負面」。

每篇文章由段落組成。我們首先計算每一段落中，正負語例數量的相差，再除以整個段落的字數。每篇文章的情緒評分則為所有段落的平均值，見以下方程式。每個新聞來源的每日情緒評分為過去 30 日所有出版文章的平均分數。媒體行業習慣以 30 日作為報告單位。輿情指數在 2021 年 1 月 1 日設定為基數日。

市民一般從多個新聞來源和傳播媒介取得資訊。由於不同媒體在不同媒介刊登的文章數目、接觸人數有明顯差別，因此，只考慮文章數目不足以呈現不同媒體對讀者觀感的影響力。為確保可靠性，本指數將採用由香港中文大學傳播與民意調查中心「市民對傳媒公信力的評分」為每個新聞來源的情緒評分加權，以及由香港民意調查中心「新聞傳媒評價」中市民的主要新聞來源為每個傳播媒介的覆蓋度加權。

Table 24: Articles processed in 1C2S MMI

表 24：輿情指數之處理報道數

| | 2023 Q2 | 2023 Q3 | 2023 Q4 | 2024 Q1 | 2024 Q2 | Database Total 數據庫總量 |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-------------------------|
| TV & Radio 電視電台 | 544 | 478 | 765 | 699 | 659 | 28,331 |
| Cable TV / Hong Kong Open TV 有線電視 / 香港開電視 | 29 | 22 | 42 | 45 | 38 | 1,068 |
| Commercial Radio 商業電台 | 72 | 59 | 90 | 72 | 69 | 3,706 |
| Metro Radio 新城電台 | 75 | 81 | 80 | 98 | 88 | 2,664 |
| Now TV | 94 | 119 | 181 | 171 | 141 | 6,009 |
| RTHK 香港電台 | 180 | 150 | 280 | 203 | 251 | 9,422 |
| TVB 無綫電視 | 94 | 47 | 92 | 110 | 72 | 5,451 |
| Newspaper 報章 | 2,884 | 2,527 | 3,185 | 3,119 | 2,324 | 214,672 |
| am730 | 78 | 73 | 106 | 104 | 82 | 5,317 |
| Apple Daily 蘋果日報 | - | - | - | - | - | 13,076 |
| Headline Daily 頭條日報 | 16 | - | - | 2 | 149 | 1,872 |
| Hong Kong Commercial Daily 香港商報 | 141 | 160 | 218 | 169 | 126 | 19,448 |
| Hong Kong Daily News 新報 | - | - | - | - | - | 4,476 |
| Hong Kong Economic Journal 信報 | 122 | 129 | 141 | 142 | 136 | 6,411 |
| Hong Kong Economic Times 經濟日報 | 71 | 64 | 60 | 63 | 66 | 9,524 |
| Lion Rock Daily 香港仔 | 26 | 20 | 42 | 36 | 17 | 704 |
| Metro Daily 都市日報 | - | - | - | - | - | 1,528 |
| Ming Pao Daily News 明報 | 126 | 118 | 156 | 124 | 116 | 15,895 |
| Oriental Daily News 東方日報 | 44 | 22 | 28 | 28 | 25 | 10,398 |
| South China Morning Post 南華早報 | 21 | 13 | 18 | - | - | 707 |
| Sharp Daily 爽報 | - | - | - | - | - | 152 |
| Sing Pao 成報 | 31 | 32 | 59 | 41 | 30 | 5,535 |
| Sing Tao Daily 星島日報 | 289 | 202 | 260 | 220 | 231 | 16,945 |
| Sky Post 晴報 | 10 | 7 | - | - | - | 833 |
| Ta Kung Pao 大公報 | 957 | 823 | 1,018 | 1,159 | 520 | 48,871 |
| The Standard 英文虎報 | - | 5 | 3 | - | - | 107 |
| The Sun 太陽報 | - | - | - | - | - | 4,828 |
| Tin Tin Daily News 天天日報 | - | - | - | - | - | 452 |
| Wen Wei Po 文匯報 | 952 | 859 | 1,076 | 1,031 | 826 | 47,593 |
| Online-Only Media 純網媒 | 629 | 513 | 776 | 717 | 645 | 26,492 |
| Bastille Post 巴士的報 | 389 | 246 | 388 | 354 | 357 | 12,133 |
| Citizen News 眾新聞 | - | - | - | - | - | 1,186 |
| HK01 香港01 | 199 | 225 | 306 | 296 | 225 | 9,107 |
| Hong Kong Free Press 香港自由新聞 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 1 | - | 45 |
| Initium Media 端傳媒 | 4 | 3 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 195 |
| In-Media 獨立媒體 | - | 4 | 28 | 27 | 18 | 555 |
| Passion Times 熱血時報 | 30 | 29 | 38 | 26 | 37 | 722 |
| Post 852 852 郵報 | - | - | - | - | - | 631 |
| Speak Out HK 港人講地 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | - | 58 |
| Stand News 立場新聞 | - | - | - | - | - | 1,860 |
| Total 總數 | 4,057 | 3,518 | 4,726 | 4,535 | 3,628 | 269,495 |

2.1. Accuracy test

1C2S MMI is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict.

In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time. As shown in Table 25, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as 'positive' whereas 1,472 were classified as 'negative.'

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be.

Table 25 also shows the average sentiment scores of these three groups of paragraphs. In particular, 'positive' paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as 'negative' paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these three groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.

Table 25: Results of accuracy test
表 25：覆查結果

| | Positive 正面 | Neutral 中立 | Negative 負面 |
|--|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers 真人研究員對情緒的判斷 | 2,363 | 14,202 | 1,472 |
| Net Value 情緒淨值 | 21.76% | 14.42% | 2.92% |

2.1. 準確度覆查

「一國兩制」輿情指數是建基於由詞彙組成的模型。此模型視每段落為一籃子的詞語，從而抽離整篇文章的脈絡。其中一個效果是可能無法辨認到如諷刺等寫作手法，因而不能完全理解每一個段落的真正含義。這個局限在分析小說及文學作品時可能較為明顯，但對於寫作手法較直接的新聞文章而言，相信不是一個大問題。

為證實此詞彙模型辨別情緒的準確度，我們請兩位研究員從語料庫中隨機抽取了約 18,000 個段落，親自分類為「正面」、「負面」和「中立」，再與詞彙模型比較。各段落的出處在給予研究員之前已經被隱藏。假如兩名研究員對同一個段落的情緒判斷有異，第三名研究員將會重讀並作出判斷。是次覆查中，兩名研究員在大約八成的情況下均能作出相同的判斷。

我們利用與「一國兩制」輿情指數相同的詞彙模型為此等段落的情緒評分。在模型中，情緒評分為正、負面詞語量的淨值，所以評分愈高代表情緒愈正面。表 25 顯示利用詞彙模型計算的情緒評分。2,363 及 1,472 個段落分別被判決為「正面」及「負面」。被研究員判斷為「正面」的段落，情緒評分為 21.76%，約為「負面」段落的 7.5 倍。再者，利用多變量回歸分析，三個類別的情緒評分發現具統計學上的顯著差異，證實詞彙模型的計算結果與我們研究員的人手分類一致。

II. 相應調查 II. Comparable Surveys


1 Perception of 1C2S 「一國兩制」觀感

Our 1C2S Index reflects local and international perceptions of areas such as Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, human rights and freedom, democratic development, economic openness, and Hong Kong-Mainland relations. We conduct telephone surveys and collect data from international think tanks every six months. Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (HKPORI, formerly Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong) also conducts telephone surveys quarterly to gauge public confidence in 1C2S. Respondents are asked, 'Generally speaking, are you confident in 1C2S?'. Figure 23 shows that these surveys display a similar trend with a decline from mid-2017 to late-2019 followed by a gradual rebound.

我們的「一國兩制」指數每半年進行電話調查及收集國際數據，為高度自治、人權自由、民主發展、經濟開放、內港關係等範疇評分，反映香港市民與世界各地對「一國兩制」的觀感。香港民意研究所（香港民研，前身為香港大學民意研究計劃）亦有訪問香港市民對「一國兩制」的信心，每三個月進行電話調查，問題為「咁整體黎講，你對一國兩制有冇信心？」。圖 23 顯示這兩項調查的趨勢相近，自 2017 年中開始下滑至 2019 年底，其後慢慢上升。

Figure 23: Changes of public perceptions towards 1C2S

圖 23：「一國兩制」公眾觀感的變動




2 Media sentiment and public opinion 輿情與民情

We use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S covered by TV stations, radios, newspapers and online media. 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) measures daily net sentiment of media reports. It is calculated monthly and reported quarterly. As media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion, we compare it with HKPORI's Public Sentiment Index (PSI). PSI quantified Hong Kong people's sentiments towards the prevailing societal, economic and political climate. It appraises the concepts of 'good governance' and 'social harmony' by evaluating the overall government performance and social conditions. Figure 24 shows both MMI and PSI oscillated in 2017 and 2018, bottomed in 2019 and embarked on a path of recovery.

我們利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒，計算電視電台、報紙和純網媒上所有與「一國兩制」有關文章的情緒淨值，每月編製「一國兩制」輿情指數，每季度結算。媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素，我們將之與香港民研的「民情指數」比較。「民情指數」反映公眾對政治、社會和經濟環境的情緒反應，包涵「政通」和「人和」兩個概念，評價整體政府管治表現和整體社會狀況。圖 24 顯示輿情指數與民情指數於 2017 年及 2018 年上下浮動，2019 年觸底並自此復甦。

Figure 24: Changes of MMI and PSI
圖 24：輿情指數與民情指數走勢



3 Political orientation 政治傾向

We ask citizens about their political inclination in our half-yearly survey and classify them as pro-establishment supporters, non-establishment supporters (including democrats, localists, and self-determinists), and moderates (including centrists and those without specific political inclination). HKUPOP conducted telephone surveys every two weeks to collect citizens' political inclination and results from October 2016 to June 2019 were released. After spinning off from the University of Hong Kong, HKPORI launches the 'We Hong Kongers' series and invites citizens to fill out questionnaires via email almost every week. Results are rim-weighted to obtain political inclination of the online group. The Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (HKIAPS) of the Chinese University of Hong Kong conducts regular telephone surveys to assess popularity of the chief executive of the HKSAR government. Political inclination of respondents has become part of its release since 2020.


我們在每半年的電話調查中詢問市民的政治傾向，統稱為建制派、非建制派（包括民主派、本土派和自決派）和溫和派（包括中間派和沒有政治取態）。港大民研每兩星期進行電話調查，其間統計市民的政治傾向，並對外公布 2016 年 10 月至 2019 年 6 月的數據。脫離香港大學後，香港民研的「我們香港人」計劃接近每星期以電郵邀請市民填寫問卷，數據經過反覆多重加權，得出網上群組的政治傾向。香港中文大學香港亞太研究所（亞太所）定期就特首民望進行電話調查，自 2020 年起同時公布訪者問的政治傾向。

Political inclination identified by HKPORI and HKIAPS, while termed differently, aligned closely with our classification. Moderates in our survey correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the centrist camp' and 'no political inclination / politically neutral / not belong to any camp' and HKIAPS' 'no specific inclination'. Non-establishment supporters correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the pro-democracy camp' and 'inclined towards the localist camp' and HKIAPS' 'non-establishment'. Pro-establishment supporters correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the pro-establishment camp' and HKIAPS' 'pro-establishment'. Figure 25 shows that both surveys are consistent with our findings. A trend of deradicalization was witnessed from mid-2017 to late-2019, followed by a rapid formation and dissolution of non-establishment supporters in the immediate year and the rise of moderate politics since mid-2020.

雖然香港民研與亞太所對各種政治傾向有不同名稱，但是大致能夠對應我們的分類。我們的建制派對應前者的「傾向建制派」和後者的「建制」，非建制派對應前者的「傾向民主派」與「傾向本土派」和後者的「非建制」，溫和派對應前者的「偏向中間派」與「沒有政治傾向／政治中立／不屬於任何派別」和後者的「沒有明確傾向」。圖25顯示兩項調查與我們的發現吻合，同時反映2017年中至2019年中的去激進化，其後非建制在一年間急速冒起並退減，以及自2020年中興起的溫和政治。

Figure 25: Changes of citizens' political inclinations

圖 25：市民政治傾向的變動



4 Citizens' identity 身份認同

Two types of questionnaire design are commonly used to track citizens' self-identity in Hong Kong, the 'dominant identity' design and the 'multiple identity' design. A 'dominant identity' design classifies one's identity either as 'Hongkonger' or 'Chinese', and in some cases, includes certain mixed identities, e.g. 'Chinese in Hong Kong', 'Hongkonger in China' and 'both'. Respondents are compelled to select only one among two or more identities. If proportionally more people choose one category, the proportions of other categories must go down.

We adopt a 'multiple identity' design which uses separate questions to measure citizens' identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese'. This approach allows a possible scenario where a citizen identifies oneself more or less strongly as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' simultaneously. Furthermore, the source data enable us to categorize citizens into four dominant identities: strong identification as Hongkongers only, strong identification as Chinese only, dual identity with strong identifications in both and others which include those without a dominant identity.

HKPORI's identity survey employs both the 'multiple identity' and 'dominant identity' questionnaire designs. Respondents first rate their identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' separately. After that, they will choose one amongst these four categories: 'Hongkonger', 'Chinese', 'Chinese in Hong Kong' and 'Hongkonger in China'. Although HKPORI releases results of both designs, media in Hong Kong focuses on the first part only as it is more popular in public surveys. The proportion of citizens that identify themselves strongly as both 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' cannot be reflected.

26 shows the ratings of citizens' identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' from HKPORI and us using a 'multiple identity' design. Both surveys suggest that the 'Hongkonger' identity maintained high in 2020 and then declined. The 'Chinese' identity recovered from its lowest level in 2019 and 2020. Figure 27 shows results from HKPORI and us using a 'dominant identity' design. HKPORI refers 'Chinese in Hong Kong' and 'Hongkongers in China' as 'mixed identities', which corresponds to our 'dual identity'. Both surveys suggest that the majority of Hong Kong society possess a 'dual identity', while being temporarily overtaken by 'Hongkonger only' from 2019 to mid-2021, it has resurged to become the primary identity since late-2021.

香港的身份認同調查有兩種問卷設計：「主要身份」及「多元身份」兩種。以「主要身份」設計的調查一般將身份認同歸類為「香港人」及「中國人」兩種，或者再加入「香港的中國人」、「中國的香港人」、「兩者皆是」等多種混合身份。受訪者需要從兩種或多種身份中，選擇其中一種，如果認同其中一種身份的比例增加，認同其他身份的比例必定減少。

我們的調查採用「多元身份」的問卷設計，用獨立問題要求市民分別對「香港人」及「中國人」的認同感評分，能夠反映市民可能對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份認同同時加強，或同時減弱。然後利用原始數據判斷市民的「主要身份」，歸為四類：只對香港人身份有較強認同、只對中國人身份有較強認同、對兩種身份均擁有較強認同的雙重認同，以及包括沒有主要身份的其他身份認同。

香港民研的身份認同調查同時採用「多元身份」及「主要身份」兩種問卷設計。受訪市民先對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份分別評分，再從四種身份中選擇其中一種，包括「香港人」、「中國人」、「香港的中國人」及「中國的香港人」。雖然香港民研公布兩種問卷結果，但是由於「主要身份」為多數調查所採用，所以香港傳媒側重報道後者的結果，未能反映有多少市民同時對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份擁有高度認同。

圖 26 為我們和香港民研的「多元身份」調查結果，顯示市民對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份的評分。兩項調查同樣反映「香港人」評分在 2020 年維持高位後回落，而「中國人」評分則在 2019 年及 2020 年墮入谷底後逐漸回升。圖 27 顯示為我們和香港民研的「主要身份」調查結果，香港民研將「香港的中國人」及「中國的香港人」合稱為「混合身份」，對應我們的「雙重認同」。兩項調查同樣反映「雙重認同」是香港社會的大多數，在 2019 年至 2021 年中被「只有香港人」短暫取代，並於 2021 年底再次成為主流身份。

Figure 26: Changes of scores with 'dominant identity' design
圖 26：「主要身分」評分的變動





Figure 27: Changes of proportions with 'multiple identity' design
圖 27：「多元身分」比例的變動



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Project Team 項目團隊

Ray Poon 潘學智
Co-convenor (Research)
聯席召集人 (研究)

Joyce Pan 潘怡
Research Officer
研究主任

Martin Cheung 張達明
Research Manager
研究經理

Ian Chan 陳譽仁
Governor
理事


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民主思路 PATH OF DEMOCRACY

3/F, Kam Chung Commercial Building
19-21 Hennessy Road, Wan Chai, HK
香港灣仔軒尼詩道19-21號金鐘商業大廈3樓

Tel : (852) 2509 3131
Fax: (852) 2509 3130

 pathofdemocracyhk
www.pathofdemocracy.hk