



民主思路  
PATH OF DEMOCRACY



'ONE COUNTRY  
TWO SYSTEMS'  
INDEX  
「一國兩制」  
指數

2024 | H2 下半年  
(Fifteenth Edition 第十五版)



2024 下半年 (第十五版)  
2024 H2 (Fifteenth Edition)

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# 前言 Preface

The implementation of "One Country, Two Systems" (1C2S) represents a complex and multifaceted endeavour that necessitates rigorous inquiry and sustained engagement from a diverse array of stakeholders. Since its establishment in 1997, progress has been realized in the operationalization of 1C2S; however, a range of challenges has concurrently emerged, necessitating ongoing assessment. In this context, Path of Democracy inaugurated the 1C2S Index in July 2017, presenting its first report aimed at systematically evaluating the implementation of 1C2S by delineating both its achievements and deficiencies.

The 1C2S Index is informed by both local sentiment and international perspectives regarding the current state of 1C2S. Periodic public surveys are employed to capture local attitudes, complemented by assessments from global think tanks to provide a comprehensive view of the perceptions surrounding 1C2S. These independent evaluations yield insights into how the framework is viewed by both the local populace and the international community. To refine our analysis, we have developed the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI), utilizing big data analytics to assess media sentiment concerning 1C2S across both Hong Kong and international outlets. Furthermore, our report incorporates public opinions on salient social issues related to 1C2S, including emigration trends, national security concerns, and economic integration.

In 2022, a thorough review was conducted to ensure that our methodologies remained aligned with contemporary societal and global developments following five years of objective measurement. The main Index will now employ a more timely, objective, and nuanced methodology. We are also advancing our examination of media sentiment by expanding the scope of the 1C2S MMI to reflect the evolving media landscape and readership dynamics. An online data portal has been established to enhance transparency and accessibility, providing policymakers, researchers, media, and the public with data visualizations and tailored analyses.

We extend our appreciation to the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong for their role in conducting telephone surveys, and to sentiment.ai for their assistance in measuring media sentiment. Looking ahead, we remain committed to conducting public surveys and updating international indices biannually, while continuously monitoring media sentiment to gauge the evolving perceptions of the public, the international community, and the media regarding 1C2S.

Ray Poon  
Co-convenor (Research)

March 2025

「一國兩制」是前無古人的創舉，自1997年實踐以來，既取得了一定成果，也面臨諸多挑戰，其過程需要社會各界持續參與及深入探索。為此，民主思路於2017年7月首次發布關於「一國兩制」實施情況的客觀評價，旨在為全面及準確貫徹此方針略盡綿力。

「一國兩制」指數的編制基於本地民意以及國際社會對其現狀的看法。我們通過定期的民意調查捕捉本地市民的態度，並結合全球智庫的評估，全面反映香港與國際社會對「一國兩制」的觀感。為了進一步提升分析深度，我們開發了「一國兩制」輿情指數，運用大數據技術評估香港及國際媒體對「一國兩制」的輿論傾向。此外，報告還納入了與「一國兩制」相關的社會熱點議題的公眾意見，包括移民趨勢、國家安全問題以及經濟融合等多個層面。

經過五年的客觀評估，我們於2022年進行了全面檢討，確保指數編制方式與香港社會及全球發展趨勢保持一致。調整後的編製方法使「一國兩制」指數的更新更及時、數據來源更客觀、指標更清晰、涵蓋層面更廣泛。同時，因應傳媒生態和讀者閱讀習慣的變化，我們擴大了輿情指數的數據範圍，為輿情研究帶來新的突破。此外，我們推出網上數據平台，秉持公開透明的原則，為政策制定者、研究人員、媒體和公眾提供數據可視化及定制分析。

最後，我們謹此感謝香港中文大學香港亞太研究所協助進行電話調查，並感謝 sentiment.ai 在測量媒體輿論方面提供的技術支持。展望未來，我們將繼續定期進行公眾調查，每半年更新國際指數，並持續監測媒體輿論，以了解公眾、國際社會和媒體對「一國兩制」觀感的變化趨勢。

潘學智  
聯席召集人 (研究)

2025年3月



# 主要發現 Key Findings





## 行政摘要 Executive Summary

- Slight Decline in the 1C2S index:** The 'One Country, Two Systems' index for the second half of 2024 stands at 6.14, reflecting a minor 0.5% decrease from the first half of the year, ending a continuous upward trend. This change primarily results from a general decline in public opinion and international assessment scores, although the score for the 'Economic Openness' pillar has seen a slight increase.
- Dual Identity Among the Public:** The prevalence of dual identity (both 'Hong Konger' and 'Chinese') has resurged, now comprising 67.0% of respondents, an increase of 3.2% from the previous round. The identification as 'Hong Konger only' accounts for 25.7%, while 'Chinese only' identity has decreased to 3.5%.
- Continued De-Radicalization Among Youth:** Among youth aged 18-29, 76.1% identify with dual identity, marking an increase of 3.6% from the last survey. The proportion of non-establishment supporters has decreased, indicating a trend toward moderation in youth political inclinations.
- Declining Willingness to Emigrate:** A significant 83.9% of respondents indicate they have 'no plans' to emigrate, resulting in a net value of -70.7%. While non-establishment supporters exhibit a higher willingness to emigrate, the overall trend suggests an enhanced sense of belonging to Hong Kong among the public.
- Low Willingness to Live or Work in Other Cities of the Greater Bay Area:** Only 8.1% of respondents express willingness to live or work in other cities within the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, with a net willingness value of -49.1%. Although there is a slight increase in willingness among the youth (18-29 years old), the overall sentiment remains cautious.
- Slight Decline in Satisfaction with the SAR Government:** The percentage of respondents expressing 'satisfaction' with the SAR government is 42.3%, a decrease of 2.1% from the last round. The public continues to adopt a wait-and-see attitude towards government performance, reflecting a mix of expectations and concerns regarding policy effectiveness.
- General Discontent with Legislative Council Performance:** Only 29.4% of respondents express 'satisfaction' with the Legislative Council, while dissatisfaction stands at a high 48.1%. Concerns over high operational costs and controversies surrounding the quality of proceedings have exacerbated public discontent.
- Divergent Views on Hong Kong's Future:** 43.7% of respondents hold an optimistic outlook on Hong Kong's future, while 40.2% express pessimism. Concerns over fiscal deficits and uncertainties in the economic outlook are likely major factors shaping public sentiment.
- 「一國兩制」指數略有下降：**2024年下半年的「一國兩制」指數為6.14分，較上半年微降0.5%，結束了連續上升的趨勢。這一變化主要源於公眾意見及國際評估分數的普遍下降，唯「經濟開放」支柱的分數略有上升。
- 公眾身份認同趨向雙重化：**雙重身份（「香港人」與「中國人」）重新成為主流，佔67.0%，較上一輪調查上升3.2個百分點。「僅香港人」的身份認同比例為25.7%，而「僅中國人」的身份認同比例則下降至3.5%。
- 青年群體去激進化趨勢持續：**在18-29歲的青年群體中，76.1%認同雙重身份，比上一輪調查上升3.6個百分點。同時，非建制派支持者的比例下降，顯示青年政治傾向正趨於溫和化。
- 移民海外意願持續下降：**83.9%的受訪者表示「沒有計劃」移民，淨值為-70.7%。非建制派支持者的移民意願較高，但整體趨勢顯示公眾對香港的歸屬感有所增強。
- 對大灣區其他城市生活或工作意願偏低：**僅8.1%的受訪者願意在粵港澳大灣區其他城市生活或工作，淨意願值為-49.1%。年輕群體（18-29歲）的意願略有上升，但整體仍以觀望態度為主。
- 對特區政府滿意度微降：**對特區政府表示「滿意」的比例為42.3%，比上一輪調查下降2.1個百分點。公眾對政府表現仍持觀望態度，顯示出對政策成效的期待與疑慮並存。
- 對立法會表現普遍不滿：**僅29.4%的受訪者對立法會表示「滿意」，而不滿比例高達48.1%。高昂運作成本、議事質量爭議以及部分議員的公務訪問風波，進一步加劇公眾對立法會不滿的情緒。
- 對香港未來看法分歧：**43.7%的受訪者對香港未來持樂觀態度，而40.2%表示「悲觀」。財政赤字討論及經濟前景的不確定性，可能是影響公眾情緒的主要因素。

## 「一國兩制」指數概覽 Index At-a-Glance

1C2S Index  
「一國兩制」指數

**6.14**

( ↓ 0.5% )

2024 H2

1C2S Mass Media Index  
「一國兩制」輿情指數

**164.0**

( ↑ 22.7% )

2024 Q4

Moderates  
溫和派

**78.7%**

( ↑ 1.6% )


2025.2

Dual Identity  
雙重身份認同

**67.0%**

( ↑ 3.2% )

2025.2



Public Opinion  
民意調查

High Degree of  
Autonomy  
高度自治

**5.21**

( ↓ 1.5% )

Human Rights and  
Freedom  
人權自由

**5.34**

( ↓ 2.2% )

Hong Kong-Mainland  
Relations  
內港關係

**5.60**

( ↓ 0.2% )

International  
Perception  
國際評價

Economic  
Openness  
經濟開放

**9.39**

( ↑ 0.4% )

Civil  
Liberty  
公民權利

**6.22**

( ↓ 0.6% )

Democratic  
Development  
民主發展

**5.05**

( ↓ 0.2% )



## 2024下半年回顧 2024 H2 Overview

In the second half of 2024, Hong Kong shifted its focus to revitalizing its economy through domestic initiatives, particularly in tourism. The government launched campaigns such as the "panda economy," leveraging the popularity of giant pandas to attract tourists and boost local businesses. This initiative aimed to rejuvenate the city's tourism sector, which had been struggling since the pandemic. By promoting cultural and eco-tourism, Hong Kong sought to strengthen its economic resilience and reduce reliance on external markets.

To further bolster its global standing, Hong Kong hosted several high-profile international events in late 2024, including the 2024 Global Financial Leaders' Investment Summit and the Belt and Road Summit. These events were designed to showcase Hong Kong's role as a global financial hub and a 'super-connector'. By attracting global leaders and investors, the city aimed to rebuild its international reputation and reaffirm its position under the 1C2S framework.

However, Hong Kong's international image came under scrutiny due to several high-profile social and political cases in the latter half of 2024. The trial of 47 pan-democratic activists, the sentencing of the "Dragon Slaying Brigade" case, and the continued trial of Jimmy Lai drew close attention from global media. These cases highlight the tensions within Hong Kong's legal system, drawing attention to the city's global reputation. Selina Cheng's dismissal by the Wall Street Journal further fuelled international criticism of threats to press freedom.

Adding to these challenges, the US government announced potential additional sanctions against Hong Kong officials in late 2024, including efforts to revoke Hong Kong's Economic and Trade Office status in the US and implications under the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. These moves created uncertainty for Hong Kong's international standing. Meanwhile, the National Security Department of the Hong Kong Police Force issued a new batch of arrest warrants for individuals accused of endangering national security, further intensifying the city's focus on safeguarding sovereignty under the 1C2S framework. These developments highlight ongoing geopolitical tensions and their implications for Hong Kong's future, as the city seeks to balance stability with international concerns.

2024年下半年，香港將政策重點轉向以本地舉措振興經濟，旅遊業成為核心推動領域。政府推出了推廣「熊貓經濟」的計劃，借助大熊貓的全球影響力吸引遊客，促進本地經濟發展。此舉旨在重振自疫情以來持續低迷的旅遊業。通過積極推廣文化旅遊與生態旅遊，香港致力於增強經濟韌性，並減少對外部市場的依賴。

為進一步提升國際地位，香港於下半年舉辦了多場高規格國際活動，包括「國際金融領袖投資峰會」及「一帶一路高峰論壇」，以彰顯其作為國際金融中心及「超級聯繫人」的角色。通過吸引全球領袖與投資者參與，香港致力於重建國際聲譽，並鞏固其在「一國兩制」框架下的獨特地位。

然而，香港的國際形象因一系列備受關注的社會及政治案件而面臨嚴峻挑戰。民主派「47人案」的審訊、「屠龍小隊」案件的判決，以及黎智英案件的持續審理，引發國際媒體的高度關注，並引起外界對香港法治狀況的廣泛討論。此外，記協主席遭《華爾街日報》解僱一事，進一步加劇了國際社會對香港新聞自由受壓的批評。

與此同時，美國於2024年底宣布可能對香港特區政府官員實施進一步制裁，包括考慮撤銷駐美經濟貿易辦事處的地位，並依據《香港人權與民主法案》採取相關行動。這些舉措為香港的國際地位增添了不確定性。另一方面，警務處國家安全處針對涉嫌危害國家安全的個人發布新一批通緝令，展現了香港在「一國兩制」框架下維護國家主權的堅定決心。這些發展不僅突顯地緣政治緊張局勢的延續，也反映了香港在維持內部穩定與應對國際關切間所面臨的複雜平衡。

## Economic Praise, Civil Liberties Concerns

Social movement cases have reignited public memories of past political disputes and hindered recent recovery in confidence towards 1C2S. Affected by a decline in local public opinion scores, the latest 1C2S index has slightly decreased from 6.17 to 6.14, reflecting a 0.5% drop. This change indicates a general decline in public perception regarding the implementation of 1C2S, particularly concerning the three pillars of local public opinion—"high degree of autonomy," "human rights and freedom," and "Hong Kong-Mainland relations"—all of which have seen decreasing scores.

Due to the time lag in compiling international indices, this survey has begun to reflect the impact of overseas promotional activities, with the "economic openness" indicator rising by 0.4%. Large-scale overseas investment promotion efforts have strengthened international confidence in Hong Kong's business environment. However, the "civil liberties" indicator has declined slightly by 0.6%, and the "democratic development" indicator has dropped by 0.2%. This suggests that while the international community acknowledges Hong Kong's economic prospects, concerns about civil liberties and democratic development persist, reflecting the complexities of Hong Kong's international image.

## Trends in political moderation amid apathy

Mass apathy within a depoliticized society has fostered a notable trend toward political moderation. Moderates now constitute the largest segment of the population, comprising 78.7%, which reflects an increase of 1.6 percentage points since the previous survey. In contrast, non-establishment supporters account for 11.6%, indicating a decline of 2.7 percentage points, while pro-establishment supporters have risen slightly to 7.2%, up by 1.3 percentage points.

This trend toward moderation is particularly evident among youths aged 18 to 29, where the proportion of moderates has increased significantly by 3.6 percentage points to 76.1%. Within the non-establishment faction, the number of democrats has decreased by 3.4 percentage points to 11.6%, while other non-establishment supporters have diminished by 0.6 percentage points to 8.7%. While the rise in moderation among the 18 to 29 age group is a positive development, it remains essential to closely monitor potential shifts in future political dynamics.

## 經濟成就與公民自由正義並存

社會運動的法庭審議案件重新喚起了公眾對過去政治爭議的記憶，並對近期「一國兩制」信心的恢復造成阻礙。受本地民意評分下降的影響，最新「一國兩制」指數從 6.17 分微降至 6.14 分，跌幅為 0.5%。這一變化反映了公眾對「一國兩制」實施的整體觀感有所下降，尤其是在本地民意的三大支柱——「高度自治」、「人權與自由」以及「內港關係」——均出現評分下滑。

由於國際指數的編制具有一定滯後性，本輪調查開始反映海外宣傳活動帶來的影響，其中「經濟開放度」指標上升了 0.4%。大規模的海外投資推廣活動有效增強了國際社會對香港營商環境的信心。然而，「公民自由」指標輕微下降了 0.6%，「民主發展」指標亦下跌了 0.2%。這表明，儘管國際社會認可本港的經濟前景，但對公民自由與民主發展的擔憂仍然存在，反映出香港國際形象的複雜性。

## 去政治化社會中的溫和化浪潮

在一個逐漸去政治化的社會中，普遍的冷漠情緒催生了顯著的政治溫和化趨勢。目前，溫和派在人口中的比例最大，達到 78.7%，較上一次調查上升了 1.6 個百分點。相比之下，非建制派支持者佔 11.6%，下降了 2.7 個百分點，而建制派支持者則略有增加，達到 7.2%，增加了 1.3 個百分點。

這一溫和化趨勢在 18 至 29 歲的青年群體中尤為明顯。該年齡段中，溫和派的比例顯著上升了 3.6 個百分點，達到 76.1%。在非建制派陣營中，民主派支持者減少了 3.4 個百分點至 11.6%，而其他非建制派支持者則下降了 0.6 個百分點至 8.7%。儘管 18 至 29 歲群體的溫和化趨勢是一個積極的發展，但對未來政治動態的潛在變化仍需保持警惕。

## Dual identity awareness among citizens

Citizens' self-identification as either 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese' reflects notable trends. Recent data indicates a strong preference for the identity of "Hongkongers," which scored 8.99 points, an increase of 6.6%. In comparison, the "Chinese" identity scored 7.31, showing a modest gain of 2.1%. Although these identities initially converged in the latter half of 2022, the gap has since widened again.

A significant portion of Hong Kong citizens embrace a dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese.' Recent surveys reveal that 67.0% of respondents identify with a dual identity, marking a 3.2 percentage point increase. This recognition has fluctuated since 2019, reaching a low in mid-2020 but rebounding thereafter. Meanwhile, the proportion identifying solely as 'Hongkongers' has risen to 25.7%, while those identifying exclusively as 'Chinese' have decreased to 3.5%. Overall, these findings underscore a robust awareness of dual identity among Hong Kong citizens.

## Implications and recommendations

While different social groups may hold varying expectations, there remains a shared desire for long-term prosperity and stability. Ultimately, this common ground can serve as a unifying force to bridge perspectives and to foster understanding.

Many indicators have returned to early 2019 levels. Public discontent sparked by the 2019 crisis has somewhat dissipated. The number of people with emigration plans continues to decline. The proportion of moderates has continued to grow, while non-establishment supporters have steadily declined. Additionally, the percentage of the population identifying as 'Chinese' has also seen a modest increase.

Two opposing camps have expressed extreme views over recent political events, with moderates serving the only counterbalance to this polarization. A rational voice appears to exist in society at large, but it is vulnerable to populist narratives. Policymakers must ensure that moderate opinions continue to thrive in a nurturing and safe environment, despite the prevailing divisions.

## 市民的雙重身份認可

市民對「香港人」或「中國人」身份認同的選擇呈現出明顯的趨勢。最新數據顯示，「香港人」身份認同得分為 8.99 分，增長了 6.6%，顯示出較強的偏好。相比之下，「中國人」身份認同得分為 7.31 分，僅小幅上升 2.1%。儘管這兩種身份認同在 2022 年下半年曾趨於接近，但此後差距再度拉大。

值得注意的是，相當一部分香港市民認同自己兼具「香港人」與「中國人」的雙重身份。最新調查顯示，67.0% 的受訪者認同雙重身份，較之前增加了 3.2%。這一比例自 2019 年以來有所波動，曾在 2020 年年中達到低點，但隨後逐步回升。同時，僅認同「香港人」身份的比例上升至 25.7%，而僅認同「中國人」身份的比例則下降至 3.5%。總體而言，這些數據表明，香港市民對雙重身份認同的意識顯著增強。

## 啟示及建議

雖然社會上不同團體對未來發展的期望各異，但對於香港實現長期繁榮穩定發展的信念是一致的。這一共同基礎可以成為凝聚社會的力量，促進不同觀點之間的理解與交流。

隨著多項指標逐步回升至修例風波前的水平，顯示這場管治危機所引發的民怨已大幅緩解。有意移民的市民數量持續下降，而溫和派依然是全港人口中占比最大的群體。在「一國兩制」在實踐上出現矛盾時，更多人認為內地和香港肩負著共同的責任。同時，對中國人身份認同感也呈現穩健上升的趨勢。

近期政治事件中，兩大政治陣營的反應極為對立，而溫和派則相對不受政治立場的束縛。儘管社會中仍有理性聲音存在，但這些聲音極易被民粹情緒所摧毀。決策者應確保溫和意見能夠在撕裂的社會上有一隅之地。



The HKSAR government must capitalize on this growing confidence by spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of Hong Kong, including the business community, academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs, to promote Hong Kong's image under 1C2S. Such efforts may include:

- Establishing an Office for 1C2S to sustain outreach efforts both locally and across the APEC region to mobilize support and enhance Hong Kong's presence. This dedicated office should actively participate in foreign think tank forums, either directly or through the business community to promote the Hong Kong narrative in the international arena.
- Holding daily press briefings with local and international media to address current policy issues in a timely, comprehensive, and appropriate manner, alleviating the fears and anxieties of the foreign community in Hong Kong.
- Providing advanced training for senior officials on effectively countering negative narratives in Western media by highlighting positive stories from Hong Kong.
- Educating young people on the fundamentals of 1C2S, including the importance of constitutional order, an understanding of the rule of law, human rights, freedoms, corresponding obligations, and broadening their awareness of social, national, and global issues.

政府應乘勢領導香港各界，如商界、學術界、專業團體、理念相近的智庫和民間組織，共同努力闡釋「一國兩制」的實況，提升香港形象。措施包括：

- 設立「一國兩制」辦公室，專門進行本地及亞太區的推廣及聯絡工作，動員社會各界支持及強化香港的影響力。此專責辦公室將會直接或通過商界積極參與外國智庫論壇，就香港事務在國際舞台發聲；
- 政府每天舉行例行記者會，面向本地及國際傳媒，適時、充分及恰當地解釋及回應政策議題，包括外國社群的疑慮；
- 提供進階培訓予高級官員，運用正面的香港故事，以回應西方媒體的負面論述；及
- 著重青年教育，擴闊他們對「一國兩制」的基本認識，豐富對我們的憲制秩序、法治、人權和自由、相應義務的理解，增強社會觸覺、國際視野及國情認識。





An aerial photograph of Hong Kong, showing a dense urban landscape with numerous high-rise buildings. In the foreground, a red cable car is seen traveling along a track through lush green vegetation. A prominent red building with a flat roof and solar panels is visible on a hillside. The background features the Victoria Harbour and the city's skyline extending to the water.

# 第十五版報告 Fifteenth Edition



This report marks the 15<sup>th</sup> edition of the "One Country, Two Systems" (1C2S) Index. The primary objective of the 1C2S Index is to provide an objective assessment of the implementation of the 1C2S framework. The inaugural report was published in mid-2017, coinciding with the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China. The 1C2S Index is updated biannually, with assessments released in the middle and at the end of each year.

The index is refreshed every six months through the administration of a public opinion survey, alongside the integration of the latest data from international indices. To enhance our analysis, we have introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI), which employs advanced big data techniques to evaluate sentiment across printed, electronic, and online media in both Hong Kong and abroad.

For the current edition, we commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct a telephone poll between 21 January and 25 February 2025, generating public opinion scores. Additionally, we updated international perception scores for the second half of 2024 by evaluating 148 countries and territories using nine comprehensive data sources and 127 indicators provided by leading international think tanks. The MMI was assessed and updated by sentiment.ai through the end of December 2024.

Our latest survey continues to address pertinent issues related to 1C2S, including prospects for the continuation of the framework beyond 2047, citizens' identities, attitudes towards emigration, and public opinions regarding the Greater Bay Area. To accurately reflect the evolving socio-political landscape of the city, we have introduced new questions aimed at gauging the impact of recent developments. This includes public satisfaction with the Legislative Council of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) government and an inquiry regarding respondents' outlook on Hong Kong's prospects over the next decade.

本報告是「一國兩制」指數的第15期發佈。該指數旨在對「一國兩制」框架的實施情況提供客觀評估。首份報告於2017年中發佈，正值香港回顧中國20周年之際。「一國兩制」指數每半年更新一次，評估結果分別於每年年中和年底發佈。

指數每半年通過進行電話民意調查並整合最新國際指數數據進行更新。為進一步完善分析，我們引入了「一國兩制」輿情指數，運用先進的大數據技術評估香港及國際媒體在印刷、電子及網絡平台上對「一國兩制」的輿論傾向。

在本期報告中，我們委托了香港中文大學香港亞太研究所於在2025年1月21日至2月25日進行電話調查，以獲取民意評分。此外，我們通過評估148個國家和地區，並結合九個綜合數據來源及127項指標（由國際領先智庫提供），更新了2024年下半年的國際觀感評分。輿情指數則由sentiment.ai評估並更新至2024年12月底。

我們的最新調查繼續探討與「一國兩制」相關的重要議題，包括2047年後「一國兩制」的前景、市民的身份認同、移民態度，以及公眾對大灣區的看法。為準確反映香港社會政治環境的變化，我們新增了一些問題，旨在評估近期發展的影響。這包括公眾對香港特別行政區政府立法會的滿意度，以及受訪者對香港未來十年前景的看法。



It is important to emphasize that public opinion, international perception, and MMI are influenced by subjective perceptions and may not necessarily reflect objective reality. Nonetheless, shifts in perceptions of 1C2S among the Hong Kong public, international think tanks, and both local and foreign media are significant. This report will analyse the underlying reasons for these shifts, as they are critical to the ongoing implementation of 1C2S.

In this report, all scores are presented on a scale from 0 to 10. An asterisk (\*) denotes statistically significant changes in scores compared to the previous assessment, while scores without an asterisk indicate statistically insignificant changes. Furthermore, certain scores will be analysed by demographic factors such as age group, educational attainment, and political inclination. Previously, the non-establishment camp was categorized into 'democrats' and 'others'; however, this division has been eliminated in the current report due to the small size of the 'others' group, which hindered meaningful analysis. Nonetheless, this data remains accessible for reference in our online data portal.

Readers can access our data portal for historical data on the 1C2S Index series by visiting the Path of Democracy webpage (<https://pathofdemocracy.hk/en-us/1c2s-index>). An extensive report on the survey results is also available.

需要強調的是，公眾意見、國際觀感及輿情指數均受主觀認知影響，未必完全反映客觀現實。然而，香港公眾、國際智庫以及本地與國際媒體對「一國兩制」觀感的變化仍然具有重要意義。本報告將分析這些變化背後的原因，因為它們對「一國兩制」的持續實施至關重要。

在本報告中，所有評分均以0至10分表示。帶有星號(\*)的評分表示與上一期評估相比有統計學上的顯著變化，而不帶星號的評分則表示變化不顯著。此外，部分評分將按年齡組別、教育程度及政治傾向等人口統計因素進行分析。以往，非建制陣營被分為「民主派」和「其他」，但由於「其他」群體規模過小，難以進行有意義的分析，因此本期報告取消了這一分類。不過，相關數據仍可在我們的網上數據平台中查閱。

「一國兩制」指數的歷年數據已上載至我們的數據平台，電話調查的詳細報告亦已刊於「調查結果：頻數及百分比分佈」，歡迎讀者參閱民主思路網頁 (<https://pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index>)。




The 1C2S Index represents the average score of three pillars on public opinion and three pillars on international perception. The three pillars on public opinion, namely 'high degree of autonomy', 'human rights and freedom' and 'Hong Kong-Mainland relationship' reflect Hong Kong residents' evaluations on different aspects of 1C2S. The three pillars on international perception, namely 'economic openness', 'civil liberty' and 'democratic development', are based on the evaluation by international think tanks regarding various aspects of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

Figure 1 illustrates the 1C2S Index from the second half of 2022 to the second half of 2024. The most recent reading for the second half of 2024 is 6.14, reflecting a 0.5% decrease from the score of 6.17 recorded six months prior. This decline, which also marks the end of a consecutive series of increases, is attributed to reductions in scores across all public opinion pillars, as well as international assessments, with the exception of a slight increase observed in the 'economic openness' pillar. A detailed analysis of the results for these pillars will be provided in the subsequent sub-sections.

「一國兩制」指數為民意調查 3 項支柱及國際評價 3 項支柱的平均值。民意調查的 3 項支柱為「高度自治」、「人權自由」及「內港關係」，用以量度公眾對「一國兩制」的評價；國際評價的 3 項支柱為「經濟開放」、「公民權利」及「民主發展」，是國際智庫對香港自由和民主程度的評估。指數的編製方法詳見附件 I。

圖 1 顯示了 2022 年下半年的「一國兩制」指數走勢。2024 年下半年的最新指數為 6.14 分，較六個月前的 6.17 分下降了 0.5%。這一下降也終止了此前連續上升的趨勢，反映除「經濟開放」支柱略有上升外，其他所有公眾意見支柱及國際評估分數均呈現普遍下降的現象。我們將在後續小節中對這些支柱的結果進行詳細分析。

Figure 1: 1C2S Index  
圖 1：「一國兩制」指數



	Scores 評分	Changes 變化
2022 H2	5.92	+0.10 (↑ 1.7%)
2023 H1	6.02	+0.10 (↑ 1.7%)
2023 H2	6.04	+0.02 (↑ 0.3%)
2024 H1	6.17	+0.13 (↑ 2.2%)
2024 H2	6.14	+0.13 (↓ 0.5%)



## 2.1

### Public Opinion 民意調查

Table 1 presents the scores for the pillars and sub-pillars derived from the public opinion survey for the second half of 2024. The results indicate slight declines in all three primary pillars compared to the previous half-year. The score for 'high degree of autonomy' decreased by 1.5%, reaching 5.21 points. The score for 'Hong Kong-Mainland Relations' experienced a minor decline of 0.2%, settling at 5.60 points, while the score for 'human rights and freedom' fell by 2.2%, attaining 5.34 points.

All twelve sub-pillars showed variations in this survey round. The three sub-pillars with the largest decreases were 'freedom of speech, association and assembly' (-5.2%), 'the gradual implementation of the politico-institutional democratization process' (-3.4%), and 'high degree of autonomy in the executive branch' (-2.9%).

The three sub-pillars with the highest scores were 'safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests' (6.62), 'equal protection of the law' (6.14), and 'the original ways of life have remained unchanged' (6.06). Conversely, the three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were 'freedom of speech, association and assembly' (4.36), 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' (4.73), and 'the gradual implementation of the politico-institutional democratization process' (4.82).

表1展示了2024年下半年民意調查中各支柱及子支柱的評分結果。與前半年相比，三大主要支柱的最新評分均略有下降。其中，「高度自治」支柱的評分下降了1.5%，降至5.21分；「內港關係」支柱的評分微降0.2%，為5.60分；而「人權自由」支柱的評分則下降了2.2%，達到5.34分。

在本輪調查中，所有12個子支柱的評分均出現變化。其中，下降幅度最大的三個子支柱分別為「言論、結社及集會自由」(-5.2%)、「民主政制發展」(-3.4%)以及「自行處理行政事務」(-2.9%)

評分最高的的三個子支柱分別為「維護國家主權、安全和發展利益」(6.62)、「法律平等保護」(6.14)以及「原有生活方式」(6.06)。相反，評分最低的三個子支柱分別為「言論、結社及集會自由」(4.36)、「港人治港」(4.73)及「民主政制發展」(4.82)。





Table 1: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on public opinion

表 1：民意調查的支柱及子支柱分數

	2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2	2024 H1	2024 H2	
<b>Overall 總分</b>	<b>4.98</b>	<b>5.22</b>	<b>5.21</b>	<b>5.45</b>	<b>5.38</b>	
<b>A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治</b>	<b>4.82</b>	<b>5.06</b>	<b>5.02</b>	<b>5.29</b>	<b>5.21</b>	
A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務	5.07	5.48	5.22	5.59	5.43	
A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權	4.99	5.25	5.29	5.40	5.38	
A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權	4.89	5.13	5.09	5.36	5.28	
A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」	4.31	4.38	4.49	4.78	4.73	
<b>B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由</b>	<b>4.94</b>	<b>5.11</b>	<b>5.26</b>	<b>5.46</b>	<b>5.34</b>	
B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式	5.52	5.77	5.77	6.08	6.06	
B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社及集會自由	4.26	4.27	4.51	4.60	4.36	
B3. Democratic development 民主政制發展	4.15	4.42	4.78	4.99	4.82	
B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護	5.82	6.00	5.96	6.17	6.14	
<b>C. Hong Kong-Mainland Relations 內港關係</b>	<b>5.19</b>	<b>5.47</b>	<b>5.34</b>	<b>5.61</b>	<b>5.60</b>	
C1. Resolving via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾	4.24	4.75	4.89	5.38	5.25	
C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益	6.24	6.39	6.31	6.43	6.62	
C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定	5.84	5.94	5.29	5.49	5.44	
C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落实「一國兩制」	4.45	4.81	4.88	5.15	5.09	

### 2.1.1. Generation gap and political divide

Figure 2 illustrates the average scores of public opinions by age group. Most age groups experienced declines, with the 60-69 age group showing the largest decrease at 4.6%. Overall, the average score across all respondents decreased by 1.3%.

Figure 3 displays the average scores of public opinions by political inclination. The pro-establishment group's score increased by 5.1% to 8.28 points. In contrast, non-establishment supporters experienced a significant decline of 16.5%, dropping to 2.64 points. Overall, the average score across all respondents saw a minor decline of 1.3%, settling at 5.38 points.

Statistical tests revealed a clear and consistent divide in public opinion across political inclinations. Compared to moderates, the evaluations of pro-establishment supporters were significantly more positive. Conversely, the evaluations of non-establishment supporters were significantly more negative.

### 2.1.1. 代溝及政治鴻溝

圖 2 顯示了按年齡組別劃分的民意調查平均分數。在本輪調查中，大多數年齡組別的分數均有所下降，其中 60-69 歲年齡組的降幅最大，達到 4.6%。整體而言，所有受訪者的平均分數下降了 1.3%。

圖 3 則展示了按政治傾向劃分的民意調查平均得分。建制派支持者的分數上升了 5.1%，達到 8.28 分；相比之下，非建制派支持者的分數則大幅下降了 16.5%，降至 2.64 分。

統計測試顯示，不同政治傾向的受訪者在民意調查中的平均得分存在顯著且一致的分歧。與中間派相比，建制派支持者的評價明顯更為正面；而非建制派支持者的評價則明顯更為負面。

Figure 2: Public opinion (by age group)  
圖 2：民意調查 (按年齡組別劃分)





Figure 3: Public opinion (by political inclination)  
圖 3：民意調查（按政治傾向劃分）



## 2.2

### International perception 國際評價

Table 2 presents the scores for the pillars and sub-pillars based on international evaluations. Compared to the previous round, the score for 'economic openness' slightly increased by 0.4% to 9.39 points, while 'civil liberty' saw a minor decline of 0.6% to 6.22 points. The score for 'democratic development' remained unchanged at 5.05 points.

The scores for the sub-pillars varied, with some increasing and others decreasing. The sub-pillar with the largest increase was 'financial stability' (+2.1%), while the largest decrease was observed in 'security and safety' (-1.0%).

The three sub-pillars with the highest scores were 'market access' (9.75), 'financial stability' (9.72) and 'regulatory quality' (9.12). The three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were 'civic participation' (5.15), 'political pluralism' (3.24) and 'expression, association and assembly' (2.99).

表 2 顯示了基於國際評價的各支柱和子支柱的評分。與上一輪相比，「經濟開放」支柱的評分小幅度上升 0.4%，達到 9.39 分，而「公民權利」支柱則微降 0.6%，至 6.22 分。「民主發展」的評分則小幅下降 0.2% 至 5.60 分。各子支柱的評分變化不一，部分上升，部分下降。其中，升幅度最大的子支柱是「金融穩定」(+2.1%)；而降幅最大的是「安全」子支柱 (-1.0%)。

評分最高的三個子支柱為「市場門檻」(9.75)、「金融穩定」(9.72) 和「監管質素」(9.12)。評分最低的三個子支柱則為「公民參與」(5.15)、「政治多元」(3.24) 以及「表達、結社和集會」(2.99)。

Table 2: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on international perception

表 2：國際評價的支柱和子支柱分數

	2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2	2024 H1	2024 H2	
<b>Overall 總分</b>	<b>6.87 (39)</b>	<b>6.82 (42)</b>	<b>6.87 (39)</b>	<b>6.89 (40)</b>	<b>6.89 (39)</b>	
<b>D. Economic Openness 經濟開放</b>	<b>9.20 (2)</b>	<b>9.17 (2)</b>	<b>9.31 (2)</b>	<b>9.35 (2)</b>	<b>9.39 (2)</b>	
D1. Business environment 營商環境	8.68 (2)	8.66 (2)	8.98 (2)	8.99 (2)	8.99 (2)	
D2. Market access 市場門檻	9.72 (1)	9.70 (1)	9.71 (1)	9.76 (1)	9.75 (1)	
D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素	8.83 (3)	8.95 (2)	9.17 (2)	9.12 (2)	9.12 (2)	
D4. Financial stability 金融穩定	9.58 (1)	9.37 (4)	9.36 (4)	9.52 (3)	9.72 (1)	
<b>E. Civil Liberty 公民權利</b>	<b>6.28 (72)</b>	<b>6.23 (73)</b>	<b>6.24 (73)</b>	<b>6.26 (72)</b>	<b>6.22 (72)</b>	
E1. Rule of law 法治	6.33 (43)	6.40 (43)	6.42 (43)	6.40 (43)	6.38 (42)	
E2. Security and safety 安全	8.09 (36)	8.11 (36)	8.20 (35)	8.23 (34)	8.15 (37)	
E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會	3.15 (124)	3.08 (126)	2.95 (126)	2.99 (126)	2.99 (126)	
E4. Individual rights 個人權利	7.56 (47)	7.34 (55)	7.41 (51)	7.40 (53)	7.36 (54)	
<b>F. Democratic Development 民主發展</b>	<b>5.12 (91)</b>	<b>5.04 (91)</b>	<b>5.06 (90)</b>	<b>5.06 (90)</b>	<b>5.05 (90)</b>	
F1. Constraints on powers 權力制約	5.50 (60)	5.39 (64)	5.43 (63)	5.40 (64)	5.44 (64)	
F2. Political pluralism 政治多元	3.51 (123)	3.23 (125)	3.23 (125)	3.24 (122)	3.24 (122)	
F3. Civic participation 公民參與	5.79 (57)	5.74 (55)	5.77 (55)	5.16 (76)	5.15 (76)	
F4. Democratic culture 民主文化	5.67 (80)	5.81 (75)	5.81 (73)	6.42 (54)	6.37 (53)	

Note: The number in parentheses indicate the world ranking.

註：括號內的數字為世界排名。



## 2.2.1. Comparison with selected regions

Generally, developed regions exhibit higher scores for freedom and democracy compared to developing regions. As a developed area, Hong Kong's performance is analyzed in relation to neighboring developed countries and regions, including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Additionally, comparisons are made with mainland China and the United States to contextualize Hong Kong's development under the 1C2S framework.

Table 3 presents the scores of Hong Kong and selected neighbouring regions across various pillars in the context of international perception. Hong Kong excels in 'economic openness' with a score of 9.39, ranking second globally, surpassing South Korea (7.02), Japan (7.47) and Taiwan (7.85).

In the category of 'civil liberty,' Hong Kong's score of 6.22 represents a slight decline from the previous round, placing it 72nd. This score remains lower than those of neighboring Singapore (6.95), South Korea (8.28), Taiwan (8.29), and Japan (9.05).

Regarding 'democratic development,' Hong Kong's score remains at 5.05, still below that of nearby developed regions, with Singapore at 6.82, South Korea at 7.71, Taiwan at 8.26, and Japan at 8.63.

Overall, with the exception of mainland China and Taiwan, the average scores of the other selected regions have shown an upward trend.

## 2.2.1. 選定地區比較

一般而言，發達地區在自由和民主方面的評分高於發展中地區。作為一個發達地區，香港的表現將與鄰近的發達國家和地區進行比較，包括日本、韓國、新加坡和台灣。此外，我們也將香港與中國內地及美國進行對比，以更好地理解香港在「一國兩制」框架下的發展情況。

表 3 比較了香港和選定鄰近地區在國際評價中各項支柱的評分。香港在「經濟開放」表現尤為突出，得分為 9.39 分，全球排名第二，超越台灣 (7.85)、日本 (7.47) 和南韓 (7.02)。

在「公民權利」方面，香港的得分為 6.22 分，較上一輪略有下降，全球排名第 72 名。這一分數仍低於鄰近的新加坡 (6.95)、台灣 (8.28)、韓國 (8.29) 及日本 (9.05)。

至於「民主發展」方面，香港的得分維持 5.05 分，仍低於周邊發達地區，如新加坡 (6.82)、南韓 (7.71)、台灣 (8.26) 和日本 (8.63)。

整體而言，在過去半年，除中國內地和台灣地區外，其他選定地區的平均國際評價得分均呈上升趨勢。

Table 3: Pillar scores on international perception of selected regions

表 3：選定地區之國際評價支柱分數

	D. Economic Openness 經濟開放		E. Civil Liberty 公民權利		F. Democratic Development 民主發展		Overall 總分	
	Score 分數	Rank 排名	Score 分數	Rank 排名	Score 分數	Rank 排名	Score 分數	Rank 排名
Hong Kong 香港	9.39	(2)	6.22	(72)	5.05	(90)	6.89	(39)
Mainland China 中國內地	6.88	(34)	2.94	(141)	2.46	(137)	4.09	(122)
Japan 日本	7.47	(21)	9.05	(13)	8.63	(12)	8.38	(14)
South Korea 南韓	7.02	(30)	8.28	(31)	7.71	(33)	7.67	(27)
Singapore 新加坡	9.65	(1)	6.95	(53)	6.82	(46)	7.81	(23)
Taiwan 台灣	7.85	(14)	8.29	(30)	8.26	(20)	8.13	(19)
United States 美國	8.14	(8)	8.16	(34)	7.77	(31)	8.02	(20)

Note: The number in parentheses indicate the world ranking.

註：括號內的數字為世界排名。

## 2.2.2. Global trend

Figure 4 illustrates the global trend in international perception. In the second half of 2024, the global economy continued to grapple with persistent inflationary pressures and rising interest rates, leading to slower economic growth and heightened recession risks in numerous countries. The return of Donald Trump to the White House and the new U.S. administration's shift in foreign policy created additional geopolitical tensions, particularly in relation to China and Russia. These developments further complicated the global economic landscape. As a result, the global average score for 'economic openness' slightly declined to 5.69 points, representing a decrease of 0.9%. Leading the rankings are Singapore (9.65), Hong Kong (9.39), and other developed regions.

Globally, civil rights and democratic development face significant challenges. In the second half of 2024, political polarization intensified in several nations, particularly in the United States, where contentious midterm elections sparked widespread protests and debates over election integrity. In Europe, rising far-right movements led to increased scrutiny of immigration policies, further exacerbating social divisions and political instability. Freedom of speech and press freedoms remained restricted in certain regions, with several governments implementing new laws to control media narratives and suppressed dissenting voices. The global score for 'civil liberty' stands at 6.12 points.

Amid ongoing controversies over electoral integrity and crackdowns on civic organizations, many regions are experiencing significant democratic backsliding. In the second half of 2024, for example, several Eastern European countries implemented restrictive measures against non-governmental organizations, limiting their operations and increasing repression of dissent. Reports of electoral fraud in various elections worldwide have further raised concerns about the legitimacy of democratic processes. Consequently, the global score for 'democratic development' has decreased by 0.4% compared to the previous six months, now reaching 5.62 points.

## 2.2.2. 全球趨勢


圖 4 展示了國際評價的全球趨勢。2024 年下半年，全球經濟持續面臨通脹壓力和利率上升的挑戰，導致多國經濟增長放緩，衰退風險進一步加劇。特朗普重返白宮後，美國新政府的外交政策發生轉向，進一步加劇了地緣政治緊張局勢，尤其是在與中國及俄羅斯的關係上。這一系列發展使得全球經濟形勢更加複雜。因此，「經濟開放」支柱的全球平均分數微降 0.9%，至 5.69 分。排名前列的國家和地區繼續為新加坡（9.65 分）、香港（9.39 分）及其他發達地區。

全球範圍內，「公民權利」及「民主發展」面臨重大挑戰。2024 年下半年，多國政治極化現象進一步加劇，尤以美國為甚。其中期選舉引發了廣泛討論，並伴隨著對選舉公正性的爭議。在歐洲，極右勢力的崛起使移民政策受到更嚴格的審視，進一步加深了社會分裂與政治不穩定。在某些地區，言論自由和新聞自由依然受到限制，多國政府通過新法規來控制媒體敘事，並壓制異見聲音。「公民自由」的全球分數為 6.12 分。

在選舉公正性爭議和對公民組織持續打壓的背景下，許多地區正經歷顯著的民主倒退。例如，2024 年下半年，東歐多國對非政府組織實施了更嚴格的限制措施，不僅限制其運作，還加強了對異見聲音的壓制。全球多場選舉中出現的選舉舞弊報告，進一步加劇了對民主程序合法性的擔憂。因此，「民主發展」的全球分數較前六個月下降了 0.4%，目前為 5.62 分。

Figure 4: Global trend of pillar scores on international perception

圖 4：國際評價支柱分數的全球趨勢



## 2.3

Significant events  
重大事件

This round of index surveys has been marked by significant political controversies and major events, both locally and internationally, which may be closely linked to the fluctuations in the 1C2S Index. The following section outlines key events that occurred between July 2024 and December 2024, providing a comprehensive understanding of the evolving trends within the Index.

本輪指數調查期間，本地和國際上發生了多起政治爭議和事件，這些可能與「一國兩制」指數的波動密切相關。以下部分概述了2024年7月至2024年12月期間發生的關鍵事件，以助全面理解指數的變化趨勢。

Table 4: Significant events  
表 4：重大事件一覽

7.3 The Legislative Council passed the 'Social Workers Registration (Amendment) Bill 2024', reforming the Social Workers Registration Board.	立法會通過《2024年社會工作者註冊（修訂）條例草案》，改革社工註冊局。
7.28-8.1 At the 2024 Paris Olympics, athletes from Hong Kong, China, won multiple medals.	巴黎奧運會上，中國香港運動員獲得多面獎牌。
7.31 The Education Bureau announced that the junior secondary Citizenship and Social Development curriculum will be fully implemented in the new school year starting September 2024, along with relevant curriculum guidelines.	教育局宣佈初中公民與社會發展科將於2024年9月新學年全面推行，並公布相關課程指引。
8.6 The National Security Exhibition Gallery has officially opened.	國家安全展覽廳開幕。
8.29 A High Court jury found one person guilty in the 'Dragon Slayer Brigade' case, while the other six were acquitted.	高等法院陪審團裁定「屠龍小隊」案中，一人有罪，其餘六人無罪。
The District Court found two former editors of Stand News guilty of 'conspiracy to publish seditious publications'.	區域法院裁定前《立場新聞》兩位編輯「串謀發布煽動刊物」罪名成立。
9.11 The Ninth Belt and Road Summit has opened in Hong Kong, gathering political and business leaders to discuss future cooperation in investment, trade, and other areas.	第九屆「一帶一路高峰論壇」在港開幕，匯聚海內外政商領袖，探討未來在投資、商貿等領域的多元化與緊密合作。
9.26 A pair of giant pandas gifted by the Central Government has arrived in Hong Kong from Sichuan.	中央贈港一對大熊貓從四川啟程抵港。

- 10.9 The HKSAR Government and the Ministry of Commerce have signed the Second Agreement Amending the CEPA Agreement on Trade in Services, reducing entry barriers to the mainland market for construction, testing and certification, film and television, finance, tourism, and other service sectors.
- 11.8 The Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office held a symposium in Shenzhen, attended by major real estate developers and representatives from various business associations.
- 11.14 The High Court delivered its verdict in the case involving 47 pro-democracy activists charged with 'conspiracy to subvert state power' under the National Security Law. Among them, Benny Tai, the 'mastermind', was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
- 11.19 State Council Vice Premier He Lifeng attended the Global Financial Leaders' Investment Summit, reaffirming the country's support for and emphasis on Hong Kong as an international financial centre.
- 11.26 The Court of Final Appeal rejected the appeals from the Department of Justice and the Housing Authority, ruling that same-sex couples have the same housing and inheritance rights as heterosexual couples.
- 11.29 The SAR Government held an event to engage businesses in the development of the Northern Metropolis, receiving support from local, mainland, and overseas enterprises.
- 12.1 The Central Government has resumed the 'one visa, multiple entries' policy for Shenzhen residents traveling to Hong Kong and will expand the program to include non-Shenzhen residents holding residence permits.
- 12.13 Chief Executive John Lee reported on his duties to President Xi Jinping in Beijing.
- 12.24 The Secretary for Security, under the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, named seven fugitives abroad, enforcing fund restrictions and passport cancellations. The Police's National Security Department offered rewards for six overseas suspects accused of breaching the Hong Kong National Security Law.
- 12.26 The United States has reinstated the sanctions provisions of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025. In response, the Hong Kong government expressed dissatisfaction, asserting that each country has the right to enact laws to protect national security.
- 特區政府與內地簽署《內地與香港關於建立更緊密經貿關係的安排》第二份修訂協議，降低建築工程、檢測認證、電視電影、金融及旅遊服務等進入內地市場的門檻。
- 港澳辦在深圳舉行香港工商界座談會，各大地產商及商會代表出席。
- 高等法院就民主派初選 47 人案，對各被告被控《國安法》下的「串謀顛覆國家政權罪」宣判，其中「首要分子」戴耀廷被判囚 10 年。
- 國務院副總理何立峰訪港並出席國際金融領袖投資峰會，強調國家對香港作為國際金融中心的支持和重視。
- 終審法院駁回律政司和房委會的上訴，裁定同性伴侶與異性伴侶享有相同的公屋和居屋住屋及繼承權。
- 特區政府舉辦企業參與北部都會區發展活動，獲得本地、內地及海外的企業支持。
- 中央政府恢復深圳居民赴港個人遊的「一簽多行」簽注安排，並將有關計劃擴展至持有居住證的非深圳戶籍居民。
- 行政長官李家超在北京向國家主席習近平述職。
- 保安局局長根據《維護國家安全條例》刊憲，對七名潛逃海外者實施資金禁令及撤銷護照等措施；警務處國安處懸紅通緝六名涉嫌違反《香港國安法》的海外逃犯。
- 美國重新將《香港人權與民主法案》制裁條款納入 2025 年度《國防授權法案》。港府表示不滿，強調各國有權制定維護國家安全的法律。

Media sentiment plays a crucial role in shaping public opinion. We employ big data techniques to assess media sentiment regarding 1C2S and to monitor its coverage in the mass media. This approach serves as a timely barometer of public sentiment. The 1C2S MMI calculates the daily net sentiment of media reports, with a quarterly average presented in this section to align with and complement our main index, which is compiled biannually. The methodology is detailed in Appendix I.

媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素，故此，我們嘗試利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒，藉此透視大眾傳媒對「一國兩制」的感受及意見，編製輿論情緒對「一國兩制」的晴雨表。「一國兩制」輿情指數為每天媒體文章的情緒淨值，此章節顯示季度平均值，以配合和補充我們每半年出版的主指數。編製方法詳見附錄 I。

### 3.1

#### Recent trend 近期趨勢

MMI continued its rising trend with the restructuring of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. Following director Xia Baolong's visit to Hong Kong, these gestures from the central government were warmly welcomed by media reports and commentaries. While discussions of different views entered the generally positive media scene, the proposed reform plan of District Council sparked widespread debate on the new local administration measures. The all-time peak was followed by a steep fall, with a recording of 139.7 in 2023 Q2, as reports released by foreign governments levelled constant criticisms against the state of rule of law and freedoms in Hong Kong.

The previous fall sustained in the second half of 2023 until President Xi's reply letter to Hong Kong students expressed his care to the younger generation and the Chief Executive's overseas visit to ASEAN expanded business opportunities. Despite foreign concerns regarding the city's political landscape and human rights development, MMI continued to soar as a new development plan for synergistic growth of Shenzhen and Hong Kong's innovative and technology sector and the completed election and appointment of new District Council members gathered hopeful news. Consequently, MMI recovered to 155.3 in 2023 Q4.

隨著港澳辦的重組，輿情指數持續呈現上升趨勢。主任夏寶龍訪港期間，媒體報道和評論反應熱烈，進一步推動了輿情的正面發展。然而，隨後的區議會改革方案引發了廣泛辯論，對地區治理新措施的看法不一，對整體正面的輿情產生了影響。此外，外國政府持續發表報告，批評香港的法治和自由狀況，導致輿情指數從歷史高峰急劇下滑，並在 2023 年第 2 季度記錄為 139.7 點。

習近平主席回信本港學生，表達對年輕一代的殷切期望；同時，特首到東盟外訪以拓展商機，成功扭轉輿情指數早前的跌勢。儘管外國仍持續關注香港的政治發展及人權問題，但隨著深港河套創新發展規劃的出台，以及新一屆區議會選舉和委任工作的圓滿完成，輿情指數持續攀升，並在 2023 年第 4 季度達到 155.3 點。






In the first half of 2024, positive media coverage and public sentiment regarding Hong Kong significantly declined. The Asian Financial Forum 2024, held at the beginning of the year, and the visit by Xia Baolong, the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, garnered some positive media attention. However, the subsequent reintroduction of Article 23 to the legislative agenda attracted considerable international scrutiny and criticism, raising concerns about further erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy and civil liberties. By the end of Q2 2024, MMI had dropped to 133.7.

Overall, the number of official news reports increased in the latter half of 2024, emphasizing national development strategies released by the central government, including the resolution on further comprehensively deepening reform to advance Chinese modernization. This resolution underscored the significance of the 1C2S framework. Additionally, President Xi's reply to Hong Kong entrepreneurs with Ningbo roots became a focal point of discussion in the business community, further promoting Hong Kong's integration into the national development framework. Coinciding with the 25th anniversary of Macau's return, President Xi reiterated in his speech that the practice of 1C2S has entered a new stage and the cause of 1C2S is to enhance development in both SARs, allowing the regions to contribute more significantly to China's progress. In this context, the MMI reached 164.0 points in the second half of 2024.

2024年上半年，有關香港的正面媒體報導和輿論顯著下跌。年初舉行的2024年亞洲金融論壇，以及國務院港澳事務辦公室主任夏寶龍訪港調研，曾引發媒體的正面關注。然而，隨著第23條立法重新提上議程，國際社會對此表達了廣泛關注與批評，並引發對香港自治及公民自由進一步受侵蝕的擔憂。至2024年第2季度末，輿情指數下降至133.7點。

2024年下半年，官方新聞報道數量顯著增加，重點關注中央政府發布的國家發展戰略，包括推進中國現代化的全面深化改革決議。該決議強調了「一國兩制」框架的重要性。此外，習主席回信祖籍為寧波的香港企業家，成為商界熱議的焦點，進一步推動香港融入國家發展框架的進程。適逢澳門回歸25週年，習主席在講話中重申「一國兩制」實踐已進入新階段，並指出實現兩個特別行政區的蓬勃發展是新時代「一國兩制」實踐的重要使命。在此背景下，2024年下半年的MMI指數飆升至164.0點。

Figure 5: 1C2S MMI (quarterly average)  
圖5：「一國兩制」輿情指數（季度結）



## 3.2

### Channel variations 傳播媒介變化

Figure 6 shows MMI across various media channels, specifically television and radio, newspapers, and online-only media. The latest scores indicate the following: television and radio have a score of 173.5, reflecting a significant increase of 30.3%; newspapers have a score of 149.2, with an increase of 10.8%; and online-only media score 155.3, representing a rise of 15.8%. The overall MMI for the "One Country, Two Systems" (1C2S) framework stands at 164.0, showing a notable increase of 22.7%.

A discernible pattern has emerged: news coverage by television and radio tends to exhibit a relatively more positive sentiment, whereas online-only media often adopt a more critical stance. This media landscape has undergone significant changes between the second quarters of 2019 and 2020. During this period, television and radio outlets, along with newspapers, aligned their reporting to express greater criticism towards the 1C2S framework, resulting in a more negative sentiment compared to online-only media. Following this interval, television and radio resumed their typical reporting styles, with sentiment scores reflecting a notable increase, particularly during generally positive news events. However, the distinction in sentiment between newspapers and online-only media has diminished over time, with trends from these two channels increasingly interwoven.

圖 6 顯示了各類媒體渠道的 MMI 指數，包括電視及電台、報紙和純網上媒體。最新數據顯示：電視及電台的得分為 173.5，顯著上升 30.3%；報紙得分為 149.2，上升 10.8%；而純網上媒體得分為 155.3，上升 15.8%。整體而言，「一國兩制」框架的 MMI 指數為 164.0，顯著增長 22.7%。

從中可觀察到一個明顯的模式：電視及電台的新聞報道傾向於呈現較為正面的情緒，而純網上媒體則往往持更為批判的立場。這一媒體格局在 2019 年第二季度至 2020 年第二季度期間發生了顯著變化。在此期間，電視及電台與報紙的報道風格趨於一致，對「一國兩制」框架表達了更多的批評，導致其情緒指數較純網上媒體更為負面。此後，電視及電台恢復了其一貫的報道風格，情緒指數顯著上升，特別是在整體新聞事件較為正面的時期。然而，報紙與純網上媒體之間的情緒差異隨時間逐漸縮小，兩者的趨勢日益交織。

Figure 6: 1C2S MMI (by media channels)

圖 6：「一國兩制」輿情指數（按傳播媒介劃分）





Figure 7 illustrates the political composition of the Hong Kong population by inclination. Moderates, encompassing centrists and those without a specific political affiliation, remain the largest group, now comprising 78.7% of the population, an increase of 1.6% since the last survey. They are followed by pro-establishment supporters at 7.2%, reflecting a rise of 1.3%. Non-establishment supporters account for 11.6%, marking a decrease of 2.7%.

The latest survey data indicates a significant trend towards de-radicalization and moderation. The proportion of centrists continues to rise, while the proportions of pro-establishment and non-establishment supporters show an opposite trend. This change suggests that an increasing number of individuals from both the pro-establishment and non-establishment camps identify as moderates, reflecting a shift in Hong Kong's political environment towards greater moderation.

圖7顯示香港市民的政治傾向。溫和派，包括「中間派」和「沒有政治傾向」仍然是本港最大的群體，佔總人口的78.7%，較上一輪增加了1.6%。其次是建制派支持者，佔7.2%，上升了1.3%。非建制派則佔11.6%，較半年前減少了2.7%。

最新調查數據顯示，去激進化及溫和化趨勢顯著。中間派的比例持續上升，而建制派和非建制派的支持者比例則呈現相反趨勢。這一變化表明，越來越多來自建制派和非建制派陣營的個人傾向於認同為中間派，反映出香港政治環境正朝著更加溫和化的方向發展。

Figure 7: Political inclination of population  
圖7：香港市民政治傾向



# 4.1

## De-radicalisation of youths 香港青年的去激進化


Figure 8 illustrates the changes in the political composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by inclination in the latter half of 2024. The proportion of moderates has significantly increased by 3.6 percentage points to 76.1%. Non-establishment supporters are now categorised into 'democrats' and 'others,' with democrats decreasing by 3.4 percentage points to 11.6%, and other non-establishment supporters declining by 0.6 percentage points to 8.7%. In contrast, pro-establishment supporters have seen a slight increase of 0.1 percentage points to 1.9%.

From mid-2017 to early 2019, there were encouraging signs of de-radicalization among youths, marked by a rising proportion of moderates. However, this trend reversed as non-establishment supporters surged, temporarily surpassing moderates, with localists occasionally outnumbering democrats. Since mid-2020, radicalization has notably eased, evidenced by the decline in localist support and the resurgence of moderates, who now exceed the total non-establishment group. Recent data indicates a continued trend toward moderation among youths, reflecting a broader shift in the political landscape.

圖8顯示了青年群體（18至29歲）的政治傾向變化。「溫和派」的比例顯著上升了3.6個百分點，達到76.1%。非建制派可再劃分為「民主派」和「其他」，後者絕大部分為本土派，兩個群組均呈下降趨勢。非建制派支持者現分為「民主派」和「其他」，其中民主派減少了3.4個百分點，降至11.6%，而其他非建制派支持者則下降了0.6個百分點，至8.7%。相比之下，建制派支持者微升0.1個百分點，達到1.9%。

從2017年中到2019年初，青年群體的去激進化趨勢曾出現積極跡象。然而，這一趨勢隨後逆轉，非建制派支持者激增，一度暫時超越「溫和派」，其中「本土派」的支持者甚至偶爾超過「民主派」。自2020年年中以來，激進化情況顯著緩解，「本土派」支持率下降，「溫和派」重新崛起並超越非建制派總和。最新數據顯示，青年群體的溫和化趨勢持續，反映出政治環境的廣泛轉變。

Figure 8: Political inclination of youths  
圖8：青年的政治傾向





A critical issue for Hong Kong's future is the sustainability of the 1C2S framework. In previous surveys, respondents were asked regarding their views on whether this constitutional arrangement should extend beyond 2047. Those who supported its continuation were subsequently asked to specify the conditions they deemed favourable for achieving this objective. However, the relevance of these inquiries diminished following the Central Government's assurance that 1C2S would be preserved in the long term. Nonetheless, understanding the public's aspirations for a preferred future remains valuable for enhancing and sustaining the 1C2S framework. Consequently, respondents were invited to identify which conditions they believe would support the continuation of 1C2S from a provided list, with the option to select multiple items:

- Maintaining a high degree of autonomy;
- Maintaining economic prosperity and stability;
- Political system democratises further;
- Maintaining national security; and
- Others (please specify).

Figure 9 illustrates the percentages of respondents who selected each of the five conditions deemed favourable for the continuation of 1C2S. The data reveals a clear preference among respondents, with "maintaining economic prosperity and stability" ranking highest at 62.7%. Following closely is "maintaining a high degree of autonomy" at 42.0%. The condition "further democratization of the political system" occupies the third position at 28.8%, surpassing "maintaining national security," which stands at 32.5%. Notably, the proportion of respondents selecting "other/don't know" has significantly increased by 8.0%, now comprising 11.2% of total responses.

Figure 10 highlights the distinct patterns of choice across different political inclinations. Non-establishment respondents show a notable preference for "further democratization" (47.8%), which ranks highest among their choices, despite a slight decrease. This is followed by "economic prosperity" (43.8%) and "maintaining a high degree of autonomy" (41.7%). Interestingly, the support for "maintaining national security" (15.1%) remains minimal, while a significant portion has opted for "other/don't know," suggesting uncertainty within this group.

香港未來的一個關鍵問題是「一國兩制」框架的可持續性。在過去的問卷調查中，受訪者被問及他們對這一憲制安排是否應在2047年後延續的看法。那些支持延續的受訪者隨後被邀請說明他們認為實現這一目標的有利條件。然而，隨著中央政府明確表示「一國兩制」將長期保持不變，這些問題的相關性有所下降。儘管如此，了解公眾對理想未來的期望，對於完善和維持「一國兩制」框架仍然具有重要價值。因此，受訪者被邀請從提供的選項中選擇他們認為有助於「一國兩制」延續的條件，並可選擇多項：

- 維持高度自治；
- 經濟維持繁榮穩定；
- 政制進一步民主化；
- 維持國家安全；及
- 其他（請註明）。

圖9顯示了受訪者對五項有利於「一國兩制」延續的條件的選擇比例。數據顯示，與上輪一致，受訪者對「維持經濟繁榮穩定」的偏好最為明顯，佔62.7%。其次為「維持高度自治」，佔42.0%。「維護國家安全」位列第三，佔32.5%，超越了「政制進一步民主化」（28.8%）。值得注意的是，選擇「其他/不知道」的受訪者比例顯著上升了8.0%，佔總受訪人數的11.2%。

圖10則呈現了不同政治傾向受訪者的選擇模式差異。非建制派受訪者對「政制進一步民主化」的偏好最為突出（47.8%），儘管比起上輪略有下降，但仍在其選擇中排名首位，其次是「維持經濟繁榮穩定」（43.8%）和「保維持高度自治」（41.7%）。值得注意的是，他們對「維護國家安全」的興趣相對較低（15.1%），而選擇「其他/不知道」的比例較高，顯示這一群體中存在一定程度的不確定性。

In contrast, moderates prioritize "maintaining economic prosperity and stability" (70.0%), which ranks as their top choice. They also favour "maintaining a high degree of autonomy," though support has decreased. Preference for "national security" (34.8%) has increased, reflecting a shift in priorities. However, their support for "further democratization" (28.4%) remains low, suggesting that economic concerns may outweigh democratic aspirations for this group.

相比之下，溫和派受訪者最重視「維持經濟繁榮穩定」（70.0%）。他們對「維持高度自治」的支持率（45.4%）較上一輪調查有所下降，而對「維護國家安全」的偏好維持在 34.8%。然而，他們對「政制進一步民主化」的支持率仍然相對較低（28.4%），表明這一群體更關注經濟問題而非民主訴求。

Pro-establishment respondents exhibit a distinct inclination towards "maintaining national security" (55.1%), which has seen a notable rise in support. Their preference for "maintaining a high degree of autonomy" (32.8%), is lower than in other groups while interest in "economic prosperity" (55.4%) reflects a moderate stance. The low support for "further democratization" (13.5%) underscores their alignment with pro-establishment views, while the small percentage selecting "other/don't know" indicates limited uncertainty within this camp.

建制派受訪者則明顯傾向於「維護國家安全」（55.1%），該選項的支持率亦顯著上升。他們對「維持高度自治」的偏好（32.8%）低於其他群體，而對「維持經濟繁榮穩定」的興趣（55.4%）則表現出較為中立的立場。對「政制進一步民主化」的低支持率（13.5%）突顯了他們與建制派觀點的一致性，而選擇「其他 / 不知道」的比例較低，表明這一群體的不確定性較小。

Figure 9: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047  
圖 9：2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件





Figure 10: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047 (by political inclination)

圖 10：有利於 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（按政治傾向劃分）






We also surveyed how citizens identify themselves: whether as 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese'. The latest data (Figure 11) indicates that the public continue to identify more strongly as "Hongkongers," scoring 8.99 points, which reflects an increase of 6.6%. In contrast, the score for "Chinese" identity stands at 7.31, resulting a modest gain of 2.1%. While scores for both identities began to converge in the second half of 2022, the gap between them has since widened again. Despite this trend, scores for dual identities remain high, underscoring a robust sense of identity among respondents.

Figure 12 illustrates the mix of identities rated by respondents against time. On a 0 to 10 scale, a median score of 5 indicates moderate identification, with scores above the median reflecting relatively strong identification and those below indicating weaker identification. These levels can be categorized into four groups: dual identity (strong in both identifications), stronger identification as "Hongkongers only," stronger identification as "Chinese only," and others, which include individuals without a dominant identity. Recent surveys reveal a clear pattern: 67.0% of respondents identify with a dual identity, marking an increase of 3.2%. Meanwhile, the proportion of those identifying as "Hongkongers" stands at 25.7%, up by 2.3%, whereas identification as "Chinese" has declined to 3.5%, down by 2.5%.

This data indicates that dual identity has regained its status as the dominant identity since 2022, overtaking "Hongkonger only." The rise in dual identity suggests a rebound in the proportion of Hong Kong citizens recognizing their dual heritage, potentially signalling a gradual easing of societal tensions. While identifying as "Chinese" does not necessarily equate to patriotism, the dual identity of "Hongkongers" and "Chinese" remains crucial for fostering a sense of devotion to both China and Hong Kong. We acknowledge that ongoing international criticism of China may influence how Hongkongers view themselves, and the significance of this factor will hopefully become clearer over time.

Figure 11: Citizens' identity scores  
圖 11：市民的身分認同評分




	Share 佔比	Changes 變化
■ Hongkonger 香港人	8.99	+0.56 (↑ 6.6%)*
■ Chinese 中國人	7.31	+0.15 (↑ 2.1%)

我們還調查了市民對自身身份的認同：「香港人」或「中國人」。最新數據（圖 11）顯示，公眾對「香港人」的認同感依然較強，得分為 8.99 分，較上一輪調查上升了 6.6%。「中國人」身份的分數為 7.31 分，僅小幅上升 2.1%。儘管兩種身份的分數在 2022 年下半年開始趨近，但之後差距再次拉大。然而，雙重身份的分數仍然保持較高水平，顯示受訪者對身份認同有著強烈的感知。

圖 12 顯示了受訪者隨時間變化的身份認同組合。在 0 至 10 分的量表中，中位數 5 分表示中等程度的認同，高於中位數的分數反映較強的認同感，而低於中位數則表示較弱的認同感。這些認同水平可分為四類：雙重身份（對兩種身份均有較強認同）、「僅香港人」身份認同較強、「僅中國人」身份認同較強，以及其他（包括無明顯主導身份的個體）。最新調查顯示，67.0% 的受訪者認同雙重身份，較上一輪上升 3.2%。與此同時，「僅香港人」身份認同的比例為 25.7%，上升 2.3%，而「僅中國人」身份認同的比例則下降至 3.5%，減少 2.5%。

數據顯示，自 2022 年以來，雙重身份再次成為主導身份，超越了「僅香港人」的身份認同。雙重身份比例的上升表明，香港市民對其雙重文化背景的認同感有所回升，這或許反映出社會緊張局勢正在逐步緩和。儘管認同「中國人」身份並不一定等同於愛國主義，但「香港人」與「中國人」的雙重身份對於培養對中國與香港的歸屬感尤為重要。我們觀察到，國際社會對中國的不斷譴責可能影響香港市民的自我認同，而這一影響有望隨時間推移變得更加明顯。

Figure 12: Citizens' identity mix  
圖 12：市民的混合身份認同



## 6.1 Rank correlation 等級相關係數

Statistical analysis reveals a positive correlation between identification as a 'Hongkonger' and as a 'Chinese'. The converse also held true, as the rank correlation coefficient is 0.269, which is statistically significant. The finding that the two identities of 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' are mutually reinforcing each other provides a strong support for the implementation of 1C2S.

統計分析結果表明，「香港人」身份認同與「中國人」身份認同之間具有正相關關係，反之亦然。其等級相關係數為 0.269，且在統計學上具有高度顯著性。這進一步顯示，「香港人」與「中國人」兩種身份認同相互增強，為「一國兩制」的實施提供了穩固的基礎。

Table 5: Rank correlation of citizens' identity  
表 5：市民的身份認同等級相關係數

	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7	2025.2
Correlation 相關係數	0.332	0.374	0.242	0.239	0.269
t-statistic t 檢定統計	10.32	12.21	7.77	7.68	8.69



7.1 Emigration  
移民海外

Table 6 presents the public's emigration plans. The majority (83.9%), reported having "no plans" to emigrate, significantly exceeding the 13.2% who indicated they had "plans." Consequently, the net value dropped by 0.5 percentage points since the last round, reaching -70.7%.

Figure 13 and Figure 14 illustrate the net value of emigration plans across different age groups and political inclinations. All age groups experienced declines, with the most significant decreases observed among those aged 18-29 and 50-59. Notably, the 18-29 age group saw a sharp rise in the proportion selecting "no plans," while older groups showed varying levels of decline.

As expected, non-establishment supporters were more likely to have plans to emigrate compared to respondents with other political inclinations. Their net value increased by 17.9 percentage points to -25.5%. In contrast, the pro-establishment camp saw a decrease in net value, dropping by 1.3 percentage points to -96.9%. Past studies indicate that surveys frequently overestimate the number of individuals intending to emigrate, as only a small fraction of those expressing interest ultimately follow through with their plans. Consequently, caution should be exercised when interpreting these findings, though they still provide valuable insights into public sentiment.

Additionally, the recent consideration or announcement by several countries to halt immigration visa schemes specifically for Hong Kong residents may prompt the general public to adopt a wait-and-see approach in assessing overall sentiment and polling related to emigration plans.

表 6 顯示了市民的移民海外計劃。本輪調查結果表明，大多數香港市民 (83.9%) 表示「無打算」移民，遠高於表示「打算」移民的受訪者比例 (13.2%)。因此，淨值較上一輪下降 0.5 個百分點，降至 -70.7%。

圖 13 和圖 14 展示了不同年齡組別及政治傾向的移民計劃淨值變化。所有年齡組別的淨值均有所下降，其中 18-29 歲和 50-59 歲年齡組的降幅最為顯著。值得注意的是，18-29 歲年齡組中「無計劃」移民的比例顯著上升，而其他年齡組則呈現不同程度的下降。

正如預期，非建制派支持者相較於其他政治傾向的受訪者，更有計劃移民。其淨值上升 17.9 個百分點，達到 -25.5%。建制派陣營的淨值則下降 1.3 個百分點，降至 -96.9%。過去研究表明，有關調查往往高估了有意移民的人數，因為只有少數表達移民意願的人最終會落實計劃。因此，解讀這些結果時應保持謹慎，但其仍為公眾情緒提供了有價值的參考。

此外，近期多個國家考慮或宣布暫停針對香港居民的移民簽證計劃，這可能促使公眾在評估整體情緒及移民計劃相關民調時採取觀望態度。

Table 6: Public's emigration plans  
表 6：市民移民海外的計劃

	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7	2025.2
Have Plans 有打算	12.3%	14.9%	17.9%	14.0%	13.2%
No Plans 無打算	78.1%	75.6%	80.8%	84.1%	83.9%
Don't Know 唔知道	9.5%	9.5%	1.3%	1.9%	2.9%
Net Value 淨值	-65.8%	-60.8%	-62.9%	-70.2%	-70.7%

Net Value: Percent "Have Plans" minus percent "No Plans"  
淨值：認為「有打算」的百分比減去認為「無打算」的百分比

Figure 13: Public's emigration plans (by age group)

圖 13：市民移民海外的計劃（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 14: Public's emigration plans (by political inclination)

圖 14：市民移民海外的計劃（按政治傾向劃分）





## 7.2

## Willingness to live or work in other Greater Bay Area (GBA) cities 前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願

Table 7 presents the respondents' willingness to live or work in other cities within the GBA. Among those surveyed, 8.1% indicated they were 'willing' to live or work in the GBA, while 57.2% were 'unwilling'. Notably, approximately 34.7% of respondents remained undecided about their willingness, a figure largely consistent with previous surveys.

Figure 15 and Figure 16 further illustrate the willingness to live or work in other GBA cities, categorized by age group and political inclination. Net willingness values exhibited a mixed trend across age groups. Among those aged 18-29, it increased by 4.1 percentage points to -49.5%, while the 40-49 age group declined by 8.4 percentage points to -46.2%.

By political inclination, non-establishment supporters saw the largest decrease, reaching -79.3%. Moderates experienced a slight decline of 0.2% to -46.2%, and pro-establishment supporters fell by 7.6% to -32.3%. Overall, net willingness among all respondents decreased by 1.1% to -49.1%.

表 7 展示了受訪者對在粵港澳大灣區其他城市生活或工作的意願。本次調查結果顯示，8.1% 的受訪者表示「會考慮」在大灣區其他城市生活或工作，而大部分受訪者 (57.2%) 表示「不會考慮」。值得注意的是，約 34.7% 的受訪者對其意願仍持「未決定」態度，該比例與過往調查結果基本一致。

按年齡群組 (圖 15) 分析，不同年齡組的淨意願值呈現出混合趨勢。其中，18-29 歲年齡組的淨意願值上升 4.1 個百分點，達到 -49.5%；而 40-49 歲年齡組則下降 8.4 個百分點，降至 -46.2%。

從政治傾向 (圖 16) 來看，非建制派支持者的淨意願值降幅最大，達到 -79.3%。中間派受訪者的淨意願值略微下降 0.2 個百分點，至 -46.2%；建制派支持者的淨意願值下降 7.6 個百分點，至 -32.3%。整體而言，所有受訪者的淨意願值下降 1.1 個百分點，至 -49.1%。

Table 7: Willingness to live or work in other GBA cities  
表 7：前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願

	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7	2025.2
Willing 會考慮	3.4%	5.1%	6.9%	7.9%	8.1%
Not willing 不會考慮	75.2%	61.3%	57.7%	56.0%	57.2%
Maybe / Don't Know 或者 / 唔知道	21.3%	33.6%	34.2%	36.1%	34.7%
Net Value 淨值	-71.8%	-56.2%	-50.9%	-48.0%	-49.1%

Net Value: Percent "Willing" minus percent "Not Willing"  
淨值：「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比



Figure 15: Willingness to live or work in other GBA cities (by age group)

圖 15：前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 16: Willingness to live or work in other GBA cities (by political inclination)

圖 16：前往大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願（按政治傾向劃分）



## 7.3

## Confidence in the Hong Kong education system 對香港教育制度的信心

Table 8 presents the level of public confidence in Hong Kong's education system. Confidence in the education system currently stands at 43.2%, a decrease of 2.4% from the first half of 2024. Conversely, the proportion of respondents expressing 'not confident' in the local education system has increased slightly by 0.4% to 39.7%. The net value of confidence has also declined from 6.3% to 3.5%.

Figure 17 and Figure 18 further illustrate confidence in the education system, segmented by age group and political inclination, respectively. Among age groups, those aged 70 or above experienced a notable increase in net confidence values (+3.3%). However, all other age groups saw a decline.

In terms of political inclination, net confidence values have increased significantly among the pro-establishment group (+24.8%). Conversely, moderates experienced a decrease of 6.6%, while non-establishment respondents saw a drop of 14.1%. Within the non-establishment group, democrats declined by 8.8%, and other non-establishment members experienced a substantial drop of 30.7%. Overall, the net confidence value for all respondents stands at 3.5%, reflecting a decrease of 2.8%.

表8展示了公眾對香港教育制度的信心水平。本次調查結果顯示，對教育制度表示「有信心」的受訪者比例為43.2%，較2024年上半年下降2.4個百分點。相反，對本地教育制度表示「沒有信心」的受訪者比例微升0.4個百分點，達到39.7%。信心淨值則從6.3%下降至3.5%。

按年齡分佈(圖17)分析，70歲或以上的受訪者信心淨值顯著上升3.3個百分點，但其他年齡組別的信心淨值均有所下降。

從政治傾向來看(圖18)，建制派支持者的信心淨值顯著上升24.8個百分點，達到正值。相比之下，溫和派受訪者的信心淨值下降6.6個百分點，而非建制派受訪者的信心淨值則下降14.1個百分點。

Table 8: Confidence in the Hong Kong Education System  
表8：對香港教育制度的信心

	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7	2025.2
Confident 有信心	29.6%	41.6%	39.1%	45.6%	43.2%
Not Confident 無信心	40.8%	37.4%	43.6%	39.3%	39.7%
Half-half 一半半	24.2%	18.7%	14.8%	13.7%	14.2%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	5.5%	2.3%	2.6%	1.4%	2.9%
Net Value 淨值	-11.2%	4.2%	-4.5%	6.3%	3.5%

Net value: Percent "Confident" minus percent "Not Confident"  
淨值：「有信心」的百分比減去「無信心」的百分比



Figure 17: Confidence in the Hong Kong Education System (by age group)

圖 17：對香港教育制度的信心（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 18: Confidence in the Hong Kong Education System (by political inclination)

圖 18：對香港教育制度的信心（按政治傾向劃分）



## 7.4

## Satisfaction with the performance of civil service 對公務員表現的滿意度

Table 9 presents the level of satisfaction respondents expressed regarding the performance of the civil service. The proportion of those satisfied with the civil service's performance decreased slightly by 2.5%, reaching 43.0%. Conversely, the proportion of respondents expressing dissatisfaction increased by 2.8% to 35.1%, accounting for over one-third of all respondents. The net satisfaction value declined to 7.9%, a statistically significant decrease compared to the previous survey.

Figure 19 and Figure 20 illustrate satisfaction with civil service performance segmented by age group, revealing mixed net values across all demographics. Notably, the 30-39 age group (+5.6%) and the 50-59 age group (+9.3%) are the only categories showing increases, while all other age groups have experienced declines compared to six months ago.

Furthermore, net satisfaction values vary significantly among supporters of different political affiliations. Pro-establishment supporters report a notable net increase of 28.9%. In contrast, both moderate supporters (-10.4%) and non-establishment supporters (-1.6%) show declines in their satisfaction with civil service performance. These findings emphasize the diverse perceptions of civil service effectiveness across age groups and political inclination.

表9展示了受訪者對公務員表現的滿意度。本次調查結果顯示，對公務員表現表示「滿意」的比例微降2.5個百分點，至43.0%。相對地，對公務員表現表示「不滿意」的受訪者比例上升2.8個百分點，達到35.1%，占總受訪人數的三分之一以上。淨滿意度下降至7.9%，與上一輪調查相比，這一變化在統計學上顯著。

按年齡組別分析（圖19），30-39歲年齡組（上升5.6個百分點）和50-59歲年齡組（上升9.3個百分點）是唯一呈現淨滿意度上升的類別，而其他年齡組別的淨值均較六個月前有所下降。

從政治取向來看（圖20），不同政治傾向支持者的淨滿意度存在顯著差異。其中，建制派支持者的淨滿意度顯著上升28.9個百分點，達到正值。相比之下，中間派支持者的淨滿意度下降10.4個百分點，而非建制派支持者的淨滿意度則下降1.6個百分點。

Table 9: Level of Satisfaction with Civil Service Performance  
表9：對公務員表現的滿意度

	2023.1	2023.7	2024.2	2024.7	2025.2
Satisfied 滿意	40.3%	49.4%	40.7%	45.5%	43.0%
Dissatisfied 不滿意	26.9%	27.6%	35.9%	32.3%	35.1%
Half-half 一半半	29.9%	19.7%	21.5%	20.3%	20.3%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	3.0%	3.3%	1.9%	2.0%	1.5%
Net Value 淨值	13.4%	21.8%	4.8%	13.3%	7.9%

Net value: Percent 'Satisfied' minus percent 'Dissatisfied'  
淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比

Figure 19: Level of satisfaction with civil service performance (by age group)

圖 19：對公務員服務水平的滿意度（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 20: Level of satisfaction with civil service performance (by political inclination)

圖 20：對公務員服務水平的滿意度（按政治傾向劃分）





### 8.1 Satisfaction with HKSAR Government 對現特區政府表現的滿意度

Table 10 presents public satisfaction ratings with the current Hong Kong SAR Government. In July 2024, 44.4% of respondents expressed satisfaction with the HKSAR government, but this figure declined to 42.3% by February 2025. Conversely, dissatisfaction increased slightly from 39.0% to 40.9%, while the proportion of neutral responses remained stable.

It is noted that the current government released its third policy address at the end of last year, and the effectiveness of these policies remains to be assessed over time. It is believed that the relatively stable satisfaction levels compared to six months ago suggest that the public maintain a wait-and-see attitude towards the government's performance.

表 10 顯示市民對現屆特區政府的滿意度評分。上一輪調查中，44.4% 的受訪者對特區政府的工作表示「滿意」，但在半年後的本輪調查中，滿意度比例下降至 42.3%。同時，對政府工作表示「不滿意」的比例從 39.0% 微升至 40.9%，而持中立態度的比例則保持穩定。

現屆政府於去年底發布了第三份《施政報告》，相關政策的成效尚需時間驗證。目前，公眾滿意度與半年前相比基本穩定，這或許反映出民眾對政府表現仍處於觀望階段。

Table 10: Level of satisfaction with the current HKSAR government  
表 10：對現屆政府表現的滿意度

	2024.7	2025.2
Satisfied 滿意	44.4%	42.3%
Dissatisfied 不滿意	39.0%	40.9%
Half-half 一半半	15.4%	15.5%
Don't know 唔知道	1.2%	1.3%
Net Value 淨值	5.4%	1.4%

Net value: Percent 'Satisfied' minus percent 'Dissatisfied'  
淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比

### 8.2 Satisfaction with Legislative Council 對立法會表現的滿意度

Table 11 presents the levels of satisfaction with the Legislative Council (LegCo) as of February 2025. Only 29.4% of respondents expressed satisfaction, while a significant 48.1% reported dissatisfaction. The proportion of individuals indicating a neutral stance, or "half-half," stood at 17.9%.

表 11 展示了公眾對立法會的滿意度水平。調查結果顯示，僅有 29.4% 的受訪者對立法會表示「滿意」，而高達 48.1% 的受訪者表示「不滿意」。持中立態度（即「一半半」）的比例為 17.9%。

This reflects a prevailing sentiment of discontent among the public regarding the LegCo's performance. This dissatisfaction may be linked to the high costs associated with the Council since its inception and public scrutiny over the quality of its deliberations, which have been marred by numerous controversies. Additionally, the disputes arising from some members' official visits to Japan late last year, particularly regarding external expenditures and certain controversial statements made by these legislators, have further fuelled public discontent.

調查結果反映出公眾對立法會表現普遍不滿。這種不滿情緒可能源於立法會自成立以來的高昂運作成本，以及公眾對其議事質量的持續關注。此外，近年來議會內多起爭議事件也對其形象造成負面影響。值得注意的是，去年年底部分議員前往日本進行公務訪問時，因公務開支問題及個別議員的爭議性言論引發的風波，可能進一步加深了公眾的不滿。

Table 11: Attitude towards accelerating democratic political development  
表 11：對加快民主政制發展的態度

	All Respondents 所有受訪者
Satisfied 滿意	29.4%
Dissatisfied 不滿意	48.1%
Half-half 一半半	17.9%
Don't know 唔知道	4.5%
Net Value 淨值	-18.7%

Net value: Percent 'Satisfied' minus percent 'Dissatisfied'  
淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比

## 8.3

### Perspectives on Hong Kong's Future 對香港前景的看法

Table 12 explores public opinion on Hong Kong's future. The data reveals that 43.7% of respondents hold an optimistic view, while 40.2% express pessimism about the region's prospects.

本輪調查還分析了公眾對香港未來的看法（表 12）。調查結果顯示，43.7% 的受訪者對香港的前景持樂觀態度，而 40.2% 的受訪者則表示悲觀。

This mixed sentiment reflects Hong Kong's complex and evolving landscape, where hopes for positive change coexist with concerns over ongoing challenges. This duality may be further underscored by recent discussions surrounding the government's fiscal deficit, which have raised apprehensions about the economic future.

這種複雜的情緒反映了香港當前多變且充滿挑戰的環境，樂觀與悲觀並存。一方面，人們對積極變革抱有希望；另一方面，對持續存在的問題深感憂慮。近期圍繞政府財政赤字的討論可能進一步加劇了公眾對經濟前景的擔憂，從而加深了這種情緒的雙重性。

Table 12: Perspectives on Hong Kong's Future  
表 12：對香港前景的看法

	All Respondents 所有受訪者
Optimistic 樂觀	43.7%
Pessimistic 悲觀	40.2%
Half-half 一半半	14.4%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	1.7%
Net Value 淨值	3.5%

Net value: Percent 'Optimistic' minus percent 'Pessimistic'  
淨值：「樂觀」的百分比減去「悲觀」的百分比

## 8.4

## Generation gap and political divide 代溝與政治鴻溝

Table 13 and Table 14 summarize the net values derived from responses to questions regarding selected political controversies, with results categorized by age group and political inclination.

The data reveals distinct patterns in how respondents from various age demographics and political affiliations responded to these contentious issues. Generally, net values exhibited an increase with age, while they decreased as political leanings shifted away from the pro-establishment spectrum. In general, the 18-29 age group and non-establishment supporters demonstrated the most critical assessments of these political controversies.

Given the divergent perspectives reflected among different political camps, the views of moderates offer a crucial reference point for understanding the general public's opinions on these pressing issues. In the current analysis, the satisfaction level of moderates regarding SAR government remained largely independent of the positions held by both pro-establishment and non-establishment groups. This observation suggests that rationality and pragmatism continue to be deeply embedded within the Hong Kong community.

表 13 和表 14 總結了針對選定政治議題的回應淨值，並按年齡組別和政治傾向分類呈現結果。

數據顯示，不同年齡層和政治立場的受訪者對這些爭議性問題的反應存在顯著差異。總體而言，淨值隨年齡增長而上升，但隨著政治傾向從親建制派轉向非建制派，淨值則逐漸下降。其中，18 至 29 歲年齡組和非建制派支持者對政治爭議的評價最為批判。

考慮到不同政治陣營之間的分歧，溫和派的觀點為理解公眾對這些迫切議題的意見提供了重要參考。在本次分析中，溫和派對特別行政區政府的滿意度並未明顯受到親建制派或非建制派立場的影響。這一觀察表明，理性與務實的態度仍然深深植根於香港社會。

Table 13: Generation gap over selected political events (by age group)

表 13：對選定政治事件之代溝（按年齡劃分）

	Satisfaction with HKSAR government 政府表現滿意度 (2024.7)	Democratic political reform 民主政制發展 (2024.7)	Satisfaction with HKSAR government 政府表現滿意度 (2025.2)	Perspectives on Hong Kong's future 對香港前景的看法 (2025.2)
18-29	-31.2%	54.6%	-33.4%	-37.2%
30-39	-26.5%	55.6%	-25.8%	-31.4%
40-49	-1.3%	59.6%	-8.4%	7.4%
50-59	10.0%	42.0%	3.3%	6.8%
60-69	21.3%	51.5%	15.1%	17.7%
≥ 70	47.6%	32.9%	40.6%	39.7%
All respondents 所有受訪者	5.4%	49.0%	1.4%	3.5%

Table 14: Political divide over selected political controversies (by political inclination)

表 14：對選定政治爭議之政治鴻溝（按政治傾向劃分）

	Satisfaction with HKSAR government 政府表現滿意度 (2024.7)	Democratic political reform 民主政制發展 (2024.7)	Satisfaction with HKSAR government 政府表現滿意度 (2025.2)	Perspectives on Hong Kong's future 對香港前景的看法 (2025.2)
Pro-establishment 建制派	65.8%	33.1%	78.9%	81.1%
Moderates 溫和派	11.5%	46.3%	4.3%	6.9%
Non-establishment 非建制派	-54.5%	72.4%	-71.1%	-65.2%
All respondents 所有受訪者	5.4%	49.0%	1.4%	3.5%



# 附錄 Appendices





Construction of 1C2S Index  
編製「一國兩制」指數

We construct a conceptual framework to capture the current situation of 1C2S through six pillars, three based on public opinion and three based on international perception. The three pillars on public opinion are derived from telephone polls conducted among Hong Kong residents, evaluating the implementation of 1C2S. The three pillars on international perception are compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on the state of freedom and democracy worldwide. Each pillar is further divided into four sub-pillars. Consequently, we create a measurement system comprising six pillars and 24 sub-pillars. Each sub-pillar is assigned equal weight to generate a pillar score. The 1C2S Index is calculated as the simple average of all six pillar scores. Table 15 below outlines the six pillars and 24 sub-pillars used in our index.

我們建構一個觀念框架以量度香港實踐「一國兩制」的情況，基於民意調查的3項支柱及國際評價的3項支柱。民意調查的3項支柱是取自香港市民在電話調查中對落實「一國兩制」的評分。國際評價的3項支柱取自國際智庫就全球自由和民主狀況而製作的相關指數。每項支柱各設4項子支柱，使此指標體系共6項支柱和24項子支柱。每項子支柱賦予均等權重，以計算支柱的分數。「一國兩制」指數是6項支柱的簡單平均分數。表13列出指數所使用的6項支柱和24項子支柱。

Table 15: Pillars and sub-pillars of 1C2S Index  
表 15：「一國兩制」指數的支柱和子支柱

	Pillar 支柱	Sub-pillar 子支柱
Public Opinion 民意調查	A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治	A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務 A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權 A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權 A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」
	B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由	B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式 B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社和集會自由 B3. Democratic development 民主發展 B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護
	C. Hong Kong-Mainland Relations 內港關係	C1. Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾 C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益 C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定 C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落實「一國兩制」
International Perception 國際評價	D. Economic Openness 經濟開放	D1. Business environment 營商環境 D2. Market access 市場門檻 D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素 D4. Financial stability 金融穩定
	E. Civil Liberty 公民權利	E1. Rule of law 法治 E2. Security and safety 安全 E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會 E4. Individual rights 個人權利
	F. Democratic Development 民主發展	F1. Constraints on power 權力制約 F2. Political pluralism 政治多元 F3. Civic participation 公民參與 F4. Democratic culture 民主文化

## 1.1. Public Opinion

We obtain three pillar and twelve sub-pillar scores on the implementation of 1C2S from telephone polls conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Each sub-pillar is represented by a single survey question, with the questions listed in Table 16.

Approximately 1,000 individuals are randomly sampled in each round using the CATI (computer-assisted telephone interviewing) system. All the respondents are aged 18 or above and spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin. To ensure representativeness of the Hong Kong population, all data are weighted by the proportion of gender and age of individuals aged 18 or above (excluding foreign domestic helpers) according to the Census and Statistics Department.

Table 17 provides details on the statistical and scientific standards of each survey. Since the first half of 2021, the telephone surveys have employed a dual-frame sampling design, randomly selecting phone numbers from a combined sample of residential landline and mobile phone numbers. To address potential double-counting or other unknown factors arising from individuals owning both landline and mobile numbers, additional steps are taken in the weighting method. The specific calculations are detailed in a subsequent subsection.

In the telephone polls, many questions employ a 1 to 7 rating scale, with 4 as the median. This scale, known as the Likert scale, is commonly used in psychological assessments. It is preferred over a 0 to 10 scale, as the latter is considered too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents. However, to better align with existing indices that typically employ a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median), we mathematically converted the results into this scale.

## 1.1. 民意調查

我們委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查，以整合市民對落實「一國兩制」的3項支柱和12項子支柱評分。每一條問卷問題代表一項子支柱。表14顯示每項子支柱相應的問卷問題。

每輪的電話調查會以電腦輔助電話訪問系統，隨機抽樣，訪問大約1,000人，全部皆屬18歲或以上，能操廣東話或普通話。進行分析時，數據依照香港政府統計處的18歲或以上性別及年齡分佈（扣除外籍家庭傭工）作加權處理，以更符合香港人口分佈的真實情況。

表15每輪電話調查的統計和科學標準。電話調查部分於2021上半年起採用雙框抽樣設計，從家居固網電話號碼及流動電話號碼的結合樣本群中隨機抽取號碼。由於大部分人同時擁有家居固網電話號碼及流動電話號碼，為免重複計算或其他不明原因帶來的估算偏差，加權的計算方法將於下一個章節詳細解釋。

電話調查中，多數題目採用1至7分的評分尺度，以4分為中位數。這是心理學常用的科學尺度，稱為李克特量尺。現時編製指數常採用0至10分的尺度，其實分類過於細緻，令市民難以選擇。不過為了與現行指數匹配，是以我們利用數學方法將調查結果轉換成為常見的0至10分尺度（以5分為中位數）。



Table 16: Questions on public opinion  
表 16：民意調查問題

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Survey Question 民調問題
A1	'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to practice a high degree of autonomy, and has been able to handle its own internal administrative affairs. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港實行到高度自治，自行處理特區內嘅行政事務。你有幾同意呢？」
A2	'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent judiciary powers. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅司法權。你有幾同意呢？」
A3	'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent legislative powers. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅立法權。你有幾同意呢？」
A4	'How successful has the practice of 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' been?' 「整體嚟講，你認為落實『港人治港』有幾成功呢？」
B1	'After the handover, the original ways of life of the Hong Kong people have maintained. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港人繼續維持原有嘅生活方式。你有幾同意呢？」
B2	'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論、結社同集會自由。你有幾同意呢？」
B3	'After the handover, the development of Hong Kong's democratic system has been progressively implemented, following the provision of the Basic Law. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港嘅民主政制發展，正係按照基本法嘅規定，循序漸進地落實。你有幾同意呢？」
B4	'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capabilities, identities and social classes. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港人不論經濟能力、身份同社會地位都能夠得到法律保護。你有幾同意呢？」
C1	'When conflicts between mainland China and Hong Kong arise, how confident are you that the conflicts can be resolved through consultation and dialogue?' 「對於當內地同香港出現嘅矛盾時，兩地可透過對話協商得以解決，你有幾大信心呢？」
C2	'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to keep intact the sovereignty of China, national security and profits from development projects. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港可以做到維護國家主權、安全和發展利益。你有幾同意呢？」
C3	'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain long-term prosperity and stability. To what extent would you agree?' 「回歸之後，香港能夠維持到長期繁榮穩定。你有幾同意呢？」
C4	'How confident are you in the full implementation of 'One Country, Two Systems' in Hong Kong in the future before 2047?' 「你有幾大信心香港嘅未來（即 2047 年前）能全面落實『一國兩制』呢？」

Table 17: Survey details  
表 17：調查概況

Round 輪次	Survey Period 調查日期	Number of Respondents 受訪人數			Response Rates 回應率		Confidence Level 置信水平	Sampling Error 抽樣誤差
		Landline 固網	Mobile 手機	Total 總數	Landline 固網	Mobile 手機		
2017 H1	5.23 - 6.3	1,002	-	1,002	36.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2017 H2	12.11 - 12.23	1,006	-	1,006	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018 H1	5.23 - 6.2	1,004	-	1,004	37.2%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018 H2	12.3 - 12.12	1,001	-	1,001	38.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2019 H1	5.27 - 6.6	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
*	7.24 - 8.7	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
*	10.17 - 10.31	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2019 H2	12.10 - 12.20	1,000	-	1,000	40.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2020 H1	6.9 - 6.29	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2020 H2	12.22 - 1.13	1,002	-	1,002	32.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2021 H1	6.21 - 7.9	498	503	1,001	30.9%	31.4%	95.0%	±3.10%
2021 H2	12.20 - 1.10	497	506	1,003	30.6%	30.0%	95.0%	±3.09%
2022 H1	6.23 - 7.11	481	521	1,002	26.9%	28.2%	95.0%	±3.10%
2022 H2	12.15 - 1.18	474	531	1,005	24.4%	26.7%	95.0%	±3.09%
2023 H1	6.13 - 7.18	432	578	1,010	16.6%	23.3%	95.0%	±3.08%
2023 H2	1.12 - 2.29	248	763	1,011	31.4%	38.2%	95.0%	±3.08%
2024 H1	7.11 - 7.31	223	790	1,013	50.7%	54.8%	95.0%	±3.08%
2024 H2	1.21 - 2.25	257	748	1,005	48.1%	59.1%	95.0%	±3.08%

Note: ‘\*’ denotes surveys conducted in addition to the biannual exercise.  
註：「\*」為半年調查的額外輪次。



### 1.1.1. Weighting method for dual-frame sampling

In dual-frame sampling, weighting adjustments are made for the ownership of phone numbers in addition to the distribution of the Hong Kong population. Since everyone owns a different number of landline and mobile numbers, each has a different probability of being selected as a respondent. To eliminate the over-representation of any individual, the first weight factor (WT1) approximates the probability of selection for each respondent. It is a ratio of the amount of landline and mobile numbers owned by a respondent to the total number of such numbers in the territory.  $WT1_i$  is calculated by the inverse of probability of selection of individual  $i$ , i.e.  $WT1_i = \pi_i^{-1}$ .

$$\pi_i = \frac{n_L}{N_L} \times \frac{t_i^L}{e_i^L} + \frac{n_m}{N_m} \times t_i^m$$

Where 當中	$i$	=	$i$ -th person selected 第 $i$ 名被抽中的人士
	$n_L$	=	amount of sample's landline numbers 家居固網電話號碼樣本數目
	$N_L$	=	amount of population's landline numbers 全部家居固網電話號碼總數
	$t_i^L$	=	amount of $i$ -th person's landline numbers 第 $i$ 名人士家中擁有的固網電話號碼數目
	$e_i^L$	=	amount of eligible respondents in the household 住戶中合資格受訪人數
	$n_m$	=	amount of sample's mobile numbers 手機號碼樣本數目
	$N_m$	=	amount of population's mobile numbers 全部手機號碼總數
	$t_i^m$	=	amount of $i$ -th person's mobile numbers 第 $i$ 名人士個人擁有的手機號碼數目

Sampling in telephone surveys is randomized by phone numbers without consideration of demographics. The second weight factor (WT2) adjusts the size of each sample group to match population distribution in terms of gender and age. WT2 is calculated by dividing the population estimates for a specific gender and age group by its sample size and the sample's probability of selection.

### 1.1.1. 雙框電話號碼取樣的加權方法

在雙框電話號碼取樣中，除了以香港人口的分布作調整外，亦需要為擁有手提電話這個因素作出調整。由於每人擁有不同數目的固網及流動電話號碼，他們被抽中的機率也有不同。為剔除任何一人被超額代表的機會，第一步驟是估算每名受訪者被隨機抽中的機會率，即以每位受訪者擁有家居固網電話號碼和手機號碼數目，對比全港家居固網電話及手機號碼總數。加權因子 1 ( $WT1_i$ ) 之計算方式為受訪者  $i$  被抽中訪問的逆向機會率，即  $WT1_i = \pi_i^{-1}$ 。

電話調查的隨機抽樣是電話號碼，沒有考慮人口特徵。加權因子 2 (WT2) 按性別和年齡，調整每一個抽樣群組以配合人口分布。加權因子 2 是將性別和年齡分布的人口估算中除以樣本大小和樣本的選擇概率。

$$WT2 = \frac{\text{group population estimates 每組人口估算}}{\text{group sample size 每組樣本大小} \times WT1}$$

The final weighting factor (WT\_F) is calculated by the following formula. 最後加權因子計算如下。

$$WT\_F = WT1 \times WT2 \times \frac{\text{total sample size 總樣本大小}}{\text{total population estimates 總人口估算}}$$

Where 當中	<b>WT_F</b>	=	final weighting factor 最後加權因子
	<b>WT1</b>	=	weight factor adjusting for the ownership of phone numbers 調整電話號碼的加權因子
	<b>WT2</b>	=	weight factor adjusting for the distribution of the Hong Kong population 調整香港人口分布的加權因子



## 1.2. International perception

We obtain three pillar scores and twelve sub-pillar scores on the state of freedom and democracy in the world from tracking indices compiled by international think tanks. Every sub-pillar is derived from multiple indicators, offering wide coverage of scopes and territories that enable us to compare Hong Kong's position on the global stage from a 1C2S perspective. There are two selection criteria for data sources. First, their datasets must include Hong Kong to allow for direct comparison. Second, their indicators must capture key areas of 1C2S framework that draw international attention. Additionally, each data source has different geographic coverage, only locations observed by at least three quarters of all data sources are included. As a result, 127 indicators from nine data sources are adopted in our model to score and rank 148 countries and territories. Tables below show the list of indicators and their sources. Data sources include:

- Cato Institute and Fraser Institute: Human Freedom Index (HFI);
- Economist Intelligence Unit: Democracy Index (DI);
- Freedom House: Freedom in the World (FiW);
- International Institute for Management Development (IMD): World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY);
- Reporters Without Borders: World Press Freedom Index (WPF);
- V-Dem Institute: V-Dem Dataset (V-Dem);
- World Bank: Doing Business Index (DB);
- World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Index (GCI); and
- World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index (RoLI).

## 1.2. 國際評價

我們收集國際智庫編製的長期追蹤指數，以整合國際社會對世界自由民主狀況的3項支柱和12項子支柱評分。每項子支柱均由多個指標組成，這些指標涵蓋廣泛的範疇和地區，使我們能夠用「一國兩制」視角，在全球舞台上比較香港的地位。我們按兩個原則選擇數據來源：一、它們的數據集必須涵蓋香港，以便進行直接比較；二、它們的指標必須涵蓋國際社會所關心的「一國兩制」關鍵領域。此外，每個數據來源也有不同的地理覆蓋範圍，我們只採納所有數據來源中，最少獲四分之三涵蓋的地區。因此，我們的模型採用來自9個數據來源的127個指標對148個國家和地區進行評分和排名。以下列表顯示指標清單及其來源。數據來源包括：






Table 18: List of indicators on international perception (D. Economic Openness)

表 18：國際評價之指標列表 (D. 經濟開放)

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
D1. Business Environment 營商環境	Business facilitation 方便營商	D1.1	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.10 Burden of government regulation	GCI	1-7
		D1.2	5C Business regulations	EFW	0-10
		D1.3	Paying Taxes	DB	0-100
		D1.4	Resolving Insolvency	DB	0-100
	Labour market 勞動市場	D1.5	Pillar 8: Labour market	GCI	0-100
		D1.6	Business Efficiency - 3.2 Labor Market	WCY	0-100
D2. Market Access 市場門檻	Free trade 自由貿易	D2.1	4 Freedom to trade internationally	EFW	0-10
		D2.2	Pillar 7: Product market - Trade openness	GCI	0-100
		D2.3	Trading across Borders	DB	0-100
	Market competition 市場競爭	D2.4	Starting a Business	DB	0-10
		D2.5	Government Efficiency - 2.4 Business Legislation	WCY	0-100
		D2.6	Business Efficiency - 3.5 Attitudes and Values	WCY	0-100
		D2.7	Pillar 7: Product market - Domestic competition	GCI	0-100
D3. Regulatory Quality 監管質素	Protection of property rights 保障私有產權	D3.1	2C Protection of property rights	EFW	0-10
		D3.2	Infrastructure - 4.3.21 Intellectual property rights	WCY	0-10
		D3.3	Pillar 1: Institutions - Property rights	GCI	0-100
		D3.4	2F Legal enforcement of contracts	EFW	0-10
	Enforcement of contracts 履行合約	D3.5	Government Efficiency - 2.3.09 Legal and regulatory framework	WCY	0-10
		D3.6	Enforcing Contracts	DB	0-100
		D3.7	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes	GCI	1-7
	Corporate governance 企業管治	D3.8	Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Auditing and accounting practices	WCY	0-10
		D3.9	Pillar 1: Institutions - Corporate governance	GCI	0-100
		D3.10	Protecting Minority Investors	DB	0-100
D4. Financial Stability 金融穩定	Public finance 公共財政	D4.1	3 Sound Money	EFW	0-10
		D4.2	Government Efficiency - 2.1.07 Public finance	WCY	0-10
		D4.3	Pillar 4: Macroeconomic stability	GCI	0-100
	Money market 金融市場	D4.4	5A Credit market regulations	EFW	0-10
		D4.5	Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Banking and financial services	WCY	0-10
		D4.6	Getting Credit	DB	0-100
		D4.7	Pillar 9: Financial system	GCI	0-100



Table 19: List of indicators on international perception (E. Civil Liberty)

表 19：國際評價之指標列表 (E. 公民權利)

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度	
E1. Rule of Law 法治	Judicial independence 司法獨立	E1.1	F. Rule of Law – F1. Is there an independent judiciary?	FiW	0-4	
		E1.2	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.07 Judicial independence	GCI	0-100	
	Civil and criminal justice 民事與刑事公義	E1.3	F. Rule of Law – F2. Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?	FiW	0-4	
		E1.4	Government Efficiency – 2.5.01 Justice	WCY	0-10	
		E1.5	Factor 7: Civil Justice	RoLI	0-1	
		E1.6	Factor 8: Criminal Justice	RoLI	0-1	
	Equal protection 平等保障	E1.7	F. Rule of Law – F4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?	FiW	0-4	
		E1.8	Access to justice	V-Dem	0-1	
	Regulatory enforcement 監管執法	E1.9	Factor 6: Regulatory Enforcement	RoLI	0-1	
		E1.10	Rigorous and impartial public administration	V-Dem	0-4	
		E1.11	Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	V-Dem	0-4	
E2. Security and Safety 安全	Absence of crime 杜絕犯罪	E2.1	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.01 Organized crime	GCI	1-7	
		E2.2	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.04 Reliability of police services	GCI	1-7	
		E2.3	Factor 5: Order and Security – 5.1 Crime is effectively controlled	RoLI	0-1	
	Right to life 生存權利	E2.4	B Security and Safety – Bi Homicide	PFI	0-10	
		E2.5	F. Rule of Law – F3. Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?	FiW	0-4	
		E2.6	Physical violence index	V-Dem	0-1	
		E2.7	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.2 The right to life and security of the person is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1	
	Civil conflict and terrorism 內戰與恐怖主義	E2.8	B Security and Safety – Bii. Disappearances, conflicts, and terrorism	PFI	0-10	
		E2.9	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.03 Terrorism incidence	GCI	0-100	
		E2.10	Factor 5: Order and Security – 5.2 Civil conflict is effectively limited	RoLI	0-1	
E3. Expression, Association and Assembly 表達、結社與集會	Expression 表達	E3.1	F Freedom of Expression – Fi Direct Attacks on Press	PFI	0-10	
		E3.2	(Removed)*	-	-	
		E3.3	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D1. Are there free and independent media?	FiW	0-4	
		E3.4	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?	FiW	0-4	
		E3.5	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D4. Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?	FiW	0-4	
		E3.6	World Press Freedom Index	WPFI	0-100	
		E3.7	Freedom of expression index	V-Dem	0-1	
		E3.8	Alternative sources of information index	V-Dem	0-1	
		E3.9	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.4 Freedom of opinion and expression is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1	
		E3.10	E. Associational and Organizational Rights	FiW	0-12	
		Association and Assembly 結社和集會	E3.11	Freedom of peaceful assembly	V-Dem	0-4
			E3.12	CSO entry and exit	V-Dem	0-4
			E3.13	CSO repression	V-Dem	0-4
			E3.14	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.7 Freedom of assembly and association is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1

\* Combined with E3.1 to reflect a revision from Cato Institute.  
因應卡托研究所之修訂，與 E3.1 合併。

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
E4. Individual Rights 個人權利	Religion 宗教	E4.1	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief – D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or non-belief in public and private?	FiW	0-4
		E4.2	Freedom of religion	V-Dem	0-4
		E4.3	Religious organization repression	V-Dem	0-4
		E4.4	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.5 Freedom of belief and religion is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Movement 遷徙	E4.5	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?	FiW	0-4
		E4.6	Freedom of domestic movement	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.7	Freedom of foreign movement	V-Dem	0-4
	Labour 勞動	E4.8	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G4. Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation?	FiW	0-4
		E4.9	Government Efficiency – 2.5.11 Equal opportunity	WCY	0-10
		E4.10	Freedom from forced labor	V-Dem	0-1
	Property rights 私有產權	E4.11	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.8 Fundamental labor rights are effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
		E4.12	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G2. Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors?	FiW	0-4
	Relationship 關係	E4.13	Property rights	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.14	Relationship Freedoms	PFI	0-10
		E4.15	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights – G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?	FiW	0-4
		E4.16	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.1 Equal treatment and absence of discrimination	RoLI	0-1
	Privacy, non-discrimination and equal treatment 私隱、非歧視和平等對待	E4.17	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights – 4.6 Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1

Table 20: List of indicators on international perception (F. Democratic Development)

表 20：國際評價之指標列表 (F. 民主發展)

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
F1. Constraints on Power 權力制約	Executive check 制約行政權	F1.1	Functioning of government	DI	0-100
		F1.2	Factor 1: Constraints on Government Powers	RoLI	0-1
		F1.3	Judicial constraints on the executive index	V-Dem	0-1
		F1.4	Legislative constraints on the executive index	V-Dem	0-1
		F1.5	C. Functioning of Government – C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?	FiW	0-4
		F1.6	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.08 Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations	GCI	0-100
	Absence of corruption 杜絕貪腐	F1.7	C. Functioning of Government – C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?	FiW	0-4
		F1.8	Government Efficiency – 2.3.13 Bribery and corruption	WCY	0-10
		F1.9	Political corruption index	V-Dem	0-1 (inverted 倒數)
		F1.10	Factor 2: Absence of Corruption	RoLI	0-1

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
F2. Political Pluralism 政治多元	Electoral process 選舉過程	F2.1	A. Electoral Process	FiW	0-12
		F2.2	Electoral process and pluralism	DI	0-100
		F2.3	Clean elections index	V-Dem	0-1
		F2.4	Share of population with suffrage	V-Dem	0-1
		F2.5	Disclosure of campaign donations	V-Dem	0-4
	Political competition 政治競爭	F2.6	B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B2. Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?	FiW	0-4
		F2.7	B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B3. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?	FiW	0-4
		F2.8	Public campaign finance	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.9	Divided party control index	V-Dem	z score z 分數
		F2.10	Elected officials index	V-Dem	0-1
	Party development 政團發展	F2.11	B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?	FiW	0-4
		F2.12	Barriers to parties	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.13	Party ban	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.14	Opposition parties autonomy	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.15	Party institutionalization index	V-Dem	0-1
F3. Civic Participation 公民參與	Political rights and awareness 政治權利與意識	F3.1	B. Political Pluralism and Participation – B4. Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?	FiW	0-4
		F3.2	Political participation	DI	0-100
	Citizen engagement 公民參與	F3.3	Mass mobilization	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.4	Civil society participation index	V-Dem	0-1
		F3.5	Engagement in state-administered mass organizations	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.6	Engagement in independent trade unions	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.7	Engagement in independent political associations	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.8	Engagement in independent non-political associations	V-Dem	0-4
	Transparency and open government 政務公開	F3.9	Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.06 Budget transparency	GCI	0-100
F3.10		Pillar 1: Institutions – 1.12 E-participation	GCI	0-100	
F3.11		C. Functioning of Government – C3. Does the government operate with openness and transparency?	FiW	0-4	
F3.12		Factor 3: Open Government	RoLI	0-1	
F3.13		Government Efficiency – 2.3.11 Transparency	WCY	0-10	
F4. Democratic Culture 民主文化	Public attitude 大眾態度	F4.1	Political culture	DI	0-100
		F4.2	Deliberative component index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.3	Political Polarization	V-Dem	0-4 (inverted 倒數)
		F4.4	Political violence	V-Dem	0-4 (inverted 倒數)
		F4.5	Factor 5: Order and Security – 5.3 People do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances	RoLI	0-1
	Political equality 政治平等	F4.6	Equal protection index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.7	Equal access index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.8	Equal distribution of resources index	V-Dem	0-1



### 1.2.1. Aggregation method for composite indicators

International indices are often released with a considerable time lag due to the extensive data compilation required from many countries. Very few indicators are collected for release in the immediate index period. Therefore, we offset the time difference by rolling data forward to the release date. In other words, indicators are assigned to the index period in which they become available. Figure 21 shows the number of indicators by years offset. An alternative approach is to backdate data to the collection period. However, this approach has three disadvantages. First, no change will be observed in the latest issue because new scores are applied to an earlier period. Second, our biannual report will always record identical values in the first and second halves because most datasets are compiled on a yearly basis. Third, published scores will be substantially revised in the subsequent issue because indicators are updated retrospectively. It is noteworthy that backdating or time offsetting affects only the presentation of historical scores. Both approaches produce the latest pillar scores based on the most recent available data.

Countries and territories covered by insufficient data sources are omitted in our model. For remaining included locations, an imputation process is carried out to replace missing data. Countries and territories are categorized into 7 regions according to the World Bank region groups. When a missing value arises, it is substituted with the regional average of recorded values. To standardize the range of data values, the complete dataset is transformed into a common scale by min-max normalisation as the below formula. For each indicator in each index period, the frontier value will be rescaled to 10 and the bottom value to 0. Even if a country or territory has the same raw score over time, its normalized score can be changed due to a change in the minimum or maximum value of the data series.

### 1.2.1. 綜合指數的整合方法

搜集大量國家數據需時，因此國際指數出版的時候一般會滯後，只有少數指標能夠即期發布。因此，我們會將數據向前滾動至出版日期，以補上時間落差。換言之，當國際智庫一發布最新指標，我們便會馬上更新至即期指數。圖 21 顯示經年期調整之指標數目。另外值得考慮的方法，是將數據回溯至它們的收集時期，但是有三個缺點。第一，我們的評分在每次發布時不會有改變，因為新分數只會被更新至較早的收集時期。第二，我們在上半年和下半年公布的數字往往會相同，因為大部分國際指數只會每年更新一次。第三，已發布的數字會在期後報告大幅修訂，因為指標只會往後更新。值得注意的是，向前滾動或向後回溯只會影響歷史分數如何呈現。發布時，它們的最新評分將會相同，因為兩者皆以最新數據去計算最新分數。

數據來源不足的國家或地區將會被省略，如尚有缺失的數據，我們將會以插補方式填補。我們根據世界銀行的標準將所有地區歸類為 7 個地理組別，並以該地理組別中有紀錄的平均值去填補缺失的數據。為將各個指標的高低範圍標準化，整個數據庫會以最小—最大標準化方式轉換至一個共同尺度，公式如下。每個時期的每個指標中，最高的數值將會被縮放為 10，最低的數值則會是 0。隨著一項指標的最低或最高值改變，即使一個國家或地區在不同時期擁有相同的原始分數，經標準化後的分數亦有機會改變。



$$\text{normalized score 標準化分數} = \frac{x_i - \min(x)}{\max(x) - \min(x)}$$

A sub-pillar score is generated by its indicators with weights determined by principal component analysis. It is a standard statistical method that processes and simplifies data scientifically in index construction. It extracts a dataset's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains variations across the data through the below statistical analysis. Table 21 shows the weights of every indicator in recent index periods. Measuring about 60 countries and territories only, the coverage of IMD's World Competitiveness Yearbook is significantly smaller than other data sources. As there are more missing than recorded entries, we will assign a zero weight to IMD indicators for unobserved countries and territories instead of imputing with sub-regional average. The weights of available indicators from the remaining data sources will be enlarged proportionately.

子支柱分數整合自多個指標，而各個指標的權重由主成分分析產生。這是一種分析和簡化數據的統計技術，是以科學化方式編製指數的標準方法。此方法通過對數據進行特徵分解，以得出數據的主要成分與它們的權值，優點是揭露數據的內部結構，從而更好解釋數據的變化。表 19 顯示近期指數的各個指標權重。IMD 世界競爭力年報只覆蓋約 60 個國家和地區，比其他數據來源的覆蓋量顯然較少，缺失的數值比有紀錄的更多。所以，未被收錄的國家或地區，我們會將相關指標的權重調整為零，而非以地理組別的平均值填補，其他數據來源的權重則會按比例地增大。

Figure 21: Number of indicators by offsetting years

圖 21：經年期調整之指標數目




Table 21: PCA weights (%)

表 21：主成分權重 (%)

D. Economic Openness 經濟開放						E. Civil Liberty 公民權利					F. Democratic Development 民主發展						
	2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2	2024 H1	2024 H2		2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2	2024 H1	2024 H2		2022 H2	2023 H1	2023 H2	2024 H1	2024 H2
D1.1	12.9	13.9	21.8	22.6	22.6	E1.1	9.4	9.3	9.2	9.4	9.4	F1.1	12.5	12.4	12.4	12.5	12.9
D1.2	19.4	19.8	21.7	22.4	22.4	E1.2	7.1	7.0	7.2	7.1	7.2	F1.2	12.8	12.5	12.5	12.5	12.6
D1.3	19.1	19.6	16.1	16.0	16.0	E1.3	10.6	10.5	10.5	10.7	10.7	F1.3	11.1	10.8	10.8	10.8	10.7
D1.4	16.9	17.0	10.4	9.9	9.9	E1.4	2.5	2.8	2.9	2.5	2.6	F1.4	9.3	9.6	9.5	10.3	10.3
D1.5	22.7	23.2	19.7	19.5	19.5	E1.5	10.5	10.6	10.7	10.7	10.7	F1.5	10.1	10.0	9.9	10.0	9.9
D1.6	9.1	6.6	10.3	9.7	9.7	E1.6	10.8	10.9	10.8	10.8	10.9	F1.6	4.8	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.7
D2.1	14.5	14.7	15.9	16.3	16.0	E1.7	8.7	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.5	F1.7	12.5	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.3
D2.2	15.1	15.3	15.3	16.1	16.0	E1.8	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.4	9.4	F1.8	3.6	4.1	4.2	3.4	3.4
D2.3	13.2	13.5	13.4	13.6	13.8	E1.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.9	10.8	F1.9	12.3	12.2	12.2	12.3	12.2
D2.4	11.2	11.1	11.5	12.1	12.0	E1.10	10.5	10.1	10.0	10.2	10.2	F1.10	11.1	11.0	11.1	11.0	11.0
D2.5	16.9	16.7	16.0	16.5	16.4	E1.11	9.5	9.7	9.7	9.7	9.7	F2.1	9.7	9.5	9.5	9.4	9.4
D2.6	10.1	9.6	9.0	6.0	6.2	E2.1	10.1	10.2	9.8	9.8	9.9	F2.2	9.2	9.2	9.1	9.2	9.2
D2.7	19.1	19.2	18.8	19.4	19.7	E2.2	10.5	10.6	10.2	10.2	10.3	F2.3	8.0	7.7	7.7	8.1	8.1
D3.1	13.1	13.2	12.7	12.9	12.9	E2.3	11.1	11.2	11.2	11.2	11.1	F2.4	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4
D3.2	10.7	11.2	10.8	10.7	10.7	E2.4	4.6	4.7	5.2	5.2	4.4	F2.5	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.8	5.7
D3.3	13.5	13.8	13.8	14.0	14.0	E2.5	13.9	13.6	13.6	13.4	13.7	F2.6	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.3	9.3
D3.4	10.3	10.3	12.2	12.4	12.4	E2.6	11.0	10.8	10.7	11.1	11.1	F2.7	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.6
D3.5	6.5	5.3	4.7	3.9	3.9	E2.7	14.2	14.1	13.7	13.7	13.9	F2.8	3.8	4.1	4.1	4.4	4.4
D3.6	8.0	8.1	8.0	8.1	8.1	E2.8	13.1	13.0	13.8	13.6	14.2	F2.9	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5
D3.7	10.5	10.2	9.5	9.5	9.4	E2.9	4.8	4.9	4.4	4.3	4.2	F2.10	4.4	4.9	5.0	4.7	4.7
D3.8	9.6	10.0	9.6	9.2	9.2	E2.10	6.8	7.0	7.3	7.4	7.1	F2.11	9.9	9.8	9.8	9.6	9.6
D3.9	10.4	10.6	10.7	11.1	11.1	E3.1	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.1	F2.12	8.3	8.2	8.1	7.9	7.9
D3.10	7.3	7.4	7.8	8.1	8.1	E3.2	-	-	-	-	-	F2.13	6.2	6.0	6.1	5.9	5.9
D4.1	15.5	15.9	17.4	17.9	18.2	E3.3	8.4	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	F2.14	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.6	8.6
D4.2	8.6	7.4	6.0	4.8	4.6	E3.4	8.3	8.2	8.2	8.3	8.4	F2.15	6.6	6.7	6.7	6.6	6.6
D4.3	22.1	23.0	22.5	22.4	21.9	E3.5	8.3	8.4	8.3	8.2	8.2	F3.1	12.8	12.7	12.7	12.1	12.1
D4.4	8.8	9.0	11.1	11.3	11.7	E3.6	7.7	7.7	7.8	7.6	7.6	F3.2	13.0	12.7	12.8	12.4	12.4
D4.5	17.1	16.3	14.8	15.4	15.2	E3.7	8.9	8.7	8.8	8.8	8.8	F3.3	1.0	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3
D4.6	6.3	6.4	7.0	7.2	6.8	E3.8	7.8	7.6	7.6	7.8	7.8	F3.4	10.8	10.3	10.2	10.7	10.7
D4.7	21.7	22.2	21.3	21.0	21.5	E3.9	7.2	7.2	7.1	7.1	7.0	F3.5	6.3	7.3	7.2	7.0	7.0
						E3.10	8.7	8.7	8.8	8.8	8.8	F3.6	4.8	5.1	4.8	5.1	5.1
						E3.11	7.7	8.1	8.1	8.0	8.0	F3.7	3.7	4.9	4.7	6.5	6.5
						E3.12	8.0	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.0	F3.8	2.8	3.3	3.1	4.5	4.5
						E3.13	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	F3.9	10.2	9.8	10.3	9.8	9.8
						E3.14	7.6	7.6	7.5	7.5	7.5	F3.10	7.4	7.0	7.4	6.8	6.8
						E4.1	6.0	6.0	5.9	6.1	6.0	F3.11	14.1	13.5	13.4	12.5	12.5
						E4.2	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.7	5.7	F3.12	12.3	11.7	11.7	11.1	11.1
						E4.3	5.9	5.9	5.8	6.0	5.9	F3.13	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.1
						E4.4	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.7	F4.1	13.1	13.1	12.8	13.0	13.2
						E4.5	7.9	7.8	7.8	7.9	7.9	F4.2	13.0	13.4	13.5	13.0	13.1
						E4.6	6.1	6.9	6.9	6.9	6.9	F4.3	7.1	6.3	6.4	7.3	7.3
						E4.7	5.6	5.9	6.0	6.4	6.4	F4.4	10.9	10.3	10.3	10.7	10.7
						E4.8	7.9	7.8	7.8	7.8	7.7	F4.5	9.2	9.1	9.3	9.6	9.3
						E4.9	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	F4.6	16.4	16.7	16.6	16.3	16.3
						E4.10	5.3	5.1	5.1	4.9	4.9	F4.7	13.9	14.4	14.3	13.7	13.7
						E4.11	6.2	6.1	6.1	6.1	6.1	F4.8	16.4	16.5	16.7	16.4	16.4
						E4.12	7.9	7.9	7.8	7.8	7.8						
						E4.13	6.2	6.3	6.3	5.9	5.8						
						E4.14	4.3	4.1	4.3	4.2	4.2						
						E4.15	7.0	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8						
						E4.16	4.6	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.6						
						E4.17	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6						



### 1.3. Revisions and refinement

After the first survey in June 2017, our public opinion questionnaire was refined during the 2017 H2, 2020 H2 and 2022 H1 rounds to increase validity. These refinements include change of wordings, as well as the addition and removal of questions, affecting five of the twelve questions used to compute public opinion scores. The scores from the other seven questions are directly comparable as they are identical in all surveys. Table 22 and Table 23 show the history of the refinement of our questionnaire and the score differences resulting from these changes, respectively.

Since the 2022 H1 report, we have expanded the measurement system for international perception by incorporating more indicators and data sources to enhance objectivity. Figure 22 compares each country's score in the original and revised measurement systems within the same index period. The overall correlation is very strong. Although a broader selection of indicators leads to slight score differences, both systems are consistent in reflecting a country's performance.

Table 22: Revisions of questions on public opinion

表 22：民意調查問題之修訂

Round 輪次	Revision 修訂	
2017 H2	Removed 'After the handover, the internal affairs of Hong Kong have not been interfered with by the central and local governments of China. To what extent would you agree?'	移除「回歸之後，特區內部事務並無受到中央各部門同其他內地省市嘅干預。你有幾同意呢？」
2017 H2	Revised 'After the handover, the way of life of the Hong Kong people has not been affected by mainland China. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain their original way of life. To what extent would you agree?'	修訂「回歸之後，香港人原有嘅生活方式受到內地影響。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港人繼續維持原有嘅生活方式。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?'	新增「回歸之後，香港人繼續喺法律面前一律平等。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to keep intact the sovereignty of China, national security and profits from development projects. To what extent would you agree?'	新增「回歸之後，香港可以做到維護國家主權、安全和發展利益。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain prosperity and stability in the long term. To what extent would you agree?'	新增「回歸之後，香港能夠維持到長期繁榮穩定。你有幾同意呢？」
2022 H1	Revised 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedom of speech.' to 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly.'	修訂「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論自由。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論、結社同集會自由。你有幾同意呢？」
2022 H1	Revised 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capability, identity and social status. To what extent would you agree?'	修訂「回歸之後，香港人繼續喺法律面前一律平等。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港人不論經濟能力、身份同社會地位都能夠得到法律保護。你有幾同意呢？」

### 1.3. 修訂與調整

在2017年6月進行第一次調查之後，我們的民意調查問卷在2017下半年、2021上半年和2022上半年的輪次中經歷三次修訂，以提高調查的應用性。修訂包括更改調查問題的用字，增加或移除問題，過程影響到民意調查評分中的5條問題，另外7條問題在所有調查均相同，評分可以直接比較。表20和表21分別顯示調查問題的修訂歷史和得分差異。

為加強國際評價的客觀性，我們在2022上半年擴展了國際評價的指標體系，採納更多的指標和數據來源。圖22比較每個國家在原有和修訂後的指標體系中，同一指數時期的得分，顯示整體相關性非常強。儘管指標數量增加導致分數略有差異，但每個地區的得分在兩個指標體系之中表現一致。




Table 23: Score difference due to revisions of questions on public opinion

表 23：修訂民意調查問題之評分差距

Round 輪次	Identical 相同	Revised 修訂	Difference 差距
2017 H1	4.70	4.84	0.14
2017 H2	4.67	4.98	0.31
2018 H1	4.78	5.05	0.27
2018 H2	4.59	4.84	0.25
2019 H1	4.30	4.58	0.28
2019 H2	3.27	3.53	0.26
2020 H1	3.15	3.39	0.24
2020 H2	3.15	3.62	0.47
2021 H1	3.19	3.62	0.43
2021 H2	3.64	4.02	0.38
2022 H1	4.35	4.71	0.36
2022 H2	4.59	4.98	0.39
2023 H1	4.89	5.22	0.33
2023 H2	4.95	5.21	0.26
2024 H1	5.24	5.45	0.22
2024 H2	5.14	5.38	0.24

Figure 22: Score difference of revised measurement systems on international perception

圖 22：修訂國際評價指標體系後之評分差距



We build up a massive dataset by collecting media articles that contain the keyword 'One Country, Two Systems' from news database. Our sample consists of 261,332 news reports from 6 television and radio stations, 21 local daily newspapers and 10 online-only media that were published between April 1998 and December 2023. Each article undergoes a 'tokenisation' process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of over 20 years, our text corpus contains around 230 million tokens. The number of articles processed from each media source is listed in Table 24.

Common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as pronouns, prepositions and particles, are first removed before further analysis. To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: 'positive', 'negative' or 'neutral'. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by the Natural Language Processing and Sentiment Analysis Lab, Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica.

An article is made up of paragraphs. For each paragraph, net sentiment is calculated by the difference between the number of positive and negative words divided by the total word count. At the article level, a net sentiment score is then derived by averaging the net sentiment of its constituent paragraphs with the below equation. To each news source, a daily net sentiment score is further assigned by averaging the score of all articles published in the past 30 days. This time frame of 30 days is a reporting standard of the media industry. MMI is set at 100 on the base day of 1 January 2021.

我們以關鍵字「一國兩制」搜集新聞文章，組成累計 261,332 篇報道的龐大數據庫，包含 1998 年 4 月至 2023 年 12 月期間，來自本地 6 間電視電台、21 份日報和 10 間純網媒。我們就每篇文章進行「分詞」，通過電腦運算將文章分解成語例（單詞或短語）。我們利用超過 20 年的資料組成語料庫，包含大約 2 億 110 萬個語例。表 22 顯示每份報章所運算的文章數量。

在進一步分析這個龐大的語料庫之前，我們首先剔除無助理解文章的常見單詞，如代詞、介詞和助詞。為了辨別一篇文章的情緒，我們採用由台灣中央研究院資訊科學研究所自然語言處理與情感分析實驗室開發的繁體中文情緒字典，把語例分類為「正面」、「中立」或「負面」。

每篇文章由段落組成。我們首先計算每一段落中，正負語例數量的相差，再除以整個段落的字數。每篇文章的情緒評分則為所有段落的平均值，見以下方程式。每個新聞來源的每日情緒評分為過去 30 日所有出版文章的平均分數。媒體行業習慣以 30 日作為報告單位。輿情指數在 2021 年 1 月 1 日設定為基數日。

$$\text{net sentiment score 情緒評分} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \frac{(a_i - b_i)}{w_i}}{N}$$

$N$  = total number of paragraphs 段落總數

$i$  = the  $i^{\text{th}}$  paragraph 第  $i$  個段落

$a^i$  = number of positive words 正面語例數目

$b_i$  = number of negative words 負面語例數目

$w_i$  = total number of words 正面語例數目

People often receive news from multiple sources and channels. Given the substantial differences in the number of news articles published by various sources and the viewership across different channels, the article count of a news source alone may be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure the reliability of the 1C2S MMI, the sentiment score for each news source is weighted by public perceptions of its credibility, based on the survey "Public Evaluation on Media Credibility" conducted by the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Additionally, each media channel is weighted according to people's primary sources of news from the survey "Appraisal of the Local News Media," conducted by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute.

市民一般從多個新聞來源和傳播媒介取得資訊。由於不同媒體在不同媒介刊登的文章數目、接觸人數有明顯差別，因此，只考慮文章數目不足以呈現不同媒體對讀者觀感的影響力。為確保可靠性，本指數將採用由香港中文大學傳播與民意調查中心「市民對傳媒公信力的評分」為每個新聞來源的情緒評分加權，以及由香港民意調查中心「新聞傳媒評價」中市民的主要新聞來源為每個傳播媒介的覆蓋度加權。

Table 24: Articles processed in 1C2S MMI

表 24：輿情指數之處理報道數

	2023 Q4	2024 Q1	2024 Q2	2024 Q3	2024 Q4	Database Total 數據庫總量
<b>TV &amp; Radio 電視電台</b>	<b>765</b>	<b>699</b>	<b>659</b>	<b>770</b>	<b>925</b>	<b>30,104</b>
Cable TV / Hong Kong Open TV 有線電視 / 香港開電視	42	45	38	55	62	1,196
Commercial Radio 商業電台	90	72	69	70	93	3,869
Metro Radio 新城電台	80	98	88	89	100	2,853
Now TV	181	171	141	174	183	6,366
RTHK 香港電台	280	203	251	261	344	10,105
TVB 無綫電視	92	110	72	121	143	5,715
<b>Newspaper 報章</b>	<b>3,185</b>	<b>3,119</b>	<b>2,324</b>	<b>3,493</b>	<b>3,756</b>	<b>221,921</b>
am730	106	104	82	92	111	5,520
Apple Daily 蘋果日報	-	-	-	-	-	13,076
Headline Daily 頭條日報	-	2	149	238	275	2,385
Hong Kong Commercial Daily 香港商報	218	169	126	466	517	20,431
Hong Kong Daily News 新報	-	-	-	-	-	4,476
Hong Kong Economic Journal 信報	141	142	136	145	170	6,726
Hong Kong Economic Times 經濟日報	60	63	66	78	47	9,649
Lion Rock Daily 香港仔	42	36	17	33	23	760
Metro Daily 都市日報	-	-	-	-	-	1,528
Ming Pao Daily News 明報	156	124	116	128	148	16,171
Oriental Daily News 東方日報	28	28	25	21	22	10,441
South China Morning Post 南華早報	18	-	-	-	1	708
Sharp Daily 爽報	-	-	-	-	-	152
Sing Pao 成報	59	41	30	30	8	5,573
Sing Tao Daily 星島日報	260	220	231	186	259	17,390
Sky Post 晴報	-	-	-	-	-	833
Ta Kung Pao 大公報	1,018	1,159	520	932	921	50,724
The Standard 英文虎報	3	-	-	1	1	109
The Sun 太陽報	-	-	-	-	-	4,828
Tin Tin Daily News 天天日報	-	-	-	-	-	452
Wen Wei Po 文匯報	1,076	1,031	826	1,143	1,253	49,989
<b>Online-Only Media 純網媒</b>	<b>776</b>	<b>717</b>	<b>645</b>	<b>724</b>	<b>796</b>	<b>28,012</b>
Bastille Post 巴士的報	388	354	357	343	433	12,909
Citizen News 眾新聞	-	-	-	-	-	1,186
HK01 香港 01	306	296	225	314	308	9,729
Hong Kong Free Press 香港自由新聞	6	1	-	1	-	46
Initium Media 端傳媒	9	10	8	10	9	214
In-Media 獨立媒體	28	27	18	28	20	603
Passion Times 熱血時報	38	26	37	27	25	774
Post 852 852 郵報	-	-	-	-	-	631
Speak Out HK 港人講地	1	3	-	1	1	60
Stand News 立場新聞	-	-	-	-	-	1,860
<b>Total 總數</b>	<b>4,726</b>	<b>4,535</b>	<b>3,628</b>	<b>4,987</b>	<b>5,477</b>	<b>280,037</b>

## 2.1. Accuracy test

1C2S MMI is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict.

In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time. As shown in Table 25, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as 'positive' whereas 1,472 were classified as 'negative.'

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be.

Table 25 also shows the average sentiment scores of these three groups of paragraphs. In particular, 'positive' paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as 'negative' paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these three groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.

Table 25: Results of accuracy test  
表 25：覆查結果

	Positive 正面	Neutral 中立	Negative 負面
No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers 真人研究員對情緒的判斷	2,363	14,202	1,472
Net Value 情緒淨值	21.76%	14.42%	2.92%

## 2.1. 準確度覆查

「一國兩制」輿情指數是建基於由詞彙組成的模型。此模型視每段落為一籃子的詞語，從而抽離整篇文章的脈絡。其中一個效果是可能無法辨認到如諷刺等寫作手法，因而不能完全理解每一個段落的真正含義。這個局限在分析小說及文學作品時可能較為明顯，但對於寫作手法較直接的新聞文章而言，相信不是一個大問題。

為證實此詞彙模型辨別情緒的準確度，我們請兩位研究員從語料庫中隨機抽取了約 18,000 個段落，親自分類為「正面」、「負面」和「中立」，再與詞彙模型比較。各段落的出處在給予研究員之前已經被隱藏。假如兩名研究員對同一個段落的情緒判斷有異，第三名研究員將會重讀並作出判斷。是次覆查中，兩名研究員在大約八成的情況下均能作出相同的判斷。

我們利用與「一國兩制」輿情指數相同的詞彙模型為此等段落的情緒評分。在模型中，情緒評分為正、負面詞語量的淨值，所以評分愈高代表情緒愈正面。表 23 顯示利用詞彙模型計算的情緒評分。2,363 及 1,472 個段落分別被判決為「正面」及「負面」。被研究員判斷為「正面」的段落，情緒評分為 21.76%，約為「負面」段落的 7.5 倍。再者，利用多變量回歸分析，三個類別的情緒評分發現具統計學上的顯著差異，證實詞彙模型的計算結果與我們研究員的人手分類一致。




### Perception of 1C2S 「一國兩制」觀感

We construct a conceptual framework to capture the current situation of 1C2S through six pillars, three based on public opinion and three based on international perception. The three pillars on public opinion are derived from telephone polls conducted among Hong Kong residents, evaluating the implementation of 1C2S. The three pillars on international perception are compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on the state of freedom and democracy worldwide. Each pillar is further divided into four sub-pillars. Consequently, we create a measurement system comprising six pillars and 24 sub-pillars. Each sub-pillar is assigned equal weight to generate a pillar score. The 1C2S Index is calculated as the simple average of all six pillar scores. Table 15 below outlines the six pillars and 24 sub-pillars used in our index.

我們建構一個觀念框架以量度香港實踐「一國兩制」的情況，基於民意調查的3項支柱及國際評價的3項支柱。民意調查的3項支柱是取自香港市民在電話調查中對落實「一國兩制」的評分。國際評價的3項支柱取自國際智庫就全球自由和民主狀況而製作的相關指數。每項支柱各設4項子支柱，使此指標體系共6項支柱和24項子支柱。每項子支柱賦予均等權重，以計算支柱的分數。「一國兩制」指數是6項支柱的簡單平均分數。表13列出指數所使用的6項支柱和24項子支柱。

Figure 23: Changes of public perceptions towards 1C2S  
圖 23：「一國兩制」公眾觀感的變動



## 2


## Media sentiment and public opinion 輿情與民情

We construct a conceptual framework to capture the current situation of 1C2S through six pillars, three based on public opinion and three based on international perception. The three pillars on public opinion are derived from telephone polls conducted among Hong Kong residents, evaluating the implementation of 1C2S. The three pillars on international perception are compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on the state of freedom and democracy worldwide. Each pillar is further divided into four sub-pillars. Consequently, we create a measurement system comprising six pillars and 24 sub-pillars. Each sub-pillar is assigned equal weight to generate a pillar score. The 1C2S Index is calculated as the simple average of all six pillar scores. Table 15 below outlines the six pillars and 24 sub-pillars used in our index.

我們利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒，計算電視電台、報紙和純網媒上所有與「一國兩制」有關文章的情緒淨值，每月編製「一國兩制」輿情指數，每季度結算。媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素，我們將之與香港民研的「民情指數」比較。「民情指數」反映公眾對政治、社會和經濟環境的情緒反應，包涵「政通」和「人和」兩個概念，評價整體政府管治表現和整體社會狀況。圖 24 顯示輿情指數與民情指數於 2017 年及 2018 年上下浮動，2019 年觸底並自此復甦。

Figure 24: Changes of MMI and PSI

圖 24：輿情指數與民情指數走勢



## 3

## Political orientation 政治傾向


We ask citizens about their political inclination in our half-yearly survey and classify them as pro-establishment supporters, non-establishment supporters (including democrats, localists, and self-determinists), and moderates (including centrists and those without specific political inclination). HKUPOP conducted telephone surveys every two weeks to collect citizens' political inclination and results from October 2016 to June 2019 were released. After spinning off from the University of Hong Kong, HKPORI launches the 'We Hong Kongers' series and invites citizens to fill out questionnaires via email almost every week. Results are rim-weighted to obtain political inclination of the online group. The Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (HKIAPS) of the Chinese University of Hong Kong conducts regular telephone surveys to assess popularity of the chief executive of the HKSAR government. Political inclination of respondents has become part of its release since 2020.

我們在每半年的電話調查中詢問市民的政治傾向，統稱為建制派、非建制派（包括民主派、本土派和自決派）和溫和派（包括中間派和沒有政治取態）。港大民研每兩星期進行電話調查，其間統計市民的政治傾向，並對外公布 2016 年 10 月至 2019 年 6 月的數據。脫離香港大學後，香港民研的「我們香港人」計劃接近每星期以電郵邀請市民填寫問卷，數據經過反覆多重加權，得出網上群組的政治傾向。香港中文大學香港亞太研究所（亞太所）定期就特首民望進行電話調查，自 2020 年起同時公布訪者問的政治傾向。

Political inclination identified by HKPORI and HKIAPS, while termed differently, aligned closely with our classification. Moderates in our survey correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the centrist camp' and 'no political inclination / politically neutral / not belong to any camp' and HKIAPS' 'no specific inclination'. Non-establishment supporters correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the pro-democracy camp' and 'inclined towards the localist camp' and HKIAPS' 'non-establishment'. Pro-establishment supporters correspond to HKPORI's 'inclined towards the pro-establishment camp' and HKIAPS' 'pro-establishment'. Figure 25 shows that both surveys are consistent with our findings. A trend of deradicalization was witnessed from mid-2017 to late-2019, followed by a rapid formation and dissolution of non-establishment supporters in the immediate year and the rise of moderate politics since mid-2020.

雖然香港民研與亞太所對各種政治傾向有不同名稱，但是大致能夠對應我們的分類。我們的建制派對應前者的「傾向建制派」和後者的「建制」，非建制派對應前者的「傾向民主派」與「傾向本土派」和後者的「非建制」，溫和派對應前者的「偏向中間派」與「沒有政治傾向／政治中立／不屬於任何派別」和後者的「沒有明確傾向」。圖 25 顯示兩項調查與我們的發現吻合，同時反映 2017 年中至 2019 年中的去激進化，其後非建制在一年間急速冒起並退減，以及自 2020 年中興起的溫和政治。

Figure 25: Changes of citizens' political inclinations  
圖 25：市民政治傾向的變動





Two types of questionnaire design are commonly used to track citizens' self-identity in Hong Kong, the 'dominant identity' design and the 'multiple identity' design. A 'dominant identity' design classifies one's identity either as 'Hongkonger' or 'Chinese', and in some cases, includes certain mixed identities, e.g. 'Chinese in Hong Kong', 'Hongkonger in China' and 'both'. Respondents are compelled to select only one among two or more identities. If proportionally more people choose one category, the proportions of other categories must go down.

We adopt a 'multiple identity' design which uses separate questions to measure citizens' identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese'. This approach allows a possible scenario where a citizen identifies oneself more or less strongly as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' simultaneously. Furthermore, the source data enable us to categorize citizens into four dominant identities: strong identification as Hongkongers only, strong identification as Chinese only, dual identity with strong identifications in both and others which include those without a dominant identity.

HKPORI's identity survey employs both the 'multiple identity' and 'dominant identity' questionnaire designs. Respondents first rate their identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' separately. After that, they will choose one amongst these four categories: 'Hongkonger', 'Chinese', 'Chinese in Hong Kong' and 'Hongkonger in China'. Although HKPORI releases results of both designs, media in Hong Kong focuses on the first part only as it is more popular in public surveys. The proportion of citizens that identify themselves strongly as both 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' cannot be reflected.

26 shows the ratings of citizens' identification as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' from HKPORI and us using a 'multiple identity' design. Both surveys suggest that the 'Hongkonger' identity maintained high in 2020 and then declined. The 'Chinese' identity recovered from its lowest level in 2019 and 2020. Figure 27 shows results from HKPORI and us using a 'dominant identity' design. HKPORI refers 'Chinese in Hong Kong' and 'Hongkongers in China' as 'mixed identities', which corresponds to our 'dual identity'. Both surveys suggest that the majority of Hong Kong society possess a 'dual identity', while being temporarily overtaken by 'Hongkonger only' from 2019 to mid-2021, it has resurged to become the primary identity since late-2021.

香港的身份認同調查有兩種問卷設計：「主要身份」及「多元身份」兩種。以「主要身份」設計的調查一般將身份認同歸類為「香港人」及「中國人」兩種，或者再加入「香港的中國人」、「中國的香港人」、「兩者皆是」等多種混合身份。受訪者需要從兩種或多種身份中，選擇其中一種，如果認同其中一種身份的比例增加，認同其他身份的比例必定減少。

我們的調查採用「多元身份」的問卷設計，用獨立問題要求市民分別對「香港人」及「中國人」的認同感評分，能夠反映市民可能對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份認同同時加強，或同時減弱。然後利用原始數據判斷市民的「主要身份」，歸為四類：只對香港人身份有較強認同、只對中國人身份有較強認同、對兩種身份均擁有較強認同的雙重認同，以及包括沒有主要身份的其他身份認同。

香港民研的身份認同調查同時採用「多元身份」及「主要身份」兩種問卷設計。受訪市民先對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份分別評分，再從四種身份中選擇其中一種，包括「香港人」、「中國人」、「香港的中國人」及「中國的香港人」。雖然香港民研公布兩種問卷結果，但是由於「主要身份」為多數調查所採用，所以香港傳媒側重報道後者的結果，未能反映有多少市民同時對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份擁有高度認同。

圖 26 為我們和香港民研的「多元身份」調查結果，顯示市民對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身份的評分。兩項調查同樣反映「香港人」評分在 2020 年維持高位後回落，而「中國人」評分則在 2019 年及 2020 年墮入谷底後逐漸回升。圖 27 顯示為我們和香港民研的「主要身份」調查結果，香港民研將「香港的中國人」及「中國的香港人」合稱為「混合身份」，對應我們的「雙重認同」。兩項調查同樣反映「雙重認同」是香港社會的大多數，在 2019 年至 2021 年中被「只有香港人」短暫取代，並於 2021 年底再次成為主流身份。



Figure 26: Changes of scores with 'dominant identity' design

圖 26：「主要身分」評分的變動





Figure 27: Changes of proportions with 'multiple identity' design

圖 27：「多元身分」比例的變動



# 'One Country Two Systems' Index 「一國兩制」指數

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### 「一國兩制」

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