

'ONE COUNTRY
TWO SYSTEMS'
INDEX

「一國兩制」指數

'One Country Two Systems' Index

August 2020
(Sixth Edition)

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Preface

The unprecedented pursuit of 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) demands unyielding exploration and persistence from stakeholders. Since 1997, we have made headway in the realization of 1C2S, but at the same time, have also encountered many challenges. To assist full implementation of 1C2S, in July 2017, Path of Democracy established the 1C2S Index and released its first report in relation thereto with a view to conduct an objective evaluation of the continued implementation of 1C2S by reviewing the accomplishments and shortfalls of 1C2S at the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong SAR.

The 1C2S Index is based on both local opinion and international perception on the current state of 1C2S. In order to measure local sentiment, we conduct periodic public surveys in Hong Kong on aspects such as 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong', judiciary independence, the high degree of autonomy and other important issues. We also looked at global studies carried out by international think tanks and how Hong Kong is being rated on aspects like human rights, rule of law, freedom of speech and freedom of association. These independent evaluations are also incorporated into the Index to give a more balanced view on how the World including Hong Kong people look at the state of 1C2S.

We also devised and introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) by making use of big data analytics to measure the media sentiment of Hong Kong towards 1C2S since 1988 with real-time monitoring and predictive alerts. In compiling our reports, we also sought views on current issues related to 1C2S, such as the public's emigration plans, national security and economic integration.

We extend our sincere gratitude to the research team involved in the production of our sixth edition of the 1C2S Index report: Gillian Tam, Ting Hin Yan, and Ian Chan. We are also grateful to Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong for completing the telephone polls on our behalf.

Going forward, to better inform policy makers and the public, we will continue to conduct public surveys and update international indices every six months, and to monitor media sentiment regularly to gauge the latest perceptions of the public, the international community and the media on 1C2S.

Ray Poon
Co-convenor (Research)

Key Findings

Before the ripple effect of the anti-extradition movement had the chance to settle, Hong Kong was quickly met with the COVID-19 pandemic as 2020 began. The combined impact of political and public health crises has plunged the difficult situation of Hong Kong deeper into a dark winter of never-before-seen scale since the handover. On the surface, Hong Kong recorded a negative economic growth for four consecutive quarters and the highest unemployment rate in fifteen years at 6.2% in July 2020. The city's leadership struggled throughout this challenging period with limited governance capacity as anti-epidemic measures were often met with resistance given the public's general lack of trust.

The severity of the dual crises was further intensified by a background of Sino-US international power struggle which fuelled the already unstable socio-political climate of Hong Kong. Not only is the duelling coronavirus blame narratives exacerbated the showdown between Washington and Beijing, the now-effective Hong Kong Autonomy Act also accelerates Sino-US decoupling with US applying sanctions over Hong Kong as well as Chinese and Hong Kong officials on the pretext of erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy. The passage of the Hong Kong National Security Law and the upgrading of the central leading committee which oversees Hong Kong and Macau affairs brought perceived increase of presence of Beijing over Hong Kong. The general atmosphere has been that of fear and uncertainty as some chanted a *de facto* abolishment of 1C2S and an approaching wave of capital and brain drains, catalysed by new international immigration arrangements designed for Hong Kong residents.

All these incidents combine to reinforce the need for Hong Kongers to confront the future of Hong Kong and 1C2S with fortitude and determination. In our sixth edition of the 1C2S Index report, we hope to shed light on the subject with substantial quantitative data from our latest round of survey in June 2020. To fully capture the socio-political reality of the city, we also introduced new sets of questions on the development of the social movement against the backdrop of more explicit presence of the central authorities in Hong Kong.

Confidence in 1C2S hung low

While the radicalism magnified by the anti-extradition movement seemed to have died down a little in the beginning of 2020, the unresolved demands of the protesters were quick to resume momentum as early strategies against COVID-19 exposed the government's unpreparedness. Concerns about the state of 1C2S and the various rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Basic Law were heightened by the drafting of the Hong Kong National Security Law in late May, prompting vigorous reactions from both local citizens and the international communities. Under these circumstances, it is to be expected that the briefly recovered 1C2S Index will resume its decline. The Index fell from 5.70 at the end of 2019 to 5.58 in June 2020, just 0.01 point higher than the lowest point recorded in October 2019.

However, while all nine dimensions from Index (A): Public Opinion fell, only one of these declinations was statistically significant, namely that in 'freedom of speech'. This is hardly surprising given China's expulsion of US journalists affected their work in Hong Kong, the review of RTHK's content production procedures aroused concerns over editorial independence, and the expeditious introduction of the Hong Kong National Security Law also mounted worries of the public over the freedoms promised by 1C2S.

From our past reports, we can see it has been a consistent pattern that the Hong Kong public hold higher expectations and much more critical view on the integrity of 1C2S. Changes in Index (B): International Perception tends to be more diverse and less drastic. Negative adjustments were made for rule of law, freedom of association and freedom of expression due to time lag in the compilation of international indices, further decline at the international level is anticipated given the current socio-political situation. This is so notwithstanding the historic turnout for the local district election, the rise of citizen journalism and the relative safety in the time of global terrorism which will be seen as positive factors in terms of democratic participation and personal freedom.

Overwhelming support for the continuation of 1C2S

Despite the fall of the Index, overall support for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 remains overwhelmingly high at 77.2%. Even with the social turbulence, support across all groups with different political inclinations still maintained over 75%, including the resistance camp, who is known to be highly critical of 1C2S. Support for other future options is marginal: direct administration under the central government stands at 4.9% and Hong Kong independence at 2.3%. Though the public's current evaluation of 1C2S is quite critical, the majority of them still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

For most people, 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (69.6%) remained the most favourable condition to the continuation of 1C2S. Consistent with one of the core demands of the anti-extradition movement which remain pertinent among the society at large, 'democratising further' (53.3%) continues to surpass 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (51.9%) as the second most important condition.

The conventional political divide over the issue of 'democratizing further' and 'maintaining national security' resumed. This is evidenced by the fact that the former continues to have strong support from democrats and other non-establishment groups, and the rise in support for the latter among both pro-establishment and moderates.

Resurgence of political polarization

Amidst a hopeful trend of a growing population of moderates in 2017 and 2018, the population became more polarized in 2019 and this trend unfortunately continues in 2020. While moderates remained the largest group, this group has embarked on a declining trend with a drop in proportion by 0.9 percentage points (from 50.9% to 50.0%) from December 2019 to June 2020. Non-establishment supporters rose by 4.2 percentage points (from 36.8% to 41.0%) in the same period while pro-establishment supporters also experienced a slight growth of 1.7% since the last round (from 7.3% to 9.0%). Different trajectories displayed by the above groups also signified further polarization, despite a subsiding momentum of the anti-extradition movement. The number of pro-establishment supporters regained and the growth of non-establishment supporters continued steadily, while moderates continued to decline.

Radicalism re-emerged among youths (aged 18 to 29), as their political inclination tends to be particularly sensitive to social events and fluctuates in a timely manner. Since non-establishment supporters overtook moderates to become the majority in late 2019, they continued to grow by 7.5 percentage points (from 55.3% to 62.8%) in the latest round while moderates steadily decreased by 2.4 percentage points (from 38.2% to 35.8%). Moderates do not only cease to be the majority, their size even falls behind that of other non-establishment supporters, accounting for 37.9%, which also overruns democrats who claimed only 24.9% of youths support. This is the first time yet that other non-establishment supporters, mainly the resistance camp, become the majority among youths. Such degree of radicalisation among 18-29 age group is a serious concern.

Up till the end of 2018, there had been encouraging signs of de-radicalization of youths, where population of moderates were high and rising. This trend, however, reversed abruptly from 2019 onwards as the proportion of non-establishment supporters witnessed a steep rise. Within the non-establishment cohort, the resistance subgroup surpasses democrats by a large margin. This presents a more pressing situation than 2017 when the traditional and radical wings were of almost equal share. This is an alarming observation.

Divergence of citizens' identity as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese'

Citizens' self-identification as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' started to diverge after a period of parallel increase. From October 2019 to June 2020, the public's self-identification as 'Hongkongers' rose from 8.41 to 8.55. In the same period, that as 'Chinese' dropped from 4.72 to 4.38 with statistical significance.

Most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese'. This has gradually changed since June 2019. While over half of the public acknowledged dual identity in earlier surveys, this

had dropped to 32.5% and was overwhelmingly surpassed by citizens identifying themselves strongly as 'Hongkongers only' (69.7%) in June 2020.

As a result of the declining dual identity, the correlation between the two stated identities became less apparent. The two identities used to mutually reinforce each other. Now, there are only signs of polarization. The negative correlation becomes statistically significant in this round. A stronger identification as 'Hongkonger' now accompanies a weaker one as 'Chinese', and vice versa. The loss of the mutuality of the two identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' risks challenging the implementation of 1C2S in the near future.

Implications


The decline in most indicators in our latest report suggested that the dual crises as well as the aftermath of the anti-extradition bill have taken a toll on the public's confidence in the future of 1C2S and Hong Kong. However, we also found that the majority of Hong Kong public supported the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. It is difficult to reconcile the fact that despite what appeared to be a marked decline in confidence of the 1C2S, people of Hong Kong still overwhelmingly indicated they were in favour of the continuation of the same beyond 2047. A possible explanation is that while the immediate perception is bad, the longer view of 1C2S still holds good.

The continued polarization sent an alarming sign. Non-establishment supporters became increasingly alienated from the majority. Along with their weak identification as 'Chinese', there are high and rising emigration ratios and diminishing enthusiasm for national development. Their priorities for the continuation of 1C2S also diverged from those of the majority. Particularly worrying was that non-establishment supporters appeared to be concentrated in the branch known to harbour increasingly radical views on the socio-economic-political future of Hong Kong and are deeply critical of 1C2S, the central and HKSAR governments.

While assertive responses from Beijing may introduce a stabilizing element to the 1C2S model in the long-run, the younger generation is beginning to accept radical means to achieve political goals. The 18-29 age group displayed an overall eagerness in the idea of mutual destruction ('laam chau' 「攞抄」) and embraced the LegCo gridlock brought by the delay in house chairman election. It may be unfair to say that their criticisms of 1C2S arose solely out of misunderstanding. It is rather more appropriate to view their disillusionment and re-radicalization as a result of prolonged negligence of the deep-rooted problems in the implementation of 1C2S. Both the central and HKSAR governments need to tackle and resolve these issues with patience and care.

1C2S at a Glance

| 1C2S Index 「一國兩制」指數 | 1C2S Mass Media Index 「一國兩制」輿情指數 | Moderates 溫和派 | Continuation of 1C2S 延續「一國兩制」 | Dual Identity 雙重身分認同 |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 5.58 (↓ 2.2%) | 65.5 (↓ 1.7%) | 50.0% (↓ 0.9%) | 77.2% (↑ 3.7%) | 32.5% (↓ 3.7%) |
| 2020.6 | 2020.7 | 2020.6 | 2020.6 | 2020.6 |



| | | | |
|--|---|---|--------------------------|
| Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務 | Independent judiciary 獨立司法權 | Independent legislature 獨立立法權 | Economic Freedom 經濟自由 |
| 3.40 (↓ 2.6%) | 4.16 (↓ 2.6%) | 3.71 (↓ 1.1%) | 8.80 (↓ 1.2%) |
| Original ways of life 原有生活方式 | Freedom of speech 言論自由 | Democratisation 民主政制發展 | Personal Freedom 個人自由 |
| 4.39 (↓ 3.5%) | 4.04 (↓ 7.3%) | 3.08 (↓ 4.0%) | 8.47 (↓ 2.4%) |
| 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' and 'high degree of autonomy' principles 「港人治港、高度自治」原則 | Full implementation of 1C2S 全面落實「一國兩制」 | Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾 | Democracy Index 民主指數 |
| 2.82 (↓ 5.7%) | 2.37 (↓ 6.3%) | 2.53 (↓ 3.8%) | 6.02 (↓ 2.1%) |

1. Introduction

This is the sixth edition of our 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) Index report. The purpose of the 1C2S Index is to provide an objective assessment on the implementation of 1C2S. Our first Report was released in mid-2017, on the 20th anniversary of the return of Hong Kong to China. We update the 1C2S Index every six months, at mid-year and year end.

Every half year, we update the 1C2S Index through updating Index (A): Public Opinion and Index (B): International Perception respectively with a new public survey and with the latest data from international indices. To complement our Index, we also introduced a new index: 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) that uses big-data techniques to measure the sentiment of Hong Kong newspapers since 1998.

We commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct telephone poll between 9th to 29th June, 2020 to compile Index (A). On the other hand, some indicators of Index (B) can only be updated to 2019 because international indices are released with a considerable time lag. MMI was updated to the end of July 2019.

In our surveys, we also included other topical issues related to 1C2S, such as the continuation of 1C2S after 2047, citizen's identity, attitude towards emigration and public opinions on the Greater Bay Area. In view of the introduction of the Hong Kong National Security Law, we change one of the favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S from 'completing the legislation of Article 23' to 'maintaining national security' accordingly.

It should be stressed that Index (A), Index (B) and MMI are determined by perception and may or may not reflect the reality. Even so, changes in perceptions of 1C2S of the Hong Kong public, of international think tanks, and of the Hong Kong press are nevertheless important. We will analyse the reasons for the changes in these perceptions as they are crucial for the implementation of 1C2S.

In our report, all scores are in a scale of 0-10. An asterisk (***) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant. If there is no mentioning of statistical significance about a score, it means that the change concerned is statistically insignificant.

2. 1C2S Index


The 1C2S Index is the average of Index (A): Public Opinion, the evaluation of the Hong Kong public on different dimensions of 1C2S, and Index (B): International Perception, the evaluation of international think tanks on various aspects of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

Figure 1 shows the scores of the 1C2S Index since its inception. The latest reading is 5.58 in June 2020. Compared to last round in December 2019, the index fell by 2.2%. The 1C2S Index increased by a very moderate 0.01 from its lowest, 5.57, recorded in October 2019. Changes in Indices (A) and (B) will be detailed in the following sub-sections.

Due to the increasing scepticism towards 1C2S and time lag in data availability, the 2020 estimated score of Index (B) is likely to be upwardly biased. This implies the decline in the 1C2S Index is likely to be understated. In this respect, decision makers in Hong Kong should take careful note of the declining trend and its ramifications.

Figure 1: 1C2S Index

圖 1：「一國兩制」指數



Note: Dotted line indicates a revision in indicators

註：虛線為指標經過修訂

2.1. Index (A): Public Opinion

Table 1 shows that after a slight rebound from the lowest of 3.26 to 3.53 in December 2019, the trend of recovery of Index (A) reversed and the latest score recorded in June 2020 is 3.39. The decline in Index (A) was statistically significant.

While all nine dimensions also experienced decline in the past six months, only one of these drops was statistically significant, namely, the mean score given to ‘freedom of speech’ (-7.3%). Nonetheless, this dimension also recorded one of the biggest percentage drop since last round, together with “full implementation of 1C2S” (-6.3%) and “‘Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong’ and ‘high degree of autonomy’ principles” (-5.7%).









Overall, as in previous rounds since the outbreak of the anti-extradition movement, no items score higher than the median of 5. The three dimensions scoring relatively higher at over 4 are: ‘independent judiciary’ (4.16), ‘original ways of life’ (4.39) and ‘freedom of speech’ (4.04). Whereas those scoring the lowest include: “‘Hong Kong people

administering Hong Kong” and “high degree of autonomy” (2.82), ‘full implementation of 1C2S’ (2.37) and ‘resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation’ (2.53).

In past surveys, item ratings typically varied within a relatively narrow band which was most plausibly due to a ‘holistic rating’ that the general public held on 1C2S. For instance, the range recorded in June 2020 oscillates between 2 plus and 4 plus. Normally, the narrow range implies that regardless of the specific item surveyed, their answers would be shaped by an overall impression, rendering the range in relation to their answers for each specific item relatively small.

Table 1 : Index (A): Public Opinion

表 1 : 指數 (A) : 民意調查

| | 2019.6 | 2019.8 | 2019.10 | 2019.12 | 2020.6 | |
|---|--------|--------|---------|---------|--------|---|
| Average 平均分 | 4.58 | 3.98 | 3.26 | 3.53 | 3.39 |  |
| Original ways of life 原有生活方式 | 5.79 | 5.34 | 4.28 | 4.55 | 4.39 |  |
| Independent judiciary 獨立司法權 | 5.13 | 4.52 | 3.93 | 4.27 | 4.16 |  |
| Freedom of speech 言論自由 | 5.27 | 4.8 | 4.04 | 4.36 | 4.04 |  |
| Independent legislature 獨立立法權 | 4.81 | 4.21 | 3.34 | 3.75 | 3.71 |  |
| Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務 | 4.59 | 3.98 | 3.31 | 3.49 | 3.40 |  |
| Democratisation 民主政制發展 | 4.12 | 3.61 | 2.90 | 3.21 | 3.08 |  |
| ‘Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong’ and ‘high degree of autonomy’ principles 「港人治港、高度自治」原則 | 4.09 | 3.48 | 2.78 | 2.99 | 2.82 |  |
| Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾 | 3.72 | 2.9 | 2.46 | 2.63 | 2.53 |  |
| Full implementation of 1C2S 全面落實「一國兩制」 | 3.68 | 2.95 | 2.30 | 2.53 | 2.37 |  |

2.1.1. Generation gap and political divide

Figure 2 shows Index (A) by age in the past surveys. In June 2020, almost all age groups witnessed drops in their average scores since December 2019, after a collective rebound from their lowest in October 2019. 30-39 age group is an outlier to this trend as the only age group with mean score recovering to pre-extradition level.

The generation gap in the evaluation of 1C2S is obvious. The average scores of younger age groups were lower than those of older age groups at a statistically significant level. Though mean scores are generally low since the outbreak of the social movement in June 2019, residing below the median of 5, that produced by 18-29 age group

is markedly lower at 2.45. Those aged over 70 years, which always produced the highest score, dropped further from 4.82 in December 2019 to 4.22 in June 2020.

Figure 3 shows Index (A) by political inclination in the past surveys. While the evaluation score of moderates was embarking on a trend of modest recovery, from 4.25 in December 2019 to 4.32 in June 2020, the pro-establishment against non-establishment political divide is big and widening. The high score of pro-establishment supporters remained significantly higher than other groups, as evident in the 2.2% rise from 7.62 in December 2019 to 7.79 in June 2020. On the other hand, the low score of non-establishment supporters fell even lower, the score 1.53 is 19% lower than that recorded in December 2019.

Statistical tests revealed that there was obvious and consistent discrepancy in evaluation scores across all political inclinations. In comparison with moderates, the evaluations of pro-establishment supporters were significantly higher. Evaluations of non-establishment supporters were significantly lower. From December 2018 onwards, differences between the democrats and other non-establishment supporters began to converge at below 2. The trend of polarisation is evident. This is a serious issue which the HKSAR government must take note.

Figure 2: Index (A): Public Opinion (by age)
圖 2：指數 (A)：民意調查 (按年齡組別劃分)





Figure 3: Index (A): Public Opinion (by political inclination)

圖 3：指數 (A)：民意調查 (按政治傾向劃分)



2.2. Index (B): International Perception

We obtain scores on Hong Kong's freedom and democracy from international think tanks to compile Index (B). These scores are derived from Cato-Fraser Institutes' Human Freedom Index, which comprises the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index, and the Economic Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index. The scores and ranks of Hong Kong since 2010 are shown in Table 2.

As international studies cover a very large number of countries, they do not always reflect the latest conditions. We will update the indices with data from comparable international indicators whenever possible. The method of updating is detailed in Appendix I.

Hong Kong has always ranked number one in Economic Freedom Index, with a score of around 9, the drop from its peak at 8.94 in 2010 to the estimated 8.91 in 2019 was only 0.3%. Although this is likely upwardly 'biased' as the credit rating of Hong Kong have been downgraded twice by two institutions (Moody's and Fitch) in the span of just four months, both indicated a 'stable' outlook for HK, suggesting certain degree of economic resilience.

Hong Kong's score in Personal Freedom Index peaked at 9.07 in 2011, dropped to an estimated score of 8.47 in 2020. Given the adverse publicity in the international media on recent political events in Hong Kong, the decline of 6.6% from its peak is not surprising. Nonetheless, Hong Kong's 2019 score of 8.47 is still relatively high.

The Democracy Index rose from 5.92 in 2010 to a peak of 6.50 in 2015, rising by 9.8%, reflecting that Hong Kong has made some progress in democratisation vis-à-vis the increase of directly elected seats in the legislature. However, Hong Kong's score fell to 6.02 in 2019, falling by 7.4% from the peak in 2015, reflecting a democratic regression originated from 'pre-existing deficiencies' in Hong Kong's political stability. It should be noted that Hong Kong's 2020 score and rank are still better than that in 2010.

Index (B) rose from 7.99 in 2010 to a peak of 8.14 in 2012, rising by 1.9%, largely as a result of the rise in Hong Kong's Democracy Index. Since then, it has embarked on a declining trend. The latest reading came in at 7.76, representing a drop of 4.6% from the peak.

Table 2: Index (B): International Perception

表 2：指數 (B)：國際評價

| | Human Freedom Index 「人類自由指數」 | | | Democracy Index 「民主指數」 | Aggregate 總分 |
|------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|
| | Economic Freedom 「經濟自由」 | Personal Freedom 「個人自由」 | Sub-aggregate 分數 | | |
| 2010 | 8.94 (1) | 9.11 (12) | 9.02 (1) | 5.92 (80) | 7.99 |
| 2011 | 8.90 (1) | 9.14 (14) | 9.02 (1) | 5.92 (80) | 7.99 |
| 2012 | 8.88 (1) | 9.11 (13) | 8.99 (1) | 6.42 (63) | 8.14 |
| 2013 | 8.88 (1) | 8.99 (18) | 8.94 (1) | 6.42 (65) | 8.10 |
| 2014 | 8.92 (1) | 8.82 (27) | 8.87 (2) | 6.46 (66) | 8.07 |
| 2015 | 8.88 (1) | 8.75 (28) | 8.82 (2) | 6.50 (67) | 8.04 |
| 2016 | 8.89 (1) | 8.59 (32) | 8.74 (3) | 6.42 (68) | 7.97 |
| 2017 | 8.91 (1) | 8.70 (27) | 8.81 (3) | 6.31 (71) | 7.97 |
| 2018 | 8.91 [^] | 8.68 [^] | 8.80 | 6.15 (73) | 7.91 |
| 2019 | 8.80 [^] | 8.47 [^] | 8.64 | 6.02 (75) | 7.76 |

Note: '^' denotes updates based on comparable indicators

註：「^」為更新自相應的國際指標

2.2.1. Components of Personal Freedom Index

Table 3 shows Hong Kong's scores and ranks in the seven components of the Personal Freedom Index from 2010 to 2019. During this period, the score of 'security & safety' has dropped by 0.04 as HK fell to the second place in the category while the score of 'movement' has been constant at 10. Five components have exhibited substantial decline in scores and ranks since 2013, namely, 'rule of law', 'religion', 'association & assembly', 'expression & information', and 'identity & relationships'. Since last round, 'expression & information' dropped further from 8.49 to 8.39. The declines show that the international community have relatively serious concerns on personal freedoms in Hong Kong.

Table 3: Personal Freedom Index

表 3：「個人自由指數」

| Year 年份 | Rule of Law 法治 | Security & Safety 安全 | Movement 遷徙自由 | Religion 宗教自由 | Association, Assembly & Civil Society 結社、集會及 公民社會自由 | Expression & Information 言論自由 | Identity & Relationships 性別認同及關係 | Aggregate 總分 |
|------------|-------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---|-------------------------------------|--|-------------------|
| 2010 | 7.50 (17) | 9.93 (3) | 10.00 (1) | 9.02 (35) | 9.42 (25) | 9.05 (42) | 10.00 (1) | 9.11 (12) |
| 2011 | 7.50 (17) | 9.97 (1) | 10.00 (1) | 8.92 (30) | 9.75 (24) | 9.01 (41) | 10.00 (1) | 9.14 (14) |
| 2012 | 7.39 (19) | 9.95 (4) | 10.00 (1) | 9.04 (24) | 9.75 (24) | 8.94 (45) | 10.00 (1) | 9.11 (13) |
| 2013 | 7.39 (19) | 9.47 (39) | 10.00 (1) | 9.19 (19) | 9.75 (24) | 8.86 (48) | 10.00 (1) | 8.99 (18) |
| 2014 | 7.80 (14) | 9.53 (35) | 10.00 (1) | 8.13 (80) | 8.00 (62) | 8.74 (52) | 10.00 (1) | 8.82 (27) |
| 2015 | 7.79 (16) | 9.54 (34) | 10.00 (1) | 8.43 (68) | 8.00 (62) | 8.77 (48) | 9.00 (36) | 8.75 (28) |
| 2016 | 7.14 (23) | 9.53 (34) | 10.00 (1) | 8.59 (40) | 8.00 (62) | 8.67 (51) | 9.00 (37) | 8.59 (32) |
| 2017 | 7.14 (23) | 9.96 (2) | 10.00 (1) | 8.59 (40) | 8.00 (62) | 8.67 (50) | 9.00 (30) | 8.70 (27) |
| 2018 | 7.08 [^] | 10.00 [^] | 10.00 [^] | 8.59 [^] | 8.00 [^] | 8.49 [^] | 9.00 [^] | 8.68 [^] |
| 2019 | 7.08 [^] | 10.00 [^] | 10.00 [^] | 8.59 [^] | 6.00 [^] | 8.39 [^] | 9.00 [^] | 8.47 [^] |

Note: Number in brackets indicates world ranking; '[^]' indicates updates based on comparable indicators

註：括號為國際排名；「[^]」為更新自相應的國際指標

2.2.2. Comparison with Hong Kong's neighbours

As Hong Kong is a highly developed region, and given that highly developed regions tend to have comparatively higher scores in freedom and democracy as compared with developing regions – we have selected certain neighbouring developed countries and territories (namely, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) as benchmarks for comparison and assessment of Hong Kong's performance. We have also compared the respective scores of the Mainland and Hong Kong under the indices, for the purpose of identifying whether Hong Kong has become increasingly 'mainlandised' under 1C2S. For brevity, we will refer to Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and the Chinese mainland as 'neighbours'.

Table 4 compares Hong Kong and its neighbours in the various indices of Index (B) in 2020. Hong Kong's score in Economic Freedom was world's number one while its score in Personal Freedom Index was at par with its developed neighbours. Due to Hong Kong's superlative performance in Economic Freedom Index, its score in Human Freedom Index was stronger than the four developed neighbours. However, Hong Kong's Democracy Index was lower than its developed neighbours, except Singapore. Consequently, Hong Kong's Index (B) score was lower than Japan's 8.24, Korea's 8.16, and Taiwan's 8.19, but above Singapore's 7.42. It was much higher than Mainland's 4.87.

Table 5 compares the 2020 Personal Freedom Index of Hong Kong with its neighbours. Hong Kong's scores were in the same league as those of our developed neighbours (Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), and were much higher than those of the Mainland. Hong Kong's aggregate score of 8.47 was much higher than that of Singapore's 7.47 but slightly lower than Japan's 8.77, Korea's 8.83, and Taiwan's 8.93.

In comparison with its four developed neighbours, Hong Kong was relatively strong in 'security & safety' and 'movement', but relatively weak in 'rule of law' and 'association, assembly & civil society'. Hong Kong was more or less at par with others in the remaining four components, namely, 'religion', 'expression & information', and 'identity & relationships'. Hong Kong's relatively low score in 'rule of law' and 'association, assembly & civil society' nevertheless warrants concern.

Table 4: Index (B): International Perception of Hong Kong and neighbours (2019)

表 4：香港與鄰近地區之指數 (B)：國際評價 (2019)

| | Human Freedom Index 「人類自由指數」 | | | Democracy Index 「民主指數」 | Aggregate 總分 |
|---------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|
| | Economic Freedom 「經濟自由」 | Personal Freedom 「個人自由」 | Sub-aggregate 分數 | | |
| Hong Kong 香港 | 8.80 | 8.47 | 8.64 | 6.02 (75) | 7.76 |
| Mainland China 中國內地 | 6.61 | 5.75 | 6.18 | 2.26 (153) | 4.87 |
| Japan 日本 | 7.97 | 8.77 | 8.37 | 7.99 (24) | 8.24 |
| Korea 韓國 | 7.61 | 8.87 | 8.24 | 8.00 (23) | 8.16 |
| Singapore 新加坡 | 8.77 | 7.47 | 8.12 | 6.02 (75) | 7.42 |
| Taiwan 台灣 | 7.90 | 8.93 | 8.42 | 7.73 (31) | 8.19 |

Note: Updates based on comparable indicators

註：更新自相應的國際指標

Table 5: Comparing Personal Freedom Index of Hong Kong and neighbours (2019)

表 5：比較香港與鄰近地區之「個人自由指數」(2019)

| | Rule of Law 法治 | Security & Safety 安全 | Movement 遷徙自由 | Religion 宗教自由 | Association, Assembly & Civil Society 結社、集會及 公民社會自由 | Expression & Information 言論自由 | Identity & Relationships 性別認同 及關係 | Aggregate 總分 |
|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|------------------|------------------|---|-------------------------------------|--|-----------------|
| Hong Kong 香港 | 7.08 | 10.00 | 10.00 | 8.59 | 6.00 | 8.39 | 9.00 | 8.47 |
| Mainland China 中國內地 | 4.43 | 9.04 | 5.00 | 3.67 | 1.00 | 5.16 | 9.00 | 5.75 |
| Japan 日本 | 7.92 | 10.00 | 10.00 | 8.09 | 7.50 | 9.12 | 8.17 | 8.77 |
| Korea 韓國 | 7.69 | 9.74 | 8.33 | 9.35 | 9.50 | 8.90 | 9.00 | 8.87 |
| Singapore 新加坡 | 7.73 | 9.57 | 8.33 | 6.11 | 3.50 | 6.13 | 7.33 | 7.47 |
| Taiwan 台灣 | 7.01 | 9.31 | 10.00 | 9.36 | 10.00 | 9.13 | 10.00 | 8.93 |

Note: Updates based on comparable indicators

註：更新自相應的國際指標

2.3. 1C2S Mass Media Index

Media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion. We attempt to use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S and monitor how 1C2S is conveyed in the mass media to provide a timely barometer of public sentiment. 1C2S MMI is a net sentiment index of newspaper articles over a given time. To dovetail with our main Index, we compile the MMI half yearly. We have mined over 153,000 news articles and around 76 million words from 21 local daily newspapers to compile the MMI (See Appendix I for details). MMI is set at 100 in the base month of July 2017, the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China.

In the longer run, subject to resource availability, MMI opens up many opportunities of further research in public opinion formation. The MMI can be compiled at high frequency intervals (e.g. monthly) as it is not subject to the long time lags of surveys. It is also possible to investigate the effect of specific significant on media sentiment, or to compare sentiments in the local and overseas media.

Newspaper is only part of the media, and the MMI does not cover news reported by traditional electronic media such as television and radio, nor news carried by new media. Measuring the sentiments of news reported by television and radio is very difficult as there is no comprehensive text-based data base available. Measurement of sentiments of new media is also very difficult as it will be very demanding on resources. Furthermore, while widely accepted credibility ratings of different newspapers are available through regular opinion polls, comparable ratings on the credibility of different new media outlets are not available. We thus confine our study to newspaper articles on 1C2S.

It should be noted that many newspapers have also broadcasted their news through online outlets such as websites and mobile apps. In so far as the news articles of these online outlets are the same as their printed versions, the sentiments of these articles are already included in our MMI regardless of whether they are printed or broadcasted online. 1C2S MMI currently only gauges sentiment of an important subset of mass media, namely, printed newspapers, as a general representation of sentiment in mass media.

2.3.1. Recent trend

1C2S encountered one of the most severe challenges in the beginning of 2016 when 1C2S MMI plummeted to 73 points. The 'Causeway Bay Bookstore' incident aroused widespread media attention in January. The civil unrest in Mongkok evolved into a clash between civilians and the police in February. The award of the independent film 'Ten Years' as the best film in Hong Kong Film Awards in April aggravated the negative sentiment in the mass media.

MMI bottomed out and rose strongly when Carrie Lam was elected as Chief Executive. Despite the NPC Standing Committee's interpretation of the Basic Law in response to the oath-taking row in the LegCo in November 2016 and the 'democracy walls' incidents in universities in September 2017, 1C2S MMI still rose to a peak of 105.0 points in March 2018 under the new administration of Carrie Lam. However, an alarming downward spiral started in July 2018 with the storm of controversies on the disbanding of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party and the rejection of visa renewal for Victor Mallet. MMI fell to a lower range around 90 points in the second half of 2018, a decline of about 15% from the peak in March.

Although the promulgation of the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area sparked hopes for future economic growth, Beijing's 1C2S ambition over Taiwan also drew public attention as to whether Hong Kong is a flawed example of the experiment. The anti-extradition movement emerged abruptly and caused the worst governance crisis since the Handover in June 2019 which dragged MMI from 91.6 to 84.5 points in the first half of 2019 before plummeting further to 67.2 as 2019 drew to a close.

Year 2020 began with personnel change in the central government responsible for Hong Kong affairs, involving the upgrade of the central committee on Hong Kong and Macau affairs from 'coordination group' to 'leading group', restructuring of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and new directorship of the Hong Kong Liaison Office. After this massive wave of news coverage pushed MMI upward to 73.0, it showed a minor drop as COVID-19 crisis management aroused debates over cross-border visitor control, followed by sentimental speculations about the impact of National Security Law which dwindled MMI to 66.7 in June 2020.

Based on the latest data from July 2020, MMI showed little sign of improvement and edged down further to 65.5.

Figure 4: 1C2S MMI (2018-2020)

圖 4：「一國兩制」輿情指數 (2018-2020)



2.4. Evaluations of 1C2S

1C2S is unprecedented in history. There have always been doubts if Hong Kong can remain a free city as part of a country ruled by a communist party. Problems and difficulties in the implementation of 1C2S are thus to be expected.

23 years after Hong Kong's return to China, despite some declines in scores in selected international indices, Hong Kong still ranked world's number one in Economic Freedom, and ranked reasonably well in Personal Freedom. According to the 2019 Human Freedom Index, Hong Kong ranked world's number three after New Zealand and Switzerland. It is a fact that Hong Kong is still one of the freest territories in the world.

Though Hong Kong's Index (B): International Perception declined somewhat lately, Hong Kong's 2019 score at 7.76 was still relatively high. We are still in the same league as our developed neighbours: above Singapore, but slightly lower than Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The gaps between Hong Kong and the Mainland in all the above Indices on freedom and democracy remained very big, showing that allegation of 'Mainlandisation' is unfounded.

The latest Index (A): Public Opinion was recorded at 3.39. The mean score of the nine items continue to be pessimistic and for the third consecutive rounds, none of the nine items received scores higher than the median of 5. 'Original ways of life', which always obtained the highest score in past surveys fell to just 4.39 and represented the highest score of all dimensions in June 2020. Some other items that usually scored less favourably in previous rounds of survey witnessed an even sharper decline, conditions such as 'the successful implementation of the "Self-Governance, High Autonomy" principles', 'full implementation of 1C2S' as well as 'resolving differences via dialogue and negotiations' continue to score below 3.

In comparison to the evaluations of international think tanks, the evaluations of the Hong Kong public are less positive. Though the moderate decline in 'expression & information' appear to align with Hongkongers and the international community's concern of the socio-political future of Hong Kong, it should be acknowledged that the public is more demanding in their assessments due to their high expectations of 1C2S. Hong Kong's people's starting point is a system with a sophisticated legal system that enshrines both rule of law and personal freedoms, and gradual democratisation that had already been in progress prior to the return to China. These in turn induced greater expectations amongst the public with respect to the high degree of autonomy and human rights enshrined by the Basic Law.

Changes in scores in the indices are likely to be affected by significant political events and other landmark events that occurred since December 2019. Listed below are the major events that occurred since the last report from January to June 2020. The major events that occurred in previous reports from mid-2017 to late 2019 are listed in Appendix II.

Table 6: Significant events (2020 H1)

表 6 : 重大事件一覽 (2020 H1)

| | |
|-------------------------|---|
| 2.13 | The State Council restructured the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and appointed Xia Baolong as the new director and the directors of Liaison Offices in Hong Kong and Macau as deputy directors. |
| 2.1-7 | In fighting the COVID-19 crisis, staff of the Hospital Authority went on a five-day strike in the attempt to push for complete closure of border with mainland. HKSAR implemented border closure to some borders and ordered all arrivals to observe fortnight-long quarantine order. |
| 2.28 & 4.18 | A group of pan-democrat leaders, including Martin Lee, Jimmy Lai, Margret Ng, Lee Cheuk-yan and Yeung Sum, were charged with participation in unauthorized assembly in relation to the anti-extradition bill movement. |
| 3.18 | US-China media row deepened after five Chinese media agents in the US were declared propaganda outlets and the opinion piece titled "China is the real sick man of Asia" was published by the Wall Street Journal in February. China expelled US journalists in retaliation and barred them from journalism in Hong Kong and Macau. Four more Chinese media entities were designated as foreign missions by the US in June. |
| 4.9 | Countering High Court's ruling last year of the unconstitutionality of anti-mask ban, the Court of Appeal ruled that the ban was constitutional at unlawful gatherings. |
| 4.13, 4.17 & 4.21 | The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the Liaison Office in Hong Kong issued statements condemning LegCo member Dennis Kwok for preventing the House Committee from electing a chairman for more than six months. The pro-democracy camp challenged that the two Offices were violating Article 22 of the Basic Law by intervening the internal operation of LegCo. In the subsequent statements, they positioned that they were bodies authorised by the central government to handle Hong Kong affairs, leading to further controversy over the applicability of the Article. The filibustering ended in May with the appointment of election host by the LegCo president after seeking external legal advice. |
| 4.20 | Fitch downed the investment grade of HK twice within the past 7 months to AA-, the HKSAR government expressed disappointment at Fitch's exaggeration of the ongoing political issues in its rating. |
| 4.27 & 5.25 | In response to the controversial district court verdict that expressing sympathy with a knifeman who was jailed over triple stabbing, Chief Justice Geoffrey Ma warned that judges should refrain from unnecessary political views to maintain the public's confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. |
| 5.14 | The People's Bank of China, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Foreign Exchange Administration of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange promulgated "Opinions on Financial Support to the Development of Guangdong-HK-Macau Greater Bay Area" promoting financial cooperation, openness and innovation in the area. |
| 5.15-22 | An HKDSE history question on Sino-Japanese relations in a period including Japanese invasion of China in World War II was criticized to have provided 'biased' sources that were overwhelmingly positive of Japan. The question was subsequently withdrew. Xinhua News Agency stated that Hong Kong should establishment a new education system in accordance to 1C2S. |
| 5.28 | The Commerce and Economic Development Bureau announced the establishment of a task force to review the governance and management of RTHK, inviting concerns over political censorship after suspected police insult in an episode of 'Headliner' and infringement of the one-China principle in 'The Pulse'. |
| 5.28 | The US State Secretary, Mike Pompeo, submitted the 2020 Hong Kong Policy Act Report to Congress, certifying that HK no longer warrants separate treatment from mainland China under US laws. |
| 6.4 | Enactment of the Anthem Law. |

- 6.30 The Hong Kong National Security Law was introduced, passed and enacted. The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government of the HKSAR will be established. The self-determination group Demosistō announced its dissolution shortly after the enactment.

Though the 1C2S Index did not recover to the pre-extradition level of around 6.3 to 6.4, it was still well over the median of 5. While 1C2S has problems in implementation, as could be expected of any unprecedented system, it is clearly not unworkable. The decline in this report should be viewed in this context.

2.4.1. Impact of internal governance

Internal governance issues that are not strictly related to 1C2S appear to have important effects on evaluations of the Hong Kong public and media, but do not affect international evaluations as much. It is important to bear this in mind when reading the findings identified in this Report.

For example, in the period before mid-2018, both MMI and Index (A) performed well despite the disqualification of six LegCo members from late 2016 to mid-2017, and the sentencing of the 3 student protestors in the Civic Square occupation to prison by the Court of Appeals on August 2017. The announcement of CY Leung in late 2016 that he would not run for a second term and the subsequent election of the new CE had strong positive effects on MMI that outweighed the effect of the above controversies. The honeymoon period of the new administration from mid-2017 to mid-2018 also appeared to have an important positive effect on Index (A).

The sharp declines in Index (A) and MMI starting from late 2018 can be attributed to political controversies over the disbandment of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, the rejection of work visa for Victor Mallet and the anti-extradition movement. At the same time, the waning approval ratings of the government reflected that internal governance issues surrounding the Lantau Tomorrow Vision reclamation project and the proposed increase of age threshold for elderly welfare payments also affected Hong Kong's public and media negatively.

2.4.2. Impact of international situation

The attitude of the West towards China has been shifting from engagement to confrontation as the West increasingly fears that its supremacy would be challenged by the rise of China. Evaluations of international think tanks may not be free of western ideological biases against the rise of China, but they may also reflect genuine weaknesses in the implementation of 1C2S. Furthermore, their effects on international investors cannot be underestimated as Hong Kong is an easy target in the 'New Cold War', as evident in the passage of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 in November. The existential ambiguity of Hong Kong presents a real vulnerability.

Much of the negative international evaluation on the rule of law in Hong Kong can be attributed to a misunderstanding of the fundamental concept of 1C2S: Hong Kong is not an independent country. It is part of a civil law country but with an independent judiciary that practices common law in relation to self-autonomy issues. The Hong Kong judiciary also has power to deal with constitutional issues but it must defer to interpretations of the national Constitution and the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. This is different in nature from courts of common law countries but not uncommon in civil law countries. This suggests the Hong Kong judiciary has a higher level of independence and judicial function than many courts at the district level of other civil law countries. This is not a weakness of the Hong Kong judicial system but rather a unique characteristic of the Hong Kong Court under 1C2S that the HKSAR Government needs to emphasize in the international arena.

Western think tanks have downgraded Hong Kong's scores on 'rule of law', citing the interpretation of the Basic Law by Beijing in 2016. However, interpretation of the Basic Law first occurred in 1999 and it is nothing new. The Hong Kong judiciary is still the same judiciary which had received high scores from western think tanks just a few years back, and it is as independent as always as demonstrated by recent prosecutions and convictions of a former Chief Executive and other high-ranking officials of the HKSAR Government. It appears that western perceptions of China and Hong Kong have changed more than Hong Kong has.

2.5. Suggestions

Given the biases and misunderstandings identified above, it is important for the HKSAR Government to consider spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of Hong Kong including the business community, the academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs to promote the image of Hong Kong under 1C2S. Such effort may include:

- Setting up a broadly representative committee to advise the HKSAR Government on all issues relating to 1C2S;
- Setting up a dedicated office under a relevant policy bureau to explain and address the concerns of and answer any queries regarding the National Security Law from the public including the international business community;
- Establishing a semi-official high-level think tank on external relations to undertake various private initiatives such as being responsible for mounting and coordinating outreach efforts, mobilizing support from all sectors of our and international communities, and enhancing Hong Kong's presence in APEC related networks;
- Setting up an early warning system within the government to alert and manage expectation of public on all possible issues which might affect 1C2S or the perception of quality of governance;
- Setting up a system whereby international media would be timely, fully and properly briefed on issues affecting 1C2S;
- Paying more attention to the education of young members of the public in relation to issues such as understanding of the 1C2S, true meaning of rule of Law, human rights and related freedoms, moral standards, broadening of societal as well as international perspectives, and increase awareness of national issues;
- Promoting, assisting and encouraging local think tanks to conduct periodical exchanges with influential foreign think tanks interested in Hong Kong affairs, especially the Heritage Foundation and the CATO-Fraser Institutes, which are sympathetic to Hong Kong as they value economic and personal freedoms highly;
- Motivating Hong Kong's business communities from western countries who are willing to defend Hong Kong in the international arena; and
- Enhancing Hong Kong's presence in APEC related networks and forums, e.g., the APEC Business Advisory Councils (ABAC), APEC Study Centres, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and other tripartite forums that involve business people, academics, and NGOs in the Asia-Pacific. As a free economy and global city, Hong Kong should find a sympathetic hearing in the vast APEC related networks in the Asia-Pacific.

3. Resurgence of Radicalism

Figure 5 shows the composition of Hong Kong population by political inclination. Moderates (which include centrists and those without specific political inclination) remained the largest group (50.0%), followed by the non-establishment supporters (41.0%), and pro-establishment supporters (9.0%). Non-establishment supporters are further divided into democrats (28.0%) and 'others' (13.0%), which are mostly the resistance camp.


From mid-2017 to December 2018, the proportion of moderates supporters in the population rose while that of non-establishment supporters declined. Since then, however, there was a reversal of trends which accentuated in 2019 and continued into 2020. The political rift is consolidating as moderates continued to decrease by 0.9 percentage points (from 50.9% to 50.0%) between December 2019 and June 2020.

The growth trends of the two juxtaposing political inclinations, pro-establishment and non-establishment, were reinforcing as they continued to expand steadily. With a modest rise of 1.7 percentage points in the first half of 2020, pro-establishment recovered to 9.0%. Non-establishment supporters grew by the largest amount, as the cohort increased by a total of 4.2 percentage points (from 36.8% to 41.0%). Among non-establishment supporters, the proportion of democrats and others rose by 2.1 percentage points, (from 25.9% to 28.0%), and 2.1 percentage points (from 10.9% to 13.0%) respectively.

Most of these changes took place abruptly since June 2019 amidst a hopeful trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation all through 2018. The number of pro-establishment supporters regained and the growth of non-establishment supporters grow steadily, while moderates continued to decline. These trajectories signified further polarization, despite a subsiding momentum of the anti-extradition movement.

Figure 5: Political inclination of population

圖 5: 香港市民政治傾向



3.1. Re-radicalisation of youths


Figure 6 shows the change in the composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by political inclination. The proportion of moderates dropped from 38.2% in December 2019 to 35.8% in June 2020 (a decrease of 2.4 percentage points) while the proportion of the non-establishment group rose from 55.3% to 62.8% (rising by 7.5 percentage points). Within the non-establishment group, the proportions of democrats dropped from 28.5% to 24.9% (decreasing by 3.6 percentage points) while other non-establishment rose from 26.9% to 37.9% (rising by 11 percentage points). This is the first time other non-establishment supporters claiming dominance within the 18-29 age group.

Up till December 2018, there had been encouraging signs of de-radicalization of youths, where population of moderates were high and rising. This trend, however, was reversed most notably from June 2019 onwards, as the proportion of non-establishment supporters witnessed a steep rise, surpassing moderates for some time. At the same time, within the non-establishment group, other non-establishment supporters overtook democrats by a large margin. This presents a more pressing situation than 2017 when the traditional and radical wings were of almost equal share.

It must be stressed that the political inclination of youths tends to move swiftly as although the changes were unambiguously notable since the latter half of 2019, the exact relationship between the radicalization of youths and the various politicized events needs further examination.

Figure 6: Political inclination of youths

圖 6: 青年的政治傾向



4. Continuation of 1C2S after 2047

An issue of utmost importance for the future of Hong Kong is the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. Table 7 shows that 77.2% of the public still agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2047. While those who chose 'should' remained steady, there had also been a decrease in 'should not' to 11.3%, leading to an increase in the net value of support by 6.4 percentage points to 65.9% from its lowest recorded in October 2019, resuming to pre-extradition level.

Figure 7 shows the net value of support produced by respondents of different political inclinations. Even after the vigorous public reaction against the imposition of the National Security law, support across all groups with different political inclinations in Hong Kong still maintained over 75% and a net value of at least 54%, including the resistance camp, who are known to be highly critical of 1C2S. Though the public's current evaluation of 1C2S is quite critical, the majority of them still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

The net value of support generally reached over 60% across most age groups and political inclination, with the exception of the following cohorts: those ageing 18-29 years (57.7%) and other non-establishment supporters (54.2%).

Table 7: Attitudes towards the continuation of 1C2S after 2047

表 7: 2047 年後香港應否繼續實行「一國兩制」


| | 2018.12 | 2019.6 | 2019.8 | 2019.10 | 2020.6 |
|--|---------|--------|--------|---------|---------|
| Should 應該 | 76.5% | 75.5% | 75.5% | 73.5% | 77.2% |
| Should not 不應該 | 8.1% | 8.6% | 10.1% | 14.1% | 11.3% |
| Should not: Direct administration under CPG 不應該：內地直轄 | - | - | - | - | 4.9% |
| Should not: Complete independence 不應該：完全獨立 | - | - | - | - | 2.3% |
| Don't know 唔知道 | 15.4% | 15.8% | 14.4% | 12.4% | 11.5% |
| Net value 淨值 | 68.4% | 66.9% | 65.4% | 59.5% | 65.9% * |

Net value: Percent who chose 'Should' less percent who chose 'Should Not'

淨值：認為「應該」的百分比減去認為「不應該」的百分比

Figure 7: Net Value of support for continuation of 1C2S by political inclination

圖 7: 繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度淨值 (按政治傾向劃分)



4.1. Alternative future arrangements for Hong Kong

In view of the re-emergence of the debate around possible futures of Hong Kong, new options were offered to respondents choosing 'should not'. We carefully limit the options to only widely debated alternatives, that is, 'direct administration under CPG' and 'complete independence'. Interesting patterns arise. Of the 11.3% voting 'should not', a majority (accounting for 4.9% overall) chose 'direct administration under CPG', followed by an overall 2.3% supporting 'complete independence', suggesting both options, but particularly 'independence', do not appear to be a viable option for many despite recurring and intensifying crisis of confidence in 1C2S.

Table 8: Support for alternative future arrangement after 2047 (by age)

表 8: 2047 年後其他前途選項的支持度 (按年齡劃分)

| | Direct Administration under CPG 內地直轄 | Complete Independence 完全獨立 | Others 其他 | Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難說 |
|-----------------------|--|----------------------------------|--------------|--|
| 18-29 | 3.5% | 6.8% | 1.2% | 2.7% |
| 30-39 | 3.2% | 1.6% | 0.0% | 3.2% |
| 40-49 | 4.4% | 1.0% | 0.0% | 3.0% |
| 50-59 | 3.9% | 1.8% | 0.9% | 1.8% |
| 60-69 | 8.7% | 2.3% | 0.0% | 1.6% |
| ≥70 | 5.7% | 0.9% | 0.0% | 2.1% |
| All respondents 所有受訪者 | 4.9% | 2.3% | 0.4% | 2.4% |

Table 9: Alternative future arrangement after 2047 (by political inclination)

表 9: 2047 年後其他前途選項的支持度 (按政治傾向劃分)

| | Direct Administration under CPG 內地直轄 | Complete Independence 完全獨立 | Others 其他 | Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難說 |
|-------------------------------|--|----------------------------------|--------------|--|
| Pro-establishment 建制派 | 14.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Moderates 溫和派 | 5.7% | 0.6% | 0.2% | 2.2% |
| Non-establishment 非建制派 | 2.0% | 4.8% | 0.7% | 3.3% |
| Non-est.: Democrats 非建制派: 民主派 | 1.8% | 2.6% | 0.3% | 3.2% |
| Non-est.: Others 非建制派: 其他 | 2.6% | 9.3% | 1.5% | 3.6% |
| All respondents 所有受訪者 | 4.9% | 2.3% | 0.4% | 2.4% |

4.2. Favourable conditions to the continuation of 1C2S after 2047

If respondents agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2017, they were then asked to choose what conditions would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S from the following list (they were allowed to choose more than 1 item):

- Political system democratises further;
- Maintaining national security (previously appeared as: Completing legislation of Article 23);
- Maintaining a high degree of autonomy;

- Maintaining economic prosperity and stability; and
- Others (please specify).

Figure 8 shows the percentages of respondents who chose each of the five conditions. For all respondents, 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (69.6%) remained the most important items, while 'democratising further' (53.3%) encountered a slight drop of 2.8 percentage points since October 2019 and secured its second place for the second time. 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (51.9%), which always occupy the second place in the list, remained the third most important condition but rose by 4.3 percentage points since October 2019. 'Maintaining national security', which previously appeared as 'Completing legislation of Article 23', was recorded at 10.1%. It must be noted that the change of name is to reflect the development of the matter and does not imply any direct comparability of the two conditions these names refer to.

Figure 9 shows how the pattern of choice differed by political inclination and the increasingly stark contrast among groups of different political inclinations. While non-establishment continues to be supportive of 'political system to democratize further', the democrats did not cease supporting 'maintaining high degree of autonomy' (78.6%) as being more important than 'political system democratize further' (75.9%). The other non-establishment remained the only cohort prioritizing the said condition (65.2%). Among the moderates, 'political system to democratize further' witnessed a dramatic drop of 6.1% in just 8 months' time, reaching a record low of 39.4%.

On the other hand, pro-establishment continues to demonstrate overwhelming support for 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (78.8%) while 'maintaining national security' (38.5%) and for the first time, overtaking 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy', which dropped to its record low of 35.7%.

Figure 8: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047

圖 8: 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件





Figure 9: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 (by political inclination)

圖 9：有利於 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（按政治傾向劃分）



5. Citizens' Identity

We also surveyed how citizens identify themselves, whether as 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese'. Figure 10 shows that members of the public continue to identify themselves much more strongly as 'Hongkongers' than as 'Chinese'. The identities started to diverge after a period of parallel increase. From October 2019 to June 2020, the public's identification as 'Hongkongers' rose from 8.41 to 8.55, the highest yet recorded. In the same period, that as 'Chinese' dropped from 4.72 to 4.38 with statistical significance, also the lowest recorded since mid-2017.

The extent to which the public identified themselves as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' can be better demonstrated by Figure 11, a graph mapping the mix of identities rated by respondents against time. On the 0 to 10 scale, the median is 5, which indicates a moderate level of identification. Ratings that are higher than the median indicate relatively strong identification; ratings that are lower than the median indicate relatively weak identification. These levels of strength can be grouped into four categories, dual identity (strong in both identifications), stronger identification as 'Hongkongers', stronger identification as 'Chinese', and others which include those without a dominant identity.

It is relatively clear that most Hong Kong citizens were typically cognizant of their dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', though this has gradually changed since June 2019. While the patterns from earlier surveys were very similar, in which a majority of the public (between 55.9% to 57.3% before December 2018) had relatively strong identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', dual identity further declined to 32.5% in June 2020 and 'Hongkongers only' remained the dominant identity surpassing the 'Hongkonger/Chinese' dual identity.

Identification as 'Chinese' may not be the same as patriotic, but identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' is a pre-requisite for 'devotion to China and Hong Kong'. The fact that the proportion of Hong Kong people with dual identity continues to decline within the past 8 months points to the adverse impact of the current socio-political climate has on the implementation of 1C2S. We have not overlooked a possibility that current persistent international condemnation of China also has an impact on how Hongkongers look at themselves. The importance or otherwise of this will hopefully become clearer in time.

Figure 10: Citizens' identity scores

圖 10: 市民的身分認同評分





Figure 11: Citizens' identity mix

圖 11: 市民的混合身分認同



5.1. Rank correlation

As a result of the declining dual identity of both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', the correlation between the two stated identifications became increasingly less apparent. The two identities used to mutually reinforce each other but currently, there are signs of polarization instead. The rank correlation coefficient decreased slightly from -0.02 in October 2019 to -0.06 in June 2020, which is statistically significant. A stronger identification as 'Hongkonger' now accompanies a weaker one as 'Chinese' (see Table 10). The converse, on the other hand, also holds. The loss of the mutuality of the two identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' risks challenging the implementation of 1C2S in the near future and one must take careful note of this.

Table 10: Rank correlation of citizens' identity

表 10: 市民的身分認同等級相關係數

| | 2017.6 | 2017.12 | 2018.6 | 2018.12 | 2019.6 | 2019.8 | 2019.10 | 2020.6 |
|--------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|
| Correlation 相關係數 | 0.13 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.12 | -0.02 | -0.06 |
| t-statistic t 檢定統計 | 4.06 | 5.58 | 5.53 | 5.55 | 5.43 | 3.85 | -0.69 | -1.82 |

6. Topical Issues

6.1 Responsibility of conflicts

Responsibility of conflicts. Table 11 shows the allocation of blame between the Mainland and Hong Kong when conflicts arise in the implementation of 1C2S. In June 2020, 50.1% of the public suggested that the Mainland would be responsible while 8.4% assigned the responsibility to Hong Kong, both of these values were at their most extreme since mid-2017 while those who chose 'equally responsible' fell from its usual $\pm 50\%$ to a record low of 35.7% in June 2020. The sentiment implied by this swing towards blaming the Mainland is worrisome.

Net values rose across all subgroups, suggesting an overall tendency to attribute blame towards Mainland in cases of conflicts, with the exception of the 30-39 age group, although it still stands relatively high at 40.5%, almost doubled that recorded in December 2018. Furthermore, several increases in net value were atypical, including a first-ever positive net value found in the 70 or above age group and a rise of 6.6 percentage points in the pro-establishment group, where the latter was also the only negative net value across all subgroups.

The results suggest that both the central and Hong Kong governments ought to reflect on its own responsibility for deadlocks and conflicts between government and people.

Table 11: Responsibility for conflicts

表 11：出現矛盾時的責任

| | 2017.6 | 2017.12 | 2018.6 | 2018.12 | 2019.6 | 2019.8 | 2019.10 | 2020.6 |
|-------------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|
| The Mainland 內地 | 24.1% | 26.5% | 26.1% | 27.2% | 29.0% | 34.0% | 45.4% | 50.1% |
| Hong Kong 香港 | 15.4% | 19.0% | 18.1% | 17.4% | 16.1% | 12.4% | 11.5% | 8.3% |
| Equally Responsible 一半半 | 54.5% | 49.0% | 50.7% | 50.8% | 50.1% | 47.3% | 36.4% | 35.7% |
| Don't Know 唔知道 | 6.0% | 5.5% | 5.1% | 4.7% | 4.8% | 6.4% | 6.7% | 5.8% |
| Net Value 淨值 | 9.3% | 7.9% | 8.0% | 9.8% | 12.9% | 21.6% | 33.8% | 41.8% |
| Mean Score 平均分 | 5.02 | 4.92 | 4.98 | 5.06 | 5.12 | 5.77 | 6.21 | 6.53 * |

Net Value: Percent who chose 'The Mainland' less percent who chose 'Hong Kong'

淨值：認為屬「內地」的百分比減去認為屬「香港」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Scores higher (lower) than 5 means greater responsibility lies with the Mainland (Hong Kong)

平均分由 0 至 10 分。分數高於 (低於) 5 分代表內地 (香港) 需負較大責任

6.2. Emigration and confidence in 1C2S

Table 12 shows public's emigration plans. Those who have 'no plans' to emigrate remained the majority (62.5%), over those who 'have plans' (34.5%). The former dropped by 6.8 percentage points while the latter rose by 5.9 percentage points. Net value changed from -40.7% in October 2019 to -28.0% in June 2020. The change in net value was statistically significant.

Table 13 and Table 14 show the percentages of age groups and groups of different political inclination who plan to emigrate due to lack of confidence in 1C2S (the emigration ratio). Between October 2019 and June 2020, the emigration ratio of the public continued the trend of growth and rose by a modest 5.1%. For moderates and non-establishment supporters, the ratios also increased, from 21.2% to 25.0%, and from 36.4% to 43.6% respectively. This left pro-establishment supporters and the 30-39 age group the only exceptions to the said trend, while the former recorded 2.6% and the latter countered the upward current as the ratio dropped by 2.8% since the last round to 34.8%. More than half of other non-establishment supporters attributed their decision to confidence in 1C2S. The 18-29 age group also obtained a record high emigration ratio (42.9%).

Past studies have suggested that surveys often inaccurately amplify the number of individuals who seek to emigrate, for only a fraction of those who express interest in emigrating eventually do so in reality. Caution should therefore be exercised in interpreting the above findings, though they still provide valuable reference of the degree and extent of concern. Amongst moderates, those who confess to having plans to emigrate due to their lack of confidence in 1C2S may do so due to – on one hand – their disillusionment towards the central and/or SAR governments, but also – on the other hand – disillusionment towards perceived instability caused by the non-establishment supporters; the latter may cause disaffection amongst the moderates due to the perceived damage of rational politics on the rule of law and Hong Kong's economy. Neither of the possibilities above could be ruled out. Furthermore, the laxing of immigration requirements by 'popular' countries in response to the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law might also mean that plans to emigrate might not necessarily be induced by a lack of confidence in 1C2S or the socio-political situation of Hong Kong but simply seen as 'opportunities not to be missed' by those who wanted to immigrate in any event.

Table 12: Public's emigration plans

表 12：市民移民海外的計劃

| | 2017.6 | 2017.12 | 2018.6 | 2018.12 | 2019.6 | 2019.8 | 2019.10 | 2020.6 |
|---|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|--------|---------|----------|
| Have Plans 有打算 | 13.6% | 12.6% | 13.0% | 14.9% | 18.0% | 24.1% | 28.6% | 34.5% |
| Have Plans: Because of confidence in 1C2S 有打算：與對一國兩制信心有關 | 8.8% | 8.0% | 9.2% | 11.2% | 14.4% | 20.8% | 25.4% | 30.5% |
| No Plans 無打算 | 85.3% | 86.4% | 86.1% | 84.0% | 79.1% | 73.3% | 69.3% | 62.5% |
| Don't Know 唔知道 | 1.0% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 1.2% | 2.9% | 2.6% | 2.1% | 3.0% |
| Net Value 淨值 | -71.7% | -74.5% | -73.1% | -69.1% | -61.1% | -49.2% | -40.7% | -28.0% * |

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Have Plans' /less percent who chose 'No Plans'

淨值：認為「有打算」的百分比減去認為「無打算」的百分比

Table 13: Emigration ratio (by age)

表 13：移民比率（按年齡劃分）

| | 2017.6 | 2017.12 | 2018.6 | 2018.12 | 2019.6 | 2019.8 | 2019.10 | 2020.6 |
|-----------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|
| 18-29 | 8.0% | 7.1% | 10.9% | 12.4% | 16.8% | 23.1% | 30.1% | 42.9% |
| 30-39 | 11.5% | 12.4% | 15.8% | 13.3% | 24.5% | 34.0% | 37.6% | 34.8% |
| 40-49 | 11.6% | 11.9% | 11.6% | 15.4% | 13.0% | 22.0% | 27.7% | 29.8% |
| 50-59 | 11.3% | 7.8% | 8.9% | 14.8% | 15.9% | 21.5% | 26.9% | 30.2% |
| 60-69 | 6.2% | 4.4% | 5.8% | 6.0% | 9.1% | 14.2% | 20.3% | 26.3% |
| ≥70 | 1.6% | 3.6% | 2.3% | 2.7% | 4.8% | 7.1% | 7.4% | 17.9% |
| All respondents 所有受訪者 | 8.8% | 8.0% | 9.2% | 11.2% | 14.4% | 20.8% | 25.4% | 30.5% |

Table 14: Emigration ratio (by political inclination)

表 14：移民比率（按政治傾向劃分）

| | 2017.6 | 2017.12 | 2018.6 | 2018.12 | 2019.6 | 2019.8 | 2019.10 | 2020.6 |
|------------------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|
| Pro-establishment 建制派 | 1.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.7% | 7.1% | 2.6% |
| Moderates 溫和派 | 7.9% | 5.8% | 6.8% | 9.3% | 13.3% | 18.6% | 21.2% | 25.0% |
| Non-establishment 非建制派 | 14.3% | 16.8% | 19.9% | 23.8% | 25.3% | 32.5% | 36.4% | 43.6% |
| Non-est.: Democrats 非建制派：民主派 | 14.0% | 14.3% | 14.9% | 21.8% | 22.6% | 30.5% | 34.0% | 37.3% |
| Non-est.: Others 非建制派：其他 | 15.3% | 24.6% | 34.3% | 30.3% | 36.6% | 39.2% | 41.3% | 57.1% |
| All respondents 所有受訪者 | 8.8% | 8.0% | 9.2% | 11.2% | 14.4% | 20.8% | 25.4% | 30.5% |

6.3. Attitudes towards the Greater Bay Area (GBA)

Table 15 shows that more disagreed on Hong Kong's participation in the development of the GBA, as 33.5% supported and 47.0% opposed, leading to a negative net value of -13.5% for the first time and its record low since mid-2018. The change in net value recorded in June 2020 compared with last round's was also statistically significant.

Table 15: Should Hong Kong participate in the development of the GBA?

表 15：香港應否參與粵港澳大灣區發展？

| | 2018.6 | 2018.12 | 2019.6 | 2019.8 | 2020.6 |
|----------------|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|
| Agree 支持 | 56.4% | 54.0% | 47.9% | 42.6% | 33.5% |
| Disagree 反對 | 23.6% | 24.7% | 30.4% | 35.3% | 47.0% |
| Don't Know 唔知道 | 7.0% | 7.2% | 5.9% | 5.5% | 6.7% |
| Net Value 淨值 | 35.4% | 31.6% | 17.6% | 7.3% | -13.5% |
| Mean Score 平均分 | 6.30 | 6.27 | 5.79 | 5.22 | 4.44 * |

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Agree' / less percent who chose 'Disagree'

淨值：認為「支持」的百分比減去認為「反對」的百分比

Mean Score goes from 0 to 10. Higher score means stronger agreement

平均分由 0 至 10 分，愈高分代表愈支持

6.3.1. Willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA

Table 16 shows that those who are 'willing' to live or work in GBA resumed to pre-anti-extradition level in June 2019, reaching 11.9%, and those 'unwilling' remained high at 72.6%, leading to an increase of a net willingness to -60.7% and the change was statistically significant.

Table 17 highlights the willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA by age. For youths (age 18 to 29), those 'unwilling' reached the highest-yet-recorded of 85.2%, which rose by 15.1 percentage points from August 2019. Nonetheless, the rise in willingness to live or work in GBA among the 30-39, 60-69 and 70 or above age groups 8.7, 15.5 and 32.9 percentage points respectively was statistically significant.

Table 16: Willingness of living or working in the GBA

表 16：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願

| | 2018.6 | 2018.12 | 2019.6 | 2019.8 | 2020.6 |
|-----------------------------|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|
| Willing 會考慮 | 12.2% | 13.0% | 12.9% | 7.8% | 11.9% |
| Not willing 不會考慮 | 63.1% | 62.6% | 67.6% | 73.9% | 72.6% |
| Maybe / Don't Know 或者 / 唔知道 | 24.7% | 24.4% | 19.6% | 18.2% | 15.6% |
| Net Value 淨值 | -51.0% | -49.5% | -54.7% | -66.1% | -60.7% |

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Willing' less Percent who chose 'Not willing'

淨值：「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比

Table 17: Net willingness of living or working in the GBA (by age)

表 17：前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願淨值（按年齡劃分）

| | 2018.6 | 2018.12 | 2019.6 | 2019.8 | 2020.6 |
|----------------------|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|
| 18-29 | -52.9% | -33.9% | -51.7% | -65.3% | -78.8% |
| 30-39 | -44.9% | -48.8% | -57.6% | -71.0% | -62.3% |
| 40-49 | -55.1% | -52.5% | -41.7% | -58.0% | -59.8% |
| 50-59 | -50.5% | -45.8% | -46.7% | -60.0% | -63.1% |
| 60-69 | -46.0% | -55.0% | -59.9% | -65.6% | -50.1% |
| ≥70 | -57.1% | -64.4% | -77.0% | -81.4% | -48.5% |
| All respondents 所有市民 | -51.0% | -49.5% | -54.7% | -66.1% | -60.7% |

6.4. Recent political controversies

6.4.1. Acceptance of Legislative Council standstill

Table 18 shows public's acceptance of the Legislative Council standstill for over seven months due the delay in the election of house committee chairman. Generally, 54.5% found it unacceptable while 36.7% had the opposite opinion. The net value is recorded at -17.8%, as half of the surveyed public found it unacceptable.

Table 18: Acceptance of Legislative Council standstill

表 18：對立法會停止進行立法工作的接受程度

| | All respondents 所有受訪者 |
|---|-----------------------|
| Acceptable 接受 | 36.7% |
| Unacceptable 不接受 | 54.5% |
| Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講 | 8.8% |
| Net Value 淨值 | -17.8% |

Net value: Percent who chose 'Acceptable' less percent who chose 'Unacceptable'

淨值：「接受」的百分比減去「不接受」的百分比

6.4.2. Acceptance of mutual destruction tactics

Similar to the rejection of the Legislative Council gridlock, public's view of the mutual destruction ('laam chau' 「攞抄」) tactics to coerce the SAR government to give in to political demands is also generally negative. Over half of the public (53.9%) found the mutual destruction tactics unacceptable while only 33.4% found it acceptable.

Table 19: Acceptance of mutual destruction tactics

表 19：對「攞抄」的接受程度

| | All respondents 所有受訪者 |
|---|-----------------------|
| Acceptable 認同 | 33.4% |
| Unacceptable 不認同 | 53.9% |
| Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講 | 12.6% |
| Net Value 淨值 | -20.5% |

Net value: Percent who chose 'Acceptable' less percent who chose 'Unacceptable'

淨值：「接受」的百分比減去「不接受」的百分比

6.4.3. Impact of HKMAO and LOCPG's statements

Regarding the uncommonly more out-spoken role of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the Liaison Office over Hong Kong affairs, an overwhelmingly negative impact on 1C2S is received, accounting for 59.2% overall. Less people reportedly felt that there is a positive impact on 1C2S from the two offices' behaviour than those who suggested no impact, which account for 13.7% and 17.4% respectively.

Table 20: Impact of HKMAO and LOCPG's statements on 1C2S

表 20：港澳辦及中聯辦聲明對一國兩制的影響

| | All respondents 所有受訪者 |
|---|-----------------------|
| Positive impact 正面影響 | 13.7% |
| Negative impact 負面影響 | 59.2% |
| No impact 沒有影響 | 17.4% |
| Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講 | 9.7% |
| Net Value 淨值 | -45.6% |

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' less percent who chose 'Negative impact'

淨值：「正面影響」的百分比減去「負面影響」的百分比

6.4.4. Impact of the National Security Law

NPC's decision to introduce the National Security Law has been unpopular as 61.5% of the public found it negative towards 1C2S and 12.3% the opposite. More people found the new law brings no impact than positive impact, as the two options record 21.1% and 12.3% respectively.

Table 21: Impact of the National Security Law on 1C2S

表 21：訂立香港國家安全法對一國兩制的影響

| | All respondents 所有受訪者 |
|--|-----------------------|
| Positive impact 正面影響 | 12.3% |
| Negative impact 負面影響 | 61.5% |
| No impact 沒有影響 | 21.1% |
| Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講 | 5.1% |
| Net Value 淨值 | -49.2% |

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' less percent who chose 'Negative impact'

淨值：「正面影響」的百分比減去「負面影響」的百分比

6.4.5. Generation gap and political divide

Table 22 and Table 23 are summaries of the net value generated from different topical questions about recent political controversies, further categorized by age and political inclination.

While most age groups and groups of political inclination display a general lack of support for severely disruptive behaviour in the Legislative Council and mutual destruction tactics, the 18-29 age group and non-establishment group (democrats and others) recorded positive net values. Other non-establishment groups recorded the highest positive net value, this stands in stark contrast to the of pro-establishment supporters.

The public tends to believe HKMAO and LOCPG's statements on HK's affairs and the abrupt gazetting of the National Security Law as causing negative impact to 1C2S. Negative net values are recorded across almost all categories of classification, where the only positive net values are found in pro-establishment group. It is clear that the sense of unease with stronger Beijing presence is shared amongst the majority of the surveyed population, except the 'pro-establishment' group, which produced the only positive net value of 49.3%. The anxiety found among the moderates should not be overlooked.

Table 22: Generation gap over recent political controversies (by age)

表 22：對近期政治爭議之代溝（按年齡劃分）

| | LegCo standstill 內會風波 | Mutual destruction 「攞炒」 | Statements from HKMAO and LOCPG 兩辦聲明 | National Security Law 《港區國安法》 |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| 18-29 | 16.2% | 11.8% | -73.9% | -71.4% |
| 30-39 | -11.0% | -15.5% | -50.8% | -57.3% |
| 40-49 | -17.3% | -18.1% | -43.5% | -50.9% |
| 50-59 | -26.3% | -28.2% | -39.4% | -42.4% |
| 60-69 | -36.0% | -35.4% | -35.1% | -37.0% |
| ≥70 | -31.3% | -37.3% | -31.0% | -36.3% |
| All respondents 所有受訪者 | -17.8% | -20.5% | -45.6% | -49.2% |

Table 23: Political divide over recent political controversies (by political inclination)

表 23：對近期政治爭議之政治鴻溝（按政治傾向劃分）

| | LegCo standstill 內會風波 | Mutual destruction 「攞炒」 | Statements from HKMAO and LOCPG 兩辦聲明 | National Security Law 《港區國安法》 |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| Pro-establishment 建制派 | -89.5% | -85.1% | 46.7% | 49.7% |
| Moderates 溫和派 | -49.4% | -51.0% | -37.2% | -40.3% |
| Non-establishment 非建制派 | 38.1% | 31.5% | -76.1% | -81.2% |
| Non-est.: Democrats 非建制派：民主派 | 26.0% | 16.6% | -74.0% | -78.3% |
| Non-est.: Others 非建制派：其他 | 63.9% | 63.6% | -80.6% | -87.6% |
| All respondents 所有受訪者 | -17.8% | -20.5% | -45.6% | -49.2% |

Appendices

I. Methodology

1. Construction of 1C2S Index

To understand the implementation of 1C2S comprehensively, we measure how the public in HK evaluate the current situation from various dimensions. International perception of freedom and democracy in HK is also pivotal as these are core components of 1C2S. Hence, we give an equal weight to scores obtained from the following two indices:

- Index (A): Public Opinion: Hong Kong public's evaluation of 1C2S compiled from telephone polls on 9 dimensions of 1C2S; and
- Index (B): International Perception: Compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on various dimensions of freedom and democracy in HK.

1.1. Index (A): Public Opinion

Index (A) is the average of sub-scores obtained from nine dimensions on different dimensions of 1C2S in our telephone polls conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Each round, about 1,000 individuals will be randomly sampled by the CATI (computer assisted telephone interviewing) system, all aged 18 or above; all of them spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin. To better represent the distribution of the Hong Kong population, all data were weighted by the proportion of gender and age of people aged 18 or above (excluding foreign domestic helpers) according to the Census and Statistics Department. Table 24 shows the statistical and scientific standards of each survey.

In the telephone polls, many questions employed 1 to 7 as the rating scale in the survey process, with 4 as the median. This scale, which is known as the Likert scale, is commonly adopted for psychological assessments. This scale was used instead of a 0 to 10 scale as the latter is deemed too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents to choose from. However, to better conform to existing indices – which tend to be expressed on a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median) – we converted the results mathematically into the popular 0 to 10 scale.

For a more extensive report on the survey results, please see *Survey Results: Frequency and Percentage Distribution*, which can be found on the webpage of Path of Democracy (<http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/>).

Table 24 Survey details

表 24 調查概況

| Round 輪次 | Survey Period 調查日期 | Number of Respondents 受訪人數 | Response Rates 回應率 | Confidence Level 置信水平 | Sampling Error 抽樣誤差 |
|----------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| 2017.06 | 23/5-3/6 | 1,002 | 36.8% | 95.0% | ±3.1% |
| 2017.12 | 11/12-23/12 | 1,006 | 39.5% | 95.0% | ±3.09% |
| 2018.06 | 23/5-2/6 | 1,004 | 37.2% | 95.0% | ±3.09% |
| 2018.12 | 3/12-12/12 | 1,001 | 38.8% | 95.0% | ±3.1% |
| 2019.06 | 27/5- 6/6 | 1,002 | 38.0% | 95.0% | ±3.1% |
| 2019.08 | 24/7-7/8 | 1,001 | 39.5% | 95.0% | ±3.1% |
| 2019.10 | 17/10-31/10 | 1,002 | 38.0% | 95.0% | ±3.09% |
| 2019.12 | 10/12-20/12 | 1,000 | 40.8% | 95.0% | ±3.1% |
| 2020.06 | 9/6-29/6 | 1,001 | 39.5% | 95.5% | ±3.1% |

1.1.1. Alternative methods of constructing Index (A)

Conceptually, there are different ways to compute the nine dimensions into a composite score as Index (A). We have chosen the method of simple average, which is the most common method employed in constructing indices. Its strength lies in its parsimony and accessibility. It may not be the best method as it assigns equal weighting to all items (i.e. assuming equal importance for all items). Here, we compare the method of simple average to two alternatives methods that are more sophisticated, namely, principal component analysis and factor analysis.

Principal component analysis is a statistical method that processes and simplifies data; it is the standard scientific method employed in constructing indices. Through statistical analysis, it extracts the data set's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains the variations across the data.

Factor analysis extracts common factors from the data, and it shares a similar methodology with Principal component analysis. Its strength lies in its ability to identify hidden and representative factors amongst the many variables and group variables of a similar nature and converting the same into a common factor, which reduces the total number of variables.

Table 25 shows the negligible difference in scores acquired by the three methods. The results of all three methods are highly similar, largely due to the clustered nature of the public's assessments of the nine dimensions (cf. the distributions of the nine dimensions are highly correlated), which causes the core components or sub-items across all three methods to be highly similar. Both alternative methods involve complex calculations, which render the methods inaccessible to laymen. Given the similarity of the results from all three methods, we adopted the simplest and most commonly used method – i.e. the average of the nine dimensions – in constructing Index (A).

Table 25 Index (A): Public Opinion computed by different methods

表 25 指數 (A) : 民意調查以不同方式編制

| Round 輪次 | Simple Average 簡單平均數 | Principal Component Analysis 主成分分析 | Factor Analysis 因子分析 |
|----------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 2017.06 | 4.84 | 4.83 | 4.82 |
| 2017.12 | 4.98 | 4.99 | 4.94 |
| 2018.06 | 5.05 | 5.06 | 5.00 |
| 2018.12 | 4.84 | 4.84 | 4.76 |
| 2019.06 | 4.58 | 4.58 | 4.53 |
| 2019.08 | 3.98 | 3.96 | 3.91 |
| 2019.10 | 3.26 | 3.23 | 3.18 |
| 2019.12 | 3.53 | 3.51 | 3.47 |
| 2020.06 | 3.39 | 3.37 | 3.30 |

1.2. Index (B): International Perception

Index (B) is the average of 3 indices, namely, the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser Institutes, and the Democracy Index of the Economic Intelligence Unit. The average of the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index is known as the Human Freedom Index, which is the most comprehensive index of freedom available.

As the Human Freedom Index covers a very large number of countries, the latest Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index only reflect conditions two years ago. These two indices are updated based on the latest comparable indicators from other international think tanks. When updating is not possible, the relevant figures are assumed to be unchanged.

1.2.1. Comparable indicators

To obtain the updated scores of Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index, we first calculate the percentage changes in the comparable indicators for the respective years; then we apply these changes to the

latest Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser. The comparable indicators for the Economic Freedom Index and each of the 7 components of the Personal Freedom Index are listed in Table 26.

Table 26 Comparable indicators of Index (B): International Perception

表 26 指數 (B) : 國際評價之相應指標

| Indicators 指標 | Comparable Indicators 相應指標 |
|---|---|
| Economic Freedom Index 經濟自由指數 | The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom 傳統基金會經濟自由指數 |
| Rule of Law 法治 | World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index – 'Procedural Justice', 'Civil Justice' and 'Criminal Justice' 世界正義項目「法治指數」—「程序公義」、「民事司法」及「刑事司法」 |
| Security and Safety 安全 | World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index – 'Order and Security' 世界正義項目「法治指數」—「秩序與治安」 |
| Movement 遷徙自由 | Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report - 'G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「G1. 人民是否享有遷徙自由·包括改變居所、就業或教育的能力？」 |
| Religion 宗教自由 | Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「D2. 人民能否在公開或私人場合自由地實踐和表達宗教信仰或非信仰？」 |
| Association, Assembly, & Civil Society 結社、集會及公民社會自由 | Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'E. Associational and Organizational Rights' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「E. 結社及組織權利」 |
| Expression and Information 言論自由 | Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index 無國界記者「全球新聞自由指數」 |
| Identity and Relationships 性別認同及關係 | Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「G3. 人民是否享有個人社交自由·包括選擇婚姻對象及家庭人數、免受居所暴力及自主改變外貌？」 |

1.3. Refinement and Estimation

After the first survey in June 2017, one out of the nine dimensions, namely the score on Question 4 ('original way of life remained unchanged'), is not comparable with subsequent ones due to refinements of survey questions. The refinement only affects one question in the nine questions used to compute Index (A). Scores of the other eight questions are directly comparable as they are identical in all surveys.

To adjust for the time lag of international indices, scores of Index (B) in previous reports were estimated with data available then. In every report, scores will be revised with latest updates from international think tanks.

For the convenience of comparison, Table 27 shows Index (A) computed by nine questions and by the identical eight questions, the estimated and revised scores of Index (B), and the 1C2S Index constructed by the combination of them. The results suggest that the differences in scores of Index (A), Index (B) and 1C2S Index due to question change and updating are at most 0.12 and therefore negligible.

Table 27: Refinement and estimation of 1C2S Index

表 27：「一國兩制」指數之修訂與估算

| Round 輪次 | Index (A): Public Opinion 指數 (A) : 民意調查 | | Index (B): International Perception 指數 (B) : 國際評價 | | 1C2S Index 「一國兩制」指數 | | Difference 差距 |
|----------|--|---------------------|--|---------------|------------------------|----------------|------------------|
| | 8 Dimensions 八範疇 | 9 Dimensions 九範疇 | Estimates 估算 | Revised 修訂 | Maximum 最大值 | Minimum 最小值 | |
| | 2017.06 | 4.88 | - | 8.04 | 7.97 | 6.46 | |
| 2017.12 | 4.84 | 4.98 | 8.04 | 7.97 | 6.51 | 6.41 | 0.10 |
| 2018.06 | 4.90 | 5.05 | 8.01 | 7.91 | 6.53 | 6.41 | 0.12 |
| 2018.12 | 4.70 | 4.84 | 7.89 | 7.91 | 6.38 | 6.30 | 0.08 |
| 2019.06 | 4.43 | 4.58 | 7.87 | 7.76 | 6.23 | 6.10 | 0.13 |
| 2019.08 | 3.81 | 3.98 | 7.87 | 7.76 | 5.93 | 5.84 | 0.09 |
| 2019.10 | 3.13 | 3.26 | 7.87 | 7.76 | 5.57 | 5.50 | 0.06 |
| 2019.12 | 3.40 | 3.53 | 7.87 | 7.76 | 5.70 | 5.58 | 0.12 |

2. Construction of 1C2S Mass Media Index

Our sample consists of around 153,000 newspaper articles related to 1C2S from 21 local daily newspapers that were published between April 1998 and December 2019. The number of articles processed in each newspaper is listed in Table 28.

Each article undergoes a ‘tokenisation’ process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of approximately 22 years, our text corpus contains around 76 million tokens. From this massive dataset, common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as ‘我’, ‘你’, ‘的’, are first removed before further analysis.

To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘neutral’ (not a sentiment word). A positive word is then given a sentiment score of 1, a negative word is assigned a score of -1, and a neutral word has a score of 0. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by the Natural Language Processing and Sentiment Analysis Lab, Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica. The number of words processed each year since 1998 is given in Table 29.

The positive, or negative as the case may be, sentiment of a paragraph is quantified via a count of the number of positive (negative) words it contains, adjusted by its total word count. The sentiment score of an article is calculated as the average difference between positive and negative proportions among constituent paragraphs. 1C2S MMI is derived as an index that captures the weighted average sentiment score among newspapers in a given month. The base month is set at July 2017 to indicate 20 years after the establishment of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Since there are substantial differences in the number of news articles published by newspapers during the sample period, the article count of a newspaper alone could be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure 1C2S MMI's reliability, the sentiment score for each newspaper is further weighted by public perceptions of its credibility based on the survey ‘Public Evaluation on Media Credibility’ conducted by Centre for Communication Research, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Table 28 News sources of 1C2S MMI
表 28 「一國兩制」指數之修訂與估算

| Newspaper 報章 | Number of Articles 文章篇數 |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| A Daily A 報 | 81 |
| am730 | 2,501 |
| Apple Daily 蘋果日報 | 10,451 |
| Headline Daily 頭條日報 | 1,282 |
| Hong Kong Commercial Daily 香港商報 | 14,876 |
| Hong Kong Daily News 新報 | 4,476 |
| Hong Kong Economic Journal 信報 | 10,918 |
| Hong Kong Economic Times 經濟日報 | 4,375 |
| Hong Kong Globe 公正報 | 194 |
| Lion Rock Daily 香港仔 | 392 |
| Metro Daily 都市日報 | 1,436 |
| Ming Pao Daily News 明報 | 12,747 |
| Oriental Daily News 東方日報 | 8,999 |
| Sharp Daily 爽報 | 152 |
| Sing Pao 成報 | 5,218 |
| Sing Tao Daily 星島日報 | 8,450 |
| Sky Post 晴報 | 582 |
| Ta Kung Pao 大公報 | 30,257 |
| The Sun 太陽報 | 4,828 |
| Tin Tin Daily News 天天日報 | 452 |
| Wen Wei Po 文匯報 | 30,621 |
| Total 總數 | 153,288 |

Table 29 Number of words processed
表 29 處理資料字數

| Year 年份 | Number of Words 字數 |
|------------|-----------------------|
| 1998 | 669,676 |
| 1999 | 2,498,254 |
| 2000 | 2,320,584 |
| 2001 | 2,640,690 |
| 2002 | 2,545,546 |
| 2003 | 2,713,403 |
| 2004 | 4,801,621 |
| 2005 | 2,874,994 |
| 2006 | 1,879,834 |
| 2007 | 2,797,512 |
| 2008 | 1,446,629 |
| 2009 | 1,815,839 |
| 2010 | 1,880,198 |
| 2011 | 2,040,824 |
| 2012 | 3,441,893 |
| 2013 | 3,312,415 |
| 2014 | 5,386,835 |
| 2015 | 4,411,567 |
| 2016 | 5,590,354 |
| 2017 | 6,204,647 |
| 2018 | 4,932,978 |
| 2019 | 7,086,984 |
| 2020 H1 | 3,109,115 |
| Total 總數 | 76,307,622 |

2.1. Accuracy test

1C2S MMI is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict.

In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time. As shown in Table 30, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as 'positive' whereas 1,472 were classified as 'negative.'

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be.

Table 30 also shows the average sentiment scores of these 3 groups of paragraphs. In particular, 'positive' paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as 'negative' paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these 3 groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.

Table 30 Results of accuracy test

表 30 覆查結果

| | Positive 正面 | Neutral 中立 | Negative 負面 |
|--|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers 真人研究員對情緒的判斷 | 2,363 | 14,202 | 1,472 |
| Net Value 情緒淨值 | 21.76% | 14.42% | 2.92% |

II. List of significant events

The significant events which may have affected evaluations of 1C2S that occurred in the previous reports (mid-2017 to late-2019) are listed below.

2017 H2

| | | |
|----------------|---|---|
| 7.14 | Disqualification of four LegCo members by the High Court; | 高等法院裁定四名立法會議員宣誓無效 |
| 8.15 & 8.17 | Prison sentences of the '13+3' protestors in relation to the demonstration against the Northeast Territories Development and the Civic Square occupation. The court also gave new tougher sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence; | 反新界東北發展示威者與強行進入公民廣場示威的「13+3」示威者被判入獄。上訴法庭更提出更嚴厲的量刑準則予未來涉及暴力的大型非法集會案件 |
| 9.1 | China's enactment of the national anthem law | 中國訂立國歌法 |
| 10.19 | Emphasis on 'overall jurisdiction over Hong Kong' in the Work Report of 19 th CPC National Congress | 中共十九大工作報告強調對香港的「全面管治權」 |
| 11.15 | LegCo's passage of the non-binding motion on the high-speed rail co-location arrangement | 立法會通過關於高鐵「一地兩檢」安排的無約束力議案 |
| 12.15 | Amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Council to restrict filibustering | 立法會透過修訂議事規則限制拉布 |

2018 H1

| | | |
|------|--|---|
| 1.27 | Agnes Chow Ting, a pro-democracy activist, was banned from running for the LegCo by-election on the grounds that her party, Demosisto, had called for 'self-determination' | 有意代表香港眾志出選立法會港島區補選的周庭，被裁定參選提名無效 |
| 2.6 | The case of the three student leaders was brought to the Court of Final Appeals (CFA). The CFA overturned the prison sentences on the trio on a technicality but ruled that the Court of Appeals was entitled to give tough sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence | 「雙學三子」案件上訴至終審法院。終審法院以技術因素推翻監禁判決，但認可上訴法院對未來涉及暴力的大規模非法集會案件所提出的更嚴厲判刑指引 |
| 6.11 | Edward Leung, leader of <i>Hong Kong Indigenous</i> , was given a prison sentence of 6 years on June 11 for his role in the civil unrest in Mongkok | 本土民主前線領袖梁天琦參與旺角騷亂，被判處 6 年監禁 |
| 6.14 | LegCo's passage of the co-location bill on June 14 after protracted debates | 立法會經過漫長辯論後，通過「一地兩檢」議案 |

2018 H2

| | | |
|------|--|--------------------------------|
| 8.14 | Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, delivered a speech hosted by the Foreign Correspondents' Club | 支持「港獨」的香港民族黨召集人陳浩天受邀於香港外國記者會演講 |
| 9.24 | The Hong Kong National Party was banned on national security grounds | 基於維護國家安全，香港民族黨被禁止運作 |

| | | |
|-------|--|---|
| 10.5 | <p>Visa renewal of Victor Mallet, the Financial Times' Asia News Editor and Vice President of the Foreign Correspondents Club (FCC), was rejected. He had chaired a talk by pro-independence activist Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the Hong Kong National Party, at the FCC</p> | <p>《金融時報》亞洲總編輯、香港外國記者會副主席馬凱的簽證續期遭拒。他早期主持主張「港獨」的香港民族黨召集人陳浩天於香港外國記者會的演講</p> |
| 10.12 | <p>Lau Siu Lai, a Democrat who had called for Hong Kong self-determination, was barred from running the LegCo by-election</p> | <p>提倡香港「自決」的民主派候選人劉小麗於立法會補選中的被裁定提名無效</p> |
| 10.23 | <p>Opening of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge</p> | <p>港珠澳大橋啟用</p> |
| 11.14 | <p>The United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended the US Congress to assess its export policy on technology with regard to Hong Kong's status as a separate customs area</p> | <p>美中經濟與安全審查委員會向美國國會建議，重新審視高科技出口政策，評估香港的獨立關稅區地位</p> |
| 11.19 | <p>Trial of 9 key figures of the 'Occupy Central' movement started</p> | <p>「佔中九子」案開審</p> |
| 12.12 | <p>Corruption investigation against Leung Chun-ying, former chief executive of HKSAR, for receiving a HK\$50 million payment from an Australian engineering firm was dropped due to lack of sufficient evidence</p> | <p>前行政長官梁振英涉嫌收取澳洲工程公司5,000萬港元，案件因證據不足不進行檢控</p> |

2019 H1

| | | |
|------------------|--|--|
| 1.2 | <p>Xi Jinping marked the 40th anniversary of the 'Message to Compatriots' by upholding 1C2S as the best solution to cross-strait unification</p> | <p>習近平於《告台灣同胞書》發表40周年紀念會指「一國兩制」為兩岸統一的最佳方式</p> |
| 2.18 | <p>Promulgation the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area</p> | <p>《粵港澳大灣區發展規劃綱要》發布</p> |
| 3.23 | <p>Kaohsiung mayor and Taiwan leader hopeful Han Kuo-yu's visited the central government's Liaison Office in Hong Kong</p> | <p>高雄市市長、台灣總統熱門候選人韓國瑜拜訪香港中聯辦</p> |
| 4.9 | <p>The 'Umbrella nine' (key leaders of the Occupy Central movement) were found guilty as the District Court ruled that civil disobedience was an invalid defence</p> | <p>區域法院裁定「佔中九子」罪成，指出公民抗命不屬抗辯理由</p> |
| 5.11 - 5.14 | <p>Attempts to start bills committee proceedings in LegCo for the controversial amendments to the extradition law erupted into chaos</p> | <p>立法會法案委員會開展審議《逃犯條例》修訂案，發生衝突</p> |
| 5.17 - 5.21 | <p>Han Zheng, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Wang Zhimin, Director of the central government's Liaison Office, both confirmed that the central government was supportive of the extradition law amendments</p> | <p>國務院副總理韓正及香港中聯辦主任王志民開腔支持《逃犯條例》修訂</p> |
| 6.9, 6.15 & 6.16 | <p>Record-setting demonstrations against the extradition law were staged. The government eventually announced the suspension of the amendment bill</p> | <p>反修例遊行集會連破人數紀錄，政府最終決定暫緩修例</p> |
| 6 - 11 | <p>Accusations of police misconduct accentuated after major collisions, including the 6.12 LegCo protest, 7.21 Yuen Long incident, 8.31 Prince Edward station incident, 10.1 and 11.11</p> | <p>連串衝突引起針對警察濫權失德的投訴，包括6.12立法會示威、7.21元朗事件、8.31</p> |

gunshot incidents, confrontation in the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University

太子站事件、10.1 及 11.11 槍傷事件、香港中文大學衝突及香港理工大學衝突

2019 H2

| | | |
|--------------|--|---|
| 7.1 & 7.21 | Protesters broke into the LegCo Chamber and vandalized the Hong Kong emblem on 1 July and laid siege to the central government's Liaison Office and defaced the Chinese emblem on 21 July | 示威者分別於 7 月 1 日及 21 日闖入立法會及包圍中聯辦大樓，塗污香港特區區徽及中國國徽 |
| 8 - 9 | Protesters called for a general strike and began a new campaign to paralyze the airport, inflicting citywide and international disruptions in transportation | 示威者發動「三罷」行動及癱瘓機場，令本地及國際交通受阻 |
| 9.4 | Carrie Lam officially announced the withdrawal of the amendment bill of the extradition law | 林鄭月娥正式宣布撤回《逃犯條例》修訂案 |
| 10.4 & 11.18 | The government enacted the anti-mask law under the Emergency Regulations Ordinance but was ruled unconstitutional by the High Court | 特區政府引用《緊急情況規例條例》訂立《反蒙面法》，及後被高等法院裁定違憲 |
| 11.4 & 11.14 | Carrie Lam met with Xi Jinping for the first time since the eruption of the social unrest. Xi said the most pressing task is to end violence and restore order. The message was reiterated in his speech in the BRICS summit in Brazil | 習近平於反修例風波爆發後首次與林鄭月娥會面，指出止暴制亂為最迫切任務，並在巴西舉行的金磚國家峰會上重申 |
| 11.24 | Pan-democrats scored a landslide victory in the District Council election with the highest voter turnout of 71.2% | 泛民主派於區議會選舉得到壓倒性勝利，投票率達 71.2%，為歷來最高 |
| 11.27 | US President Donald Trump signed the 'Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act' | 美國總統特朗普簽署《香港人權及民主法案》 |
| 12.19 | The bank account of Spark Alliance, fundraising platform for protesters, was froze due to accusation of money laundering | 反修例運動的籌款平台星火同盟的銀行戶口，涉嫌洗黑錢被凍結 |

'One Country Two Systems' Index

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