

'ONE COUNTRY
TWO SYSTEMS'
INDEX

「一國兩制」指數

ADVANCE
VERSION
預覽版

'One Country Two Systems' Index

2024 H2
(Fifteen Edition)

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Preface

The implementation of "One Country, Two Systems" (1C2S) represents a complex and multifaceted endeavour that necessitates rigorous inquiry and sustained engagement from a diverse array of stakeholders. Since its establishment in 1997, progress has been realized in the operationalization of 1C2S; however, a range of challenges has concurrently emerged, necessitating ongoing assessment. In this context, Path of Democracy inaugurated the 1C2S Index in July 2017, presenting its first report aimed at systematically evaluating the implementation of 1C2S by delineating both its achievements and deficiencies.

The 1C2S Index is informed by both local sentiment and international perspectives regarding the current state of 1C2S. Periodic public surveys are employed to capture local attitudes, complemented by assessments from global think tanks to provide a comprehensive view of the perceptions surrounding 1C2S. These independent evaluations yield insights into how the framework is viewed by both the local populace and the international community. To refine our analysis, we have developed the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI), utilizing big data analytics to assess media sentiment concerning 1C2S across both Hong Kong and international outlets. Furthermore, our report incorporates public opinions on salient social issues related to 1C2S, including emigration trends, national security concerns, and economic integration.

In 2022, a thorough review was conducted to ensure that our methodologies remained aligned with contemporary societal and global developments following five years of objective measurement. The main Index will now employ a more timely, objective, and nuanced methodology. We are also advancing our examination of media sentiment by expanding the scope of the 1C2S MMI to reflect the evolving media landscape and readership dynamics. An online data portal has been established to enhance transparency and accessibility, providing policymakers, researchers, media, and the public with data visualizations and tailored analyses.

We extend our appreciation to the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong for their role in conducting telephone surveys, and to sentiment.ai for their assistance in measuring media sentiment. Looking ahead, we remain committed to conducting public surveys and updating international indices biannually, while continuously monitoring media sentiment to gauge the evolving perceptions of the public, the international community, and the media regarding 1C2S.

Ray Poon
Co-convenor (Research)

March 2025

Executive Summary

- Slight Decline in the 1C2S index:** The 'One Country, Two Systems' index for the second half of 2024 stands at 6.14, reflecting a minor decrease of 0.5% from the first half, ending a continuous upward trend. This change primarily results from a general decline in public opinion and international assessment scores, although the score for the 'Economic Openness' pillar has seen a slight increase.
- Dual Identity Among the Public:** The prevalence of dual identity (both 'Hong Konger' and 'Chinese') has resurged, now comprising 67.0% of respondents, an increase of 3.2% from the previous round. The identification as 'Hong Konger only' accounts for 25.7%, while 'Chinese only' identity has decreased to 3.5%.
- Continued De-Radicalization Among Youth:** Among youth aged 18-29, 76.1% identify with dual identity, marking an increase of 3.6% from the last survey. The proportion of non-establishment supporters has decreased, indicating a trend toward moderation in youth political inclinations.
- Declining Willingness to Emigrate:** A significant 83.9% of respondents indicated they have 'no plans' to emigrate, resulting in a net value of -70.7%. While non-establishment supporters exhibit a higher willingness to emigrate, the overall trend suggests an enhanced sense of belonging to Hong Kong among the public.
- Low Willingness to Live or Work in Other Cities of the Greater Bay Area:** Only 8.1% of respondents are willing to live or work in other cities within the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, with a net willingness value of -49.1%. Although there is a slight increase in willingness among the youth (18-29 years old), the overall sentiment remains cautious.
- Slight Decline in Satisfaction with the SAR Government:** The percentage of respondents expressing 'satisfaction' with the SAR government is 42.3%, a decrease of 2.1% from the last round. The public continues to adopt a wait-and-see attitude towards government performance, reflecting a mix of expectations and concerns regarding policy effectiveness.
- General Discontent with Legislative Council Performance:** Only 29.4% of respondents express 'satisfaction' with the Legislative Council, while dissatisfaction stands at a high 48.1%. Concerns over high operational costs and controversies surrounding the quality of proceedings have exacerbated public discontent.
- Divergent Views on Hong Kong's Future:** 43.7% of respondents hold an optimistic outlook on Hong Kong's future, while 40.2% express pessimism. Discussions surrounding fiscal deficits and uncertainties in the economic outlook are likely major factors influencing public sentiment.

Index At-a-Glance

1C2S Index
「一國兩制」指數

6.14
(↓ 0.5%)

2024 H2

1C2S Mass Media Index
「一國兩制」輿情指數

164.0
(↑ 22.7%)

2024 Q4

Moderates
溫和派


78.7%
(↑ 1.6%)

2025.2

Dual Identity
雙重身分認同

67.0%
(↑ 3.2%)

2025.2



Public
Opinion
民意調查

High Degree of Autonomy
高度自治

5.21
(↓ 1.5%)

Human Rights and Freedom
人權自由

5.34
(↓ 2.2%)

Hong Kong-Mainland Relations
內港關係

5.60
(↓ 0.2%)

International
Perception
國際評價

Economic Openness
經濟開放

9.39
(↑ 0.4%)

Civil Liberty
公民權利

6.22
(↓ 0.6%)

Democratic Development
民主發展

5.05
(↓ 0.2%)

2024 H2 Overview

In the second half of 2024, Hong Kong shifted its focus to revitalizing its economy through domestic initiatives, particularly in tourism. The government launched campaigns such as the "panda economy," leveraging the popularity of giant pandas to attract tourists and boost local businesses. This initiative aimed to rejuvenate the city's tourism sector, which had been struggling since the pandemic. By promoting cultural and eco-tourism, Hong Kong sought to strengthen its economic resilience and reduce reliance on external markets.

To further bolster its global standing, Hong Kong hosted several high-profile international events in late 2024, including the 2024 Global Financial Leaders' Investment Summit and the Belt and Road Summit. These events were designed to showcase Hong Kong's role as a global financial hub and a 'super-connector'. By attracting global leaders and investors, the city aimed to rebuild its international reputation and reaffirm its position under the 1C2S framework.

However, Hong Kong's international image faced significant scrutiny due to several high-profile social and political cases in the latter half of 2024. The trial of 47 pan-democratic activists, the sentencing of the "Dragon Slaying Brigade" case, and the continued trial of Jimmy Lai drew close attention from global media. These cases highlight the tensions within Hong Kong's legal system, drawing attention to the city's global reputation. Selina Cheng's dismissal by the Wall Street Journal further fuelled international criticism of threats to press freedom.

Adding to these challenges, the US announced potential additional sanctions against Hong Kong government officials in late 2024, including efforts to revoke Hong Kong's Economic and Trade Office status in the US and implications under the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. These moves created uncertainty for Hong Kong's international standing. Meanwhile, the National Security Department of the Hong Kong Police Force issued a new batch of arrest warrants for individuals accused of endangering national security, further intensifying the city's focus on safeguarding sovereignty under the 1C2S framework. These developments highlighted the ongoing geopolitical tensions and their impact on Hong Kong's future, as the city navigated the delicate balance between maintaining stability and addressing international concerns.

Economic Praise, Civil Liberties Concerns

Social movement cases reignited public memories of past political disputes and hindered recent recovery in confidence towards 1C2S. Influenced by a decline in local public opinion scores, the latest "One Country, Two Systems" index has slightly decreased from 6.17 to 6.14, reflecting a 0.5% drop. This change indicates a general decline in public perception regarding the implementation of 1C2S, particularly concerning the three pillars of local public opinion—"high degree of autonomy," "human rights and freedom," and "Hong Kong-Mainland relations"—all of which have seen decreasing scores.

Due to the lag in the compilation of international indices, this round of survey begins to reflect the impact of overseas promotional activities, with the "economic openness" indicator rising by 0.4%. Large-scale overseas investment promotion efforts have strengthened international confidence in Hong Kong's business environment. However, the "civil liberties" indicator has seen a slight decline of 0.6%, and the "democratic development" indicator has dropped by 0.2%. This suggests that while the international community acknowledges Hong Kong's economic prospects, concerns regarding civil liberties and democratic development persist, reflecting the complexities of Hong Kong's international image.

Trends in political moderation amid apathy

Mass apathy within a depoliticized society has fostered a notable trend toward political moderation. Moderates now represent the largest segment of the population, comprising 78.7%, which reflects an increase of 1.6 percentage points since the previous survey. In contrast, non-establishment supporters account for 11.6%, indicating a decline of 2.7 percentage points, while pro-establishment supporters have experienced a slight rise to 7.2%, marking an increase of 1.3 percentage points.

This trend toward moderation is particularly pronounced among youths aged 18 to 29, where the proportion of moderates has increased significantly by 3.6 percentage points to 76.1%. Within the non-establishment faction, the number of democrats has decreased by 3.4 percentage points to 11.6%, while other non-establishment supporters have diminished by 0.6 percentage points to 8.7%. While the rise of moderation among the 18 to 29 age group is a positive development, it remains essential to maintain vigilance regarding potential shifts in future political dynamics.

Dual identity awareness among citizens

Citizens' self-identification as either 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese' reflects notable trends. Recent data indicates a strong preference for the identity of "Hongkongers," which scored 8.99 points, an increase of 6.6%. In comparison, the "Chinese" identity scored 7.31, showing a modest gain of 2.1%. Although these identities initially converged in the latter half of 2022, the gap has since widened again.

A significant portion of Hong Kong citizens acknowledges their dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese.' Recent surveys reveal that 67.0% of respondents identify with a dual identity, marking an increase of 3.2%. This recognition has fluctuated since 2019, reaching a low in mid-2020 but rebounding thereafter. Meanwhile, the proportion identifying solely as 'Hongkongers' has risen to 25.7%, while those identifying exclusively as 'Chinese' have decreased to 3.5%. Overall, these findings underscore a robust awareness of dual identity among Hong Kong citizens.

Implications and recommendations

International perception has shown signs of recovery after repeated declines. Simultaneously, domestic opinion has experienced substantial growth. The disparity between how local people and the international community looked at 1C2S has been narrowing. While different social groups may hold varying expectations, there remains a shared desire for long-term prosperity and stability. Ultimately, this common ground can serve as a unifying force to bridge perspectives and foster understanding.

Many indicators have returned to early 2019 levels. Public discontent sparked by the crisis in 2019 seems to have somewhat dissipated. The number of people with emigration plans continues to decline. The proportion of moderates has continued to grow, while non-establishment supporters have steadily declined. Additionally, the percentage of the population identifying as 'Chinese' has also seen a modest increase.

Two rival camps have expressed extreme views over recent political events, with moderates being the only group countering this juxtaposition. A rational voice appears to exist in society at large, but it is vulnerable to populist narratives. Policymakers must ensure that moderate opinions continue to thrive in a nurturing and safe environment, despite the prevailing divisions.

It is important for the HKSAR government to capitalize on this growing confidence and build further momentum by spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of Hong Kong, including the business community, academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs, to promote Hong Kong's image under 1C2S. Such efforts may include:

- Establishing an Office of 1C2S for sustained outreach both locally and in the APEC region to mobilize support and enhance Hong Kong's presence. This dedicated office should actively participate in foreign think tank forums, either directly or through the business community to promote the Hong Kong narrative in the international arena.
- Holding daily press briefings with local and international media to address the latest policy issues in a timely, comprehensive, and appropriate manner, alleviating the fears and anxieties of the foreign community in Hong Kong.
- Providing advanced training for our senior officials on how to counter the negative narrative in Western media by using positive stories from Hong Kong.
- Educating young members of the public on the basics of 1C2S, including the importance of our constitutional order, an understanding of the rule of law, human rights, freedoms, corresponding obligations, and broadening awareness of social, national, and global issues.

1. Introduction

This report marks the 15th edition of the "One Country, Two Systems" (1C2S) Index. The primary objective of the 1C2S Index is to provide an objective assessment of the implementation of the 1C2S framework. The inaugural report was published in mid-2017, coinciding with the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China. The 1C2S Index is updated biannually, with assessments released in the middle and at the end of each year.

The index is refreshed every six months through the administration of a public opinion survey, alongside the integration of the latest data from international indices. To enhance our analysis, we have introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI), which employs advanced big data techniques to evaluate sentiment across printed, electronic, and online media in both Hong Kong and abroad.

For the current edition, we commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct a telephone poll between 21 January and 25 February 2025, generating public opinion scores. Additionally, we updated international perception scores for the second half of 2024 by evaluating 148 countries and territories using nine comprehensive data sources and 127 indicators provided by leading international think tanks. The MMI was assessed and updated by sentiment.ai through the end of December 2024.

Our latest survey continues to address pertinent issues related to 1C2S, including prospects for the continuation of the framework beyond 2047, citizens' identities, attitudes towards emigration, and public opinions regarding the Greater Bay Area. To accurately reflect the evolving socio-political landscape of the city, we have introduced new questions aimed at gauging the impact of recent developments. This includes public satisfaction with the Legislative Council of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) government and an inquiry regarding respondents' outlook on Hong Kong's prospects over the next decade.

It is important to emphasize that public opinion, international perception, and MMI are influenced by subjective perceptions and may not necessarily reflect objective reality. Nonetheless, shifts in perceptions of 1C2S among the Hong Kong public, international think tanks, and both local and foreign media are significant. This report will analyse the underlying reasons for these shifts, as they are critical to the ongoing implementation of 1C2S.

In this report, all scores are presented on a scale from 0 to 10. An asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant changes in scores compared to the previous assessment, while scores without an asterisk indicate statistically insignificant changes. Furthermore, certain scores will be analysed by demographic factors such as age group, educational attainment, and political inclination. Previously, the non-establishment camp was categorized into 'democrats' and 'others'; however, this division has been eliminated in the current report due to the small size of the 'others' group, which hindered meaningful analysis. Nonetheless, this data remains accessible for reference in our online data portal.

Readers can access our data portal for historical data on the 1C2S Index series by visiting the Path of Democracy webpage (<https://pathofdemocracy.hk/en-us/1c2s-index>). An extensive report on the survey results is also available.


2. 1C2S Index

The 1C2S Index is the average score of three pillars on public opinion and three pillars on international perception. The three pillars on public opinion, namely 'high degree of autonomy', 'human rights and freedom' and 'Hong Kong-Mainland relationship' reflect Hong Kong residents' evaluations on different aspects of 1C2S. The three pillars on international perception, namely 'economic openness', 'civil liberty' and 'democratic development', are based on the evaluation by international think tanks regarding various aspects of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

Figure 1 illustrates the 1C2S Index from the second half of 2022 to the second half of 2024. The most recent reading for the second half of 2024 is 6.14, reflecting a 0.5% decrease from the score of 6.17 recorded six months prior. This decline, which also marks the end of a consecutive series of increases, is attributed to reductions in scores across all public opinion pillars, as well as international assessments, with the exception of a slight increase observed in the 'economic openness' pillar. A detailed analysis of the results for these pillars will be provided in the subsequent sub-sections.

Figure 1: 1C2S Index

圖 1：「一國兩制」指數



2.1. Public opinion

Table 1 presents the scores for the pillars and sub-pillars derived from the public opinion survey for the second half of 2024. The scores indicate slight declines in all three primary pillars compared to the previous half-year. The score for 'high degree of autonomy' decreased by 1.5%, reaching 5.21 points. The score for 'Hong Kong-Mainland Relations' experienced a minor decline of 0.2%, settling at 5.60 points, while the score for 'human rights and freedom' fell by 2.2%, attaining 5.34 points.

All twelve sub-pillars showed variations in this survey round. The three sub-pillars with the largest decreases were 'freedom of speech, association and assembly' (-5.2%), 'the gradual implementation of the politico-institutional democratization process' (-3.4%), and 'high degree of autonomy in the executive branch' (-2.9%).

The three sub-pillars with the highest scores were 'safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests' (6.62), 'equal protection of the law' (6.14), and 'the original ways of life have remained unchanged' (6.06). Conversely, the three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were 'freedom of speech, association and assembly' (4.36), 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' (4.73), and 'the gradual implementation of the politico-institutional democratization process' (4.82).

Table 1: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on public opinion

表 1：民意調查的支柱及子支柱分數

	2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2	2024 H1	2024 H2	
Overall 總分	4.98	5.22	5.21	5.45	5.38	
A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治	4.82	5.06	5.02	5.29	5.21	
A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務	5.07	5.48	5.22	5.59	5.43	
A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權	4.99	5.25	5.29	5.40	5.38	
A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權	4.89	5.13	5.09	5.36	5.28	
A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」	4.31	4.38	4.49	4.78	4.73	
B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由	4.94	5.11	5.26	5.46	5.34	
B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式	5.52	5.77	5.77	6.08	6.06	
B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社及集會自由	4.26	4.27	4.51	4.60	4.36	
B3. Democratic development 民主政制發展	4.15	4.42	4.78	4.99	4.82	
B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護	5.82	6.00	5.96	6.17	6.14	
C. Hong Kong-Mainland Relations 內港關係	5.19	5.47	5.34	5.61	5.60	
C1. Resolving via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾	4.24	4.75	4.89	5.38	5.25	
C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益	6.24	6.39	6.31	6.43	6.62	
C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定	5.84	5.94	5.29	5.49	5.44	
C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落實「一國兩制」	4.45	4.81	4.88	5.15	5.09	

2.1.1. Generation gap and political divide

Figure 2 illustrates the average scores of public opinions by age group. Most age groups experienced declines, with the 60-69 age group showing the largest decrease at 4.6%. Overall, the average score for all respondents decreased by 1.3%.

Figure 3 displays the average scores of public opinions by political inclination. The pro-establishment group's score increased by 5.1% to 8.28 points. In contrast, the non-establishment supporters experienced a significant decline of 16.5%, dropping to 2.64 points. Overall, the average score for all respondents saw a minor decline of 1.3%, settling at 5.38 points.

Statistical tests revealed a clear and consistent divide in public opinion across political inclinations. Compared to moderates, the evaluations of pro-establishment supporters were significantly more positive. Conversely, the evaluations of non-establishment supporters were significantly more negative.

Figure 2: Public opinion (by age group)
圖 2：民意調查（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 3: Public opinion (by political inclination)

圖 3：民意調查（按政治傾向劃分）



2.2. International perception

Table 2 presents the scores for the pillars and sub-pillars based on international evaluation. Compared to the previous round, the scores for 'economic openness' slightly increased by 0.4% to 9.39 points, while 'civil liberty' saw a minor decline of 0.6% to 6.22 points. The score for 'democratic development' remained unchanged at 5.05 points.

The scores for the sub-pillars varied, with some increasing and others decreasing. The sub-pillar with the largest increase was 'financial stability' (+2.1%), while the largest decrease occurred in the score for 'security and safety' (-1.0%).

The three sub-pillars with the highest scores were 'market access' (9.75), 'financial stability' (9.72) and 'regulatory quality' (9.12). The three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were 'civic participation' (5.15), 'political pluralism' (3.24) and 'expression, association and assembly' (2.99).

Table 2: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on international perception

表 2：國際評價的支柱和子支柱分數

	2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2	2024 H1	2024 H2	
Overall 總分	6.87 (39)	6.82 (42)	6.87 (39)	6.89 (40)	6.89 (39)	
D. Economic Openness 經濟開放	9.20 (2)	9.17 (2)	9.31 (2)	9.35 (2)	9.39 (2)	
D1. Business environment 營商環境	8.68 (2)	8.66 (2)	8.98 (2)	8.99 (2)	8.99 (2)	
D2. Market access 市場門檻	9.72 (1)	9.70 (1)	9.71 (1)	9.76 (1)	9.75 (1)	
D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素	8.83 (3)	8.95 (2)	9.17 (2)	9.12 (2)	9.12 (2)	
D4. Financial stability 金融穩定	9.58 (1)	9.37 (4)	9.36 (4)	9.52 (3)	9.72 (1)	
E. Civil Liberty 公民權利	6.28 (72)	6.23 (73)	6.24 (73)	6.26 (72)	6.22 (72)	
E1. Rule of law 法治	6.33 (43)	6.40 (43)	6.42 (43)	6.40 (43)	6.38 (42)	
E2. Security and safety 安全	8.09 (36)	8.11 (36)	8.20 (35)	8.23 (34)	8.15 (37)	
E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會	3.15 (124)	3.08 (126)	2.95 (126)	2.99 (126)	2.99 (126)	
E4. Individual rights 個人權利	7.56 (47)	7.34 (55)	7.41 (51)	7.40 (53)	7.36 (54)	
F. Democratic Development 民主發展	5.12 (91)	5.04 (91)	5.06 (90)	5.06 (90)	5.05 (90)	
F1. Constraints on powers 權力制約	5.50 (60)	5.39 (64)	5.43 (63)	5.40 (64)	5.44 (64)	
F2. Political pluralism 政治多元	3.51 (123)	3.23 (125)	3.23 (125)	3.24 (122)	3.24 (122)	
F3. Civic participation 公民參與	5.79 (57)	5.74 (55)	5.77 (55)	5.16 (76)	5.15 (76)	
F4. Democratic culture 民主文化	5.67 (80)	5.81 (75)	5.81 (73)	6.42 (54)	6.37 (53)	

Note: World ranking in parentheses.

2.2.1. Comparison with selected regions

Generally, developed regions exhibit higher scores for freedom and democracy compared to developing regions. As a developed area, Hong Kong's performance is analyzed in relation to neighboring developed countries and regions, including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Additionally, comparisons are made with mainland China and the United States to contextualize Hong Kong's development under the 1C2S framework.

Table 3 presents the score of Hong Kong and selected neighbouring regions across various pillars in the context of international perception. Hong Kong excels in 'economic openness' with a score of 9.39, ranking second globally, surpassing South Korea (7.02), Japan (7.47) and Taiwan (7.85).

In the category of 'civil liberty,' Hong Kong's score of 6.22 represents a slight decline from the previous round, resulting in a rank of 72nd. This score remains lower than those of neighboring Singapore (6.95), South Korea (8.28), Taiwan (8.29), and Japan (9.05).

Regarding 'democratic development,' Hong Kong's score remains at 5.05, still below that of nearby developed regions, with Singapore at 6.82, South Korea at 7.71, Taiwan at 8.26, and Japan at 8.63.

Overall, with the exception of mainland China and Taiwan, the average scores of the other selected regions have exhibited an upward trend.

Table 3: Pillar scores on international perception of selected regions

表 3：選定地區之國際評價支柱分數

	D. Economic Openness 經濟開放		E. Civil Liberty 公民權利		F. Democratic Development 民主發展		Overall 總分	
	Score 分數	Rank 排名	Score 分數	Rank 排名	Score 分數	Rank 排名	Score 分數	Rank 排名
Hong Kong 香港	9.39	(2)	6.22 ↓	(72)	5.05 ↓	(90)	6.89 ↑	(39)
Mainland China 中國內地	6.88 ↑	(34)	2.94 ↓	(141)	2.46 ↓	(137)	4.09 ↓	(122)
Japan 日本	7.47 ↑	(21)	9.05 ↑	(13)	8.63 ↑	(12)	8.38 ↑	(14)
South Korea 南韓	7.02 ↑	(30)	8.28 ↑	(31)	7.71 ↑	(33)	7.67 ↑	(27)
Singapore 新加坡	9.65 ↓	(1)	6.95 ↑	(53)	6.82 ↑	(46)	7.81 ↑	(23)
Taiwan 台灣	7.85 ↓	(14)	8.29 ↑	(30)	8.26 ↓	(20)	8.13 ↓	(19)
United States 美國	8.14 ↓	(8)	8.16 ↑	(34)	7.77 ↑	(31)	8.02 ↑	(20)

Note: World ranking in parentheses.

2.2.2. Global trend

Figure 4 illustrates the global trend in international perception. In the second half of 2024, the global economy continued to grapple with persistent inflationary pressures and rising interest rates, contributing to slower economic growth and heightened recession risks in numerous countries. The return of Donald Trump to the White House and the new U.S. administration's shift in foreign policy created additional geopolitical tensions, particularly in relation to China and Russia. These developments further complicated the global economic landscape. As a result, the global average score for 'economic openness' has slightly declined to 5.69 points, representing a decrease of 0.9%. Leading the rankings are Singapore (9.65), Hong Kong (9.39), and other developed regions.


Globally, civil rights and democratic development confront significant challenges. In the second half of 2024, political polarization intensified in several nations, particularly in the United States, where contentious midterm elections

sparked widespread protests and debates over election integrity. In Europe, rising far-right movements led to increased scrutiny of immigration policies, further exacerbating social divisions and political instability. Freedom of speech and press freedoms remained restricted in certain regions, with several governments implementing new laws to control media narratives and stifle dissenting voices. The global score for 'civil liberty' stands at 6.12 points.

Amidst ongoing controversies regarding electoral integrity and crackdowns on civic organizations, many regions are experiencing significant democratic backsliding. In the second half of 2024, for example, several countries in Eastern Europe implemented restrictive measures against non-governmental organizations, limiting their operations and increasing repression of dissent. Reports of electoral fraud in various elections worldwide have further raised concerns about the legitimacy of democratic processes. Consequently, the global score for 'democratic development' has decreased by 0.4% compared to the previous six months, now reaching 5.62 points.

Figure 4: Global trend of pillar scores on international perception

圖 4：國際評價支柱分數的全球趨勢



2.3. Significant events

This round of index surveys has been marked by significant political controversies and major events, both locally and internationally, which may be closely associated with the fluctuations in the 1C2S Index. The following section outlines key events that transpired between July 2024 and December 2024, offering a comprehensive understanding of the evolving trends within the Index.

Table 4: Significant events

表 4：重大事件一覽

7.3	The Legislative Council passed the 'Social Workers Registration (Amendment) Bill 2024', reforming the Social Workers Registration Board.	立法會通過《2024年社會工作者註冊(修訂)條例草案》，改革社工註冊局。
7.28-8.1	At the Paris Olympics 2024, athletes from Hong Kong, China, won multiple medals.	巴黎奧運會上，中國香港運動員獲得多面獎牌。
7.31	The Education Bureau announced that the junior secondary Citizenship and Social Development curriculum will be fully implemented in the new school year starting September 2024, along with relevant curriculum guidelines.	教育局宣佈初中公民與社會發展科將於2024年9月新學年全面推行，並公布相關課程指引。
8.6	The National Security Exhibition Gallery has officially opened.	國家安全展覽廳開幕。
8.29	The High Court jury has found one person guilty in the 'Dragon Slayer Brigade' case, while the other six were acquitted.	高等法院陪審團裁定「屠龍小隊」案中，一人有罪，其餘六人無罪。
	The District Court has found two former editors of Stand News guilty of 'conspiracy to publish seditious publications.'	區域法院裁定前《立場新聞》兩位編輯「串謀發布煽動刊物」罪名成立。
9.11	The Ninth Belt and Road Summit has opened in Hong Kong, gathering political and business leaders to discuss future cooperation in investment, trade, and other areas.	第九屆「一帶一路高峰論壇」在港開幕，匯聚海內外政商領袖，探討未來在投資、商貿等領域的多元化與緊密合作。
9.26	A pair of giant pandas gifted by the Central Government has arrived in Hong Kong from Sichuan.	中央贈港一對大熊貓從四川啟程抵港。
10.9	The HKSAR Government and the Ministry of Commerce have signed the Second Agreement Amending the CEPA Agreement on Trade in Services, reducing entry barriers to the mainland market for construction, testing and certification, film and television, finance, tourism, and other service sectors.	特區政府與內地簽署《內地與香港關於建立更緊密經貿關係的安排》第二份修訂協議，降低建築工程、檢測認證、電視電影、金融及旅遊服務等進入內地市場的門檻。
11.8	The Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office held a symposium in Shenzhen, attended by major real estate developers and representatives from various business associations.	港澳辦在深圳舉行香港工商界座談會，各大地產商及商會代表出席。

- 11.14 The High Court has delivered its verdict on the case involving 47 pro-democracy activists charged with 'conspiracy to subvert state power' under the National Security Law. Among them, Benny Tai, the 'mastermind', was sentenced to 10 years in prison. 高等法院就民主派初選 47 人案，對各被告被控《國安法》下的「串謀顛覆國家政權罪」宣判，其中「首要分子」戴耀廷被判囚 10 年。
- 11.19 State Council Vice Premier He Lifeng attended the Global Financial Leaders' Investment Summit, expressing the country's support for and emphasis on Hong Kong as an international financial center. 國務院副總理何立峰訪港並出席國際金融領袖投資峰會，表達國家對香港作為國際金融中心的支持和重視。
- 11.26 The Court of Final Appeal rejected the appeals from the Department of Justice and the Housing Authority, ruling that same-sex couples have the same housing and inheritance rights as heterosexual couples. 終審法院駁回律政司和房委會的上訴，裁定同性伴侶與異性伴侶享有相同的公屋和居屋住屋及繼承權。
- 11.29 The SAR Government held an event to engage businesses in the development of the Northern Metropolis, receiving support from local, mainland, and overseas enterprises. 特區政府舉辦企業參與北部都會區發展活動，獲得本地、內地及海外的企業支持。
- 12.1 The Central Government has resumed the 'one visa, multiple entries' policy for Shenzhen residents traveling to Hong Kong and will expand the program to include non-Shenzhen residents holding residence permits. 中央政府恢復深圳居民赴港個人遊的「一簽多行」簽注安排，並將有關計劃擴展至持有居住證的非深圳戶籍居民。
- 12.13 Chief Executive John Lee reported on his duties to President Xi Jinping in Beijing. 行政長官李家超在北京向國家主席習近平述職。
- 12.24 The Secretary for Security, under the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, named seven fugitives abroad, enforcing fund restrictions and passport cancellations. The Police's National Security Department offered rewards for six overseas suspects accused of breaching the Hong Kong National Security Law. 保安局局長根據《維護國家安全條例》刊憲，對七名潛逃海外者實施資金禁令及撤銷護照等措施；警務處國安處懸紅通緝六名涉嫌違反《香港國安法》的海外逃犯。
- 12.26 The United States has reinstated the sanctions provisions of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025. In response, the Hong Kong government expressed dissatisfaction, asserting that each country has the right to enact laws to protect national security. 美國重新將《香港人權與民主法案》制裁條款納入 2025 年度《國防授權法案》。港府表示不滿，強調各國有權制定維護國家安全的法律。

3. 1C2S Mass Media Index

Media sentiment plays a crucial role in shaping public opinion. We employ big data techniques to assess media sentiment regarding 1C2S and to monitor its coverage in the mass media. This approach serves as a timely barometer of public sentiment. The 1C2S MMI calculates the daily net sentiment of media reports, with a quarterly average presented in this section to align with and complement our main index, which is compiled biannually. The methodology is detailed in Appendix I.

3.1. Recent trend

MMI continued its rising trend with the restructuring of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. Following director Xia Baolong's visit to Hong Kong, these gestures from the central government were warmly welcomed by media reports and commentaries. While discussions of different views entered the generally positive media scene, the proposed reform plan of District Council sparked widespread debate on the new local administration measures. The all-time peak was followed by a steep fall, with a recording of 139.7 in 2023 Q2, as reports released by foreign governments levelled constant criticisms against the state of rule of law and freedoms in Hong Kong.


The previous fall sustained in the second half of 2023 until President Xi's reply letter to Hong Kong students expressed his care to the younger generation and the Chief Executive's overseas visit to ASEAN expanded business opportunities. Despite foreign concerns regarding the city's political landscape and human rights development, MMI continued to soar as a new development plan for synergistic growth of Shenzhen and Hong Kong's innovative and technology sector and the completed election and appointment of new District Council members gathered hopeful news. Consequently, MMI recovered to 155.3 in 2023 Q4.

In the first half of 2024, positive media coverage and public sentiment regarding Hong Kong significantly declined. The Asian Financial Forum 2024, held at the beginning of the year, and the visit by Xia Baolong, the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, garnered some positive media attention. However, the subsequent reintroduction of Article 23 to the legislative agenda attracted considerable international scrutiny and criticism, raising concerns about further erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy and civil liberties. By the end of Q2 2024, MMI had dropped to 133.7.

Overall, the number of official news reports increased in the latter half of 2024, emphasizing national development strategies released by the central government, including the resolution on further comprehensively deepening reform to advance Chinese modernization. This resolution underscored the significance of the 1C2S framework. Additionally, President Xi's reply to Hong Kong entrepreneurs with Ningbo roots became a focal point of discussion in the business community, further promoting Hong Kong's integration into the national development framework. Coinciding with the 25th anniversary of Macau's return, President Xi reiterated in his speech that the practice of 1C2S has entered a new stage and the cause of 1C2S is to enhance development in both SARs, allowing the regions to contribute more significantly to China's progress. In this context, the MMI reached 164.0 points in the second half of 2024.

Figure 5: 1C2S MMI (quarterly average)

圖 5：「一國兩制」輿情指數 (季度結)



Quarter	Scores 評分	Changes 變化
2023 Q1	162.5	(↑ 13.1%)
2023 Q2	139.7	(↓ 22.8%)
2023 Q3	143.2	(↑ 3.5%)
2023 Q4	155.3	(↑ 12.1%)
2024 Q1	143.8	(↓ 11.5%)
2024 Q2	133.7	(↓ 10.1%)
2024 Q3	159.5	(↑ 25.8%)
2024 Q4	164.0	(↑ 4.5%)

3.2. Channel variations


Figure 6 shows MMI across various media channels, specifically television and radio, newspapers, and online-only media. The latest scores indicate the following: television and radio have a score of 173.5, reflecting a significant increase of 30.3%; newspapers have a score of 149.2, with an increase of 10.8%; and online-only media score 155.3, representing a rise of 15.8%. The overall MMI for the "One Country, Two Systems" (1C2S) framework stands at 164.0, showing a notable increase of 22.7%.

A discernible pattern has emerged: news coverage by television and radio tends to exhibit a relatively more positive sentiment, whereas online-only media often adopt a more critical stance. This media landscape has undergone significant changes between the second quarters of 2019 and 2020. During this period, television and radio outlets, along with newspapers, aligned their reporting to express greater criticism towards the 1C2S framework, resulting in a more negative sentiment compared to online-only media. Following this interval, television and radio resumed their typical reporting styles, with sentiment scores reflecting a notable increase, particularly during generally positive news events. However, the distinction in sentiment between newspapers and online-only media has diminished over time, with trends from these two channels increasingly interwoven.

Figure 6: 1C2S MMI (by media channels)

圖 6：「一國兩制」輿情指數 (按傳播媒介劃分)

Media Channel	Scores 評分	Changes 變化
■ TV & radio 電視電台	173.5	(↑ 30.3%)
■ Newspaper 報章	149.2	(↑ 10.8%)
■ Online-only media 純網媒	155.3	(↑ 15.8%)
☒ 1C2S MMI 「一國兩制」輿情指數	164.0	(↑ 22.7%)




4. Political Orientation

Figure 7 illustrates the political composition of the Hong Kong population by inclination. Moderates, encompassing centrists and those without a specific political affiliation, remain the largest group, now comprising 78.7% of the population, an increase of 1.6% since the last survey. This is followed by pro-establishment supporters at 7.2%, which has risen by 1.3%. Non-establishment supporters account for 11.6%, reflecting a decrease of 2.7%.

The latest survey data indicates a significant trend towards de-radicalization and moderation. The proportion of centrists continues to rise, while the proportions of pro-establishment and non-establishment supporters show an opposite trend. This change suggests that an increasing number of individuals from both the pro-establishment and non-establishment camps identify as moderates, reflecting a shift in Hong Kong's political environment towards greater moderation.

Figure 7: Political inclination of population

圖 7：香港市民政治傾向




4.1. De-radicalisation of youths

Figure 8 illustrates the changes in the political composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by inclination in the latter half of 2024. The proportion of moderates has significantly increased by 3.6 percentage points to 76.1%. Non-establishment supporters are now divided into 'democrats' and 'others,' with democrats decreasing by 3.4 percentage points to 11.6%, and other non-establishment supporters declining by 0.6 percentage points to 8.7%. In contrast, pro-establishment supporters have seen a slight increase of 0.1 percentage points to 1.9%.

From mid-2017 to early 2019, there were encouraging signs of de-radicalization among youths, marked by a rising proportion of moderates. However, this trend reversed as non-establishment supporters surged, temporarily surpassing moderates, with localists occasionally outnumbering democrats. Since mid-2020, the situation of radicalization has notably eased, evidenced by the decline in localist support and the resurgence of moderates, who now exceed the total non-establishment group. The recent data indicates a continued trend toward moderation among youths, reflecting a broader shift in the political landscape.

Figure 8: Political inclination of youths

圖 8：青年的政治傾向



5. Continuation of 1C2S

A critical issue for Hong Kong's future is the sustainability of the 1C2S framework. In previous surveys, respondents were queried regarding their views on whether this constitutional arrangement should extend beyond 2047. Those who affirmed a continuation were subsequently asked to specify the conditions they deemed favourable for achieving this objective. However, the relevance of these inquiries diminished following the Central Government's assurance that 1C2S would be preserved in the long term. Nonetheless, understanding the public's aspirations for a preferred future remains valuable for enhancing and sustaining the 1C2S framework. Consequently, respondents were invited to identify which conditions they believe would support the continuation of 1C2S from a provided list, with the option to select multiple items:

- Maintaining a high degree of autonomy;
- Maintaining economic prosperity and stability;
- Political system democratises further;
- Maintaining national security; and

Others (please specify).

Figure 9 illustrates the percentages of respondents who selected each of the five conditions deemed favourable for the continuation of 1C2S. The data reveals a clear preference among respondents, with "maintaining economic prosperity and stability" ranking highest at 62.7%. Following closely is "maintaining a high degree of autonomy" at 42.0%. The condition "further democratization of the political system" occupies the third position at 28.8%, surpassing "maintaining national security," which stands at 32.5%. Notably, the proportion of respondents selecting "other/don't know" has significantly increased by 8.0%, now comprising 11.2% of the total responses.

Figure 10 highlights the distinct patterns of choice across different political inclinations. Non-establishment respondents show a notable preference for "further democratization" (47.8%), which ranks highest among their choices, despite a slight decrease, followed by "economic prosperity" (43.8%) and "maintaining a high degree of autonomy" (41.7%). Interestingly, the interest in "maintaining national security" (15.1%) remains minimal, while a significant portion has opted for "other/don't know," suggesting uncertainty within this group.

In contrast, moderates prioritize "maintaining economic prosperity and stability" (70.0%), which ranks as their top choice. They also favour "maintaining a high degree of autonomy," though support has decreased. The preference for "national security" has increased, reflecting a shift in priorities. However, their support for "further democratization" (28.4%) remains low, indicating that economic concerns may outweigh democratic aspirations for this group.

Pro-establishment respondents exhibit a distinct inclination towards "maintaining national security" (55.1%), which has seen a notable rise in support. Their preference for "maintaining a high degree of autonomy" (32.8%), is lower compared to other groups, and interest in "economic prosperity" (55.4%) reflects a moderate stance. The low support for "further democratization" (13.5%) underscores their alignment with pro-establishment views, while a small percentage selecting "other/don't know" indicates limited uncertainty within this camp.

Figure 9: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047

圖 9：2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件





Figure 10: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047 (by political inclination)

圖 10：有利於 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（按政治傾向劃分）



6. Citizens' Identity

We also surveyed how citizens identify themselves: whether as 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese'. The latest data (Figure 11) indicates that members of the public consistently identify more strongly as "Hongkongers," scoring 8.99 points, which reflects an increase of 6.6%. In contrast, the score for "Chinese" identity is 7.31, showing a modest gain of 2.1%. While scores for both identities began to converge in the second half of 2022, the gap between them has since widened again. Despite this trend, the scores for dual identities remain high, underscoring a robust sense of identity among respondents.

Figure 12 illustrates the mix of identities rated by respondents against time. On a 0 to 10 scale, a median score of 5 indicates moderate identification, with scores above the median reflecting relatively strong identification and those below indicating weaker identification. These levels can be categorized into four groups: dual identity (strong in both identifications), stronger identification as "Hongkongers only," stronger identification as "Chinese only," and others, which include individuals without a dominant identity. Recent surveys show a clear pattern where 67.0% of respondents identify with a dual identity, reflecting an increase of 3.2%. Meanwhile, the share of those identifying as "Hongkongers" stands at 25.7%, up by 2.3%, whereas identification as "Chinese" has decreased to 3.5%, down by 2.5%.

This data indicates that dual identity has regained its status as the dominant identity since 2022, overtaking "Hongkonger only." The increase in dual identity suggests a rebound in the proportion of Hong Kong citizens recognizing their dual heritage, which may indicate a gradual easing of societal tensions. While identifying as "Chinese" does not necessarily equate to patriotism, the dual identity of "Hongkongers" and "Chinese" is crucial for fostering devotion to both China and Hong Kong. We acknowledge that ongoing international condemnation of China may influence how Hongkongers view themselves, and the significance of this factor will hopefully become clearer over time.

Figure 11: Citizens' identity scores

圖 11：市民的身分認同評分





Figure 12: Citizens' identity mix
圖 12：市民的混合身分認同



6.1. Rank correlation

Statistical analysis yields the observation that there was a positive correlation between identification as a 'Hongkonger' and as a 'Chinese'. The converse also held true, as the rank correlation coefficient was 0.269 and this was statistically very significant. The finding that the two identities as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' were mutually reinforcing each other provided a strong basis for the implementation of 1C2S.

Table 5: Rank correlation of citizens' identity
表 5：市民的身分認同等級相關係數

	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7	2025.2
Correlation 相關係數	0.332	0.374	0.242	0.239	0.269
t-statistic t 檢定統計	10.32	12.21	7.77	7.68	8.69

7. Topical Issues

7.1. Emigration

Table 6 presents the public's emigration plans. The majority (83.9%), reported having "no plans" to emigrate, significantly exceeding the 13.2% with "plans." Consequently, the net value dropped by 0.5 percentage points since the last round, reaching -70.7%.

Figure 13 and Figure 14 illustrate the net value of emigration plans across different age groups and political inclinations. All age groups experienced declines, with the most drastic decreases observed among those aged 18-29 and 50-59. Notably, the 18-29 age group saw a significant increase in "no plans," while older groups showed varying levels of decline.

As expected, non-establishment supporters were more likely to have plans to emigrate compared to respondents with other political inclinations. Their net value increased by 17.9 percentage points to -25.5%. The pro-establishment camp experienced a decrease in net value, dropping by 1.3 percentage points to -96.9%. Past studies indicate that surveys frequently overestimate the number of individuals intending to emigrate, as only a small fraction of those expressing interest ultimately follow through with their plans. Consequently, caution should be exercised when interpreting these findings, though they still offer valuable insights into public sentiment.

Additionally, the recent consideration or announcement by several countries to halt immigration visa schemes specifically for Hong Kong residents may prompt the general public to adopt a wait-and-see approach in assessing overall sentiment and polling related to emigration plans.

Table 6: Public's emigration plans
表 6 : 市民移民海外的計劃

	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7	2025.2
Have Plans 有打算	12.3%	14.9%	17.9%	14.0%	13.2%
No Plans 無打算	78.1%	75.6%	80.8%	84.1%	83.9%
Don't Know 唔知道	9.5%	9.5%	1.3%	1.9%	2.9%
Net Value 淨值	-65.8%	-60.8%	-62.9%	-70.2%	-70.7%

Net Value: Percent 'Have Plans' minus percent 'No Plans'

淨值：認為「有打算」的百分比減去認為「無打算」的百分比

Figure 13: Public's emigration plans (by age group)
圖 13：市民移民海外的計劃（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 14: Public's emigration plans (by political inclination)
圖 14：市民移民海外的計劃（按政治傾向劃分）



7.2. Willingness to live or work in other Greater Bay Area (GBA) cities

Table 7 presents the willingness of respondents to live or work in other cities within the GBA. Of those surveyed, 8.1% indicated they were 'willing' to live or work in the GBA, while 57.2% were 'unwilling'. Notably, approximately 34.7% of respondents remained undecided about their willingness, a figure largely consistent with previous surveys.

Figure 15 and

Figure 16 further illustrate the willingness to live or work in other GBA cities, categorized by age group and political inclination. Net willingness values showed a mixed trend across age groups. Among those aged 18-29, it increased by 4.1 percentage points to -49.5%, while the 40-49 age group declined by 8.4 percentage points to -46.2%. By political inclination, non-establishment supporters saw the largest decrease at -79.3%. Moderates experienced a slight decline of 0.2% to -46.2%, and pro-establishment supporters fell by 7.6% to -32.3%. Overall, net willingness among all respondents decreased by 1.1% to -49.1%.

Table 7: Willingness to live or work in other cities of the GBA

表 7：前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願

	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7	2025.2
Willing 會考慮	3.4%	5.1%	6.9%	7.9%	8.1%
Not willing 不會考慮	75.2%	61.3%	57.7%	56.0%	57.2%
Maybe / Don't Know 或者 / 唔知道	21.3%	33.6%	34.2%	36.1%	34.7%
Net Value 淨值	-71.8%	-56.2%	-50.9%	-48.0%	-49.1%

Net Value: Percent 'Willing' minus percent 'Not Willing'
淨值：「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比

Figure 15: Willingness to live or work in other cities of the GBA (by age group)

圖 15：前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 16: Willingness to live or work in other cities of the GBA (by political inclination)

圖 16：前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願（按政治傾向劃分）



7.3. Confidence in the Hong Kong education system

Table 8 presents the level of public confidence in Hong Kong's education system. Confidence in the education system is currently at 43.2%, a decrease of 2.4% from first half of 2024. Conversely, the proportion of respondents expressing 'not confident' in the local education system has increased slightly by 0.4% to 39.7%. The net value of confidence has also declined from 6.3% to 3.5%.

Figure 17 and Figure 18 further illustrate confidence in the education system, segmented by age group and political inclination, respectively. Among age groups, those aged 70 or above experienced a notable increase in net confidence values (+3.3%). However, all other age groups saw a decrease).

In terms of political inclination, net confidence values have increased significantly among the pro-establishment group (+24.8%). Conversely, moderates experienced a decrease of 6.6%, while non-establishment respondents saw a decline of 14.1%. Within the non-establishment group, democrats decreased by 8.8%, and other non-establishment members experienced a substantial drop of 30.7%. Overall, the net confidence value for all respondents stands at 3.5%, reflecting a decrease of 2.8%.

Table 8: Confidence in the Hong Kong education system

表 8：對香港教育制度的信心

	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7	2025.2
Confident 有信心	29.6%	41.6%	39.1%	45.6%	43.2%
Not Confident 無信心	40.8%	37.4%	43.6%	39.3%	39.7%
Half-half 一半半	24.2%	18.7%	14.8%	13.7%	14.2%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	5.5%	2.3%	2.6%	1.4%	2.9%
Net Value 淨值	-11.2%	4.2%	-4.5%	6.3%	3.5%

Net value: Percent 'Confident' minus percent 'Not Confident'

淨值：「有信心」的百分比減去「無信心」的百分比

Figure 17: Confidence in the Hong Kong education system (by age group)

圖 17：對香港教育制度的信心（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 18: Confidence in the Hong Kong education system (by political inclination)

圖 18：對香港教育制度的信心（按政治傾向劃分）



7.4. Satisfaction with the performance of civil service

Table 9 presents the level of satisfaction respondents expressed regarding the performance of the civil service. Those satisfied with the civil service's performance decreased slightly by 2.5%, reaching 43.0%. Conversely, the proportion of respondents expressing dissatisfaction increased by 2.8% to 35.1%, accounting for over one-third of the respondents. The net satisfaction value declined to 7.9%, a statistically significant decrease compared to the previous survey.

Figure 19 and Figure 20 illustrate satisfaction with civil service performance segmented by age group, revealing mixed net values across all demographics. Notably, the 30-39 age group (+5.6%) and the 50-59 age group (+9.3%) are the only categories showing increases, while all other age groups have experienced declines compared to six months ago.

Furthermore, net satisfaction values vary significantly among supporters of different political affiliations. Pro-establishment supporters report a notable net increase of 28.9%. In contrast, both moderate supporters (-10.4%) and non-establishment supporters (-1.6%) exhibit declines in their satisfaction with civil service performance. These findings emphasize the diverse perceptions of civil service effectiveness across age groups and political stances.

Table 9: Level of satisfaction with civil service performance

表 9：對公務員服務水平的滿意度

	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7	2025.2
Satisfied 滿意	40.3%	49.4%	40.7%	45.5%	43.0%
Dissatisfied 不滿意	26.9%	27.6%	35.9%	32.3%	35.1%
Half-half 一半半	29.9%	19.7%	21.5%	20.3%	20.3%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	3.0%	3.3%	1.9%	2.0%	1.5%
Net Value 淨值	13.4%	21.8%	4.8%	13.3%	7.9%

Net value: Percent 'Satisfied' minus percent 'Dissatisfied'

淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比

Figure 19: Level of satisfaction with civil service performance (by age group)

圖 19：對公務員服務水平的滿意度（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 20: Level of satisfaction with civil service performance (by political inclination)

圖 20：對公務員服務水平的滿意度（按政治傾向劃分）



8. Recent Political Events

8.1. Satisfaction with HKSAR Government

Table 10 presents public satisfaction ratings with the current Hong Kong SAR Government. In July 2024, 44.4% of respondents expressed satisfaction with the HKSAR government, which fell to 42.3% by February 2025. Conversely, dissatisfaction increased slightly from 39.0% to 40.9%. While proportion of neutral responses remained stable.

It is noted that the current government released its third policy address at the end of last year, and the effectiveness of these policies remains to be assessed over time. It is believed that the relatively stable satisfaction levels among the public compared to half a year ago are due to a continued wait-and-see attitude towards the government's performance.

Table 10: Level of satisfaction with the current HKSAR government
表 10：對現屆政府表現的滿意度

	2024.7	2025.2
Satisfied 滿意	44.4%	42.3%
Dissatisfied 不滿意	39.0%	40.9%
Half-half 一半半	15.4%	15.5%
Don't know 唔知道	1.2%	1.3%
Net Value 淨值	5.4%	1.4%

Net value: Percent 'Satisfied' minus percent 'Dissatisfied'
淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比

8.2. Satisfaction with Legislative Council

Table 11 presents the levels of satisfaction with the Legislative Council (LegCo) as of February 2025. Only 29.4% of respondents expressed satisfaction, while a significant 48.1% reported dissatisfaction. The proportion of individuals indicating a neutral stance, or "half-half," stood at 17.9%.

This reflects a prevailing sentiment of discontent among the populace regarding the performance of the LegCo. This dissatisfaction may be linked to the high costs associated with the Council since its inception and the public scrutiny over the quality of its deliberations, which have been marred by numerous controversies. Additionally, the disputes arising from some members' trips to Japan for official visits in late last year, particularly concerning external expenditure and certain controversial statements made by these legislators, have further fuelled public discontent.

Table 11: Level of satisfaction with the Legislative Council
表 10：對立法會表現的滿意度

	All Respondents 所有受訪者
Satisfied 滿意	29.4%
Dissatisfied 不滿意	48.1%
Half-half 一半半	17.9%
Don't know 唔知道	4.5%
Net Value 淨值	-18.7%

Net value: Percent 'Should' minus percent 'Should not'
淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比

8.3. Perspectives on Hong Kong's Future

Table 12 explores public opinion on Hong Kong's future. The data reveals that 43.7% of respondents hold an optimistic view, while 40.2% express pessimism about the region's prospects.

This mixed sentiment reflects the complex and evolving landscape in Hong Kong, where hopes for positive change coexist with concerns about ongoing challenges. This duality may be further underscored by recent discussions surrounding the government's fiscal deficit, which have raised apprehensions about the economic future.

Table 12: Perspectives on Hong Kong's Future

表 11：對香港前景的看法

	All Respondents 所有受訪者
Optimistic 樂觀	43.7%
Pessimistic 悲觀	40.2%
Half-half 一半半	14.4%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	1.7%
Net Value 淨值	3.5%

Net value: Percent 'Optimistic' minus percent 'Pessimistic'

淨值：「樂觀」的百分比減去「悲觀」的百分比

8.4. Generation gap and political divide

Table 13 and Table 14 summarize the net values derived from responses to questions regarding selected political controversies, with results categorized by age group and political inclination.

The data reveals distinct patterns in how respondents from various age demographics and political affiliations responded to these contentious issues. Generally, net values exhibited an increase with age, while they decreased as political leanings shifted away from the pro-establishment spectrum. In general, the 18-29 age group and non-establishment supporters demonstrated the most critical assessments of the political controversies.

Given the divergent perspectives reflected across different political camps, the views of moderates offer a crucial reference point for understanding the general public's opinions on these pressing issues. In the current analysis, the satisfaction level of moderates regarding SAR government remained largely independent of the positions held by both pro-establishment and non-establishment groups. This observation suggests that rationality and pragmatism continue to be deeply embedded within the Hong Kong community.

Table 13: Generation gap over selected political events (by age group)

表 12：對選定政治事件之代溝（按年齡劃分）

	Satisfaction with HKSAR government 政府表現滿意度 (2024.7)	Democratic political reform 民主政制發展 (2024.7)	Satisfaction with HKSAR government 政府表現滿意度 (2025.2)	Perspectives on Hong Kong's future 對香港前景的看法 (2025.2)
18-29	-31.2%	54.6%	-33.4%	-37.2%
30-39	-26.5%	55.6%	-25.8%	-31.4%
40-49	-1.3%	59.6%	-8.4%	7.4%
50-59	10.0%	42.0%	3.3%	6.8%
60-69	21.3%	51.5%	15.1%	17.7%
≥70	47.6%	32.9%	40.6%	39.7%
All respondents 所有受訪者	5.4%	49.0%	1.4%	3.5%

Table 14: Political divide over selected political controversies (by political inclination)

表 13：對選定政治爭議之政治鴻溝（按政治傾向劃分）

	Satisfaction with HKSAR government 政府表現滿意度 (2024.7)	Democratic political reform 民主政制發展 (2024.7)	Satisfaction with HKSAR government 政府表現滿意度 (2025.2)	Perspectives on Hong Kong's future 對香港前景的看法 (2025.2)
Pro-establishment 建制派	65.8%	33.1%	78.9%	81.1%
Moderates 溫和派	11.5%	46.3%	4.3%	6.9%
Non-establishment 非建制派	-54.5%	72.4%	-71.1%	-65.2%
All respondents 所有受訪者	5.4%	49.0%	1.4%	3.5%

Appendices

I. Methodology

1. Construction of 1C2S Index

We construct a conceptual framework to capture the current situation of 1C2S through six pillars, three based on public opinion and three based on international perception. The three pillars on public opinion are derived from telephone polls conducted among Hong Kong residents, evaluating the implementation of 1C2S. The three pillars on international perception are compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on the state of freedom and democracy worldwide. Each pillar is further divided into four sub-pillars. Consequently, we create a measurement system comprising six pillars and 24 sub-pillars. Each sub-pillar is assigned equal weight to generate a pillar score. The 1C2S Index is calculated as the simple average of all six pillar scores. Table 15 below outlines the six pillars and 24 sub-pillars used in our index.

Table 15: Pillars and sub-pillars of 1C2S Index

表 14：「一國兩制」指數的支柱和子支柱

	Pillar 支柱	Sub-pillar 子支柱
Public Opinion 民意調查	A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治	A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務
		A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權
		A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權
		A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」
	B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由	B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式
		B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社和集會自由
		B3. Democratic development 民主發展
		B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護
	C. Hong Kong-Mainland Relations 內港關係	C1. Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾
C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益		
C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定		
C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落实「一國兩制」		
International Perception 國際評價	D. Economic Openness 經濟開放	D1. Business environment 營商環境
		D2. Market access 市場門檻
		D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素
		D4. Financial stability 金融穩定
	E. Civil Liberty 公民權利	E1. Rule of law 法治
		E2. Security and safety 安全
		E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會
		E4. Individual rights 個人權利
F. Democratic Development 民主發展	F1. Constraints on power 權力制約	
	F2. Political pluralism 政治多元	
	F3. Civic participation 公民參與	
	F4. Democratic culture 民主文化	

1.1. Public Opinion

We obtain three pillar and twelve sub-pillar scores on the implementation of 1C2S from telephone polls conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Each sub-pillar is represented by a single survey question, with the questions listed in Table 16.

Approximately 1,000 individuals are randomly sampled in each round using the CATI (computer-assisted telephone interviewing) system. All the respondents are aged 18 or above and spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin. To ensure representativeness of the Hong Kong population, all data are weighted by the proportion of gender and age of individuals aged 18 or above (excluding foreign domestic helpers) according to the Census and Statistics Department.

Table 17 provides details on the statistical and scientific standards of each survey. Since the first half of 2021, the telephone surveys have employed a dual-frame sampling design, randomly selecting phone numbers from a combined sample of residential landline and mobile phone numbers. To address potential double-counting or other unknown factors arising from individuals owning both landline and mobile numbers, additional steps are taken in the weighting method. The specific calculations are detailed in a subsequent sub-section.

In the telephone polls, many questions employ a 1 to 7 rating scale, with 4 as the median. This scale, known as the Likert scale, is commonly used in psychological assessments. It is preferred over a 0 to 10 scale, as the latter is considered too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents. However, to better align with existing indices that typically employ a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median), we mathematically converted the results into this scale.

Table 16: Questions on public opinion

表 15 : 民意調查問題

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Survey Question 民調問題
A1	‘After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to practice a high degree of autonomy, and has been able to handle its own internal administrative affairs. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港實行到高度自治，自行處理特區內嘅行政事務。你有幾同意呢？」
A2	‘After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent judiciary powers. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅司法權。你有幾同意呢？」
A3	‘After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent legislative powers. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅立法權。你有幾同意呢？」
A4	‘How successful has the practice of ‘Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong’ been?’ 「整體嚟講，你認為落實『港人治港』有幾成功呢？」
B1	‘After the handover, the original ways of life of the Hong Kong people have maintained. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港人繼續維持原有嘅生活方式。你有幾同意呢？」
B2	‘After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論、結社同集會自由。你有幾同意呢？」
B3	‘After the handover, the development of Hong Kong’s democratic system has been progressively implemented, following the provision of the Basic Law. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港嘅民主政制發展，正係按照基本法嘅規定，循序漸進地落實。你有幾同意呢？」
B4	‘After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capabilities, identities and social classes. To what extent would you agree?’ 「回歸之後，香港人不論經濟能力、身份同社會地位都能夠得到法律保護。你有幾同意呢？」

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Survey Question 民調問題
C1	'When conflicts between mainland China and Hong Kong arise, how confident are you that the conflicts can be resolved through consultation and dialogue?' 「對於當內地同香港出現嘅矛盾時，兩地可透過對話協商得以解決，你有幾大信心呢？」
C2	'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to keep intact the sovereignty of China, national security and profits from development projects. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港可以做到維護國家主權、安全和發展利益。你有幾同意呢？」
C3	'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain long-term prosperity and stability. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港能夠維持到長期繁榮穩定。你有幾同意呢？」
C4	'How confident are you in the full implementation of 'One Country, Two Systems' in Hong Kong in the future (before 2047)?' 「你有幾大信心香港喺未來（即 2047 年前）能全面落实『一國兩制』呢？」

Table 17: Survey details

表 16：調查概況

Round 輪次	Survey Period 調查日期	Number of Respondents 受訪人數			Response Rates 回應率		Confidence Level 置信水平	Sampling Error 抽樣誤差
		Landline 固網	Mobile 手機	Total 總數	Landline 固網	Mobile 手機		
2017 H1	5.23 - 6.3	1,002	-	1,002	36.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2017 H2	12.11 - 12.23	1,006	-	1,006	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018 H1	5.23 - 6.2	1,004	-	1,004	37.2%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018 H2	12.3 - 12.12	1,001	-	1,001	38.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2019 H1	5.27 - 6.6	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
*	7.24 - 8.7	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
*	10.17 - 10.31	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2019 H2	12.10 - 12.20	1,000	-	1,000	40.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2020 H1	6.9 - 6.29	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2020 H2	12.22 - 1.13	1,002	-	1,002	32.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2021 H1	6.21 - 7.9	498	503	1,001	30.9%	31.4%	95.0%	±3.10%
2021 H2	12.20 - 1.10	497	506	1,003	30.6%	30.0%	95.0%	±3.09%
2022 H1	6.23 - 7.11	481	521	1,002	26.9%	28.2%	95.0%	±3.10%
2022 H2	12.15 - 1.18	474	531	1,005	24.4%	26.7%	95.0%	±3.09%
2023 H1	6.13 - 7.18	432	578	1,010	16.6%	23.3%	95.0%	±3.08%
2023 H2	1.12 - 2.29	248	763	1,011	31.4%	38.2%	95.0%	±3.08%
2024 H1	7.11-7.31	223	790	1,013	50.7%	54.8%	95.0%	±3.08%
2024 H2	1.21-2.25	257	748	1,005	48.1%	59.1%	95.0%	±3.08%

Note: '**' denotes surveys conducted in addition to the biannual exercise.

1.1.1. Weighting method for dual-frame sampling

In dual-frame sampling, weighting adjustments are made for the ownership of phone numbers in addition to the distribution of the Hong Kong population. Since everyone owns a different number of landline and mobile numbers, each has a different probability of being selected as a respondent. To eliminate the over-representation of any individual, the first weight factor (WT1) approximates the probability of selection for each respondent. It is a ratio of the amount of landline and mobile numbers owned by a respondent to the total number of such numbers in the territory. WT1_{*i*} is calculated by the inverse of probability of selection of individual *i*, i.e. $WT1_i = \pi_i^{-1}$.

$$\pi_i = \frac{n_L}{N_L} \times \frac{t_i^L}{e_i^L} + \frac{n_m}{N_m} \times t_i^m$$

<i>Where</i>	<i>i</i>	=	<i>i</i> -th person selected
	<i>n_L</i>	=	amount of sample's landline numbers
	<i>N_L</i>	=	amount of population's landline numbers
	<i>t_i^L</i>	=	amount of <i>i</i> -th person's landline numbers
	<i>e_i^L</i>	=	amount of eligible respondents in the household
	<i>n_m</i>	=	amount of sample's mobile numbers
	<i>N_m</i>	=	amount of population's mobile numbers
	<i>t_i^m</i>	=	amount of <i>i</i> -th person's mobile numbers

Sampling in telephone surveys is randomized by phone numbers without consideration of demographics. The second weight factor (WT2) adjusts the size of each sample group to match population distribution in terms of gender and age. WT2 is calculated by dividing the population estimates for a specific gender and age group by its sample size and the sample's probability of selection.

$$WT2 = \frac{\text{group population estimates}}{\text{group sample size} \times WT1}$$

The final weighting factor (WT_F) is calculated by the following formula.

$$WT_F = WT1 \times WT2 \times \frac{\text{total sample size}}{\text{total population estimates}}$$

<i>Where</i>	WT_F	=	final weighting factor
	WT1	=	weight factor adjusting for the ownership of phone numbers
	WT2	=	weight factor adjusting for the distribution of the Hong Kong population

1.2. International perception

We obtain three pillar scores and twelve sub-pillar scores on the state of freedom and democracy in the world from tracking indices compiled by international think tanks. Every sub-pillar is derived from multiple indicators, offering wide coverage of scopes and territories that enable us to compare Hong Kong's position on the global stage from a 1C2S perspective. There are two selection criteria for data sources. First, their datasets must include Hong Kong to allow for direct comparison. Second, their indicators must capture key areas of 1C2S framework that draw international attention. Additionally, each data source has different geographic coverage, only locations observed by at least three quarters of all data sources are included. As a result, 127 indicators from nine data sources are adopted in our model to score and rank 148 countries and territories. Tables below show the list of indicators and their sources. Data sources include:

- Cato Institute and Fraser Institute: Human Freedom Index (HFI);
- Economist Intelligence Unit: Democracy Index (DI);
- Freedom House: Freedom in the World (FiW);
- International Institute for Management Development (IMD): World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY);
- Reporters Without Borders: World Press Freedom Index (WPFI);
- V-Dem Institute: V-Dem Dataset (V-Dem);
- World Bank: Doing Business Index (DB);
- World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Index (GCI); and
- World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index (RoLI).

Table 18: List of indicators on international perception (D. Economic Openness)

表 17：國際評價之指標列表（D. 經濟開放）

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
D1. Business Environment 營商環境	Business facilitation 方便營商	D1.1	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.10 Burden of government regulation	GCI	1-7
		D1.2	5C Business regulations	EFW	0-10
		D1.3	Paying Taxes	DB	0-100
		D1.4	Resolving Insolvency	DB	0-100
	Labour market 勞動市場	D1.5	Pillar 8: Labour market	GCI	0-100
		D1.6	Business Efficiency - 3.2 Labor Market	WCY	0-100
D2. Market Access 市場門檻	Free trade 自由貿易	D2.1	4 Freedom to trade internationally	EFW	0-10
		D2.2	Pillar 7: Product market - Trade openness	GCI	0-100
		D2.3	Trading across Borders	DB	0-100
	Market competition 市場競爭	D2.4	Starting a Business	DB	0-10
		D2.5	Government Efficiency - 2.4 Business Legislation	WCY	0-100
		D2.6	Business Efficiency - 3.5 Attitudes and Values	WCY	0-100
		D2.7	Pillar 7: Product market - Domestic competition	GCI	0-100
D3. Regulatory Quality 監管質素	Protection of property rights 保障私有產權	D3.1	2C Protection of property rights	EFW	0-10
		D3.2	Infrastructure - 4.3.21 Intellectual property rights	WCY	0-10
		D3.3	Pillar 1: Institutions - Property rights	GCI	0-100
	Enforcement of contracts 履行合約	D3.4	2F Legal enforcement of contracts	EFW	0-10
		D3.5	Government Efficiency - 2.3.09 Legal and regulatory framework	WCY	0-10
		D3.6	Enforcing Contracts	DB	0-100
		D3.7	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes	GCI	1-7
	Corporate governance 企業管治	D3.8	Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Auditing and accounting practices	WCY	0-10
		D3.9	Pillar 1: Institutions - Corporate governance	GCI	0-100
		D3.10	Protecting Minority Investors	DB	0-100
D4. Financial Stability 金融穩定	Public finance 公共財政	D4.1	3 Sound Money	EFW	0-10
		D4.2	Government Efficiency - 2.1.07 Public finance	WCY	0-10
		D4.3	Pillar 4: Macroeconomic stability	GCI	0-100
	Money market 金融市場	D4.4	5A Credit market regulations	EFW	0-10
		D4.5	Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Banking and financial services	WCY	0-10
		D4.6	Getting Credit	DB	0-100
		D4.7	Pillar 9: Financial system	GCI	0-100

Table 19: List of indicators on international perception (E. Civil Liberty)

表 18：國際評價之指標列表（E. 公民權利）

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度	
E1. Rule of Law 法治	Judicial independence 司法獨立	E1.1	F. Rule of Law – F1. Is there an independent judiciary?	FiW	0-4	
		E1.2	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.07 Judicial independence	GCI	0-100	
	Civil and criminal justice 民事與刑事公義	E1.3	F. Rule of Law – F2. Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?	FiW	0-4	
		E1.4	Government Efficiency – 2.5.01 Justice	WCY	0-10	
		E1.5	Factor 7: Civil Justice	RoLI	0-1	
		E1.6	Factor 8: Criminal Justice	RoLI	0-1	
	Equal protection 平等保障	E1.7	F. Rule of Law – F4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?	FiW	0-4	
		E1.8	Access to justice	V-Dem	0-1	
	Regulatory enforcement 監管執法	E1.9	Factor 6: Regulatory Enforcement	RoLI	0-1	
		E1.10	Rigorous and impartial public administration	V-Dem	0-4	
		E1.11	Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	V-Dem	0-4	
E2. Security and Safety 安全	Absence of crime 杜絕犯罪	E2.1	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.01 Organized crime	GCI	1-7	
		E2.2	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.04 Reliability of police services	GCI	1-7	
		E2.3	Factor 5: Order and Security – 5.1 Crime is effectively controlled	RoLI	0-1	
	Right to life 生存權利	E2.4	B Security and Safety – Bi Homicide	PFI	0-10	
		E2.5	F. Rule of Law – F3. Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?	FiW	0-4	
		E2.6	Physical violence index	V-Dem	0-1	
		E2.7	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.2 The right to life and security of the person is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1	
	Civil conflict and terrorism 內戰與恐怖主義	E2.8	B Security and Safety – Bii. Disappearances, conflicts, and terrorism	PFI	0-10	
		E2.9	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.03 Terrorism incidence	GCI	0-100	
		E2.10	Factor 5: Order and Security – 5.2 Civil conflict is effectively limited	RoLI	0-1	
E3. Expression, Association and Assembly 表達、結社與集會	Expression 表達	E3.1	F Freedom of Expression – Fi Direct Attacks on Press	PFI	0-10	
		E3.2	(Removed)*	-	-	
		E3.3	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D1. Are there free and independent media?	FiW	0-4	
		E3.4	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?	FiW	0-4	
		E3.5	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D4. Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?	FiW	0-4	
		E3.6	World Press Freedom Index	WPFI	0-100	
		E3.7	Freedom of expression index	V-Dem	0-1	
		E3.8	Alternative sources of information index	V-Dem	0-1	
		E3.9	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.4 Freedom of opinion and expression is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1	
		E3.10	E. Associational and Organizational Rights	FiW	0-12	
		Association and Assembly 結社和集會	E3.11	Freedom of peaceful assembly	V-Dem	0-4
			E3.12	CSO entry and exit	V-Dem	0-4
			E3.13	CSO repression	V-Dem	0-4
			E3.14	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.7 Freedom of assembly and association is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1

* Combined with E3.1 to reflect a revision from Cato Institute.

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
E4. Individual Rights 個人權利	Religion 宗教	E4.1	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or non-belief in public and private?	FiW	0-4
		E4.2	Freedom of religion	V-Dem	0-4
		E4.3	Religious organization repression	V-Dem	0-4
		E4.4	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.5 Freedom of belief and religion is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Movement 遷徙	E4.5	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?	FiW	0-4
		E4.6	Freedom of domestic movement	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.7	Freedom of foreign movement	V-Dem	0-4
	Labour 勞動	E4.8	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G4. Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation?	FiW	0-4
		E4.9	Government Efficiency – 2.5.11 Equal opportunity	WCY	0-10
		E4.10	Freedom from forced labor	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.11	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.8 Fundamental labor rights are effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Property rights 私有產權	E4.12	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G2. Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors?	FiW	0-4
		E4.13	Property rights	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.14	Relationship Freedoms	PFI	0-10
	Relationship 關係	E4.15	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?	FiW	0-4
		E4.16	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.1 Equal treatment and absence of discrimination	RoLI	0-1
	Privacy, non-discrimination and equal treatment 私隱、非歧視和平等對待	E4.17	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.6 Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1

Table 20: List of indicators on international perception (F. Democratic Development)

表 19：國際評價之指標列表 (F. 民主發展)

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
F1. Constraints on Power 權力制約	Executive check 制約行政權	F1.1	Functioning of government	DI	0-100
		F1.2	Factor 1: Constraints on Government Powers	RoLI	0-1
		F1.3	Judicial constraints on the executive index	V-Dem	0-1
		F1.4	Legislative constraints on the executive index	V-Dem	0-1
		F1.5	C. Functioning of Government – C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?	FiW	0-4
		F1.6	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.08 Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations	GCI	0-100
	Absence of corruption 杜絕貪腐	F1.7	C. Functioning of Government – C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?	FiW	0-4
		F1.8	Government Efficiency – 2.3.13 Bribery and corruption	WCY	0-10
		F1.9	Political corruption index	V-Dem	0-1 (inverted 倒數)
		F1.10	Factor 2: Absence of Corruption	RoLI	0-1

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
F2. Political Pluralism 政治多元	Electoral process 選舉過程	F2.1	A. Electoral Process	FiW	0-12
		F2.2	Electoral process and pluralism	DI	0-100
		F2.3	Clean elections index	V-Dem	0-1
		F2.4	Share of population with suffrage	V-Dem	0-1
		F2.5	Disclosure of campaign donations	V-Dem	0-4
	Political competition 政治競爭	F2.6	B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B2. Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?	FiW	0-4
		F2.7	B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?	FiW	0-4
		F2.8	Public campaign finance	V-Dem	0-4 z score
		F2.9	Divided party control index	V-Dem	z 分數
		F2.10	Elected officials index	V-Dem	0-1
	Party development 政團發展	F2.11	B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?	FiW	0-4
		F2.12	Barriers to parties	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.13	Party ban	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.14	Opposition parties autonomy	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.15	Party institutionalization index	V-Dem	0-1
F3. Civic Participation 公民參與	Political rights and awareness 政治權利與意識	F3.1	B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B4. Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?	FiW	0-4
		F3.2	Political participation	DI	0-100
		F3.3	Mass mobilization	V-Dem	0-4
	Citizen engagement 公民參與	F3.4	Civil society participation index	V-Dem	0-1
		F3.5	Engagement in state-administered mass organizations	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.6	Engagement in independent trade unions	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.7	Engagement in independent political associations	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.8	Engagement in independent non-political associations	V-Dem	0-4
	Transparency and open government 政務公開	F3.9	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.06 Budget transparency	GCI	0-100
		F3.10	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.12 E-participation	GCI	0-100
		F3.11	C. Functioning of Government – C3. Does the government operate with openness and transparency?	FiW	0-4
		F3.12	Factor 3: Open Government	RoLI	0-1
		F3.13	Government Efficiency – 2.3.11 Transparency	WCY	0-10
F4. Democratic Culture 民主文化	Public attitude 大眾態度	F4.1	Political culture	DI	0-100
		F4.2	Deliberative component index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.3	Political Polarization	V-Dem	0-4 (inverted 倒數)
		F4.4	Political violence	V-Dem	0-4 (inverted 倒數)
		F4.5	Factor 5: Order and Security – 5.3 People do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances	RoLI	0-1
	Political equality 政治平等	F4.6	Equal protection index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.7	Equal access index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.8	Equal distribution of resources index	V-Dem	0-1

1.2.1. Aggregation method for composite indicators

International indices are often released with a considerable time lag due to the extensive data compilation required from many countries. Very few indicators are collected for release in the immediate index period. Therefore, we offset the time difference by rolling data forward to the release date. In other words, indicators are assigned to the index period in which they become available. Figure 21 shows the number of indicators by years offset. An alternative approach is to backdate data to the collection period. However, this approach has three disadvantages. First, no change will be observed in the latest issue because new scores are applied to an earlier period. Second, our biannual report will always record identical values in the first and second halves because most datasets are compiled on a yearly basis. Third, published scores will be substantially revised in the subsequent issue because indicators are updated retrospectively. It is noteworthy that backdating or time offsetting affects only the presentation of historical scores. Both approaches produce the latest pillar scores based on the most recent available data.

Countries and territories covered by insufficient data sources are omitted in our model. For remaining included locations, an imputation process is carried out to replace missing data. Countries and territories are categorized into 7 regions according to the World Bank region groups. When a missing value arises, it is substituted with the regional average of recorded values. To standardize the range of data values, the complete dataset is transformed into a common scale by min-max normalisation as the below formula. For each indicator in each index period, the frontier value will be rescaled to 10 and the bottom value to 0. Even if a country or territory has the same raw score over time, its normalized score can be changed due to a change in the minimum or maximum value of the data series.

$$\text{normalized score} = \frac{x_i - \min(x)}{\max(x) - \min(x)}$$

A sub-pillar score is generated by its indicators with weights determined by principal component analysis. It is a standard statistical method that processes and simplifies data scientifically in index construction. It extracts a dataset's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains variations across the data through the below statistical analysis. Table 21 shows the weights of every indicator in recent index periods. Measuring about 60 countries and territories only, the coverage of IMD's World Competitiveness Yearbook is significantly smaller than other data sources. As there are more missing than recorded entries, we will assign a zero weight to IMD indicators for unobserved countries and territories instead of imputing with sub-regional average. The weights of available indicators from the remaining data sources will be enlarged proportionately.

Figure 21: Number of indicators by offsetting years

圖 21：經年期調整之指標數目




Table 21: PCA weights (%)

表 20 : 主成分權重 (%)

D. Economic Openness 經濟開放						E. Civil Liberty 公民權利						F. Democratic Development 民主發展					
	2022	2023	2023	2024	2024		2022	2023	2023	2024	2024		2022	2023	2023	2024	2024
	H2	H1	H2	H1	H2		H2	H1	H2	H1	H2		H2	H1	H2	H1	H2
D1.1	12.9	13.9	21.8	22.6	22.6	E1.1	9.4	9.3	9.2	9.4	9.4	F1.1	12.5	12.4	12.4	12.5	12.9
D1.2	19.4	19.8	21.7	22.4	22.4	E1.2	7.1	7.0	7.2	7.1	7.2	F1.2	12.8	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.6
D1.3	19.1	19.6	16.1	16.0	16.0	E1.3	10.6	10.5	10.5	10.7	10.7	F1.3	11.1	10.8	10.8	10.8	10.7
D1.4	16.9	17.0	10.4	9.9	9.9	E1.4	2.5	2.8	2.9	2.5	2.6	F1.4	9.3	9.6	9.5	10.3	10.3
D1.5	22.7	23.2	19.7	19.5	19.5	E1.5	10.5	10.6	10.7	10.7	10.7	F1.5	10.1	10.0	9.9	10.0	9.9
D1.6	9.1	6.6	10.3	9.7	9.7	E1.6	10.8	10.9	10.8	10.8	10.9	F1.6	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.7
D2.1	14.5	14.7	15.9	16.3	16.0	E1.7	8.7	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.5	F1.7	12.5	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.3
D2.2	15.1	15.3	15.3	16.1	16.0	E1.8	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.4	9.4	F1.8	3.6	4.1	4.2	3.4	3.4
D2.3	13.2	13.5	13.4	13.6	13.8	E1.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.8	F1.9	12.3	12.2	12.2	12.3	12.2
D2.4	11.2	11.1	11.5	12.1	12.0	E1.10	10.5	10.1	10.0	10.2	10.2	F1.10	11.1	11.0	11.1	11.0	11.0
D2.5	16.9	16.7	16.0	16.5	16.4	E1.11	9.5	9.7	9.7	9.7	9.7	F2.1	9.7	9.5	9.5	9.4	9.4
D2.6	10.1	9.6	9.0	6.0	6.2	E2.1	10.1	10.2	9.8	9.8	9.9	F2.2	9.2	9.2	9.1	9.2	9.2
D2.7	19.1	19.2	18.8	19.4	19.7	E2.2	10.5	10.6	10.2	10.2	10.3	F2.3	8.0	7.7	7.7	8.1	8.1
D3.1	13.1	13.2	12.7	12.9	12.9	E2.3	11.1	11.2	11.2	11.2	11.1	F2.4	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4
D3.2	10.7	11.2	10.8	10.7	10.7	E2.4	4.6	4.7	5.2	5.2	4.4	F2.5	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.8	5.7
D3.3	13.5	13.8	13.8	14.0	14.0	E2.5	13.9	13.6	13.6	13.4	13.7	F2.6	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.3	9.3
D3.4	10.3	10.3	12.2	12.4	12.4	E2.6	11.0	10.8	10.7	11.1	11.1	F2.7	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.6
D3.5	6.5	5.3	4.7	3.9	3.9	E2.7	14.2	14.1	13.7	13.7	13.9	F2.8	3.8	4.1	4.1	4.4	4.4
D3.6	8.0	8.1	8.0	8.1	8.1	E2.8	13.1	13.0	13.8	13.6	14.2	F2.9	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5
D3.7	10.5	10.2	9.5	9.5	9.4	E2.9	4.8	4.9	4.4	4.3	4.2	F2.10	4.4	4.9	5.0	4.7	4.7
D3.8	9.6	10.0	9.6	9.2	9.2	E2.10	6.8	7.0	7.3	7.4	7.1	F2.11	9.9	9.8	9.8	9.6	9.6
D3.9	10.4	10.6	10.7	11.1	11.1	E3.1	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.1	F2.12	8.3	8.2	8.1	7.9	7.9
D3.10	7.3	7.4	7.8	8.1	8.1	E3.2	-	-	-	-	-	F2.13	6.2	6.0	6.1	5.9	5.9
D4.1	15.5	15.9	17.4	17.9	18.2	E3.3	8.4	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	F2.14	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.6	8.6
D4.2	8.6	7.4	6.0	4.8	4.6	E3.4	8.3	8.2	8.2	8.3	8.4	F2.15	6.6	6.7	6.7	6.6	6.6
D4.3	22.1	23.0	22.5	22.4	21.9	E3.5	8.3	8.4	8.3	8.2	8.2	F3.1	12.8	12.7	12.7	12.1	12.1
D4.4	8.8	9.0	11.1	11.3	11.7	E3.6	7.7	7.7	7.8	7.6	7.6	F3.2	13.0	12.7	12.8	12.4	12.4
D4.5	17.1	16.3	14.8	15.4	15.2	E3.7	8.9	8.7	8.8	8.8	8.8	F3.3	1.0	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3
D4.6	6.3	6.4	7.0	7.2	6.8	E3.8	7.8	7.6	7.6	7.8	7.8	F3.4	10.8	10.3	10.2	10.7	10.7
D4.7	21.7	22.2	21.3	21.0	21.5	E3.9	7.2	7.2	7.1	7.1	7.0	F3.5	6.3	7.3	7.2	7.0	7.0
						E3.10	8.7	8.7	8.8	8.8	8.8	F3.6	4.8	5.1	4.8	5.1	5.1
						E3.11	7.7	8.1	8.1	8.0	8.0	F3.7	3.7	4.9	4.7	6.5	6.5
						E3.12	8.0	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.0	F3.8	2.8	3.3	3.1	4.5	4.5
						E3.13	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	F3.9	10.2	9.8	10.3	9.8	9.8
						E3.14	7.6	7.6	7.5	7.5	7.5	F3.10	7.4	7.0	7.4	6.8	6.8
						E4.1	6.0	6.0	5.9	6.1	6.0	F3.11	14.1	13.5	13.4	12.5	12.5
						E4.2	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.7	5.7	F3.12	12.3	11.7	11.7	11.1	11.1
						E4.3	5.9	5.9	5.8	6.0	5.9	F3.13	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.1
						E4.4	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.7	F4.1	13.1	13.1	12.8	13.0	13.2
						E4.5	7.9	7.8	7.8	7.9	7.9	F4.2	13.0	13.4	13.5	13.0	13.1
						E4.6	6.1	6.9	6.9	6.9	6.9	F4.3	7.1	6.3	6.4	7.3	7.3
						E4.7	5.6	5.9	6.0	6.4	6.4	F4.4	10.9	10.3	10.3	10.7	10.7
						E4.8	7.9	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.7	F4.5	9.2	9.1	9.3	9.6	9.3
						E4.9	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	F4.6	16.4	16.7	16.6	16.3	16.3
						E4.10	5.3	5.1	5.1	4.9	4.9	F4.7	13.9	14.4	14.3	13.7	13.7
						E4.11	6.2	6.1	6.1	6.1	6.1	F4.8	16.4	16.5	16.7	16.4	16.4
						E4.12	7.9	7.9	7.8	7.8	7.8						
						E4.13	6.2	6.3	6.3	5.9	5.8						
						E4.14	4.3	4.1	4.3	4.2	4.2						
						E4.15	7.0	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8						
						E4.16	4.6	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.6						
						E4.17	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6						

1.3. Revisions and refinement

After the first survey in June 2017, our public opinion questionnaire was refined during the 2017 H2, 2020 H2 and 2022 H1 rounds to increase validity. These refinements include change of wordings, as well as the addition and removal of questions, affecting five of the twelve questions used to compute public opinion scores. The scores from the other seven questions are directly comparable as they are identical in all surveys. Table 22 and Table 23 show the history of the refinement of our questionnaire and the score differences resulting from these changes, respectively.

Since the 2022 H1 report, we have expanded the measurement system for international perception by incorporating more indicators and data sources to enhance objectivity. Figure 22 compares each country's score in the original and revised measurement systems within the same index period. The overall correlation is very strong. Although a broader selection of indicators leads to slight score differences, both systems are consistent in reflecting a country's performance.

Table 22: Revisions of questions on public opinion

表 21：民意調查問題之修訂

Round 輪次	Revision 修訂
2017 H2	Removed 'After the handover, the internal affairs of Hong Kong have not been interfered with by the central and local governments of China. To what extent would you agree?' 移除「回歸之後，特區內部事務並無受到中央各部門同其他內地省市嘅干預。你有幾同意呢？」
2017 H2	Revised 'After the handover, the way of life of the Hong Kong people has not been affected by mainland China. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain their original way of life. To what extent would you agree?' 修訂「回歸之後，香港人原有嘅生活方式受到內地影響。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港人繼續維持原有嘅生活方式。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?' 新增「回歸之後，香港人繼續喺法律面前一律平等。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to keep intact the sovereignty of China, national security and profits from development projects. To what extent would you agree?' 新增「回歸之後，香港可以做到維護國家主權、安全和發展利益。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain prosperity and stability in the long term. To what extent would you agree?' 新增「回歸之後，香港能夠維持到長期繁榮穩定。你有幾同意呢？」
2022 H1	Revised 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedom of speech.' to 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly.' 修訂「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論自由。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論、結社同集會自由。你有幾同意呢？」
2022 H1	Revised 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capability, identity and social status. To what extent would you agree?' 修訂「回歸之後，香港人繼續喺法律面前一律平等。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港人不論經濟能力、身份同社會地位都能夠得到法律保護。你有幾同意呢？」


Table 23: Score difference due to revisions of questions on public opinion

表 22：修訂民意調查問題之評分差距

Round 輪次	Identical 相同	Revised 修訂	Difference 差距
2017 H1	4.70	4.84	0.14
2017 H2	4.67	4.98	0.31
2018 H1	4.78	5.05	0.27
2018 H2	4.59	4.84	0.25
2019 H1	4.30	4.58	0.28
2019 H2	3.27	3.53	0.26
2020 H1	3.15	3.39	0.24
2020 H2	3.15	3.62	0.47
2021 H1	3.19	3.62	0.43
2021 H2	3.64	4.02	0.38
2022 H1	4.35	4.71	0.36
2022 H2	4.59	4.98	0.39
2023 H1	4.89	5.22	0.33
2023 H2	4.95	5.21	0.26
2024 H1	5.24	5.45	0.22
2024 H2	5.14	5.38	0.24

Figure 22: Score difference of revised measurement systems on international perception

圖 22：修訂國際評價指標體系後之評分差距



2. Construction of 1C2S Mass Media Index

We build up a massive dataset by collecting media articles that contain the keyword ‘One Country, Two Systems’ from news database. Our sample consists of 261,332 news reports from 6 television and radio stations, 21 local daily newspapers and 10 online-only media that were published between April 1998 and December 2023. Each article undergoes a ‘tokenisation’ process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of over 20 years, our text corpus contains around 230 million tokens. The number of articles processed from each media source is listed in Table 24.

Common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as pronouns, prepositions and particles, are first removed before further analysis. To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘neutral’. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by the Natural Language Processing and Sentiment Analysis Lab, Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica.

An article is made up of paragraphs. For each paragraph, net sentiment is calculated by the difference between the number of positive and negative words divided by the total word count. At the article level, a net sentiment score is then derived by averaging the net sentiment of its constituent paragraphs with the below equation. To each news source, a daily net sentiment score is further assigned by averaging the score of all articles published in the past 30 days. This time frame of 30 days is a reporting standard of the media industry. MMI is set at 100 on the base day of 1 January 2021.

$$\text{net sentiment score} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \frac{(a_i - b_i)}{w_i}}{N}$$

N = total number of paragraphs

i = the *i*th paragraph

a_i = number of positive words

b_i = number of negative words

w_i = total number of words

People often receive news from multiple sources and channels. Given the substantial differences in the number of news articles published by various sources and the viewership across different channels, the article count of a news source alone may be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure the reliability of the 1C2S MMI, the sentiment score for each news source is weighted by public perceptions of its credibility, based on the survey "Public Evaluation on Media Credibility" conducted by the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Additionally, each media channel is weighted according to people's primary sources of news from the survey "Appraisal of the Local News Media," conducted by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute.

Table 24: Articles processed in 1C2S MMI

表 23 : 輿情指數之處理報道數

	2023 Q4	2024 Q1	2024 Q2	2024 Q3	2024 Q4	Database Total 數據庫總量
TV & Radio 電視電台	765	699	659	770	925	30,104
Cable TV / Hong Kong Open TV 有線電視/香港開電視	42	45	38	55	62	1,196
Commercial Radio 商業電台	90	72	69	70	93	3,869
Metro Radio 新城電台	80	98	88	89	100	2,853
Now TV	181	171	141	174	183	6,366
RTHK 香港電台	280	203	251	261	344	10,105
TVB 無綫電視	92	110	72	121	143	5,715
Newspaper 報章	3,185	3,119	2,324	3,493	3,756	221,921
am730	106	104	82	92	111	5,520
Apple Daily 蘋果日報	-	-	-	-	-	13,076
Headline Daily 頭條日報	-	2	149	238	275	2,385
Hong Kong Commercial Daily 香港商報	218	169	126	466	517	20,431
Hong Kong Daily News 新報	-	-	-	-	-	4,476
Hong Kong Economic Journal 信報	141	142	136	145	170	6,726
Hong Kong Economic Times 經濟日報	60	63	66	78	47	9,649
Lion Rock Daily 香港仔	42	36	17	33	23	760
Metro Daily 都市日報	-	-	-	-	-	1,528
Ming Pao Daily News 明報	156	124	116	128	148	16,171
Oriental Daily News 東方日報	28	28	25	21	22	10,441
South China Morning Post 南華早報	18	-	-	-	1	708
Sharp Daily 爽報	-	-	-	-	-	152
Sing Pao 成報	59	41	30	30	8	5,573
Sing Tao Daily 星島日報	260	220	231	186	259	17,390
Sky Post 晴報	-	-	-	-	-	833
Ta Kung Pao 大公報	1,018	1,159	520	932	921	50,724
The Standard 英文虎報	3	-	-	1	1	109
The Sun 太陽報	-	-	-	-	-	4,828
Tin Tin Daily News 天天日報	-	-	-	-	-	452
Wen Wei Po 文匯報	1,076	1,031	826	1,143	1,253	49,989
Online-Only Media 純網媒	776	717	645	724	796	28,012
Bastille Post 巴士的報	388	354	357	343	433	12,909
Citizen News 眾新聞	-	-	-	-	-	1,186
HK01 香港 01	306	296	225	314	308	9,729
Hong Kong Free Press 香港自由新聞	6	1	-	1	-	46
Initium Media 端傳媒	9	10	8	10	9	214
In-Media 獨立媒體	28	27	18	28	20	603
Passion Times 熱血時報	38	26	37	27	25	774
Post 852 852 郵報	-	-	-	-	-	631
Speak Out HK 港人講地	1	3	-	1	1	60
Stand News 立場新聞	-	-	-	-	-	1,860
Total 總數	4,726	4,535	3,628	4,987	5,477	280,037

2.1. Accuracy test

1C2S MMI is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict.

In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time. As shown in Table 25, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as 'positive' whereas 1,472 were classified as 'negative.'

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be.

Table 25 also shows the average sentiment scores of these three groups of paragraphs. In particular, 'positive' paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as 'negative' paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these three groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.

Table 25: Results of accuracy test

表 24 : 覆查結果

	Positive 正面	Neutral 中立	Negative 負面
No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers 真人研究員對情緒的判斷	2,363	14,202	1,472
Net Value 情緒淨值	21.76%	14.42%	2.92%


II. Comparable Surveys

1. Perception of 1C2S

Our 1C2S Index reflects local and international perceptions of areas such as Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, human rights and freedom, democratic development, economic openness, and Hong Kong-Mainland relations. We conduct telephone surveys and collect data from international think tanks every six months. Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (HKPORI, formerly Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong) also conducts telephone surveys quarterly to gauge public confidence in 1C2S. Respondents are asked, 'Generally speaking, are you confident in 1C2S?'. Figure 23 shows that these surveys display a similar trend with a decline from mid-2017 to late-2019 followed by a gradual rebound.

Figure 23: Changes of public perceptions towards 1C2S

圖 23：「一國兩制」公眾觀感的變動




2. Media sentiment and public opinion

We use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S covered by TV stations, radios, newspapers and online media. 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) measures daily net sentiment of media reports. It is calculated monthly and reported quarterly. As media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion, we compare it with HKPORI's Public Sentiment Index (PSI). PSI quantified Hong Kong people's sentiments towards the prevailing societal, economic and political climate. It appraises the concepts of 'good governance' and 'social harmony' by evaluating the overall government performance and social conditions. Figure 24 shows both MMI and PSI oscillated in 2017 and 2018, bottomed in 2019 and embarked on a path of recovery.

Figure 24: Changes of MMI and PSI

圖 24：輿情指數和民情指數的變動




3. Political orientation

We ask citizens about their political inclination in our half-yearly survey and classify them as pro-establishment supporters, non-establishment supporters (including democrats, localists, and self-determinists), and moderates (including centrists and those without specific political inclination). HKUPOP conducted telephone surveys every two weeks to collect citizens' political inclination and results from October 2016 to June 2019 were released. After spinning off from the University of Hong Kong, HKPORI launches the 'We Hong Kongers' series and invites citizens to fill out questionnaires via email almost every week. Results are rim-weighted to obtain political inclination of the online group. The Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (HKIAPS) of the Chinese University of Hong Kong conducts regular telephone surveys to assess popularity of the chief executive of the HKSAR government. Political inclination of respondents has become part of its release since 2020.

Political inclination identified by HKPORI and HKIAPS, while termed differently, aligned closely with our classification. Moderates in our survey correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the centrist camp' and 'no political inclination / politically neutral / not belong to any camp' and HKIAPS' 'no specific inclination'. Non-establishment supporters correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the pro-democracy camp' and 'inclined towards the localist camp' and HKIAPS' 'non-establishment'. Pro-establishment supporters correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the pro-establishment camp' and HKIAPS' 'pro-establishment'. Figure 25 shows that both surveys are consistent with our findings. A trend of deradicalization was witnessed from mid-2017 to late-2019, followed by a rapid formation and dissolution of non-establishment supporters in the immediate year and the rise of moderate politics since mid-2020.

Figure 25: Changes of citizens' political inclinations

圖 25：市民政治傾向的變動



4. Citizens' identity

Two types of questionnaire design are commonly used to track citizens' self-identity in Hong Kong, the 'dominant identity' design and the 'multiple identity' design. A 'dominant identity' design classifies one's identity either as 'Hongkonger' or 'Chinese', and in some cases, includes certain mixed identities, e.g. 'Chinese in Hong Kong', 'Hongkonger in China' and 'both'. Respondents are compelled to select only one among two or more identities. If proportionally more people choose one category, the proportions of other categories must go down.

We adopt a 'multiple identity' design which uses separate questions to measure citizens' identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese'. This approach allows a possible scenario where a citizen identifies oneself more or less strongly as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' simultaneously. Furthermore, the source data enable us to categorize citizens into four dominant identities: strong identification as Hongkongers only, strong identification as Chinese only, dual identity with strong identifications in both and others which include those without a dominant identity.

HKPORI's identity survey employs both the 'multiple identity' and 'dominant identity' questionnaire designs. Respondents first rate their identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' separately. After that, they will choose one amongst these four categories: 'Hongkonger', 'Chinese', 'Chinese in Hong Kong' and 'Hongkonger in China'. Although HKPORI releases results of both designs, media in Hong Kong focuses on the first part only as it is more popular in public surveys. The proportion of citizens that identify themselves strongly as both 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' cannot be reflected.

26 shows the ratings of citizens' identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' from HKPORI and us using a 'multiple identity' design. Both surveys suggest that the 'Hongkonger' identity maintained high in 2020 and then declined. The 'Chinese' identity recovered from its lowest level in 2019 and 2020. Figure 27 shows results from HKPORI and us using a 'dominant identity' design. HKPORI refers 'Chinese in Hong Kong' and 'Hongkongers in China' as 'mixed identities', which corresponds to our 'dual identity'. Both surveys suggest that the majority of Hong Kong society

possess a 'dual identity', while being temporarily overtaken by 'Hongkonger only' from 2019 to mid-2021, it has resurged to become the primary identity since late-2021.

Figure 26: Changes of scores with 'dominant identity' design

圖 26：「主要身分」評分的變動





Figure 27: Changes of proportions with 'multiple identity' design

圖 27：「多元身分」比例的變動



'One Country Two Systems' Index

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