

'ONE COUNTRY
TWO SYSTEMS'
INDEX

「一國兩制」指數

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'One Country Two Systems' Index

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Preface

The unprecedented pursuit of ‘One Country Two Systems’ (henceforth 1C2S) requires unyielding exploration and persistence of stakeholders. Since 1997, we have made headway in the realization of 1C2S, but at the same time, have also encountered many challenges. To assist full implementation of 1C2S, in July 2017, Path of Democracy established the 1C2S Index and released its first report in relation thereto with a view to conduct an objective evaluation of the continued implementation of 1C2S by reviewing the accomplishments and shortfalls of 1C2S at the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong SAR.

The 1C2S Index is based on both local opinion and international perception on the current state of 1C2S. In order to measure local sentiment, we conduct periodic public surveys in Hong Kong on aspects such as ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’, judiciary independence, the high degree of autonomy and other important issues. We also looked at global studies carried out by international think tanks and how Hong Kong is being rated on aspects like human rights, rule of law, freedom of speech and freedom of association. These independent evaluations are also incorporated into the Index to give a more balanced view on how the World including Hong Kong people look at the state of 1C2S.

We also devised and introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) by making use of big data analytics to measure the media sentiment of Hong Kong towards 1C2S since 1988 with real-time monitoring and predictive alerts.

In compiling our reports, we also sought views on current issues related to 1C2S, such as the public’s emigration plans, national security and economic integration. In this report, in view of the special unprecedented circumstances caused by the anti-extradition movement, we have conducted two extra rounds of survey to reflect the change of public sentiments during the relevant period.

We extend our sincere gratitude to the research team involved in the production of our fifth edition of the 1C2S Index report: Gillian Tam, Ting Hin Yan, and Ian Chan. We are also grateful to Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong for completing the telephone polls on our behalf.

Going forward, to better inform policy makers and the public, we will continue to conduct public surveys and update international indices every six months, and to monitor media sentiment regularly to gauge the latest perceptions of the public, the international community and the media on 1C2S.

Ray Poon
Co-convenor (Research)

Key Findings

While some applauded the promulgation of the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area in early 2019, the outbreak of public fear over 'submission to the Mainland' was epitomized by both the persistence and magnitude of the anti-extradition movement which also highlighted the inadequacies or insensitivity of local governance and deep rooted social problems. Many feared heightened tensions provoked by increased violence would bring about intervention from Beijing. Hong Kong also became a battle ground of international power struggle, featuring in the Sino-US trade talks, Beijing's 1C2S plan for Taiwan, the passage of the 'Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act', and some even attempted to portray the anti-extradition movement as an inspiration for pro-democratic uprisings around the world. What is certain is there can be no foregone conclusions other than that the final verdict is yet to come.

Everyone is now compelled to confront with the future of Hong Kong and 1C2S. In our fifth edition of the 1C2S Index report, we hope to shed light on the subject with substantial quantitative data from four rounds of surveys. To fully capture the socio-political reality of the city, we also introduced new sets of questions on the social movement that gripped Hong Kong and the international community in the latter half of 2019.

Confidence in 1C2S at risk

Concerns built up around the nature of the amendment bill and inexplicably turned what was to be an innocuous attempt to fill up a loophole in the criminal justice system into an acute frenzy questioning the continuation of judicial independence and even the erosion of legislative power. The injunction against violent online messages and the anti-mask law further escalated the matter as the bans were read as examples of encroachment on the freedom of expression. In these circumstances, a substantial drop in the 1C2S Index is to be expected. The Index fell from 6.38 at the end of 2018, to its record low since its inception at 5.57 in October and slightly recovered to 5.70 in December of 2019.

While all nine dimensions from Index (A): Public Opinion fell, five of them rebounded with statistical significance from October to December, namely, independent judiciary, independent legislature, original ways of life, freedom of speech and democratisation. The upturn coincided with the ruling by the High Court that the anti-mask law was unconstitutional, the landslide victory of the non-establishment camp in the District Council election and the government's proposal to create an independent panel to review the causes of the social unrest in November and December which no doubt contributed to the slight recovery of the Index.

From our past reports, we can see it has been a consistent pattern that the Hong Kong public hold higher expectations and much more critical view on the integrity of 1C2S. Changes in Index (B): International Perception tends to be more diverse and less drastic. In line with the improved reliability rating of police services from the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report, Cato-Fraser Institutes raised Hong Kong's rating for security. Negative adjustments were made for rule of law and freedom of expression in other international studies but due to time lag in the compilation of international indices, further decline at the international level is anticipated given the current socio-political situation, notwithstanding the historic turnout for the local district election and the rise of citizen journalism will be seen as positive factors in term of democratic participation.

Youth involvement in the anti-extradition movement

Chaos erupted as the bills committee proceedings in LegCo for the controversial extradition law amendment attempted to start. Accusations of police brutality surfaced after major collisions between police and demonstrators, such as the 7.21 Yuen Long incident, 8.31 Prince Edward station incident, 10.1 and 11.11 gunshot incidents and campus clashes in universities. Protests turned more ferocious as general acceptance of violence in most age groups increased between August and October, especially in the 18-29 age group.

Our data also reveal that young people's involvement in the movement produced some distinctive patterns among their sub-groups. In the 18-29 age group, students' participation (50.7%) had been much less prominent than

employed youths (73.8%). Students generally embraced the concept of violent resistance as their net acceptance ratio grew sharply from 6.5% in August to 29.1% in October. The rise in this group was much quicker than their employed counterparts.

As the discontent boiled, more vigorous 'retaliation' strategies were deployed by both camps. People from both camps began to use online doxing to put pressure on protesters and journalists on the one hand and on police officers and their families on the other. Acceptance of such behaviours was low, although acceptance of doxing against police officers and their families was generally higher. The difference in level of acceptance of online doxing against the two groups was starkest among the age group 30-39 years, of which difference was statistically significant.

Overwhelming support for the continuation of 1C2S

The overall support for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 was however, overwhelmingly high at 73.5%. Despite the social turbulence, support across all groups with different political inclinations still maintained at around and often over 70%, including the localists and self-determinists, who are known to be highly critical of 1C2S. Though the public's current evaluation of 1C2S is quite critical, the majority of them still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

For most people, 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (65.4%) remained the most favourable condition to the continuation of 1C2S. Consistent with one of the core demands of the anti-extradition movement, 'democratising further' (56.0%) surpassed 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (47.6%) as the second most important condition for the first time since 2018.

Albeit to different degree, the rapid growth in the share of 'democratising further' happening from June 2019 onwards was common to all political inclination, with the exception of pro-establishment supporters. Nonetheless, the pro-establishment group's regard of 'completing legislation of Article 23' had lowered continuously since December 2018, giving way to 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability'.

Resurgence of political polarization

The population became more polarized from December 2018 to December 2019 amidst a hopeful trend of the rise of moderation in 2017 and 2018. While moderates remained the largest group, they had decreased by 13.3 percentage points (from 64.2% to 50.9%) in 2019. Non-establishment supporters rose by 15.1 percentage points (from 21.7% to 36.8%) in the same period while pro-establishment supporters decreased by 4 percentage points (from 11.3% to 7.3%). Different trajectories displayed by the above groups also signified further polarization, as evident in the changes between October and December 2019. While the number of pro-establishment supporters regained and the growth of non-establishment supporters stabilized, moderates continued to decline.

Radicalism re-emerged among youths (aged 18 to 29). The proportion of moderates in this age group dropped from 66.4% in December 2018 to 38.2% in December 2019 (decreasing by 28.2 percentage points) while the proportion of the non-establishment group rose from 29.7% to 55.3% (rising by 25.6 percentage points). Within the non-establishment group, the proportions of democrats and 'others' rose from 19.6% to 28.5% and from 10.1% to 26.9% respectively (rising by 8.9% and 16.8% percentage points).

Up till December 2018, there had been encouraging signs of de-radicalization of youth, where population of moderates were high and rising. This trend, however, was reversed abruptly from June 2019 onwards, as the proportion of non-establishment supporters witnessed steep rise, surpassing moderates. At the same time, within the non-establishment group, 'others' overtook and dropped just below democrats in December 2019, which reminisced 2017 when the traditional and radical wings were of almost equal share. This is an alarming observation.

Divergence of citizens' identity as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese'

Citizens' self-identification as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' started to diverge after a period of parallel increase. From December 2018 to October 2019, the public's self-identification as 'Hongkongers' rose from 8.06 to 8.41. In the same period, that as 'Chinese' dropped from 6.83 to 4.72. Both changes were statistically significant.

Most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese'. This has gradually changed since June 2019. While over half of the public acknowledged dual identity in earlier surveys, this had dropped to 36.2% and was surpassed by citizens identifying themselves strongly as 'Hongkongers only' (53.5%) in October 2019.

As a result of the declining dual identity, the correlation between the two stated identities became less apparent. The two identities used to mutually reinforce each other. Now, there are signs of polarization between them instead. The rank correlation coefficient changed from 0.74 in December 2018 to -0.22 in October 2019, though the correlation was not statistically significant. A stronger identification as 'Hongkonger' now accompanies a weaker one as 'Chinese', and vice versa. The loss of the mutuality of the two identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' risks challenging the implementation of 1C2S in the near future.

Implications

The decline in most indicators in our latest report suggested that the anti-extradition movement reached a never-before-seen scale and magnitude of a crisis of confidence in the future of 1C2S and Hong Kong. Disaffection of the younger age groups is most alarming. However, we also found that the Hong Kong public overwhelmingly supported the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. For instance, the post-80s who produced one of the lowest evaluations of the current 1C2S and the strongest hostility in the anti-government protests, were also the most supportive towards the continuation of 1C2S. It is difficult to reconcile the fact that despite what appeared to be a marked decline in confidence of the 1C2S, people of Hong Kong still overwhelmingly indicated they were in favour of the continuation of the same beyond 2047.

The continued polarization sent an even more alarming sign. Non-establishment supporters became increasingly alienated. Along with their weak identification as 'Chinese', there are high and rising emigration ratios and diminishing enthusiasm for national development. Their priorities for the continuation of 1C2S also diverged from those of the majority. Particularly worrying was that non-establishment supporters appeared to be concentrated in the branch known to harbour increasingly radical views on the socio-economic-political future of Hong Kong and are deeply critical of 1C2S, the central and HKSAR governments.

Mapping the eruption of the anti-extradition movement, it is hard to describe the disillusionment and re-radicalization of the population as coming out of the blue; nor is it fair to say that their criticisms of 1C2S arose solely out of misunderstanding. It is rather more appropriate to view this as the result of prolonged negligence of the deep-rooted problems in the implementation of 1C2S. Both the central and HKSAR governments need to tackle and resolve these issues with patience and care.

1. Introduction

This is the fifth edition of our 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) Index report. The purpose of the 1C2S Index is to provide an objective assessment on the implementation of 1C2S. Our first Report was released in mid-2017, on the 20th anniversary of the return of Hong Kong to China. We update the 1C2S Index every six months, at mid-year and year end.

Every half year, we update the 1C2S Index through updating Index (A): Public Opinion and Index (B): International Perception respectively with a new public survey and with the latest data from international indices. To complement our Index, we also introduced a new index: 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) that uses big-data techniques to measure the sentiment of Hong Kong newspapers since 1998.

Starting from mid-2019, anti-extradition protests dominated the headlines, marking the most severe crisis of 1C2S since 1997. Our mid-2019 survey was conducted a few days before the eruption of the very large demonstrations of June 9 and June 16. Though the survey already reflected part of the increasing scepticism of the public towards 1C2S, it did not capture the explosion of public anger that came soon after. To get a more representative picture of public sentiments, we conducted two extra rounds of survey in addition to our regular half-year investigation.

We commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct four telephone polls in June, August, October and December 2019 to compile Index (A). On the other hand, some indicators of Index (B) can only be updated to 2018 because international indices are released with a considerable time lag. MMI was updated to the end of December 2019.

In our surveys, we also included other topical issues related to 1C2S, such as the continuation of 1C2S after 2047, citizen's identity, attitude towards emigration and public opinions on the Greater Bay Area. In the August and October surveys, we have added new questions in relation to the anti-extradition movement.

It should be stressed that Index (A), Index (B) and MMI are determined by perception and may or may not reflect the reality. Even so, changes in perceptions of 1C2S of the Hong Kong public, of international think tanks, and of the Hong Kong press are nevertheless important. We will analyse the reasons for the changes in these perceptions as they are crucial for the implementation of 1C2S.

In our report, all scores are in a scale of 0-10. Differences in scores at a particular point in time, or changes in scores over time that are big enough to be statistically significant will be noted explicitly. If there is no mentioning of statistical significance about a score, it means that the difference or change concerned is statistically insignificant.

2. 1C2S Index


The 1C2S Index is the average of Index (A): Public Opinion, the evaluation of the Hong Kong public on different dimensions of 1C2S, and Index (B): International Perception, the evaluation of international think tanks on various aspects of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

Figure 1 shows the scores of the 1C2S Index since its inception. The 1C2S Index declined from 6.38 in December 2018 to 5.70 in the December 2019 after rebounding from its lowest at 5.57 in October, falling by 10.7% in total. Changes in Indices (A) and (B) will be detailed in the following sub-sections.

Due to the increasing scepticism towards 1C2S and time lag in data availability, the 2019 estimated score of Index (B) is likely to be upwardly biased. This implies the decline in the 1C2S Index is likely to be understated. In this respect, decision makers in Hong Kong should take careful note of the declining trend and its ramifications.

Figure 1: 1C2S Index

圖 1：「一國兩制」指數



Note: Dotted line indicates a revision in indicators

註：虛線為指標經過修訂

2.1. Index (A): Public Opinion

In past surveys, item ratings typically varied within a relatively narrow band which was most plausibly due to a 'holistic rating' that the general public held on 1C2S. For instance, the range recorded in December 2019 oscillates just between 2 plus and 4 plus. Normally, the narrow range implies that regardless of the specific item surveyed, their answers would be shaped by an overall impression, rendering the range in relation to their answers for each specific item relatively small.

Table 1 shows that, after falling to its lowest at 3.26 in October 2019, Index (A) recovered to 3.53 in December 2019 from 4.84 in December 2018, falling by 27.1% in total. The decline in Index (A) was statistically significant, sending a worrisome signal. Moreover, all nine dimensions have declined in the past year with statistical significance which is again a point of concern.

Between October and December 2019, the statistically significant rebound in mean scores given to several dimensions, namely, independent judiciary, independent legislature, original ways of life, freedom of speech and democratisation largely matches with the general public sentiment and the development of the anti-extradition movement. For instance, the enactment of the anti-mask ban in October, which escalated the incubating societal division to a whole new level as it was badly received as facilitating the becoming of a 'police state'. However, the

ruling of anti-mask ban by the High Court as 'unconstitutional' in mid-November seemed to ease the anxiety as the ruling probably worked to assure the public of the judicial independence of HKSAR. The rebound also coincides with the District Council election where the non-establishment camp won a landslide victory and where a record number of opposition candidates won in districts known for their conservatism.

In past surveys, item ratings typically varied within a relatively narrow band which was most plausibly due to a 'holistic rating' that the general public held on 1C2S. For instance, the range recorded in December 2019 oscillates just between 2 plus and 4 plus. Normally, the narrow range implies that regardless of the specific item surveyed, their answers would be shaped by an overall impression, rendering the range in relation to their answers for each specific item relatively small.

Table 1: Index (A): Public Opinion

表 1：指數 (A)：民意調查

	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12	
Average 平均分	4.84	4.58	3.98	3.26	3.53	*
4 Original ways of life 原有生活方式	5.96	5.79	5.34	4.28	4.55	*
5 Freedom of speech 言論自由	5.41	5.27	4.8	4.04	4.36	*
2 Independent judiciary 獨立司法權	5.39	5.13	4.52	3.93	4.27	*
3 Independent legislature 獨立立法權	5.08	4.81	4.21	3.34	3.75	*
1 Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務	4.82	4.59	3.98	3.31	3.49	*
6 Democratisation 民主政制發展	4.34	4.12	3.61	2.90	3.21	*
7 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' and 'high degree of autonomy' principles 「港人治港、高度自治」原則	4.38	4.09	3.48	2.78	2.99	*
9 Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾	4.05	3.72	2.9	2.46	2.63	*
8 Full implementation of 1C2S 全面落實「一國兩制」	4.09	3.68	2.95	2.30	2.53	*

Note: '**' denotes changes that are statistically significant compared with the previous report (results from 2018.12)

註：「*」為與上一次報告 (2018 年 12 月) 相比達統計上顯著水平之變化

2.1.1. Generation gap and political divide

Figure 2 shows Index (A) by age in the past surveys. All age groups have witnessed clear drops in their average scores since December 2018, as well as a collective rebound from their lowest in October 2019. However, only the rebound among 30-39 years was statistically significant. Nonetheless, changes in mean score since December 2018 happening across all age groups were statistically significant.

The generation gap in the evaluation of 1C2S is obvious. The average scores of younger age groups were lower than those of older age groups at a statistically significant level. The scores of the two youngest groups, the 18-29 and the 30-39 age groups, converged at around 2.75 in December 2019. Those aging over 70 years, which always produced the highest score, dropped to below the median of 5 at 4.82.

Figure 3 shows Index (A) by political inclination in the past surveys. There was a collective drop across all political inclinations. The evaluation scores of moderates and of democrats declined from 4.87 in December 2018 to 4.25 in the December 2019 and from 2.97 to 1.94 respectively. Only the declines recorded in these two groups were statistically significant overtime.

Statistical tests revealed that there was obvious and consistent discrepancy in evaluation scores across all political inclinations. In comparison with moderates, the evaluations of pro-establishment supporters were significantly higher. Evaluations of non-establishment supporters were significantly lower. Since December 2018, differences between the democrats and other non-establishment supporters began to converge at below 2 in December 2019.

The pro-establishment against non-establishment political divide is big and widening. The high score of pro-establishment supporters remained significantly higher than other groups, though the gradual rise was halted by the social unrest, as evident in the 5.1% drop in their evaluation score since December 2018. On the other hand, the low score of non-establishment supporters fell even lower, by around 28.1% since December 2018. The trend of polarisation is evident. This is a serious issue which the HKSAR government must take note.

Figure 2: Index (A): Public Opinion (by age)

圖 2：指數 (A)：民意調查 (按年齡組別劃分)





Figure 3: Index (A): Public Opinion (by political inclination)

圖 3：指數 (A)：民意調查 (按政治傾向劃分)



2.2. Index (B): International Perception

We obtain scores on Hong Kong's freedom and democracy from international think tanks to compile Index (B). These scores are derived from Cato-Fraser Institutes' Human Freedom Index, which comprises the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index, and the Economic Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index. The scores and ranks of Hong Kong since 2010 are shown in Table 2.

As international studies cover a very large number of countries, they do not always reflect the latest conditions. We will update the indices with data from comparable international indicators whenever possible. The method of updating is detailed in Appendix I.

Hong Kong has always ranked number one in Economic Freedom Index, with a score of around 9, the drop from its peak at 8.94 in 2010 to 8.91 in 2019 was only 0.3%.

Hong Kong's score in Personal Freedom Index peaked at 9.07 in 2011, dropped to 8.58 in 2016, and rose to an estimated score of 8.68 in 2019. Given the adverse publicity in the international media on recent political events in Hong Kong, the decline of 4.3% from its peak is not surprising. Nonetheless, Hong Kong's 2019 score of 8.68 is still relatively high.

The Democracy Index rose from 5.92 in 2010 to a peak of 6.50 in 2015, rising by 9.8%, reflecting that Hong Kong has made some progress in democratisation vis-à-vis the increase of directly elected seats in the legislature. However, Hong Kong's score fell to 6.02 in 2019, falling by 7.4% from the peak in 2015, reflecting a democratic regression originated from pre-existing deficiencies in Hong Kong's political stability. It should be noted that Hong Kong's 2019 score and rank are still better than those in 2010.

Index (B) rose from 7.99 in 2010 to a peak of 8.14 in 2012, rising by 1.9%, largely as a result of the rise in Hong Kong's Democracy Index. Since then, it has embarked on a declining trend. The latest reading came in at 7.87, representing a drop of 3.3% from the peak.

Table 2: Index (B): International Perception

表 2：指數 (B)：國際評價

	Human Freedom Index 「人類自由指數」			Democracy Index 「民主指數」	Aggregate 總分
	Economic Freedom 「經濟自由」	Personal Freedom 「個人自由」	Sub-aggregate 分數		
2010	8.94 (1)	9.11 (12)	9.02 (1)	5.92 (80)	7.99
2011	8.90 (1)	9.14 (14)	9.02 (1)	5.92 (80)	7.99
2012	8.88 (1)	9.11 (13)	8.99 (1)	6.42 (63)	8.14
2013	8.88 (1)	8.99 (18)	8.94 (1)	6.42 (65)	8.10
2014	8.92 (1)	8.82 (27)	8.87 (2)	6.46 (66)	8.07
2015	8.88 (1)	8.75 (28)	8.82 (2)	6.50 (67)	8.04
2016	8.89 (1)	8.59 (32)	8.74 (3)	6.42 (68)	7.97
2017	8.91 (1)	8.70 (27)	8.81 (3)	6.31 (71)	7.97
2018	8.91*	8.68*	8.80	6.15 (73)	7.91
2019	8.91*	8.68*	8.80	6.02 (75)	7.87

Note: '*' denotes updates based on comparable indicators

註：「*」為更新自相應的國際指標

2.2.1. Components of Personal Freedom Index

Table 3 shows Hong Kong's scores and ranks in the seven components of the Personal Freedom Index from 2010 to 2019. During this period, the score of 'security & safety' has risen while the score of 'movement' has been constant at 10. Five components have exhibited substantial decline in scores and ranks since 2013, namely, 'rule of law', 'religion', 'association & assembly', 'expression & information', and 'identity & relationships'. The declines show that the international community have relatively serious concerns on personal freedoms in Hong Kong.

Table 3: Personal Freedom Index

表 3：「個人自由指數」

Year 年份	Rule of Law 法治	Security & Safety 安全	Movement 遷徙自由	Religion 宗教自由	Association, Assembly & Civil Society 結社、集會及公民社會自由	Expression & Information 言論自由	Identity & Relationships 性別認同及關係	Aggregate 總分
2010	7.50 (17)	9.93 (3)	10.00 (1)	9.02 (35)	9.42 (25)	9.05 (42)	10.00 (1)	9.11 (12)
2011	7.50 (17)	9.97 (1)	10.00 (1)	8.92 (30)	9.75 (24)	9.01 (41)	10.00 (1)	9.14 (14)
2012	7.39 (19)	9.95 (4)	10.00 (1)	9.04 (24)	9.75 (24)	8.94 (45)	10.00 (1)	9.11 (13)
2013	7.39 (19)	9.47 (39)	10.00 (1)	9.19 (19)	9.75 (24)	8.86 (48)	10.00 (1)	8.99 (18)
2014	7.80 (14)	9.53 (35)	10.00 (1)	8.13 (80)	8.00 (62)	8.74 (52)	10.00 (1)	8.82 (27)
2015	7.79 (16)	9.54 (34)	10.00 (1)	8.43 (68)	8.00 (62)	8.77 (48)	9.00 (36)	8.75 (28)
2016	7.14 (23)	9.53 (34)	10.00 (1)	8.59 (40)	8.00 (62)	8.67 (51)	9.00 (37)	8.59 (32)
2017	7.14 (23)	9.96 (2)	10.00 (1)	8.59 (40)	8.00 (62)	8.67 (50)	9.00 (30)	8.70 (27)
2018	7.08*	10.00*	10.00*	8.59*	8.00*	8.49*	9.00*	8.68*
2019	7.08*	10.00*	10.00*	8.59*	8.00*	8.49*	9.00*	8.68*

Note: '*' denotes updates based on comparable indicators

註：「*」為更新自相應的國際指標

2.2.2. Comparison with Hong Kong's neighbours

As Hong Kong is a highly developed region, and given that highly developed regions tend to have comparatively higher scores in freedom and democracy as compared with developing regions – we have selected certain neighbouring developed countries and territories (namely, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) as benchmarks for comparison and assessment of Hong Kong's performance. We have also compared the respective scores of the Mainland and Hong Kong under the indices, for the purpose of identifying whether Hong Kong has become increasingly 'Mainlandised' under 1C2S. For brevity, we will refer to Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and the Chinese mainland as 'neighbours'.

Table 4 compares Hong Kong and its neighbours in the various indices of Index (B) in 2019. Hong Kong's score in Economic Freedom was world's number one while its score in Personal Freedom Index was at par with its developed neighbours. Due to Hong Kong's superlative performance in Economic Freedom Index, its score in Human Freedom Index was stronger than the four developed neighbours. However, Hong Kong's Democracy Index was lower than its developed neighbours, except Singapore. Consequently, Hong Kong's Index (B) score was lower than Japan's 8.19, Korea's 8.09, and Taiwan's 8.18, but above Singapore's 7.44. It was much higher than Mainland's 4.87.

Table 5 compares the 2019 Personal Freedom Index of Hong Kong with its neighbours. Hong Kong's scores were in the same league as those of our developed neighbours (Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), and were much higher than those of the Mainland. Hong Kong's aggregate score of 8.68 was much higher than that of Singapore's 7.52 but slightly lower than Japan's 8.74, Korea's 8.83, and Taiwan's 8.88.

In comparison with its four developed neighbours, Hong Kong was relatively strong in 'security & safety' and 'movement', but relatively weak in 'rule of law'. Hong Kong was more or less at par with others in the remaining four components, namely, 'religion', 'association & assembly', 'expression & information', and 'identity & relationships'. Hong Kong's relatively low score in 'rule of law' may be unfair but nevertheless warrants concern.

Table 4: Index (B): International Perception of Hong Kong and neighbours (2019)
表 4：香港與鄰近地區之指數 (B)：國際評價 (2019)

	Human Freedom Index 「人類自由指數」*			Democracy Index 「民主指數」	Aggregate 總分
	Economic Freedom 「經濟自由」	Personal Freedom 「個人自由」	Sub-aggregate 分數		
Hong Kong 香港	8.91	8.68	8.80	6.02 (75)	7.87
Mainland China 中國內地	6.49	5.86	6.18	2.26 (153)	4.87
Japan 日本	7.84	8.74	8.29	7.99 (24)	8.19
Korea 韓國	7.44	8.83	8.14	8.00 (23)	8.09
Singapore 新加坡	8.77	7.52	8.15	6.02 (75)	7.44
Taiwan 台灣	7.92	8.88	8.40	7.73 (31)	8.18

Note: '**' denotes updates based on comparable indicators

註：「*」為更新自相應的國際指標

Table 5: Comparing Personal Freedom Index of Hong Kong and neighbours (2019)
表 5：比較香港與鄰近地區之「個人自由指數」(2019)

	Rule of Law 法治	Security & Safety 安全	Movement 遷徙自由	Religion 宗教自由	Association, Assembly & Civil Society 結社、集會及 公民社會自由	Expression & Information 言論自由	Identity & Relationships 性別認同及關係	Aggregate 總分
Hong Kong 香港	7.08	10.00	10.00	8.59	8.00	8.49	9.00	8.68
Mainland China 中國內地	4.77	9.16	5.00	3.67	1.00	5.13	9.00	5.86
Japan 日本	7.88	10.00	10.00	8.09	7.50	8.97	8.17	8.74
Korea 韓國	7.74	9.74	8.33	9.35	9.50	8.46	9.00	8.83
Singapore 新加坡	7.77	9.57	8.33	6.11	3.50	6.58	7.33	7.52
Taiwan 台灣	7.01	9.31	10.00	9.36	10.00	8.68	10.00	8.88

Note: '**' denotes updates based on comparable indicators

註：「*」為更新自相應的國際指標

2.3. 1C2S Mass Media Index

Media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion. We attempt to use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S and monitor how 1C2S is conveyed in the mass media to provide a timely barometer of public sentiment. 1C2S MMI is a net sentiment index of newspaper articles over a given time. To dovetail with our main Index, we compile the MMI half yearly. We have mined close to 146,000 news articles and

around 73 million words from 21 local daily newspapers to compile the MMI (See Appendix I for details). MMI is set at 100 in the base month of July 2017, the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China.

In the longer run, subject to resource availability, MMI opens up many opportunities of further research in public opinion formation. The MMI can be compiled at high frequency intervals (e.g. monthly) as it is not subject to the long time lags of surveys. It is also possible to investigate the effect of specific significant on media sentiment, or to compare sentiments in the local and overseas media.

Newspaper is only part of the media, and the MMI does not cover news reported by traditional media such as television and radio, nor news carried by new media. Measuring the sentiments of news reported by television and radio is very difficult as there is no comprehensive text-based data base available. Measurement of sentiments of new media is also very difficult as it will be very demanding on resources. Furthermore, while widely accepted credibility ratings of different newspapers are available through regular opinion polls, comparable ratings on the credibility of different new media outlets are not available. We thus confine our study to newspaper articles on 1C2S.

It should be noted that many newspapers have also broadcasted their news through online outlets such as websites and mobile apps. In so far as the news articles of these online outlets are the same as their printed versions, the sentiments of these articles are already included in our MMI regardless of whether they are printed or broadcasted online. 1C2S MMI currently only gauges sentiment of an important subset of mass media, namely, printed newspapers, as a general representation of sentiment in mass media.


2.3.1. Recent trend

1C2S encountered one of the most severe challenges in the beginning of 2016 when 1C2S MMI plummeted to 73 points. The 'Causeway Bay Bookstore' incident aroused widespread media attention in January. The civil unrest in Mongkok evolved into a clash between civilians and the police in February. The award of the independent film 'Ten Years' as the best film in Hong Kong Film Awards in April aggravated the negative sentiment in the mass media.

MMI bottomed out and rose strongly when Carrie Lam was elected as Chief Executive. Despite the NPC Standing Committee's interpretation of the Basic Law in response to the oath-taking row in the LegCo in November 2016 and the 'democracy walls' incidents in universities in September 2017, 1C2S MMI still rose to a peak of 105.0 points in March 2018 under the new administration of Carrie Lam. However, an alarming downward spiral started in July 2018 with the storm of controversies on the disbanding of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party and the rejection of visa renewal for Victor Mallet. MMI fell to a lower range around 90 points in the second half of 2018, a decline of about 15% from the peak in March.

Although the promulgation of the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area sparked hopes for future economic growth, Beijing's 1C2S ambition over Taiwan also drew public attention as to whether Hong Kong is a flawed example of the experiment. The anti-extradition movement emerged abruptly and caused the worst governance crisis since the Handover in June 2019 which dragged MMI from 91.6 to 84.5 points in the first half of 2019 before plummeting further to 67.2 as 2019 drew to a close, representing a drop of 24.4% on a year-on-year basis.

Figure 4: 1C2S MMI (2018 – 2020)
圖 4：「一國兩制」輿情指數 (2018-2020)



2.4. Evaluations of 1C2S

1C2S is unprecedented in history. There have always been doubts if Hong Kong can remain a free city as part of a country ruled by a Communist Party. Problems and difficulties in the implementation of 1C2S are thus to be expected.

22 years after Hong Kong's return to China, despite some declines in scores in selected international indices, Hong Kong still ranked world's number one in Economic Freedom, and ranked very well in Personal Freedom. According to the 2019 Human Freedom Index, Hong Kong ranked world's number three after New Zealand and Switzerland. It is a fact that Hong Kong is still one of the freest territories in the world.

Though Hong Kong's Index (B): International Perception declined somewhat lately, Hong Kong's 2019 score at 7.87 was still relatively high. We are still in the same league as our developed neighbours: above Singapore, but slightly lower than Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The gaps between Hong Kong and the Mainland in all the above Indices on freedom and democracy remained very big, showing that the allegation of 'Mainlandisation' is unfounded.

The latest Index (A): Public Opinion was just over 3.5. For the first time since mid-2017, none of the nine items received scores higher than 5, 'original ways of life', which always obtained the highest score in past surveys fell to just 4.55 and represented the highest score of all categories in December 2019. Some other items that usually scored less favourably in previous rounds of survey witnessed an even sharper decline, items such as "Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong" and "high degree of autonomy" principles, 'full implementation of 1C2S' as well as 'resolving differences via dialogue and negotiations' which even fell to below 3, all accounting for more than 30% drop since December 2018. This again presents a never-before-seen decline since mid-2017.

In comparison to the evaluations of international think tanks, the evaluations of the Hong Kong public are less positive, suggesting that the public is more demanding in their assessments due to their high expectations of 1C2S. Hong Kong's people's starting point is a system with a sophisticated legal system that enshrines both rule of law and personal freedoms, and gradual democratisation that had already been in progress prior to the return to China. These in turn induced greater expectations amongst the public with respect to the high degree of autonomy and human rights enshrined by the Basic Law.

Changes in scores in the indices are likely to be affected by significant political events and other landmark events that occurred throughout 2019 and June, in particular, presents itself as a tipping point after which most of the indicator scores plummeted. We list below the major events that occurred since the last report in December 2018. The major events that occurred in previous reports from mid-2017 to late 2018 are listed in Appendix II.

- Xi Jinping marked the 40th anniversary of the 'Message to Compatriots' by upholding 1C2S as the best solution to cross-strait unification (2 January);
- Promulgation the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (18 February);
- Kaohsiung mayor and Taiwan leader hopeful Han Kuo-yu's visited the central government's Liaison Office in Hong Kong (23 March);
- The 'Umbrella nine' (key leaders of the Occupy Central movement) were found guilty as the District Court ruled that civil disobedience was an invalid defence (9 April) ;
- Attempts to start bills committee proceedings in LegCo for the controversial amendments to the extradition law erupted into chaos (11-14 May);
- Han Zheng, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Wang Zhimin, Director of the central government's Liaison Office, both confirmed that the central government was supportive of the extradition law amendments (17 and 21 May);
- Record-setting demonstrations against the extradition law were staged. The government eventually announced the suspension of the amendment bill (9, 15 and 16 June);
- Accusations of police misconduct accentuated after major collisions, including the 6.12 LegCo protest, 7.21 Yuen Long incident, 8.31 Prince Edward station incident, 10.1 and 11.11 gunshot incidents, confrontation in the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University (June-November);
- Protesters broke into the LegCo Chamber and vandalized the Hong Kong emblem on 1 July and laid siege

- to the central government's Liaison Office and defaced the Chinese emblem on 21 July (July);
- Protesters called for a general strike and began a new campaign to paralyze the airport, inflicting citywide and international disruptions in transportation (August and September);
- Carrie Lam officially announced the withdrawal of the amendment bill of the extradition law (4 September);
- The government enacted the anti-mask law under the Emergency Regulations Ordinance but was ruled unconstitutional by the High Court (4 October and 18 November);
- Carrie Lam met with Xi Jinping for the first time since the eruption of the social unrest. Xi said the most pressing task is to end violence and restore order. The message was reiterated in his speech in the BRICS summit in Brazil (4 and 14 November);
- Pan-democrats scored a landslide victory in the District Council election with the highest voter turnout of 71.2% (24 November);
- US President Donald Trump signed the 'Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act' (27 November); and
- The bank account of Spark Alliance, fundraising platform for protesters, was froze due to accusation of money laundering (19 December).

Though the 1C2S Index declined from 6.38 in December 2018 to an alarming level of 5.72 in December 2019, it was still well over the median of 5. While 1C2S has problems in implementation, as could be expected of any unprecedented system, it is clearly not unworkable. The decline in this report should be viewed in this context.

2.4.1. Impact of internal governance

Internal governance issues that are not strictly related to 1C2S appear to have important effects on evaluations of the Hong Kong public and media, but do not affect international evaluations as much. It is important to bear this in mind when reading the findings identified in this Report.

For example, in the period before mid-2018, both MMI and Index (A) performed well despite the disqualification of six LegCo members from late 2016 to mid-2017, and the sentencing of the 3 student protestors in the Civic Square occupation to prison by the Court of Appeals on August 2017. The announcement of CY Leung in late 2016 that he would not run for a second term and the subsequent election of the new CE had strong positive effects on MMI that outweighed the effect of the above controversies. The honeymoon period of the new administration from mid-2017 to mid-2018 also appeared to have an important positive effect on Index (A).

The sharp declines in Index (A) and MMI starting from late 2018 can be attributed to political controversies over the disbandment of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, the rejection of work visa for Victor Mallet and the anti-extradition movement. At the same time, the waning approval ratings of the government reflected that internal governance issues surrounding the Lantau Tomorrow Vision reclamation project and the proposed increase of age threshold for elderly welfare payments also affected Hong Kong's public and media negatively.

2.4.2. Impact of international situation

The attitude of the West towards China has been shifting from engagement to confrontation as the West increasingly fears that its supremacy would be challenged by the rise of China. Evaluations of international think tanks may not be free of western ideological biases against the rise of China, but they may also reflect genuine weaknesses in the implementation of 1C2S. Furthermore, their effects on international investors cannot be underestimated as Hong Kong is an easy target in the 'New Cold War', as evident in the passage of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 in November. The existential ambiguity of Hong Kong presents a real vulnerability.

Much of the negative international evaluation on the rule of law in Hong Kong can be attributed to a misunderstanding of the fundamental concept of 1C2S: Hong Kong is not an independent country. It is part of a civil law country but with an independent judiciary that practices common law in relation to self-autonomy issues. The Hong Kong judiciary also has power to deal with constitutional issues but it must defer to interpretations of the national Constitution and the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. This is different in nature from courts of common law countries but not uncommon in civil law countries. This suggests the Hong Kong judiciary has a higher level of independence and judicial function than many courts at the district level

of other civil law countries. This is not a weakness of the Hong Kong judicial system but rather a unique characteristic of the Hong Kong Court under 1C2S that the HKSAR Government needs to emphasize in the international arena.

Western think tanks have downgraded Hong Kong's scores on 'rule of law', citing the interpretation of the Basic Law by Beijing in 2016. However, interpretation of the Basic Law first occurred in 1999 and it is nothing new. The Hong Kong judiciary is still the same judiciary which had received high scores from western think tanks just a few years back, and it is as independent as always as demonstrated by recent prosecutions and convictions of a former Chief Executive and other high-ranking officials of the HKSAR Government. It appears that western perceptions of China and Hong Kong have changed.

2.5. Suggestions

Given the biases and misunderstandings identified above, it is important for the HKSAR Government to consider spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of Hong Kong including the business community, the academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs to promote the image of Hong Kong under 1C2S. Such effort may include:

- Setting up a broadly representative committee to advise the HKSAR Government on all issues relating to 1C2S;
- Establishing a semi-official high-level think tank on external relations to undertake various private initiatives such as being responsible for mounting and coordinating outreach efforts, mobilizing support from all sectors of our and international communities, and enhancing Hong Kong's presence in APEC related networks;
- Setting up an early warning system within the government to alert and manage expectation of public on all possible issues which might affect 1C2S or the perception of quality of governance;
- Setting up a system whereby international media would be timely, fully and properly briefed on issues affecting 1C2S;
- Promoting, assisting and encouraging local think tanks to conduct periodical exchanges with influential foreign think tanks interested in Hong Kong affairs, especially the Heritage Foundation and the CATO-Fraser Institutes, which are sympathetic to Hong Kong as they value economic and personal freedoms highly;
- Motivating Hong Kong's business communities from western countries who are willing to defend Hong Kong in the international arena; and
- Enhancing Hong Kong's presence in APEC related networks and forums, e.g., the APEC Business Advisory Councils (ABAC), APEC Study Centres, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and other tripartite forums that involve business people, academics, and NGOs in the Asia-Pacific. As a free economy and global city, Hong Kong should find a sympathetic hearing in the vast APEC related networks in the Asia-Pacific.

3. Anti-Extradition Movement

In view of the escalating and deepening public discontent, we conducted two special rounds of survey in August and October, aiming to better understand the relationship between the anti-extradition bill movement and its impact as well as implication on the implementation of 1C2S.

3.1. Participation in the movement

Table 6 shows the percentages of interviewees who have participated in anti-extradition bill marches. A total of 40.5% of interviewees have participated in the movement in the second survey in October. As expected, the rate of participation of young adults (age 18 to 29) was high (63.2%). The rate of participation of older age groups were also substantial: 35.0% for the 60 to 69 age group, and 24.7% for the 70 years or above age group respectively.

Table 6: Participation in the anti-extradition movement

表 6：反修例運動參與度

	2019.08	2019.10
Participated 有參加	35.7%	40.5%
Didn't Participate 無參加	63.5%	59.0%
Don't Know 唔知道	0.9%	0.5%

3.2. Acceptance of violent means of protesting

Table 7 shows the public acceptance of two indicative events where violence was observed. We asked in August whether respondents accepted the storming of the Legislative Council by some of the demonstrators on July 1 and in October the attacks targeting MTR stations, police stations and Chinese banks and shops after the enactment of anti-mask law. Though the two incidents are not strictly comparable, changes across different groups may reveal their acceptance of violent means of protesting.

It can be seen that there recorded a slight increase between August and October in the number of people accepting the use of violence in the protest. Those who voted 'accept' generally account for about half of those interviewed.

From Figure 5, with the exception of the cohort ages 70 or above, mean score of acceptance of all age groups increased, though only that of 18-29 age group was statistically significant.

From Figure 6, it can be seen that as with the political inclinations of those 'accepting' violent means of protesting, only non-establishment supporters recorded a rise in mean score, while scores given by moderates and pro-establishment supporters were both low, suggesting more polarization.

Table 7: Acceptance of violent means of protesting
表 7：激進示威行為的接受程度

	2019.08	2019.10
Accept 接受	44.4%	52.6%
Reject 不接受	33.5%	22.0%
Don't Know 不知道	0.8%	0.8%
Net Value 淨值	10.9%	30.6%
Mean Score 平均分	5.16	5.81

Net value: Percent who chose 'Accept' less percent who chose 'Reject'
淨值：認為「接受」的百分比減去認為「不接受」的百分比
Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater acceptance
平均分由 0 至 10 分，愈高分代表愈接受

Figure 5: Acceptance of violent means of protesting (by age)
圖 5：激進示威行為的接受程度（按年齡劃分）





Figure 6: Acceptance of violent means of protesting (by political inclination)
圖 6：激進示威行為的接受程度（按政治傾向劃分）



3.3. Acceptance of online doxing

As the discontent boiled, people began to use online doxing to create pressure against protesters and journalists on the one hand and against police officers and their families on the other. Table 8 shows that there was a very low acceptance of online doxing in October. The net value of acceptance against police officers and their families and against protesters and journalists were -52.6% and -64.2% respectively and the mean score against them were 2.40 and 2.06 respectively.

By age, Figure 7 shows that the acceptance of online doxing against police officers and their families was generally higher, except of those aging 70 or above. Young people (18-29 years) gave the highest mean score of 2.88 on the acceptance of online doxing against police officers and their families. Furthermore, the difference in level of acceptance of online doxing against police officers and their families and against protesters and journalists was starkest among the age group 30-39 years, of which difference was statistically significant.

Acceptance of online doxing against the two rival groups was significantly different for each of the political inclinations. Figure 8 shows that pro-establishment supporters accepted online doxing against protesters and journalists more than against police officers and their families, and vice versa for non-establishment supporters. Moderates did not display targeted hatred towards any of the two rival groups, with mean scores between 1.62 and 1.71. Mean score given by pro-establishment supporters on the level of acceptance of doxing against protesters and journalists was highest at 2.18 while the mean score given by other non-establishment supporters on the level of acceptance of doxing against police and families was also highest at 4.59.

Table 8: Acceptance of online doxing (2019.10)

表 8：網上「起底」的接受程度 (2019.10)

	Against police officers and their families 針對警察及其家人	Against protesters and journalists 針對示威者及記者
Accept 接受	19.0%	11.4%
Reject 不接受	71.7%	75.7%
Don't Know 不知道	1.9%	1.9%
Net Value 淨值	-52.6%	-64.2%
Mean Score 平均分	2.40	2.06

Net value: Percent who chose 'Accept' less percent who chose 'Reject'

淨值：認為「接受」的百分比減去認為「不接受」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater acceptance

平均分由 0 至 10 分 · 愈高分代表愈接受

Figure 7: Acceptance of online doxing (by age)
圖 7：網上「起底」的接受程度（按年齡劃分）





Figure 8: Acceptance of online doxing (by political inclinations)
圖 8：網上「起底」的接受程度（按政治傾向劃分）



3.4. Perceived efficacy of community dialogues

The Hong Kong government proposed to meet the public in community dialogue sessions. In October, we asked the public about their perceived efficacy of such dialogue after the first of such sessions. Table 9 suggests that the mean score for the efficacy of community dialogues in easing societal tension was 4.26, slightly below the median of 5. All age groups, with the exception of those of 70 years or above, tended to hold a negative view on its efficacy.

Nonetheless, there exists a clear divide in the outlook on the community dialogues among those with different political inclinations, while pro-establishment and moderates both gave a higher mean score of 5.92 and 5.13 respectively, there was also a difference between democrats and other non-establishment supporters, with the former giving a score of 3.93 and the latter only 2.98.

Table 9: Can community dialogues ease emotions? (2019.10)

表 9：社區對話的效用 (2019.10)

	2019.10
Can 能夠	30.7%
Cannot 不能夠	46.4%
Don't Know 不知道	0.8%
Net Value 淨值	-15.7%
Mean Score 平均分	4.26

Net value: Percent who chose 'Can' less percent who chose 'Cannot'

淨值：認為「能夠」的百分比減去認為「不能夠」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means stronger agreement

平均分由 0 至 10 分 · 愈高分代表愈能夠

3.5. Enactment of Anti-Mask Law

As seen in Table 10, overall, 64.1% opposed to the enactment of the anti-mask law. The oppose rates across all age groups all recorded at past 58%. Only among the pro-establishment, 'support' was higher than 'oppose' with an overwhelming 82.0% supporting the law.

Table 10: Support for enactment the anti-mask law (2019.10)

表 10：訂立禁蒙面法的支持度 (2019.10)

	2019.10
Support 贊成	27.2%
Oppose 反對	64.1%
Don't Know 不知道	8.8%

3.6. Youth involvement

Younger people tended to produce responses quite distinctively from other age groups, reflecting the unique nature of their participation in the movement. As shown below, there appears clear differences among sub-groups of young people within the age group of 18-29. This contradicts the common references made with the label of 'young people' which tend to flatten the heterogeneity among them. We will discuss the responses from three survey questions which displayed most notable differences amongst this group below.

Employed youths were the most active in the movement, as their rate of participation remained around 70%. In comparison, students' participation had been much less prominent though much steadier, where rate of participation oscillated between just below and above 50% in August and October respectively.

Compared with other age groups, only the 18-29 age group experienced a significant increase in the acceptance of violent means of protesting. Although the score for employed youth and students increased at a similar rate, the net value for students grew sharply from 6.5% to 29.1%. This suggests more students accepted the concept of violent protesting between August and October, only milder than their employed counterparts.

Students between 18 and 29 years held a more balanced attitude towards online doxing against different groups, with a mean score ranging between 2.59 and 2.88. Those who are working in the same age group found online doxing against police officers and their families much more acceptable than against protesters and journalists.

Table 11: Participation in the movement (18-29 years)

表 11：反修例運動參與度（18-29 歲）

	2019.8			2019.10		
	Employed 在職人士	Students 學生	18-29	Employed 在職人士	Students 學生	18-29
Didn't Participate 無參加	30.3%	51.8%	42.3%	24.9%	49.3%	36.1%
Participated 有參加	66.5%	48.2%	56.2%	73.8%	50.7%	63.2%
Don't Know 唔知道	3.3%	0.0%	1.5%	1.3%	0.0%	0.7%

* Jobseekers aged 18-29 are too few to be shown, the same for below. 18-29 歲待業者過少，故不列出，下同。

Table 12: Acceptance of violent means of protesting (18-29 years)

表 12：激進示威行為的接受程度（18-29 歲）

	2019.08			2019.10		
	Employed 在職人士	Students 學生	18-29	Employed 在職人士	Students 學生	18-29
Accepted 接受	46.5%	43.3%	44.4%	51.0%	54.6%	52.6%
Rejected 不接受	30.2%	36.8%	33.5%	19.1%	25.5%	22.0%
Don't Know 唔知道	1.7%	0.0%	0.8%	1.5%	0.0%	0.8%
Net Value 淨值	16.3%	6.5%	10.9%	31.8%	29.1%	30.6%
Mean Score 平均分	5.47	4.92	5.16	6.13	5.46	5.81

Net value: Percent who chose 'Accept' / less percent who chose 'Reject'

淨值：認為「接受」的百分比減去認為「不接受」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater acceptance

平均分由 0 至 10 分，愈高分代表愈接受

Table 13: Acceptance of online doxing (18-29 years)

表 13：網上「起底」的接受程度（18-29 歲）

	Against police officers and their families 針對警察及其家人			Against protesters and journalists 針對示威者及記者		
	Employed 在職人士	Students 學生	18-29	Employed 在職人士	Students 學生	18-29
Accepted 接受	25.7%	23.3%	24.7%	11.5%	18.2%	14.0%
Rejected 不接受	64.0%	68.2%	66.1%	79.9%	65.8%	73.7%
Don't Know 唔知道	1.5%	0.0%	0.8%	1.5%	0.0%	1.7%
Net Value 淨值	-38.3%	-44.9%	-41.4%	-68.4%	-47.6%	-59.6%
Mean Score 平均分	3.08	2.59	2.88	2.03	2.88	2.38

Net value: Percent who chose 'Accept' / less percent who chose 'Reject'

淨值：認為「接受」的百分比減去認為「不接受」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater acceptance

平均分由 0 至 10 分，愈高分代表愈接受

4. Resurgence of Radicalism

Figure 9 shows the composition of Hong Kong population by political inclination. Moderates (which include centrists and those without specific political inclination) remained the largest group (50.9%), followed by the non-establishment supporters (36.8%), and pro-establishment supporters (7.3%). Non-establishment supporters are further divided into democrats (25.9%) and 'others' (10.9%), which are mostly localists and self-determinists.


From mid-2017 to December 2018, the proportion of moderates and pro-establishment supporters in the population have risen while that of non-establishment supporters has declined. Since then, however, there was a reversal of trends which accentuated in 2019.

Throughout 2019, moderates decreased by 13.3 percentage points (from 64.2% to 50.9%); pro-establishment supporters also decreased by 4 percentage points (from 11.3% to 7.3%); but non-establishment supporters increased by 15.1% (from 21.7% to 36.8%). Among non-establishment supporters, the proportion of democrats and 'others' rose by 9.3 percentage points (from 16.6% to 25.9%), and 5.8 percentage points (from 5.1% to 10.9%) respectively.

Most of these changes took place abruptly since June 2019 amidst a hopeful trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation all through 2018. Different trajectories displayed by groups of different political inclinations also signify further polarization, as evident in the changes between October and December 2019, a time when the momentum of the movement started to slow, while number of pro-establishment supporters regained and the growth of non-establishment supporters stabilized, moderates continued to decline, though its size still accounted for the majority of the respondents.

Figure 9: Political inclination of population

圖 9：香港市民的政治傾向



4.1. Re-radicalisation of youths


Figure 10 shows the change in the composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by political inclination. The proportion of moderates dropped from 66.4% in December 2018 to 38.2% in December 2019 (decreasing by 28.2 percentage points) while the proportion of the non-establishment group rose from 29.7% to 55.3% (rising by 25.6 percentage points). Within the non-establishment group, the proportions of democrats and 'others' rose from 19.6% to 28.5% and from 10.1% to 26.9% (rising by 8.9% and 16.8% percentage points) respectively.

Up till December 2018, there had been encouraging signs of de-radicalization of youth, where population of moderates were high and rising. This trend, however, was reversed most notably from June 2019 onwards, as the proportion of non-establishment supporters witnessed a steep rise, surpassing moderates for some time. At the same time, within the non-establishment group, after overtaking democrats, other non-establishment supporters dropped below democrats in December 2019. Worryingly, over a quarter of youths identified themselves as localists or self-determinists, which reminisced 2017 when the traditional and radical wings were of almost equal share.

It must be stressed that the political inclination of youths tends to move swiftly as although the changes were unambiguously notable in the latter half of 2019, the exact relationship between the radicalization of youth and the social unrest since June 2019 needs further examination.

Figure 10: Political inclination of youths

圖 10：青年的政治傾向



5. Continuation of 1C2S after 2047

An issue of utmost importance for the future of Hong Kong is the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. Table 14 shows that 73.5% of the public still agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. Even after the anti-extradition movement erupted in June, support across all groups with different political inclinations in Hong Kong still maintained at around and often over 70%, including the localists and self-determinists, who are known to be highly critical of 1C2S. Though the public's current evaluation of 1C2S is quite critical, the majority of them still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

While those who chose 'should' remained steady, there was an increase in 'should not', leading to a statistically significant drop in the net value of support by 8.9 percentage points, reaching its lowest score since December 2018 at 59.5%. The net value of support generally reached over 50% across most age groups, educational attainment, and political inclination, with the exception of the following cohorts: those ageing 70 years or above (44.0%), those with primary school enrolment or below (46.7%) and other non-establishment supporters (44.7%).

Figure 11 shows the volatility of net value of support produced by respondents of different political inclinations. Most notable of these changes was the steep increase in net value by other non-establishment supporters in the first half of 2019, catching up with both moderates and democrats at over 70%, which was immediately followed by a statistically significant steep decrease since June 2019. Net value by pro-establishment supporters also fluctuated with a sudden rebound after an initial decline.

Overall, since December 2018, in addition to the collective decline in net value of support for the continuation of 1C2S, differences among those with different political inclinations are surfacing. Given the decrease in net support from all political inclinations, one may find it difficult to conclude what alternatives are on the rise.

Table 14: Attitude towards the continuation of 1C2S after 2047

表 14：2047 年後香港應否繼續實行「一國兩制」


	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Should 應該	76.5%	75.5%	75.5%	73.5%	-
Should Not 不應該	8.1%	8.6%	10.1%	14.1%	-
Don't Know 唔知道	15.4%	15.8%	14.4%	12.4%	-
Net Value 淨值	68.4%	66.9%	65.4%	59.5%	-

Net value: Percent who chose 'Should' less percent who chose 'Should Not'

淨值：認為「應該」的百分比減去認為「不應該」的百分比

Figure 11: Net Value of support for continuation of 1C2S by political inclination

圖 11：繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度淨值（按政治傾向劃分）



5.1. Favourable conditions to the continuation of 1C2S after 2047

If respondents agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2017, they were then asked to choose what conditions would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S from the following list (they were allowed to choose more than 1 item):

- Hong Kong's political system democratises further;
- Hong Kong completing legislation of Article 23;
- Hong Kong maintaining a high degree of autonomy;
- Hong Kong maintaining economic prosperity and stability; and
- Others (please specify).

Figure 12 shows the percentages of respondents who chose each of the five conditions. For all respondents, 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (65.4%) remained the most important items, while 'democratising further' (56.0%) rose by over 22.7 percentage points since December 2018, of which steep rise happened from June 2019 onwards. 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (47.6%), which used to occupy the second place in the list dropped by 6.8 percentage points and became only the third most important condition. 'Completing legislation of Article 23' (4.5%) came in the last and witnessed a drop by almost 7 percentage points since December 2018 of the survey.

Figure 13 shows the pattern of choice differed by political inclination. Most groups, with the exception of pro-establishment supporters, started to attach more importance to the option 'political system democratising further' in the implementation of 1C2S, albeit to different degree.

As in previous rounds of survey, pro-establishment supporters perceived 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' as an unambiguous priority for the implementation of 1C2S (78.3%). This group also displayed the highest percentage of support in the option, 'completing legislation of Article 23', amongst all other groups, though the percentage also witnessed a sharp drop of 27.3 percentage points since December 2018.

Moderates displayed more balanced ratings on the different categories and less fluctuations to their ratings. There was notable increase to the scores of 'democratising further' since December 2018, from whence an increase of 15.4 percentage points was recorded in October 2019.

Among non-establishment supporters, those of 'others' produced the strongest priority given to a condition in this survey, as they gave 88.6% to 'democratising further'. Democrats, on the other hand, still rated 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (79.0%) as the top priority for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047, although 'democratising further' came close at 75.2%.

Figure 12: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047

圖 12：2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件





Figure 13: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 (by political inclination)
 圖 13：有利於 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（按政治傾向劃分）



6. Citizens' Identity

We also surveyed how citizens identify themselves, whether as 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese'. Figure 14 shows that members of the public identify themselves much more strongly as 'Hongkongers' than as 'Chinese'. The identities started to diverge after a period of parallel increase. From December 2018 to October 2019, the public's identification as 'Hongkongers' rose from 8.06 to 8.41. In the same period, that as 'Chinese' dropped from 6.83 to 4.72. Both changes were statistically significant.

The extent to which the public identified themselves as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' can be better demonstrated by Figure 15, a graph mapping the mix of identities rated by respondents against time. On the 0 to 10 scale, the median is 5, which indicates a moderate level of identification. Ratings that are higher than the median indicate relatively strong identification; ratings that are lower than the median indicate relatively weak identification. These levels of strength can be grouped into four categories, dual identity (strong in both identifications), stronger identification as 'Hongkongers', stronger identification as 'Chinese', and others which include those without a dominant identity.

It is clearly depicted that most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', though this has gradually changed since the June 2019. While the patterns from earlier surveys were very similar, where a majority of the public (between 55.9% to 57.3% before December 2018) had relatively strong identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese'. In the October 2019, this has steadily dropped to only 36.2%.

In the October 2019, citizens identifying themselves strongly as 'Hongkongers only' surpassed those with dual identity at 53.5% for the first time since the inception of our survey in mid-2017.

Identification as 'Chinese' may not be the same as patriotic, but identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' is a pre-requisite for 'devotion to China and Hong Kong'. The fact that the proportion of Hong Kong people with dual identity is declining throughout 2019 suggests the adverse impact the anti-extradition movement has on the implementation of 1C2S.

Figure 14: Citizens' identity scores

圖 14：市民的身分認同評分





Figure 15: Citizens' identity mix

圖 15：市民的混合身分認同



6.1. Rank correlation

As a result of the declining dual identity of both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', the correlation between the two stated identifications became less apparent. The two identities used to mutually reinforce each other but today, there are signs of polarization between them instead. The rank correlation coefficient changed from 0.74 in December 2018 to -0.22 in October 2019, though the correlation was not statistically significant. A stronger identification as 'Hongkonger' now accompanies a weaker one as 'Chinese' (see Table 15). The converse, on the other hand, also holds. The loss of the mutuality of the two identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' risks challenging the implementation of 1C2S in the near future.

Table 15: Rank correlation of citizens' identity

表 15：市民的身分認同等級相關係數

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Correlation 相關係數	0.13	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.12	-0.02	-
t-statistic t 檢定統計	4.06	5.58	5.53	5.55	5.43	3.85	-0.69	-

7. Topical Issues

7.1. Public consultation of Article 23

Table 16 summarizes the pattern of attitudes towards initiating public consultation for Article 23. In previous surveys, opinions were divided without a clear majority: Slightly less than half chose 'relatively unnecessary' while slightly more than a third chose 'relatively necessary'. Over time, there has been a slight rise in 'relatively unnecessary' over 'relatively necessary'. Since December 2018, opinions seemed to have converged to produce a negative skew. Clear tendency can be seen in the latest round of survey in December 2019, where an unambiguous majority of over 60% deemed initiating Article 23 'relatively unnecessary'. Policy makers should exercise the highest degree of caution in approaching this subject in view of the widespread disagreement on the issue.

The result may be read within the following context: it is plausible that a considerable proportion of the public is strongly opposed to having Article 23 legislation at all, and hence is opposed to any consultation. It is also possible that, some chose 'relatively unnecessary' as an answer as a consequence of careful consideration of the political reality of the society, namely, the efficacy of initiating Article 23 consultation amidst the escalating public discontentment. As with those still in favour, they might hold that – given the inevitability of Article 23's legislation under the Basic Law, it is marginally better to have at least some consultation, as opposed to none.

Compared with moderates, pro-establishment supporters were more inclined towards 'very necessary', whilst non-establishment supporters were more inclined towards 'very unnecessary'. Moderates were divided: Their opinions were close to that of the community as a whole.

Table 16: Attitudes towards initiating Article 23 consultation

表 16：對第二十三條立法諮詢的取態

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Relatively Necessary 比較有需要	35.5%	37.1%	34.5%	34.0%	28.2%	18.5%	-	-
Relatively Unnecessary 比較無需要	45.5%	44.4%	45.3%	47.9%	53.7%	63.2%	-	-
Don't Know 唔知道	5.9%	5.2%	5.5%	5.3%	5.6%	5.5%	-	-
Net Value 淨值	-10.6%	-7.7%	-11.4%	-14.7%	-25.5%	-44.7%	-	-
Mean Score 平均分	4.74	4.66	4.49	4.37	4.79	2.82	-	-

Net value: Percent who chose 'Relatively Necessary' less percent who chose 'Relatively Unnecessary'

淨值：認為「比較有須要」的百分比減去認為「比較無須要」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means greater necessity

平均分由 0 至 10 分，愈高分代表愈有須要

7.2. Knowledge of Basic Law

Table 17 shows that the mean score of public's self-rating of its knowledge of the Basic Law experienced a slight drop from 4.69 in December 2018 to 4.63 in August 2019. The rating was still below the median of 5, indicating that the public's knowledge of Basic Law is still inadequate.

Table 17: Knowledge of Basic Law

表 17：對《基本法》的認識

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Good Knowledge 認識較深	29.1%	30.2%	32.6%	34.9%	36.4%	34.7%	-	-
Little Knowledge 認識較淺	47.6%	44.8	43.6%	42.0%	40.1%	43.0%	-	-
Don't Know 唔知道	0.4%	0.8%%	1.2%	1.0%	1.0%	1.0%	-	-
Net Value 淨值	-18.6%	-14.7%	-11.2%	-7.1%	-3.7%	-8.3%	-	-
Mean Score 平均分	4.45	4.53	4.64	4.69	4.79	4.63	-	-

Net value: Percent who chose 'Good Knowledge' less percent who chose 'Little Knowledge'

淨值：認為「認識較深」的百分比減去認為「認識較淺」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means better knowledge

平均分由 0 至 10 分，愈高分代表認識愈深

7.3. Responsibility of conflicts

Table 18 shows the allocation of blame between the Mainland and Hong Kong when conflicts arise in the implementation of 1C2S. In October 2019, 45.4% of the public suggested that the Mainland would be responsible while 11.5% assigned the responsibility to Hong Kong, both of these values are at their most extreme since mid-2017. Nonetheless, those who chose 'equally responsible' fell from its usual $\pm 50\%$ to only 36.4% in October 2019. The sentiment implied by this swing toward blaming the Mainland is worrisome.

The results suggest that both the Central Government and HKSAR Government ought to reflect on its own responsibility for deadlocks and conflicts between government and people.

Table 18: Responsibility for conflicts

表 18：出現矛盾時的責任

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
The Mainland 內地	24.1%	26.5%	26.1%	27.2%	29.0%	34.0%	45.4%	-
Hong Kong 香港	15.4%	19.0%	18.1%	17.4%	16.1%	12.4%	11.5%	-
Equally responsible 一半半	54.5%	49.0%	50.7%	50.8%	50.1%	47.3%	36.4%	-
Don't Know 唔知道	6.0%	5.5%	5.1%	4.7%	4.8%	6.4%	6.7%	-
Net Value 淨值	9.3%	7.9%	8.0%	9.8%	12.9%	21.6%	33.8%	-
Mean Score 平均分	5.02	4.92	4.98	5.06	5.12	5.77	6.21	-

Net Value: Percent who chose 'The Mainland' less percent who chose 'Hong Kong'

淨值：認為屬「內地」的百分比減去認為屬「香港」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Scores higher (lower) than 5 means greater responsibility lies with the Mainland (Hong Kong)

平均分由 0 至 10 分，分數高於（低於）5 分代表內地（香港）需負較大責任

7.4. Impact of Carrie Lam on societal division

Unlike previous rounds of survey, Table 19 shows that those who chose 'increased' vastly exceeded those who chose 'Decreased'. Since December 2018, those who chose 'increased' rose by 48 percentage points while those who chose 'decreased' fell by 27.6 percentage points. The net value fell from 25.1% in December 2018 to a shocking -50.5%, indicating that the favourable impact on societal division of Carrie Lam's appointment as CE dramatically evaporated since June 2019. This is consistent with the decline in the CE approval ratings in other surveys in 2019.

Table 19: Impact of Carrie Lam on societal division

表 19：林鄭月娥上台對社會撕裂的影響

	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Decreased 減少	49.0%	42.1%	37.5%	29.0%	17.1%	9.9%	-
Increased 增加	7.6%	9.1%	12.4%	23.1%	44.8%	60.4%	-
Unchanged 無變	41.0%	46.5%	47.6%	45.3%	34.8%	26.7%	-
Don't Know 唔知道	2.4%	2.3%	2.4%	2.6%	3.2%	2.9%	-
Net Value 淨值	42.4%	33.1%	25.1%	6.1%	-27.7%	-50.5%	-

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Decreased' less percent who chose 'Increased'

淨值：認為「減少」的百分比減去認為「增加」的百分比

7.5. Emigration and confidence in 1C2S

Table 20 shows public's emigration plans. Those who had 'no plans' to emigrate remain the majority (69.3%), majorly exceeded those who 'have plans' (28.6%). Over time, there has been a clear fall in those who have 'no plans' to emigrate and rise in those who 'have plans', respectively from 84.0% in December 2018 to 69.3% in October 2019 and from 14.9% to 28.6%. These changes were statistically significant.

Table 21 shows the percentages of different groups who plan to emigrate due to lack of confidence in 1C2S (the emigration ratio). Between December 2018 and October 2019, the emigration ratio of the public rose with statistical significance from 11.2% to 25.4%. For moderates and non-establishment supporters, the ratios also increased, at a statistically significant level, respectively from 9.3% to 21.2%, and from 23.8% to 36.4% respectively. Pro-establishment supporters, on the other hand, recorded the lowest emigration ratio of 7.1%.

Past studies have suggested that surveys often inaccurately amplify the number of individuals who seek to emigrate, for only a fraction of those who express interest in emigrating eventually do so in reality. Caution should therefore be exercised in interpreting the findings, though they still provide valuable reference of the degree and extent of concern. Amongst moderates, those who confess to having plans to emigrate due to their lack of confidence in 1C2S may do so due to – on one hand – their disillusionment towards the central government and the pro-establishment, but also – on the other hand – disillusionment towards perceived instability caused by the non-establishment supporters; the latter may cause disaffection amongst the moderates due to the perceived damage of radical politics on the rule of law and Hong Kong's economy. Neither of the possibilities above could be ruled out.

Table 20: Public's emigration plans

表 20：市民移民海外的計劃

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Have Plans 有打算	13.6%	12.6%	13.0%	14.9%	18.0%	24.1%	28.6%	-
No Plans 無打算	85.3%	86.4%	86.1%	84.0%	79.1%	73.3%	69.3%	-
Don't Know 唔知道	1.0%	0.9%	0.9%	1.2%	2.9%	2.6%	2.1%	-
Net Value 淨值	-71.7%	-74.5%	-73.1%	-69.1%	-61.1%	-49.2%	-40.7%	-

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Have Plans' less percent who chose 'No Plans'

淨值：認為「無打算」的百分比減去認為「有打算」的百分比

Table 21: Emigration ratio (by political inclination)

表 21：移民比率（按政治傾向劃分）

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Pro-establishment 建制派	1.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.7%	7.1%	-
Moderates 溫和派	7.9%	5.8%	6.8%	9.3%	13.3%	18.6%	21.2%	-
Non-establishment 非建制派	14.3%	16.8%	19.9%	23.8%	25.3%	32.5%	36.4%	-
Of which: Democrats 其中：民主派	14.0%	14.3%	14.9%	21.8%	22.6%	30.5%	34.0%	-
Of which: Others 其中：其他非建制派	15.3%	24.6%	34.3%	30.3%	36.6%	39.2%	41.3%	-
Others 其他	3.1%	2.5%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	11.7%	-
All Respondents 整體市民	8.8%	8.0%	9.2%	11.2%	14.4%	20.8%	25.4%	-

7.6. Attitudes towards the Greater Bay Area (GBA) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

Table 22 shows that more agreed to Hong Kong's participation in the development of the GBA, though the rate of support was closely followed by those who 'disagree', with a narrowing mean score from 6.27 in December 2018 to 5.22 in August 2019. The decline was statistically significant.

All age groups and political inclination groups experienced statistically significant drop. The 30-39 age group had been the most critical group towards the development, and they switched from mild agreement to mild disagreement: Their mean score fell from 5.67 to 4.46.

Table 22: Should Hong Kong participate in the development of the GBA?

表 22：香港應否參與粵港澳大灣區發展？

	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Agree 支持	56.4%	54.0%	47.9%	42.6%	-	-
Disagree 反對	23.6%	24.7%	30.4%	35.3%	-	-
Don't Know 唔知道	7.0%	7.2%	5.9%	5.5%	-	-
Net Value 淨值	35.4%	31.6%	17.6%	7.3%	-	-
Mean Score 平均分	6.30	6.27	5.79	5.22	-	-

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Agree' less percent who chose 'Disagree'

淨值：認為「支持」的百分比減去認為「反對」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means stronger agreement

平均分由 0 至 10 分，愈高分代表愈支持

7.6.1. Willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA

Table 23 shows that, in August 2019, only 7.8% of the public would consider moving there; another 10.4% may consider moving, but 73.9% would not consider moving. Over time, there was a slight fall in 'willing' and a rise of over 10 percentage points in 'not willing' since the December 2018 of survey. The change was statistically significant.

Table 24 shows the change in the willingness of youths (age 18 to 29) to live or work in other cities of the GBA. In August 2018, only 8.1% of youths were willing to live or work in other cities of the GBA, and this has almost halved by August 2019, after experiencing a rise of 6.8 percentage points in the latter part of 2018. Those who were unwilling to do so rose from 61.0% in mid-2018 to 70.1% in August 2019, after a drop of 12.2 percentage points at the end of 2018. The rise in net unwillingness of youths was large (12.4%), and the change was statistically significant.

Table 23: Willingness of living or working in other cities of the GBA

表 23：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願

	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Willing 會考慮	12.2%	13.0%	12.9%	7.8%	-	-
Not willing 不會考慮	63.1%	62.6%	67.6%	73.9%	-	-
Maybe 或者	11.9%	13.4%	11.8%	10.4%	-	-
Don't Know 唔知道	12.8%	11.0%	7.8%	7.8%	-	-
Net Value 淨值	-51.0%	-49.5%	-54.7%	-66.1%	-	-

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Willing' less Percent who chose 'Not willing'

淨值：「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比

Table 24: Willingness of youths (age 18 to 29) to live or work in other cities of the GBA

表 24：青年（18 至 29 歲）前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願

	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Willing 會考慮	8.1%	14.9%	8.9%	4.8%	-	-
Not willing 不會考慮	61.0%	48.8%	60.6%	70.1%	-	-
Maybe 或者	15.0%	23.5%	20.8%	15.4%	-	-
Don't Know 唔知道	15.9%	12.7%	9.8%	9.6%	-	-
Net Value 淨值	-52.9%	-33.9%	-51.7%	-65.3%	-	-

Net value: Percent who chose 'Willing' less percent who chose 'Not willing'

淨值：「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比

7.6.2. Should Hong Kong take part in the development of BRI?

Table 25 shows that the majority of the respondents interviewed supported the development of BRI. Over time, the net support fell from 26.2% in December 2018 to 17.6% in June 2019. This may be related to the problems that the BRI encountered in a number of countries.

As expected, pro-establishment supporters were highly positive of the BRI: their mean score increased from 8.65 to 8.75. Moderates remained mildly positive although their mean score fell slightly from 6.46 to 6.22. Mean score of non-establishment supporters had a statistically significant fall from 4.01 to 3.50.

Table 25: Hong Kong's participation in the development of the BRI

表 25：香港應否參與「一帶一路」發展

	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12
Support 支持	56.5%	53.1%	48.9%	-	-	-
Oppose 反對	21.6%	28.3%	31.9%	-	-	-
Don't Know 唔知道	7.1%	5.6%	5.9%	-	-	-
Net Value 淨值	37.6%	26.2%	17.6%	-	-	-
Mean Score 平均分	6.37	6.02	5.74	-	-	-

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Support' less percent who chose 'Oppose'

淨值：「支持」的百分比減去「反對」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means stronger support

平均分由 0 至 10 分，愈高分代表愈支持

Appendices

I. Methodology

1. Construction of 1C2S Index

To understand the implementation of 1C2S comprehensively, we measure how the public in HK evaluate the current situation from various dimensions. International perception of freedom and democracy in HK is also pivotal as these are core components of 1C2S. Hence, we give an equal weight to scores obtained from the following two indices:

- Index (A): Public Opinion: Hong Kong public's evaluation of 1C2S compiled from telephone polls on 9 dimensions of 1C2S; and
- Index (B): International Perception: Compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on various dimensions of freedom and democracy in HK.

1.1. Index (A): Public Opinion

Index (A) is the average of sub-scores obtained from nine dimensions on different dimensions of 1C2S in our telephone polls conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Each round, about 1,000 individuals will be randomly sampled by the CATI (computer assisted telephone interviewing) system, all aged 18 or above; all of them spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin. Table 26 shows the statistical and scientific standards of each survey.

In the telephone polls, many questions employed 1 to 7 as the rating scale in the survey process, with 4 as the median. This scale, which is known as the Likert scale, is commonly adopted for psychological assessments. This scale was used instead of a 0 to 10 scale as the latter is deemed too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents to choose from. However, to better conform to existing indices – which tend to be expressed on a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median) – we converted the results mathematically into the popular 0 to 10 scale.

For a more extensive report on the survey results, please see *Survey Results: Frequency and Percentage Distribution*, which can be found on the webpage of Path of Democracy (<http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/>).

Table 26: Survey details

表 26：調查概況

Round 輪次	Survey Period 調查日期	Number of Respondents 受訪人數	Response Rates 回應率	Confidence Level 置信水平	Sampling Error 抽樣誤差
2017.06	23/5-3/6	1,002	36.8%	95.0%	±3.1%
2017.12	11/12-23/12	1,006	39.5%	95.0%	±3.09%
2018.06	23/5-2/6	1,004	37.2%	95.0%	±3.09%
2018.12	3/12-12/12	1,001	38.8%	95.0%	±3.1%
2019.06	27/5- 6/6	1,002	38.0%	95.0%	±3.1%
2019.08	24/7-7/8	1,001	39.5%	95.0%	±3.1%
2019.10	17/10-31/10	1,002	38.0%	95.0%	±3.09%
2019.12	10/12-20/12	1,000	39.8%	95.0%	±3.1%

1.1.1. Alternative methods of constructing Index (A)

Conceptually, there are different ways to compute the nine dimensions into a composite score as Index (A). We have chosen the method of simple average, which is the most common method employed in constructing indices.

Its strength lies in its parsimony and accessibility. It may not be the best method as it assigns equal weighting to all items (i.e. assuming equal importance for all items). Here, we compare the method of simple average to two alternatives methods that are more sophisticated, namely, principal component analysis and factor analysis.

Principal component analysis is a statistical method that processes and simplifies data; it is the standard scientific method employed in constructing indices. Through statistical analysis, it extracts the data set's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains the variations across the data.

Factor analysis extracts common factors from the data, and it shares a similar methodology with Principal component analysis. Its strength lies in its ability to identify hidden and representative factors amongst the many variables and group variables of a similar nature and converting the same into a common factor, which reduces the total number of variables.

Table 27 shows the negligible difference in scores acquired by the three methods. The results of all three methods are highly similar, largely due to the clustered nature of the public's assessments of the nine dimensions (cf. the distributions of the nine dimensions are highly correlated), which causes the core components or sub-items across all three methods to be highly similar. Both alternative methods involve complex calculations, which render the methods inaccessible to laymen. Given the similarity of the results from all three methods, we adopted the simplest and most commonly used method – i.e. the average of the nine dimensions – in constructing Index (A).

Table 27: Index (A): Public Opinion computed by different methods

表 27：指數 (A)：民意調查以不同方式編制

Round 輪次	Simple Average 簡單平均數	Principal Component Analysis 主成分分析	Factor Analysis 因子分析
2017.06	4.84	4.83	4.82
2017.12	4.98	4.99	4.94
2018.06	5.05	5.06	5.00
2018.12	4.84	4.84	4.76
2019.06	4.58	4.58	4.53
2019.08	3.98	3.96	3.91
2019.10	3.26	3.23	3.18
2019.12	3.53	3.51	3.47

1.2. Index (B): International Perception

Index (B) is the average of 3 indices, namely, the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser Institutes, and the Democracy Index of the Economic Intelligence Unit. The average of the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index is known as the Human Freedom Index, which is the most comprehensive index of freedom available.

As the Human Freedom Index covers a very large number of countries, the latest Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index only reflect conditions two years ago. These two indices are updated based on the latest comparable indicators from other international think tanks. When updating is not possible, the relevant figures are assumed to be unchanged.

1.2.1. Comparable indicators

To obtain the updated scores of Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index, we first calculate the percentage changes in the comparable indicators for the respective years; then we apply these changes to the latest Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser. The comparable indicators for the Economic Freedom Index and each of the 7 components of the Personal Freedom Index are listed in Table 28.

Table 28: Comparable indicators of Index (B): International Perception

表 28：指數 (B)：國際評價之相應指標

Indicators 指標	Comparable Indicators 相應指標
Economic Freedom Index 經濟自由指數	The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom 傳統基金會經濟自由指數
Rule of Law 法治	World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index – 'Procedural Justice', 'Civil Justice' and 'Criminal Justice' 世界正義項目「法治指數」—「程序公義」、「民事司法」及「刑事司法」
Security and Safety 安全	World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index – 'Order and Security' 世界正義項目「法治指數」—「秩序與治安」
Movement 遷徙自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report - 'G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「G1. 人民是否享有遷徙自由，包括改變居所、就業或教育的能力？」
Religion 宗教自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「D2. 人民能否在公開或私人場合自由地實踐和表達宗教信仰或非信仰？」
Association, Assembly, & Civil Society 結社、集會及公民社會自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'E. Associational and Organizational Rights' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「E. 結社及組織權利」
Expression and Information 言論自由	Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index 無國界記者「全球新聞自由指數」
Identity and Relationships 性別認同及關係	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「G3. 人民是否享有個人社交自由，包括選擇婚姻對象及家庭人數、免受居所暴力及自主改變外貌？」

1.3. Refinement and Estimation


After the first survey in June 2017, one out of the nine dimensions, namely the score on Question 4 ('original way of life remained unchanged'), is not comparable with subsequent ones due to refinements of survey questions. The refinement only affects one question in the nine questions used to compute Index (A). Scores of the other eight questions are directly comparable as they are identical in all surveys.

To adjust for the time lag of international indices, scores of Index (B) in previous reports were estimated with data available then. In every report, scores will be revised with latest updates from international think tanks.

For the convenience of comparison, Figure 16 shows Index (A) computed by nine questions and by the identical eight questions, the estimated and revised scores of Index (B), and the 1C2S Index constructed by the combination of them. The results suggest that the differences in scores of Index (A), Index (B) and 1C2S Index due to question change and updating are at most 0.12 and therefore negligible.

Figure 16: Refinement and estimation of 1C2S Index

圖 16：「一國兩制」指數之修訂與估算



2. Construction of 1C2S Mass Media Index

Our sample consists of around 146,000 newspaper articles related to 1C2S from 21 local daily newspapers that were published between April 1998 and December 2019. The number of articles processed in each newspaper is listed in Table 29.

Each article undergoes a ‘tokenisation’ process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of approximately 22 years, our text corpus contains around 73 million tokens. From this massive dataset, common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as ‘我’, ‘你’, ‘的’, are first removed before further analysis.

To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘neutral’ (not a sentiment word). A positive word is then given a sentiment score of 1, a negative word is assigned a score of -1, and a neutral word has a score of 0. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by the Natural Language Processing and Sentiment Analysis Lab, Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica. The number of words processed each year since 1998 is given in Table 30.

The positive, or negative as the case may be, sentiment of a paragraph is quantified via a count of the number of positive (negative) words it contains, adjusted by its total word count. The sentiment score of an article is calculated as the average difference between positive and negative proportions among constituent paragraphs. 1C2S MMI is derived as an index that captures the weighted average sentiment score among newspapers in a given month. The base month is set at July 2017 to indicate 20 years after the establishment of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Since there are substantial differences in the number of news articles published by newspapers during the sample period, the article count of a newspaper alone could be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure 1C2S MMI’s reliability, the sentiment score for each newspaper is further weighted by public perceptions of its credibility based on the survey ‘Public Evaluation on Media Credibility’ conducted by Centre for Communication Research, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Table 29: News sources of 1C2S MMI

表 29：「一國兩制」輿情指數之報章來源

Newspaper 報章	Number of Articles 文章篇數
A Daily A 報	81
am730	2,316
Apple Daily 蘋果日報	9,760
Headline Daily 頭條日報	1,162
Hong Kong Commercial Daily 香港商報	14,157
Hong Kong Daily News 新報	4,476
Hong Kong Economic Journal 信報	10,391
Hong Kong Economic Times 經濟日報	4,232
Hong Kong Globe 公正報	194
Lion Rock Daily 香港仔	392
Metro Daily 都市日報	1,436
Ming Pao Daily News 明報	12,017
Oriental Daily News 東方日報	8,485
Sharp Daily 爽報	152
Sing Pao 成報	5,030
Sing Tao Daily 星島日報	7,933
Sky Post 晴報	524
Ta Kung Pao 大公報	29,033
The Sun 太陽報	4,828
Tin Tin Daily News 天天日報	452
Wen Wei Po 文匯報	29,164
Total 總數	146,215

Table 30: Number of words processed

表 30：處理資料字數

Year 年份	Number of Words 字數
1998	669,676
1999	2,498,254
2000	2,320,584
2001	2,640,690
2002	2,545,546
2003	2,713,403
2004	4,801,621
2005	2,874,994
2006	1,879,834
2007	2,797,512
2008	1,446,629
2009	1,815,839
2010	1,880,198
2011	2,040,824
2012	3,441,893
2013	3,312,415
2014	5,386,835
2015	4,411,567
2016	5,590,354
2017	6,204,647
2018	4,932,978
2019	7,086,984
Total 總數	73,198,507

2.1. Accuracy test

1C2S MMI is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict.

In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time. As shown in Table 31, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as 'positive' whereas 1,472 were classified as 'negative.'

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be.

Table 31 also shows the average sentiment scores of these 3 groups of paragraphs. In particular, 'positive' paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as 'negative' paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these 3 groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.

Table 31: Results of accuracy test

表 31：覆查結果

	Positive 正面	Neutral 中立	Negative 負面
No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers 真人研究員對情緒的判斷	2,363	14,202	1,472
Net Value 情緒淨值	21.76%	14.42%	2.92%

II. List of significant events

The significant events which may have affected evaluations of 1C2S that occurred in the previous reports (mid-2017 to late-2018) are listed below.

2017 H2

- Disqualification of four LegCo members by the High Court (14 July);
- Prison sentences on the (13 + 3) protesters: The violent demonstrations of 13 protestors in relation to East North Territories Development, and the three student leaders (Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, and Alex Chow) in the Civic Square occupation. In August 2017, the Court of Appeals sentenced them to 6 to 13 months imprisonment. The court also gave new tougher sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence (15 and 17 August);
- China's enactment of the national anthem law (1 September);
- Emphasis on 'overall jurisdiction over Hong Kong' in the Work Report of 19th CPC National Congress (19 October);
- LegCo's passage of the non-binding motion on the high-speed rail co-location arrangement (15 November); and
- Amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Council to restrict filibustering (15 December).

2018 H1

- Agnes Chow Ting, a pro-democracy activist, was banned from running for the LegCo by-election on the grounds that her party, Demosisto, had called for 'self-determination' (27 January);
- The case of the three student leaders was brought to the Court of Final Appeals (CFA). The CFA overturned the prison sentences on the trio on a technicality but ruled that the Court of Appeals was entitled to give tough sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence (6 February);
- Edward Leung, leader of *Hong Kong Indigenous*, was given a prison sentence of 6 years on June 11 for his role in the civil unrest in Mongkok (11 June); and
- LegCo's passage of the co-location bill on June 14 after protracted debates (14 June).

2018 H2

- Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, delivered a speech hosted by the Foreign Correspondents' Club (14 August);
- The Hong Kong National Party was banned on national security grounds (24 September);
- Visa renewal of Victor Mallet, the Financial Times' Asia News Editor and Vice President of the Foreign Correspondents Club (FCC), was rejected. He had chaired a talk by pro-independence activist Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the Hong Kong National Party, at the FCC (5 October);
- Lau Siu Lai, a Democrat who had called for Hong Kong self-determination, was barred from running the LegCo by-election (12 October);
- Opening of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge (23 October);
- The United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended the US Congress to assess its export policy on technology with regard to Hong Kong's status as a separate customs area (14 November);
- Trial of 9 key figures of the 'Occupy Central' movement started (19 November);
- A series of celebrations of the 40th anniversary of China's reform and opening up (December);
- Public education campaigns to promote the country's Constitution and Hong Kong's Basic Law were initiated on the National Constitution Day (4 December); and
- Corruption investigation against Leung Chun-ying, former chief executive of HKSAR, for receiving a HK\$50 million payment from an Australian engineering firm was dropped due to lack of sufficient evidence (12 December).

'One Country Two Systems' Index

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